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Home > Electronic Reading Room > Document Collections > Reports Associated with Events
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> August 3
Event Notification Report for August 3, 2007
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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Event Reports For
08/02/2007 - 08/03/2007
** EVENT NUMBERS **
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| Other Nuclear Material |
Event Number: 43533 |
Rep Org: THYSSENKRUPP WAUPACA
Licensee: THYSSENKRUPP WAUPACA
Region: 3
City: TELL CITY State: IN
County:
License #: 48-150-31-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: GARY GREUBEL
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
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Notification Date: 07/28/2007
Notification Time: 11:32 [ET]
Event Date: 07/25/2007
Event Time: 20:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/02/2007
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Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
OTHER UNSPEC REQMNT
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Person (Organization):
ERIC DUNCAN (R3)
DENNIS RATHBUN (FSME)
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Event Text
DAMAGED LEVEL GAUGE
The licensee (a foundry) reported damage to a level gauge (Texas Nuclear/Thermal Fischer Scientific containing a 100 millicurie source) due to a loss of area cooling. The cooling was lost when a unrelated fire damaged a water cooling pump in another part of the facility and radiant heat from the foundry process apparently caused damage to lead shielding around the gauge. The damage was discovered when the gauge started reading erratically. Investigation into the erratic level reading revealed a high radiation level in the vicinity of the gauge. The area in the vicinity of the gauge was cordoned off and assistance from the gauge manufacturer was requested. Shielding on one of the gauges was found to be partially melted and was assumed to have occurred when cooling in the area was lost. No contamination or damage to the source took place and no overexposure occurred. The damaged gauge and another gauge in the area were both removed and packaged for shipment back to the manufacturer for repair.
* * * UPDATE AT 1347 EDT ON 8/2/07 FROM GARY GREUBEL TO S. SANDIN * * *
Two gauges, S/N B3224 and B3223, approximately 8 feet apart were involved in the above incident. Each gauge contained a 100 mCi Cs-137 source. Both gauges have been packaged and are awaiting shipment to the manufacturer. Notified R3DO (Orth) and FSME (Burgess). |
| General Information or Other |
Event Number: 43539 |
Rep Org: WISCONSIN RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: GUNDERSEN LUTHERAN MEDICAL CENTER
Region: 3
City: LACROSSE State: WI
County:
License #: 063-1121-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: LEOLA DEKOCK
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
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Notification Date: 07/31/2007
Notification Time: 15:40 [ET]
Event Date: 07/16/2007
Event Time: 12:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/31/2007
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Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
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Person (Organization):
STEVE ORTH (R3)
DENNIS RATHBUN (FSME)
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This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material.
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Event Text
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT FROM WISCONSIN - LOSS OF TWO PALLADIUM-103 SEEDS
RSO telephoned DHFS July 31, 2007.
"The RSO notified DHFS by telephone of the possible loss of two Pd-103 implant seeds. The two seeds were unaccounted for following a July 16, 2007 prostate seed implant procedure.
"During the procedure, the Physicist was making the strands using the BARD QuickLink system. About half way through the case he made a relatively long link. When the authorized User tried to load this link it was easily traveling through the implant needle so he retracted it and emptied the entire strand on the OR table backwards through the needle. A new link was made and properly implanted into the patient. Because they needed to use nearly all the ordered seeds for the procedure, the Physicist attempted to take apart the problem link using a pair of tweezers. This required some force to separate the links and seeds. While doing this at least two of the links separated and 'flew' off the table. The past experience with seeds falling in the operating room was that they were relatively easy to find immediately post procedure with the survey meter, so they completed the implant. The on-going inventory indicated there would be 5 leftover seeds. Multiple surveys of the operating room resulted in the recovery of 3 seeds. Surveys of all bed linens were conducted, no additional seeds were located."
The patient be returning to the facility for routine post implant CT imaging. The implant seed count will be repeated at that time.
Event Report ID No.: WI070015
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. |
| General Information or Other |
Event Number: 43540 |
Rep Org: WISCONSIN RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: DBA WELDSONIX INC
Region: 3
City: ROME State: WI
County:
License #: TX L05718
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KURT PEDERSEN
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
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Notification Date: 07/31/2007
Notification Time: 16:07 [ET]
Event Date: 07/31/2007
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/31/2007
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Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
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Person (Organization):
STEVE ORTH (R3)
SANDLER ILTAB ()
DENNIS RATHBUN (FSME)
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This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material.
