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POLICY ISSUE
(Information)

SECY-04-0157

August 30, 2004

• PURPOSE
• BACKGROUND
• DISCUSSION
• RESOURCES
• COORDINATION
• CONCLUSION

PURPOSE:

To provide a status report to the Commission on the staff's effort regarding a "Regulatory Structure for New Plant Licensing" and to alert the Commission on potentially new policy issues.

BACKGROUND:

In SECY-03-0047, "Policy Issues Related to Licensing Non-Light-Water Reactor Designs," dated March 28, 2003 (ML030160002), the staff discussed options and provided recommendations for Commission consideration on seven policy issues fundamental to licensing non-light-water reactor designs. The staff stated in that paper that four of the issues would be included in the development of the framework for future plant licensing. These four issues pertained to the definition for defense-in-depth, the use of a probabilistic approach to establish the licensing basis, the use of scenario-specific source terms for licensing decisions, and the advisability of revision of the emergency planning zone. The other three issues pertained to how requirements for non-light-water reactors (non-LWRs) relate to international codes and standards, the implementation of the Commission's expectations for enhanced safety in future non-LWRs, and the possibility of plant licensing without a pressure-retaining containment building.

In SECY-03-0059, "NRC Advanced Reactor Research Program," dated April 18, 2003 (ML023310534), the staff discussed its plan to develop a technology-neutral risk-informed structure for new plant licensing.

The June 26, 2003, staff requirements memorandum (SRM) in response to SECY-03-0047, provided direction on recommendations on the seven policy issues. The Commission approved the staff's recommendations for the four issues being addressed in the framework, but disapproved the staff's recommendation related to international codes and standards. On the remaining two issues, the Commission requested the staff (1) to provide further details on the options for, and associated impacts of, requiring that modular reactor designs account for the integrated risk posed by multiple reactors and (2) to develop functional containment performance standards and submit options and recommendations to the Commission.

In SECY-04-0103, "Status of Response to the June 26, 2003, Staff Requirements Memorandum on Policy Issues Related to Licensing Non-Light-Water Reactor Designs," dated June 23, 2004 (ML041140521), the staff provided a status report on the integrated risk of multiple reactors and containment performance standards. The staff also noted that the Commission's direction on the other four policy issues was being implemented through development of the framework. The staff further noted that it planned to provide (1) a status paper in late August 2004 on the framework and any new policy issues and (2) a draft framework with recommendations on the new policy issues in December 2004.

This paper provides a status report on the staff's effort to date on the framework and discussion of new policy issues identified by the staff.

DISCUSSION:

The objective of the regulatory structure for new plant licensing is to provide a technology-neutral risk-informed approach that would enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of new plant licensing in the longer term (beyond the advanced designs currently in the pre-application stage). The staff is developing a regulatory structure with four major parts:

1. a technology-neutral risk-informed framework (to be documented in a NUREG report) that will provide guidance and criteria to the staff for the development of technology-neutral requirements

2. the content for a set of technology-neutral risk-informed requirements that will be based on the guidance and criteria established in the technology-neutral framework NUREG

3. a technology-specific framework (to be documented in a NUREG report) that will provide guidance and criteria for the staff on how to apply the technology-neutral framework and requirements on a technology-specific basis

4. technology-specific regulatory guides that will be derived from the implementation of the technology-specific framework and will provide guidance to licensees on how to apply the technology-neutral regulations on a technology-specific basis

This paper focuses on the status of Part 1 of the Regulatory Structure for New Plant Licensing: the Technology-Neutral Framework. Work has not been initiated on the other three parts, and although the framework will be useful to the staff and designers in their activities on new reactors, the completion of each part will be needed to achieve effectiveness and efficiency in conducting new plant licensing.

To date, the staff has made substantial progress in developing the framework. The staff is developing the framework in a hierarchal fashion using guidance in the Commission's policy statements (i.e., Commission's Policy Statement on Severe Accidents, 50 FR 32138, August 8, 1985, Commission's Policy Statement on the Regulation of Advanced Nuclear Power Plants, 51 FR 24643, July 8, 1986, and Commission's 1986 Reactor Safety Goal Policy, 51 FR 28044). Supporting criteria and guidance are being developed that will promote achievement of the top-level objectives in a risk-informed manner. This approach can then form the technical basis for developing a set of technology-neutral requirements for new plant licensing. In this regard, the framework is being used to implement the Commission's direction in the SRM of June 26, 2003, on the four approved non-LWR policy issues described in SECY-03-0047.

