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POLICY ISSUE
NOTATION VOTE
SECY-00-0198
September 14, 2000
FOR: | The Commissioners |
FROM: | William D. Travers Executive Director for Operations |
SUBJECT: | STATUS REPORT ON STUDY OF RISK-INFORMED CHANGES TO THE TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR PART 50 (OPTION 3) AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON RISK-INFORMED CHANGES TO 10 CFR 50.44 (COMBUSTIBLE GAS CONTROL) |
To provide the second status report on the staff's study of possible risk-informed changes to the technical requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, to provide the staff's recommendations for risk-informed changes to 10 CFR 50.44 ("Standards for Combustible Gas Control System in Light-Water-Cooled Power Reactors") that will both enhance safety and reduce unnecessary burden, and to provide policy issues for Commission decision.
In a June 8, 1999, staff requirements memorandum (SRM) on SECY-98-300, the Commission approved proceeding with a study of risk-informing the technical requirements of 10 CFR Part 50. The Commission specifically directed the staff to pursue the "study on an aggressive timetable and provide, for Commission approval, a schedule for this activity. The staff should periodically inform the Commission on progress made in the study....if the staff identifies a regulatory requirement which warrants prompt revision..., the Commission should be...provided with a recommended course of action."
The staff provided its plan and schedule for the study phase of its work to risk-inform the technical requirements of 10 CFR Part 50 in SECY-99-264, "Proposed Staff Plan for Risk-Informing Technical Requirements in 10 CFR Part 50," dated November 8, 1999. The plan consists of two phases: an initial study phase (Phase 1), in which an evaluation of the feasibility of risk-informed changes along with recommendations to the Commission on proposed changes will be made; and an implementation phase (Phase 2), in which recommended changes resulting from Phase 1, and approved by the Commission, will be made. SECY-99-264 discussed Phase 1 of the plan. In Phase 1, the staff is studying the ensemble of technical requirements contained in 10 CFR Part 50 to (1) identify candidate changes to requirements and design basis accidents (DBAs), (2) prioritize candidate changes to requirements and DBAs, and (3) establish the feasibility of and identify recommended changes to requirements.
The Commission approved proceeding with the plan in a February 3, 2000, SRM. In addition, the Commission directed the staff to highlight any policy issues for Commission resolution as early as possible during the process, particularly those related to the concept of defense-in-depth, and to develop a communication plan that facilitates greater stakeholder involvement and actively seeks stakeholder participation.
On April 12, 2000, the staff provided its first status report on Phase 1 of this work in SECY-00-0086 ("Status Report on Risk-Informing the Technical Requirements of 10 CFR Part 50 (Option 3)") and also indicated its intention to expedite recommendations for risk-informed changes to 10 CFR 50.44 ("Standards for Combustible Gas Control System in Light-Water-Cooled Power Reactors"). This paper provides the staff's second periodic status report on Phase 1, its recommendations on 10 CFR 50.44, and related policy issues for Commission consideration.
Since the first status report in April 2000, the staff has accomplished a number of activities; it-
A summary of each of these activities follows.
The staff has developed a framework that describes the approach, process and guidelines the staff will apply in reviewing, formulating, and recommending risk-informed alternatives to 10 CFR Part 50 technical requirements. An initial version of this framework was attached to SECY-00-0086. The staff is using this framework to develop recommendations for generic changes to the technical requirements and is not applying it on a plant-specific basis. The framework has been tested in risk-informing 10 CFR 50.44 and has also been the subject of comments by stakeholders. It has been updated since the initial version provided in SECY-00-0086 to reflect experience from its use and the comments received; however, it may undergo additional refinement as it is tested against more challenging rules such as 10 CFR 50.46.