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Event Text
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
"On July 31, 2007, the licensee notified DHFS of the theft of a control device for a Masterminder 2 x-ray crawler. It has been stored in a locked storage trailer at a temporary jobsite located a few miles north of Rome, WI. The lock had been cut, and other equipment had been stolen. The device contains a Cs-137 source with an approximately activity of 126.5 mCi. Local law enforcement and the Federal Bureau of Investigation have been notified, and are investigating. State and local emergency management have been notified, and a DHFS emergency responder has been dispatched to the site.
"The company was doing radiography on a natural gas pipeline. WeldSonix has provided a picture of the device.
"DHFS is planning on issuing a press release."
The state indicated that the device was 25 years old, and the activity level should be reduced by one half-life.
"Event Report ID No.: WI 07-0014"
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.
This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source |
| General Information or Other |
Event Number: 43544 |
Rep Org: WESTINGHOUSE NUCLEAR SERVICES
Licensee: WESTINGHOUSE NUCLEAR SERVICES
Region: 1
City: PITTSBURGH State: PA
County:
License #:
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JIM GRESHAM
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
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Notification Date: 08/02/2007
Notification Time: 13:24 [ET]
Event Date: 08/02/2007
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/02/2007
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Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
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Person (Organization):
JOHN WHITE (R1)
VERN HODGE (Part 21) (NRR)
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Event Text
POTENTIAL DEFECT INVOLVING FAILURE OF WESTINGHOUSE DB-25 CIRCUIT BREAKER
"The following information is provided pursuant to the requirements to 10 CFR 21 to report the potential for the existence of a SUBSTANTIAL SAFETY HAZARD. This issue concerns the failure of a Westinghouse DB-25 circuit breaker to close after a new closing solenoid moving core relay release arm was installed at site. Westinghouse supplied closing solenoid moving core release arms that do not meet the material hardness requirement for safety-related applications at Constellation Nuclear, Robert E Ginna Generating Station.
"Background: The closing solenoid moving core relay release arm for DB-25 circuit breakers is manufactured for and commercially dedicated by Westinghouse for Class 1E applications. After plant personnel installed a new closing solenoid moving core relay release arm on a DB-25 safety-related breaker and placed the breaker in service it failed to close on demand. The investigation of this breaker showed that the closing solenoid moving core relay release arm had interfered with the body of the control relay. While investigating this issue, it was determined that the closing solenoid moving core relay release arm material was from a single batch that did not meet the required material hardness specification. Westinghouse shipped twenty- five closing solenoid moving core relay release arm kits to a single plant from the batch that did not meet the material hardness requirement.
"Evaluation: It is Westinghouse's understanding that the direct cause of the failure is that the closing solenoid moving core relay release arm material was too weak and bent after several closures of the breaker. This changed the mechanical and electrical timing of the circuit breaker, preventing it from closing again.
"Safety Impact: Two of twenty five closing solenoid moving core relay release arms were actually installed on breakers at the plant [Ginna]. Only one breaker was actually placed into service. Had the defective closing solenoid moving core release arms been installed in redundant safety related breakers, this condition could have resulted in a common mode failure and the plant could have been in a condition outside the design basis. If the breaker was closed, the breaker would open but would then be unable to close again.
"Corrective Action: Upon discovery of the DB-25 circuit breaker failing to close [at Ginna], plant personnel took corrective actions to remove the defective closing solenoid moving core relay release arms from service. Westinghouse removed the remaining defective closing solenoid moving core relay release arms from stock.
"Plant Applicability: This notification is applicable to Robert E. Ginna Generating Station. Westinghouse has confirmed only one batch of closing solenoid moving core relay release arms was not manufactured to the correct hardness specification. No other plant received closing solenoid moving core relay release arms made from the batch that did not meet the correct material hardness specification from Westinghouse.
"Communications: Robert E. Ginna Generating Station is aware of the issue. Westinghouse will be issuing a Nuclear Safety Advisory Letter (NSAL) documenting this issue. |
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