

# **Knowledge and Abilities Catalog for Nuclear Power Plant Operators**

Pressurized Water Reactors

**Final Report** 

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Washington, DC 20555-0001



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#### Supplement 1 to Revision 2 of NUREG-1122 Record of Changes

Instructions: Remove the existing NUREG-1122, Revision 2, pages and insert replacement pages as noted below (corrections and clarifications have been made as indicated).

Section	Remove Page(s)	Replacement Page(s) / Correction Summary
Cover page	Cover page	Cover page / add Supp.1
Abstract	iii and blank	iii-iv / describe Supplement 1 changes in Abstract, add Paperwork Reduction Act page
Table of Contents	v-viii	v-viii / add Supplement 1, page number changes, add new APE (077) for Generator Voltage and Electric Grid Disturbances to Section 4.2
Summary of	xi-xii	xi-xii / describe the replacement of Section 2
Significant Changes	xvii-xviii	xvii-xviii / discuss the study basis to reassess job safety and importance values
Organization of Catalog	1-1 to 1-6	1-1 to 1-6 / amend to conform with Revision 9 of NUREG-1021 and Section 2 changes
	1-11 and 1-12	1-11 and 1-12 / add new APE (077) for Generator Voltage and Electric Grid Disturbances
2.0 Generic Knowledges and Abilities	2-1 to 2-16	2-1 to 2-18 / revise Section 2
4.2 Generic Abnormal Plant	4.2-1 to 4.2-2	4.2-1 to 4.2-2/ add new APE (077) for Generator Voltage and Electric Grid Disturbances
Evolutions (APEs)	4.2-11 to 4.2-14	4.2-11 to 4.2-14/ correct typographical error, delete the word "pump" from loss of reactor coolant makeup K/A category statements
	4.2-59 and blank	4.2-59 to blank / add new APE (077) for Generator Voltage and Electric Grid Disturbances

#### **ABSTRACT**

The Knowledge and Abilities Catalog for Nuclear Power Plant Operators: Pressurized-Water Reactors (PWRs) (NUREG-1122, Revision 2, Supplement 1) provides the basis for the development of content-valid licensing examinations for reactor operators (ROs) and senior reactor operators (SROs). The examinations developed using the PWR Catalog along with the Operator Licensing Examination Standards for Power Reactors (NUREG-1021, Rev. 9, Supplement 1) will sample the topics listed under Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 55 (10 CFR 55).

The PWR Catalog contains approximately 5,100 knowledge and ability (K/A) statements for ROs and SROs at PWRs. The catalog is organized into six major sections: Catalog Organization, Generic Knowledge and Ability Statements, Plant Systems, Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions, Components and Theory.

Revision 1 to the PWR Catalog modified the form and content of the original catalog. The K/As were linked to their applicable 10 CFR 55 item numbers. SRO level K/As were identified by 10 CFR 55.43 item numbers. The plant-wide generic and system generic K/As were combined in one section. Systems were organized into nine safety functions and the emergency and abnormal evolutions were reorganized and expanded.

Revision 2 incorporated corrections to the Rev. 1 catalog that were identified during a pilot testing program associated with revision of 10 CFR 55 and implementation of NUREG-1021, Interim Rev. 8, "Operator Licensing Examination Standards for Power Reactors." Corrections to the catalog included:

- 1. addition of K/As that had been omitted in Rev. 1 (approximately 70).
- 2. deletion of duplicate K/As (approximately 15).
- 3. correction of importance values of consolidated K/As to reflect highest previously assigned values (approximately 75).
- 4. correction of typographical errors.
- 5. addition of importance value modifiers that had been omitted in Rev. 1 (approximately 225).

Revision 2, Supplement 1, includes the following changes:

- 1. total replacement of Section 2, "Generic Knowledges and Abilities."
- 2. inclusion of one additional Abnormal Plant Evolution (APE), 077, "Generator Voltage and Electric Grid Disturbances," in Section 4.2, "Generic Abnormal Plant Evolutions."

Corrections and additions are identified by "redline" marking in the margins.

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#### **SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT CHANGES**

The changes described in paragraphs 1 through 6, below, were incorporated in Revision 1 of the catalog in August, 1995. Paragraph 7 describes changes that were incorporated with Revision 2 of the catalog. Paragraph 8 describes Supplement 1 to Revision 2, which includes a replacement of Section 2, "Generic Knowledges and Abilities," and a new abnormal plant evolution (APE).

#### 1 ORGANIZATION OF THE CATALOG CHANGES

#### 1.1 10 CFR 55 items listed

The content of the written examinations and operating licensing tests is dictated by Sections 55.41, 55.43, and 55.45 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR). The thirty four (34) items listed in 10 CFR 55 are listed in the catalog to reduce the need for cross referencing.

#### 1.2 Stem statements linked to 10 CFR 55 items

The linkage of K/As to the 10 CFR 55.41, 43 and 45 requirements was done to help ensure that the examinations include a representative sample from among the applicable items. Throughout the catalog, 10 CFR 55 section references are shown in parentheses following the appropriate K/A statement, such as (CFR: 41.x / 43.x / 45.x).

#### 1.3 Senior Reactor Operator (SRO) K/As identified

NUREG-1021, Rev. 8, "Operator Licensing Examination Standards for Power Reactors," Section ES-401, required at least 25% of the site-specific written examination for SROs to evaluate K/As required for the higher license level. The original catalogs did not explicitly identify the K/As that represented the higher license level. Differences in RO and SRO importance ratings were sometimes used, but, the rating differences were not linked to the 10 CFR 55.43 SRO items. In this catalog revision, SRO license level K/As were linked to the items associated with the 10 CFR 55.43 SRO items. This is intended to remove subjectivity from selection of higher license level K/As.

#### 1.4 Senior Reactor Operator Limited to Fuel Handling (LSRO) discussion added

NUREG-1021, Rev. 8, Section 701 referred to the K/A catalog. In an effort to assure consistency between the Examination Standards and the catalog, a brief discussion of the use of the catalog for LSRO examinations was included.

#### 1.5 New catalog organization was implemented.

#### 1 ORGANIZATION OF THE CATALOG

#### 2 GENERIC KNOWLEDGE AND ABILITIES (120, Rev. 2, Supp. 1)

Conduct of Operations K/As Equipment Control K/As

Radiation Control K/As Emergency Procedures / Plan K/As

#### 3 PLANT SYSTEMS (45)

Knowledge Categories (K1 - K6) Ability Categories (A1 - A4)

#### 4 EMERGENCY AND ABNORMAL PLANT EVOLUTIONS

Generic EPEs (7) and APEs (32)
Babcock and Wilcox EPEs and APEs (17)
Combustion Engineering EPEs and APEs (7)
Westinghouse EPEs and APEs (16)
Knowledge Categories (EK/AK 1 - EK/ AK3)
Ability Categories (EA/AA 1 - EA/AA 2)

#### **5 COMPONENTS**

Component Knowledge Categories (8)

#### 6 THEORY

Reactor Theory Knowledge Categories (8) Thermodynamics Knowledge Categories (10)

#### 1.6 Revised knowledge and ability stem statements for plant systems.

The knowledge and ability stem statements (categories) for plant systems were revised for consistency with the BWR catalog. This involved revising three knowledge stem statements as shown below. The changes are underlined.

K3. Knowledge of the effect that a loss <u>or malfunction</u> of the (SYSTEM) will have on the following:

(CFR 41.7 / 45.6)

K5. Knowledge of the <u>operational implications</u> of the following concepts as they apply to the (SYSTEM):

(CFR 41.5 / 45.7)

K6 Knowledge of the <u>effect of a loss or malfunction of the following will</u> have on the (SYSTEM):

(CFR 41.7 / 45.7)

#### 1.7 Revised knowledge and ability stem statements for emergency plant evolutions.

The knowledge and ability stem statements (categories) for emergency plant evolutions were revised for consistency with the BWR catalog. This involved revising all five (5) knowledge stem statements as shown below. The changes are underlined.

EK1. Knowledge of the <u>operational implications</u> of the following concepts as they apply to the (EMERGENCY PLANT EVOLUTION): (CFR 41.8 / 41.10 / 45.3)

EK2. Knowledge of the <u>interrelations between</u> (EMERGENCY PLANT EVOLUTION) and the following: (CFR 41.7 / 45.7)

EK3. Knowledge of the reasons for the following <u>responses as they apply to</u> (EMERGENCY PLANT EVOLUTION): (CFR 41.5 / 41.10 / 45.6 / 45.13)

EA1. Ability to operate and / or monitor the following <u>as they apply to</u> (EMERGENCY PLANT EVOLUTION): (CFR 41.7 / 45.6)

EA2. Ability to determine and interpret the following <u>as they apply to (EMERGENCY PLANT EVOLUTION):</u>
(CFR 43.5 / 45.13)

#### 2 GENERIC KNOWLEDGE AND ABILITIES CHANGES

# 2.1 The System Generic and Emergency Plant Evolution K/As were combined with the Plant-Wide Generic K/As.

Many of the old system generic K/As had plant-wide applicability as well as local applicability. In addition, the old plant-wide generic section had relatively few K/As to draw upon to make up 13% of the RO examination or 17% of the SRO examination, per NUREG-1021. As a result, all generic K/As were merged into one section.

	OLD SYSTEM GENERIC K/A	NEW K/A
	1	2.1.2
l	2	2.1.14
	3	2.4.30
	4	2.1.27
	5	2.2.22
l	6	2.2.25
l	7	2.1.28
	8	2.4.31
	9	2.1.30
	10	2.1.32
l	11	2.1.33
l	12	2.4.50
	13	2.1.23
	14	2.4.49
	15	2.4.4

# 2.2 The new generic knowledge and abilities section was grouped into four (4) topic areas.

These are generally administrative knowledge and abilities with broad application across systems and operations. The four (4) topic areas listed below, were derived from, NUREG-1021, ES-301.

- 1. Conduct of Operations K/As
- 2. Equipment Control K/As

- 3. Radiation Control K/As
- 4. Emergency Procedures /Plan K/As

The generic K/As for "Conduct of Operations," are used to evaluate the applicant's knowledge of the daily operation of the facility. The types of information covered under this category may include for example, shift turnover or temporary modification procedures.

The generic K/As for "Equipment Control" are used to evaluate the administrative issues associated with the management and control of plant systems and equipment. Examples of the types of information evaluated under this topic include maintenance and temporary modifications of systems. Fuel handling and refueling K/As were also organized into this topic area because of the equipment control aspect of fuel handling.

The generic K/As for "Radiation Control," are used to evaluate the applicant's knowledge and abilities with respect to radiation hazards and protection (personnel and public). Examples of the types of information that should be evaluated under this topic are knowledge of significant radiation hazards or radiation work permits.

The generic K/As for "Emergency Procedures / Plan" are used to evaluate the applicant's general knowledge of emergency operations. The K/As are designed to evaluate knowledge of the emergency procedures use. The emergency plan K/As are used to evaluate the applicant's knowledge of the plan, including, as appropriate, the RO's or SRO's responsibility to decide whether it should be executed and the duties assigned under the plan.

#### 2.3 Approximately one hundred (100) new generic K/As were added.

The new K/As were identified through license examiner surveys and an independent review of the catalog, NUREG-1021, licensee event reports and inspection reports. All new K/As were directly linked to the applicable 10 CFR 55 requirements.

#### 3 SAFETY FUNCTIONS CHANGES

#### 3.1 Consolidated Safety Functions to match BWR Catalog.

The eleven (11) original PWR safety functions were consolidated into nine (9) safety functions. There were several reasons for this change.

First, NUREG-0737, Supplement 1 treated core cooling and heat removal from the primary system as one safety function. It did not separate RCS heat removal from secondary system heat transport as in the original safety functions 4 and 5. Therefore, original safety functions 4 and 5 were combined into new 4, Heat Removal From Reactor Core.

Second, original Safety Function 8, Control Air System focused on two plant service systems rather than on a safety function. Safety functions have a broader context in the operation of a plant. Therefore, original Safety Function 8 was consolidated into new

Safety Function 8, Plant Service Systems.

- Third, original Safety Function 10, Auxiliary Thermal Systems focused on two specific systems. Safety functions have a broader context in the operation of a nuclear power
   plant. Therefore, original Safety Function 10 was consolidated into new Safety Function 8, Plant Service Systems.
- Fourth, a number of systems listed under original Safety Function 11: Indirect Radioactivity Release Control were more applicable to Plant Service Systems. Specifically fire protection and fuel handling systems did not fit neatly in Function 11. Therefore, they were moved to Safety Function 8, Plant Services Systems.
- Fifth, original Safety Function 11, Indirect Radioactivity Release Control implies that there is a direct radioactivity release control function when there is not. NUREG-0737, Supplement 1 and the BWR catalog does not make the distinction between direct and
   indirect releases. Therefore, the title of originalold Safety Function 11 has been changed in new Safety Function 9 to Radioactivity Release.

#### 3.2 Organized original Emergency Plant Evolutions to Section 4.

Many of the emergency plant evolutions affected more than one safety function. In addition, organizing the emergency plant evolutions by safety function did not provide an integrated picture of the overall emergency and abnormal procedures networks at PWRs. This change is discussed in more detail in Section 4 changes.

#### 3.3 Moved System Generic K/As to new generic section 2.

- The original system generic K/As were removed from the individual system sections, and relocated in the new Section 2, Generic Knowledge and Abilities section. This was done because a number of the original system generic K/As had plant wide applicability.
  - K3. Knowledge of the effect that a <u>loss or malfunction</u> of the (SYSTEM) will have on the following: (CFR 41.7 /45.6)
  - K5. Knowledge of the <u>operational implications</u> of the following concepts as they apply to the (SYSTEM):

    (CFR 41.5 / 45.7)
  - K6. Knowledge of the <u>effect of a loss or malfunction on the</u> following will have on the (SYSTEM): (CFR 41.7 / 45.7)

The knowledge and ability stem statements (categories) for emergency plant evolutions were revised for consistency with the BWR catalog. This involved revising all five (5) knowledge and ability stem statements as shown below with the changes underlined:

- EK1. Knowledge of the <u>operational implications</u> following concepts as they apply to the (EMERGENCY PLANT EVOLUTION) (CFR 41.8 / 41.10 / 45.3)
- EK2. Knowledge of the <u>interrelations between</u> (EMERGENCY PLANT EVOLUTION) and the following: (CFR 41.7 / 45.7)
- EK3. Knowledge of the reasons for the following <u>responses</u> as they apply to (EMERGENCY PLANT EVOLUTION): (CFR 41.5 / 41.10 / 45.6 . 45.13)
- EA1. Ability to operate and / or monitor the following <u>as they apply to</u> (EMERGENCY PLANT EVOLUTION): (CFR 41.7 / 45.6)
- EA2. Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to (EMERGENCY PLANT EVOLUTION): (CFR 43.5 / 45.13)

#### 3.4 Consolidated multi-mode plant system K/As.

This change was made for several reasons. First, only ten (10) of the forty five (45) plant systems were organized in more than one mode. This created inconsistency in the way the tasks and K/As associated with the plant system were presented within the catalog. This also resulted in K/A duplication (e.g. 28 duplicate K/As in ECCS).

As result of this change, duplicate K/As were eliminated and the remaining K/As were organized into one section per system. The systems affected by this change are listed below:

- 1. Control Rod Drive System
- 2. Chemical and Volume Control System
- 3. Reactor Coolant System
- 4. Emergency Core Cooling System
- 5. Main Turbine Generator System
- 6. Condensate System
- 7. Containment Spray System
- 8. Emergency Diesel Generator
- 9. Component Cooling Water System
- 10. Circulating Water System.

# 4 EMERGENCY (EPE) AND ABNORMAL PLANT EVOLUTIONS (APE) CHANGES

#### 4.1 The original EPEs were organized into generic EPEs and APEs.

The original EPEs represented a mix of EPEs and APEs. In the context of the K/A catalog an EPE is any condition, event or symptom which leads to entry into

emergency operating procedures (EOPs). An APE is any degraded condition, event or symptom not leading directly to an EOP entry condition nor related to an operational condition as: power operation, hot shutdown, start-up, shutdown and refueling.

#### 4.2 All EPEs and APEs were consolidated in new Section 4.

The original PWR catalog listed 7 EPEs and 31 APEs in the individual safety function sections. This method of organizing the EPEs and APEs did not accommodate integrative situations crossing several plant systems and or safety functions. The consolidated organization in Section 4 is designed to accommodated integrative evolutions.

#### 4.3 Vendor specific EPEs and APEs were added to Section 4.

The original EPEs did not address the EPE and APE differences imposed by vendor specific technologies and procedures. As a result, 40 new vendor specific APEs and APEs were added.

#### 5 COMPONENTS CHANGES

**5.1** Component K/As were linked to 10 CFR 55 item numbers.

#### **6 THEORY CHANGES**

**6.1** Reactor Theory and Thermodynamics theory K/As were linked to 10 CFR 55 item numbers.

#### 7 REVISION 2 CHANGES

- 7.1 Approximately 70 K/As that had been omitted in Rev. 1 were added.
- **7.2** Approximately 15 duplicate K/As were deleted.
- 7.3 Approximately 75 corrections were made to the importance values of consolidated K/As to reflect highest previously assigned values.
- **7.4** Typographical errors were corrected.
- 7.5 Importance value modifiers that had been omitted in Rev. 1 were added.

#### 8 REVISION 2, SUPPLEMENT 1, CHANGES

- **8.1** Regarding replacement of Section 2, the Pressurized Water Reactor Owners Group, with the endorsement of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), first initiated a study to reassess the job relevance and importance-to-safety ratings of 129 K/As in Section 2 of NUREG-1122. The study was subsequently expanded to include the Boiling Water Reactor Owners Group to reassess its counterpart Section 2 of NUREG-1123.
- **8.2** Regarding the additional APE 077, "Generator Voltage and Electric Grid Disturbances," the NRC requested that additional K/As related to degraded voltage be incorporated and validated during the study's second phase to address lessons learned from a major blackout in August 2003.

Corrections and additions are identified by "redline" marking.

# 1 ORGANIZATION OF THE CATALOG

#### 1.1 INTRODUCTION

The Knowledge and Abilities Catalog for Nuclear Power Plant Operators: Pressurized Water Reactors (PWR) NUREG-1122, Revision 2, Supplement 1, provides the basis for development of content-valid written and operating licensing examinations for reactor operators (ROs) and senior reactor operators (SROs). The Catalog is designed to ensure equitable and consistent examinations.

#### 1.2 PART 55 OF TITLE 10 OF THE CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS

The catalog is used in conjunction with NUREG-1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1, "Operator Licensing Examination Standards for Power Reactors." NUREG-1021 provides policy and guidance and establishes the procedures and practices for examining licensees and applicants for RO and SRO licenses pursuant to Part 55 of Title 10 of the <u>Code of Federal Regulations</u> (10 CFR 55). All knowledge and abilities (K/As) in this catalog are directly linked by item number to 10 CFR 55.

#### 1.3 RO WRITTEN EXAMINATION ITEMS

The items for RO written examinations are specified in 10 CFR 55.41(b). The RO written examination questions should be generated from a representative sample of K/As derived from among the 10 CFR 55.41(b) items listed below:

- (1) Fundamentals of reactor theory, including fission process, neutron multiplication, source effects, control rod effects, criticality indications, reactivity coefficients, and poison effects.
- (2) General design features of the core, including core structure, fuel elements, control rods, core instrumentation, and coolant flow.
- (3) Mechanical components and design features of reactor primary system.
- (4) Secondary coolant and auxiliary systems that affect the facility.
- (5) Facility operating characteristics during steady state and transient conditions, including coolant chemistry, causes and effects of temperature, pressure and reactivity changes, effects of load changes, and operating limitations and reasons for these operating characteristics.

- (6) Design, components, and function of reactivity control mechanisms and instrumentation.
- (7) Design, components, and function of control and safety systems, including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features.
- (8) Components, capacity, and functions of emergency systems.
- (9) Shielding, isolation, and containment design features, including access limitations.
- (10) Administrative, normal, abnormal, and emergency operating procedures for the facility.
- (11) Purpose and operation of radiation monitoring systems, including alarms and survey equipment.
- (12) Radiological safety principles and procedures.
- (13) Procedures and equipment available for handling and disposal of radioactive materials and effluents.
- (14) Principals of heat transfer, thermodynamics and fluid mechanics.

The RO written examination is administered in two sections, a generic fundamentals examination (GFE) section and a site-specific examination. The GFE covers those knowledge items that do not vary significantly among reactors of the same type (refer to NUREG-1021, ES-205). The GFE covers components, reactor theory, and thermodynamics knowledge.

The component knowledge items are derived from 10 CFR 55.41(b) items 3 and 7. Reactor theory knowledge items are derived from 10 CFR 55.41(b)1. Thermodynamic knowledge items are derived from 10 CFR 55.41(b)14.

The site-specific RO written examination covers K/As that vary among reactors of the same type. The guidance for preparation of RO written examination is presented in NUREG-1021, ES-401. The RO examination includes a balanced mix of generic K/As, plant systems K/As, and emergency/abnormal evolution K/As. The K/As associated with the RO site-specific written examinations are derived from 10 CFR 55.41(b) items 2 through 13.

#### 1.4 SRO WRITTEN EXAMINATION ITEMS

The items for SRO written examinations are presented in 10 CFR 55.43(b). The guidance for preparation of the SRO written examination is presented in NUREG-1021, ES-401. The examination for SROs includes 25 questions based on the higher license level K/As from the 7 items listed under 10 CFR 55.43(b), and 75 questions derived from 10 CFR 55.41(b) RO K/As. The 7 SRO items listed under 10 CFR 55.43(b) include:

- (1) Conditions and limitations in the facility license.
- (2) Facility operating limitations in the technical specifications and their bases.
- (3) Facility licensee procedures required to obtain authority for design and operating changes in the facility.
- (4) Radiation hazards that may arise during normal and abnormal situations, including maintenance activities and various contamination conditions.
- (5) Assessment of facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during normal, abnormal, and emergency situations.
- (6) Procedures and limitations involved in initial core loading, alterations in core configuration, control rod programming, and determination of various internal and external effects on core reactivity.
- (7) Fuel handling facilities and procedures.

#### 1.5 RO AND SRO OPERATING TEST ITEMS

The items for operating tests for ROs and SROs are presented in 10 CFR 55.45(a). The guidance for preparation of the operating tests is presented in NUREG-1021, ES-301. The operating test should include a representative selection of K/As derived from 13 items listed in 10 CFR 55.45(a). The 13 items listed in 10 CFR 55.45(a) are:

- (1) Perform pre-startup procedures for the facility, including operating of those controls associated with plant equipment that could affect reactivity.
- (2) Manipulate the console controls as required to operate the facility between shutdown and designated power levels.
- (3) Identify annunciators and condition-indicating signals and perform appropriate remedial actions where appropriate.

- (4) Identify the instrumentation systems and the significance of facility instrument readings.
- (5) Observe and safely control the operating behavior characteristics of the facility.
- (6) Perform control manipulations required to obtain desired operating results during normal, abnormal, and emergency situations.
- (7) Safely operate the facility's heat removal systems, including primary coolant, emergency coolant, and decay heat removal systems, and identify the relations of proper operation of these systems to the operation of the facility.
- (8) Safety operate the facility's auxiliary and emergency systems, including operation of those controls associated with plant equipment that could affect reactivity or the release of radioactive materials to the environment
- (9) Demonstrate or describe the use and function of the facility's radiation monitoring systems, including fixed radiation monitors and alarms, portable survey instruments, and personnel monitoring equipment.
- (10) Demonstrate a knowledge of significant radiation hazards, including permissible levels in excess of those authorized, and ability to perform other procedures to reduce excessive levels of radiation and to guard against personnel exposure.
- (11) Demonstrate knowledge of the emergency plan for the facility, including, as appropriate, the operator's or senior operator's responsibility to decide when the plan should be executed and the duties under the plan assigned.
- (12) Demonstrate the knowledge and ability as appropriate to the assigned position to assume the responsibilities associated with the safe operation of the facility.
- (13) Demonstrate the applicant's ability to function within the control room team as appropriate to the assigned position, in such a way that the facility licensee's procedures are adhered to and that the limitations in its license and amendments are not violated.

#### 1.6 SENIOR OPERATORS LIMITED TO FUEL HANDLING

The specifications for examinations for Senior Operators Limited to Fuel Handling (LSRO) are provided in Examination Standard, NUREG 1021, Section ES-701. The LSRO examination process includes both a written examination and an operating test. This examination and test include, but are not limited to, items associated with 10 CFR 55.43(b) items 5 through 7, and 10 CFR 55.45(a) items 5 and 6.

#### 1.7 ORGANIZATION OF THE PWR CATALOG

The Knowledge and Abilities Catalog for Nuclear Power Plant Operators: Pressurized Water Reactors is organized into 6 major sections. K/As are grouped according to the major section to which they pertain. This organization is shown schematically below.

#### 1 ORGANIZATION OF THE CATALOG

#### **2 GENERIC KNOWLEDGE AND ABILITIES (120)**

Conduct of Operations K/As Equipment Control K/As Radiation Control K/As Emergency Procedures / Plan K/As

#### 3 PLANT SYSTEMS (45)

Knowledge Categories (K1 - K6) Ability Categories (A1 - A4)

#### 4 EMERGENCY AND ABNORMAL PLANT EVOLUTIONS

Generic EPEs (7) and APEs (32)
Babcock and Wilcox EPEs and APEs (17)
Combustion Engineering EPEs and APEs (7)
Westinghouse EPEs and APEs (16)
Knowledge Categories (EK/AK 1 - EK/ AK3)
Ability Categories (EA/AA 1 - EA/AA 2)

#### **5 COMPONENTS**

Component Knowledge Categories (8)

#### 6 THEORY

Reactor Theory Knowledge Categories (8) Thermodynamics Knowledge Categories (10)

#### 1.8 GENERIC KNOWLEDGE AND ABILITIES

Generic knowledge and abilities are generally administrative knowledges and abilities with broad application across systems and operations. They are listed in Section 2 of the catalog. The four (4) categories of generic K/As are listed below:

- 1) Conduct of Operations K/As
- 2) Equipment Control K/As
- 3) Radiation Control K/As
- 4) Emergency Procedures / Plan K/As

The generic K/As for "Conduct of Operations" are used to evaluate the applicant's knowledge of the daily operation of the facility. The types of information covered under this category may include, for example, shift turnover, operator responsibilities, and procedure usage.

The generic K/As for "Equipment Control" are used to evaluate the administrative activities associated with the management and control of plant systems and equipment. Examples of the types of information evaluated under this topic include maintenance and temporary modifications of systems.

The generic K/As for "Radiation Control" are used to evaluate the applicant's knowledge and abilities with respect to radiation hazards and protection (personnel and public). Examples of the types of information that should be evaluated under this topic are knowledge of significant radiation hazards or radiation work permits.

The generic K/As for "Emergency Procedures / Plan" are used to evaluate the applicant's general knowledge of emergency operations. The K/As are designed to evaluate knowledge of the emergency procedures network and its use. The emergency plan K/As are used to evaluate the applicant's knowledge of the plan, including, as appropriate, the RO's or SRO's responsibility to decide whether it should be executed and the duties assigned under the plan.

#### 1.9 PLANT SYSTEMS

#### 1.9.1 Plant System Organization by Safety Function

Nine (9) major safety functions must be maintained to ensure safe PWR nuclear power plant operation. The safety function groups are:

- 1) Reactivity Control
- 2) Reactor Coolant System Inventory Control
- 3) Reactor Pressure Control
- 4) Heat Removal From Reactor Core
- 5) Containment Integrity
- 6) Electrical
- 7) Instrumentation
- 8) Plant Service Systems
- 9) Radioactivity Release.

Forty five (45) plant systems have been included in the PWR Catalog based on their relationship and importance to 9 safety functions. Table 1 contains a list of these plant systems, arranged within safety function. It should be noted that 3 plant systems (Reactor Coolant System, Chemical and Volume Control System, and Emergency Core Cooling System) each contribute to 2 safety functions. Also, because the emergency plant evolutions are linked to more than one system, they have been listed separately

under the appropriate, related function. Each system has a 3-digit identifier. The identifiers are the same as those used by INPO. See Section 3 of the PWR catalog for the delineation of K/As for the plant systems.

# Table 1 Plant Systems by Safety Functions

#### **Safety Function 1: Reactivity Control**

001	Control Rod Drive System
004	Chemical and Volume Control System
014	Rod Position Indication System

#### **Safety Function 2: Reactor Coolant System Inventory Control**

002	Reactor Coolant System
004	Chemical and Volume Control System
006	Emergency Core Cooling System
011	Pressurizer Level Control System
013	Engineered Safety Features Actuation System

#### **Safety Function 3: Reactor Pressure Control**

006	Emergency Core Cooling System
010	Pressurizer Pressure Control System

#### **Safety Function 4: Heat Removal From Reactor Core**

#### **Primary System**

002	Reactor Coolant System
003	Reactor Coolant Pump System
005	Residual Heat Removal System
035	Steam Generator System

#### **Secondary System**

039	Main and Reheat Steam System
041	Steam Dump System and Turbine Bypass Control
045	Main Turbine Generator System
055	Condenser Air Removal System
056	Condensate System
059	Main Feedwater System
061	Auxiliary / Emergency Feedwater System
076	Service Water System

#### **Safety Function 5: Containment Integrity**

007	Pressurizer Relief Tank / Quench Tank System
)22	Containment Cooling System
)25	Ice Condenser System
026	Containment Spray System
)27	Containment Iodine Removal System
)28	Hydrogen Recombiner and Purge Control System
103	Containment System

#### **Safety Function 6: Electrical**

062	A.C. Electrical Distribution
063	D.C. Electrical Distribution
064	<b>Emergency Diesel Generators</b>

#### **Safety Function 7: Instrumentation**

012	Reactor Protection System
015	Nuclear Instrumentation System
016	Non-Nuclear Instrumentation System
017	In-Core Temperature Monitor System
072	Area Radiation Monitoring System
073	Process Radiation Monitoring System

#### **Safety Function 8: Plant Service Systems**

Component Cooling Water System
Containment Purge System
Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System
Fuel Handling Equipment System
Circulating Water System
Instrument Air System
Station Air System
Fire Protection System

#### **Safety Function 9: Radioactivity Release**

068	Liquid Radwaste System
071	Waste Gas Disposal System

1.8

#### 1.9.2 Plant System K/A Stem Statements

The information delineated within each plant system is organized into 6 different types of knowledge and 4 different types of ability. If there are no knowledge or ability statements following a stem statement there is no applicable K/A.

The applicable 10 CFR 55.41 / 43 / and 45 item numbers are included with each stem statement. In most cases the K/As associated with the stem statements can be used for both the written examination and the operating test. See Table 2 below:

# Table 2 Knowledge and Ability Stem Statements for Plant Systems

#### **Knowledge Stem Statements**

- K1. Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between (SYSTEM) and the following: (CFR: 41.2 to 41.9 / 45.7 to 45.8)
- K2. Knowledge of electrical power supplies to the following: (CFR: 41.7)
- K3. Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the (SYSTEM) will have on the following:

  (CFR: 41.7 / 45.6)
- K4. Knowledge of (SYSTEM) design feature(s) and or interlock(s) which provide for the following: (CFR: 41.7)
- K5. Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the (SYSTEM): (CFR: 41.5 / 45.7)
- K6 Knowledge of the of the effect of a loss or malfunction on the following will have on the (SYSTEM):

  (CFR: 41.7 / 45.7)

1.9

#### **Ability Stem Statements**

A1. Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters associated with operating the (SYSTEM) controls including: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.5)

- A2. Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the (SYSTEM) and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal operation: (CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.13)
- A3. Ability to monitor automatic operations of the (SYSTEM) including: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5)
- A4. Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 to 45.8)

#### 1.10 EMERGENCY AND ABNORMAL PLANT EVOLUTIONS

#### 1.10.1 Generic and Vendor Specific EPEs and APEs

Section 4 of the PWR catalog contains generic and vendor specific emergency plant evolutions (EPEs) and Abnormal Plant Evolutions (APEs). The listing of EPEs and APEs was developed to include those integrative situations crossing several plant systems and/or safety functions.

An emergency plant evolution is any condition, event or symptom which leads to entry into Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs). An abnormal plant evolution is any degraded condition, event, or symptom not directly leading to an EOP entry condition.

It is recognized that for each condition, there are degrees of severity. The EOP entry conditions were used as the bases for classifying a condition either as an EPE or an APE. Any abnormal condition which degrades as to threaten the plant safety will result in entry into the EOPs is treated as an emergency condition.

Table 3 contains a list of emergency and abnormal plant evolutions included in the PWR catalog. Within PWRs, there are three nuclear steam system supply (NSSS) vendors, Babcock and Wilcox, Combustion Engineering, and Westinghouse. The NSSS vendors have EPEs and APEs that are common to all three vendors, and they have evolutions that are vendor specific. Therefore, this Section 4 is organized by generic and vendor specific EPEs and APEs.

The EPEs and APEs each have a unique three-digit evolution number.

# Table 3 Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions

#### **Generic Emergency Plant Evolutions (EPEs)**

007 Reactor Trip

009 Small Break LOCA

- 011 Large Break LOCA
- 029 Anticipated Transient Without Scram (ATWS)
- 038 Steam Generator Tube Rupture
- 055 Station Blackout
- 074 Inadequate Core Cooling

#### **Generic Abnormal Plant Evolutions (APEs)**

- 001 Continuous Rod Withdrawal
- 003 Dropped Control Rod
- 005 Inoperable/Stuck Control Rod
- 008 Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident
- 015 Reactor Coolant Pump Malfunctions
- 017 Reactor Coolant Pump Malfunctions (Loss of RC Flow)
- 022 Loss of Reactor Coolant Makeup
- 024 Emergency Boration
- 025 Loss of Residual Heat Removal System
- 026 Loss of Component Cooling Water
- 027 Pressurizer Pressure Control System Malfunction
- 028 Pressurizer Level Control Malfunction
- 032 Loss of Source Range Nuclear Instrumentation
- 033 Loss of Intermediate Range Nuclear Instrumentation
- 036 Fuel Handling Incidents
- 037 Steam Generator Tube Leak
- 040 Steam Line Rupture
- 051 Loss of Condenser Vacuum
- 054 Loss of Main Feedwater
- 056 Loss of Off-Site Power
- 057 Loss of Vital AC Electrical Instrument Bus
- 058 Loss of DC Power
- 059 Accidental Liquid Radwaste Release
- 060 Accidental Gaseous Radwaste Release
- O61 Area Radiation Monitoring (ARM) System Alarms
- 062 Loss of Nuclear Service Water
- 065 Loss of Instrument Air
- 067 Plant Fire on Site
- 068 Control Room Evacuation
- 069 Loss of Containment Integrity
- 076 High Reactor Coolant Activity
- 077 Generator Voltage and Electric Grid Disturbances

#### **Babcock and Wilcox EPEs /APEs**

- E02 Vital System Status Verification
- E03 Inadequate Subcooling Margin
- E04 Inadequate Heat Transfer
- E05 Excessive Heat Transfer

- E08 LOCA Cooldown
- **E09** Natural Circulation Operations
- E10 Post-Trip Stabilization
- E13 EOP Rules
- E14 EOP Enclosures
- A01 Plant Runback
- A02 Loss of NNI-X
- A03 Loss of NNI-Y
- A04 Turbine Trip
- A05 Emergency Diesel Actuation
- A06 Shutdown Outside Control Room
- A07 Flooding
- A08 Refueling Canal Level Decrease

#### **Combustion Engineering Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions**

- E02 Reactor Trip Recovery
- E05 Excess Steam Demand
- E06 Loss of Feedwater
- E09 Functional Recovery
- A11 RCS Overcooling
- A13 Natural Circulation Operations
- A16 Excess RCS Leakage

#### **Westinghouse Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions**

- E02 SI Termination
- E03 LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization
- E04 LOCA Outside Containment
- E05 Loss of Secondary Heat Sink
- E06 Degraded Core Cooling
- E07 Saturated Core Cooling
- E08 Pressurized Thermal Shock
- E09 Natural Circulation Operations
- E10 Natural Circulation with Steam Void in Vessel with/without RVLIS
- E11 Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation
- E12 Uncontrolled Depressurization of all Steam Generators
- E13 Steam Generator Overpressure
- E14 High Containment Pressure
- E15 Containment Flooding
- E16 High Containment Radiation

#### 1.10.2 K/A Stem Statements for EPEs and APEs

The information delineated within each emergency plant evolution is organized into 3 different types of knowledge and 2 different types of ability. If there are no knowledge or ability statements following a stem statement there is no applicable K/A.

The applicable 10 CFR: 55.41 / 43 / and 45 item numbers are included with each stem statement. In most cases the K/As associated with the stem statements can be used for both the written examination and the operating test. See Table 4 below:

# Table 4 Knowledge and Ability Stem Statements for Emergency Plant Evolutions

#### **Knowledge Stem Statements**

EK1 Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the loss of (SYSTEM):

(CFR: 41.8 / 41.10 / 45.3)

EK2. Knowledge of the interrelations between the loss of (SYSTEM) and the following:

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.7)

EK3. Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the loss of (SYSTEM):

(CFR: 41.5 / 41.10 / 45.6 / 45.13)

#### **Ability Stem Statements**

EA1. Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the loss of (SYSTEM):

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6)

EA2. Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the loss of (SYSTEM): (CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)

#### 1.11 COMPONENTS

Basic components such as valves and pumps are found in many systems. NUREG-1021, section ES-205, "General Fundamentals Examination," lists 8 categories of components. The 8 categories of components, for which additional knowledge statements are necessary are listed below and delineated in Section 5 of the PWR catalog.

The component knowledge statements are more detailed than those provided in the system listing, yet at the same time they are generic to the component types. Each component has a unique 6-digit code number identified in NUREG-1021, and 10 CFR 55.41(b) item number. See Table 5, below.

#### Table 5 Components

191001	Valves (CFR: 41.3)
191002	Sensors and Detectors (CFR: 41.7)
191003	Controllers and Positioners (CFR: 41.7)
191004	Pumps(CFR: 41.3)
191005	Motors and Generators (CFR: 41.7)
191006	Heat Exchangers and Condensers (CFR: 41.4)
191007	Demineralizers and Ion Exchangers (CFR: 41.3)
191008	Breakers, Relays, and Disconnects (CFR: 41.7)

#### **1.12 THEORY**

NUREG-1021, Section ES-205, "General Fundamentals Examination," lists theory items. General fundamental knowledge which underlies safe performance on the job is delineated in Section 6 of the PWR Catalog. These theory topics represent general fundamental concepts related to plant operation. Each theory topic has the same 6-digit code number identified in NUREG-1021. The applicable 10 CFR 55 item number is provided for Reactor Theory and Thermodynamics Theory.

#### **Reactor Theory (CFR: 41.1)**

192001	Neutrons
192002	Neutron Life Cycle
192003	Reactor Kinetics and Neutron Sources
192004	Reactivity Coefficients
192005	Control Rods
192006	Fission Product Poisons
192007	Fuel Depletion and Burnable Poisons
192008	Reactor Operational Physics

#### Thermodynamics Theory (CFR: 41.14)

193001	Thermodynamic Units and Properties
193003	Steam
193004	Thermodynamic Process
193005	Thermodynamic Cycles
193006	Fluid Statics and Dynamics
193007	Heat Transfer
193008	Thermal Hydraulics
193009	Core Thermal Limits
193010	Brittle Fracture and Vessel Thermal Stress

#### 1.13 IMPORTANCE RATINGS

Importance, in this context, considers direct and indirect impact of the K/A on safe plant operation in a manner ensuring personnel and public health and safety. Importance Ratings of the K/As are given for Reactor Operators and Senior Reactor Operators next to each knowledge and ability in the catalog. These ratings reflect average ratings of individual NRC and utility panel members. The rating scale is presented in Table 6, below.

Table 6
RO and SRO Importance Ratings

Rating	Importance for safe operation
5	Essential
4	Very important
3	Fairly important
2	Of limited importance
1	Insignificant Importance
*	Indicates variability in the responses

Therefore, the rating of 2.0 or below represents a statement of limited or insignificant importance for the safe operation of a plant. Such statements are generally considered as inappropriate content for NRC licensing examinations. (See below for qualifications of importance ratings related to variability of the ratings and plant specific data.)

#### 1.13.1 Asterisk and Question Ratings

Some importance ratings are followed by an asterisk (\*) or question mark (?). These marks indicate variability in the rating responses. An asterisk indicates that the rating spread was very broad. An asterisk can also signify that more than 15 percent of the raters indicated that the knowledge or ability is not required for the RO/SRO position at their plant, either because it refers to an inapplicable design feature or because it is the responsibility of someone else (e.g. SRO vs. RO). A question mark indicates that more than 15 percent of the raters felt that they were not familiar with the knowledge or ability as related to the particular system or design feature. These marks indicate a need for examination developers to review plant-specific materials to determine whether or not that knowledge or ability is indeed appropriate for inclusion in any given examination.