The updated framework is provided as Attachment 1 and five of its key features are as follows:
1. | The framework utilizes a risk-informed defense-in-depth approach to accomplish the goal of protecting public health and safety. This defense-in-depth approach builds on: (a) the principles in Regulatory Guide 1.174, (b) the Commission's White Paper on risk-informed and performance-based regulation, dated March 11, 1999, (c) the reactor oversight cornerstones, and (d) the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) recommendations on defense-in-depth, as discussed in the ACRS letter to former Chairman Jackson, dated May 19, 1999. |
2. | The defense-in-depth approach includes elements that are dependent upon risk insights and elements that are employed independent of risk insights. Risk insights are used to set guidelines that- |
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Safety function success probabilities (commensurate with accident frequencies, consequences, and uncertainties) are achieved via appropriate | |
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The following defense-in-depth elements are employed independent of risk insights: | |
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3. | The framework considers both design-basis as well as core-melt accidents. |
4. | The framework considers uncertainties. |
5. | Consistent with Commission direction in its June 19, 1990, SRM, the staff is using the Safety Goals to define how safe is safe enough. That is, the framework is constructed in such a way that risk-informed alternatives to 10 CFR Part 50 will be developed consistent with this direction (using the subsidiary objectives of the Safety Goals as guidelines). The framework uses quantitative guidelines, based on the Safety Goals and its subsidiary objectives of 10-4 per reactor year (ry) for core damage frequency (CDF) and 10-5/ry for large early release frequency (LERF), to assist the staff in determining the appropriate balance between prevention and mitigation and whether or not to recommend a risk-informed alternative to the current requirements. |
The staff has identified two policy issues for Commission consideration, which are discussed in this section along with a recommended position:
In SECY-98-300, the staff recommended that implementation of a risk-informed modification be voluntary, but that a licensee should not be allowed to choose which elements of the revised Part 50 to follow. In its response to the staff, the Commission stated that "risk-informed implementation of Part 50 should be voluntary for licensees. ..... The Commission has disapproved the staff's recommendation that selective implementation not be allowed. This issue is prematurely before the Commission. A future Commission will be better able to judge the issue of selective implementation after the rules are drafted and rulemakings provide comment on this issue as it affects that rule...."
The staff recognizes that licensees may voluntarily implement a specific risk-informed rule (e.g., 10 CFR 50.44). However, the staff recommends that a licensee not be allowed to select which specific requirements within a risk-informed rule to follow. The risk-informed alternative rules are being developed in an integral fashion and, therefore, represent a balance between reducing unnecessary burden and employing safety enhancements that address risk-significant concerns. Selective implementation of specific requirements within a rule could allow licensees to preferentially reduce burden without also implementing the risk-informed changes that address risk-significant concerns not currently addressed. Such selective implementation is not compatible with the intent of risk-informed regulation, which includes safety improvements justified by risk considerations.
As discussed below, the staff has developed a set of characteristics for a risk-informed version of 10 CFR 50.44. These characteristics reflect an approach of not permitting selective implementation within 10 CFR 50.44. If approved by the Commission, the staff would proceed to use these characteristics to develop a proposed rule and solicit public comment on that rule. As part of this rulemaking, the staff would explicitly request comment on selective implementation. Accordingly, the staff recommends that within the context of development of a risk-informed alternative to 10 CFR 50.44, no selective implementation be allowed.
Risk-informed alternative rules may include a combination of elimination, modification, and addition of requirements. Therefore, the staff does believe that backfit considerations should not be totally ignored since some of the recommended safety enhancements may be sufficiently important to be considered as mandatory changes for all plants. For those risk-informed changes that appear to substantially enhance safety and that have the potential to be cost beneficial, the staff therefore recommends that these changes (i.e., proposed requirements) be sent to the generic issue program for prioritization and consideration as a mandatory change to existing requirements (using provisions of 10 CFR 50.109, "Backfitting"). This will require consideration of alternative means of implementing those changes that enhance safety and conducting detailed cost-benefit analysis.
However, since the licensee may voluntarily implement a risk-informed alternative to a given rule, the staff recommends that a backfit analysis of the risk-informed alternative not be required.
