NTSB Board Meeting AA Flight 587



Operational Factors

Captain David J. Ivey





 American Airlines Advanced Aircraft Maneuvering Program (AAMP)



- American Airlines Advanced Aircraft Maneuvering Program (AAMP)
- Lack of flight crew training about the A300-600 rudder system



- American Airlines Advanced Aircraft Maneuvering Program (AAMP)
- Lack of pilot training about the A300-600 rudder system
 - Changes in rudder pedal sensitivity
 - Changes in rudder pedal travel limits
 - Airplane response to rudder inputs
 - Design maneuver speed

American Airlines Advanced Aircraft Maneuvering Program

- Ground School Training
- Simulator Flight Training





 Unusual attitudes and recovery strategies



- Unusual attitudes and recovery strategies
- Aerodynamics and use of flight controls, including rudder, during recovery



 Did not fully explain airplane response to rudder inputs



- Did not fully explain airplane response to rudder inputs
- Did not explain rudder pedal characteristics at higher airspeeds







Wake turbulence scenario



- Wake turbulence scenario
- Roll 10 degrees in one direction



- Wake turbulence scenario
- Roll 10 degrees in one direction
- Roll past 90 degrees in the opposite direction



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- Roll 10 degrees in one direction
- Roll past 90 degrees in the opposite direction
- Flight controls initially inhibited



- Wake turbulence scenario
- Roll 10 degrees in one direction
- Roll past 90 degrees in the opposite direction
- Flight controls initially inhibited
- Pilots unaware that flight controls were initially inhibited





Unrealistic wake turbulence encounter



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- Flight control inhibition may have conditioned use of rudder



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- Flight control inhibition may have conditioned use of rudder
- Potentially masked movement of rudder pedal stops



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- Pilots not informed of changing rudder pedal sensitivity and travel limits

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- Flight control inhibition may have conditioned use of rudder
- Potentially masked movement of rudder pedal stops
- Pilots not informed of changing rudder pedal sensitivity and travel limits
- No feedback on G loading



 Pilots are experienced in using control column and wheel at all airspeeds.



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- Pilots primarily use rudder controls at low airspeeds.



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- Pilots may not have experienced airplane response resulting from rudder use at high airspeeds.

- Pilots are experienced in using control column and wheel at all airspeeds.
- Pilots primarily use rudder controls at low airspeeds.
- Pilots have not experienced airplane response resulting from rudder use at high airspeeds.
- Lack of experience is typical of pilots throughout the industry.



 Alternating rudder inputs were safe below design maneuvering speed (V_A).



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- The rudder limiting system would protect the structure from pilot inputs.



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- The rudder limiting system would protect the structure from pilot inputs.
- The rudder pedal travel and rudder pedal forces were thought to be unchanged.



Conclusion

- AAMP did not address rudder pedal forces at high airspeeds.
- Simulator training did not present realistic wake turbulence scenarios.
- Operating manuals did not provide useful information.

National Transportation Safety Board



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