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> SECY-03-0047
June 26, 2003
COMMISSION VOTING RECORD
DECISION ITEM: |
SECY-03-0047 |
TITLE: |
POLICY ISSUES RELATED TO LICENSING NON-LIGHT-WATER REACTOR DESIGNS |
The Commission (with Chairman Diaz and Commissioners Dicus and McGaffigan
agreeing) approved the subject paper in part and disapproved in part,
as recorded in the Staff Requirements Memorandum (SRM) of June 26, 2003.
Commissioner Merrifield approved the subject paper.
This Record contains a summary of voting on this matter together with
the individual vote sheets, views and comments of the Commission.
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___________________________
Annette L. Vietti-Cook
Secretary of the Commission |
cc: |
Chairman Diaz
Commissioner Dicus
Commissioner McGaffigan
Commissioner Merrifield
OGC
EDO
PDR |
VOTING SUMMARY - SECY-03-0047
RECORDED VOTES
|
APRVD |
DISAPRVD |
ABSTAIN |
NOT
PARTICIP |
COMMENTS |
DATE |
CHRM. DIAZ |
X |
X |
|
|
X |
4/18/03 |
COMR. DICUS |
X |
X |
|
|
X |
5/19/03 |
COMR. McGAFFIGAN |
X |
X |
|
|
X |
6/13/03 |
COMR. MERRIFIELD |
X |
|
|
|
X |
6/11/03 |
COMMENT RESOLUTION
In their vote sheets, Chairman Diaz and Commissioners Dicus and McGaffigan
approved the subject paper in part and disapproved in part. Commissioner
Merrifield approved the paper. Subsequently, the comments of the Commission
were incorporated into the guidance to staff as reflected in the SRM issued
on June 26, 2003.
Commissioner Comments on SECY-03-0047
Chairman Diaz
I approve the staff's recommendations on issues 2, 4, 5, and 7.
Regarding issue 1, the staff should provide additional details on the
options for, and associated impacts of, requiring that modular reactor
designs should account for the integrated risk posed by multiple reactors.
The staff will need to establish a usable definition of core damage and
will need to determine if the concept of large early release frequency
is meaningful or if a level 3 risk assessment would be needed. Other than
this item, I approve the staff's recommendation on issue 1.
Regarding issue 3, I disapprove the staff's recommendation to "proactively
participating in development of and endorsing international codes and
standards where such codes and standards have been identified by applicants
or pre-applicants for use in their submittals or by staff as needed to
fill gaps in the NRC's non-LWR infrastructure." The staff reports that
this would require one additional FTE in FY 2003 and, depending upon the
number of international codes and standards NRC reviews or participates
in, could require an additional 1-3 FTE/FY beginning in FY 2004. I am
concerned that we would likely end up taking the lead on many issues,
increasing international travel, and adding a lot of extra work in developing
the codes and standards. The staff should pursue option a, specifically
to "Review international codes and standards only as part of an application
or pre-application review." This involves less resources and we would
likely be able to charge the applicant directly for this work.
Regarding issue 6, I believe that the possible use of a confinement building
instead of a containment building is a very important issue that warrants
additional work. At this time there is insufficient information for the
Commission to prejudge the best options and make a decision on the viability
of a confinement building. The staff should develop performance requirements
and criteria working closely with industry experts, e.g., designers, EPRI,
etc., regarding options in this area, taking into account such features
as core, fuel, and cooling systems design.
Commissioner Dicus
The staff has done a commendable job in identifying important potential
policy issues associated with new non light water (LWR) reactor designs
early in the process. It is important to keep the Commission involved
in the development of the resolution of those policy issues. My comments
on the each of the seven policy issues follows.
On Issue 1, I believe that an integrated, holistic approach is important.
However, additional details are needed with regard to considering integrated
risk. Therefore, I believe that a revision to the Commission's Policy
Statement on the Regulation of Advanced Reactors should be a short term
product (not an intermediate or long term product as suggested by the
staff) and that the additional details should be provided as part of the
Commission's review of a revised Policy Statement on the Regulation of
Advanced Reactors.
For Issue 2, I approve. I note, however, that the concept of "defense-in-depth"
need not be a separate policy statement. Before proceeding, the staff
should consider whether it can accomplish the same goals in a more efficient
and effective manner by updating the Commission Policy Statement on Use
of Probabilistic Risk Assessment Methods in Nuclear Regulatory Activities
to include a more explicit discussion of defense-in-depth, risk-informed
regulation, and performance-based regulation.
