Peter W. Rodman
Senior Fellow, The Brookings Institution
“U.S. Policy and the
Road to Damascus:
Who’s Converting Whom?”
Remarks Prepared for a Hearing of the
Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia
of the
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
Thursday, April 24, 2008
Mr.
Chairman, members of this subcommittee:
Thank you for the invitation to testify on the important
topic of U.S. policy toward Syria.
The
idea of splitting Syria from
Iran
seems like a no-brainer. This is the
most important strategic argument that is often made for trying to improve the U.S. relationship with Syria. The idea has been around for a long time,
however -- 25 years or so, in fact, since the Syrian-Iranian alliance took
shape during the Iran-Iraq war of the 1980’s.
The obstacle to actually accomplishing this strategic coup is that no one
has figured out a way to do it consistently with other important strategic
interests or without risk to other strategic interests of the United States.
It
is reasonable to look at this question again, however, in the current context –
especially in light of recent rumors of Syrian-Israeli contacts.
The Strategic Context Up to Now
The
main problems lately have been Syria’s
role and actions in Iraq, in
Lebanon,
in the Palestinian diplomacy, and in the nuclear dimension.
Iraq.-- Syria’s President Bashar al-Asad sided with
Saddam Hussein just before the 2003 Iraq war. Then, after the war, he opened Syria to Ba’athist
extremists trying to undermine the new Iraqi government and to kill Americans. The Bush Administration sent senior officials
on several visits to Damascus to meet with President Asad to try to persuade
him to stop these activities: Secretary
of State Colin Powell went in May 2003; I had the privilege of visiting myself
in September 2004 as part of an interagency delegation with Assistant Secretary
of State William Burns; and Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage had a
similar meeting with Asad in early 2005.
In
each case, the Syrians’ response was that destabilizing Iraq and
killing Americans were the furthest things from their minds; they did confess to
having trouble controlling the Syrian-Iraqi border, and asked for our technical
assistance. The concern that the
American side expressed, however, was that the main problem was not border
control but the evident policy of the Syrian government to allow sanctuary inside Syria for political organizing by
Iraqi extremists directly involved in those hostile activities. We even gave them names of senior Iraqi
extremists who we knew were operating out of Syria. As we told President Asad, we had a hard time
believing that the Syrian government did not have control over these kinds of activities
on its territory. In response, they
turned over one Iraqi radical, if I recall correctly.
And
the Syrians are masters of spin. Each of
these visits by senior Americans was meant to convey a serious warning and to ratchet
up pressures on Damascus
to reverse its disruptive and destructive policy. Our talking points, I recall on my own visit,
were as blunt and tough as any talking points I have seen in many years (and we
let President Asad know they had been cleared by President Bush). But the Syrians always publicized the fact of the high-level meetings as a
sign that U.S.-Syrian relations were excellent.
This conveyed a wrong impression to everyone, including our friends in
the region. In other words, while our
tough talking points were meant to ratchet up pressures, the Syrians spun the
visits into relief from pressures.
Lebanon.-- The murder of former prime minister Rafiq Hariri took
place in February 2005; the war between Israel and Hizballah occurred in July
2006. One important consequence of these
two events was to isolate Syria
in the Arab world. The Arabs,
particularly the Gulf Arabs, were furious at Syria – Hariri was a close friend
of the Saudis, and the Gulf Arabs saw Hizballah’s aggression as an Iranian
power play. At an Arab summit, there was
the unusual occurrence of many leaders condemning Hizballah for provoking the
conflict. The Syrians chose that period
to float another peace overture to Israel. But we and the Israelis and the Arabs
correctly saw this as a ploy -- as a device to break out of their isolation, indeed
as a way to split us from the Gulf Arabs.
At a moment when we and the Gulf Arabs were intensifying our security
cooperation – in an important U.S.
initiative called the Gulf Security Dialogue – prompted in large part by concern
over Iran, for us to have
taken the bait and launched into a rapprochement with Syria would
have caused considerable confusion in the Arab world about our strategic
judgment.
Arab
anger at Syria
is a recurring phenomenon -- usually short-lived. In recent years, however, given the growing
threat from Iran, the unholy
alliance between Syria and Iran is likely
to remain a big issue in Syrian-Arab relations.
We should not forget which side we have the bigger stake in.
The Palestinian Issue.-- On the Palestinian issue, too, Syria has long played a negative
role, backing rejectionist forces. Today
it is solidly backing Hamas and harboring its leaders. President Carter’s efforts notwithstanding,
this is a way of obstructing the peace process, not advancing it. Syria
has long played this kind of role – to maximize its leverage over Israel
and indeed its regional leverage.