#### 1.13.2 Difference Ratings

A dagger (†) to the left of an individual knowledge or ability statement indicates that more than 20 percent (20%) of the raters indicated that the <u>level</u> of knowledge or ability required by an SRO is different than the <u>level</u> of knowledge or ability required by an RO. In the PWR catalog, daggers may only appear next to plant-wide generic

K/A statements, system-wide generic K/A statements, and statements in Appendices A and B as this information was not collected for the statements in the other sections of the catalog.

#### 1.14 ACRONYMS AND TERMS

APE abnormal plant evolution
AFAS auxiliary feed actuation signal
AFW auxiliary feedwater system
ALARA as low as reasonably achievable

AOV air operated valve

ARM area radiation monitoring system ATWS anticipated transient without scram

BIT boron injection tank BWST borated water storage tank

CARS condenser air removal system

CAT chemical addition tank
CCS containment cooling system
CCWS component cooling water system

CEA control element assembly (Combustion Engineering)

CIRS containment iodine removal system COLSS core operating limit support system

CPS containment purge system
CRDM control rod drive motor
CRDS control rod drive system

CRT cathode ray tube

Crud corrosion product material floating in system

CSAS containment spray actuation signal

CSS containment spray system

CVCS chemical and volume control system

D/G diesel generator D/P differential pressure

DNB departure from nucleate boiling ECCS emergency core cooling system ECP estimated critical position EDG emergency diesel generator EPE emergency plant evolution ESF engineered safety feature

ESFAS engineered safety features actuation system

FHES fuel handling equipment system

FPS fire protection system HPI high pressure injection

HRPS hydrogen recombiner and purge control system

#### 1.14 ACRONYMS AND TERMS (Continued)

HVAC heating, ventilation and air conditioning

IAS instrument air system
I&C instrumentation and control

ICS integrated control system (Babcock and Wilcox)

INPO Institute of Nuclear Power Operation ITMS in-core temperature monitor system

JTA job-task analysis K/A knowledge and ability

K-effective subcritical multiplication factor

LOCA loss of coolant accident
LPI low pressure injection

LRS liquid radwaste system

LVDT linear variable differential transformer

MFW main feedwater
M/G motor generator
MOV motor operated valve

MRSS main and reheat steam system MSIV main steam isolation valve

MTC moderator temperature coefficient

MT/G main turbine generator

NIS nuclear instrumentation system
NNI non-nuclear instrumentation
NPSH net positive suction head

NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission
P&ID piping and instrumentation diagram
PDIL power dependent insertion limit

PEO plant equipment operator PORV power operated relief valves

PPDIL pre-power dependent insertion limit

PRM process radiation monitor
PRT pressurizer relief tank
PTS pressurized thermal shock
PWR pressurized water reactor

PZR pressurizer

PZR LCS pressurizer level control system PZR PCS pressurizer pressure control system

RCP reactor coolant pump
RCS reactor coolant system
rem roentgen equivalent man
RHR residual heat removal

RMS radiation monitoring system

RO reactor operator

RPI rod position indication

#### **1.14 ACRONYMS AND TERMS (Continued)**

RPS reactor protection system RWST refueling water storage tank

SAS station air system SDS steam dump system

SFPS spent fuel pool cooling system

S/G steam generator

S/GB steam generator blowdown SCR silicon controlled rectifier

SDM shutdown margin
SIS safety injection system
SME subject matter expert

SOP standard operating procedure

SRO senior reactor operator

SS shift supervisor SUR startup rate

SWS service water system

T-ave average reactor coolant temperature

T-cold measured temperature of inlet

T/G turbine generator

T-ref reference temperature for RCS

UHI upper head injection
VARS volt-amperes reactive
VCT volume control tank

WGDS waste gas disposal system

# 2.0 GENERIC KNOWLEDGES AND ABILITIES

- 2.0.1 Technical Requirements Manual (TRM) For the purpose of this catalog, K/As that reference Technical Specifications (TS) may include the Technical Requirements Manual, where applicable.
- 2.0.2 K/A Clarifying Examples K/As that include the words "such as" list suggested topical areas as examples and are not intended to be all inclusive.
- 2.1 Conduct of Operations
- 2.1.1 Knowledge of conduct of operations requirements.

(CFR: 41.10 / 45.13)

IMPORTANCE RO 3.8 SRO 4.2

2.1.2 Knowledge of operator responsibilities during all modes of plant operation.

(CFR: 41.10 / 45.13)

IMPORTANCE RO 4.1 SRO 4.4

2.1.3 Knowledge of shift or short-term relief turnover practices.

(CFR: 41.10 / 45.13)

IMPORTANCE RO 3.7 SRO 3.9

2.1.4 Knowledge of individual licensed operator responsibilities related to shift staffing, such as medical requirements, "no-solo" operation, maintenance of active license status, 10CFR55, etc.

(CFR: 41.10 / 43.2)

IMPORTANCE RO 3.3 SRO 3.8

2.1.5 Ability to use procedures related to shift staffing, such as minimum crew complement, overtime limitations, etc.

(CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.12)

IMPORTANCE RO 2.9\* SRO 3.9

2.1.6 Ability to manage the control room crew during plant transients.

(CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.12 / 45.13)

IMPORTANCE RO 3.8\* SRO 4.8

2.1.7 Ability to evaluate plant performance and make operational judgments based on operating characteristics, reactor behavior, and instrument interpretation.

(CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.12 / 45.13)

IMPORTANCE RO 4.4 SRO 4.7

**Conduct of Operations (continued)** 2.1.8 Ability to coordinate personnel activities outside the control room. (CFR: 41.10 / 45.5 / 45.12 / 45.13) **IMPORTANCE** RO 3.4 SRO 4.1 2.1.9 Ability to direct personnel activities inside the control room. (CFR: 41.10 / 45.5 / 45.12 / 45.13) **IMPORTANCE** RO 2.9\* SRO 4.5 2.1.10 Moved to 2.2.38 2.1.11 Moved to **2.2.39** 2.1.12 Moved to **2.2.40** 2.1.13 Knowledge of facility requirements for controlling vital/controlled access. (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.9 / 45.10) **IMPORTANCE** RO 2.5 SRO 3.2 2.1.14 Knowledge of criteria or conditions that require plant-wide announcements, such as pump starts, reactor trips, mode changes, etc. (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.12) **IMPORTANCE** SRO 3.1 RO 3.1 2.1.15 Knowledge of administrative requirements for temporary management directives, such as standing orders, night orders, Operations memos, etc. (CFR: 41.10 / 45.12) **IMPORTANCE** RO 2.7 SRO 3.4 2.1.16 **Deleted** 2.1.17 Ability to make accurate, clear, and concise verbal reports. (CFR: 41.10 / 45.12 / 45.13) **IMPORTANCE** RO 3.9 SRO 4.0 2.1.18 Ability to make accurate, clear, and concise logs, records, status boards, and reports. (CFR: 41.10 / 45.12 / 45.13) IMPORTANCE SRO 3.8 RO 3.6 2.1.19 Ability to use plant computers to evaluate system or component status. (CFR: 41.10 / 45.12) **IMPORTANCE** RO 3.9 **SRO 3.8** 

2.1

- 2.1 Conduct of Operations (continued)
- 2.1.20 Ability to interpret and execute procedure steps.

(CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.12)

IMPORTANCE RO 4.6

SRO 4.6

2.1.21 Ability to verify the controlled procedure copy.

(CFR: 41.10 / 45.10 / 45.13)

IMPORTANCE RO 3.5\*

SRO 3.6\*

- 2.1.22 Revised and moved to **2.2.35**
- 2.1.23 Ability to perform specific system and integrated plant procedures during all modes of plant operation.

(CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.2 / 45.6)

IMPORTANCE RO 4.3

SRO 4.4

- 2.1.24 Moved to 2.2.41
- 2.1.25 Ability to interpret reference materials, such as graphs, curves, tables, etc.

(CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.12)

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.9

SRO 4.2

2.1.26 Knowledge of industrial safety procedures (such as rotating equipment, electrical, high temperature, high pressure, caustic, chlorine, oxygen and hydrogen).

(CFR: 41.10 / 45.12)

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.4

SRO 3.6

2.1.27 Knowledge of system purpose and/or function.

(CFR: 41.7)

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.9

SRO 4.0

2.1.28 Knowledge of the purpose and function of major system components and controls.

(CFR: 41.7)

IMPORTANCE

RO 4.1

SRO 4.1

2.1.29 Knowledge of how to conduct system lineups, such as valves, breakers, switches, etc.

(CFR: 41.10 / 45.1 / 45.12)

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 4.1

SRO 4.0

2.1 **Conduct of Operations (continued)** 2.1.30 Ability to locate and operate components, including local controls. (CFR: 41.7 / 45.7) IMPORTANCE RO 4.4 SRO 4.0 2.1.31 Ability to locate control room switches, controls, and indications, and to determine that they correctly reflect the desired plant lineup. (CFR: 41.10 / 45.12) RO 4.6 IMPORTANCE SRO 4.3 2.1.32 Ability to explain and apply system limits and precautions. (CFR: 41.10 / 43.2 / 45.12) IMPORTANCE RO 3.8 SRO 4.0 2.1.33 Moved to **2.2.42** 2.1.34 Knowledge of primary and secondary plant chemistry limits. (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.12) IMPORTANCE RO 2.7 SRO 3.5 2.1.35 Knowledge of the fuel-handling responsibilities of SROs. (CFR: 41.10 / 43.7) **IMPORTANCE** RO 2.2 SRO 3.9 2.1.36 Knowledge of procedures and limitations involved in core alterations. (CFR: 41.10 / 43.6 / 45.7) IMPORTANCE SRO 4.1 RO 3.0 2.1.37 Knowledge of procedures, guidelines, or limitations associated with reactivity management. (CFR: 41.1 / 43.6 / 45.6) **SRO 4.6 IMPORTANCE** RO 4.3 2.1.38 Knowledge of the station's requirements for verbal communications when implementing procedures. (CFR: 41.10 / 45.13) RO 3.7\* **IMPORTANCE** SRO 3.8

2.1.39 Knowledge of conservative decision making practices.

(CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.12)

IMPORTANCE RO 3.6 SRO 4.3

2.1.40 Knowledge of refueling administrative requirements.

(CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13)

IMPORTANCE RO 2.8 SRO 3.9

- 2.1 Conduct of Operations (continued)
- 2.1.41 Knowledge of the refueling process.

(CFR: 41.2 / 41.10 / 43.6 / 45.13)

IMPORTANCE RO 2.8 SRO 3.7

2.1.42 Knowledge of new and spent fuel movement procedures.

(CFR: 41.10 / 43.7 / 45.13)

IMPORTANCE RO 2.5 SRO 3.4

2.1.43 Ability to use procedures to determine the effects on reactivity of plant changes, such as reactor coolant system temperature, secondary plant, fuel depletion, etc.

(CFR: 41.10 / 43.6 / 45.6)

IMPORTANCE RO 4.1 SRO 4.3

2.1.44 Knowledge of RO duties in the control room during fuel handling, such as responding to alarms from the fuel handling area, communication with the fuel storage facility, systems operated from the control room in support of fueling operations, and supporting instrumentation.

(CFR: 41.10 / 43.7 / 45.12)

IMPORTANCE RO 3.9 SRO 3.8

2.1.45 Ability to identify and interpret diverse indications to validate the response of another indication.

(CFR: 41.7 / 43.5 / 45.4)

IMPORTANCE RO 4.3 SRO 4.3

2.2 Equipment Control

2.2.1 Ability to perform pre-startup procedures for the facility, including operating those controls associated with plant equipment that could affect reactivity.

(CFR: 41.5 / 41.10 / 43.5 / 43.6 / 45.1)

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 4.5

SRO 4.4

2.2.2 Ability to manipulate the console controls as required to operate the facility between shutdown and designated power levels.

(CFR: 41.6 / 41.7 / 45.2)

IMPORTANCE 1

**RO 4.6** 

SRO 4.1

2.2.3 (multi-unit license) Knowledge of the design, procedural, and operational differences between units.

(CFR: 41.5 / 41.6 / 41.7 / 41.10 / 45.12)

IMPORTANCE RO 3.8

SRO 3.9

2.2.4 (multi-unit license) Ability to explain the variations in control board/control room layouts, systems, instrumentation, and procedural actions between units at a facility.

(CFR: 41.6 / 41.7 / 41.10 / 45.1 / 45.13)

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.6

SRO 3.6

2.2.5 Knowledge of the process for making design or operating changes to the facility.

(CFR: 41.10 / 43.3 / 45.13)

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 2.2

SRO 3.2

2.2.6 Knowledge of the process for making changes to procedures.

(CFR: 41.10 / 43.3 / 45.13)

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.0

SRO 3.6

2.2.7 Knowledge of the process for conducting special or infrequent tests.

(CFR: 41.10 / 43.3 / 45.13)

IMPORTANCE RO 2.9

SRO 3.6

- **2.2.8 Deleted**
- **2.2.9 Deleted**
- 2.2.10 **Deleted**

#### **2.2** Equipment Control (continued)

2.2.11 Knowledge of the process for controlling temporary design changes.

(CFR: 41.10 / 43.3 / 45.13)

IMPORTANCE RO 2.3 SRO 3.3

2.2.12 Knowledge of surveillance procedures.

(CFR: 41.10 / 45.13)

IMPORTANCE RO 3.7 SRO 4.1

2.2.13 Knowledge of tagging and clearance procedures.

(CFR: 41.10 / 45.13)

IMPORTANCE RO 4.1 SRO 4.3

2.2.14 Knowledge of the process for controlling equipment configuration or status.

(CFR: 41.10 / 43.3 / 45.13)

IMPORTANCE RO 3.9 SRO 4.3

2.2.15 Ability to determine the expected plant configuration using design and configuration control documentation, such as drawings, line-ups, tag-outs, etc.

(CFR: 41.10 / 43.3 / 45.13)

IMPORTANCE RO 3.9 SRO 4.3

#### 2.2.16 **Deleted**

2.2.17 Knowledge of the process for managing maintenance activities during power operations, such as risk assessments, work prioritization, and coordination with the transmission system operator.

(CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13)

IMPORTANCE RO 2.6 SRO 3.8

2.2.18 Knowledge of the process for managing maintenance activities during shutdown operations, such as risk assessments, work prioritization, etc.

(CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13)

IMPORTANCE RO 2.6 SRO 3.9

2.2.19 Knowledge of maintenance work order requirements.

(CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13)

IMPORTANCE RO 2.3 SRO 3.4

2.2 **Equipment Control (continued)** 2.2.20 Knowledge of the process for managing troubleshooting activities. (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13) **IMPORTANCE RO 2.6 SRO 3.8** 2.2.21 Knowledge of pre- and post-maintenance operability requirements. (CFR: 41.10 / 43.2) **IMPORTANCE** RO 2.9 SRO 4.1 2.2.22 Knowledge of limiting conditions for operations and safety limits. (CFR: 41.5 / 43.2 / 45.2) RO 4.0 SRO 4.7 **IMPORTANCE** 2.2.23 Ability to track Technical Specification limiting conditions for operations. (CFR: 41.10 / 43.2 / 45.13) **IMPORTANCE** RO 3.1 SRO 4.6 2.2.24 Moved to **2.2.36** 2.2.25 Knowledge of the bases in Technical Specifications for limiting conditions for operations and safety limits. (CFR: 41.5 / 41.7 / 43.2) **IMPORTANCE** RO 3.2 SRO 4.2 2.2.26 Moved to **2.1.40** 2.2.27 Moved to 2.1.41 2.2.28 Moved to 2.1.42 2.2.29 Moved to 2.1.35 2.2.30 Moved to 2.1.44 2.2.31 Revised and moved to **2.1.36** 2.2.32 **Deleted** 2.2.33 **Deleted** 2.2.34 Revised and moved to **2.1.43** 

#### **2.2** Equipment Control (continued)

2.2.35 Ability to determine Technical Specification Mode of Operation.

(CFR: 41.7 / 41.10 / 43.2 / 45.13) IMPORTANCE RO 3.6 SRO 4.5

2.2.36 Ability to analyze the effect of maintenance activities, such as degraded power sources, on the status of limiting conditions for operations.

(CFR: 41.10 / 43.2 / 45.13) IMPORTANCE RO 3.1 SRO 4.2

2.2.37 Ability to determine operability and/or availability of safety related equipment.

(CFR: 41.7 / 43.5 / 45.12) IMPORTANCE RO 3.6 SRO 4.6

2.2.38 Knowledge of conditions and limitations in the facility license.

(CFR: 41.7 / 41.10 / 43.1 / 45.13) IMPORTANCE RO 3.6 SRO 4.5

2.2.39 Knowledge of less than or equal to one hour Technical Specification action statements for systems.

(CFR: 41.7 / 41.10 / 43.2 / 45.13) IMPORTANCE RO 3.9 SRO 4.5

2.2.40 Ability to apply Technical Specifications for a system.

(CFR: 41.10 / 43.2 / 43.5 / 45.3) IMPORTANCE RO 3.4 SRO 4.7

2.2.41 Ability to obtain and interpret station electrical and mechanical drawings.

(CFR: 41.10 / 45.12 / 45.13) IMPORTANCE RO 3.5 SRO 3.9

2.2.42 Ability to recognize system parameters that are entry-level conditions for Technical Specifications.

(CFR: 41.7 / 41.10 / 43.2 / 43.3 / 45.3) IMPORTANCE RO 3.9 SRO 4.6

2.2.43 Knowledge of the process used to track inoperable alarms.

(CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13) IMPORTANCE RO 3.0 SRO 3.3

## 2.2 Equipment Control (continued)

2.2.44 Ability to interpret control room indications to verify the status and operation of a system, and understand how operator actions and directives affect plant and system conditions.

(CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.12) IMPORTANCE RO 4.2 SRO 4.4

- 2.3 Radiation Control
- 2.3.1 **Deleted**
- 2.3.2 **Deleted**
- 2.3.3 **Deleted**
- 2.3.4 Knowledge of radiation exposure limits under normal or emergency conditions.

(CFR: 41.12 / 43.4 / 45.10)

IMPORTANCE RO 3.2 SRO 3.7

2.3.5 Ability to use radiation monitoring systems, such as fixed radiation monitors and alarms, portable survey instruments, personnel monitoring equipment, etc.

(CFR: 41.11 / 41.12 / 43.4 / 45.9)

IMPORTANCE RO 2.9 SRO 2.9

2.3.6 Ability to approve release permits.

(CFR: 41.13 / 43.4 / 45.10)

IMPORTANCE RO 2.0 SRO 3.8

2.3.7 Ability to comply with radiation work permit requirements during normal or abnormal conditions.

(CFR: 41.12 / 45.10)

IMPORTANCE RO 3.5 SRO 3.6

- 2.3.8 Deleted
- 2.3.9 **Deleted**
- 2.3.10 **Deleted**
- 2.3.11 Ability to control radiation releases.

(CFR: 41.11 / 43.4 / 45.10)

IMPORTANCE RO 3.8 SRO 4.3

2.3.12 Knowledge of radiological safety principles pertaining to licensed operator duties, such as containment entry requirements, fuel handling responsibilities, access to locked high-radiation areas, aligning filters, etc.

(CFR: 41.12 / 45.9 / 45.10)

IMPORTANCE RO 3.2 SRO 3.7

2.3 Radiation Control (continued)

2.3.13 Knowledge of radiological safety procedures pertaining to licensed operator duties, such as response to radiation monitor alarms, containment entry requirements, fuel handling responsibilities, access to locked high-radiation areas, aligning filters, etc.

(CFR: 41.12 / 43.4 / 45.9 / 45.10) IMPORTANCE RO 3.4 SRO 3.8

2.3.14 Knowledge of radiation or contamination hazards that may arise during normal, abnormal, or emergency conditions or activities.

(CFR: 41.12 / 43.4 / 45.10) IMPORTANCE RO 3.4 SRO 3.8

2.3.15 Knowledge of radiation monitoring systems, such as fixed radiation monitors and alarms, portable survey instruments, personnel monitoring equipment, etc.

(CFR: 41.12 / 43.4 / 45.9) IMPORTANCE RO 2.9 SRO 3.1 2.4 Emergency Procedures / Plan

2.4.1 Knowledge of EOP entry conditions and immediate action steps.

(CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13)

IMPORTANCE RO 4.6 SRO 4.8

2.4.2 Knowledge of system set points, interlocks and automatic actions associated with EOP entry conditions.

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.7 / 45.8)

IMPORTANCE RO 4.5 SRO 4.6

2.4.3 Ability to identify post-accident instrumentation.

(CFR: 41.6 / 45.4)

IMPORTANCE RO 3.7 SRO 3.9

2.4.4 Ability to recognize abnormal indications for system operating parameters that are entry-level conditions for emergency and abnormal operating procedures.

(CFR: 41.10 / 43.2 / 45.6)

IMPORTANCE RO 4.5 SRO 4.7

2.4.5 Knowledge of the organization of the operating procedures network for normal, abnormal, and emergency evolutions.

(CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13)

IMPORTANCE RO 3.7 SRO 4.3

2.4.6 Knowledge of EOP mitigation strategies.

(CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13)

IMPORTANCE RO 3.7 SRO 4.7

- **2.4.7 Deleted**
- 2.4.8 Knowledge of how abnormal operating procedures are used in conjunction with EOPs.

(CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13)

IMPORTANCE RO 3.8 SRO 4.5

2.4.9 Knowledge of low power/shutdown implications in accident (e.g., loss of coolant accident or loss of residual heat removal) mitigation strategies.

(CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13)

IMPORTANCE RO 3.8 SRO 4.2

2.4 **Emergency Procedures / Plan (continued)** 2.4.10 **Deleted** 2.4.11 Knowledge of abnormal condition procedures. (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13) SRO 4.2 **IMPORTANCE** RO 4.0 2.4.12 Knowledge of general operating crew responsibilities during emergency operations. (CFR: 41.10 / 45.12) RO 4.0 **IMPORTANCE** SRO 4.3 2.4.13 Knowledge of crew roles and responsibilities during EOP usage. (CFR: 41.10 / 45.12) **IMPORTANCE** RO 4.0 SRO 4.6 2.4.14 Knowledge of general guidelines for EOP usage. (CFR: 41.10 / 45.13) **IMPORTANCE** RO 3.8 SRO 4.5 2.4.15 Revised and moved to **2.1.38** 2.4.16 Knowledge of EOP implementation hierarchy and coordination with other support procedures or guidelines such as, operating procedures, abnormal operating procedures, and severe accident management guidelines. (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13) **IMPORTANCE** RO 3.5 SRO 4.4 2.4.17 Knowledge of EOP terms and definitions. (CFR: 41.10 / 45.13) **IMPORTANCE** RO 3.9 SRO 4.3 2.4.18 Knowledge of the specific bases for EOPs. (CFR: 41.10 / 43.1 / 45.13) IMPORTANCE RO 3.3 SRO 4.0 2.4.19 Knowledge of EOP layout, symbols, and icons. (CFR: 41.10 / 45.13) **IMPORTANCE** RO 3.4 SRO 4.1 2.4.20 Knowledge of the operational implications of EOP warnings, cautions, and notes. (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13) **IMPORTANCE** RO 3.8 SRO 4.3

- 2.4 Emergency Procedures / Plan (continued)
- 2.4.21 Knowledge of the parameters and logic used to assess the status of safety functions, such as reactivity control, core cooling and heat removal, reactor coolant system integrity, containment conditions, radioactivity release control, etc.

(CFR: 41.7 / 43.5 / 45.12) IMPORTANCE RO 4.0 SRO 4.6

2.4.22 Knowledge of the bases for prioritizing safety functions during abnormal/emergency operations.

(CFR: 41.7 / 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.12) IMPORTANCE RO 3.6 SRO 4.4

2.4.23 Knowledge of the bases for prioritizing emergency procedure implementation during emergency operations.

(CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13) IMPORTANCE RO 3.4 SRO 4.4

- 2.4.24 **Deleted**
- 2.4.25 Knowledge of fire protection procedures.

(CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13) IMPORTANCE RO 3.3 SRO 3.7

2.4.26 Knowledge of facility protection requirements, including fire brigade and portable fire fighting equipment usage.

(CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.12) IMPORTANCE RO 3.1 SRO 3.6

2.4.27 Knowledge of "fire in the plant" procedures.

(CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13) IMPORTANCE RO 3.4 SRO 3.9

2.4.28 Knowledge of procedures relating to a security event (non-safeguards information).

(CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13) IMPORTANCE RO 3.2 SRO 4.1

2.4.29 Knowledge of the emergency plan.

(CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.11) IMPORTANCE RO 3.1 SRO 4.4 2.4 Emergency Procedures / Plan (continued)

2.4.30 Knowledge of events related to system operation/status that must be reported to internal organizations or external agencies, such as the State, the NRC, or the transmission system operator.

(CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.11)

IMPORTANCE RO 2.7

SRO 4.1

2.4.31 Knowledge of annunciator alarms, indications, or response procedures.

(CFR: 41.10 / 45.3)

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 4.2

SRO 4.1

2.4.32 Knowledge of operator response to loss of all annunciators.

(CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13)

IMPORTANCE RO 3.6

SRO 4.0

2.4.33 Moved to **2.2.43** 

2.4.34 Knowledge of RO tasks performed outside the main control room during an emergency and the resultant operational effects.

(CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13)

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 4.2

SRO 4.1

2.4.35 Knowledge of local auxiliary operator tasks during an emergency and the resultant operational effects.

(CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13)

IMPORTANCE

RO 3.8

SRO 4.0

2.4.36 **Deleted** 

2.4.37 Knowledge of the lines of authority during implementation of the emergency plan.

(CFR: 41.10 / 45.13)

IMPORTANCE RO

RO 3.0

SRO 4.1

2.4.38 Ability to take actions called for in the facility emergency plan, including supporting or acting as emergency coordinator if required.

(CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.11)

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 2.4

SRO 4.4

2.4.39 Knowledge of RO responsibilities in emergency plan implementation.

(CFR: 41.10 / 45.11)

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.9

SRO 3.8

2.4 **Emergency Procedures / Plan (continued)** 2.4.40 Knowledge of SRO responsibilities in emergency plan implementation. (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.11) IMPORTANCE RO 2.7 SRO 4.5 2.4.41 Knowledge of the emergency action level thresholds and classifications. (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.11) **IMPORTANCE** RO 2.9 SRO 4.6 2.4.42 Knowledge of emergency response facilities. (CFR: 41.10 / 45.11) **IMPORTANCE** RO 2.6 **SRO 3.8** 2.4.43 Knowledge of emergency communications systems and techniques. (CFR: 41.10 / 45.13) IMPORTANCE RO 3.2 **SRO 3.8** 2.4.44 Knowledge of emergency plan protective action recommendations. (CFR: 41.10 / 41.12 / 43.5 / 45.11) SRO 4.4 **IMPORTANCE** RO 2.4 2.4.45 Ability to prioritize and interpret the significance of each annunciator or alarm. (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.12) **IMPORTANCE** RO 4.1 SRO 4.3 2.4.46 Ability to verify that the alarms are consistent with the plant conditions. (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.12) **IMPORTANCE** RO 4.2 SRO 4.2 2.4.47 Ability to diagnose and recognize trends in an accurate and timely manner utilizing the appropriate control room reference material. (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.12) **IMPORTANCE** RO 4.2 SRO 4.2 2.4.48 Revised and moved to **2.2.44** 2.4.49 Ability to perform without reference to procedures those actions that require

SRO 4.4

immediate operation of system components and controls.

(CFR: 41.10 / 43.2 / 45.6)

**RO 4.6** 

**IMPORTANCE** 

- 2.4 Emergency Procedures / Plan (continued)
- 2.4.50 Ability to verify system alarm setpoints and operate controls identified in the alarm response manual.

(CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.3)

IMPORTANCE RO 4.2 SRO 4.0

# **Safety Function 1:**

Reactivity Control		page
001	Control Rod Drive System	3.1-2
004	Chemical and Volume Control System	3.1-11
014	Rod Position Indication System	3.1-21

#### 001 Control Rod Drive System

TASK: Perform full-length control rod assembly drop time test

Disconnect and connect control rod drive shaft from control rod Perform safety group transfer operations between the dc hold and auxiliary power supplies

Operate control rods to shape axial power

Perform individual rod transfer operations between the normal and auxiliary power supplies

Perform regulating group transfer operations between the normal and auxiliary power supplies

De-energize a CRDM

operate control rods manually while the reactor is at power (Mode 1)

Establish initial conditions for reactor startup

Perform estimated critical position calculations

Perform control rod programming verification

Start up the CRDS

Perform rod group latching and position indication alignment

Manually trip the reactor

Adjust overlap between sequential rods

Perform a shutdown group withdrawal

Operate the CRDS to bring the reactor critical

Shift the control rod drive mode of control from manual sequential to automatic sequential

Shift the control rod drive mode between automatic and manual group or manual individual

Shift the control rod drive mode between manual group or manual individual and manual sequential

Operate the CRDS to shut down the reactor

Secure rod drive M/G sets

Shut down the CRDS

Start up rod drive M/G sets

Perform SDM calculations

Recover from a sequence inhibit situation

Level a control rod while in the automatic mode of control

<u>K/A NO.</u>	KNOWLEDGE	IMPORTANCE RO \$60	
K1	Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the CRDS and the following systems:		
	(CFR: 41.2 to 41.9 / 45.7 to 45.8)		
K1.01	CCW	3.0*	3.2*
K1.02	CVCS	3.6*	3.7*
K1.03	CRDM	3.4	3.6
K1.04	RCS	3.2*	3.4*
K1.05	NIS and RPS	4.5	4.4
K1.06	WGDS	1.7*	2.0*
K1.07	Quench tank	1.7*	2.1*
K1.08	CCWS: must be shut down to prevent condensation on		
	CRDM stators	2.2*	2.4*
K1.09	CCWS must be cut in before energizing CRDS	2.8*	3.1*
K2	Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following: (CFR: 41.7)		
K2.01	One-line diagram of power supply to M/G sets	3.5	3.6
K2.02	One-line diagram of power supply to trip breakers	3.6	3.7
K2.02 K2.03	One-line diagram of power supplies to logic circuits	2.7*	3.1
K2.03	One-time diagram of power supplies to logic circuits	2.7	3.1
K2.04	Control rod lift coil	2.1*	2.7
K2.05	M/G sets	3.1*	3.5
K2.06	Circuit breakers	2.4	2.8
K2.07	Sensors and detectors	2.1	2.4
K2.07 K2.08	Motors	1.7	2.1
<b>K</b> 2.00	Wiotors	1./	2.1
К3	Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the CRDS will have on the following: (CFR: 41.7/45.6)		
K3.01	CVCS	2.9*	3.0*
K3.02	RCS	3.4*	3.5
K3.03	CCW	2.2*	2.4*
K4	Knowledge of CRDS design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: (CFR: 41.7)		
K4.01	Rod position indication	3.5	3.8
K4.01 K4.02	Control rod mode select control (movement control)	3.8	3.8
K4.02 K4.03	Rod control logic	3.5	3.8
K4.03 K4.04	Circuitry and principle of operation for LVDT or reed	5.5	3.0
127.07	switch	2.5	2.8
	SWILCH	2.3	2.0

K4.05	Boration and dilution	3.9*	3.9
K4.06	Indication of what caused reactor trip (first-out panel)	3.7	4.2
K4.07	Rod stops	3.7	3.8
K4.08	Prevention of excessive rod movement	3.2*	3.4
K4.09	Recovery of dropped rod	3.9	4.1
K4.10	Trip signals that would prevent reset of reactor trip signals	3.6	3.8
K4.11	Resetting of CRDM circuit breakers	2.7	2.9
K4.12	Re-zeroing rod demand position counters.	2.5	2.6
K4.13	Operation of CRDS controls for withdrawing lingering rods and		
	transferring rods and rod groups	3.4	3.4
K4.14	Operation parameters, including proper rod speed	2.6	2.8
K4.15	Operation of latching controls for groups and individual rods	2.7	3.0
K4.16	Synchronization of power supplies to CRDS	2.2	2.4
K4.17	Override (bypass) for rod bank motion when one rod is bottomed	2.9*	3.1
K4.18	Configuration of control/shutdown rods in core	2.1	2.5
K4.19	How contactors absorb arcing where used in conjunction with circuit		
	breakers	1.4	1.5
K4.20	The permissives and interlocks associated with increase from zero power	3.2	3.4
K4.21	Prevention of adverse chemical conditions	1.9	2.3
K4.22	Seismic considerations	1.4	1.8
K4.23	Rod motion inhibit	3.4	3.8
K5	Knowledge of the following operational implications as they apply to the CRDS:		
	(CFR: 41.5/45.7)		
K5.01	Understanding and application of individual and over-lapped rod		
	bank curves	3.3	3.7
K5.02	Definitions of differential rod worth and integral rod worth;		
	their applications	2.9	3.4
K5.03	Principles of operation of rod drive motor (magnetic jack or roller nut)	2.1	2.4
K5.04	Rod insertion limits	4.3	4.7
K5.05	Interpretation of rod worth curves, including proper curve to use:		
	all rods in (ARI), all rods out (ARO), hot zero power (HZP),		
	hot full power (HFP)	3.5	3.9
K5.06	Effects of control rod motion on axial offset	3.8	4.1
K5.07	Effects of an asymmetric rod configuration on power distribution	3.3	4.0
K5 08	Reasons for rod insertion limits and their effect on shutdown margin	3.9	44

K5.09	Relationships between reactivity due to boron and reactivity due to control rod	3.5	3.7
K5.10	Effect of rod motion on core power distribution and RCS temperatures	3.9	4.1
K5.11	Relationship between reactivity worth of power-shaping control rod group and other control rod groups (power-shaping, or part-length, rods	3.7	
	have much less reactivity than full-length control rods)	3.1	3.6*
K5.12	Effects on power of inserting axial shaping rods	3.4*	4.1*
K5.12	Effects of past power history on xenon concentration and samarium	3.4	7.1
13.13	concentration	3.7	4.0
K5.14	Interpretation of isothermal temperature coefficient; ability to apply it with	3.7	1.0
13.14	respect to isothermal temperature defect	2.3	2.8
K5.15	Relationship between RCS temperature and MTC	3.4	3.7
K5.16	Relationship between RCS temperature and NDT of vessel	3.4	4.0
K5.17	Sources for adding positive reactivity	4.2	4.2
K5.17	Anticipation of criticality at any time when adding	7.2	7.2
113.10	positive reactivity during startup	4.2	4.3
K5.19	Reasons for using boron in the reactor	3.1	3.4
K5.20	Effects of RCS temperature on boron reactivity worth	2.8	3.2
K5.21	Unit of measure of RCS boron concentration	2.2	2.5
K5.22	Reason for use of peak samarium instead of equilibrium	2.2	2.3
113.22	samarium in shutdown margin calculations	2.2	2.5
K5.23	Definition and effects of xenon absorption cross section	2.2	2.6
K5.24	Definition and effects of moderator absorption cross section	2.1	2.4
K5.25	Definition and effects of moderator scattering cross section	1.8	2.1
K5.26	Definition of moderator temperature coefficient; application to reactor		
	control	3.3	3.6
K5.27	Interpretation of isothermal temperature coefficient; ability to apply		
	it with respect to the isothermal temperature defect	2.4*	2.8*
K5.28	Boron reactivity worth vs. boron concentration, i.e., amount of boron		
	needed (ppm) to change core reactivity to desired amount	3.5	3.8
K5.29	Effect on reactivity of changes in T-ave	3.7	3.9
K5.30	Effects of fuel burnout on reactivity in the core	2.9	3.1
K5.31	Concept of equilibrium with respect to isotope production and decay	2.6	3.0
K5.32	Fission process	2.5	2.8
K5.33	Xenon production and removal process	3.2	3.5
K5.34	Effects of power level on peak samarium	2.1	2.2
K5.35	Methods of samarium production and removal	2.1	2.3
K5.36	Significance of sign (always minus) of a calculated power defect	3.1	3.4
K5.37	Sources of decay heat and effects on RCS	3.6	4.1
K5.38	Definition of xenon transient; causes; effects on reactivity	3.5	4.1
K5.39	Definition and units of reactivity	2.7	2.9

K5.40	Definition of ppm	2.0	2.2
K5.41	Theory of radioactive decay of reactor poisons such as		
	<sup>131</sup> I, <sup>135</sup> Xe	2.4	2.8
K5.42	Definitions of T-ave and no-load T-ave	2.9	3.0
K5.43	Definition of T-ref	3.2	3.4
K5.44	Definition of isothermal temperature defect	2.2	2.6
K5.45	Heat transfer formulas for primary and secondary coolant	2.4	2.9
K5.46	Hot channel factors	2.3	3.6
K5.47	Factors affecting SUR: b-eff, l, p	2.9	3.4
K5.48	Definition of fuel temperature (Doppler) effect	3.3	3.5
K5.49	Definitions and effects of factors affecting power defect: moderator		
	temperature defect, fuel temperature defect, moderator void defect,		
	redistribution, individual contribution effects (the summation of all defects)		3.4
	3.7		
K5.50	Definition of moderator void defect	2.2	2.5
K5.51	Definition of xenon oscillation	3.1	3.7
K5.52	Definition and purpose of axial offset	3.0	3.6
K5.53	Definition of delta flux and its relationship to axial offset	2.8	3.4
K5.54	Definition and units of reactivity	2.8	3.1
K5.55	Definition and function of moderator	3.0	3.2
K5.56	Determination of degrees of subcooling, using temperature and		
	pressure indications for primary coolant	4.2	4.6
K5.57	Interpretation of rod drop test data	2.2	2.5
K5.58	Reason for overlap of control banks	2.7	3.2
K5.59	Reasons for overlap of control rod banks for withdrawal and insertion	2.7	3.4
K5.60	Reason for using M/G sets to power rod control system	1.9	2.4
K5.61	Operational theory for M/G sets	1.5	1.7
K5.62	Effects of RCS temperature on rod worth	2.2	2.8
K5.63	Meaning of zero SUR; reactor just critical or completely shut down	3.3*	3.4
K5.64	Reason for withdrawing shutdown group: to provide adequate shutdown	0.0	٠
	margin	3.3	3.8
K5.65	CRDS circuitry, including effects of primary/secondary	0.0	0.0
120.00	power mismatch on rod motion	3.2	3.6
K5.66	Not Used	N/A	N/A
K5.67	Nucleonics associated with startup	2.9	3.2
K5.68	Understanding of "cold-water" (startup) accidents	3.4	3.8
K5.69	Purpose of overlap between source and intermediate range instrumentation	2.9	3.6
K5.70	Method used to parallel the rod control M/G sets	2.1	2.6
K5.71	Reason for maintaining cross-tie breaker between rod drive M/G sets;	2.1	2.0
13.71	reliability of control rod drive trip breakers during operation of one M/G set		2.4
	remainity of control for differ the breakers during operation of one with set		2.9
K5.72	Reactivity balance (shutdown withdrawal precedes dilution)	3.1	3.6
K5.72 K5.73	Need for maintenance of stable plant conditions during rod exercising	2.7	3.1
K5.74	Reactor may <u>not</u> go critical upon withdrawal of a shut-down group	3.7	4.0
K5.74 K5.75	Definition, uses, and calculation of l/m plot	2.9	3.5
K5 76	Effects on power of inserting axial shaping rods	2.9 3.3*	3.7*
IN.2.7(1)	Laticus on dowel of inserting axial shading lous	1. 7	.)./"

K5.77	Determination of the amount of boron needed to back out		
	rods from the core, including effects of xenon	3.2	3.6
K5.78	Response effects on T-ave. of dilution without rod motion	3.3	3.5
K5.79	Effects of positioning of axial shape rods on SDM	3.0*	3.6*
K5.80	Prediction of changes in boron concentration due to		
	power operation, dilution, or boration	3.4	3.9
K5.81	Determination (using plant curve book) of reactivity		
	change associated with the difference in boron concentration	3.2	3.6
K5.82	Interpretation of differential and integral boron worth curves	2.7	3.1
K5.83	Approximation of change in reactivity due to change in		
	boron concentration (using differential boron thumb rule)	3.4	3.5
K5.84	Significance of sign change (plus or minus) in reactivity		
	due to change in boron concentration	3.3	3.5
K5.85	Estimation of xenon reactivity based on time to reach peak xenon after		
	trip/shutdown, approximate peak xenon reactivities after shutdown		
	from various power levels, approximate xenon worth during the decay process		
	following peak worth	3.5	3.7
K5.86	Significance of sign change (plus or minus) in reactivity due to change		
	in samarium level	2.3	2.7
K5.87	Magnitude of heat decay as a function of time after shutdown	3.2	3.5
K5.88	Effects of boron on temperature coefficient	2.9	3.4
K5.89	Relationships of axial offset to ECP: method of recovery from high power		
	trip, allowing for xenon transient, with minimum boron movement	2.3	3.2
K5.90	Estimation of core life based on RCS boron concentration (correlation		
	of estimated critical boron concentration with time in core life)	2.3*	3.1*
K5.91	Estimation of samarium reactivity based on time to reach peak samarium		
	after trip/shutdown, and on approximate peak samarium reactivities after		
	shutdown from various power levels	1.9	2.4
K5.92	Comparison of actual data with historical data to		
	determine whether a trend exists	2.1	3.1
K5.93	Axial offset problems caused by xenon oscillations (and their		
	application to Tech-Spec power limitations)	3.2	4.1
K5.94	Definition of shutdown margin	3.3	3.6
K5.95	Effect of reactor power changes on RCS temperature	3.4	3.7
K5.96	Sign changes (plus or minus) in reactivity, obtained when		
	positive reactivities are added to negative reactivities	3.2	3.4
K5.97	Relationship of T-ave. to T-ref	3.3	3.6
K5.98	Effect of adding high or low boron concentration to		
	maintain T-ave. equal to T-ref	3.4	3.8

K6	Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction on the following CRDS components: (CFR: 41.7/45.7)		
K6.01	Control rod configuration and construction material	2.2	2.5
K6.02	Purpose and operation of sensors feeding into the CRDS	2.8	3.3
K6.03	Reactor trip breakers, including controls	3.7	4.2
K6.04	Breakers, relays, and disconnects	2.4	2.8
K6.05	Sensors and detectors	2.4	2.7
K6.06	Motors	2.1	2.1
K6.07	Transformers and voltage regulators	1.8	2.0
K6.08	Purpose and position switch of alarm for high flux at shutdown	2.9*	3.2*
K6.09	Purpose and operation of neutron flux recorder at high		
	speed concentration	2.9*	2.9*
K6.10	Location and operation of rod control M/G sets and control		
	panel, including trips	3.1*	3.3
K6.11	Location and operation of CRDS fault detection (trouble alarms) and reset		
	system, including rod control annunciator	2.9	3.2
K6.12	Location and interpretation of CRDS ac/dc status alarms	2.9*	3.2*
K6.13	Location and operation of RPIS	3.6	3.7
K6.14	Location and interpretation of reactor trip breaker	4.0	4.1
A1	ABILITY  Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the CRDS controls including: (CFR: 41.5/45.5)		
A1.01	T-ave. and no-load T-ave	3.8	4.2
A1.02	T-ref	3.1	3.4
A1.03	S/G level and pressure	3.6	3.7
A1.04	PZR level and pressures	3.7	3.9
A1.05	Effect on T-ave. of dilution without rod motion compensation	3.4	3.9
A1.06	Reactor power	4.1	4.4
A1.07	RCS average temperature indications (T-ave.)	3.7	4.0
A1.08	Verification that CRDS temperatures are within limits before starting	2.6	3.0
A1.09	Location and interpretation of RCS temperature and pressure		
	indications	4.2	4.4
A1.10	Location and operation of controls and indications for CRDS		
	component cooling water	2.9	2.7
A1.11	Required primary system subcooling during shutdown;		
	location of indication	3.7	3.9
A1.12	Estimation of decay heat load, in order to control RCS		
	temperature with proper amount of heat removal	2.9	3.4
A1.13	"Prepower dependent insertion limit" and power dependent		
	insertion limit, determined with metroscope	4.0?	4.27

#### SYSTEM: 001 Control Rod Drive System **A2** Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunction or operations on the CRDS- and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: (CFR: 41.5/43.5/45.3/45.13) A2.01 Loss of CCW or fan cooling ..... 3.1 3.7 A2.02 Loss of power source to reactor trip breakers ..... 4.3 3.8 A2.03 4.2 Effect of stuck rod or Misaligned rod ..... 3.5 A2.04 Positioning of axial shaping rods and their effect on 3.2\* 3.8\* A2.05 Fractured split pins ..... 1.9? 1.9? A2.06 3.4 3.7 A2.07 Effect of reactor trip on primary and secondary parameters and systems . . 4.1 4.4 A2.08 Loss of CCW to CRDS ..... 2.9 3.3 A2.09 Station blackout ..... 3.8\* 4.0 A2.10 Loss of power to one or more M/G sets ...... 3.4 3.9 A2.11 4.4 4.7 A2.12 3.6 4.2 A2.13 ATWS ..... 4.4 4.6 A2.14 Urgent failure alarm, including rod-out-of-sequence and 3.7 3.9 Quadrant power tilt ..... A2.15 3.6 4.2 A2.16 Possible causes of mismatched control rods ..... 3.0 3.8 A2.17 Rod-misalignment alarm ..... 3.3 3.8 A2.18 Incorrect rod stepping sequence ..... 3.2 3.8 A2.19 Axial flux distribution ..... 4.0 3.6 Isolation of left coil on affected rod to prevent coil burnout ..... A2.20 2.6\* 3.6\* **A3** Ability to monitor automatic operation of the CRDS, including: (CFR: 41.7/45.13) Reactor power ..... A3.01 4.1 4.0 A3.02 Rod height ..... 3.6 3.7 A3.03 Axial imbalance ..... 3.6 3.8 3.5 A3.04 3.8 A3.05 3.5 3.5 A3.06 RCS temperature and pressure ..... 3.9 3.9

positive reactivity ......

