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> January 3
Event Notification Report for January 3, 2007
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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Event Reports For
01/02/2007 - 01/03/2007
** EVENT NUMBERS **
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| General Information or Other |
Event Number: 43052 |
Rep Org: SCIENTECH, LLC
Licensee: NUS INSTRUMENTS, LLC
Region:
City: IDAHO FALLS State: ID
County:
License #:
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MARTIN R. BOOSKA
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
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Notification Date: 12/14/2006
Notification Time: 14:47 [ET]
Event Date: 12/14/2006
Event Time: 14:47 [MST]
Last Update Date: 01/02/2007
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Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
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Person (Organization):
RICHARD CONTE (R1)
OMID TABATABAI (NRR)
VERN HODGE (NRR)
JAMES MOORMAN (R2)
JULIO LARA (R3)
DAVID PROULX (R4)
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Event Text
PART 21 - DEFECT FOUND IN BASIC COMPONENTS (FOXBORO REPLACEMENT MODULES) SUPPLIED TO NUCLEAR POWER PLANT
Scientech LLC company manufactures a replacement for obsolete Foxboro 66 R Lead/Lag unit - a TMD500, the time domain module in NUSI's Series 500 line. The Fully model number is of the form TMD500-xx/xx/xx/xx-xx-xx-yy, where xx defines certain input, output, and power options, while 'yy' selects the style of faceplate.
Two shipments were made to Ginna, one of five modules and one of nine modules, were made in mid-September of 2006. Ginna performed receipt inspection and tested the modules for proper operation. The tests confirmed that NUSI had configured the modules as required and the modules worked as expected.
Ginna Station installed the NUSI TMD500 modules in the reactor protection channels as part of a modification required for an extended power uprate.
After further testing twelve modules in total were installed; 4 modules configured for OPDT setpoint calculator, and 8 modules configured as lag units. Two lag modules units were installed in each of the four reactor protection channels on the output side of the Thot R/I modules, to dampen the effects of hot leg streaming. All of these modules were bought under one purchase order and received in September 2006.
On 11/2/06, several days after installation and calibration activities were completed, computer monitoring of the OPDT setpoints indicated that Channel 1 OPDT setpoint calculator module was following Tavg as it increased from 550 degrees F. The magnitude was small - approximately 0.3 degrees F change for a 10 degree F change in Tavg. However, the output of the module should have been steady until Tavg reached 574 degrees F. Ginna Station Operations declared reactor protection channel 1 OPDT setpoint inoperable when this condition was identified. The module was replaced, the replacement calibrated, and the channel was declared operable.
On 11/6/06, several days later, computer monitoring of the channel 2 OPDT setpoint calculator showed it was exhibiting the same anomalous behavior that has occurred previously on the channel 1 OPDT setpoint calculator. Operations declared channel 2 OPDT setpoint inoperable. Ginna requested a team from NUSI travel to site and address the problem. A team of one engineer, one assembler, and the QA Manager traveled to Ginna to inspect and hopefully correct the problem.
Troubleshooting by Ginna Station I&C personnel determined that the zero potentiometer wiper was shorted to the module case. The edge of the mounting fixture for the Lo Lim potentiometer had cut through the insulation of the wire going to the wiper of the Zero potentiometer.
The NUSI team arrived on site while Ginna personnel were making repairs, and provided advice. The team inspected the module originally found defective and removed from service; they found that the wire to the wiper of the Zero potentiometer was damaged. They reinsulated the wire with electrical tape in accordance with approved Ginna procedures and tested the module, confirming that it worked correctly. The NUSI team then returned to the Idaho Falls facility on the 11/08/06. NUSI initiated Non-Conformance Report 06N-090 and this 10CFR21 evaluation on 11/10/06.
Extent of Condition: There are four module types that use this style of faceplate:
TMD500-[options]-01 Time Domain Module, MTH500-[options]-01 Simple Math Module, CMM500-[options]-01 Complex Math Module, and HLS500-[options]-01 High/Low Select Module.
Modules in this category were sold to Ginna and Indian Point. These modules were also sold to Westinghouse for resale; the module identifiers were the same with the substitution of "9000" for "500" in the module number.
Per Scientech; Ginna, as stated above, is aware of the problem associated with the TMD500 but they have not been officially informed of a Part 21 being issued concerning the TMD500 problem. As for the Indian Point 2 and Westinghouse they have also not been informed of the Part 21 being issued. The major problem will be trying to trace down the where abouts of the "9000s" that were sold to Westinghouse.
* * * UPDATE AT 1057 EST ON 12/18/06 FROM MARTIN BOOSKA TO S. SANDIN * * *
Scientech confirmed that Ginna, Indian Point 2 and Westinghouse have been informed of this Part 21 notification. Notified R1DO (Powell), R2DO (Moorman), R3DO (Duncan), R4DO (Whitten) and NRR (Hodge, Tabatabai) via email.