As discussed in SECY-00-0086, the staff had identified 10 CFR 50.44 as a regulation that "warrants prompt revision" and has developed recommendations for a risk-informed alternative. The current rule was implemented to control combustible gases, such as hydrogen, that could burn or detonate and thereby challenge the integrity of the containment. Consequently, based on knowledge at the time, the following technical requirements were formulated and are contained in 10 CFR 50.44:
Analytical requirements to address the conditions, source and amount of hydrogen | |
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Physical requirements to mitigate these analytical requirements (first bullet) | |
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Other requirements in 10 CFR Part 50 and implementing documents (e.g., regulatory guides) are associated with 10 CFR 50.44. These related requirements and documents have imposed additional "requirements" beyond those stated in 10 CFR 50.44 (e.g., safety-grade continuous monitors for measuring the hydrogen concentration). Therefore, in its evaluation of 10 CFR 50.44, the staff also examined the related regulations and implementing documents.
Based upon current risk information and research results, the staff believes that little to no risk significance or benefit is associated with some of the combustible gas control requirements of this regulation, potentially resulting in unnecessary burden. In addition, the staff also believes that the current requirements do not address some risk-significant concerns from accident scenarios. Therefore, the staff recommends changes to the requirements that represent both a safety enhancement (some of which may have an associated additional burden) and a reduction in unnecessary burden.
Core damage/melt accidents can potentially produce combustible gases (both hydrogen and carbon monoxide) from both fuel-cladding oxidation and core-concrete interaction. Risk insights associated with combustible gas generation and combustion have led to the following conclusions:
A detailed discussion of the staff's feasibility study and recommendations is provided in Attachment 2 . In summary, the staff considers the work described in
Attachment 2 sufficient to establish the feasibility for risk-informed changes to the technical requirements of 10 CFR 50.44 and recommends the following
characteristics for a risk-informed alternative to 10 CFR 50.44(2):
Accordingly, the staff recommends development of a proposed risk-informed alternative to 10 CFR 50.44 consistent with the recommendations in this paper. It is recognized that, since this recommendation is based upon a feasibility study, additional work is required to support the actual rule change. In addition to the calculation of the combustible gas source term discussed earlier, such work would include:
Also, the rulemaking process will provide opportunities for additional stakeholder feedback on the risk-informed alternative, its technical basis and the additional work needed to support rulemaking. The staff will provide a schedule for this rulemaking 3 months after receiving the SRM on this paper.
These recommendations represent a voluntary risk-informed alternative to the current 10 CFR 50.44, including a performance-based option. In selecting the risk-informed alternative to 10 CFR 50.44, licensees (1) would improve safety by better focusing on the risk-significant challenges from combustible gases, (2) would ensure control of combustible gases during all risk-significant events, and (3) would also eliminate those aspects of the current requirements that provide no safety benefit (e.g., recombiners). As discussed previously, the staff recommends that safety enhancements that have the potential to pass the backfit test be assessed for mandatory application through the generic issue program. The staff estimates that unnecessary burden reduction associated with this alternative is approximately $200K per unit per year (Ref. 2) and that the safety improvement will remove a significant vulnerability (~0.9 conditional containment failure probability) of containment failure during station blackout for Mark III and ice condenser containments. It is recognized that there would be costs associated with the safety improvement; however, the magnitude of these costs is dependent on the means selected by the licensee for implementation. Consistent with the recommendation above on selective implementation, the staff recommends that licensees not be allowed to select individual requirements within the alternative rulemaking (e.g., choose only to eliminate the requirement for measuring hydrogen concentration).
Also, consistent with the policy discussion on backfit considerations in this paper, the staff intends to evaluate the safety issue associated with the Mark III and ice condenser containment igniter power supply as potential backfits through the generic safety issue program.