Anticipation of criticality at any time when adding

A3.07

A3.08

4.1

3.9

3.7

4.0

#### **A4** Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: (CFR: 41.7/45.5 to 45.8) A4.01 Controls for CCWS 3.1 2.9 A4.02 4.1 3.9 A4.03 4.0 3.7 A4.04 3.9\* 3.6\* A4.05 Determination of the amount of boron needed to back the rods out of the core, including xenon effects if equilibrium is not yet achieved . . . . . . 3.7 3.7 A4.06 Control rod drive disconnect/connect ..... 2.9 3.2 A4.07 3.3? 3.3? A4.08 Mode select for CRDS; operation of rod control M/G sets and control panel ..... 3.7 3.4 CCWS ..... A4.09 2.8 3.1 A4.10 3.5 3.9 Determination of SDM ..... A4.11 3.5 4.1 A4.12 Stopping T/G load changes; only make minor adjustments 2.9\* 2.9 A4.13 Stopping other changes in plant, e.g., turbine, S/G, SDBCS, boration, before adjusting rods ..... 2.7\* 2.9\* A4.14 Resetting rod control logic while recovering from misaligned rod, using instrument Tech-Specs ..... 3.0 3.4 A4.15 Stopping boration/dilution or other means of reactivity change while adjusting either rod position or T-ave ..... 3.1\* 3.1\*

#### 004 Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS)

TASK: Perform lineup of the CVCS

Perform boron concentration dilution (bleed) of the RCS

Perform boration (feed) for the RCS

Perform boration system flow path verification

Fill and vent the CVCS

Perform boration flow-path verification

Start up the CVCS

Perform borated water source operability verification

What if RCS temperature starts to increase after placing demineralizer in service?

Nitrogen purge the VCT

Perform boric acid pump functional test

What if estimated critical position is not calculated properly and

reactor goes critical before it is expected?

Perform hydrogen purge and establish hydrogen overpressure

Shut down the CVCS

Operate the CVCS to increase the primary system pressure

Perform boron concentration change calculations

Shift to automatic feed and bleed of the RCS

Operate a mixed-bed demineralizer

Operate the cation bed demineralizer

Operate a deborating demineralizer

Perform RCS dilution using purification demineralizer in series with deborating demineralizer

Deborate to a critical condition during reactor startup

Monitor the CVCS operation

Perform excess letdown to either VCT or radwaste

Perform excess letdown to the reactor coolant drain/CVCS holdup tank

Operate the CVCS to form a steam bubble in the PZR

Operate the CVCS to collapse the steam bubble in the PZR

Switch the letdown filters (post-demineralizer filters)

Operate letdown coolers

Operate seal injection subsystem (auto-manual)

Vent a volume control/makeup tank (VCT)

Manual makeup to the VCT

Perform low-pressure purification using the RHRS

Degas the RCS through the VCT

Adjust the charging flow rate

Adjust the letdown flow rate

Change the seal injection filters

Operate the CVCS to make up to the RWST

Degas the RCS through the PZR

### SYSTEM 004 Chemical and Volume Control System

			<b>IMPORTANCE</b>	
K/A NO.	KNOWLEDGE	RO	<u>SRO</u>	
K1	Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the CVCS and the following systems:			
	(CFR: 41.2 to 41.9 / 45.7 to 45.8)			
K1.01	PZR LCS	3.6	4.0	
K1.02	PZR and RCS temperature and pressure relationships	3.5	3.8	
K1.03	Operation, function and control of T/G	2.2	2.6	
K1.04	RCPS, including seal injection flows	3.4	3.8	
K1.05	CRDS operation in automatic mode control	2.7*	3.2	
K1.06	Makeup system to VCT	3.1	3.1	
K1.07	NIS	2.6	2.9	
K1.08	Interface of CVCS with PRT	2.2	2.4	
K1.09	Relationship between CVCS and RPIS	2.2*	2.7	
K1.10	Pneumatic valves and RHRS	2.7	2.9	
K1.11	Expected PRT response when opening PORV during bubble			
	formation in PZR	2.9	3.2	
K1.12	Nitrogen systems	2.4	2.6	
K1.13	Hydrogen systems	2.8	2.9	
K1.14	IAS	2.6	2.8	
K1.15	ECCS	3.8	4.0	
K1.16	Boric acid storage tank	3.3	3.5	
K1.17	PZR	3.4	3.4	
K1.18	CCWS	2.9	3.2	
K1.19	Primary grade water supply	2.7	2.9	
K1.19	Location of sample points for chemically sampled fluid	2.7	2.)	
K1.20	systems	1.7	2.5	
K1.21	WGDS	2.4	2.8	
K1.21	BWST	3.4	3.7	
K1.22 K1.23	RWST	3.4	3.7	
K1.23	RHRS	3.4	3.9	
K1.24 K1.25	Interface between HPI flow path and excess letdown flow path	2.7*	3.2*	
K1.25 K1.26	Flow path from CVCS to reactor coolant drain tank and holdup tank	2.7	2.8	
K1.20 K1.27		2.7*	2.3*	
K1.27 K1.28	Relationship between seal filter and letdown filter	2.3*	2.4*	
· -	Interface between high-activity waste tank and letdown filter drain	2.1	2.4	
K1.29	Effect and detection of leaking PORV or relief on PZR level and	2.4	4.0	
V1 20	pressure, including VCT makeup activity in automatic mode	3.4	4.0	
K1.30	Relationship between letdown flow and RCS pressure	2.9	3.1	
K1.31	Interface between CVCS and degassifier (WGDS)	2.3	2.5	
K1.32	Minimum VCT pressure effect on RCP seals	2.8 2.3*	3.1 2.7*	
K1 33	Interface between clean waste receiver tank and seal injection filters	7. 15	1.1*	

## SYSTEM 004 Chemical and Volume Control System

K1.34 K1.35 K1.36	Interface between CVCS and reactor coolant drain tank; and PZR PCS Understanding of interface with LRS	2.7 2.5 2.6	2.9 2.8 2.8
K2	<b>Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following:</b> (CFR: 41.7)		
K2.01 K2.02 K2.03 K2.04 K2.05 K2.06 K2.07	Boric acid makeup pumps  Makeup pumps Charging pumps BWST tank heaters MOVs Control instrumentation Heat tracing	2.9 2.9 3.3 2.6 2.7 2.6* 2.7	3.1 3.5 2.7 2.9 2.7 3.2
K3	Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the CVCS will have on the following: (CFR: 41.7/45/6)		
K3.01 K3.02	CRDS (automatic)	2.5*	2.9
K3.03	CCWS	2.2	2.4
K3.04	RCPS	3.7	3.9
K3.05	PZR LCS	3.8	4.2
K3.06	RCS temperature and pressure	3.4	3.6
K3.07	PZR level and pressure	3.8	4.1
K3.08	RCP seal injection	3.6	3.8
K4	Knowledge of CVCS design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: (CFR: 41.7)		
K4.01	Oxygen control in RCS	2.8	3.3
K4.02	Control of pH, and range of acceptability	2.1	2.6
K4.03	Protection of ion exchangers (high letdown temperature		
	will isolate ion exchangers)	2.8	2.9
K4.04	Manual/automatic transfers of control	3.2	3.1
K4.05	Interrelationships and design basis, including fluid flow splits in		
	branching networks (e.g., charging and seal injection flow)	3.3	3.2
K4.06	Isotopic control	2.3	2.7
K4.07	Water supplies	3.0	3.3
K4.08	Hydrogen control in RCS	2.8	3.2
K4.09	High temperature limit on CVCS to protect ion exchange resins	2.4	3.1

## SYSTEM 004 Chemical and Volume Control System

K4.10	Minimum temperature requirements on borated systems		•
T7 4 1 1	(prevent crystallization)	3.2	3.8
K4.11	Temperature/pressure control in letdown line: prevent boiling,	2.1	2.0
17.4.10	lifting reliefs, hydraulic shock, piping damage, and burst	3.1	3.6
K4.12	Minimum level of VCT	3.1	3.4
K4.13	Interlock between letdown isolation valve and flow control valve	3.2*	3.5
K4.14	Control interlocks on letdown system (letdown tank bypass valve)	2.8*	3.2
K4.15 K4.16	Interlocks associated with operation of orifice isolation valves  Temperature at which the temperature control valve automatically	3.0*	3.4
	diverts flow from the demineralizer to the VCT; reason for this diversion .	2.6	3.0
K5	Knowledge of the operational implications of the following		
	concepts as they apply to the CVCS: (CFR: 41.5/45.7)		
K5.01	Importance of oxygen control in RCS	2.7	3.3
K5.02	Explosion hazard associated with hydrogen containing systems	3.5	3.9
K5.03	Definition of pH, reasons for importance, range of acceptability in RCS	2.2	2.9
K5.04	Reason for hydrogen cover gas in VCT (oxygen scavenge)	2.8	3.2
K5.05	Source of neutrons (leakage, effect of core life) and NIS indications	2.3*	2.8
K5.06	Concept of boron "worth" or inverse boron "worth" (reactivity, pcm/ppm) .	3.0	3.3
K5.07	Relationship between SUR and reactivity	2.8	3.2
K5.08	Estimation of subcritical multiplication factor (K-eff)		
	by means other than the 6-factor formula: relationship		
	of count rate changes to reactivity changes	2.6	3.2
K5.09	Thermal shock: high component stress due to rapid temperature change	3.7	4.2
K5.10	Importance of nil-ductility transition temperature in plant operations	3.2	3.7
K5.11	Thermal stress, brittle fracture, pressurized thermal shock	3.6	3.9
K5.12	Effects of temperature on corrosion	2.3	2.7
K5.13	Galvanic and general corrosion	2.1	2.6
K5.14	Reduction process of gas concentration in RCS: vent-		
	accumulated non-condensable gases from PZR bubble space,		
	depressurized during cooldown or by alternately heating		
	and cooling (spray) within allowed pressure band (drive		
	more gas out of solution)	2.5	2.9

K5.15	Boron and control rod reactivity effects as they relate to MTC	3.3	3.5
K5.16	Source of T-ave. and T-ref. signals to control and RPS	3.2	3.4
K5.17	Types and effects of radiation, dosimetry, and shielding-time-distance	2.6	3.1
K5.18	Relationship between neutron flux and reactivity	2.8	3.3
K5.19	Concept of SDM	3.5	3.9
K5.20	Reactivity effects of xenon, boration, and dilution	3.6	3.7
K5.21	Ppm and weight % for boron	2.2	2.7
K5.22	Ion bead degradation by temperature	2.3	2.6
K5.23	Radioactive decay of crud	1.9	2.4
K5.24	Decontamination factors	1.9	2.5
K5.25	Channeling of ion exchanger	1.9	2.4
K5.26	Relationship between VCT pressure and NPSH for charging pumps	3.1	3.2
K5.27	Reason for nitrogen purge of CVCS	2.6	3.2
K5.28	Reason for "burping" non-condensable gases from VCT	2.4	3.0
K5.29	Reason for sampling for chloride, fluoride, sodium and solids in RCS	2.6	3.3
K5.30	Relationship between temperature and pressure in CVCS		
	components during solid plant operation	3.8	4.2
K5.31	Purpose of flow path around boric acid storage tank	3.0*	3.4
K5.32	Purpose and control of heat tracing (prevent crystallization)	3.1	3.4
K5.33	Use of a boronometer	2.3*	2.6
K5.34	For ion exchangers: demineralization, boration/		
	deboration, thermal regeneration, lithium control	2.4	2.8
K5.35	Heat exchanger principles and the effects of flow, temperature		
	and other parameters	2.5	2.9
K5.36	Solubility of boron in water; temperature effect	2.5	2.8
K5.37	Effects of boron saturation on ion exchanger behavior	2.6	3.1
K5.38	Use of thermal well for accessibility of resistance temperature detector	1.7	1.9
K5.39	Relationship between flow and pressure drop for fluids		
	passing through valves and orifices	2.4	2.7
K5.40	Response of PRT during bubble formation in PZR: in-		
	crease in quench tank pressure when cycling PORV shows		
	that complete steam bubble does not exist, that signifi-		
	cant noncondensable gas is still present	3.0*	3.4*
K5.41	Solubility of gases in solution: temperature and pressure effects	2.3	2.6
K5.42	Solubility of boron in water: temperature effect	2.4	2.7
K5.43	Saturation, subcooling, superheat in steam/water	3.6	3.9
K5.44	Pressure response in PZR during in-and-out surge	3.2	3.4
K5.45	Resistance heating: power/current relations	1.8	2.1
K5.46	Reason for going solid in PZR (collapsing steam bubble):		
	make sure no steam is in PRT when PORV is opened to drain RCS	2.5*	2.9
K5.47	Reason for second CCW pump when second heat exchanger is lined up	2.4*	2.9

	K5.48	Purpose of hydrogen purging and sampling processes	2.2	2.9
	K5.49	Purpose and method of hydrogen removal from RCS before		
		opening system: explosion hazard, nitrogen purge	2.7	3.3
	K5.50	Design basis letdown system temperatures: resin integrity	2.6	2.7
	K5.51	Operation principle of hydrogen catalytic recombiners	1.9*	2.3
	K5.52	Reason for of reducing letdown rate when filling PZR; collapse		
		steam bubble	2.4	2.7
	K5.53	Reason for keeping VCT pressure as low as possible during degas	2.3	2.6
	K5.54	Calculation of rate of boron change in RCS as function flow rate	2.2	2.6
	K5.55	Factors which effect changes in letdown temperature	2.3	2.4
	K5.56	Sources of radio iodine in RCS (hazard in filter changeout)	2.1	2.7
	K6	Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction on the following CVCS components: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.7)		
	K6.01	Spray/heater combination in PZR to assure uniform boron		
	110.01	concentration	3.1	3.3
l	K6.02	Demineralizers and ion exchangers	2.5	2.6
•	K6.03	Valves	2.4	2.5
	K6.04	Pumps	2.8	3.1
	K6.05	Sensors and detectors	2.5	2.5
I	K6.06	Motors	2.1	2.3
•	K6.07	Heat exchangers and condensers	2.7	2.8
	K6.08	Breakers, relays, and disconnects	2.0	2.2
	K6.09	Purpose of VCT divert valve	2.8	3.1
	K6.10	Boric acid storage tank/boron injection tank recirculation flow path	2.7	3.1
	K6.11	Recirculation valve on boric acid storage tank (why it is closed during		
		functional test)	2.4*	2.7
	K6.12	Principle of recirculation valve: (permit emergency flow even if valve		
		is blocked by crystallized boric acid)	2.6	2.9
	K6.13	Purpose and function of the boration/dilution batch controller	3.1	3.3
	K6.14	Recirculation path for charging pumps	2.7	3.0
	K6.15	Reason for venting VCT and pump casings while filling:		
		vents must connect to LRS	2.8	3.1
	K6 16	Purpose of spray nozzle in VCT	2.3	2.6
	K6.17	Flow paths for emergency boration	4.4	4.6
	K6.18	Design characteristics of boric acid transfer pump	2.0	2.3
	K6.19	Purpose of centrifugal pump miniflows (recirculation)	2.3	2.6
	K6.20	Function of demineralizer, including boron loading and temperature limits	2.5	3.1
	K6.21	Design and purpose of charging pump desurger	2.1*	2.4
	K6.22	Design minimum and maximum flow rates for letdown system	2.6	2.9

K6.23	Capacity of boron recovery tanks: plan not to exceed by inefficient boron movement; interface with boron recovery system	2.1*	2.7
K6.24	Controllers and positioners	2.5	2.6
K6.25	Tank capacity: RCS makeup, CVCS, and boron recovery system	2.2	2.6
K6.26	Methods of pressure control of solid plant (PZR relief and water inventory)	2.2	3.8
K0.20	Methods of pressure control of solid plant (121x feller and water inventory)		4.1
K6.27	Durnose of DUD relief and isolation valves	3.4	3.6
K6.28	Purpose of RHR relief and isolation valves	3.4 2.2*	2.5
	Interface between high-activity waste tank and letdown filter drain		
K6.29	Reason for excess letdown and its relationship to CCWS	2.7	3.1
K6.30	Purpose and control of degassifier inlet and divert valves	2.3*	2.5
K6.31	Seal injection system and limits on flow range	3.1	3.5
K6.32	Venting of VCT: reduce concentration of gases in solution,	2.1	2.5
TT < 00	keep stress in tank down	2.1	2.5
K6.33	Principles of boronometer	1.9*	2.1
K6.34	Maximum allowable purge flow rate	1.9	2.2
K6.35	Relationship between VCT vent rate and vent header pressure	2.2	2.5
K6.36	Letdown pressure control to prevent RCS coolant from		
	flashing to steam in letdown piping	2.9	3.1
K6.37	Boron loading of demineralizer resin	2.9	3.4
K6.38	Methods of minimizing the amount of RCS coolant water		
	processed and reducing the amount of waste water generated	2.4	3.2
	<u>ABILITY</u>		
<b>A1</b>	Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters		
<b>A1</b>			
A1	Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters		
A1	Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with		
	Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the CVCS controls including: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.5)		
A1.01	Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the CVCS controls including: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.5)  Activity levels in primary system	2.9	3.8
A1.01 A1.02	Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the CVCS controls including: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.5)  Activity levels in primary system  T-ave. and T-ref	3.4*	3.6
A1.01 A1.02 A1.03	Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the CVCS controls including: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.5)  Activity levels in primary system  T-ave. and T-ref  RCS pressure	3.4* 3.8	3.6 3.8
A1.01 A1.02 A1.03 A1.04	Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the CVCS controls including: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.5)  Activity levels in primary system T-ave. and T-ref RCS pressure PZR pressure and level	3.4* 3.8 3.9	3.6 3.8 4.1
A1.01 A1.02 A1.03 A1.04 A1.05	Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the CVCS controls including: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.5)  Activity levels in primary system T-ave. and T-ref RCS pressure PZR pressure and level S/G pressure and level	3.4* 3.8 3.9 2.9*	3.6 3.8 4.1 3.2
A1.01 A1.02 A1.03 A1.04 A1.05 A1.06	Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the CVCS controls including: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.5)  Activity levels in primary system T-ave. and T-ref RCS pressure PZR pressure and level S/G pressure and level VCT level	3.4* 3.8 3.9 2.9* 3.0	3.6 3.8 4.1 3.2 3.2
A1.01 A1.02 A1.03 A1.04 A1.05	Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the CVCS controls including: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.5)  Activity levels in primary system T-ave. and T-ref RCS pressure PZR pressure and level S/G pressure and level VCT level Maximum specified letdown flow	3.4* 3.8 3.9 2.9*	3.6 3.8 4.1 3.2 3.2 3.1
A1.01 A1.02 A1.03 A1.04 A1.05 A1.06	Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the CVCS controls including: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.5)  Activity levels in primary system T-ave. and T-ref RCS pressure PZR pressure and level S/G pressure and level VCT level	3.4* 3.8 3.9 2.9* 3.0	3.6 3.8 4.1 3.2 3.2
A1.01 A1.02 A1.03 A1.04 A1.05 A1.06 A1.07	Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the CVCS controls including: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.5)  Activity levels in primary system T-ave. and T-ref RCS pressure PZR pressure and level S/G pressure and level VCT level Maximum specified letdown flow	3.4* 3.8 3.9 2.9* 3.0 2.7	3.6 3.8 4.1 3.2 3.2 3.1
A1.01 A1.02 A1.03 A1.04 A1.05 A1.06 A1.07 A1.08	Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the CVCS controls including: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.5)  Activity levels in primary system T-ave. and T-ref RCS pressure PZR pressure and level S/G pressure and level VCT level Maximum specified letdown flow Normal operating band for letdown flow rate	3.4* 3.8 3.9 2.9* 3.0 2.7 2.7	3.6 3.8 4.1 3.2 3.2 3.1 2.9
A1.01 A1.02 A1.03 A1.04 A1.05 A1.06 A1.07 A1.08 A1.09	Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the CVCS controls including: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.5)  Activity levels in primary system T-ave. and T-ref RCS pressure PZR pressure and level S/G pressure and level VCT level Maximum specified letdown flow Normal operating band for letdown flow rate RCS pressure and temperature	3.4* 3.8 3.9 2.9* 3.0 2.7 2.7 3.6	3.6 3.8 4.1 3.2 3.2 3.1 2.9 3.8
A1.01 A1.02 A1.03 A1.04 A1.05 A1.06 A1.07 A1.08 A1.09 A1.10	Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the CVCS controls including: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.5)  Activity levels in primary system T-ave. and T-ref RCS pressure PZR pressure and level S/G pressure and level VCT level Maximum specified letdown flow Normal operating band for letdown flow rate RCS pressure and temperature Reactor power	3.4* 3.8 3.9 2.9* 3.0 2.7 2.7 3.6 3.7	3.6 3.8 4.1 3.2 3.2 3.1 2.9 3.8 3.9
A1.01 A1.02 A1.03 A1.04 A1.05 A1.06 A1.07 A1.08 A1.09 A1.10 A1.11	Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the CVCS controls including: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.5)  Activity levels in primary system T-ave. and T-ref RCS pressure PZR pressure and level S/G pressure and level VCT level Maximum specified letdown flow Normal operating band for letdown flow rate RCS pressure and temperature Reactor power Letdown and charging flows	3.4* 3.8 3.9 2.9* 3.0 2.7 2.7 3.6 3.7	3.6 3.8 4.1 3.2 3.2 3.1 2.9 3.8 3.9
A1.01 A1.02 A1.03 A1.04 A1.05 A1.06 A1.07 A1.08 A1.09 A1.10 A1.11	Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the CVCS controls including: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.5)  Activity levels in primary system T-ave. and T-ref RCS pressure PZR pressure and level S/G pressure and level VCT level Maximum specified letdown flow Normal operating band for letdown flow rate RCS pressure and temperature Reactor power Letdown and charging flows Rate of boron concentration reduction in RCS as a	3.4* 3.8 3.9 2.9* 3.0 2.7 2.7 3.6 3.7	3.6 3.8 4.1 3.2 3.2 3.1 2.9 3.8 3.9

Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the CVCS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:

(CFR: 41.5/43/5/45/3/45/5)

A2.01	RCS pressure allowed to exceed limits	3.8	4.2
A2.02	Loss of PZR level (failure mode)	3.9	4.2
A2.03	Boundary isolation valve leak	3.6	4.2
A2.04	Unplanned gas release	3.7*	4.1
A2.05	RCP seal failures	4.0	4.3
A2.06	Inadvertent boration/dilution	4.2	4.3
A2.07	Isolation of letdown/makeup	3.4	3.7
A2.08	Loss of heat tracing	3.0	3.7
A2.09	High primary and/or secondary activity	3.0	3.9
A2.10	Inadvertent boration/dilution	3.9	4.2
A2.11	Loss of IAS	3.6	4.2
A2.12	CIAS, SIAS	4.1	4.3
A2.13	Low RWST	3.6	3.9
A2.14	Emergency boration	3.8*	3.9
A2.15	High or low PZR level	3.5	3.7
A2.16	T-ave. and T-ref. deviations	3.2	3.6
A2.17	Low PZR pressure	3.4	3.7
A2.18	High VCT level	3.1	3.1
A2.19	High secondary and primary concentrations of chloride,		
	fluoride, sodium and solids	2.8	3.5
A2.20	Shifting demineralizer while divert valve is lined up to VCT	2.7	2.7
A2.21	Excessive letdown flow, pressure, and temperatures on		
	ion exchange resins (also causes)	2.7	2.7
A2.22	Mismatch of letdown and changing flows	3.2	3.1
A2.23	High filter D/P	2.6	2.7
A2.24	Isolation of both letdown filters at one time: down-stream relief lifts	2.8	2.8
A2.25	Uncontrolled boration or dilution	3.8	4.3
A2.26	Low VCT pressure	2.8	3.0
A2.27	Improper RWST boron concentration	3.5	4.2
A2.28	Depressurizing of RCS while it is hot	3.7	4.3
A2.29	Indication by increased letdown flow that demineralizers are bypassed	2.3	2.4
A2.30	Reduction of boron concentration in the letdown flow; its effects		
	on reactor operation	3.3	3.6
A2.31	Potential for RCS chemical contamination when placing		
	CVCS demineralizer in service	2.3	2.7
A2.32	Expected reactivity changes after valving in a new		
	mixed-bed demineralizer that has not been preborated	3.4	3.9

A2.33	Fact that isolating action dominaralizar atons haven		
A2.33	Fact that isolating cation demineralizer stops boron dilution and enables restoration of normal boron concentration	2.7	3.3
A2.34	Fact that for very low RCS boron concentrations, deborating	2.1	3.3
112.54	demineralizers may be more cost effective than using makeup water	2.2*	2.3
A2.35	Reactor trip	3.3	3.8
112.00		0.0	0.0
<b>A3</b>	Ability to monitor automatic operation of the CVCS,		
	including:		
	(CFR: 41.7 / 45.5)		
A3.01	Water and boron inventory	3.5	3.7
A3.02	Letdown isolation	3.6	3.6
A3.03	Ion exchange bypass	2.9	2.9
A3.04	VCT pressure control	2.8	2.9
A3.05	RCS pressure and temperature	3.9	3.9
A3.06	T-ave. and T-ref	3.9	3.8
A3.07	S/G level and pressure	3.3	3.3
A3.08	Reactor power	3.9	3.9
A3.09	VCT level	3.3	3.2
A3.10	PZR level and pressure	3.9	3.9
A3.11	Charging/letdown	3.6	3.4
A3.12	Interpretation of letdown demineralizer flow-divert valve position		
	indicating lights	3.0	2.7
A3.13	DELETED		
A3.14	Letdown and charging flows	3.4	3.1
A3.15	PZR pressure and temperature	3.5	3.6
A3.16	Interpretation of emergency borate valve position indicating lights	3.8	4.2
A3.17	Interpretation of ion exchanger status light	2.3	2.4
A3.18	Interpretation of letdown orifice isolation valve position indicators	2.8	2.7
<b>A4</b>	Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control		
	room:		
	(CFR: 41/7 / 45.5 to 45.8)		
A4.01	Boron and control rod reactivity effects	3.8	3.9
A4.02	Calculation of ECP and related boration/dilution/reactivity relationships	3.2	3.9
A4.03	Construction and use of 1/M plots (inverse multiplication,		
	criticality prediction method)	2.7	3.2
A4.04	Calculation of boron concentration changes	3.2	3.6
A4.05	Letdown pressure and temperature control valves	3.6	3.1
A4.06	Letdown isolation and flow control valves	3.6	3.1
A4.07	Boration/dilution	3.9	3.7
A4.08	Charging	3.8	3.4
A4.09	PZR spray and heater controls	3.5	3.3
A4.10	Boric acid pumps	3.6	3.2

A4.11	RCP seal injection	3.4	3.3
A4.12	Boration/dilution batch control	3.8	3.3
A4.13	VCT level control and pressure control	3.3	2.9
A4.14	Ion exchangers and demineralizers	2.8	2.4
A4.15	Boron concentration	3.6	3.7
A4.16	Activity levels of RCS and letdown	2.7	3.5
A4.17	Deborating demineralizer	2.7	2.7
A4.18	Emergency borate valve	4.3	4.1
A4.19	CVCS letdown orifice isolation valve and valve control		
	switches	3.1	2.8
A4.20	Deborating demineralizer selector valve and selector		
	valve control switch	2.6	2.5
A4.21	Letdown demineralizer flow divert valve control switch	2.6	2.3
A4.22	Boronometer chart recorder	2.5*	2.5
A4.23	Calculation of the required volume through the deborating		
	demineralizer, using the appropriate equation	2.1	2.3

# **Rod Position Indication System (RPIS)**

TASK: Start up the RPIS Shut down the RPIS

Shut down the RPIS
Record the primary coil voltage to verify rod position

	record the primary con votage to verify rod position		
K/A NO.	KNOWLEDGE	IMPORTANCE RO SRO	
K1	Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the RPIS and the following systems:  (CFR: 41.3 to 41.9 / 45.7 to 45.8)		
K1.01 K2.02	CRDS	3.2* 3.0	3.6 3.3
K2	<b>Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following:</b> (CFR: 41.7)		
K2.01 K2.02 K2.03	Reed switches Metroscope Pulse counters	1.8 1.9* 1.7	2.0 2.2 2.1
К3	Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the RPIS will have on the following: (CFR: $41.7 / 45.6$ )		
K3.01 K3.02	CRDS Plant computer	2.4 2.5	2.8* 2.8*
<b>K4</b>	Knowledge of RPIS design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.7)		
K4.01 K4.02 K4.03 K4.04 K4.05 K4.06	Upper electrical limit Lower electrical limit Rod bottom lights Zone reference lights Rod hold interlocks Individual and group misalignment	2.5* 2.5* 3.2 2.6* 3.1 3.4	2.7* 2.7* 3.4* 2.9* 3.3 3.7

### SYSTEM: 014 Rod Position Indication System (RPIS)

K5	Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the RPIS: $(CFR:\ 41.5\ /\ 45.7)$		
K5.01 K5.02 K5.03 K5.04	Reasons for differences between RPIS and step counter	2.7 2.8 2.1 1.5	3.0 3.3 2.3 1.7
К6	Knowledge of the affect if a loss or malfunction on the following will have on the RPIS: $(CFR:\ 41.5/\ 45.7)$		
K6.01 K6.02 K6.03	Sensors and detectors Breakers, relays, and disconnects Metroscope	2.3 1.7 2.1*	2.5 1.8 2.6
	<u>ABILITY</u>		
A1	Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the RPIS controls, including: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.5)		
A1.01	Metroscope reed switch display	2.9*	3.1
A1.02	Control rod position indication on control room panels	3.2	3.6
A1.03 A1.04	PDIL, PPDIL	3.6? 3.5	3.8? 3.8
A2	Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the RPIS; and (b) based on those on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: (CFR: $41.5/43.5/45.3/45.13$ )		
A2.01 A2.02 A2.03 A2.04 A2.05 A2.06	Loss of offsite power Loss of power to the RPIS Dropped rod Misaligned rod Reactor trip Loss of LVDT	2.8 3.1 3.6 3.4 3.9 2.6*	3.3 3.6 4.1 3.9 4.1 3.0*
A2.07	Loss of reed switch	2.6	2.9

#### 

Primary coil voltage measurement .....

Re-zeroing of rod position prior to startup .....

A4.02

A4.03

A4.04

3.4

2.6\*

2.7

3.2

2.7\*

2.7

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# **Safety Function 2:**

Rea	page	
002	Reactor Coolant System	3.2-2
004	Chemical and Volume Control System	3.2-6
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011	Pressurizer Level Control System	3.2-21
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## 002 Reactor Coolant System (RCS)

TASK: Perform lineups on the RCS

Vent the CRDM Drain the RCS

Drain the S/G (primary side) Drain the refueling cavity Fill the refueling cavity

Perform RCS water inventory balance

Add nitrogen to the PZR

Monitor the RCS

Establish natural circulation

		IMPORTANCE	
K/A NO.	<u>KNOWLEDGE</u>	RO	SRO
K1	Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the RCS and the following systems: (CFR: $41.2$ to $41.9$ / $45.7$ to $45.8$ )		
K1.01	RWST	3.7	3.9
K1.02	CRDS	2.9*	3.0*
K1.03	Borated water storage tank	3.8	3.8
K1.04	RCS vent system	2.8	3.2
K1.05	PRT	3.2	3.4
K1 06	CVCS	3.7	4.0
K1 07	Reactor vessel level indication system	3.5*	3.7*
K1.08	ECCS	4.5	4.6
K1 09	PZR	4.1	4.1
K1 10	Reactor coolant drain tank	2.8	3.1
K1.11	S/GS, feedwater systems	4.1	4.2
K1 12	NIS	3.5*	3.6
K1.13	RCPS	4.1	4.2
K1.14	Spent-fuel pool purification	2.3	2.6
K1.15	Refueling canal	2.2	2.4
K1.16	Refueling water purification	1.9	2.2
K1.17	MT/G	3.5	3.8
W2	Vnowledge of his newer supplies to the following:		

K2 Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following:

(CFR: 41.7)

None

SYSTEM	002 Reactor Coolant System (RCS)		
К3	Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the RCS will have on the following: (CFR: 41.7)		
K3.01	LRS	2.1	2.6
K3.02	Fuel	4.2	4.5
K3.03	Containment	4.2	4.6
K4	Knowledge of RCS design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: (CFR: 41.7)		
K4.01	Filling and draining the RCS	2.7	3.0
K4 02	Monitoring reactor vessel level	3.5*	3.8*
K4.03	Venting the RCS	2.9	3.2
K4 04	Filling and draining the refueling canal	2.2	2.7
K4.05	Detection of RCS leakage	3.8	4.2
K4.06	Prevention of missile hazards	2.1	2.4
K4.07	Contraction and expansion during heatup and cooldown	3.1	3.5
K4.08	Anchoring of componentsie, loops, vessel, S/Gs, and coolant pumps	1.9	2.1
K4.09	Operation of loop isolation valves	3.2	3.2
K4.10	Overpressure protection	4.2	4.4
K5	Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the RCS: (CFR: $41.5 / 45.7$ )		
K5.01	Basic heat transfer concepts	3.2	3.6
K5.02	Purpose of vent flow path when draining	2.5	2.9
K5.03	Difference in pressure-temperature relationship between the		
K5.04	water/steam system and the water/nitrogen system	2.2	2.6
K3.04	RCS water inventory balance	3.1	3.4
K5.05	Reason for drain tank pressure rise during water inventory operations	2.9	3.3
K5.06	Pressure, temperature, and volume relationships of nitrogen gas in	,	0.0
	association with water	2.3	2.6
K5.07	Reactivity effects of RCS boron, pressure and temperature	3.6	3.9
K5.08	Why PZR level should be kept within the programmed band	3.4	3.9
K5.09	Relationship of pressure and temperature for water saturation	2.5	4.0
TT # 10	and subcooling conditions	3.7	4.2
K5.10	Relationship between reactor power and RCS differential temperature	3.6	4.1
K5.11	Relationship between effects of the primary coolant system and	4.0	4.2
V5 10	the secondary coolant system	4.0	4.2
K5.12	Relationship of temperature average and loop differential temperature to	2 7	2.0
	loop hot-let and cold-leg temperature indications	3.7	3.9

#### SYSTEM 002 Reactor Coolant System (RCS)

	K5.13	Causes of circulation.	3.5	3.9
	K5.14	Consequences of forced circulation loss.	3.8	4.2
	K5.15	Reasons for maintaining subcooling margin during natural circulation	4.2	4.6
	K5.16	Reason for automatic features of the Feedwater control system during total	2.5	4.0
ı	IZ 5 1 7	loss of reactor coolant flow	3.5	4.0
	K5.17	Need for monitoring in-core thermocouples during natural circulation	3.8	4.2
	K5.18	Brittle fracture	3.3	3.6
	K5.19	Neutron embrittlement	2.6	2.9
	K5.20	Corrosion control principles	2.3	2.7
	K6	Knowledge of the effect or a loss or malfunction on the following RCS		
		components:		
		(CFR: 41.7 / 45.7)		
	K6.01	RCS valves that may pose and unusually high radiological		
		Hazard because of trapped crud	2.2	2.9
	K6.02	RCP	3.6	3.8
	K6.03	Reactor vessel level indication	3.1	3.6
	K6.04	RCS vent valves	2.5	2.9
	K6.05	Valves	2.1	2.4
	K6.06	Sensors and Detectors	2.5	2.8
•	K6.07	Pumps	2.5	2.8
	K6.08	Controllers and Positioners	2.4	2.7
	K6.09	Motors	2.1	2.5
	K6.10	Breakers, relays, and disconnects	2.2	2.4
	K6.11	Thermal sleeves	2.2	2.6
ı	K6.12	Code Safety valves	3.0	3.5
ı	K6.13	Reactor vessel and internals	2.3	2.8
	K6.14	Core components	2.2	2.8
I	K6.15	Post-accident sampling	TBD	TBD
ı	110.10		155	122
		ABILITY		
	A1	Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent		
		exceeding design limits) associated with operating the RCS controls incl	luding:	
		(CFR: 41.5 / 45.7)		
	A1.01	Primary and secondary pressure	3.8	4.1
	A1.02	PZR and makeup tank level	3.6	3.9
	A1.03	Temperature	3.7	3.8
	A1.04	Subcooling Margin	3.9	4.1
	A1.05	RCS flow	3.4	3.7
	A1.06	Reactor power	4.0	4.0
	A1.07	Reactor differential temperature	3.3	3.5
	A1.08	RCS average temperature	3.7	3.8
	A1.09	RCS T-ave	3.7	3.8
	A1.10	RCS T-ref	3.7	3.8
	A1.11	Relative level indications in the RWST, the refueling cavity, the PZR and	= • •	2.0
		the reactor vessel during preparation for refueling	2.7	3.2
		0 r-r	-··	

#### SYSTEM 002 Reactor Coolant System (RCS)

A1.12 A1.13	Radioactivity level when venting CRDS	2.9* 3.4	3.3 4.0
A2	Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the RCS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: $(CFR:\ 41.5\ /\ 43.5\ /\ 45.3\ /\ 45.5)$		
A2.01	Loss of coolant inventory	4.3	4.4
A2.02	Loss of coolant pressure	4.2	4.4
A2.03	Loss of forced circulation	4.1	4.3
A2.04	Loss of heat sinks	4.3	4.6
A3	<b>Ability to monitor automatic operation of the RCS, including:</b> (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5)		
A3.01	Reactor coolant leak detection system	3.7	3.9
A3.02	Containment sound-monitoring system	2.6*	2.8*
A3.03	Pressure, temperatures, and flows	4.4	4.6
A4	Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: (CFR: $41.7 / 45.5$ to $45.8$ )		
A4.01	RCS leakage calculation program using the computer	3.5*	3.8*
A4.02	Indications necessary to verify natural circulation from appropriate level, flow, and temperature indications and valve positions upon loss of forced		
	circulation	4.3	4.5
A4.03	Indications and controls necessary to recognize and correct		
	saturation conditions	4.3	4.4
A4.04	The filling/draining of LPI pumps during refueling	2.8	2.6
A4.05	The HPI system when it is used to refill the refueling cavity	2.8*	2.7*
A4.06	Overflow level of the RWST	2.9	2.7
A4.07	Flow path linking the RWST through the RHR system to the RCS hot		
	legs for gravity refilling of the refueling cavity	2.8	3.1
A4.08	Safety parameter display systems	3.4*	3.7*

### OO4 Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS)

TASK: Perform lineup of the CVCS

Perform boron concentration dilution (bleed) of the RCS

Perform boration (feed) for the RCS

Perform boration system flow path verification

Fill and vent the CVCS

Perform boration flow-path verification

Start up the CVCS

Perform borated water source operability verification

What if RCS temperature starts to increase after placing demineralizer in service?