* * * UPDATE AT 1739 ON 1/2/2007 FROM MARTY BOOSKA TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *
NUSI determined that very old TMD500s could not read higher than 10 Meg. This was traced to a noise suppressing zener diode which has been replaced in more recent models with a metal oxide varistor. A new test criteria was suggested for the older versions.
Notified the R1DO (Lorson), R2DO Munday), R3DO (Burgess), R4DO (Farnholtz), NRR (Hodge, Tabatabai) via E-mail. |
| General Information or Other |
Event Number: 43068 |
Rep Org: CALIFORNIA RADIATION CONTROL PRGM
Licensee: NINYO AND MOORE
Region: 4
City: SAN JACINTO State: CA
County:
License #: 5073-30
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: BARBARA HAMRICK
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
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Notification Date: 12/29/2006
Notification Time: 16:13 [ET]
Event Date: 12/28/2006
Event Time: 18:30 [PST]
Last Update Date: 12/29/2006
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Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
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Person (Organization):
THOMAS FARNHOLTZ (R4)
KEITH McCONNELL (NMSS)
ILTAB (via e-mail) ()
MEXICO CNSNS ()
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This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material.
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Event Text
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - THEFT OF A TROXLER MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE
"On December 29, 2006, at 11:10 am, the licensee contacted the California [Radiologic Health Branch] RHB to report the theft of a Troxler, Model 3430 moisture/density gauge (S/N 38217) containing a nominal 10 millicuries Cs-137 and nominal 40 millicuries Am-241. When the licensee initially reported, they had been informed by their technician that the gauge (secured by two locking cables in the truck bed) had been stolen at 11:00 am on December 29, 2006, while the technician was having lunch at a restaurant in Fontana, CA. Subsequently, during the police investigation, the technician acknowledged that the gauge had actually been stolen out of his truck, sometime the night previously (i.e., between about 6:30 pm December 28, 2006 and 8:00 am December 29, 2006), while the truck was parked in front of his home in San Jacinto, CA.
"The licensee prohibits their technicians from taking the gauges home overnight, and intends to take disciplinary action against the technician in this regard. The San Jacinto police have also been contacted, and the licensee intends to place a reward notification in the local press in the San Jacinto area. RHB will continue to follow up on this matter."
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. |
| Power Reactor |
Event Number: 43070 |
Facility: BRUNSWICK
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: TOM SHERRILL
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
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Notification Date: 01/02/2007
Notification Time: 13:19 [ET]
Event Date: 11/01/2006
Event Time: 18:23 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/02/2007
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Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
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Person (Organization):
JOEL MUNDAY (R2)
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| Unit |
SCRAM Code |
RX CRIT |
Initial PWR |
Initial RX Mode |
Current PWR |
Current RX Mode |
| 1 |
N |
Y |
100 |
Power Operation |
100 |
Power Operation |
Event Text
LOSS OF UNIT-2 AUX TRANSFORMER CAUSED UNIT-1 SYSTEM ISOLATIONS AND ACTUATIONS
"This report is being made in accordance with 50.73 (a)(1), which states, in part, 'In the case of an invalid actuation reported under 50.73 (a)(2)(iv), other than actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) when the reactor is critical, the licensee may, at its option, provide a telephone notification to the NRC Operations Center within 60 days after discovery of the event instead of submitting a written LER.' These invalid actuations are being reported under 50.73 (a)(2)(iv)(A), NUREG-1022, Rev. 2, states that the report should provide the following information:
The specific train(s) and system(s) that were actuated
Whether each train actuation was complete or partial
Whether or not the system started and functioned successfully.
"On November 1, 2006, with Unit 1 operating at 100% of rated thermal power, the loss of the Unit 2 Startup Auxiliary Transformer resulted in loss of power to the isolation logic associated with the common main stack radiation monitor resulting in actuations normally associated with a high radiation signal. This invalid signal resulted in actuation of the Unit 1 Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) Group 6 (i.e., Containment Atmosphere Control/Dilution, Containment Atmosphere Monitoring, and Post Accident Sampling Systems) valves, a Unit 1 Reactor Building Ventilation System isolation (i.e., Secondary Containment isolation) and the automatic start of both Unit 1 Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System trains A and B. The actuations of PCIS Group 6 valves and Reactor Building Ventilation System isolation were complete and the affected equipment responded as designed to the invalid signal (i.e., the valves and dampers that were open, at the time of the event, closed). Additionally, SGT System trains A and B started and functioned successfully.
"Discussion of the causes and corrective actions associated with this event are documented in the corrective action program in Nuclear Condition Report (i.e., NCR) 211237. The resident inspector will be notified."
The System Engineer (Leo Kauffel) verified that the Unit 2 actuations resulting from this event were previously submitted in LER 2-2006-001 and are not stated in this event report. |
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