The staff conducted several public meetings from May 2003 to July 2004. The most recent public meeting was July 27 and 28, 2004. This meeting was well attended by approximately 50 people, including representatives from the nuclear industry, public citizen organizations, vendors, academia, the Department of Energy, national laboratories, consultants and members of the staff. The feedback on the framework was positive and indicated general agreement with the need for a framework and the conceptual bases of the framework. The attendees expressed their desire to comment on the draft framework when it is issued for public review and comment. In addition, the staff has had several discussions with the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS), both the full Committee and the Subcommittee on Future Plant Designs. The verbal feedback from the Committee has been very positive stating that the staff has made significant progress and is asking the right questions. The Committee also stated its interest in future staff briefings and its desire to support the staff. The staff plans to interact with both ACRS and external stakeholders on a regular basis.

The key features of the framework are:

• a hierarchal approach based on a safety philosophy that is consistent with the Commission's expectations for new reactors as expressed in the Commission's Policy Statement on the Regulation of Advanced Nuclear Power Plants;

• protective strategies that provide the basis for the technical requirements needed to ensure that the safety philosophy has been met;

• a defense-in-depth approach to address uncertainties that is based on previous Commission guidance, on recommendations from the ACRS and on cornerstones of safety developed as part of the Reactor Oversight Process;

• a probabilistic (risk-informed) approach that identifies and selects design basis accidents and that assigns safety classification;

• a performance-based approach that will establish performance standards and acceptance criteria for results in development of the requirements; and

• incorporation of Commission direction on security related matters for new plants.

To determine that the overall objectives of the regulatory structure have been met (e.g., enhanced effectiveness and efficiency), the staff identified key characteristics for the regulatory structure. Examples include:

• Flexible--The technology-neutral and technology-specific frameworks are developed in such a manner that they allow for changes and modifications to occur, in an efficient and effective manner, that are based on new information, knowledge, etc., and can be adapted to any technology-specific reactor design;

• Risk-informed--Risk information and risk insights are integrated into the decision-making process such that there is a blended approach using both probabilistic and deterministic information;

• Performance-based--The guidance and criteria, when implemented, will produce a set of safety requirements that will minimize prescriptive means for achieving its goals, and therefore, will be performance oriented to the extent practical;

• Uncertainty--The guidance and criteria will include treatment of the different types of uncertainties; and

• Defense-in-depth--Defense-in-depth is maintained and is an integral part of the framework.

In developing the framework, the staff identified three additional policy issues which the Commission may need to decide in the future:

• Should the objective of the requirements be to achieve the level of safety expressed in the Commission's Safety Goal Policy? As expressed by the Commission in a June 15, 1990, SRM, this level of safety represents that associated with "how safe is safe enough." The use of the level of safety expressed in the Safety Goal Policy as a target for the safety of future plants is also considered consistent with (1) the Commission's expectations for enhanced safety, as expressed in the Commission's Policy Statement on Severe Accidents and the Commission's Policy Statement on the Regulation of Advanced Nuclear Power Plants and (2) the approach being taken in risk-informing 10 CFR Part 50, with the reactor Safety Goal Policy subsidiary objectives being used as screening criteria for identifying potential areas for modification and in the decision making process for licensing changes.

• Should security issues be included in the scope of plant risk assessments? Although the staff intends to incorporate Commission direction on security-related matters into the framework, security matters have not been traditionally included in the scope of plant risk assessments. Further, the Commission's Safety Goal Policy specifically excludes sabotage from the scope of risk addressed by the safety goals. However, with the development of a risk-informed process for new plant licensing, where risk information will be part of the licensing basis, and with the potential for security-related matters to affect plant risk, the Commission may wish to consider whether to include security matters within the scope of plant risk assessments and the associated acceptance criteria.

• Should selective implementation be prohibited? The staff is developing a technology-neutral risk-informed framework and requirements for new plant licensing on an integrated basis. The structure is hierarchal. The various elements build on and are integrally related to each other. The staff expects that there will be very few "stand alone" pieces in the framework of requirements. Accordingly, it will likely not be practical to pick and choose pieces of the framework or requirements to implement.

The staff plans to provide preliminary recommendations on the additional policy issues in December 2004 and final recommendations after the public review and comment period. Stakeholder input will, therefore, have been taken into consideration.

A more detailed description of the framework is attached.

RESOURCES:

The plans discussed in this paper do not require additional resources for implementation. Implementation is included in budgeted activities related to the development of a framework for new plant licensing and regulatory infrastructure development. Specifically, the current RES budget has 2 FTEs and $500K in FY 2004 for this activity. The proposed budget before the Commission for RES for this activity requests 1 FTE and $500K in FY 2005, and 1 FTE and $400K in FY 2006.

COORDINATION:

The Office of the General Counsel has no legal objection.

The Office of the Chief Financial Officer has reviewed this Commission paper for resource implications and has no objections.

CONCLUSION:

The staff will complete the draft framework which will be provided concurrently to the Commission and to the public for formal public review and comment by the end of December 2004. The staff will also provide recommendations on new policy issues for Commission consideration.

Attachment:

Summary, Technology-Neutral Framework for a Regulatory Structure for New Plant Licensing

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