Nitrogen purge the VCT

Perform boric acid pump functional test

What if estimated critical position is not calculated properly and

reactor goes critical before it is expected?

Perform hydrogen purge and establish hydrogen overpressure

Shut down the CVCS

Operate the CVCS to increase the primary system pressure

Perform boron concentration change calculations

Shift to automatic feed and bleed of the RCS

Operate a mixed-bed demineralizer

Operate the cation bed demineralizer

Operate a deborating demineralizer

Perform RCS dilution using purification demineralizer in series with deborating demineralizer

Deborate to a critical condition during reactor startup

Monitor the CVCS operation

Perform excess letdown to either VCT or radwaste

Perform excess letdown to the reactor coolant drain/CVCS holdup tank

Operate the CVCS to form a steam bubble in the PZR

Operate the CVCS to collapse the steam bubble in the PZR

Switch the letdown filters (post-demineralizer filters)

Operate letdown coolers

Operate seal injection subsystem (auto-manual)

Vent a volume control/makeup tank (VCT)

Manual makeup to the VCT

Perform low-pressure purification using the RHRS

Degas the RCS through the VCT

Adjust the charging flow rate

Adjust the letdown flow rate

Change the seal injection filters

Operate the CVCS to make up to the RWST

Degas the RCS through the PZR

K/A NO.	KNOWLEDGE	IMPOF RO	RTANCE SRO
K1	Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the CVCS and the following systems: (CFR: 41.2 to 41.9 / 45.7 to 45.8)		
K1.01	PZR LCS	3.6	4.0
K1.02	PZR and RCS temperature and pressure relationships	3.5	3.8
K1.03	Operation, function and control of T/G	2.2	2.6
K1.04	RCPS, including seal injection flows	3.4	3.8
K1.05	CRDS operation in automatic mode control	2.7*	3.2
K1.06	Makeup system to VCT	3.1	3.1
K1.07	NIS	2.6	2.9
K1.08	Interface of CVCS with PRT	2.2	2.4
K1.09	Relationship between CVCS and RPIS	2.2*	2.7
K1.10	Pneumatic valves and RHRS	2.7	2.9
K1.11	Expected PRT response when opening PORV during bubble	2.7	2.7
111.11	formation in PZR	2.9	3.2
K1.12	Nitrogen systems	2.4	2.6
Kl.13	Hydrogen systems	2.8	2.9
K1.14	IAS	2.6	2.8
K1.15	ECCS	3.8	4.0
K1.16	Boric acid storage tank	3.3	3.5
K1.10 Kl.17	PZR	3.4	3.4
K1.17 K1.18	CCWS	2.9	3.4
K1.19	Primary grade water supply	2.7	2.9
K1.19 K1.20	Location of sample points for chemically sampled fluid systems	1.7	2.5
K1.20 K1.21	WGDS	2.4	2.8
K1.21 K1.22	BWST	3.4	3.7
K1.22 K1.23	RWST	3.4	3.7
K1.23 K1.24	RHRS	3.4	3.7
K1.24 K1.25	Interface between HPI flow path and excess letdown flow path	3.4 2.7*	3.9*
K1.25 K1.26	Flow path from CVCS to reactor coolant drain tank and holdup tank	2.7	2.8
K1.20 K1.27	Relationship between seal filter and letdown filter	2.7*	2.3*
	•		
K1.28	Interface between high-activity waste tank and letdown filter drain	2.1*	2.4*
K1.29	Effect and detection of leaking PORV or relief on PZR level and pressure,	2.4	4.0
K1 20	including VCT makeup activity in automatic mode	3.4	4.0
K1.30	Relationship between letdown flow and RCS pressure	2.9	3.1
K1.31	Interface between CVCS and degassifier (WGDS)	2.3	2.5
K1.32	Minimum VCT pressure effect on RCP seals	2.8	3.1
K1.33	Interface between clean waste receiver tank and seal injection filters	2.3*	2.7*

	K1.34 K1.35 K1.36	Interface between CVCS and reactor coolant drain tank; and PZR PCS Understanding of interface with LRS	2.7 2.5 2.6	2.9 2.8 2.8
	K2	<b>Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following:</b> (CFR: 41.7)		
	K2.01	Boric acid makeup pumps	2.9	3.1
	K2.02	Makeup pumps	2.9	3.1
l	K2.03	Charging pumps	3.3	3.5
•	K2.04	BWST tank heaters	2.6	2.7
	K2.05	MOVs	2.7	2.9
	K2.06	Control instrumentation	2.6*	2.7
	K2.07	Heat tracing	2.7	3.2
	К3	Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the CVCS will have on the following: (CFR: $41.7/45/6$ )		
	K3.01	CRDS (automatic)	2.5*	2.9
	K3.02	PZR LCS	3.7	4.1
	K3.03	CCWS	2.2	2.4
	K3.04	RCPS	3.7	3.9
	K3.05	PZR LCS	3.8	4.2
	K3.06	RCS temperature and pressure	3.4	3.6
	K3.07	PZR level and pressure	3.8	4.1
	K3.08	RCP seal injection	3.6	3.8
	K4	Knowledge of CVCS design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: (CFR: 41.7)		
	K4.01	Oxygen control in RCS	2.8	3.3
	K4.02	Control of pH, and range of acceptability	2.1	2.6
	K4.03	Protection of ion exchangers (high letdown temperature	2.1	2.0
	114.03	will isolate ion exchangers)	2.8	2.9
	K4.04	Manual/automatic transfers of control	3.2	3.1
	K4.05	Interrelationships and design basis, including fluid	3.2	5.1
	14.03	flow splits in branching networks (e.g., charging and		
		seal injection flow)	3.3	3.2
	K4.06	Isotopic control	2.3	2.7
	K4.07	Water supplies	3.0	3.3
	K4.08	Hydrogen control in RCS	2.8	3.2
	K4.09	High temperature limit on CVCS to protect ion exchange resins	2.4	3.2
	1xT.U/	ring it comportation of the vest to protect for exchange results	∠.+	ا.1

K4.10 K4.11	Minimum temperature requirements on borated systems (prevent crystallization)	3.2	3.8
K4.12	boiling, lifting reliefs, hydraulic shock, piping damage, and burst	3.1 3.1	3.6 3.4
K4.13 K4.14 K4.15 K4.16	Interlock between letdown isolation valve and flow control valve	3.2* 2.8* 3.0* 2.6	3.5 3.2 3.4 3.0
K5	Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the CVCS: (CFR: $41.5/45.7$ )		
K5.01 K5.02 K5.03 K5.04 K5.05 K5.06 K5.07 K5.08 K5.09 K5.10 K5.11 K5.12 K5.13	Importance of oxygen control in RCS  Explosion hazard associated with hydrogen containing systems  Definition of pH, reasons for importance, range of acceptability in RCS  Reason for hydrogen cover gas in VCT (oxygen scavenge)  Source of neutrons (leakage, effect of core life) and NIS indications  Concept of boron "worth" or inverse boron "worth" (reactivity, pcm/ppm)  Relationship between SUR and reactivity  Estimation of subcritical multiplication factor (K-eff) by means other than the 6-factor formula: relationship of count rate changes to reactivity changes  Thermal shock: high component stress due to rapid temperature change  Importance of nil-ductility transition temperature in plant operations  Thermal stress, brittle fracture, pressurized thermal shock  Effects of temperature on corrosion  Galvanic and general corrosion  Reduction process of gas concentration in RCS: vent-accumulated	2.7 3.5 2.2 2.8 2.3* 3.0 2.8 2.6 3.7 3.2 3.6 2.3 2.1	3.3 3.9 2.9 3.2 2.8 3.3 3.2 4.2 3.7 3.9 2.7 2.6
KJ.14	non-condensable gases from PZR bubble space, depressurized during cooldown or by alternately heating and cooling (spray) within allowed pressure band (drive more gas out of solution)	2.5	2.9

K5.16Source of T-ave. and T-ref. signals to control and RPS3.23.4K5.17Types and effects of radiation, dosimetry, and shielding-time-distance2.63.1K5.18Relationship between neutron flux and reactivity2.83.3K5.19Concept of SDM3.53.9K5.20Reactivity effects of xenon, boration, and dilution3.63.7K5.21Ppm and weight % for boron2.22.7K5.22Ion bead degradation by temperature2.32.6K5.23Radioactive decay of crud1.92.4K5.24Decontamination factors1.92.5K5.25Channeling of ion exchanger1.92.4K5.26Relationship between VCT pressure and NPSH for charging pumps3.13.2K5.27Reason for nitrogen purge of CVCS2.63.2K5.28Reason for "burping" non-condensable gases from VCT2.43.0K5.29Reason for sampling for chloride, fluoride, sodium and solids in RCS2.63.3K5.30Relationship between temperature and pressure in CVCS components during solid plant operation3.84.2
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K5.28 Reason for "burping" non-condensable gases from VCT
K5.29 Reason for sampling for chloride, fluoride, sodium and solids in RCS 2.6 3.3 K5.30 Relationship between temperature and pressure in CVCS components during solid plant operation
K5.29 Reason for sampling for chloride, fluoride, sodium and solids in RCS 2.6 3.3 K5.30 Relationship between temperature and pressure in CVCS components during solid plant operation 3.8 4.2
K5.30 Relationship between temperature and pressure in CVCS components during solid plant operation
components during solid plant operation
K5.31 Purpose of flow path around boric acid storage tank
K5.32 Purpose and control of heat tracing (prevent crystallization)
K5.33 Use of a boronometer
K5.34 For ion exchangers: demineralization, boration/
deboration, thermal regeneration, lithium control
K5.35 Heat exchanger principles and the effects of flow, temperature
and other parameters
K5.36 Solubility of boron in water; temperature effect
K5.37 Effects of boron saturation on ion exchanger behavior
K5.38 Use of thermal well for accessibility of resistance temperature detector 1.7 1.9
K5.39 Relationship between flow and pressure drop for fluids passing through
valves and orifices
K5.40 Response of PRT during bubble formation in PZR: increase in quench tank
pressure when cycling PORV shows that complete steam bubble does not
exist, that significant noncondensable gas is still present
K5.41 Solubility of gases in solution: temperature and pressure effects 2.3 2.6
K5.42 Solubility of boron in water: temperature effect
K5.43 Saturation, subcooling, superheat in steam/water
K5.44 Pressure response in PZR during in-and-out surge
K5.45 Resistance heating: power/current relations
K5.46 Reason for going solid in PZR (collapsing steam bubble): make sure no
steam is in PRT when PORV is opened to drain RCS
K5.47 Reason for second CCW pump when second heat exchanger is lined up 2.4* 2.9

K5.48	Purpose of hydrogen purging and sampling processes	2.2	2.9
K5.49	Purpose and method of hydrogen removal from RCS before	0.7	2.2
17.5.50	opening system: explosion hazard, nitrogen purge	2.7	3.3
K5.50	Design basis letdown system temperatures: resin integrity	2.6	2.7
K5.51	Operation principle of hydrogen catalytic recombiners	1.9*	2.3
K5.52	Reason for of reducing letdown rate when filling PZR;	2.4	2.7
17.5.50	collapse steam bubble	2.4	2.7
K5.53	Reason for keeping VCT pressure as low as possible during degas	2.3	2.6
K5.54	Calculation of rate of boron change in RCS as function flow rate	2.2	2.6
K5.55	Factors which effect changes in letdown temperature	2.3	2.4
K5.56	Sources of radio iodine in RCS (hazard in filter changeout)	2.1	2.7
K6	Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction on the following CVCS components: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.7)		
K6.01	Spray/heater combination in PZR to assure uniform boron concentration	3.1	3.3
K6.02	Demineralizers and ion exchangers	2.5	2.1
K6.03	Valves	2.4	2.5
K6.04	Pumps	2.8	3.1
K6.05	Sensors and detectors	2.5	2.5
K6.06	Motors	2.0	2.2
K6.07	Heat exchangers and condensers	2.7	2.8
K6.08	Breakers, relays, and disconnects	2.0	2.2
K6.09	Purpose of VCT divert valve	2.8	3.1
K6.10	Boric acid storage tank/boron injection tank recirculation flow path	2.7	3.1
K6.11	Recirculation valve on boric acid storage tank (why it		
	is closed during functional test)	2.4*	2.7
K6.12	Principle of recirculation valve: (permit emergency flow		
	even if valve is blocked by crystallized boric acid)	2.6?	2.9
K6.13	Purpose and function of the boration/dilution batch controller	3.1	3.3
K6.14	Recirculation path for charging pumps	2.7	3.0
K6.15	Reason for venting VCT and pump casings while filling:		
	vents must connect to LRS	2.8	3.1
K6 16	Purpose of spray nozzle in VCT	2.3	2.6
K6.17	Flow paths for emergency boration	4.4	4.6
K6.18	Design characteristics of boric acid transfer pump	2.0	2.3
K6.19	Purpose of centrifugal pump miniflows (recirculation)	2.3	2.6
K6.20	Function of demineralizer, including boron loading and temperature limits	2.5	3.1
K6.21	Design and purpose of charging pump desurger	2.1*	2.4
K6.22	Design minimum and maximum flow rates for letdown system	2.6	2.9

K6.23	Capacity of boron recovery tanks: plan not to exceed by inefficient boron		
	movement; interface with boron recovery system	2.1*	2.7
K6.24	Controllers and positioners	2.5	2.6
K6.25	Tank capacity: RCS makeup, CVCS, and boron recovery system	2.2	2.6
K6.26	Methods of pressure control of solid plant (PZR relief and water inventory)		3.8 4.1
K6.27	Purpose of RHR relief and isolation valves	3.4	3.6
K6.28	Interface between high-activity waste tank and letdown filter drain	2.2*	2.5
K6.29	Reason for excess letdown and its relationship to CCWS	2.7	3.1
K6.30	Purpose and control of degassifier inlet and divert valves	2.3*	2.5
K6.31	Seal injection system and limits on flow range	3.1	3.5
K6.32	Venting of VCT: reduce concentration of gases in solution, keep stress in		
	tank down	2.1	2.5
K6.33	Principles of boronometer	1.9*	2.1
K6.34	Maximum allowable purge flow rate	1.9	2.2
K6.35	Relationship between VCT vent rate and vent header pressure	2.2	2.5
K6.36	Letdown pressure control to prevent RCS coolant from flashing to steam		
	in letdown piping	2.9	3.1
K6.37	Boron loading of demineralizer resin	2.9	3.4
K6.38	Methods of minimizing the amount of RCS coolant water		
	processed and reducing the amount of waste water generated	2.4	3.2
	<u>ABILITY</u>		
A1	Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the CVCS controls including: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.5)		
A1.01	Activity levels in primary system	2.9	3.8
A1.02	T-ave. and T-ref	3.4*	3.6
A1.03	RCS pressure	3.8	3.8
A1.04	PZR pressure and level	3.9	4.1
A1.05	S/G pressure and level	2.9*	3.2
A1.06	VCT level	3.0	3.2
A1.07	Maximum specified letdown flow	2.7	3.1
A1.08	Normal operating band for letdown flow rate	2.7	2.9
A1.09	RCS pressure and temperature	3.6	3.8
A1.10	Reactor power	3.7	3.9
A1.11	Letdown and charging flows	3.0	3.0
A1.12	Rate of boron concentration reduction in RCS as a function of letdown		
	flow while deborating demineralizer is in service	2.8	3.2

<b>A2</b>	Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following
	malfunctions or operations on the CVCS; and (b) based
	on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control,
	or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions
	or operations:

(CFR: 41.5 / 43/5 / 45/3 / 45/5)

A2.01	RCS pressure allowed to exceed limits	3.8	4.2
A2.02	Loss of PZR level (failure mode)	3.9	4.2
A2.03	Boundary isolation valve leak	3.6	4.2
A2.04	Unplanned gas release	3.7*	4.1
A2.05	RCP seal failures	4.0	4.3
A2.06	Inadvertent boration/dilution	4.2	4.3
A2.07	Isolation of letdown/makeup	3.4	3.7
A2.08	Loss of heat tracing	3.0	3.7
A2.09	High primary and/or secondary activity	3.0	3.9
A2.10	Inadvertent boration/dilution	3.9	4.2
A2.11	Loss of IAS	3.6	4.2
A2.12	CIAS, SIAS	4.1	4.3
A2.13	Low RWST	3.6	3.9
A2.14	Emergency boration	3.8*	3.9
A2.15	High or low PZR level	3.5	3.7
A2.16	T-ave. and T-ref. deviations	3.2	3.6
A2.17	Low PZR pressure	3.4	3.7
A2.18	High VCT level	3.1	3.1
A2.19	High secondary and primary concentrations of chloride,		
	fluoride, sodium and solids	2.8	3.5
A2.20	Shifting demineralizer while divert valve is lined up to VCT	2.7	2.7
A2.21	Excessive letdown flow, pressure, and temperatures on		
	ion exchange resins (also causes)	2.7	2.7
A2.22	Mismatch of letdown and changing flows	3.2	3.1
A2.23	High filter D/P	2.6	2.7
A2.24	Isolation of both letdown filters at one time: downstream relief lifts	2.8	2.8
A2.25	Uncontrolled boration or dilution	3.8	4.3
A2.26	Low VCT pressure	2.8	3.0
A2.27	Improper RWST boron concentration	3.5	4.2
A2.28	Depressurizing of RCS while it is hot	3.7	4.3
A2.29	Indication by increased letdown flow that demineralizers are bypassed	2.3	2.4
A2.30	Reduction of boron concentration in the letdown flow;		
	its effects on reactor operation	3.3	3.6
A2.31	Potential for RCS chemical contamination when placing		
	CVCS demineralizer in service	2.3	2.7
A2.32	Expected reactivity changes after valving in a new		
	mixed-bed demineralizer that has not been preborated	3.4	3.9
	r	-	

A2.33	Fact that isolating cation demineralizer stops boron		
	dilution and enables restoration of normal boron concentration	2.7	3.3
A2.34	Fact that for very low RCS boron concentrations, deborating demineralizers		
	may be more cost effective than using makeup water	2.2*	2.3
A2.35	Reactor trip	3.3	3.8
A3	Ability to monitor automatic operation of the CVCS,		
	including:		
	(CFR: 41.7 / 45.5)		
A3.01	Water and boron inventory	3.5	3.7
A3.02	Letdown isolation	3.6	3.6
A3.03	Ion exchange bypass	2.9	2.9
A3.04	VCT pressure control	2.8	2.9
A3.05	RCS pressure and temperature	3.9	3.9
A3.06	T-ave. and T-ref	3.9	3.8
A3.07	S/G level and pressure	3.3	3.3
A3.08	Reactor power	3.9	3.9
A3.09	VCT level	3.3	3.2
A3.10	PZR level and pressure	3.9	3.9
A3.11	Charging/letdown	3.6	3.4
A3.12	Interpretation of letdown demineralizer flow-divert valve position		
	indicating lights	3.0	2.7
A3.13	RCS temperature and pressure	3.4	3.6
A3.14	Letdown and charging flows	3.4	3.1
A3.15	PZR pressure and temperature	3.5	3.6
A3.16	Interpretation of emergency borate valve position indicating lights	3.8	4.2
A3.17	Interpretation of ion exchanger status light	2.3	2.4
A3.18	Interpretation of letdown orifice isolation valve position indicators	2.8	2.7
A4	<b>Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room:</b> (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 to 45.8)		
	100m (C11. 11.77 13.5 to 13.0)		
A4.01	Boron and control rod reactivity effects	3.8	3.9
A4.02	Calculation of ECP and related boration/dilution/reactivity relationships	3.2	3.9
A4.03	Construction and use of 1/M plots (inverse multiplication, criticality		
	prediction method)	2.7	3.2
A4.04	Calculation of boron concentration changes	3.2	3.6
A4.05	Letdown pressure and temperature control valves	3.6	3.1
A4.06	Letdown isolation and flow control valves	3.6	3.1
A4.07	Boration/dilution	3.9	3.7
A4.08	Charging	3.8	3.4
A4.09	PZR spray and heater controls	3.5	3.3
A4.10	Boric acid pumps	3.6	3.2

A4.11	RCP seal injection	3.4	3.3
A4.12	Boration/dilution batch control	3.8	3.3
A4.13	VCT level control and pressure control	3.3	2.9
A4.14	Ion exchangers and demineralizers	2.8	2.4
A4.15	Boron concentration	3.6	3.7
A4.16	Activity levels of RCS and letdown	2.7	3.5
A4.17	Deborating demineralizer	2.7	2.7
A4.18	Emergency borate valve	4.3	4.1
A4.19	CVCS letdown orifice isolation valve and valve control switches	3.1	2.8
A4.20	Deborating demineralizer selector valve and selector valve control switch.	2.6	2.5
A4.21	Letdown demineralizer flow divert valve control switch	2.6	2.3
A4.22	Boronometer chart recorder	2.5*	2.5*
A4.23	Calculation of the required volume through the deborating		
	demineralizer, using the appropriate equation	2.1	2.3

## **Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS)**

TASK: Perform ECCS pump operability checks

Fill the high-pressure SIS

Fill the accumulators/core flood tanks/safety injection tanks Perform core flooding isolation valves alarms actuation test Drain the accumulators/core flood tanks/safety injection tanks

Perform ECCS leak rate test Fill the boron injection tank

Perform safety injection tank outlet isolation valve test

Prepare the SIS for a normal plant startup Fill the refueling/borated water storage tank

Perform high-head safety injection test and flushing of stainless steel pipe

Recalculate and/or purify the refueling/borated water storage tank

Adjust HPI flow

Prepare the high-pressure SIS for shutdown

Secure the high-pressure SIS Drain the high-pressure SIS

Adjust accumulator/core flood tank/safety injection tank pressure

Vent accumulation/core flood tank/safety injection tanks

Monitor the SIS

Operate the SIS in the recirculation mode

Manually initiate safety injection

What if HPI is overpressurizing the reactor?

K/A NO.	<u>KNOWLEDGE</u>	IMPOI RO	RTANCE SRO
K1	Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the ECCS and the following systems: (CFR: 41.2 to 41.9 / 45.7 to 45.8)		
K1.01	Spent fuel cooling system	2.4*	2.8*
K1.02	ESFAS	4.3	4.6
K1.03	RCS	4.2	4.3
K1.04	Auxiliary spray system	2.7*	2.8*
K1.05	RCP seal injection and return	2.8*	2.9*
K1.06	Liquid waste tank/reactor drain tank	2.2	2.4
K1.07	MFW System	2.9*	3.3*
K1.08	CVCS	3.6	3.9
K1.09	Nitrogen	2.6	2.9
K1.10	Safety injection tank heating system	2.6*	2.8*
K1.11	CCWS	2.8	3.2
K1.12	Accumulator vent system	2.4	2.6
K1.13	CSS	3.3*	3.6*
K1.14	IAS	3.0	3.4*
K1 15	Accumulator drains	2 2*	2 2*

### SYSTEM: 006 Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS)

K2	Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following: (CFR: 41.7)		
K2.01	ECCS pumps	3.6	3.9
K2.02	Valve operators for accumulators	2.5*	2.9
K2.03	Heat tracing	2.3	2.5
K2.04	ESFAS-operated valves	3.6	3.8
	1		
К3	Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the ECCS will have on the following: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.6)		
K3.01	RCS	4.1*	4.2
K3.02	Fuel	4.3	4.4
K3.03	Containment	4.2	4.4
K4	Knowledge of ECCS design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: (CFR: 41.7)		
K4.01	Cooling of centrifugal pump bearings	2.6	2.9
K4.02	Relieving shutoff head (recirculation)	2.8	3.0
K4.03	Flushing of piping following transfer of highly concentrated boric acid	2.4	2.5
K4.04	System venting	2.3	2.5
K4.05	Autostart of HPI/LPI/SIP	4.3	4.4
K4.06	Recirculation of minimum flow through pumps	2.7	3.1
K4.07	Normal water supply for SIS	3.4	3.8
K4 08	Recirculation flowpath of reactor building sump	3.4*	3.6*
K4.09	Valve positioning on safety injection signal	3.9	4.2
K4.10	Redundant pressure meters	3.3	3.6
K4.11	Reset of SIS	3.9	4.2
K4.12	HPI flow throttling	4.1*	4.3*
K4.13	Reset of containment isolation	3.8	4.1
K4.14	Cross-Connection of HPI/LPI/SIP	3.9	4.2
K4.15	RHR pump test flow path	2.4	2.6
K4.16	Interlocks between RHR valves and RCS	3.2	3.5
K4.17	Safety Injection valve interlocks	3.8	4.1
K4.18	Valves normally isolated from their control power	3.6*	3.7
K4.19	Interlocks to storage tank makeup valve	3.0	3.1
K4.20	Automatic closure of common drain line and fill valves to accumulator	3.2*	3.5*
K4.21	Bypassing/blocking ESF channels	4.1	4.3
K4.22	Interlocks between RCP seal flow rate and standby HPI pump	3.4*	3.7*
K4.23	Demineralized water supply to RWST	2.3*	2.5*
K4.24	Water inventory control	2.6	3.0
K4.25	Concentrated boric acid supply to RWST	2.8	3.2
K4.26	Parallel redundant systems	3.3	3.8
K4.27	Alarm for misalignment of the accumulator isolation valve	2.9	3.4
K4.28	RHR	3.2	3.5
K4.29	BIT recirculation	2.5*	2.9*
K4.30	Containment isolation	3.6	3.9

SYSTEM:	006 Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS)		
K5	Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to ECCS: $(CFR: 41.5/45.7)$		
K5.01	Effects of temperatures on water level indications	2.8	3.3
K5.02	Relationship between accumulator volume and pressure	2.8	2.9
K5.03	Weight percent calculation boron concentration	1.9	2.2
K5.04	Brittle fracture, including causes and preventative actions	2.9	3.1
K5.05	Effects of pressure on a solid system	3.4	3.8
K5.06	Relationship between ECCS flow and RCS pressure	3.5	3.9
K5.07	Expected temperature levels in various locations of the RCS due to various		
120.07	plant conditions	2.7	3.0
K5.08	Operation of pumps in parallel	2.9*	3.1*
K5.09	Thermodynamics of water and steam, including subcooled margin,	2.7	5.1
183.07	superheat, and saturation	3.3	3.6
K5.10	Theory of thermal stress	2.5	2.9*
K5.10	Basic heat transfer equation	2.5	2.4*
K5.11	Theory of fluid flow	2.3	2.6
KJ.12	Theory of fluid flow	2.4	2.0
K6	Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction on the following will have on the ECCS: $(CFR: 41.7/45.7)$		
K6.01	BIT/borated water sources	3.4	3.9
K6.02	Core flood tanks (accumulators)	3.4	3.9
K6.03	Safety Injection Pumps	3.6	3.9
K6.04	Breakers, relays and disconnects	2.1	2.5
K6.05	HPI/LPI cooling water	3.0	3.5
K6.06	Isolation valves	2.3	2.7
K6.07	Drain and fill valves	1.7	1.9
K6.08	Accumulator and sample system	1.7	1.9
K6.09	RWST purification system	1.8	1.9
K6.10	Valves	2.6	2.8
K6.11	Sensors and detectors	2.3	2.7
K6.12	Controllers and positioners	2.1	2.6
K6.13	Pumps	2.8	3.1
K6.14	Motors	2.4	2.5
K6.15	Filters	1.8	2.2
K6.16	Demineralizers	1.8	2.2
K6.17	Heat Exchangers and condensers	2.2	2.6
K6.17	Subcooling margin indicators	3.6	3.9
K6.19	HPI/LPI systems (mode change)	3.7	3.9
	<u>ABILITY</u>		
<b>A1</b>	Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the ECCS controls including: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.5)		
A1.01	Avoidance of thermal and pressure stresses due to pump startup	3.1	3.4
A1.01 A1.02	Boron concentration in accumulator, boron storage tanks.	3.1	3.4
A1.02 A1.03	Flow rates in BWST/BW recirculation pumps	2.4	2.6
A1.03	Thow rates in Dws 1/Dw recirculation pumps	∠.4	2.0