The Nuclear Dimension.--
None of us on the outside can know
the full ramifications of the reported Israeli strike last September against a
North Korean-related nuclear facility in Syria. It was interesting that both Israel and Syria perceived an interest in
minimizing the public political fallout from that event. The incident probably has more immediate
relevance to our present diplomacy with North Korea, but it is also a
reminder of the potential dangers of a Syrian-Israeli conflict. Syria already possesses other forms
of WMD if not nuclear weapons.
Where Do We Go from Here?
Some
might say these are all reasons for the United
States to reach out to Syria. But, if Syria
really wants to make a deal with us (and Israel)
in good faith, and if that’s what Syria is really after, it has been going
about it the wrong way. It is not in our
interest to take the bait (on the Golan) in a context that complicates our Arab
relations or seems to reward the killing of Americans. Some make the argument a little differently,
saying that our current difficulties show we need Syria
and need to reach out to them. But Syria’s collusion in the killing of Americans in
Iraq has made it
unattractive for the United
States to take any such initiative. Yielding to blackmail, or approaching them as
demandeur, would be the wrong approach.
Thus,
Syrian policies have made it harder to visualize any kind of rapprochement –
assuming that’s what they are interested in.
My conclusion is, on the contrary, that the Syrian government has
behaved like a government that has made a strategic decision to continue to
play the spoiler – to cling to its alliance with Iran in order to maximize its regional
position and leverage. Syria
is an essentially weak country that has made itself a major factor in the Arab
world by its alliance with Iran
and by being disruptive and menacing in its behavior. It is not self-evident the Syrians will give
all that up, just for the Golan Heights. Their strategic priorities do not seem to be
limited to the Golan.
Is
there some “grand bargain” to be had between us and Syria? If so, what would it be? What else could we give them, apart from helping
them recover the Golan? We can’t “give
them Lebanon,”
or seem to. In 1991, the inclusion of Syria in the Madrid
peace process was seen by some (including the Syrians) as giving them a green
light to step up their bullying in Lebanon. That’s not in the cards today.
In other
words, it’s not only Syria
that has a price; we have a
price:
-- Will
they leave Lebanon
alone? The continuing deadlock over the
Lebanese presidency and cabinet shows Syria
still playing a bullying role and trying to regain by other means the dominance
it lost in Lebanon
after it took its troops out.
-- In
Iraq, there seems to be some
recent reduction in the flow of extremist fighters from Syria, but it may be the result of a crackdown
on Islamists within Syria –
for Syria’s own domestic
purposes -- rather than a strategic decision to stop trying to weaken Iraq and bleed the United States.
--
Will Syria still play the role of spoiler on other
regional issues – supporting extremists, maintaining its strategic alliance
with Iran?
In
short, the conditions do not exist for an improvement of relations with Syria so long as Syrian policies remain hostile
to important interests of ours in the Middle East. It is appropriate to continue sanctions and
pressures on Syria
so long as this is the case. And, based
on the experience of past meetings with President Asad, I am skeptical of the
value of further diplomatic overtures in the absence of significant
improvements in U.S.
leverage or in the overall balance of forces in the region.
Lately
there have been fresh reports of Syrian-Israeli diplomatic contacts. I can only
speculate, but I can see some benefit to the Israelis in playing the Syrians
and Palestinians off against each other, or in nailing down a stable situation
on the Syrian front while they continue to wrestle with the agonizing
Palestinian problem. Perhaps now is an opportunity for the Israelis to be
creative in this area. But I have two
concerns.
One
is whether Israeli domestic politics can absorb a Syrian negotiation at the
same time as the (already difficult) Palestinian negotiation. It has long been an axiom of the Middle East peace process that the Israeli political
system cannot handle major concessions on more than one front at a time. But that, of course, is for the Israeli
government and people to decide.
Second,
it is essential that Israel
and the United States
coordinate their respective strategies toward Syria, in light of the broader
regional significance of Syrian policies.
Israel and the United States also need to keep in mind the
broader Arab context – and the Iran
context -- and the stake we both have in cooperation with the moderate Arabs,
including in the Gulf. Ultimately there
will have to be a Syrian-Israeli peace settlement – everyone knows that – but
it should be in a strategic context that strengthens the forces of moderation
in the region rather than weakening them.
Syria will be
thinking strategically if it pursues a dialogue with Israel; so should we.
My
bottom line is that Syria
has to pay a big part of the price – in Iraq,
in Lebanon, in the
Arab-Israeli diplomacy, and in its ties with Iran
– if it wants the United
States to lift a finger in its behalf.
Thank
you.