On November 9, 1999, Mr. Robert Christie of Performance Technology submitted a "request for proposed rulemaking" to the staff on 10 CFR 50.44. As discussed in a January 4, 2000, letter from S. Collins to Mr. Christie, his request has been considered as part of the staff's study of possible risk-informed changes to 10 CFR 50.44. The recommended risk-informed alternative in this paper addresses Mr. Christie's request. A comparison of Mr. Christie's request with the staff's recommendation is contained in Attachment 3.
The staff has held several meetings with stakeholders. These meetings have focused primarily on the framework, and changes to 10 CFR 50.44 and 10 CFR 50.46. The staff also attended an industry workshop on NRC risk-informed activities (in which one session addressed changes to technical requirements in 10 CFR Part 50). In addition, the staff has had several discussions with the ACRS (both the sub- and the full committee) and plans to continue to meet with them on a regular basis. The staff has continued to maintain the interactive Web site(3). As information is ready for stakeholder review, it is posted to this Web page (and placed in the public document room for those who do not have internet access). Also, stakeholders can provide comments directly to the staff in this Web page; however, as of this date, stakeholders have not exercised this option.
Stakeholder feedback has included:
The staff has begun work to develop risk-informed alternatives to the current 10 CFR 50.46 and special treatment requirements. The work on 10 CFR 50.46 has
involved several public meetings with the Westinghouse Owners Group, which is sponsoring work related to redefining the large break LOCA. RES is planning
a public workshop on October 2, 2000, to discuss the latest version of the framework (Attachment 1 ) and the status and issues associated with risk-informed
changes to the technical requirements of 10 CFR 50.46. Making risk-informed changes to the technical requirements of 10 CFR 50.46 has the potential to affect
many aspects of plant design and operation. Because of the extent of the potential impacts, we are approaching our study in stages, starting with assessing the
possible risk-informed alternatives to the large break LOCA and their implications for requirements related to ECCS performance. Subsequent stages would
look at implications for other plant design and performance requirements (e.g., containment) and ECCS acceptance criteria. We expect in December 2000, to be
able to report on the first stage and on plans and schedule for the remaining stages. Also, in December 2000, we will report on plans for any other future work,
including risk-informed alternatives to the special treatment requirements. This work on risk-informed alternatives to existing special treatment requirements
will be coordinated with the ongoing effort on the scope of structures, systems and components subject to these requirements (referred to as Option 2).
RES and NRR resources for moving forward, upon Commission approval, with Phase 2 for risk-informing 10 CFR 50.44 are included in the current RES and NRR budgets for FY2001 and FY2002.
The Office of the General Counsel has reviewed this paper and has no legal objections. The Office of the Chief Financial Officer has reviewed this paper for resource implications and has no objections.
The staff recommends that the Commission approve for this paper-
In the interim, the staff will proceed with application of the Option 3 framework in the technical study of additional requirements consistent with its recommendations, unless otherwise directed.
/RA by Frank J. Miraglia Acting For/
William D. Travers |
CONTACT: | Mary T. Drouin, RES 415-6675 |
References:
On November 9, 1999, Mr. Robert Christie of Performance Technology submitted a "request for proposed rulemaking" to the staff on 10 CFR 50.44 ("Standards for Combustible Gas Control System in Light-water-cooled Power Reactors"). As discussed in a January 4, 2000, letter from S. Collins to Mr. Christie, his request has been considered as part of the staff's study of possible risk-informed changes to 10 CFR 50.44. The staff's recommended risk-informed alternative to 10 CFR 50.44 addresses Mr. Christie's request. A comparison of Mr. Christie's request with the staff's recommendation follows:
1. 10 CFR 50.44 does not impose the 75% metal-water reaction on large dry and subatmospheric containments. However, Generic Safety Issue 121 did address this source term for these containments and found it not to be a challenge.
2. Implementation of this risk-informed alternative would also require changes to other associated regulations and implementing documents.
3. The Web site is accessed via the NRC Web site under the Nuclear Reactors icon, and then selecting the "Risk-Informed Part 50 Initiatives" line item, followed by the "Risk-Informed Part 50, Changes to Technical Requirements (Option 3)" line item.
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