Al.04	SYSTEM:	006 Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS)		
Placing in service   2,9   3.3			2.2	2.5
Al.06 Subcooling margin		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	2.9	3.3
A1.07 Pressure, high and low	A1.06	· •		3.9
Al.08   Temperature, high motor and bearing   2.8   3.1	A1.07		3.3	3.6
Al.09   Pump amperage, including start, normal and locked   2.8   3.2     Al.10   CVCS Letdown flow   2.4   2.7*     Al.11   Boron Concentration   3.1   3.4     Al.12   RHR heatup limits   2.9   3.4     Al.13   Accumulator pressure (level, boron concentration)   3.5   3.7     Al.14   Reactor vessel level   3.6   3.9     Al.15   RWST Level and temperature   3.3   3.9     Al.16   RCS temperature, including superheat, saturation, and subcooled   4.1   4.2     Al.17   ECCS flow rate   4.0   4.3     Al.18   PZR level and pressure   4.0   4.3     Al.19   Subcooling   4.0   4.4    A2   Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the ECCS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.5)    A2.01   High bearing temperature   2.9   3.1     A2.02   Loss of flow path   3.9   4.3     A2.03   System leakage   3.3   3.7     A2.04   Improper discharge pressure   3.4   3.5     A2.05   Improper amperage to the pump motor   3.4   3.5     A2.06   Water hammer   3.3   3.5     A2.07   Loss of heat tracing   2.8   3.1     A2.08   Effect of electric power loss on valve position   3.0   3.3     A2.09   Radioactive release from venting RWST to atmosphere   2.6   3.2*     A2.11   Rupture of ECCS header   4.0   4.4     A2.12   Conditions requiring actuation of ECCS   4.5   4.8     A2.11   Rupture of ECCS header   4.0   4.4     A2.12   Conditions requiring actuation of ECCS   4.5   4.8     A3.01   Accumulators   4.0*   4.9     A3.02   Pumps   4.1   4.1     A3.03   ESFAS-operated valves   4.1   4.1     A3.04   Accumulators   4.0*   4.3     A3.05   Safety Injection Pumps   4.2   4.3     A3.06   Valve lineups   3.9   4.2     A3.07   RHR pumps   3.6*   3.7	A1.08	<u> </u>	2.8	3.1
A1.10   CVCS Letdown flow   2.4   2.7*	A1.09			3.2
A1.11   Boron Concentration   3.1   3.4     A1.12   RHR heatup limits   2.9   3.4     A1.13   Accumulator pressure (level, boron concentration)   3.5   3.7     A1.14   Reactor vessel level   3.6   3.9     A1.15   RWST Level and temperature   3.3   3.9     A1.16   RCS temperature, including superheat, saturation, and subcooled   4.1   4.2     A1.17   ECCS flow rate   4.2   4.3     A1.18   PZR level and pressure   4.0   4.3     A1.19   Subcooling   4.0   4.4     A2   Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the ECCS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.5)    A2.01   High bearing temperature   2.9   3.1     A2.02   Loss of flow path   3.9   4.3     A2.03   System leakage   3.3   3.7     A2.04   Improper discharge pressure   3.4   3.8     A2.05   Improper discharge pressure   3.4   3.8     A2.06   Water hammer   3.3   3.5     A2.08   Effect of electric power loss on valve position   3.0   3.3     A2.09   Radioactive release from venting RWST to atmosphere   2.6   3.2*     A2.11   Rupture of ECCS header   4.0   4.4     A2.12   Conditions requiring actuation of ECCS   4.5   4.8     A2.13   Inadvertent SIS actuation   3.9   4.2    A3.01   Accumulators   4.0 * 3.9     A3.02   Pumps   4.1   4.1     A3.03   ESFAS-operated valves   4.1   4.1     A3.04   Cooling water systems   3.8   3.8     A3.05   Safety Injection Pumps   4.2   4.3     A3.06   Valve lineups   3.9   4.2     A3.07   RHR pumps   3.6*   3.7	A1.10			
A1.12       RHR heatup limits       2.9       3.4         A1.13       Accumulator pressure (level, boron concentration)       3.5       3.7         A1.14       Reactor vessel level       3.6       3.9         A1.15       RWST Level and temperature       3.3       3.9         A1.16       RCS temperature, including superheat, saturation, and subcooled       4.1       4.2         A1.17       ECCS flow rate       4.0       4.3         A1.18       PZR level and pressure       4.0       4.3         A1.19       Subcooling       4.0       4.4         A2       Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the ECCS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:	A1.11			
A1.13       Accumulator pressure (level, boron concentration)       3.5       3.7         A1.14       Reactor vessel level       3.6       3.9         A1.15       RWST Level and temperature       3.3       3.9         A1.16       RCS temperature, including superheat, saturation, and subcooled       4.1       4.2         A1.17       ECCS flow rate       4.0       4.3         A1.18       PZR level and pressure       4.0       4.4         A1.19       Subcooling       4.0       4.4         A2       Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the ECCS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.5)         A2.01       High bearing temperature       2.9       3.1         A2.02       Loss of flow path       3.9       4.3         A2.03       System leakage       3.3       3.7         A2.04       Improper discharge pressure       3.4       3.8         A2.05       Improper amperage to the pump motor       3.4       3.5         A2.06       Water hammer       3.3       3.5         A2.07       Loss of heat tracing       2.8       3.1         A2.08       Effect of electric power				
A1.14   Reactor vessel level   3.6   3.9     A1.15   RWST Level and temperature   3.3   3.9     A1.16   RCS temperature, including superheat, saturation, and subcooled   4.1   4.2     A1.17   ECCS flow rate   4.2   4.3     A1.18   PZR level and pressure   4.0   4.3     A1.19   Subcooling   4.0   4.4     A2   Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the ECCS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:   (CFR: 41.5 / 45.5)   CFR: 41.5 / 45.5     A2.01   High bearing temperature   2.9   3.1     A2.02   Loss of flow path   3.9   4.3     A2.03   System leakage   3.3   3.7     A2.04   Improper discharge pressure   3.4   3.8     A2.05   Improper amperage to the pump motor   3.4   3.5     A2.06   Water hammer   3.3   3.5     A2.07   Loss of heat tracing   2.8   3.1     A2.08   Effect of electric power loss on valve position   3.0   3.3     A2.09   Radioactive release from venting RWST to atmosphere   2.6   3.2*     A2.10   Low boron concentration in SIS   3.4   3.9     A2.11   Rupture of ECCS header   4.0   4.4     A2.12   Conditions requiring actuation of ECCS   4.5   4.8     A2.13   Inadvertent SIS actuation   3.9   4.2     A3   Ability to monitor automatic operation of the ECCS, including:   (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5)   (CFR: 41.		•		
A1.15 RWST Level and temperature				
A1.16       RCS temperature, including superheat, saturation, and subcooled       4.1       4.2       4.3         A1.17       ECCS flow rate       4.0       4.3         A1.18       PZR level and pressure       4.0       4.4         A1.19       Subcooling       4.0       4.4         A2       Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the ECCS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:				
A1.17       ECCS flow rate       4.2       4.3         A1.18       PZR level and pressure       4.0       4.3         A1.19       Subcooling       4.0       4.4         A2       Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the ECCS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:		•		
A1.18       PZR level and pressure       4.0       4.3         A1.19       Subcooling       4.0       4.4         A2       Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the ECCS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:				
A1.19       Subcooling       4.0       4.4         A2       Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the ECCS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:				
Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the ECCS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:  (CFR: 41.5 / 45.5)  A2.01 High bearing temperature 2.9 3.1 A2.02 Loss of flow path 3.9 4.3 A2.03 System leakage 3.3 3.7 A2.04 Improper discharge pressure 3.4 3.8 A2.05 Improper amperage to the pump motor 3.4 3.5 A2.06 Water hammer 3.3 3.5 A2.07 Loss of heat tracing 2.8 3.1 A2.08 Effect of electric power loss on valve position 3.0 3.3 A2.09 Radioactive release from venting RWST to atmosphere 2.6 3.2* A2.10 Low boron concentration in SIS 3.4 3.9 A2.11 Rupture of ECCS header 4.0 4.4 A2.12 Conditions requiring actuation of ECCS 4.5 4.8 A2.13 Inadvertent SIS actuation 3.9 4.2  A3 Ability to monitor automatic operation of the ECCS, including:  (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5)  A3.01 Accumulators 4.0 4.1 4.1 A3.03 ESFAS-operated valves 4.1 4.1 A3.04 Cooling water systems 3.8 3.8 A3.05 Safety Injection Pumps 4.2 4.3 A3.06 Valve lineups 3.9 4.2 A3.07 RHR pumps 3.6* 3.7		•		
operations on the ECCS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:	A1.1)	Subcooming	7.0	7.7
A2.02       Loss of flow path       3.9       4.3         A2.03       System leakage       3.3       3.7         A2.04       Improper discharge pressure       3.4       3.8         A2.05       Improper amperage to the pump motor       3.4       3.5         A2.06       Water hammer       3.3       3.5         A2.07       Loss of heat tracing       2.8       3.1         A2.08       Effect of electric power loss on valve position       3.0       3.3         A2.09       Radioactive release from venting RWST to atmosphere       2.6       3.2*         A2.10       Low boron concentration in SIS       3.4       3.9         A2.11       Rupture of ECCS header       4.0       4.4         A2.12       Conditions requiring actuation of ECCS       4.5       4.8         A2.13       Inadvertent SIS actuation       3.9       4.2         A3       Ability to monitor automatic operation of the ECCS, including:        (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5)       4.1       4.1         A3.01       Accumulators       4.0*       3.9         A3.02       Pumps       4.1       4.1         A3.03       ESFAS-operated valves       3.8       3.8         A3.05       Safety Inje		procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:		
A2.02       Loss of flow path       3.9       4.3         A2.03       System leakage       3.3       3.7         A2.04       Improper discharge pressure       3.4       3.8         A2.05       Improper amperage to the pump motor       3.4       3.5         A2.06       Water hammer       3.3       3.5         A2.07       Loss of heat tracing       2.8       3.1         A2.08       Effect of electric power loss on valve position       3.0       3.3         A2.09       Radioactive release from venting RWST to atmosphere       2.6       3.2*         A2.10       Low boron concentration in SIS       3.4       3.9         A2.11       Rupture of ECCS header       4.0       4.4         A2.12       Conditions requiring actuation of ECCS       4.5       4.8         A2.13       Inadvertent SIS actuation       3.9       4.2         A3       Ability to monitor automatic operation of the ECCS, including:        (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5)       4.1       4.1         A3.01       Accumulators       4.0*       3.9         A3.02       Pumps       4.1       4.1         A3.03       ESFAS-operated valves       3.8       3.8         A3.05       Safety Inje	A 2 O1	High hearing temperature	20	3 1
A2.03       System leakage       3.3       3.7         A2.04       Improper discharge pressure       3.4       3.8         A2.05       Improper amperage to the pump motor       3.4       3.5         A2.06       Water hammer       3.3       3.5         A2.07       Loss of heat tracing       2.8       3.1         A2.08       Effect of electric power loss on valve position       3.0       3.3         A2.09       Radioactive release from venting RWST to atmosphere       2.6       3.2*         A2.10       Low boron concentration in SIS       3.4       3.9         A2.11       Rupture of ECCS header       4.0       4.4         A2.12       Conditions requiring actuation of ECCS       4.5       4.8         A2.13       Inadvertent SIS actuation       3.9       4.2         A3       Ability to monitor automatic operation of the ECCS, including:				
A2.04       Improper discharge pressure       3.4       3.8         A2.05       Improper amperage to the pump motor       3.4       3.5         A2.06       Water hammer       3.3       3.5         A2.07       Loss of heat tracing       2.8       3.1         A2.08       Effect of electric power loss on valve position       3.0       3.3         A2.09       Radioactive release from venting RWST to atmosphere       2.6       3.2*         A2.10       Low boron concentration in SIS       3.4       3.9         A2.11       Rupture of ECCS header       4.0       4.4         A2.12       Conditions requiring actuation of ECCS       4.5       4.8         A2.13       Inadvertent SIS actuation       3.9       4.2         A3       Ability to monitor automatic operation of the ECCS, including:         (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5)         A3.01       Accumulators       4.0*       3.9         A3.02       Pumps       4.1       4.1         A3.03       ESFAS-operated valves       4.1       4.1         A3.04       Cooling water systems       3.8       3.8         A3.05       Safety Injection Pumps       4.2       4.3         A3.06       Valve lineups       3.9				
A2.05       Improper amperage to the pump motor       3.4       3.5         A2.06       Water hammer       3.3       3.5         A2.07       Loss of heat tracing       2.8       3.1         A2.08       Effect of electric power loss on valve position       3.0       3.3         A2.09       Radioactive release from venting RWST to atmosphere       2.6       3.2*         A2.10       Low boron concentration in SIS       3.4       3.9         A2.11       Rupture of ECCS header       4.0       4.4         A2.12       Conditions requiring actuation of ECCS       4.5       4.8         A2.13       Inadvertent SIS actuation       3.9       4.2         A3       Ability to monitor automatic operation of the ECCS, including:         (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5)         A3.01       Accumulators       4.0*       3.9         A3.02       Pumps       4.1       4.1         A3.03       ESFAS-operated valves       4.1       4.1         A3.04       Cooling water systems       3.8       3.8         A3.05       Safety Injection Pumps       4.2       4.3         A3.06       Valve lineups       3.9       4.2         A3.07       RHR pumps       3.6*       3.7 <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td>				
A2.06       Water hammer       3.3       3.5         A2.07       Loss of heat tracing       2.8       3.1         A2.08       Effect of electric power loss on valve position       3.0       3.3         A2.09       Radioactive release from venting RWST to atmosphere       2.6       3.2*         A2.10       Low boron concentration in SIS       3.4       3.9         A2.11       Rupture of ECCS header       4.0       4.4         A2.12       Conditions requiring actuation of ECCS       4.5       4.8         A2.13       Inadvertent SIS actuation       3.9       4.2         A3       Ability to monitor automatic operation of the ECCS, including:        (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5)       4.0*       3.9         A3.01       Accumulators       4.0*       3.9         A3.02       Pumps       4.1       4.1         A3.03       ESFAS-operated valves       4.1       4.1         A3.04       Cooling water systems       3.8       3.8         A3.05       Safety Injection Pumps       4.2       4.3         A3.06       Valve lineups       3.9       4.2         A3.07       RHR pumps       3.6*       3.7				
A2.07       Loss of heat tracing       2.8       3.1         A2.08       Effect of electric power loss on valve position       3.0       3.3         A2.09       Radioactive release from venting RWST to atmosphere       2.6       3.2*         A2.10       Low boron concentration in SIS       3.4       3.9         A2.11       Rupture of ECCS header       4.0       4.4         A2.12       Conditions requiring actuation of ECCS       4.5       4.8         A2.13       Inadvertent SIS actuation       3.9       4.2         A3       Ability to monitor automatic operation of the ECCS, including:        (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5)       4.0*       3.9         A3.01       Accumulators       4.0*       3.9         A3.02       Pumps       4.1       4.1         A3.03       ESFAS-operated valves       4.1       4.1         A3.04       Cooling water systems       3.8       3.8         A3.05       Safety Injection Pumps       4.2       4.3         A3.06       Valve lineups       3.9       4.2         A3.07       RHR pumps       3.6*       3.7				
A2.08       Effect of electric power loss on valve position.       3.0       3.3         A2.09       Radioactive release from venting RWST to atmosphere       2.6       3.2*         A2.10       Low boron concentration in SIS       3.4       3.9         A2.11       Rupture of ECCS header       4.0       4.4         A2.12       Conditions requiring actuation of ECCS       4.5       4.8         A2.13       Inadvertent SIS actuation       3.9       4.2         A3       Ability to monitor automatic operation of the ECCS, including: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5)       4.0*       3.9         A3.01       Accumulators       4.0*       3.9         A3.02       Pumps       4.1       4.1         A3.03       ESFAS-operated valves       4.1       4.1         A3.04       Cooling water systems       3.8       3.8         A3.05       Safety Injection Pumps       4.2       4.3         A3.06       Valve lineups       3.9       4.2         A3.07       RHR pumps       3.6*       3.7				
A2.09       Radioactive release from venting RWST to atmosphere       2.6       3.2*         A2.10       Low boron concentration in SIS       3.4       3.9         A2.11       Rupture of ECCS header       4.0       4.4         A2.12       Conditions requiring actuation of ECCS       4.5       4.8         A2.13       Inadvertent SIS actuation       3.9       4.2         A3       Ability to monitor automatic operation of the ECCS, including: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5)       4.0*       3.9         A3.01       Accumulators       4.0*       3.9         A3.02       Pumps       4.1       4.1         A3.03       ESFAS-operated valves       4.1       4.1         A3.04       Cooling water systems       3.8       3.8         A3.05       Safety Injection Pumps       4.2       4.3         A3.06       Valve lineups       3.9       4.2         A3.07       RHR pumps       3.6*       3.7		ě		
A2.10       Low boron concentration in SIS       3.4       3.9         A2.11       Rupture of ECCS header       4.0       4.4         A2.12       Conditions requiring actuation of ECCS       4.5       4.8         A2.13       Inadvertent SIS actuation       3.9       4.2         A3       Ability to monitor automatic operation of the ECCS, including: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5)       4.0*       3.9         A3.01       Accumulators       4.0*       3.9         A3.02       Pumps       4.1       4.1         A3.03       ESFAS-operated valves       4.1       4.1         A3.04       Cooling water systems       3.8       3.8         A3.05       Safety Injection Pumps       4.2       4.3         A3.06       Valve lineups       3.9       4.2         A3.07       RHR pumps       3.6*       3.7		•		
A2.11       Rupture of ECCS header       4.0       4.4         A2.12       Conditions requiring actuation of ECCS       4.5       4.8         A2.13       Inadvertent SIS actuation       3.9       4.2         A3       Ability to monitor automatic operation of the ECCS, including: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5)       4.0*       3.9         A3.01       Accumulators       4.0*       3.9         A3.02       Pumps       4.1       4.1         A3.03       ESFAS-operated valves       4.1       4.1         A3.04       Cooling water systems       3.8       3.8         A3.05       Safety Injection Pumps       4.2       4.3         A3.06       Valve lineups       3.9       4.2         A3.07       RHR pumps       3.6*       3.7				
A2.12       Conditions requiring actuation of ECCS       4.5       4.8         A2.13       Inadvertent SIS actuation       3.9       4.2         A3       Ability to monitor automatic operation of the ECCS, including: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5)       4.0*       3.9         A3.01       Accumulators       4.0*       3.9         A3.02       Pumps       4.1       4.1         A3.03       ESFAS-operated valves       4.1       4.1         A3.04       Cooling water systems       3.8       3.8         A3.05       Safety Injection Pumps       4.2       4.3         A3.06       Valve lineups       3.9       4.2         A3.07       RHR pumps       3.6*       3.7				
A2.13       Inadvertent SIS actuation       3.9       4.2         A3       Ability to monitor automatic operation of the ECCS, including: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5)       4.0*       3.9         A3.01       Accumulators       4.0*       3.9         A3.02       Pumps       4.1       4.1         A3.03       ESFAS-operated valves       4.1       4.1         A3.04       Cooling water systems       3.8       3.8         A3.05       Safety Injection Pumps       4.2       4.3         A3.06       Valve lineups       3.9       4.2         A3.07       RHR pumps       3.6*       3.7				
A3       Ability to monitor automatic operation of the ECCS, including: (CFR: 41.7/45.5)         A3.01       Accumulators       4.0*       3.9         A3.02       Pumps       4.1       4.1         A3.03       ESFAS-operated valves       4.1       4.1         A3.04       Cooling water systems       3.8       3.8         A3.05       Safety Injection Pumps       4.2       4.3         A3.06       Valve lineups       3.9       4.2         A3.07       RHR pumps       3.6*       3.7		· •		
A3.01       Accumulators       4.0*       3.9         A3.02       Pumps       4.1       4.1         A3.03       ESFAS-operated valves       4.1       4.1         A3.04       Cooling water systems       3.8       3.8         A3.05       Safety Injection Pumps       4.2       4.3         A3.06       Valve lineups       3.9       4.2         A3.07       RHR pumps       3.6*       3.7	A2.13	madvertent SIS actuation	3.9	4.2
A3.02       Pumps       4.1       4.1         A3.03       ESFAS-operated valves       4.1       4.1         A3.04       Cooling water systems       3.8       3.8         A3.05       Safety Injection Pumps       4.2       4.3         A3.06       Valve lineups       3.9       4.2         A3.07       RHR pumps       3.6*       3.7	A3			
A3.02       Pumps       4.1       4.1         A3.03       ESFAS-operated valves       4.1       4.1         A3.04       Cooling water systems       3.8       3.8         A3.05       Safety Injection Pumps       4.2       4.3         A3.06       Valve lineups       3.9       4.2         A3.07       RHR pumps       3.6*       3.7	A3.01	Accumulators	4.0*	3.9
A3.03       ESFAS-operated valves       4.1       4.1         A3.04       Cooling water systems       3.8       3.8         A3.05       Safety Injection Pumps       4.2       4.3         A3.06       Valve lineups       3.9       4.2         A3.07       RHR pumps       3.6*       3.7				
A3.04       Cooling water systems       3.8       3.8         A3.05       Safety Injection Pumps       4.2       4.3         A3.06       Valve lineups       3.9       4.2         A3.07       RHR pumps       3.6*       3.7		•		4.1
A3.05       Safety Injection Pumps       4.2       4.3         A3.06       Valve lineups       3.9       4.2         A3.07       RHR pumps       3.6*       3.7		•		
A3.06       Valve lineups       3.9       4.2         A3.07       RHR pumps       3.6*       3.7				
A3.07 RHR pumps		• • •		
1 1				

#### SYSTEM: 006 Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: **A4** (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 to 45.8) A4.01 3.9 Pumps ..... 4.1 A4.02 Valves ..... 4.0\* 3.8 A4.03 Transfer from boron storage tank to boron injection tank ...... 3.5\* 3.5\* RHRS ..... 3.7\* A4.04 3.6 A4.05 3.9 3.8 A4.06 ESF control panel ..... 4.4 4.4 ECCS pumps and valves ..... 4.4 4.4 A4.07 ESF system, including reset ..... A4.08 4.2 4.3 A4.09 PZR LCS and PZR PCS ..... 4.1 4.2 A4.10 3.8\* 4.2\*

4.2

4.3

A4.11

#### 011 **Pressurizer Level Control System** (PZR LCS) TASK: Operate PZR level control in manual Transfer from manual to automatic PZR level control Monitor the PZR LCS Place the PZR level programmer in manual **IMPORTANCE** K/A NO. **KNOWLEDGE** RO SRO **K1** Knowledge of the physical connections and/or causeeffect relationships between the PZR LCS and the following systems: (CFR: 41.2 to 41.9 / 45.7 to 45.8) K1.01 CVCS 3.6 3.9 K1.02 RCS ..... 3.7 3.8 K1.03 PZR PCS ..... 3.7 4.0 K1.04 RPS ..... 3.8 3.9 K1.053.4? 3.5? **K2** Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following: (CFR: 41.7) K2.01 3.1 3.2 K2.02 3.1 3.2 K2.03 Level channels and controllers ..... 2.4\* 2.4 **K3** Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the PZR LCS will have on the following: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.6) CVCS K3.01 3.2\* 3.4 K3.02 RCS ..... 3.5 3.7 K3.03 PZR PCS ..... 3.2 3.7 **K**4 Knowledge of PZR LCS design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: (CFR: 41.7) K4.01 3.3 3.7 K4.02 PZR level controller ..... 3.3 3.4 2.9 K4.03 2.6 K4.04 PZR level inputs ..... 3.0 3.3 K4.05 PZR level inputs to RPS ..... 3.7\* 4.1\* K4.06 3.3 3.7

Cold-calibrated channel ......

K4.07

3.2

2.9

### SYSTEM: 011 Pressurizer Level Control System (PZR LCS)

	K5	Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as the apply to the PZR LCS: (CFR: $41.5 / 45.7$ )	ney	
	K5.01 K5.02	Theory of operation of bellows-type level detector	1.9	2.2
		control valve	2.0*	2.2*
٠	K5.03	Principle of operation of the charging flow sensor	1.7	1.9
	K5.04 K5.05	Reasons for not allowing coolant to flash into steam in the letdown piping Interrelation of indicated charging flow rate with volume of water required	2.5	2.9
		to bring PZR level back to programmed level hot/cold	2.8	3.1
	K5.06	Indicated charging flow: seal flow plus actual charging flow	2.9	3.2
	K5.07	Definition of flow rate	1.9	2.1
	K5.08	Relative flow rate through letdown subsystem as a function of flow control	2.3	2.5*
	K5.09	Reason for manually controlling PZR level	2.6	2.7*
	K5.10	Indications of reactor vessel bubble	3.7	4.0
	K5.11	Reasons for selecting "manual" on letdown control valve controller	2.5*	2.8*
	K5.12	Criteria and purpose of PZR level program	2.7	3.3
	K5.13	Impact of high/low PZR level on interrelated system	3.2*	3.4
	K5.14	Sizing of the PZR for maximum insurge/outsurge	1.9	2.2
	K5.15	PZR level indication when RCS is saturated	3.6	4.0
	K6	Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction on the following will have on the PZR LCS: (CFR: $41.7/45.7$ )	e	
ı	K6.01	Reasons for starting charging pump while increasing letdown flow rate	2.8*	3.2*
	K6.02	Relationship of makeup flow rate to throttle valve position	2.2	2.5*
'	K6.03	Relationship between PZR level and PZR heater control circuit	2.9	3.3
	K6.04	Operation of PZR level controllers	3.1	3.1
	K6.05	Function of PZR level gauges as postaccident monitors	3.1	3.7
	K6.06	Correlation of demand signal indication on charging		
		pump flow valve controller to the valve position	2.5*	2.8*
'	K6.07	Correlation of demand signal indication with letdown PVC position	2.4	2.6
	K6.08	Valves	2.1	2.4
	K6.09	Sensor and detectors	2.4	2.6
	K6.10	Controllers and positioners	2.3	2.6
	K6.11	Pumps	1.9	2.1
	K6.12	Motors	1.8	1.9
	K6.13	Breakers, relays, and disconnects	1.9	2.0

SYSTEM	011 Pressurizer Level Control System (PZR LCS)		
	<u>ABILITY</u>		
A1	Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the PZR LCS controls including: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.5)		
A1.01 A1.02 A1.03 A1.04	PZR level and pressure Charging and letdown flows VCT level T-ave	3.5 3.3 2.8 3.1	3.6 3.5 3.2 3.3
A2	Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the PZR LCS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: (CFR: $41.5/43.5/45.3/45.13$ )		
A2.01	Excessive letdown	3.2	3.1
A2.02	Excessive charging	3.2	3.2
A2.03	Loss of PZR level	3.8	3.9
A2.04	Loss of one, two or three charging pumps	3.5	3.7
A2.05	Loss of PZR heaters	3.3	3.7
A2.06	Inadvertent PZR spray actuation	3.7	3.9
A2.07	Isolation of letdown	3.0	3.3
A2.08	Loss of level compensation	2.6	2.8
A2.09	High ambient reflux boiling temperature effect or indicated PZR level	2.9?	3.5?
A2.10	Failure of PZR level instrument - high	3.4	3.6
A2.10 A2.11	Failure of PZR level instrument - low	3.4	3.6
A2.11 A2.12		3.4	3.3
A2.12	Operation of auxiliary spray	3.3	3.3
A3	Ability to monitor automatic operation of the PZR LCS, including: $(CFR:\ 41.7\ /\ 45.5)$		
A3.01	Boration/dilution	2.8*	2.8
A3.02	Reactor power	2.6*	2.8*
A3.03	Charging and letdown	3.2*	3.3
A4	Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: (CFR: $41.7 / 45.5$ to $45.8$ )		
A4.01	Charging pump and flow controls	3.5	3.2
A4.02	Movement of the pressure control valve, using manual controller	3.4	3.1
A4.02 A4.03	PZR heaters	3.3	3.1
A4.03 A4.04	Transfer of PZR LCS from automatic to manual control	3.2	2.9
A4.04	Transfer of LEX LCS from automatic to manual control	5.4	۷.۶

Letdown flow controller .....

A4.05

3.2

2.9

### **Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS)**

TASK: Monitor the ESFAS

What if safety injection (cold-leg injection) flow is not sufficient?

Manually initiate ESF

Perform the design basis accident sequence test

Reset the ESF Bypass the ESF

Perform the integrated ESF test

Perform the ESF equipment response time test Perform the ESF equipment performance test

K/A NO.	KNOWLEDGE	IMPOF RO	RTANCE SRO
K1	Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause effect relationships between the ESFAS and the following systems: (CFR: 41.2 to 41.9 / 45.7 to 45.8)		
K1.01	Initiation signals for ESF circuit logic	4.2	4.4
K1.02	RCP	3.2	3.6
K1.03	CCS	3.8	4.1
K1.04	RPS injection	3.9?	4.3?
K1.05	CSS	4.1	4.4
K1.06	ECCS	4.2	4.4
K1.07	AFW System	4.1	4.4
K1.08	CCWS	3.6	3.8
K1.09	CIRS	3.3*	3.7*
K1.10	CPS	2.8*	3.1*
K1.11	CVCS	3.3	3.8
K1.12	ED/G	4.1	4.4
K1.13	HVAC	2.8	3.1
K1.14	IAS	3.1*	3.4*
K1.15	MFW System	3.4	3.8
K1.16	MRSS	2.9*	3.4*
K1.17	LRS	2.6	3.0
K1.18	Premature reset of ESF actuation	3.7	4.1
K1.19	WGDS	2.6	3.0
K2	Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following: (CFR: 41.7)		
K2.01	ESFAS/safeguards equipment control	3.6*	3.8

SYSTEM	013 Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS)		
К3	Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the ESFAS will have on the following: (CFR: $41.7 / 45.6$ )		
K3.01 K3.02	Fuel RCS	4.4 4.3	4.7 4.5
K3.03	Containment	4.3	4.7
K4	Knowledge of ESFAS design feature(s) and/or inter- lock(s) which provide for the following: (CFR: 41.7)		
T7.4.01	QIQ .	2.0	4.0
K4.01	SIS reset	3.9	4.3
K4.02	Containment integrity system reset	3.9	4.2
K4.03	Main Steam Isolation System	3.9	4.4
K4.04	Auxiliary feed actuation signal	4.3*	4.5*
K4.05	Core spray actuation signal reset	4.0*	4.2*
K4.06	Recirculation actuation system reset	4.0*	4.3*
K4.07	Power supply loss	3.7	4.1
K4.08	Redundancy	3.1	3.4
K4.09	Spurious trip protection	2.7	3.1*
K4.10	Safeguards equipment control reset	3.3	3.7
K4.11	Vital power load control	3.2	3.8
K4.12	Safety injection block	3.7	3.9
K4.13	MFW isolation/reset	3.7	3.9
K4.14	Upper head injection accumulator isolation	3.7*	4.0*
K4.15	Continuous testing	2.6	3.2
K4.16	Avoidance of PTS	3.8	4.2
K4.17 K4.18	Reason for stopping air coolers on train being tested	2.9*	2.9*
	spray pump on train being tested	3.3*	3.5*
K4.19	Reason for opening breaker on high-head injection pump	3.0*	3.4*
K4.20	Reason for stopping CCW pump on train being tested	3.1*	3.3*
K4.21	Reason for starting an additional service water booster pump for train not		
	being tested and stopping the pump on train under test	3.1*	3.3*
K4.22	Reason for shut safety injection pump discharge valve of train to be tested	2.9*	3.1*
K4.23	Reason for disabling of ED/G during ESF sequencer test	2.6*	2.9*
K4.24	Reason for disabling of BIT so it will not function during ESF		
	sequencer test	3.0*	3.1*
K5	Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the ESFAS: (CFR: $41.5 / 45.7$ )		
K5.01 K5.02	Definitions of safety train and ESF channel	2.8 2.9	3.2 3.3
113.02	Safety system regional remaining	2.7	5.5

SYSTEM:	013 Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS)		
К6	Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction on the following will have on the ESFAS: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 to 45.8)	r <b>e</b>	
K6.01 K6.02 K6.03 K6.04	Sensors and detectors  Controllers and positioners  Breakers, relays, and disconnects  Trip setpoint calculators	2.7* 2.2 2.4 2.4*	3.1* 2.6 2.9 2.7*
	<u>ABILITY</u>		
A1	Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to Prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the ESFAS controls including: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.5)		
A1.01	RCS pressure and temperature	4.0	4.2
A1.02	Containment pressure, temperature, and humidity	3.9	4.2
A1.03	Feedwater header differential	2.6*	2.6*
A1.04	S/G level	3.4	3.6
A1.05	Main steam pressure	3.4	3.6
A1.06	RWST level	3.6	3.9
A1.07	Containment radiation	3.6	3.9
A1.08	Containment sump level	3.7	3.8
A1.09	T-hot	3.4	3.7
A1.10	T-cold	3.4	3.7
A2	Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operat on the ESFAS; and (b) based Ability on those predictions, use procedure correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations; (CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.13)		
A2.01	LOCA	4.6	4.8
A2.02	Excess steam demand	4.3	4.5
A2.03	Rapid depressurization	4.4	4.7
A2.04	Loss of instrument bus	3.6	4.2
A2.05	Loss of dc control power	3.7	4.2
A2.06	Inadvertent ESFAS actuation	3.7*	4.0
A3	Ability to monitor automatic operation of the ESFAS including: $(CFR:\ 41.7/45.5)$		
A3.01	Input channels and logic	3.7*	3.9
A3.02	Operation of actuated equipment	4.1	4.2
A3.02 A3.03	Continuous testing feature	2.4*	2.7*
13.03	Continuous testing reature	∠.→	4.1

SYSTEM:	013 Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS)		
A4	Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: (CFR: $41.7 / 45.5$ to $45.8$ )		
A4.01	ESFAS-initiated equipment which fails to actuate	4.5	4.8
A4.02	Reset of ESFAS channels	4.3	4.4
A4.03	ESFAS initiation	4.5	4.7

## **Safety Function 3:**

# Reactor Pressure Controlpage006Emergency Core Cooling System3.3-2010Pressurizer Pressure Control System3.3-6

#### 006 Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS)

TASK: Perform ECCS pump operability checks

Fill the high-pressure SIS

Fill the accumulators/core flood tanks/safety injection tanks Perform core flooding isolation valves alarms actuation test Drain the accumulators/core flood tanks/safety injection tanks

Perform ECCS leak rate test Fill the boron injection tank

Perform safety injection tank outlet isolation valve test

Prepare the SIS for a normal plant startup Fill the refueling/borated water storage tank

Perform high-head safety injection test and flushing of stainless steel pipe

Recirculate and/or purify the refueling/borated water storage tank

Adjust HPI flow

Prepare the high-pressure SIS for shutdown

Secure the high-pressure SIS Drain the high-pressure SIS

Adjust accumulator/core flood tank/safety injection tank pressure

Vent accumulation/core flood tank/safety injection tanks

Monitor the SIS

Operate the SIS in the recirculation mode

Manually initiate safety injection

What if HPI is overpressurizing the reactor?

K/A NO.	<u>KNOWLEDGE</u>	IMPOR RO	RTANCE SRO
K1	Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the ECCS and the following systems: (CFR: $41.2 \text{ to } 41.9 / 45.7 \text{ to } 45.8$ )		
K1.01	Spent fuel cooling system	2.4*	2.8*
K1.02	ESFAS	4.3	4.6
K1.03	RCS	4.2	4.3
K1.04	Auxiliary spray system	2.7*	2.8*
K1.05	RCP seal injection and return	2.8*	2.9
K1.06	Liquid waste tank/reactor drain tank	2.2	2.4
K1.07	MFW System	2.9*	3.3*
K1.08	CVCS	3.6	3.9
K1.09	Nitrogen	2.6	2.7
K1.10	Safety injection tank heating system	2.6*	2.8*
K1.11	CCWS	2.8	3.2
K1.12	Accumulator vent system	2.4	26
K1.13	CSS	3.3*	3.6*
K1.14	IAS	3.0	3.4*
K1.15	Accumulator drains	2.2*	2.2*

### SYSTEM: 006 Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS)

K2	<b>Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following:</b> (CFR: 41.7)		
K2.01	ECCS pumps	3.6	3.9
K2.02	Valve operators for accumulators	2.5*	2.9
K2.02 K2.03	Heat tracing	2.3	2.5
K2.04	ESFAS-operated valves	3.6	3.8
K2.04	Est As-operated varves	3.0	3.0
К3	Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the ECCS will have on the following: $(CFR:\ 41.7/45.6)$		
K3.01	RCS	4.1	4.2
K3.02	Fuel	4.3	4.4
K3.03	Containment	4.2	4.4
K4	Knowledge of ECCS design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: (CFR: 41.7)		
K4.01	Cooling of centrifugal pump bearings	2.6	2.9
K4.02	Relieving shutoff head (recirculation)	2.8	3.0
K4.03	Flushing of piping following transfer of highly concentrated boric acid	2.4	2.5
K4.04	System venting	2.3	2.5
K4.05	Autostart of HPI/LPI/SIP	4.3	4.4
K4.06	Recirculation of minimum flow through pumps	2.7	3.0
K4.07	Normal water supply for SIS	3.3	3.6
K4 08	Recirculation flowpath of reactor building sump	3.2*	3.6*
K4.09	Valve positioning on safety injection signal	3.8	4.2
K4.10	Redundant pressure meters	2.9	3.2
K4.11	Reset of SIS	3.9	4.2
K4.12	HPI flow throttling	4.1*	4.3*
K4.13	Reset of containment isolation	3.8	4.1
K5	Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to ECCS: $(CFR:\ 41.5\ /\ 45.7)$		
K5.01	Effects of temperatures on water level indications	2.8	3.3
K5.02	Relationship between accumulator volume and pressure	2.8	2.9
K5.03	Weight percent calculation boron concentration	1.9	2.2
K5.04	Brittle fracture, including causes and preventative actions	2.9	3.1
K5.05	Effects of pressure on a solid system	3.4	3.8
K5.06	Relationship between ECCS flow and RCS pressure	3.5	3.9
K5.07	Expected temperature levels in various locations of the	3.3	5.7
	RCS due to various plant conditions	2.7	3.0
K5.08	Operation of pumps in parallel	2.9*	3.1*

### SYSTEM: 006 Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS)

К6	Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction on the following will have on the ECCS: (CFR: 41.7/45.7)		
K6.01	BIT/borated water sources.	3.4	3.9
K6.02	Core flood tanks (accumulators)	3.4	3.9
K6.03	Safety Injection Pumps	3.6	3.9
K6.04	Breakers, relays and disconnects	2.1	2.5
K6.05	HPI/LPI cooling water	3.0	3.5
K6.06	Isolation valves	2.3	2.7
K6.07	Drain and fill valves	1.7	1.9
K6.08	Accumulator and sample system	1.7	1.9
K6.09	RWST purification system	1.8	1.9
K6.10	Valves	2.2	2.4
K6.11	Sensors and detectors	2.1	2.6
K6.12	Controllers and positioners	2.1	2.6
K6.13	Pumps	2.6	2.9
K6.14	Motors	2.1	2.4
K6.15	Filters	1.8	2.2
K6.16	Demineralizers	1.8	2.2
K6.17	Heat Exchangers and condensers	2.1	2.4
K6.18	Subcooling margin indicators	3.5	3.9
A1	Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the ECCS controls including: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.5)		
A1.01	Avoidance of thermal and pressure stresses due to pump startup	3.1	3.4
A1.02	Boron concentration in accumulator, boron storage tanks	3.0	3.6
A1.03	Flow rates in BWST/BW recirculation pumps	2.4	2.6
A1.04	D/P across accumulator isolation valve	2.2	2.5
A1.05	CCW flow (establish flow to RHR heat exchanger prior to		
	placing in service)	2.9	3.3
A1.06	Subcooling margin	3.6	3.9
A1.07	Pressure, high and low	3.3	3.6
A1.08	Temperature, high motor and bearing	2.8	3.1
A1.09	Pump amperage, including start, normal and locked	2.8	3.2
A1.10	CVCS Letdown flow	2.4	2.7
A1.11	Boron Concentration	3.1	3.4
A1.12	RHR heatup limits	2.9	3.4
A1.13	Accumulator pressure (level, boron concentration)	3.5	3.7
A1.14	Reactor vessel level	3.5	3.8
A1.15	RWST Level and temperature	3.3	3.9
A1.16	RCS temperature, including superheat, saturation, and subcooled	4.1	4.2
A1.17	ECCS flow rate	4.2	4.3
A1.18	PZR level and pressure	4.0	4.3
A1.19	Subcooling	4.0	4.4

### SYSTEM: 006 Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS)

A2	Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the ECCS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: (CFR: $41.5/45.5$ )		
A2.01	High bearing temperature	2.9	3.1
A2.02	Loss of flow path	3.9	4.3
A2.03	System leakage	3.3	3.7
A2.04	Improper discharge pressure	3.4	3.8
A2.05	Improper amperage to the pump motor	3.4	3.5
A2.06	Water hammer	3.3	3.5
A2.07	Loss of heat tracing	2.8	3.1
A2.08	Effect of electric power loss on valve position	3.0	3.3
A2.09	Radioactive release from venting RWST to atmosphere	2.6	3.2*
A2.10	Low boron concentration in SIS.	3.4	3.9
A2.11	Rupture of ECCS header	4.0	4.4
A2.11 A2.12	Conditions requiring actuation of ECCS	4.5	4.8
A2.12 A2.13	Inadvertent SIS actuation	3.9	4.2
A3.01 A3.02 A3.03 A3.04 A3.05 A3.06 A3.07 A3.08	Ability to monitor automatic operation of the ECCS, including: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5)  Accumulators Pumps ESFAS-operated valves Cooling water systems Safety Injection Pumps Valve lineups RHR pumps Automatic transfer of ECCS flowpaths	4.0* 4.1 4.1 3.8 3.4 3.9 3.6 4.2	3.9 4.1 4.1 3.8 3.9 4.2 3.7 4.3
A4	Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: (CFR: $41.7 / 45.5$ to $45.8$ )		
A4.01	Pumps	4.1	3.9
A4.02	Valves	4.0*	3.8
A4.03	Transfer from boron storage tank to boron injection tank	3.5*	3.5*
A4.04	RHRS	3.7	3.6
A4.05	Transfer of ECCS flowpaths prior to recirculation	3.9	3.8
A4.06	ESF control panel	4.4	4.4
A4.07	ECCS pumps and valves	4.4	4.4
A4.08	ESF system, including reset	4.2	4.3
A4.09	PZR LCS and PZR PCS	4.1	4.2
A4.10	Safety parameter display system	3.8*	4.2*
A4.11	Overpressure protection system	4.2	4.3

# 010 Pressurizer Pressure Control System (PZR PCS)

TASK: Control PZR pressure in individual manual mode (using heaters or

spray manually)

Test PORV operability

Control PZR pressure in master manual model

Heat up the PZR with the PZR heaters

Perform lineup on the PZR pressure relief system Transfer from manual to automatic pressure control

Monitor PZR pressure

Monitor the PZR pressure relief system

<u>K/A NO.</u>	<u>KNOWLEDGE</u>	IMPOF RO	RTANCE <u>SRO</u>
K1	Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the PZR PCS and the following systems: (CFR: 41.2 to 41.9 / 45.7 to 45.8)		
K1.01	RPS	3.9	4.1
K1.02	ESFAS	3.9	4.1
K1.03	RCS	3.6	3.7
K1.04	AFW	2.4	2.7
K1.05	PRTS	3.4	3.6
K1.06	CVCS	2.9	3.1
K1.07	Containment	2.9	3.1
K1.08	PZR LCS	3.2	3.5
K2	<b>Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following:</b> (CFR: 41.7)		
K2.01	PZR heaters	3.0	3.4
K2.02	Controller for PZR spray valve	2.5	2.7
K2.03	Indicator for PORV position	2.8*	3.0*
K2.04	Indicator for code safety position	2.7*	2.9*
К3	Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the PZR PCS will have on the following: (CFR: $41.7/45.6$ )		
K3.01	RCS	3.8	3.9
K3.02	RPS	4.0	4.1
K3.03	ESFAS	4.0	4.2

K4	Knowledge of PZR PCS design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: (CFR: 41.7)		
K4.01	Spray valve warm-up	2.7	2.9
K4.02	Prevention of uncovering PZR heaters	3.0	3.4
K4.03	Over pressure control	3.8	4.1
K5	Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as the apply to the PZR PCS: $(CFR:\ 41.5\ /\ 45.7)$		
K5.01	Determination of condition of fluid in PZR, using steam tables	3.5	4.0
K5.02	Constant enthalpy expansion through a valve	2.6	3.0*
K6	Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction of the following will have on the PZR PCS: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.7)	e	
K6.01	Pressure detection systems	2.7	3.1
K6.02	PZR	3.2	3.5
K6.03	PZR sprays and heaters	3.2	3.6
K6.04	PRT	2.9	3.2
K6.05	Valves	2.3	2.4
K6.06	Sensors and detectors	2.3	2.4
K6.07	Controllers and positioners	2.3	2.5
	<u>ABILITY</u>		
A1	Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the PZR PCS controls including: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.5)		
A1.01	PZR and RCS boron concentrations	2.8	2.9*
A1.02	Spray and surge line flow rates	2.4	2.6*
A1.03	PRT pressure and temperature	2.9	3.2
A1.04	Effects of temperature change during solid operation	3.6	3.8
A1.05	Pressure effect on level	2.8	2.9
A1.06	RCS heatup and cooldown effect on pressure	3.1	3.2
A1.07	RCS pressure	3.7	3.7
A1.08	Spray nozzle DT	3.2	3.3
A 1 OO	Tail pipe temperature and acquetic monitors	3 /	37

010 Pressurizer Pressure Control System (PZR PCS)

**SYSTEM:** 

A1.09

Tail pipe temperature and acoustic monitors .....