I defer consideration of Issue 3 at this time. I believe that the NRC
should continue to be a proactive technical leader. However, I share the
Chairman's concern that this could be a resource drain where NRC assumes
additional burden beyond what is anticipated. The staff should consider
previous Commission guidance related to involvement in international activities,
better define applicant and industry review roles, and provide more specific
details regarding the level of NRC proposed involvement in international
codes and standards development. The staff proposes to develop a plan
after Commission approval. I believe this is out-of-sequence and in order
for the Commission to fully consider this issue I believe that the staff
should "develop a plan for proactive involvement in international codes
and standards" and seek Commission approval of that plan.
I approve the staff's recommendations for Issues 4 and 5.
For Issue 6, I believe that the recommended resolution to this issue
is before the Commission prematurely. A better understanding of the potential
functional performance requirements to establish the acceptability of
a containment or confinement structure is needed before the Commission
can made an informed decision. Therefore, the staff should continue efforts
to develop such functional performance requirements. It is important to
emphasis that, beyond the technical issues, this is also a public confidence
issue and, as such, the staff should seek broad stakeholder engagement
and input in the development of a resolution to this issue.
Finally, I approve the staff's approach for resolving Issue 7.
Commissioner McGaffigan
I approve the staff's recommendations for issues 2, 4, 5, and 7.
With respect to the first issue, I agree with Chairman Diaz that integrative
risks may merit further consideration for modular reactor applications.
Historically, the NRC has issued operating licenses to sites with as many
as three units, granted Construction Permits for four at one site (Shearon
Harris), and docketed another application for five at one site (Palo Verde).
The staff should review those dockets for relevant historical regulatory
positions on these issues, including potential precedents.
For issue 3, I join with my colleagues on the Commission in the view
that it is premature to commit resources as requested by the staff. In
particular, I agree with Chairman Diaz in approving "option a": reviewing
international codes and standards only as part of an application or pre-application
review.
I agree with my colleagues that issue 6 is not yet ripe for a decision
by the Commission.
Commissioner Merrifield
I approve the staff's recommendations for issues 2, 4, 5 and 7.
In general, I approve the staff's recommendation for issue 1. However,
I agree with Chairman Diaz and Commissioner Dicus that additional information
is needed to support an informed decision regarding the integration risk
of multiple reactors.
For issue 3, regarding how NRC requirements for non-light-water reactors
(non-LWRs) should relate to international codes and standards, I agree
with the comments of Chairman Diaz and Commissioner Dicus and share some
of the same concerns. I believe that it is premature for us to proactively
participate in these efforts for non-LWRs. Rather experience should be
gained through review of international codes and standards during the
pre-application and application reviews of non-LWRs. I encourage the staff
to then apply the lessons-learned from these reviews to their activities
involving our domestic codes and standards committees.
Though the global marketplace will require us to take a more fundamental
look at how we do business and cause us to evaluate the usefulness of
adopting international codes and standards, I believe we should be focused
on improvements that would benefit the current fleet of operating nuclear
power plants and those suppliers who must maintain current Appendix B
Quality Assurance (QA) programs. The staff is scheduled to provide the
Commission in the near-term an assessment of the options for adopting
more widely accepted international standards like the International Organization
for Standardization 9000 (ISO-9000) standard by looking at Part 50, Appendix
B requirements and the existing regulatory framework surrounding QA. I
believe this is a worth while initiative whose time has come. I look forward
to the staff's paper on this issue.
As for issue 6, regarding the conditions for licensing a plant with a
non-pressure retaining containment building, additional information is
needed. Though I support a risk-informed and performance-based method
for determining the plant design characteristics, the absence of operating
experience, other than Fort St. Vrain, and the uncertainties with plant
and fuel performance do not provide enough information to make a decision
on this significant design issue at this time. Nonetheless, I encourage
the staff to pursue the development of functional performance standards
through external stakeholder interactions and then re-engage the Commission
on this important policy decision. Regardless of the final design approved,
the Commission and industry must be prepared to adequately communicate
with members of the public, the design and safety features of these new
reactors to ensure public confidence. The use of new terms and their implied
meaning lead to confusion and concern. For example, when members of the
public hear the term "confinement," they may be left with the impression
that this is something not as robust as containment, and consequently
is less safe. These perceptions must be proactively and effectively addressed
early in the process.
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