3.4

3.7

SYSTEM:	010 Pressurizer Pressure Control System (PZR PCS)		
A2	Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the PZR PCS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: (CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.13)		
A2.01	Heater failures	3.3	3.6
A2.02	Spray valve failures	3.9	3.9
A2.03	PORV failures	4.1	4.2
A3	Ability to monitor automatic operation of the PZR PCS, including: $(CFR\colon41.7/45.5)$		
A3.01	PRT temperature and pressure during PORV testing	3.0	3.2
A3.02	PZR pressure	3.6	3.5
113.02	12h pressure	5.0	3.5
<b>A4</b>	Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: (CFR: $41.7 / 45.5$ to $45.8$ )		
A4.01	PZR spray valve	3.7	3.5
A4.02	PZR heaters	3.6	3.4
A4.03	PORV and block valves	4.0	3.8
111.05	1 OIL, and older taries	0	5.0

## **Safety Function 4:**

Hea	at Removal From Reactor Core	page
PRIMA	RY SYSTEM	
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## 002 Reactor Coolant System (RCS)

TASK: Perform lineups on the RCS

Vent the CRDM Drain the RCS

Drain the S/G (primary side) Drain the refueling cavity Fill the refueling cavity

Perform RCS water inventory balance

Add nitrogen to the PZR

Monitor the RCS

Establish natural circulation

K/A NO.	KNOWLEDGE	IMPOR RO	RTANCE SRO
K1	Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the RCS and the following systems:  (CFR: 41.2 to 41.9 / 45.7 to 45.8)		
K1.01	RWST	3.7	3.9
K1.02	CRDS	2.9*	3.0*
K1.03	Borated water storage tank	3.8	3.8
K1.04	RCS vent system	2.8	3.2
K1.05	PRT	3.2	3.4
K1 06	CVCS	3.7	4.0
K1 07	Reactor vessel level indication system	3.5*	3.7*
K1.08	ECCS	4.5	4.6
K1 09	PZR	4.1	4.1
K1 10	Reactor coolant drain tank	2.8	3.1
K1.11	S/GS, feedwater systems	4.1	4.2
K1 12	NIS	3.5*	3.6
K1.13	RCPS	4.1	4.2
K1.14	Spent-fuel pool purification	2.3	2.6
K1.15	Refueling canal	2.2	2.4
K1.16	Refueling water purification	1.9	2.2
K1.17	MT/G	3.5	3.8
K2	<b>Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following:</b> (CFR: 41.7)		
	None		

#### SYSTEM 002 Reactor Coolant System (RCS)

К3	Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the RCS will have on the following: (CFR: 41.7)		
K3.01 K3.02 K3.03	LRS Fuel Containment	2.1 4.2 4.2	2.6 4.5 4.6
K4	Knowledge of RCS design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: (CFR: 41.7)		
K4.01 K4 02 K4.03 K4 04 K4.05 K4.06 K4.07 K4.08 K4.09 K4.10	Filling and draining the RCS  Monitoring reactor vessel level  Venting the RCS  Filling and draining the refueling canal  Detection of RCS leakage  Prevention of missile hazards  Contraction and expansion during heatup and cooldown  Anchoring of componentsie, loops, vessel, S/Gs, and coolant pumps  Operation of loop isolation valves  Overpressure protection	2.7 3.5* 2.9 2.2 3.8 1.9 3.1 1.5 3.2 4.2	3.0 3.8* 3.2 2.7 4.2 2.2 3.5 1.8 3.2 4.4
K5	Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the RCS: $(CFR:\ 41.5\ /\ 45.7)$		
	they apply to the RCS: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.7)	3 1	3.4
K5.01	they apply to the RCS: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.7)  Basic heat transfer concepts	3.1	3.4
K5.01 K5.02	they apply to the RCS: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.7)  Basic heat transfer concepts Purpose of vent flow path when draining	3.1 2.5	3.4 2.9
K5.01	they apply to the RCS: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.7)  Basic heat transfer concepts  Purpose of vent flow path when draining  Difference in pressure-temperature relationship between	2.5	2.9
K5.01 K5.02 K5.03	they apply to the RCS: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.7)  Basic heat transfer concepts Purpose of vent flow path when draining Difference in pressure-temperature relationship between the water/steam system and the water/nitrogen system		
K5.01 K5.02	they apply to the RCS: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.7)  Basic heat transfer concepts  Purpose of vent flow path when draining  Difference in pressure-temperature relationship between	2.5	2.9
K5.01 K5.02 K5.03	they apply to the RCS: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.7)  Basic heat transfer concepts Purpose of vent flow path when draining Difference in pressure-temperature relationship between the water/steam system and the water/nitrogen system Reason for requirement he plant to be in steady-state	2.5	2.9
K5.01 K5.02 K5.03 K5.04	they apply to the RCS: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.7)  Basic heat transfer concepts Purpose of vent flow path when draining Difference in pressure-temperature relationship between the water/steam system and the water/nitrogen system Reason for requirement he plant to be in steady-state condition during RCS water inventory balance	<ul><li>2.5</li><li>2.2</li><li>2.9</li></ul>	<ul><li>2.9</li><li>2.6</li><li>3.4</li></ul>
K5.01 K5.02 K5.03 K5.04 K5.05	they apply to the RCS: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.7)  Basic heat transfer concepts Purpose of vent flow path when draining Difference in pressure-temperature relationship between the water/steam system and the water/nitrogen system Reason for requirement he plant to be in steady-state condition during RCS water inventory balance Reason for drain tank pressure rise during water inventory operations	<ul><li>2.5</li><li>2.2</li><li>2.9</li></ul>	<ul><li>2.9</li><li>2.6</li><li>3.4</li></ul>
K5.01 K5.02 K5.03 K5.04 K5.05	they apply to the RCS: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.7)  Basic heat transfer concepts Purpose of vent flow path when draining Difference in pressure-temperature relationship between the water/steam system and the water/nitrogen system Reason for requirement he plant to be in steady-state condition during RCS water inventory balance Reason for drain tank pressure rise during water inventory operations Pressure, temperature, and volume relationships of	<ul><li>2.5</li><li>2.2</li><li>2.9</li><li>2.7</li></ul>	2.9 2.6 3.4 3.0
K5.01 K5.02 K5.03 K5.04 K5.05 K5.06	they apply to the RCS: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.7)  Basic heat transfer concepts Purpose of vent flow path when draining Difference in pressure-temperature relationship between the water/steam system and the water/nitrogen system Reason for requirement he plant to be in steady-state condition during RCS water inventory balance Reason for drain tank pressure rise during water inventory operations Pressure, temperature, and volume relationships of nitrogen gas in association with water	<ul><li>2.5</li><li>2.2</li><li>2.9</li><li>2.7</li><li>2.3</li></ul>	2.9 2.6 3.4 3.0 2.6
K5.01 K5.02 K5.03 K5.04 K5.05 K5.06	they apply to the RCS: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.7)  Basic heat transfer concepts Purpose of vent flow path when draining Difference in pressure-temperature relationship between the water/steam system and the water/nitrogen system Reason for requirement he plant to be in steady-state condition during RCS water inventory balance Reason for drain tank pressure rise during water inventory operations Pressure, temperature, and volume relationships of nitrogen gas in association with water Reactivity effects of RCS boron, pressure and temperature	2.5 2.2 2.9 2.7 2.3 3.3	2.9 2.6 3.4 3.0 2.6 3.6
K5.01 K5.02 K5.03 K5.04 K5.05 K5.06 K5.07 K5.08	they apply to the RCS: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.7)  Basic heat transfer concepts Purpose of vent flow path when draining Difference in pressure-temperature relationship between the water/steam system and the water/nitrogen system Reason for requirement he plant to be in steady-state condition during RCS water inventory balance Reason for drain tank pressure rise during water inventory operations Pressure, temperature, and volume relationships of nitrogen gas in association with water Reactivity effects of RCS boron, pressure and temperature Why PZR level should be kept within the programmed band Relationship of pressure and temperature for water at saturation and subcooling conditions	2.5 2.2 2.9 2.7 2.3 3.3	2.9 2.6 3.4 3.0 2.6 3.6 3.9
K5.01 K5.02 K5.03 K5.04 K5.05 K5.06 K5.07 K5.08 K5.09	they apply to the RCS: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.7)  Basic heat transfer concepts Purpose of vent flow path when draining Difference in pressure-temperature relationship between the water/steam system and the water/nitrogen system Reason for requirement he plant to be in steady-state condition during RCS water inventory balance Reason for drain tank pressure rise during water inventory operations Pressure, temperature, and volume relationships of nitrogen gas in association with water Reactivity effects of RCS boron, pressure and temperature Why PZR level should be kept within the programmed band Relationship of pressure and temperature for water at saturation and subcooling conditions Relationship between reactor power and RCS differential temperature	2.5 2.2 2.9 2.7 2.3 3.3 3.4	2.9 2.6 3.4 3.0 2.6 3.6 3.9
K5.01 K5.02 K5.03 K5.04 K5.05 K5.06 K5.07 K5.08 K5.09	they apply to the RCS: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.7)  Basic heat transfer concepts Purpose of vent flow path when draining Difference in pressure-temperature relationship between the water/steam system and the water/nitrogen system Reason for requirement he plant to be in steady-state condition during RCS water inventory balance Reason for drain tank pressure rise during water inventory operations Pressure, temperature, and volume relationships of nitrogen gas in association with water Reactivity effects of RCS boron, pressure and temperature Why PZR level should be kept within the programmed band Relationship of pressure and temperature for water at saturation and subcooling conditions Relationship between reactor power and RCS differential temperature Relationship between effects of the primary coolant system and the secondary coolant system	2.5 2.2 2.9 2.7 2.3 3.3 3.4 3.7	2.9 2.6 3.4 3.0 2.6 3.6 3.9
K5.01 K5.02 K5.03 K5.04 K5.05 K5.06 K5.07 K5.08 K5.09	they apply to the RCS: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.7)  Basic heat transfer concepts Purpose of vent flow path when draining Difference in pressure-temperature relationship between the water/steam system and the water/nitrogen system Reason for requirement he plant to be in steady-state condition during RCS water inventory balance Reason for drain tank pressure rise during water inventory operations Pressure, temperature, and volume relationships of nitrogen gas in association with water Reactivity effects of RCS boron, pressure and temperature Why PZR level should be kept within the programmed band Relationship of pressure and temperature for water at saturation and subcooling conditions Relationship between reactor power and RCS differential temperature Relationship between effects of the primary coolant system	2.5 2.2 2.9 2.7 2.3 3.3 3.4 3.7 3.6	2.9 2.6 3.4 3.0 2.6 3.6 3.9 4.2 4.1

#### SYSTEM 002 Reactor Coolant System (RCS)

	K5.13	Causes of circulation	3.3	3.6
	K5.14	Consequences of forced circulation loss	3.7	4.2
	K5.15	Reasons for maintaining subcooling margin during natural circulation	4.2	4.6
	K5.16	Reason for automatic features of the Feedwater control		
		system during total loss of reactor coolant flow	3.5	4.0
	K5.17	Need for monitoring in-core thermocouples during natural circulation	3.8	4.1
	K5.18	Brittle fracture	3.3	3.6
	K5.19	Neutron embrittlement	2.6	2.9
	K5.20	Corrosion control principles	2.3	2.7
	K6	Knowledge of the effect or a loss or malfunction on the following RCS components:		
		(CFR: 41.7 / 45.7)		
	K6.01	RCS valves that may pose and unusually high radiological		
		Hazard because of trapped crud	2.2	2.9
•	K6.02	RCP	3.6	3.8
	K6.03	Reactor vessel level indication	3.1	3.6
	K6.04	CS vent valves	2.5	2.9
	K6.05	Valves	2.1	2.4
	K6.06	Sensors and Detectors	2.5	2.8
	K6.07	Pumps	2.5	2.8
	K6.08	Controller and positioner	2.4	2.7
	K6.09	Motors	2.1	2.5
	K6.10	Breakers, relays, and disconnects	2.2	2.4
	K6.11	Thermal sleeves	2.2	2.6
	K6.12	Mode Safety valves	3.0	3.5
	K6.13	Reactor vessel and internals	2.3	2.8
	K6.14	Core components	2.2	2.8
		<u>ABILITY</u>		
	A1	Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent		
		exceeding design limits) associated with operating the RCS controls inc (CFR: 41.5 / 45.7)	cluding:	
	A1.01	Primary and secondary pressure	3.8	4.1
	A1.02	PZR and makeup tank level	3.6	3.9
ı	A1.02 A1.03	Temperature	3.7	3.8
I	A1.04	Subcooling Margin	3.7	4.1
	A1.04 A1.05	RCS flow	3.4	3.7
	A1.06	Reactor power	4.0	4.0
	A1.07	Reactor differential temperature	3.3	3.5
	A1.08	RCS average temperature	3.7	3.8
ı	A1.09	RCS T-ave	3.7	3.8
ı	A1.10	RCS T-ref	3.7	3.8
	A1.11	Relative level indications in the RWST, the refueling cavity, the PZR and	3.1	5.0
		the reactor vessel during preparation for refueling	2.7	3.2

#### SYSTEM 002 Reactor Coolant System (RCS)

A1.12 A1.13	Radioactivity level when vending CRDS	2.9 3.4	3.3 4.0
A2	Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the RCS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: (CFR: $41.5/43.5/45.3/45.5$ )		
A2.01	Loss of coolant inventory	4.3	4.4
A2.02	Loss of coolant pressure	4.2	4.4
A2.03	Loss of forced circulation	4.1	4.3
A2.04	Loss of heat sinks	4.3	4.6
<b>A3</b>	Ability to monitor automatic operation of the RCS, including: $(CFR:\ 41.7\ /\ 45.5)$		
A3.01	Reactor coolant leak detection system	3.7	3.9
A3.02	Containment sound-monitoring system	2.6*	2.8
A3.03	Pressure, temperatures, and flows	4.4	4.6
A4	<b>Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room:</b> (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 to 45.8)		
A4.01	RCS leakage calculation program using the computer	3.5*	3.8*
A4.02	Indications necessary to verify natural circulation from appropriate level, flow, and temperature indications and valve positions upon loss of forced		
A4.03	circulation	4.3	4.5
A4.03	saturation conditions	4.3	4.4
A4.04	The filling/draining of LPI pumps during refueling	2.8	2.6
A4.05	The HPI system when it is used to refill the refueling cavity	2.8*	2.7*
A4.06	Overflow level of the RWST	2.9	2.7
A4.07	Flow path linking the RWST through the RHR system to	2.7	2.,
	the RCS hot legs for gravity refilling of the refueling cavity	2.8	3.1
A4.08	Safety parameter display systems	3.4*	3.7*
	• • •		

## 003 Reactor Coolant Pump System (RCPS)

Monitor the operation of the RCPS Perform a normal RCP shutdown

Start an RCP

Vent RCP seals

TASK:

	Adjust flushing flow to RCP seals		
K/A NO.	KNOWLEDGE	IMPOR RO	RTANCE SRO
K1	Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the RCPS and the following systems: (CFR: 41.2 to 41.9 / 45.7 to 45.8)		
K1.01 K1.02 K1.03 K1.04 K1.05 K1.06 K1.07 K1.08 K1.09 K1.10 K1.11 K1.12 K1.13	RCP lube oil RCP motor cooling and ventilation RCP seal system CVCS CCS SWS RCP vibration monitoring Containment isolation RCS drain tank RCS Sound monitoring CCWS RCP bearing lift oil pump	2.6 2.6 3.3 2.6* 2.2 1.9 2.4 2.7* 2.0 3.0 2.3 3.0 2.5	2.8 2.8 3.6 2.9* 2.4* 2.1 2.9 3.0* 2.2 3.2 2.5 3.3 2.5
K2	Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following: (CFR: 41.7)	2.0	2.3
K2.01 K2.02 K2.03 K2.04 K2.05	RCPS CCW pumps RCP lube oil pumps Containment isolation valves for RCP cooling water RCP bearing lift oil pump	3.1 2.5* 2.2 2.3 2.1	3.1 2.6* 2.2 2.4 1.9
К3	Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the RCPS will have on the following: $(CFR:\ 41.7\ /\ 45.6)$		
K3.01 K3.02 K3.03 K3.04 K3.05 K3.06	RCS S/G Feedwater and emergency feedwater RPS ICS MRSS	3.7 3.5 2.8 3.9 3.6* 2.2	4.0 3.8 3.1 4.2 3.7* 2.4

SYSTEM:	003 Reactor Coolant Pump System (RCPS)		
K4	Knowledge of RCPS design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: (CFR: 41.7)		
K4.01	Minimizing power peaking	2.1	2.3
K4.02	Prevention of cold water accidents or transients	2.5	2.7*
K4.03	Adequate lubrication of the RCP	2.5	2.8
K4.04	Adequate cooling of RCP motor and seals	2.8	3.1
K4.05	Prevention of reverse rotation	2.3	2.7*
K4.06	Handling axial thrust (thrust bearing)	2.1	2.4
K4.07	Minimizing RCS leakage (mechanical seals)	3.2	3.4
K4.08	Anchoring the RCP and its associated piping	1.6	1.9
K4.09	Seal and pump venting	2.2	2.4
K4.10	Increasing pump inertia (flywheel)	2.3	2.5
K4.11	Isolation valve interlocks	3.0*	3.0*
K5	Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the RCPS: $(CFR:\ 41.5\ /\ 45.7)$		
K5.01	The relationship between the RCPS flow rate and the nuclear reactor		
	core operating parameters (quadrant power tilt, imbalance, DNB rate,		
	local power density, difference in loop T-hot pressure)	3.3	3.9
K5.02	Effects of RCP coastdown on RCS parameters	2.8	3.2
K5.03	Effects of RCP shutdown on T-ave., including the reason		
	for the unreliability of T-ave. in the shutdown loop	3.1	3.5
K5.04	Effects of RCP shutdown on secondary parameters, such		
	as steam pressure, steam flow, and feed flow	3.2	3.5
K5.05	The dependency of RCS flow rates upon the number of operating RCPs	2.8*	3.0*
K5.06	Enthalpy increase associated with RCPs, and its effect		
	upon calorimetric calculation of power	2.2	2.6
K5.07	The reason for "jogging" RCPs during venting or when		
	starting under unusual conditions	2.4	2.6
K5.08	RCP current or supply voltage changes and cold versus hot operation	2.2	2.4*
K5.09	Effects of RCP operation on ? P, especially at lower temperatures	2.3	2.6*
K6	Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction on the		
	following will have on the RCPS: (CFR: 41.7 / 45/5)		
K6.01	RCP performance characteristics	1.9	2.4
K6.02	RCP seals and seal water supply	2.7	3.1
K6.03	RCP lift oil pump, lube oil pumps	2.4	2.6
K6.04	Containment isolation valves affecting RCP operation	2.8	3.1
K6.05	Impeller	1.6	1.9

	rate of the control o		
K6.06	Thermal barrier	2.3	2.4
K6.07	Thrust and radial bearing	1.8	2.1
K6.08	Anti-reverse rotation device	2.1	2.4
K6.09	RCP electric motor	1.9	2.1
K6.10	Pumps	1.8	2.1
K6.11	Motors	1.6	1.9
K6.12	Sensors and detectors	1.7	2.1
K6.13	Breakers, relays, and disconnects	1.6	1.8
K6.14	Starting requirements	2.6	2.9
	<u>ABILITY</u>		
A1	Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the RCPS controls including: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.5)		
A1.01	RCP vibration	2.9	2.9
A1.02	RCP pump and motor bearing temperatures	2.9	2.9
A1.03	RCP motor stator winding temperatures	2.6	2.6
A1.04	RCP oil reservoir levels	2.6	2.5
A1.05	RCS flow	3.4	3.5
A1.06	PZR spray flow	2.9	3.1
A1.07	RCS temperature and pressure	3.4*	3.4
A1.08	Seal water temperature	2.5	2.6
A1.09	Seal flow and D/P	2.8	2.8
A1.10	RCP standpipe levels	2.5	2.7
A2	Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the RCPS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: (CFR: $41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45/13$ )		
A2.01	Problems with RCP seals, especially rates of seal leak-off	3.5	3.9
A2.02	Conditions which exist for an abnormal shutdown of an		
	RCP in comparison to a normal shutdown of an RCP	3.7	3.9
A2.03	Problems associated with RCP motors, including faulty	a =	2.1
1201	motors and current, and winding and bearing temperature problems	2.7	3.1
A2.04	Effects of fluctuation of VCT pressure on RCP seal injection flow	2.4	2.8
A2.05	Effects of VCT pressure on RCP seal leakoff flows	2.5	2.8

003 Reactor Coolant Pump System (RCPS)

SYSTEM:

#### SYSTEM: 003 Reactor Coolant Pump System (RCPS)

A3	Ability to monitor automatic operation of the RCPS, including: $(CFR:\ 41.7/45.5)$		
A3.01	Seal injection flow	3.3	3.2
A3.02	Motor current	2.6	2.5
A3.03	Seal D/P	3.2	3.1
A3.04	RCS flow	3.6	3.6
A3.05	RCP lube oil and bearing lift pumps	2.7*	2.6
<b>A4</b>	Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: (CFR: $41.7 / 45.5$ to $45.8$ )		
A4.01	Seal injection	3.3	3.2
A4.02	RCP motor parameters	2.9	2.9
A4.03	RCP lube oil and lift pump motor controls	2.8	2.5
A4.04	RCP seal differential pressure instrumentation	3.1	3.0
A4.05	RCP seal leakage detection instrumentation	3.1	3.0
A4.06	RCP parameters	2.9*	2.9
A4.07	RCP seal bypass	2.6*	2.6
A4.08	RCP cooling water supplies	3.2	2.9

#### 005 Residual Heat Removal System (RHRS)

TASK: Perform lineups of the RHRS (shutdown cooling system)

Perform decay heat removal system valves automatic closure and

interlock verification Fill and vent the RHRS

Perform shutdown cooling return header valve test What if the RHR pump is not operating properly?

Start up the RHRS

Perform the RHRS MOV cycling test Operate an RHRS heat exchanger

Perform operability check of core cooling system What if the RHR cooldown rate is exceeded?

Perform purification of the RHRS during shutdown cooling

Operator RHRS with the fuel pool cooling system

Monitor the RHRS Shut down the RHRS Drain the RHRS

Fill the refueling cavity/transfer canal using the RHRS

Drain the refueling cavity and/or dryer-separator using the RHRS

		IMPO!	RTANCE
K/A NO.	KNOWLEDGE	RO	SRO
K1	Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the RHRS and the following systems: (CFR: $41.2$ to $41.9$ / $45.7$ to $45.8$ )		
K1.01	CCWS	3.2	3.4
K1.02	PZR	2.2	2.4
K1.03	Spent fuel pool cooling	2.2	2.3
K1.04	CVCS	2.9	3.1
K1.05	RCPS	2.1	2.2
K1.06	ECCS	3.5	3.6
K1.07	Borated water storage tank	2.9	2.9
K1.08	SWS	2.7	2.8
K1.09	RCSO	3.6	3.9
K1.10	CSS	3.2	3.4*
K1.11	RWST	3.5	3.6
K1.12	Safeguard pumps	3.1	3.4
K1.13	SIS	3.3	3.5

### SYSTEM: 005 Residual Heat Removal System (RHRS)

K2	<b>Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following:</b> (CFR: 41.7)		
K2.01	RHR pumps	3.0	3.2
K2.02	Containment isolation valves	2.4	2.6
K2.03	RCS pressure boundary motor-operated valves	2.7*	2.8*
К3	Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the RHRS will have on the following: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.6)		
K3.01	RCS	3.9	4.0
K3.02	RCPS	2.1	2.1
K3.03	CVCS	2.2	2.4
K3.04	PZR	2.1*	2.2*
K3.05	ECCS	3.7*	3.8*
K3.06	CSS	3.1*	3.2*
K3.07	Refueling operations	3.2*	3.6*
K3.08	CCWS	2.1	2.2
K4	Knowledge of RHRS design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide or the following: (CFR: 41.7)		
<b>K4</b> K4.01	which provide or the following: (CFR: 41.7)	3.0	3.2
	which provide or the following: (CFR: 41.7)  Overpressure mitigation system	3.0 3.2	3.2 3.5*
K4.01	which provide or the following: (CFR: 41.7)		
K4.01 K4.02	which provide or the following: (CFR: 41.7)  Overpressure mitigation system  Modes of operation	3.2	3.5*
K4.01 K4.02 K4.03	which provide or the following: (CFR: 41.7)  Overpressure mitigation system  Modes of operation  RHR heat exchanger bypass flow control	3.2	3.5*
K4.01 K4.02 K4.03	which provide or the following: (CFR: 41.7)  Overpressure mitigation system	3.2 2.9	3.5* 3.2
K4.01 K4.02 K4.03 K4.04	which provide or the following: (CFR: 41.7)  Overpressure mitigation system	3.2 2.9 2.0	3.5* 3.2 2.3
K4.01 K4.02 K4.03 K4.04	which provide or the following: (CFR: 41.7)  Overpressure mitigation system	3.2 2.9 2.0 2.5	3.5* 3.2 2.3 2.9
K4.01 K4.02 K4.03 K4.04 K4.05 K4.06	which provide or the following: (CFR: 41.7)  Overpressure mitigation system Modes of operation RHR heat exchanger bypass flow control Need for contents of liquid waste holdup tanks to be low enough before draining RHR system Relation between RHR flowpath and refueling cavity Function of RHR pump miniflow recirculation System protection logics, including high-pressure inter-lock, reset controls, and valve interlocks	3.2 2.9 2.0 2.5	3.5* 3.2 2.3 2.9
K4.01 K4.02 K4.03 K4.04 K4.05 K4.06 K4.07	which provide or the following: (CFR: 41.7)  Overpressure mitigation system	3.2 2.9 2.0 2.5 2.7 3.2 3.1*	3.5* 3.2 2.3 2.9 3.0 3.5 3.5*
K4.01 K4.02 K4.03 K4.04 K4.05 K4.06 K4.07	which provide or the following: (CFR: 41.7)  Overpressure mitigation system Modes of operation RHR heat exchanger bypass flow control Need for contents of liquid waste holdup tanks to be low enough before draining RHR system Relation between RHR flowpath and refueling cavity Function of RHR pump miniflow recirculation System protection logics, including high-pressure inter-lock, reset controls, and valve interlocks	3.2 2.9 2.0 2.5 2.7	3.5* 3.2 2.3 2.9 3.0
K4.01 K4.02 K4.03 K4.04 K4.05 K4.06 K4.07	which provide or the following: (CFR: 41.7)  Overpressure mitigation system Modes of operation RHR heat exchanger bypass flow control Need for contents of liquid waste holdup tanks to be low enough before draining RHR system Relation between RHR flowpath and refueling cavity Function of RHR pump miniflow recirculation System protection logics, including high-pressure inter- lock, reset controls, and valve interlocks Lineup for "piggy-back" mode with high-pressure injection Vortexing while draining Control of RHR heat exchanger outlet flow	3.2 2.9 2.0 2.5 2.7 3.2 3.1*	3.5* 3.2 2.3 2.9 3.0 3.5 3.5*
K4.01 K4.02 K4.03 K4.04 K4.05 K4.06 K4.07 K4.08 K4.09	which provide or the following: (CFR: 41.7)  Overpressure mitigation system Modes of operation RHR heat exchanger bypass flow control Need for contents of liquid waste holdup tanks to be low enough before draining RHR system Relation between RHR flowpath and refueling cavity Function of RHR pump miniflow recirculation System protection logics, including high-pressure interlock, reset controls, and valve interlocks Lineup for "piggy-back" mode with high-pressure injection Vortexing while draining	3.2 2.9 2.0 2.5 2.7 3.2 3.1* 2.2	3.5* 3.2 2.3 2.9 3.0 3.5 3.5* 2.5

#### SYSTEM: 005 Residual Heat Removal System (RHRS)

K5	Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as t apply the RHRS: $(CFR:\ 41.5\ /\ 45.7)$	hey	
K5.01	Nil ductility transition temperature (brittle fracture)	2.6	2.9
K5.02	Need for adequate subcooling	3.4	3.5
K5.03	Reactivity effects of RHR fill water	2.9*	3.1*
K5 04	Calculation of heat load on the RHR heat exchanger	2.1	2.3*
K5 05	Plant response during "solid plant": pressure change due to the relative		
	incompressibility of water	2.7*	3.1*
K5.06	Special concerns regarding the use of water chemistry	1.9*	2.6*
K5.07	Relationship between PZR level, VCT level, and charging flow	2.2	2.4*
K5.08	PTS	2.4*	2.5*
K5.09	Dilution and boration considerations	3.2	3.4
K6	Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction on the following will have on the RHRS: $(CFR:\ 41.7/45.7)$		
K6.01	RHR pump performance characteristics	2.4	2.6
K6.02	"Packless" valves	1.8*	1.9*
K6.03	RHR heat exchanger	2.5	2.6
K6.04	Valves	1.9	2.1
K6.05	Pumps	1.9	2.1
K6.06	Motors	1.8	1.8
K6.07	Sensors and detectors	2.1	2.3
K6.08	Controllers and positioners	2.2	2.4
K6.09	Demineralizers and ion exchangers	1.6	1.9
K6.10	Breakers, relays, and disconnects	1.7	1.8
K6.11	RHR heat exchanger and outlet flow control	2.3	2.7*
	ABILITY		
A1	Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the RHRS controls including: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.5)		
A1.01	Heatup/cooldown rates	3.5	3.6
A1.02	RHR flow rate	3.3	3.4
A1.03	Closed cooling water flow rate and temperature	2.5	2.6
A1.04	Relationship between RWST level and level in the spent fuel pool	2.1*	2.3
A1.05	Detection of and response to presence of water in RHR emergency sump .	3.3*	3.3*
A1.06	Relationship (dependence) of time available to perform system isolation		
	surveillance test to time for decay heat to reach high limit	2.7	3.1*
A1.07	Determination of test acceptability by comparison of re-		
	corded valve response times with Tech-Spec requirements	2.5	3.1*

### SYSTEM: 005 Residual Heat Removal System (RHRS)

A2	Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the RHRS, and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: (CFR: $41.5/43.5/45.3/45.13$ )		
A2.01	Failure modes for pressure, flow, pump motor amps, motor		
	temperature, and tank level instrumentation	2.7	2.9*
A2.02	Pressure transient protection during cold shutdown	3.5	3.7
A2.03	RHR pump/motor malfunction	2.9	3.1
A2.04	RHR valve malfunction	2.9	2.9
A3	Ability to monitor automatic operation of the RHRS, including: (CFR: $41.7 / 45.5$ )		
	None		
A4	Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: (CFR: $41.7 / 45.5$ to $45.8$ )		
A4.01	Controls and indication for RHR pumps	3.6*	3.4
A4.02	Heat exchanger bypass flow control	3.4*	3.1
A4.03	RHR temperature, PZR heaters and flow, and nitrogen	2.8*	2.7*
A4.04 A4.05	Controls and indication for closed cooling water pumps  Position of RWST recirculation valve (locked when not	3.1*	2.9
	in use, continuously monitored when in use)	2.8*	2.8*

#### 035 **Steam Generator System (S/GS)**

TASK: Perform lineups on the S/GS

Perform S/G hydrostatic test for leaking tubes

Fill the S/G

Recirculate the S/G during wet lay-up Remove S/G from wet lay-up recirculation

Add chemicals to the S/G Monitor S/G operation Drain the S/G

77/4 370			TANCE
K/A NO.	KNOWLEDGE	RO	SRO
K1	Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the S/GS and the following systems: (CFR: $41.2 \text{ to } 41.9 / 45.7 \text{ to } 45.8$ )		
K1.01	MFW/AFW systems	4.2	4.5
K1.02	MRSS	3.2	3.4
K1.03	Blowdown	2.4	2.6
K1.04	Condenser hotwell	2.2*	2.3
K1.05	Nitrogen	1.7	1.7
K1.06	Sampling	1.7	1.8
K1.07	S/G recirculation	1.9	1.9
K1.08	Chemical addition	1.8	2.2
K1.09	RCS	3.8	4.0
K1.10	ARM system	2.4	2.5
K1.11	PRM system	3.1	3.1
K1.12	RPS	3.7	3.9
K1.13	Condensate system	2.7	2.8
K1.14	ESF	3.9	4.1
K2	<b>Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following:</b> (CFR: 41.7)		
K2.01	S/G level control system	2.2*	2.3
K3	Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the S/GS will have on the following: (CFR: $41.7/45.6$ )		
K3.01	RCS	4.4	4.6
K3.02	ECCS	4.0	4.3
K3.03	Secondary systems	3.0*	3.1*

#### SYSTEM 035 Steam Generator System (S/GS)

K4	Knowledge of S/GS design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: (CFR: 41.7)		
K4.01	S/G level control	3.6	3.8
K4.02	S/G level indication	3.2	3.5
K4.03	Automatic blowdown and sample line isolation and reset	2.6*	2.8*
K4.04	Radiation high-level isolation while draining S/G secondary to		
	main condenser	2.8*	3.1*
K4.05	Amount of reserve water in S/G	2.9	3.2
K4.06	S/G pressure	3.1	3.4
K4.07	Pre/post-blowdown system	2.3*	2.3*
K4.08	AFW pump operation as it relates to hydrotest	1.9*	2.1*
K4.09	Maintenance of hydrostatic pressure by throttling AFW control valve	1.7*	1.9*
K5	Knowledge of operational implications of the following concepts as the apply to the S/GS: $(CFR:\ 41.5/45.7)$		
K5.01	Effect of secondary parameters, pressure, and temperature on reactivity	3.4	3.9
K5.02	Chemistry control	2.2	2.9*
K5.03	Shrink and swell concept	2.8	3.1
K5.04	Purpose of using nitrogen blanket in S/G	2.0	2.3
K5.05	Relationship between AFW pump speed and discharge pres		
	sure during hydrotest	1.7*	2.0*
K6	Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction on the following will have on the S/GS: $(CFR:\ 41.7\ /\ 45.7)$		
K6.01	MSIVs	3.2	3.6
K6.02	Secondary PORV	3.1	3.5
K6.03	S/G level detector	2.6	3.0
K6.04	Pumps	1.6	1.9
K6.05	Motors	1.4	1.6
K6.06	Valves	1.9*	2.1*
K6.07	Sensors and detectors	2.2	2.2
K6.08	Controllers and positioners	1.9	2.1
K6.09	Heat exchangers and condensers	2.2*	2.3*
110.07	Treat Chemingers and Condensers	2.2	2.5

SYSTEM	035 Steam Generator System (S/GS)		
	<u>ABILITY</u>		
A1	Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the S/GS controls including: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.5)		
A1.01	S/G wide and narrow range level during startup, shut-		
	down, and normal operations	3.6	3.8
A1.02 A1.03	S/G pressure  Feed flow/steam flow while going into wet lay-up	3.5 2.2	3.8 2.3
A1.03	reca now/steam now winte going into wet tay-up	2.2	2.5
A2	Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the GS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:  (CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.5)		
A2.01	Faulted or ruptured S/Gs	4.5	4.6
A2.02	Reactor trip/turbine trip	4.2	4.4
A2.03	Pressure/level transmitter failure	3.4	3.6
A2.04	Steam flow/feed mismatch	3.6	3.8
A2.05	Unbalanced flows to the 5/Gs	3.2	3.4
A2.06	Small break LOCA	4.5	4.6
A3	Ability to monitor automatic operation of the S/G including: (CFR: $41.7  /  45.5$ )		
A3.01	S/G water level control	4.0	3.9
A3.02	MAD valves	3.7?	3.5?
A3.03	Components used to conduct a secondary side hydrostatic		
	test (e.g., AFW pump)	1.9*	1.8*
A3.04	Components used to conduct S/G tube hydrostatic test	1.9	1.9
A4	Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: (CFR: $41.7 / 45.5$ to $45.8$ )		
A4.01	Shift of S/G controls between manual and automatic		
	control, by bumpless transfer	3.7	3.6
A4.02	Fill of dry S/G	2.7	2.8
A4.03	Lay-up to operating conditions	2.2	2.3
A4.04	Operating to lay-up conditions	2.2	2.4
A4.05	Level Control to enhance natural circulation	3.8	4.0
A4.06	S/G isolation on steam leak or tube rupture/leak	4.5	4.6
A4.07	Adjustment of cooling water flow rate from blowdown heat exchanger	2.0	2.0

### SYSTEM 035 Steam Generator System (S/GS)

A4.08	Recognition that increasing radiation levels in sec-		
	ondary systems may mean leaking and possibly ruptured S/G tubes	4.1	4.4
A4.09	Reason for using timed flow in filling top of S/G while		
	going into wet lay-up	2.1*	2.0
A4.10	Need for frequent S/G level verification during wet lay-up	2.0*	2.0

## Secondary System

# Main and Reheat Steam System (MRSS)

TASK: Perform a lineup of the MRSS

Perform MSIV partial-stroke test

Warm up and pressurize main steam leads

Perform MSIV full-stroke test

Perform a moisture separator/reheater cold start Perform a moisture separator/reheater hot start

Perform an MSIV trip test Operate high-pressure drains

Perform hydrostatic test of reheaters

Operate low-pressure drains Monitor reheater operation

Dump steam through the atmospheric relief/dump valves

Monitor the MRSS Shut down the MRSS

K/A NO.	<u>KNOWLEDGE</u>	IMPOR RO	TANCE SRO	
K1	Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the MRSS and the following systems: (CFR: $41.2 \text{ to } 41.9 / 45.7 \text{ to } 45.8$ )			
K1.01 K1.02 K1.03 K1.04 K1.05 K1.06 K1.07 K1.08 K1.09	S/G Atmospheric relief dump valves Instrument air RCS temperature monitoring and control T/G Condenser steam dump AFW MFW RMS	3.1 3.3 2.3 3.1 2.5* 3.1 3.4* 2.7* 2.7	3.2 3.3 2.5 3.1 2.6* 3.0 3.4* 2.9* 2.7	1
K2	<b>Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following:</b> (CFR: 41.7)			
K2.01 K2.02	MRSS Moisture separator reheater valves	1.5 1.4	1.8 1.6	
К3	Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the MRSS will have on the following: $(CFR:\ 41.7\ /\ 45.6)$			
K3.01 K3.02 K3.03 K3.04 K3.05	T/G Condenser AFW pumps MFW pumps RCS SDS	2.3 1.8 3.2* 2.5* 3.6	2.6* 1.9 3.5* 2.6* 3.7	
K3.06	SDS	2.8*	3.1	

### SYSTEM: 039 Main and Reheat Steam System (MRSS)

	K4	Knowledge of MRSS design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: (CFR: 41.7)		
	K4.01	Expected values of main steam temperature downstream of		
		MSIVs during warm-up	1.8	1.8
	K4.02	Utilization of T-ave. program control when steam dumping		
		through atmospheric relief/dump valves, including T-ave. limits	3.1	3.2
	K4.03	Main condenser, including steam dump valves, operating	2.2	2.5
	TZ 4 O 4	limits, controls, indications	2.3	2.5
	K4.04	Utilization of steam pressure program control when steam	2.0	2.1
	17.4.05	dumping through atmospheric relief/dump valves, including T-ave. limits	2.9	3.1
	K4.05	Automatic isolation of steam line	3.7	3.7
	K4.06 K4.07	Prevent reverse steam flow on steam line break	3.3	3.6
ı		Reactor building isolation	3.4 3.3	3.7 3.4
l	K4.08	Interlocks on MSIV and bypass valves	3.3	3.4
	K5	Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as the apply to the MRSS: $(CFR:\ 441.5\ /\ 45.7)$		
	K5.01	Definition and causes of steam/water hammer	2.9	3.1
	K5.02	Definition and causes of thermal stress	2.4	2.7
	K5.03	Definition of, and reason for, steam blanketing on moisture		
		separator reheater	1.9	2.2
	K5.04	Effect of condenser vacuum on plant efficiency	2.1	2.1
	K5.05	Bases for RCS cooldown limits	2.7	3.1*
	K5.06	Purpose of density compensation of main steam flow	2.2	2.4
	K5.07	Latent heat of condensation applied to moisture separators	1.8	2.0
	K5.08	Effect of steam removal on reactivity	3.6	3.6
	К6	Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction on the following will have on the MRSS: (CFR: $41.7/45.7$ )	/ <b>e</b>	
l	K6.01	Valves	2.1*	2.4*
	K6.02	Sensors and detectors	2.0	2.1
•	K6.03	Controllers and positioners	1.9	2.2
	K6.04	Pumps	1.4	1.7
	K6.05	Motors	1.3	1.5

#### SYSTEM: 039 Main and Reheat Steam System (MRSS)

#### **ABILITY**

A1	Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the MRSS controls including: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.5)			
A1.01	Moisture separator reheater, from its temperature and pressure	1.7	1.7	
A1.02	Temperature heatup rate limit for main steam piping	2.2	2.3	
A1.03	Primary system temperature indications, and required values, during main			
	steam system warm-up	2.6	2.7	
A1.04	Low pressure turbine metal inlet temperature indications relative to the			
	opening and shutting of steam vents for moisture separator reheater	1.8	1.9	
A1.05	RCS T-ave	3.2*	3.3	
A1.06	Main steam pressure	3.0	3.1	
A1.07	Main steam temperature	2.4	2.6	
A1.08	Reheater steam pressure	1.8	1.9	
A1.09	Main steam line radiation monitors	2.5*	2.7*	
A1.10	Air ejector PRM	2.9*	3.0*	
A2	Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the MRSS; and (b) based on predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:  (CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.13)			
A2.01	Flow paths of steam during a LOCA	3.1	3.2	
A2.02	Decrease in turbine load as it relates to steam escaping from relief valves.	2.4	2.7*	- 1
A2.03	Indications and alarms for main steam and area radiation			ı
	monitors (during SGTR)	3.4	3.7	
A2.04	Malfunctioning steam dump	3.4	3.7	
A2.05	Increasing steam demand, its relationship to increases in reactor power	3.3	3.6	
A3	Ability to monitor automatic operation of the MRSS, including: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.5)			
A3.01 A3.02	Moisture separator reheater steam supply	1.9* 3.1	1.7 3.5*	1

#### SYSTEM: 039 Main and Reheat Steam System (MRSS)

#### **A4** Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 to 45.8) A4.01 2.9\* 2.8\* Remote operators to auxiliary steam ..... A4.02 2.1 1.9 A4.03 2.8\* 2.8\* A4.04 Emergency feedwater pump turbines ..... 3.9 3.8 Moisture separator reheater, checking its temperatures and steam pressures A4.05 1.8 1.6 A4.06 1.9 1.8 A4.07 Steam dump valves.... 2.8\* 2.9

# O41 Steam Dump System (SDS) and Turbine Bypass Control

TASK: Energize the SDS

Shift to alternate channel (power supply) of ICS Monitor the reactor regulating control system Shift to and from various modes of SDS Operate the SDS in various modes

De-energize the SDS

Perform feedwater block valve junction testing

Perform lineups of the SDS

<u>K/A NO.</u>	<u>KNOWLEDGE</u>	IMPOR RO	TANCE SRO	
K1	Knowledge of the Physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the SDS and the following systems: (CFR: 41.2 to 41.9 / 45.7 to 45.8)			
K1.01 K1.02 K1.03 K1.04 K1.05 K1.06	Circulating water to the condenser  S/G level  Feed pumps  Feedwater block valves  RCS  Condenser	2.2 2.7 2.1 2.0 3.5 2.6	2.5 2.9 2.1 2.0 3.6 2.9	
K2	<b>Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following:</b> (CFR: 41.7)			
K2.01 K2.02	ICS, normal and alternate power supply	2.8* 2.8*	2.9* 2.8*	
К3	Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the SDS will have on the following: (CFR: $41.7 / 45.6$ )			
K3.01 K3.02 K3.03 K3.04	S/G         RCS         T/G         Reactor power	3.2* 3.8 2.2* 3.5	3.3 3.9 2.4* 3.4	I

	SYSTEM:	041 Steam Dump System (SDS)/Turbine Bypass Control		
	K4	Knowledge of SDS design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: (CFR: 41.7)		
ı	K4.01	RRG/ICS system	2.9*	3.3*
'	K4.02	Condenser	2.3	2.6
	K4.03	Load change	2.3	2.6
	K4.04	Operation at power	2.1	2.3
	K4.05	Plant startup	2.4	2.7
	K4.06	MFW and AFW systems	2.1	2.4
	K4.07	Relationship of vacuum level to condenser availability	2.4	2.7
- 1	K4.08	Control rod index	2.3*	2.6*
	K4.09	Relationship of low/low T-ave. setpoint in SDS to primary cooldown	3.0	3.3*
	K4.10	PZR LCS	2.3	2.5*
I	K4.11	T-ave./T-ref. program	2.8	3.1
	K4.11	Reason for maintaining S/G in saturated condition during cooldown	2.3	2.4
	K4.12 K4.13	Relationship of S/G pressure to steam flow	2.2	2.4
	K4.13 K4.14		2.5*	2.4
	K4.14 K4.15	Operation of loss-of-load bistable taps upon turbine load loss	2.5	2.0
ı	K4.13	"Measured variable" readings on ICS hand-automatic stations	2.0*	2.0*
	V / 16	and required action if reading is out of the acceptable band	2.9*	2.9*
	K4.16	Low main steam pressure	2.6*	2.7*
	K4.17	Reactor trip	3.7	3.9
	K4.18	Turbine trip	3.4	3.6
	K5	Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as the apply to the SDS: (CFR: $41.5 / 45.7$ )		
	K5.01	Relationship of no-load T-ave. to saturation pressure relief setting on		
		valves	2.9	3.2
	K5.02	Use of steam tables for saturation temperature and pressure	2.5	2.8
	K5.03	Flow ? P relation for valves	1.9	2.1
	K5.04	Basis for plant cooldown rates	2.4	3.1
	K5.05	Basis for RCS design pressure limits	2.6	3.2*
	K5.06	Effect of power change on fuel cladding	2.5	2.8*
'	K5.07	Reactivity feedback effects	3.1*	3.6
	K6	Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction on the following will have on the SDS: (CFR: $41.7/45.7$ )		
	K6.01	Condenser	2.1	2.4
ı	K6.02	Valves, including main and bypass feedwater valves	2.1	2.4*
I	K6.02 K6.03	Controller and positioners, including ICS, S/G, CRDS	2.7	2.0
	K6.03 K6.04		1.8	
	K6.04 K6.05	Main feed pumps, including effect on capacity of internal wear		1.9
		Sensors and detectors	1.6	1.7
	K6.06	Breakers, relays, and disconnects	1.4	1.7

SYSTEM:	041 Steam Dump System (SDS)/Turbine Bypass Control		
	<u>ABILITY</u>		
A1	Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the SDS controls including: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.5)		
A1.01 A1.02	T-ave., verification above low/low setpoint	2.9* 3.1	2.9 3.2
A2	Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the SDS; and (b) based on those predictions or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: (CFR: $41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.13$ )		
A2.01 A2.02 A2.03	Unbalanced feedwater flow between two MFW pumps Steam valve stuck open Loss of IAS	2.1* 3.6 2.8	2.1 3.9 3.1
A3	Ability to monitor automatic operation of the SDS, including: $(CFR:\ 41.7/45.5)$		
A3.01 A3.02 A3.03 A3.04 A3.05	RCS T-ave. meter (cooldown rate) RCS pressure, RCS temperature, and reactor power Steam flow Condenser vacuum Main steam pressure	3.2* 3.3 2.7 2.2 2.9*	3.2 3.4 2.8 2.3 2.9
A4	Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: (CFR: $41.7 / 45.5$ to $45.8$ )		
A4.01 A4.02 A4.03 A4.04 A4.05 A4.06 A4.07 A4.08	ICS voltage inverter Cooldown valves T-ave. mode Pressure mode Main steam header pressure Atmospheric relief valve controllers Remote gagging of stuck open-relief valves Steam dump valves	2.9* 2.7* 2.4* 2.7* 3.1 2.9* 2.9* 3.0*	3.1* 2.9* 2.5* 2.7 3.3 3.1 3.0* 3.1*

#### 045 Main Turbine Generator (MT/G) System

TASK: Perform overspeed trip and backup overspeed trip test of the T/G

Perform turbine auto stop functional test

Perform turbine valve freedom test

Start up the T/G to rated speed

Perform generator excitation

Operate generator voltage regulator

Synchronize the T/G with output grid at minimum load

Increase load on the T/G

Monitor the T/G

Unload the T/G electrically to minimum load

Secure generator output and excitation

Shut down the T/G

Operate the turbine turning gear

Operate the turbine bearing lift oil pumps

What if turbine fails to trip (during startup)?

What if turbine does not trip when required (during operation)?

What if auto-synchronous system out of service?

What if computer fails while performing calorimetric test?

Steam dump valves fail to shut Delta flux exceeds operating band

What if control rods are below insertion limits?

Exciter breaker fails to open using control switch on main

control board?

T/G voltage regulator failure to respond to control switch

			IMPORTANCE	
K/A NO.	<u>KNOWLEDGE</u>	RO	SRO	
K1	Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the MT/G system and the following systems: (CFR: 41.2 to 41.9 / 45.7 to 45.8)			
K1.01	MRSS	2.1	2.2	
K1.02	Condenser	2.1	2.2	
K1.03	AC distribution system	2.3	2.5	
K1.04	Extraction steam system	1.8	1.9	
K1.05	Generator cooling	1.9	2.1	
K1.06	RCS, during steam valve test	2.6	2.6	

### SYSTEM 045 Main Turbine Generator (MT/G) System

K1.07	Secondary systems, when testing throttle and other valves	2.1*	2.1	
K1.08	Moisture separator reheater (interface with low-pressure turbine)	1.8	1.8	
K1.09	MRSS and MFW system, as T/G load is varied	2.1*	2.1	
K1.10	Condenser operation (vacuum, temperature flow) heater			
	drains, CCW and CW operations	1.9	1.8	
K1.11	Electrical system, including unit auxiliary transformer			
	and service transformer	2.3	2.4	
K1.12	Load control system in "following mode"	2.1	2.1	
K1.13	Load control circuit	2.0	2.1	
K1.14	Bearing lift oil pump	1.7	1.7	
K1.15	Turning gear operation	1.7	1.7	
K1.16	Vibration and eccentricity monitoring system	1.6	1.7	
K1.17	Turbine latching (reset) controls	1.9	2.0	
K1.18	RPS	3.6	3.7	
K1.19	ESFAS	3.4*	3.6	
K1.20	Protection system	3.4	3.6	
K2	Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following:			
	(CFR: 41.7)			
K2.01	T/G turning gear	1.7	1.7	
K2.02	T/G lube oil pumps	1.9*	2.1	
K3	Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the MT/G			
K3	system will have on the following:			
К3				
	system will have on the following: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.6)	2.0	2.2	
<b>K3</b>	system will have on the following:	2.9	3.2	1
K3.01	system will have on the following: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.6)  Remainder of the plant	2.9	3.2	I
	system will have on the following: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.6)  Remainder of the plant	2.9	3.2	1
K3.01	system will have on the following: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.6)  Remainder of the plant	2.9	3.2	1
K3.01	system will have on the following: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.6)  Remainder of the plant	2.9	3.2	I
K3.01 <b>K4</b>	system will have on the following: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.6)  Remainder of the plant	2.9	3.2	1
K3.01	system will have on the following: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.6)  Remainder of the plant			I
K3.01 <b>K4</b> K4.01	system will have on the following: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.6)  Remainder of the plant	2.9	3.2	
K3.01 <b>K4</b>	system will have on the following: (CFR: 41.7/45.6)  Remainder of the plant	2.7	2.9	
K3.01 <b>K4</b> K4.01 K4.02	system will have on the following: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.6)  Remainder of the plant	2.7 2.5*	2.9 2.9*	1
K3.01 <b>K4</b> K4.01  K4.02  K4.03	system will have on the following: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.6)  Remainder of the plant	2.7 2.5* 1.8	2.9 2.9* 2.2	
K3.01  K4  K4.01  K4.02  K4.03  K4.04	system will have on the following: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.6)  Remainder of the plant	2.7 2.5* 1.8 2.1	2.9 2.9* 2.2 2.5*	
K3.01  K4  K4.01  K4.02  K4.03  K4.04  K4.05	system will have on the following: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.6)  Remainder of the plant  Knowledge of MT/G system design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: (CFR: 41.7)  Programmed controller for relationship between steam pressure at T/G inlet (impulse, first stage) and plant power level Automatic shut of reheat stop valves as well as main control valves when tripping turbine Voltage regulation mode Turbine load-following mode of operation Acceptable loading rate for T/G	2.7 2.5* 1.8	2.9 2.9* 2.2	
K3.01  K4  K4.01  K4.02  K4.03  K4.04	system will have on the following: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.6)  Remainder of the plant  Knowledge of MT/G system design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: (CFR: 41.7)  Programmed controller for relationship between steam pressure at T/G inlet (impulse, first stage) and plant power level Automatic shut of reheat stop valves as well as main control valves when tripping turbine Voltage regulation mode Turbine load-following mode of operation Acceptable loading rate for T/G Prevention of tie-in if phase difference (generator and system)	2.7 2.5* 1.8 2.1 1.7	2.9 2.9* 2.2 2.5* 2.2*	
K3.01  K4  K4.01  K4.02  K4.03  K4.04  K4.05  K4.06	system will have on the following: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.6)  Remainder of the plant  Knowledge of MT/G system design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: (CFR: 41.7)  Programmed controller for relationship between steam pressure at T/G inlet (impulse, first stage) and plant power level Automatic shut of reheat stop valves as well as main control valves when tripping turbine Voltage regulation mode Turbine load-following mode of operation Acceptable loading rate for T/G Prevention of tie-in if phase difference (generator and system) is beyond set limit	2.7 2.5* 1.8 2.1 1.7 2.0	2.9 2.9* 2.2 2.5* 2.2* 2.3*	
K3.01  K4  K4.01  K4.02  K4.03  K4.04  K4.05  K4.06	system will have on the following: (CFR: 41.7/45.6)  Remainder of the plant  Knowledge of MT/G system design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: (CFR: 41.7)  Programmed controller for relationship between steam pressure at T/G inlet (impulse, first stage) and plant power level Automatic shut of reheat stop valves as well as main control valves when tripping turbine Voltage regulation mode Turbine load-following mode of operation Acceptable loading rate for T/G Prevention of tie-in if phase difference (generator and system) is beyond set limit Electrohydraulic control for response to load changes	2.7 2.5* 1.8 2.1 1.7	2.9 2.9* 2.2 2.5* 2.2*	
K3.01  K4  K4.01  K4.02  K4.03  K4.04  K4.05  K4.06	system will have on the following: (CFR: 41.7/45.6)  Remainder of the plant  Knowledge of MT/G system design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: (CFR: 41.7)  Programmed controller for relationship between steam pressure at T/G inlet (impulse, first stage) and plant power level Automatic shut of reheat stop valves as well as main control valves when tripping turbine Voltage regulation mode Turbine load-following mode of operation Acceptable loading rate for T/G Prevention of tie-in if phase difference (generator and system) is beyond set limit Electrohydraulic control for response to load changes The reactor bailey station and reactor diamond station	2.7 2.5* 1.8 2.1 1.7 2.0 2.4*	2.9 2.9* 2.2 2.5* 2.2* 2.3* 2.5	
K3.01  K4  K4.01  K4.02  K4.03  K4.04  K4.05  K4.06	system will have on the following: (CFR: 41.7/45.6)  Remainder of the plant  Knowledge of MT/G system design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: (CFR: 41.7)  Programmed controller for relationship between steam pressure at T/G inlet (impulse, first stage) and plant power level Automatic shut of reheat stop valves as well as main control valves when tripping turbine Voltage regulation mode Turbine load-following mode of operation Acceptable loading rate for T/G Prevention of tie-in if phase difference (generator and system) is beyond set limit Electrohydraulic control for response to load changes	2.7 2.5* 1.8 2.1 1.7 2.0	2.9 2.9* 2.2 2.5* 2.2* 2.3*	

#### SYSTEM 045 Main Turbine Generator (MT/G) System K4.09 Generator capability, including power factor, VARs and hydrogen pressure ..... 1.8 2.2\* K4.10 Programmed controller for T-ref. signal generation from first stage (impulse) pressure in turbine ...... 2.4 2.7\* K4.11 3.6 3.9 K4.12 3.3 3.6 K4.13 2.6\* 2.8\* K4.14 Measurement of valve stroke times ..... 1.5 1.7 K4.15 Steam blanketing (atmospheric pressure) moisture separator reheater to drive out air and non-condensables prior to starting up ..... 1.6 1.7 K4.16 Recognition of unusual sounds during startup of turbine (vibration monitoring) ...... 1.9 2.1 K4.17 Relationship between governor and throttle valves ..... 2.1 1.8 K4.18 Use of T/G balance voltmeter prior to placing voltage regulator in service. 1.6 1.8 K4.19 Low-speed rotation by turbine turning gear to prevent "set" in shaft . . . . . . . 1.7 1.9 K4.20 Quenching of steam at entrance to exhaust hood by sprays ..... 1.6 1.6 Changeover from bearing oil pump to shaft pump as turbine K4.21 speed increases ..... 1.7 1.7 K4.22 Field excitation breakers in generator ..... 1.6 1.7 K4.23 Shift from manual to automatic voltage regulation when within limits (bumpless transfer) ..... 1.6 1.7 K4.24 Closure of motor-operated disconnects before closure of 1.9\* 2.1 K4.25 Adjustment of electrohydraulic control to maintain minimum 2.1\* 2.2 K4.26 Shifting of auxiliary buses between unit auxiliary transformer and service transformer during loading of main T/G (function of reactor power) ..... 2.3 2.1\* K4.27 Calibrations of the nuclear instrumentation as flux shifts during 2.6 2.9 K4.28 1.7\* 2.3 K4.29 Load sharing between high-pressure and low-pressure turbine (shifts to low-pressure turbine as T/G load increases also affects interface with moisture separator reheater) ..... 1.7 1.9 K4.30 Time required to effect load changes ..... 1.9 2.1 K4.31 Operation of auto-synchronous system ..... 1.8 2.0 K4.32 Paralleling of generator to grid when one team of generator breakers is closed ..... 1.7 1.9 Preventing of breaker closure unless generator frequency K4.33 is within required amount of grid frequency ...... 1.8 1.9 K4.34 Operation of CRDS in manual mode at T/G power below 15% ..... 2.9 2.7

K4.35   Operation of reactor in the load-following mode above 15% power   3.1   3.2	SYSTEM	045 Main Turbine Generator (MT/G) System			
K4.37	K4.35	Operation of reactor in the load-following mode above 15% power	3.1	3.2	
Station power switched to offsite source, air to extraction	K4.36		1.6	1.8	
Steam non-return valves removed   3.4*   3.6	K4.37	Automatic functions associated with turbine trip: reactor trip,			
K4.38		station power switched to offsite source, air to extraction			
K4.40			3.4*	3.6	
K4.40					
K4.41         Lockout of command relay to generator breaker         1.6         1.6           K4.42         Operation of SDS (turbine bypass) in event of load loss or plant trip         2.8*         3.0*           K4.43         T-ave, program, in relation to SDS controller         2.8         3.2*           K4.44         Impulse pressure mode control of steam dumps         2.5*         2.8*           K4.45         Operation of low-pressure steam dump to prevent T/G overspeed         2.3*         2.5*           K4.46         Defeat of reactor trip by overspeed trip test lever         2.5         2.8*           K4.47         Turbine trip upon reactor trip         4.0         4.3           K4.48         Trip of T/G and lube oil pumps by FPS         2.1*         2.3*           K5         Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as the apply to the MT/B System:					
K4.42					
K4.43         T-ave, program, in relation to SDS controller         2.8         3.2*           K4.44         Impulse pressure mode control of steam dumps         2.5*         2.8*           K4.45         Operation of low-pressure steam dump to prevent T/G overspeed         2.3*         2.5*           K4.46         Defeat of reactor trip by overspeed trip test lever         2.5         2.8*           K4.47         Turbine trip upon reactor trip         4.0         4.3           K4.48         Trip of T/G and lube oil pumps by FPS         2.1*         2.3*           K5         Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as the apply to the MT/B System:		· ·			
Math					
K4.45         Operation of low-pressure steam dump to prevent T/G overspeed         2.3*         2.5*           K4.46         Defeat of reactor trip by overspeed trip test lever         2.5         2.8*           K4.47         Turbine trip upon reactor trip         4.0         4.3           K4.48         Trip of T/G and lube oil pumps by FPS         2.1*         2.3*           KS         Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as the apply to the MT/B System:		· •			
K4.46         Defeat of reactor trip by overspeed trip test lever         2.5         2.8*           K4.47         Turbine trip upon reactor trip         4.0         4.3           K4.48         Trip of T/G and lube oil pumps by FPS         2.1*         2.3*           KS         Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as the apply to the MT/B System: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.7)           K5.01         Possible presence of explosive mixture in generator if hydrogen purity deteriorates         2.8*         3.2*           K5.02         Effects of moisture in steam on the turbine         2.1         2.4           K5.03         Purpose of extraction steam system         1.8         1.9*                     K5.04         Basic design of turbine blades         1.3         1.5           K5.05         Effect of steam reheating, feedwater heating, and condenser vacuum on plant efficiency         1.9         2.1           K5.06         Understanding of the principle of operation of voltage regulator null meter         1.7         1.8           K5.07         Reasons why rotation of synchroscope must be slowing in fast direction prior to connection to the grid         1.8         2.1*           K5.08         Even heatup/cooldown of turbine         1.8         2.1*           K5.09         Maneuvering limits for T/G         1.9					
K4.47         Turbine trip upon reactor trip         4.0         4.3           K4.48         Trip of T/G and lube oil pumps by FPS         2.1*         2.3*           K5         Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as the apply to the MT/B System:					
K4.48         Trip of T/G and lube oil pumps by FPS.         2.1*         2.3*           K5         Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as the apply to the MT/B System:					
K5   Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as the apply to the MT/B System: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.7)    K5.01   Possible presence of explosive mixture in generator if hydrogen purity deteriorates					
Concepts as the apply to the MT/B System:   (CFR: 41.5 / 45.7)	K4.48	Trip of T/G and lube oil pumps by FPS	2.1*	2.3*	
Nydrogen purity deteriorates   2.8*   3.2*	K5	concepts as the apply to the MT/B System:			
Nydrogen purity deteriorates   2.8*   3.2*	K5.01	Possible presence of explosive mixture in generator if			
K5.02         Effects of moisture in steam on the turbine         2.1         2.4           K5.03         Purpose of extraction steam system         1.8         1.9*           K5.04         Basic design of turbine blades         1.3         1.5           K5.05         Effect of steam reheating, feedwater heating, and condenser vacuum on plant efficiency         1.9         2.1           K5.06         Understanding of the principle of operation of voltage regulator null meter         1.7         1.8           K5.07         Reasons why rotation of synchroscope must be slowing in fast direction prior to connection to the grid         1.8         2.1*           K5.08         Even heatup/cooldown of turbine         1.8         2.1*           K5.09         Maneuvering limits for T/G         1.9         2.2           K5.10         Reasons for different procedures in hot and cold starts (temperature differential limits)         1.7         1.9           K5.11         Purpose of turning gear         1.7         1.8           K5.12         Role of field excitation in generator         1.6         1.7           K5.13         Reason for having generator voltage slightly higher than system voltage when paralleling         1.6         1.7           K5.14         Reason for paralleling both generator breaker circuits         1.6         1.7 <td></td> <td></td> <td>2.8*</td> <td>3.2*</td> <td></td>			2.8*	3.2*	
K5.04 Basic design of turbine blades 1.3 1.5  K5.05 Effect of steam reheating, feedwater heating, and condenser vacuum on plant efficiency 1.9 2.1  K5.06 Understanding of the principle of operation of voltage regulator null meter 1.7 1.8  K5.07 Reasons why rotation of synchroscope must be slowing in fast direction prior to connection to the grid 1.8 2.1*  K5.08 Even heatup/cooldown of turbine 1.8 2.1*  K5.09 Maneuvering limits for T/G 1.9 2.2  K5.10 Reasons for different procedures in hot and cold starts (temperature differential limits) 1.7 1.9  K5.11 Purpose of turning gear 1.7 1.8  K5.12 Role of field excitation in generator 1.6 1.7  K5.13 Reason for having generator voltage slightly higher than system voltage when paralleling 1.6 1.7  K5.14 Reason for reactive load adjustment after paralleling 1.6 1.7  K5.15 Reason for paralleling both generator breaker circuits 1.6 1.7  K5.16 Need for heat balance as T/G load increases 2.0* 2.2*  K5.17 Relationship between moderator temperature coefficient and boron concentration in RCS as T/G load increases 2.5* 2.7*  K5.18 Purpose of low-power reactor trips (limited to 25% power) 2.7 3.2  K5.19 Reason for minimum T/G load (to cool low-pressure turbine blade tips) 1.7 1.9*	K5.02		2.1	2.4	'
K5.05 Effect of steam reheating, feedwater heating, and condenser vacuum on plant efficiency	K5.03	Purpose of extraction steam system	1.8	1.9*	
K5.06 Understanding of the principle of operation of voltage regulator null meter	K5.04	Basic design of turbine blades	1.3	1.5	•
K5.06 Understanding of the principle of operation of voltage regulator null meter	K5.05	Effect of steam reheating, feedwater heating, and condenser vacuum			
regulator null meter		on plant efficiency	1.9	2.1	
K5.07 Reasons why rotation of synchroscope must be slowing in fast direction prior to connection to the grid 1.8 2.1*  K5.08 Even heatup/cooldown of turbine 1.8 2.1*  K5.09 Maneuvering limits for T/G 1.9 2.2  K5.10 Reasons for different procedures in hot and cold starts (temperature differential limits) 1.7 1.9  K5.11 Purpose of turning gear 1.7 1.8  K5.12 Role of field excitation in generator 1.6 1.7  K5.13 Reason for having generator voltage slightly higher than system voltage when paralleling 1.6 1.7  K5.14 Reason for reactive load adjustment after paralleling 1.6 1.7  K5.15 Reason for paralleling both generator breaker circuits 1.6 1.7  K5.16 Need for heat balance as T/G load increases 2.0* 2.2*  K5.17 Relationship between moderator temperature coefficient and boron concentration in RCS as T/G load increases 2.5* 2.7*  K5.18 Purpose of low-power reactor trips (limited to 25% power) 2.7 3.2  K5.19 Reason for minimum T/G load (to cool low-pressure turbine blade tips) 1.7 1.9*	K5.06	Understanding of the principle of operation of voltage			
fast direction prior to connection to the grid 1.8 2.1*  K5.08 Even heatup/cooldown of turbine 1.8 2.1*  K5.09 Maneuvering limits for T/G 1.9 2.2  K5.10 Reasons for different procedures in hot and cold starts (temperature differential limits) 1.7 1.9  K5.11 Purpose of turning gear 1.7 1.8  K5.12 Role of field excitation in generator 1.6 1.7  K5.13 Reason for having generator voltage slightly higher than system voltage when paralleling 1.6 1.7  K5.14 Reason for reactive load adjustment after paralleling 1.6 1.7  K5.15 Reason for paralleling both generator breaker circuits 1.6 1.7  K5.16 Need for heat balance as T/G load increases 2.0* 2.2*  K5.17 Relationship between moderator temperature coefficient and boron concentration in RCS as T/G load increases 2.5* 2.7*  K5.18 Purpose of low-power reactor trips (limited to 25% power) 2.7 3.2  K5.19 Reason for minimum T/G load (to cool low-pressure turbine blade tips) 1.7 1.9*			1.7	1.8	
K5.08 Even heatup/cooldown of turbine 1.8 2.1* K5.09 Maneuvering limits for T/G 1.9 2.2 K5.10 Reasons for different procedures in hot and cold starts (temperature differential limits) 1.7 1.9 K5.11 Purpose of turning gear 1.7 1.8 K5.12 Role of field excitation in generator 1.6 1.7 K5.13 Reason for having generator voltage slightly higher than system voltage when paralleling 1.6 1.7 K5.14 Reason for reactive load adjustment after paralleling 1.6 1.7 K5.15 Reason for paralleling both generator breaker circuits 1.6 1.7 K5.16 Need for heat balance as T/G load increases 2.0* 2.2* K5.17 Relationship between moderator temperature coefficient and boron concentration in RCS as T/G load increases 2.5* 2.7* K5.18 Purpose of low-power reactor trips (limited to 25% power) 2.7 3.2 K5.19 Reason for minimum T/G load (to cool low-pressure turbine blade tips) 1.7 1.9*	K5.07				
K5.09 Maneuvering limits for T/G					
K5.10 Reasons for different procedures in hot and cold starts (temperature differential limits)		<u> </u>			
K5.11Purpose of turning gear1.71.9K5.12Role of field excitation in generator1.61.7K5.13Reason for having generator voltage slightly higher than system voltage when paralleling1.61.7K5.14Reason for reactive load adjustment after paralleling1.61.7K5.15Reason for paralleling both generator breaker circuits1.61.7K5.16Need for heat balance as T/G load increases2.0*2.2*K5.17Relationship between moderator temperature coefficient and boron concentration in RCS as T/G load increases2.5*2.7*K5.18Purpose of low-power reactor trips (limited to 25% power)2.73.2K5.19Reason for minimum T/G load (to cool low-pressure turbine blade tips)1.71.9*			1.9	2.2	
K5.11 Purpose of turning gear	K5.10				
K5.12 Role of field excitation in generator					
K5.13 Reason for having generator voltage slightly higher than system voltage when paralleling					
when paralleling1.61.7K5.14Reason for reactive load adjustment after paralleling1.61.7K5.15Reason for paralleling both generator breaker circuits1.61.7K5.16Need for heat balance as T/G load increases2.0*2.2*K5.17Relationship between moderator temperature coefficient and boron concentration in RCS as T/G load increases2.5*2.7*K5.18Purpose of low-power reactor trips (limited to 25% power)2.73.2K5.19Reason for minimum T/G load (to cool low-pressure turbine blade tips)1.71.9*			1.6	1.7	
K5.14Reason for reactive load adjustment after paralleling1.61.7K5.15Reason for paralleling both generator breaker circuits1.61.7K5.16Need for heat balance as T/G load increases2.0*2.2*K5.17Relationship between moderator temperature coefficient and boron concentration in RCS as T/G load increases2.5*2.7*K5.18Purpose of low-power reactor trips (limited to 25% power)2.73.2K5.19Reason for minimum T/G load (to cool low-pressure turbine blade tips)1.71.9*	K5.13		1.6	1.7	
K5.15 Reason for paralleling both generator breaker circuits 1.6 1.7 K5.16 Need for heat balance as T/G load increases 2.0* 2.2* K5.17 Relationship between moderator temperature coefficient and boron concentration in RCS as T/G load increases 2.5* 2.7* K5.18 Purpose of low-power reactor trips (limited to 25% power) 2.7 3.2 K5.19 Reason for minimum T/G load (to cool low-pressure turbine blade tips) 1.7 1.9*	K5.14				
K5.16 Need for heat balance as T/G load increases					
K5.17 Relationship between moderator temperature coefficient and boron concentration in RCS as T/G load increases					
and boron concentration in RCS as T/G load increases					1
K5.18 Purpose of low-power reactor trips (limited to 25% power)		*	2.5*	2.7*	
K5.19 Reason for minimum T/G load (to cool low-pressure turbine blade tips) 1.7 1.9*	K5.18				'
	K5.19		1.7	1.9*	
· •	K5.20	Effect of temperature on lube oil viscosity	1.6	1.7	•

	SYSTEM	045 Main Turbine Generator (MT/G) System		
	K5.21	Purpose of turbine lube oil lift pump (to hold T/G off		
		main bearing at low rotation speeds)	1.6	1.6
	K5.22	Operation of synchroscope	1.7	1.8
	K5.23	Relationship between rod control and RCS boron concen-		
		tration during T/G load increases	2.7	2.8
	К6	Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction on the following will have on the MT/G system components: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.7)		
	K6.01	Generator stator cooling (turbine building CCW)	2.0	2.1
	K6.02	Breakers, relays, and disconnects	1.7	1.9
	K6.03	Valves	1.6	1.7
	K6.04	Main ac electrical system mimic bus	2.0	2.3
	K6.05	Hydrogen purity analyzer	1.7	1.9
	K6.06	Generator amplidyne balance system	1.6*	1.8*
•	K6.07	Hydrogen oil seal system on generator	1.7	1.8
	K6.08	Turbine lube oil system	1.7	1.8
	K6.09	Steam gland seal system on turbine	1.6	1.7
	K6.10	Sensors and detectors	1.6	1.7
	K6.11	Controllers and positioners	1.8	1.9
	K6.12	Lube oil pump	1.6	1.6
	K6.13	MFW, cooling water, heater drains, and demineralizers		
		(unless automatic controls are provided, flows must be		
		adjusted manually during power decrease)	1.7	1.7
	K6.14	DELETED		

### SYSTEM 045 Main Turbine Generator (MT/G) System

#### **ABILITY**

<b>A1</b>	Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters
	(to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with
	operating the MT/G system controls including:
	(CFR: 41.5 / 45.5)

	(CFR. +1.37 +5.3)	IMPORTANCE	
<u>K/A NO.</u>	<u>ABILITY</u>	RO	SRO
A1.01	Normal speed, sound, vibration, temperature, pressure,		
711.01	and flow characteristics of T/G	2.1*	2.2
A1.02	Electrical parameters for the T/G	1.9	2.1
A1.03	Use of sounding rod to monitor bearings for high vibration	1.7	1.7
A1.04	Turbine vibration and expansion during rise to full load	1.8	1.9
A1.05	Expected response of primary plant parameters (tempera-	1.0	1.,
111.05	ture and pressure) following T/G trip	3.8	4.1
A1.06	Expected response of secondary plant parameters following T/G trip	3.3	3.7
111.00	Expected response of secondary plant parameters following 1/6 dip	3.3	3.7
A2	Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following mal-		
	functions or operation on the MT/G system; and (b) based		
	on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control,		
	or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or		
	operations:		
	(CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.5)		
A2.01	Condensate backing up in drains and reheaters	1.8	1.9
A2.02	Generator stator cooling water screen becoming clogged	1.9	1.9
A2.03	Mismatch between generator output and unit demand	2.1	2.1
A2.04	Improperly operating steam and turbine drains	1.7	1.8
A2.05	Changing extraction steaming rates	1.6	1.6
A2.06	Cold and hot starts	1.7	1.8
A2.07	Unsuccessful turbine latching	1.7	1.7
A2.08	Steam dumps are not cycling properly at low load, or stick open at higher		
	load (isolate and use atmospheric reliefs when necessary)	2.8	3.1*
A2.09	If exciter fails, trip the T/G	2.2*	2.4*
A2.10	Voltage regulator malfunction	1.8	2.1*
A2.11	Control problems in primary, e.g., axial flux imbalance;		
	need to reduce load on secondary	2.4	2.9*
A2.12	Control rod insertion limits exceeded (stabilize secondary)	2.5	2.8*
A2.13	Opening of the steam dumps at low pressure	2.1	2.5*
A2.14	Loss of condenser vacuum	2.1	2.4*
A2.15	Turbine overspeed	2.2*	2.6*
A2.16	Turbine blade failure	2.3*	2.4*
A2.17	Malfunction of electrohydraulic control	2.7*	2.9*

	SYSTEM	045 Main Turbine Generator (MT/G) System		
	A3	Ability to monitor automatic operation of the MT/G system, including: (CFR: $41/7  /  45.5$ )		
	A3.01	Recognition of trends on main T/G output meter	2.1*	1.9
	A3.02	Interpretation of T/G output breaker indicating lights	2.2*	2.1
	A3.03	Interpretation of T/G voltage regulation indication	1.9	1.9
	A3.04	T/G trip	3.4	3.6
	A3.05	Electrohydraulic control	2.6	2.9
	A3.06	Turbine supervisory instrumentation	2.1	2.2
	A3.07	Turbine stop/governor valve closure on turbine trip	3.5	3.6
	A3.08	Determination from throttle and governor indicators of turbine trip: several		
		indications, including CRDS trip alarm	3 3*	3.5*
	A3.09	Comparison of incoming and running voltmeters	1.9	2.0
	A3.10	Voltage regulator	1.9	2.0
	A3.11	Generator trip	2.6*	2.9*
	A4.	Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: (CFR: $41.7 / 45.5$ to $45.8$ )		
	A4.01	Turbine valve indicators (throttle, governor, control,		
		stop, intercept), alarms, and annunciators	3.1	2.9
	A4.02	T/G controls, including breakers	2.7	2.6*
•	A4.03	T/G speed indication for on-line and off-line operation	1.9	1.9
	A4.04	Exhaust hood spray system for temperature control	1.9	1.6
	A4 05	Electrical (T/G) and steam system adjustments	2.2	1.9
	A4 06	Turbine stop valves	2.8	2.7*
•	A4.07	Voltage regulator	1.9	1.9
	A4.08	RCS parameters (temperature and pressure), while conducting		
		valve freedom test	2.7*	2.6*
•	A4.09	Turbine supervisory instruments during startup	1.8	1.9
	A4.10	Startup T/G on load limits	1.9*	2.2
	A4.11	T/G output breaker controls; understanding of indications and alarms	2.4*	2.3*
	A4.12	Interpretation of electrohydraulic control indications	2.2	2.4*
	A4.13	Governor and load limits	2.1	2.2

#### Conduct condenser air leakage check Monitor the CARS operation Operate the mechanical vacuum pump Operate steam jet air ejectors **IMPORTANCE** K/A NO. **KNOWLEDGE** RO SRO **K1** Knowledge of the physical connections and/or causeeffect relationships between the CARS and the following systems: (CFR: 41.2 to 41.9 / 45.7 to 45.8) 1.7 K1.01 1.6 K1.02 Main condenser ..... 2.0 2.1 Condensate ..... K1.031.9 2.1 K1.04 1.9 2.0 K1.05 Polishing demineralizers ..... 1.5 1.5 K1.06 PRM system ..... 2.6 2.6 K1.07 1.9 1.9 K1.08 1.7 1.6 K1.09 1.6 1.6 **K2** Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following: (CFR: 41.7) K2.01 1.7 1.6 K2.02 Exhaust fan(s) ..... 1.5 1.5 **K3** Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the CARS will have on the following: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.6) Main condenser ..... K3.01 2.5 2.7 1.9 K3.02 1.7 K3.03 MT/G ..... 1.6 1.9 MFW pumps (steam driven) ..... 2.0\* K3.04 1.7 K3.05 2.3 2.6 SDS .....

**Condenser Air Removal System (CARS)** 

Perform lineups of the CARS

055

TASK:

SYSTEM:	055 Condenser Air Removal System (CARS)		
K4	Knowledge of CARS design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: (CFR: 41.7)		
K4.01 K4.02	Turbine startup	1.9 2.4	2.3* 2.6*
K5	Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as the apply to the CARS: (CFR: $41.5 / 45.7$ )		
K5.01 K5.02 K5.03 K5.04	Measures of pressure and vacuum  Venturi effects  Relationship between pressure and temperature  S/G chemistry	1.6 1.4 1.6 1.6	1.7 1.5 1.6 1.9
K6	Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction of the following will have on the CARS components: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.7)		
K6.01 K6.02 K6.03 K6.04	Air ejectors Vacuum pumps Heat exchangers Flow sensors	1.7 1.6 1.3 1.3	1.7 1.8 1.4 1.4
A1	Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceed design limits) associated with operating the CARS controls including: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.5)	ling	
A1.01 A1.02	Condenser vacuum gauge	1.7 1.6	2.0* 1.7
A2	Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operatio on the CARS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: (CFR: $41.5/43.5/45.3/45.13$ )		
A2.01 A2.02 A2.03 A2.04	Loss of circulating cooling water system  Loss of gland seal/gland exhaust  Loss of air ejector cooling water  Air in leakage	2.1 2.1 1.8* 2.1	2.2 2.1 2.0* 2.2

SYSTEM:	055 Condenser Air Removal System (CARS)		
<b>A3</b>	Ability to monitor automatic operation of the CARS, including: (CFR: $41.7 / 45.5$ )		
A3.01	Air removal pump	1.8	1.9
A3.02	Steam to CARS	1.9	1.9
A3.03	Automatic diversion of CARS exhaust	2.5*	2.7*
A4	Ability to manually operate and monitor in the control room: (CFR: $41.7 / 45.5$ to $45.8$ )		
A4.01	Sealing steam	1.8	1.9
A4.02	Vacuum pumps	1.8	1.9
A4.03	Steam to CARS	1.8	1.8

# 056 Condensate System

TASK:	Perform lineups of the condensate system  Operate condensate pumps in different combinations  De-aerate the condensate system prior to startup  Fill the condensate system  Place the condensate system in high pressure cleanup operation  start up the condensate system  shut down the condensate system  operate the low pressure heaters  operate the high pressure heaters  Operate the condensate booster pumps in different combinations  Operate the hotwell pumps  Manually operate the condensate hotwell makeup and dump system  monitor condensate system operate  Operate the condensate pump and air ejector recirc subsystem  What if high water level exists in low pressure feedwater
	Operate the condensate pump and air ejector recirc subsystem What if high water level exists in low-pressure feedwater heater during turbine operations?

<u>K/A NO.</u>	KNOWLEDGE	IMPORTANCE RO SRO	
K1	Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the Condensate System and the following systems: (CFR: $41.2$ to $41.9$ / $45.7$ to $45.8$ )		
K1.01	feedwater cleanup system	1.8	1.8
K1.02	Main vacuum and gland seal system	1.6	1.6
K1.03	MFW	2.6*	2.6
K1.04	Condenser	1.7	1.6
K1.05	Secondary sealing water	1.5	1.5
K1.06	Heater drains	1.4	1.5
K1.07	Gland seals	1.5	1.5
K1.08	CARs	1.6	1.6
K1.09	Extraction steam	1.6	1.6
K1.10	Chemical treating	1.7	1.7
K1.11	Stator cooling	1.5	1.5
K1.12	Secondary plant component cooling	1.6	1.6
K1.13	AFW	2.4*	2.4*
K1.14	Demineralizer water makeup system	1.7	1.9
K1.15	Hotwell pumps, booster pumps, and main feed pumps	2.1	2.1
K1.16	Demineralizer bypass valve (prevent water impact on		
	resin beds during pump startup)	1.9	2.1*
K1.17	Feed system, the polishing demineralizer system, and the		
	condensate strainer operation	1.9	2.1*
K2	<b>Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following:</b> (CFR: 41.7)		
K2.01	Condensate pumps and booster pumps	1.6	1.7*

SYSTEM:	056 Condensate System			
К3	Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the Condensate System will have on the following: $(CFR: 41.7/45.6)$			
K3.01	MFW	2.4*	2.4	
K3.02	CARS	1.6	1.7	
K3.03	MFW pumps	2.2*	2.3	
K3.04	Heater drain pumps	1.6	1.6	
K3.05	Extraction steam	1.6	1.6	
K3.06	Gland steam system	1.5	1.6	
K3.07	Stator coolant	1.7	1.6	
K3.08	Hydrogen coolers	1.6	1.6	
K4	Knowledge of Condensate System design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: (CFR: 41.7)			
K4.01	Feedwater heating at low, intermediate, and high			
	pressure	1.6	1.9	
K4.02	Condensate demineralizer resin regenerative			
	process	1.7	1.9	
K4.03	Restricting hotwell level range	1.7	1.7	
K4.04	Moving condensate to and from storage tank and hotwell	1.7	1.8	
K4.05	Securing steam seals on main turbine during shutdown	1.5	1.6	
K4.06	Proper sequencing of hotwell pumps and condensate			
	polishing demineralzer bypass valves	1.5	1.6	
K4.07	Cooling condensate pumps seals, using makeup water	1.5	1.7	
K4.08	Venting condensate pump seals	1.4	1.5	
K4.09	Feedwater pump turbine windmill protection	1.8	1.9	
K4.10	Flow control valve for the gland exhaust condenser	1.5	1.6	
K4.11	Byass of heater stream	1.7	2.0	
K4.12	Condensate minimum flow recirculation valve	1.6	1.6	
K4.13	Condensate pump runout capacity	1.7	1.7	
K4.14	MFW pump NPSH	2.2	2.6*	
K4.15	Booster pump starting interlock	1.9	2.1*	
K4.16	Low-level and High-level heater	1.6	1.7	
K4.17	Adjustment of automatic setpoint and polish demineralizer			
	bypass valves	1.6	1.7	
K4.18	Interlocks between booster pumps and auxiliary oil pumps	1.5*	1.7	I
K4.19	Setpoints and trip levels for condensate pump and			'
	booster pump operations	1.9	1.9	
K4.20	Flow rate limits of condensate piping system	1.6	1.7	
K4.21	Operation of hotwell pump and air ejector recirculation		-	
	line isolation valve to maintain header pressure	1.5*	1.7*	
K4.22	Feed pump and booster pump NPSH protection	2.1	2.4*	
	Land Land Land Land Land Land			

### SYSTEM: 056 Condensate System

	K5	Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as the apply to the Condensate system: $(CFR:\ 41.5\ /\ 45.7)$		
	K5.01	Principle of vacuum drag	1.5	1.5
	K5.02	Energies associated with fluid flow (Kinetic, Potential pressure)	1.4	1.6
	K5.03	Water hammer and methods of prevention	2.2	2.6*
	K5.04	Function of lubricating oil and its application to pump		
		and motor bearings	1.7	1.8
	K5.05	Understanding of the working properties of water (Enthalpy,	1.7	2.04
	W5.06	entropy, pressure, temperature, specific volume	1.7	2.0*
	K5.06	Purpose of condensate demineralizer	1.7	1.9
	K5.07	Purpose and principle of de-aeration, of oxygen removal	1.7	1.0
	V.5.00	from condensate	1.7	1.9
	K5.08	Chemistry specs for secondary system dissolved oxygen (corrosion control	1.9	2.4
	K5.09	Water quality requirements for demineralizer water	1.7	2.4
ı	K5.10	Effects of leaks (on plant efficiency and personnel)	1.7	2.0
I	K5.10 K5.11	Reasons for venting all high points in condensate system	1.5	1.7
	K5.11	Reason and methods for breaking main condenser vacuum	1.5	1.7
	113.12	before removing turbine seals	1.6	1.7
	K5.13	Purpose of low-pressure cleanup valve	1.5	1.6
l	K5.14	Purpose of valve between upper surge tank and hotwell	1.7*	1.7*
'	K5.15	Stabilization of piping system parameters after changes in chemistry	1.6	1.8
	K5.16	Limits of condensate pump ability to feed S/G	2.0*	2.3*
	K5.17	Principles and mechanisms of S/G water level control	2.3*	2.3*
	K6	Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction of the following will have on the Condensate System components: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.7)		
	K6.01	Condensate pumps	1.7	1.9
	K6.02	Booster pumps	1.7	1.9
	K6.03	Main feed pumps	2.1	2.4*
	K6.04	Valves	1.6	1.6
	K6.05	Sensors and detectors	1.4	1.5
	K6.06	Controllers and positioners	1.5	1.6
	K6.07	Heat exchangers and condensers	1.6	1.7
	K6.08	Breakers, relays, and disconnects	1.3	1.5
	K6.09	Demineralizers	1.7	1.9
	K6.10	Pumps	1.6	1.7
ı	K6.11	Motors	1.4	1.6

### SYSTEM: 056 Condensate System

### **ABILITY**

A1	Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the Condensate System controls including: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.5)			
A1.01	Pressure, flow and amps for condensate, booster, and main feed pumps	2.1*	2.4*	
A1.02	Deleted			
A1.03	Normal sequence of alarms on startup of condensate			'
	pumps, including low suction pressure alarm	1.6	1.6	
A1.04	Hotwell level alarms and flow indicators	1.6	1.7	
A1.05	Differential pressure indicators (Across pumps, demineralizers	1.6	1.7	
A1.06	Heater parameters (temperature, pressure, flow level)			
	and their effect on condensate flow	1.7	1.8	
A1.07	S/G level under transient induced by feed rate change (pumps on and off) .	2.1	2.3*	
A1.08	MFW pump suction pressure	2.3	2.6*	
	malfunctions or operations on the Condensate System; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: $(CFR:\ 41.5/43.5/45.3/45.13)$			
A2.01	Loss of condenser pressure	1.8	2.0	
A2.02	Bad chemistry	1.8	2.3*	
A2.03	Demineralizer D/P	1.8	2.0*	
A2.04	Loss of condensate pumps	2.6	2.8*	
A2.05	Condenser tube leakage	2.1	2.5*	
A2.06	Abnormal hotwell pump discharge pressure	1.6	1.7	
A2.07	Removal of condensate demineralizer from service	1.7	1.9	
A2.08	Feedwater heater tube leak	1.6	1.8	
A2.09	Feedwater level high or low	1.6	1.7	
A2.10	Decreased effectiveness of condensate demineralizer due			
	to increased flow through it	1.5	1.7	
A2.11	Approximate time necessary to regenerate one condensate			
	demineralizer resin bed	1.6	1.8*	
A2.12	Opening of the heater string bypass valve	1.8	2.1*	
A2.13	Opening of the condensate recirculation valve	1.7	1.8	
A2.14	Opening of the condensate spill valve	2.0	2.2	

SYSTEM:	056 Condensate System		
A3	Ability to monitor automatic operation of the Condensate System including: CFR: (CFR: 41.7/45.5)		
A3.01	Automatic hotwell level control	1.8	1.8
A3.02	Hotwell and condensate storage tank level indicators	1.9	2.1
A3.03	Condensate flow, header pressure, pump amperage and	1.0	
A3.04	running indicators / related alarms and annunciators	1.8	1.7
A3.04	pumps are operating	2.1	2.1
A3.05	Monitoring of steam jet air ejector air flow	1.7	1.8*
A3.06	Remote and local feedwater heater level indicators	1.7	1.6
A3.07	Determination that the differential pressure of the	1.,	1.0
120.07	condensate demineralizer is within limits	1.6	1.7
A3.08	Flow through stator coolant and hydrogen coolers	1.6	1.5
A3.09	Automatic protection of MFW pump low suction pressure	2.1	2.4*
A3.10	Upper surge tank flowmeter	1.7*	1.6*
A4	Ability to manually operate and monitor in the control room: CFR: (CFR: $41.7 / 45.5$ to $45.8$ )		
A4.01	Condensate pump controls	1.9	1.8
A4.02	Condensate demineralizer bypass valve and precoat by pass valve	2.0	1.9
A4.03	Hotwell high level dump	2.1*	2.1
A4.04	Cleanup Valve	1.8	1.7
A4.05	Valve between upper surge tank and hotwell	1.8*	1.7*
A4.06	Condensate demineralizer bypass valve controller	1.8	1.8*
A4.07	Hotwell pumps	1.7	1.7
A4.08	Condensate automatic makeup valve controller	1.7	1.5
A4.09	Demineralizer flow control valve	1.9*	1.7*
A4.10	Low-pressure and high-pressure cleanup valves	1.7*	1.6*
A4.11	Setpoints on polish demineralizer bypass valve controllers	1.6	1.6
A4.12	Condensate pump, including verification of proper		
	startup from parameter readings	1.7	1.7
A4.13	Alarms associated with booster pump operation	1.7	1.7
A4.14	Auxiliary oil pumps for booster pumps	1.6	1.6
A4.15	Turbine and feedwater pump turbine exhaust temperature during shutdown.	1.6	1.5
A4.16	Heater unit controls and control valves during heater startup/shutdown	1.5	1.5
A4.17	Deleted	1.0	1.7
A4.18	Hotwell level alarms and flow indicators	1.9	1.7

### 059 Main Feedwater (MFW) System

Task: Perform initial lineup of the MFW system

Perform feedwater isolation valve functional test

Fill the MFW system

Perform MFW pump turbine tachometer overspeed trip test

Start up the MFW system

Operate the MFW pumps in different combinations Operate the feedwater regulating system in manual and

automatic modes

Operate / test MFW pump lube oil pump monitor MFW system

operations

Shut down the MFW system

What if the automatic S/G water level control does not respond

properly?

K/A NO.	<u>KNOWLEDGE</u>	IMPOR RO	TANCE SRO	
K1	Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the MFW and the following systems: (CFR: $41.2 \text{ to } 41.9 / 45.7 \text{ to } 45.8$ )			
K1.01	Condensate	2.3*	2.3	
K1.02	AFW system	3.4*	3 . 4	
K1.03 K1.04	S/GS S/GS water level control system	3.1 3.4	3.3 3.4	
K1.05	RCS	3.1*	3.2	
K1.06	Chemical treatment	1.9	2.1 3.2*	
K1.07 K1.08	ICS	3.2* 1.6	3.2* 1.6	
K1.08 K1.09	Secondary cooling water	1.0	1.8	
K1.10	Extraction steam	1.7	1.7	
K2	<b>Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following:</b> (CFR: 41.7)			
K2.01	MFW system pumps	2.2*	2.3*	
K2.02	MOVs	2.0*	2.1	
К3	Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the MFW will have on the following: (CFR: $41.7/45.6$ )			
K3.01	Condensate system	1.8	1.8	
K3.02	AFW system	3.6	3.7	
K3.03	S/GS	3.5	3.7.	
K3.04	RCS	3.6	3.8	

	SYSTEM:	059 Main Feedwater (MFW) System		
	K4	Knowledge of MFW design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: (CFR: 41.7)		
	K4.01	MFW and startup feedwater valve combination	2.4	2.6*
	K4.02	Automatic turbine/reactor trip runback	3.3	3.5
'	K4.03	Adequate condensate flow	2.1	2.3*
	K4.04	Heating of feedwater	1.9	2.2
	K4.05	Control of speed of MFW pump turbine	2.5*	2.8*
	K4.06	Comparison of actual D/P, between main steam and MFW		
	11.100	pump discharge pressure, to programmed D/P when placing		
- [		MFW pump in automatic mode	2.2*	2.4*
,	K4.07	Closing MFW pump drains	1.6*	1.7*
	K4.08	Feedwater regulatory valve operation (on basis of steam	1.0	1.,
	111.00	flow, feed flow mismatch)	2.5	2.7
	K4.09	Controlling MFW pump lube oil system	1.7	1.8
	K4.10	Bearing oil signal to the turning gear start sequence	1.7	1.8
	K4.11	Porting oil	1.8?	1.9?
	K4.11	Sources of cooling water for MFW pump lube oil cooler	1.8	1.9
	K4.12 K4.13	Feedwater fill for S/G upon loss of RCPs	2.9	2.9
1	K4.13 K4.14	Start permissives for MFW pumps	2.9	2.3 *
ı	K4.14 K4.15	Automatic starts for MFW pumps	2.1*	2.4*
	K4.15 K4.16	Automatic trips for MFW pumps	3.1*	3.2*
ı	K4.10 K4.17		2.5*	2.8*
ı		Increased feedwater flow following a reactor trip		
	K4.18	Automatic feedwater reduction on plant trip	2.8*	3.0*
	K4.19	Automatic feedwater isolation of MFW	3.2	3.4
	K4.20	Automatic feed pump recirculation flow	1.9	2.2*
	K5	Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as the apply to the MFW: $(CFR:\ 41.5\ /\ 45.7)$		
	K5.01	Variation of flow discharge pressure	2.1	2.1
	K5.02	Shrink and swell	2.4	2.6*
	K5.03	Reason for maintenance of minimum D/P between main	2.4	2.0
	143.03	steam and MFW pump discharge pressure	2.1	2.2
	K5.04	Definition of water hammer	2.3*	2.6*
	K5.05	Reason for balancing MFW pump loads	2.0	2.2*
	K5.06	Characteristics of level, flow, and pressure	2.0	2.2
	K3.00	indications	1.8	2.1*
	V5 07	Relationship between feedwater pump speed and feedwater	1.0	2.1
	K5.07		1 0	2.1*
	IZ 5 00	regulating valve position	1.8	2.1*
	K5.08	Reason for matching steam flow and feedwater flow	2.4	2.6*
	K5.09	Effects of low temperature and high viscosity on oil	1.0	1 7
	17.5.10	system operations	1.6	1.7
	K5.10	Theory of film-riding oil in journal bearing	1.4	1.6
	K5.11	Definition of turbine windmilling	1.6	1.7
	K5.12	Increased MFW pump discharge with increased turbine speed	2.2*	2.5*
	K5.13	Reasons for monitoring feedwater pump suction flow/pressure	2.3	2.6*
	K5.14	Quadrant power tilt	1.9	2.4*

SYSTEM:	059 Main Feedwater (MFW) System		
K6	Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction of the following will have on the MFW components: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.7)		
K6.01	Valves	1.9	2.1*
K6.02	Sensors and detectors	1.9	1.9
K6.03	Controllers and positioners	1.9	2.1*
K6.04	Pumps	1.9	2.1*
K6.05	Motors	1.7	1.9*
K6.06	Heat exchangers and condensers	1.6	1.8
K6.07	Breakers, relays, and disconnects	1.4	1.7
K6.08	Breakers, relays, and disconnects	1.6	1.8
K6.09	MFW pump speed and flow regulating valves (reason for		
	adjusting position of both)	2.4*	2.6*
K6.10	Feedwater isolation valve travel time	1.9	2.1*
K6.11	High and low feedwater discharge header pressure	1.9	2.1*
K6.12	S/G controller logic for MFW regulating valve	2.3*	2.5
A1	ABILITY  Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the MFW controls including: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.5)		
A1.01	Location, limits, and normal ranges for level, pressure		
111101	flow, temperature, and RPM measurements associated with		
	the MFW system	2.4*	2.5*
A1.02	MFW pump oil temperatures and MFW pump vibrations	1.8	1.9
A1.03	Power level restrictions for operation of MFW pumps and valves	2.7*	2.9*
A1.04	Main steam pressure	2.2*	2.2*
A1.05			
A1.03	<u> </u>	2.4*	2.6
A1.06	S/G level, comparison with normal values	2.4* 1.8	2.6 2.0
	<u> </u>		
A1.06	S/G level, comparison with normal values	1.8	2.0
A1.06 A1.07	S/G level, comparison with normal values	1.8 2.5*	2.0 2.6*
A1.06 A1.07 A1.08	S/G level, comparison with normal values  Abnormal noises or vibrations of MFW pump  Feed Pump speed, including normal control speed for ICS  Oil Pressure indications for MFW pumps	1.8 2.5* 1.7	2.0 2.6* 1.8

	SYSTEM:	Main Feedwater (MFW) System		
	A2	Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operation the MFW; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: (CFR: $41.5/43.5/45.3/45.13$ )	t,	
	A2.01 A2.02 A2.03 A2.04 A2.05 A2.06 A2.07 A2.08 A2.09	Feedwater actuation of AFW system  Loss of feedwater heater  Overfeeding event  Feeding a dry S/G  Rupture in MFW suction or discharge line  Loss of steam flow to MFW system  Tripping of MFW pump turbine  Extremely low MFW pump control lube oil or bearing oil pressure  Overspeed on turning gear	3.4* 2.2* 2.7 2.9* 3.1* 2.7* 3.0* 1.9	3.6* 2.5* 3.1* 3.4* 3.4* 2.9* 3.3* 2.2*
	A2.10 A2.11 A2.12 A2.13	Secondary cooling water  Failure of feedwater control system  Failure of feedwater regulating valves  Loss of condensate/heater draining flow	1.7 3.0* 3.1* 2.1*	1.8 3.3* 3.4* 2.1*
	A3.01 A3.02 A3.03 A3.04 A3.05 A3.06 A3.07	Ability to monitor automatic operation of the MFW, including: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5)  Valve timer display  Programmed levels of the S/G  Feedwater pump suction flow pressure  Turbine driven feed pump  Starts and stops on the main feed pumps  Feedwater isolation ICS	2.0* 2.9 2.5 2.5* 2.4* 3.2* 3.4*	2.1* 3.1 2.6* 2.6* 2.7* 3.3 3.5*
	A4	Ability to manually operate and monitor in the control room: (CFR: $41.7 / 45.5$ to $45.8$ )		
	A4.01 A4.02 A4.03 A4.04 A4.05 A4.06 A4.07	MFW turbine trip indication Null out MFW pump D/P differences Feedwater control during power increase and decrease Reset MFW overspeed trip MFW pump oil cooler, cooling water outlet valve controller MFW pump turbine reset switch Valve timer reset pushbutton	3.1* 2.3* 2.9* 2.2* 1.7 2.4* 2.0*	3.1* 2.4* 2.9 2.3* 1.8 2.3* 1.9*
1	A4.08 A4.09 A4.10 A4.11 A4.12	Feed regulating valve controller  Remote determination of operating feedwater pump turning gear  ICS  Recovery from automatic feedwater isolation  Initiation of automatic feedwater isolation	3.0* 2.1* 3.9* 3.1 3.4	2.9* 2.0* 3.8* 3.3 3.5

### 061 Auxiliary / Emergency Feedwater (AFW) System

TASK: Perform lineups of the AFW system

Perform AFW system operability demonstration

What if the AFW system did not operate properly automatically?

Fill and vent the AFW system

Auxiliary feed pump failure due to improper valve lineup

Start the AFW system

Perform AFW automatic actuation test Feed steam generators with AFW system Perform S/G auxiliary feed pump test Operate motor driven AFW pumps

Perform S/G auxiliary feed pump flow capacity test

Operate turbine driven AFW pumps Perform testing of AFW check valves Shift auxiliary feed pump suction Perform exercise of AFW MOVs test

Overspeed test the auxiliary feed pump turbine

shut down the AFW system

Drain the AFW pump turbine and steam supply header

			TANCE
K/A NO.	KNOWLEDGE	RO	SRO
K1	Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the AFW and the following systems: (CFR: $41.2$ to $41.9$ / $45.7$ to $45.8$ )		
K1.01	S/G system	4.1	4.1
K1.02	MFW System	3.4	3.7
K1.03	Main steam system	3.5	3.9
K1.04	RCS	3.9	4.1
K1.05	Condensate system	2.6*	2.8*
K1.06	Cooling water	2.4*	2.6*
K1.07	Emergency water source	3.6	3.8
K1.08	Chemical treatment	2.1	2.3*
K1.09	PRMS	2.6*	2.8*
K1.10	Diesel fuel oil	2.6*	2.7*
K1.11	AFW turbine exhaust drains	2.7	2.8*
K2	<b>Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following:</b> (CFR: 41.7)		
K2.01	AFW system MOVs	3.2*	3.3
K2.02	AFW electric drive pumps	3.7*	3.7
K2.03	AFW diesel driven pump	4.0*	3.8*

	SYSTEM:	061 Auxiliary / Emergency Feedwater (AFW) System		
	К3	Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the AFW will have on the following: $(CFR:\ 41.7/45.6)$		
	K3.01 K3.02	RCS	4.4 4.2	4.6 4.4
	K4	Knowledge of AFW design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: (CFR: 41.7)		
	K4.01	Water sources and priority of use	4.1	4.2
	K4.02	AFW automatic start upon loss of MFW pump, S/G level,		
		blackout, or safety injection	4.5	4.6
	K4.03	Automatic blowdown/sample isolation	2.7	2.9*
	K4.04 K4.05	Prevention of AFW runout by limiting AFW flow  Prevention of MFW swapover to AFW suction	3.1	3.4
		pressure is low	3.5*	3.7*
	K4.06	AFW startup permissives	4.0*	4.2*
	K4.07	Turbine trip, including overspeed	3.1*	3.3*
	K4.08	AFW recirculation	2.7	2.9
	K4.09	Crossties between multi-unit station	3.7	3.3
	K4.10	Reset of MFW reactor trip logic	2.6	2.9*
	K4.11	Automatic level control	2.7*	2.9*
	K4.12	Natural circulation flow	3.5*	3.7
-	K4.13	Initiation of cooling water and lube oil	2.7	2.9
	K4.14	AFW automatic isolation	3.5*	3.7*
	K5	Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as the apply to the AFW: (CFR: $41.5 / 45.7$ )		
	V5 01	Deletionship between ADW flow and DCC best transfer	26	2.0
	K5.01 K5.02	Relationship between AFW flow and RCS heat transfer	3.6 3.2	3.9 3.6
	K5.02 K5.03	Decay heat sources and magnitude	2.6	3.0 2.9*
- 1	K5.03 K5.04	Pump head effects when control valve is shut	2.3	2.5*
ı	K5.05	Reason for warming up turbine prior to turbine startup  Feed line voiding and water hammer	2.3	3.2
	K6	Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction of the following will have on the AFW components: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.7)		
	TT 6 0.1		2 -	• • •
	K6.01	Controllers and positioners	2.5	2.8*
	K6.02	Pumps	2.6	2.7
	K6.03	Motors	2.0	1.9
	K6.04	Breakers, relays, and disconnects	1.7	1.9
	K6.05	Valves	2.3*	2.5*
	K6.06	Sensors and detectors	2.1	2.4*
	K6.07	Pump lube oil system and cooling	2.0	2.2
	K6.08	Bearing oil supply for turbine drive pumps	2.1	2.3

SYSTEM:	061 Auxiliary / Emergency Feedwater (AFW) System			
	<u>ABILITY</u>			
A1	Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the AFW controls including: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.5)			
A1.01	S/G level	3.9	4.2	
A1.02	S/G pressure	3.3*	3.6*	
A1.03	Interactions when multi unit systems are cross tied	3.1*	3.6*	
A1.04	AFW source tank level	3.9	3.9	
A1.05	AFW flow/motor amps	3.6	3.7	
A1.06	S/G hydrotest parameters	1.7	1.7	
A2	Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operation on the AFW; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: (CFR: $41.5/43.5/45.3/45.13$ )	ns		
A2.01	Startup of MFW pump during AFW operation	2.5	2.6*	
A2.02	Loss of air to steam supply valve	3.2*	3.6*	
A2.03	Loss of dc power	3.1	3.4	
A2.04	pump failure or improper operation	3.4	3.8	
A2.05	Automatic control malfunction	3.1*	3.4*	
A2.06	Back leakage of MFW	2.7	3.0	
A2.07	Air or MOV failure	3.4	3.5	
A2.08	Flow rates expected from various combinations of AFW			
	pump discharge valves	2.7*	2.9*	
A2.09	Total loss of feedwater	TBD	TBD	
A3	Ability to monitor automatic operation of the AFW, including: $(CFR:\ 41.7/45.5)$			
A3.01	AFW startup and flows	4.2	4.2	
A3.02	RCS cooldown during AFW operations	4.0	4.0	•
A3.03	AFW S/G level control on automatic start	3.9	3.9	
A3.04	Automatic AFW isolation	4.1	4.2	
A3.05	Recognition of leakage, using sump level changes	2.5	2.5*	
A3.06	S/G blowdown/sampling isolation	2.2*	2.3	
A4	Ability to manually operate and monitor in the control room: (CFR: $41.7 / 45.5$ to $45.8$ )			

None

# 076 Service Water System (SWS)

TASK: Perform lineups of the SWS

Perform the SWS valve test

Fill and vent the SWS

Perform a service water pump test

Start up the SWS Monitor the SWS

Operate service water pumps in various combinations

Operate heat exchangers in different combinations (two-train SWS)

Isolate service water from individual components

Shut down the SWS

K/A NO.	KNOWLEDGE	IMPOR RO	TANCE SRO
K1	Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause- effect relationships between the SWS and the following systems: (CFR: $41.2$ to $41.9$ / $45.7$ to $45.8$ )		
K1.01	CCW system	3.4	3.3
K1.02	Turbine lube oil system	1.8	1.8
K1.03	Relationship of SWS to raw water filtration (RWF) sys-		
	tem and location of SWS supply pump to RWF system	1.9*	1.9*
K1.04	Relationship of domestic water to lube water for SWS pumps	1.8*	1.9*
K1.05	D/G	3.8*	4.0*
K1.06	Switch gear room coolers	2.1*	2.0*
K1.07	Secondary closed cooling water	2.5*	2.3
K1.08	RHR system	3.5*	3.5*
K1.09	Reactor building closed cooling water	3.0*	3.1*
K1.10	Turbine building closed cooling water	2.1*	2.1
K1.11	Domestic water and raw water	1.7	1.6
K1.12	Intake screen system	1.9	2.1
K1.13	LRS	2.3*	2.3*
K1.14	Condenser circulating water	2.1	2.1
K1.15	FPS	2.5	2.6
K1.16	ESF	3.6	3.8
K1.17	PRMS	3.6*	2.7
K1.18	SWS normal heat loads	2.1	2.2
K1.19	SWS emergency heat loads	3.6*	3.7
K1.20	AFW	3.4*	3.4*
K1.21	Auxiliary backup SWS	2.7*	2.9*
K1.22	Water treatment	1.8	1.8

### SYSTEM: 076 Service Water System (SWS)

K1.23	Spent fuel pool makeup	2.1*	2.2
K1.24	Chemical addition	1.8	1.9
K1.25	Heat sink pond makeup	2.4*	2.3*
K1.26	Flood alarm system	2.2*	2.2*
K1.20	1 lood alarm system	2.2	2.2
K2	<b>Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following:</b> (CFR: 41.7)		
K2.01	Service water	2.7*	2.7
K2.01 K2.02		2.7*	2.2*
	Closed cooling water		2.0*
K2.03	Secondary closed cooling water	2.1*	
K2.04	Reactor building closed cooling water	2.5*	2.6*
K2.05	Turbine building closed cooling water	2.0*	2.0*
K2.06	RHR components, controls, sensors, indications and		
	alarms, including radiation monitors	2.2*	2.4*
K2.07	Cooling tower fans	2.2*	2.1*
K2.08	ESF-actuated MOVs	3.1*	3.3*
K2.09	Traveling screens	1.8	2.2*
<b>K</b> 2.07	Travelling sercens	1.0	2.2
K3	Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the SWS will have on the following: $(CFR:\ 41.7\ /\ 45.6)$		
K3.01	Closed cooling water	3.4*	3.6
K3.02	Secondary closed cooling water	2.5*	2.8*
K3.03	Reactor building closed cooling water	3.5*	3.9*
	Turbing building closed cooling water		
K3.04	Turbine building closed cooling water	2.2*	2.4*
K3.05	RHR components, controls, sensors, indicators, and		
	alarms, including rad monitors	3.0*	3.2*
K3.06	Turbine lube oil system	1.7	1.8
K3.07	ESF loads	3.7	3.9
K3.08	Radioactive liquid waste discharges	2.3	2.9*
K3.09	Normal process heat loads	1.9	2.1
K4	Knowledge of SWS design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: (CFR: 41/7)		
K4.01	Conditions initiating automatic closure of closed cool-		
	ing water auxiliary building header supply and return valves	2.5*	2.9*
K4.02	Automatic start features associated with SWS pump controls	2.9	3.2
		۷.۶	5.4
K4.03	Automatic opening features associated with SWS isolation	2.64	0.44
	valves to CCW heat exchanges	2.9*	3.4*
K4.04	River intake water level recorders	2.2*	2.5*
K4.05	Service water train flow and discharge pressure when service water flow		
	to heat exchanger for closed cooling water is throttled	2.3*	2.6*
K4.06	Service water train separation	2.8	3.2
		-	

K5	Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as the apply to the SWS: $(CFR:\ 41.7/45.5)$		
К6	Knowledge of the effects of a loss or malfunction of the following will have on the SWS components: $(CFR: 41.7/45.7)$		
K6.01 K6.02 K6.03 K6.04 K6.05 K6.06 K6.07 K6.08 K6.09 K6.10	Valves Sensors and detectors Controllers and positioners Pumps Motors Heat exchangers and condensers Breakers, relays, and disconnects Cooling towers Traveling screens Strainers	1.9 1.7 1.9 2.1 1.7 2.2 1.7 1.7* 1.6 1.5	2.0 1.9 2.0 2.2* 1.8 2.4* 1.9 1.8* 1.7
A1	Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the SWS controls including: (CFR: 41.5/45.5)		
A1.01 A1.02	Line losses in SWS, by comparing SWS pump discharge and turbine building gauge	1.9 2.6*	1.9 2.6*
A2	Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the SWS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:  (CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45/3 / 45/13)		
A2.01 A2.02	Loss of SWS	3.5* 2.7	3.7* 3.1
<b>A3</b>	Ability to monitor automatic operation of the SWS, including: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5)		
A3.01	Normal-process heat loads	2.4	2.5

Emergency heat loads .....

3.7

3.7

**SYSTEM:** 

A3.02

076 Service Water System (SWS)

#### SYSTEM: 076 Service Water System (SWS)

#### A4 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room:

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 to 45.8)

A4.01	SWS pumps	2.9	2.9
A4.02	SWS valves	2.6	2.6
A4.03	Normal-process heat loads	2.3	2.4
A4.04	Emergency heat loads	3.5*	3.5
A4.05	Traveling water screens system	2.0	2.1

# **Safety Function 5:**

<u>Cor</u>	Containment Integrity	
007	Pressurizer Relief Tank / Quench Tank System	3.5-2
022	Containment Cooling System	3.5-5
025	Ice Condenser System	3.5-8
026	Containment Spray System	3.5-10
027	Containment Iodine Removal System	3.5-14
028	Hydrogen Recombiner and Purge Control System	3.5-16
103	Containment System	3.5-18

#### Fill the PRT Monitor the PRT Transfer the PRT (quench tank) contents Add nitrogen to the PRT Vent nitrogen from the PRT Recirculate the PRT (quench tank) with cooling pumps Operate the PRTS to form a steam bubble in the PZR **IMPORTANCE KNOWLEDGE** K/A NO. RO SRO **K**1 Knowledge of the physical connections and/or causeeffect relationships between the PRTS and the following systems: (CFR: 41.2 to 41.9 / 45.7 to 45.8) K1.013.1 K1.02 2.4 K1.03 RCS ...... 3.0 3.2 K1.04 2.3 K1.05 2.2 **K2** Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following: (CFR: 41.7) None **K3** Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the PRTS will have on the following: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.6) K3.01 3.6 Knowledge of PRTS design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) **K4** which provide for the following: (CFR: 41.7) K4.01 2.9 K4.02 2.3 K4.03 2.2

Pressurizer Relief Tank/Quench Tank System (PRTS)

Perform lineups of the PRT (quench tank)

007

TASK:

SYSTEM:	007 Pressurizer Relief Tank/Quench Tank System (PRTS)		
K5	Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as the apply to PRTS: $(CFR:\ 41.5/45.7)$		
K5.01 K5.02 K5.03 K5.04 K5.05 K5.06	Principles of steam quenching  Method of forming a steam bubble in the PZR  Characteristics of convection heat transfer  Properties of noncondensable gases in contact with water  Characteristics of conduction heat transfer  Properties of condensable gases in contact with water	2.2 3.1 1.8 1.9 1.8 1.9	2.6 3.4 2.1 2.2 2.1 2.2
K6	Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction on the following will have on the PRTS: $(CFR:\ 41.7/45.7)$		
K6.01 K6.02 K6.03 K6.04 K6.05	Valves Sensors and detectors Pumps Motors Breakers, relays, and disconnects	1.9 1.8 1.4* 1.3* 1.6	2.0 1.9 1.7* 1.6* 1.8
A1	ABILITY  Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the PRTS controls including:  (CFR: 41.5 / 45.5)		
A1.01 A1.02 A1.03	Maintaining quench tank water level within limits	2.9 2.7 2.6	3.1 2.9 2.7
A2	Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operation on the P S; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: (CFR: $41.5/43.5/45.3/45.13$ )		
A2.01 A2.02 A2.03 A2.04 A2.05 A2.06 A2.07	Stuck-open PORV or code safety Abnormal pressure in the PRT Overpressurization of the PZR Overpressurization of the waste gas vent header Exceeding PRT high-pressure limits Bubble formation in PZR Recirculating quench tank	3.9 2.6 3.6 2.5 3.2 2.6 2.3*	4.2 3.2 3.9 2.9 3.6 2.8 2.6*
A3	Ability to monitor automatic operation of the PRTS, including: (CFR: $41.7 / 45.5$ )		
A3.01	Components which discharge to the PRT	2.7*	2.9

#### SYSTEM: 007 Pressurizer Relief Tank/Quench Tank System (PRTS) Ability to manually operate and/or monitor **A4** in the control room: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 to 45.8) 2.7\* A4.01 PRT spray supply valve ..... 2.7\* A4.02 PRT drain valve ..... 2.2 2.2 A4.03 Nitrogen block valve 2.1 1.9 A4.04 PZR vent valve 2.6\* 2.6 A4.05 2.4\* 2.2\* 2.4\* 2.2\* A4.06 Throttle valve A4.07 Converting inches (or feet) of tank level to gallons (or percent) ...... 1.6 1.8 A4.08 2.2\* 2.3 A4.09 Relationships between PZR level and changing levels of 2.7 the PRT and bleed holdup tank ..... 2.5 Recognition of leaking PORV/code safety ..... A4.10 3.6 3.8

#### 022 **Containment Cooling System (CCS)**

Perform lineups of the CCS Fill and vent the CCS TASK:

Start the CCS

Monitor the CCS (air and water sides)

What if lower containment temperature cannot be controlled within

specified limits? Shut down the CCS

K/A NO.	KNOWLEDGE	IMPORTANCE RO SRO	
K1	Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the CCS and the following systems: (CFR: $41.2$ to $41.9$ / $45.7$ to $45.8$ )		
K1.01 K1.02 K1.03 K1.04	SWS/cooling system SEC/remote monitoring systems Auxiliary steam Chilled water	3.5 3.7? 2.4* 2.9*	3.7 3.5? 2.3* 2.9*
K2	<b>Knowledge of power supplies to the following:</b> (CFR: 41.7)		
K2.01 K2.02 K2.03	Containment cooling fans Chillers MOVs	3.0* 2.5* 2.3*	3.1 2.4* 2.3
K3	Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the CCS will have on the following: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.6)		
K3.01 K3.02 K3.03	Containment equipment subject to damage by high or low temperature, humidity, and pressure	2.9* 3.0 1.7	3.2* 3.3 2.1
K4	Knowledge of CCS design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: (CFR: 41.7)		
K4.01 K4.02 K4.03 K4.04 K4.05 K4.06	Cooling of containment penetrations  Correlation of fan speed and flowpath changes with containment pressure  Automatic containment isolation  Cooling of control rod drive motors  Containment cooling after LOCA destroys ventilation ducts  Containment pipe chase cooling	2.5* 3.1* 3.6* 2.8 2.6* 2.1*	3.0* 3.4* 4.0 3.1 2.7 2.4*

SYSTEM:	022 Containment Cooling System (CCS)		
K5	Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as the apply to the CCS: (CFR: $41.5/45.7$ )		
K5.01	Gas laws (Boyles, Charles), to appreciate environmental conditions	1.6	2.0
K6	Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction of the following will have on the CCS components: $(CFR:\ 41.7\ /\ 45.7)$		
K6.01	Valves	1.9	2.1
K6.02	Sensors and detectors	2.1	2.1
K6.03	Controllers and positioners	1.8	2.0
K6.04	Pumps	1.6	1.8
K6.05	Motors	1.7	1.9
K6.06	Breakers, relays, and disconnects	1.7	1.9
K6.07	Computers and calculators	1.8	1.9
K6.08	Heat exchangers and condensers	1.9	2.0
	<u>ABILITY</u>		
A1	Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the CCS controls including: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.5)		
A1.01	Containment temperature	3.6	3.7
A1.02	Containment pressure	3.6	3.8
A1.03	Containment humidity	3.1	3.4
A1.04	Cooling water flow	3.2	3.3
A2	Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operation the CCS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: (CFR: $41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.13$ )		
A2.01	Fan motor over-current	2.5	2.7
A2.02	Fan motor vibration	2.3	2.6
A2.03	Fan motor thermal overload/high-speed operation	2.6	3.0
A2.04	Loss of service water	2.9*	3.2
A2.05	Major leak in CCS	3.1	3.5
A2.06	Loss of CCS pump	2.8*	3.2*
A3	Ability to monitor automatic operation of the CCS, including: $(CFR:\ 41.7/45.5)$		
A3.01	Initiation of safeguards mode of operation	4.1	4.3

#### SYSTEM: 022 Containment Cooling System (CCS)

#### Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 to 45.8) **A4**

A4.01	CCS fans	3.6	3.6
A4.02	CCS pumps	3.2*	3.1*
A4.03	Dampers in the CCS	3.2*	3.2*
A4.04	Valves in the CCS	3.1*	3.2
A4.05	Containment readings of temperature, pressure, and humidity system	3.8	3.8

# SYSTEM: 025 Ice Condenser System

TASK: Monitor the ice condenser system

K/A NO.	<u>KNOWLEDGE</u>	IMPORT RO	SRO
К1	Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the ice condenser system and the following systems:  (CFR: 41.2 to 41.9 / 45.7 to 45.8)		
K1.01 K1.02 K1.03	Containment ventilation	2.7* 2.7* 3.2*	2.7* 2.7* 3.0*
K2	<b>Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following:</b> (CFR: 41.7)		
K2.01 K2.02 K2.03	Containment ventilation fans and dampers	2.2* 2.0* 2.0*	2.7* 2.5* 2.2*
K3	Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the ice condenser system will have on the following: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.6)		
K3.01	Containment	3.8*	3.8*
K4	Knowledge of ice condenser system design feature(s) and/ or interlock(s) which provide for the following: (CFR: 41.7)		
K4.01 K4.02	Glycol expansion tank levels and ice condenser system containment isolation valves	2.2* 2.8*	2.5* 3.0*
K5	Knowledge of operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the ice condenser system: $(CFR:\ 41.5\ /\ 45.7)$		
K5 01 K5 02 K5.03	Relationships between pressure and temperature  Heat transfer  Gas laws	3.0* 2.6* 2.4*	3.4* 2.8* 2.8*
К6	Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction of the following will have on the ice condenser system: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.7)	2	
K6.01	Upper and lower doors of the ice condenser	3.4*	3.6*

SYSTEM:	025 Ice Condenser System		
	<u>ABILITY</u>		
<b>A1</b>	Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters associated with operating the ice condenser system controls including: (CFR: $41.5/45.5$ )		
A1.01 A1.02 A1.03	Temperature chart recorders  Glycol expansion tank level  Glycol flow to ice condenser air handling units	3.0* 2.5* 2.5*	3.0* 2.2* 2.5*
A2	Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the ice condenser system; correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: (CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.13)		
A2.01 A2.02 A2.03 A2.04 A2.05 A2.06	Trip of glycol circulation pumps High/low floor cooling temperature Opening of ice condenser doors Containment isolation Abnormal glycol expansion tank level Decreasing ice condenser temperature	2.2* 2.7* 3.0* 3.0* 2.5* 2.5*	2.7* 2.5* 3.2* 3.2* 2.7* 2.7*
A3	Ability to monitor automatic operation of the ice condenser system, including: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5)		
A3.01 A3.02	Refrigerant system	3.0* 3.4*	3.0* 3.4*
<b>A4</b>	Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: (CFR: $41.7 / 45.5$ to $45.8$ )		
A4.01 A4.02	Ice condenser isolation valves	3.0* 2.7*	2.7* 2.5*

Glycol circulation pumps .....

A4.03

2.2\*

2.2\*

## 026 Containment Spray System (CSS)

TASK: Perform lineup of the CSS

Monitor CSS Fill the CSS

Perform the recirculation spray systems valve test Fill the containment spray chemical additive tank Perform the recirculation spray subsystem pumps test

Recirculate a spray tank

Manually initiate containment spray Perform the containment spray pump test Perform postaccident recirculation

Secure containment spray

Isolate the CSS Drain the CSS

K/A NO.	KNOWLEDGE	IMPOR RO	RTANCE SRO
K1	Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the CSS and the following systems: (CFR: 41.2 to 41.9 / 45.7 to 45.8)		
K1.01 K1.02 K1.03 K1.04	ECCS Cooling water Waste water holdup tank (vent) Fill/makeup water	4.2 4.1 2.1* 2.2*	4.2 4.1 2.0* 2.2*
K2	<b>Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following:</b> (CFR: 41.7)		
K2.01 K2.02	Containment spray pumps	3.4* 2.7*	3.6 2.9
К3	Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the CSS will have on the following: (CFR: $41.7 / 45.6$ )		
K3.01 K3.02	CCS Recirculation spray system	3.9 4.2*	4.1 4.3

K4	SYSTEM:	026 Containment Spray System (CSS)			
Neutralized boric acid to reduce corrosion and remove inorganic fission product iodine from steam (NAOH) in containment spray   3.1   3.6	K4	which provide for the following:			
K4.03         Not Used         N/A         N/A         N/A           K4.04         Reduction of temperature and pressure in containment after a LOCA by condensing steam, to reduce radiological hazard, and protect equipment from corrosion damage (spray)         3.7         4.1           K4.05         Prevention of material from clogging nozzles during recirculation         2.8         3.3           K4.06         Iodine scavenging via the CSS         2.8         3.2*           K4.07         Adequate level in containment sump for suction (interlock)         3.8*         4.1*           K4.08         Automatic swapover to containment sump suction for recirculation phase after LOCA (RWST low-low level alarm)         4.1*         4.3*           K4.09         Prevention of path for escape of radioactivity from containment to the outside (interlock on RWST isolation after swapover)         3.7*         4.1*           K5         Knowledge of operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the CSS:			4.2	4.3	
Reduction of temperature and pressure in containment after a LOCA by condensing steam, to reduce radiological hazard, and protect equipment from corrosion damage (spray) 3.7 4.1		product iodine from steam (NAOH) in containment spray	3.1	3.6	
K4.05       Prevention of material from clogging nozzles during recirculation       2.8       3.3         K4.06       Iodine scavenging via the CSS       2.8       3.2*         K4.07       Adequate level in containment sump for suction (interlock)       3.8*       4.1*         K4.08       Automatic swapover to containment sump suction for recirculation phase after LOCA (RWST low-low level alarm)       4.1*       4.3*         K4.09       Prevention of path for escape of radioactivity from containment to the outside (interlock on RWST isolation after swapover)       3.7*       4.1*         K5       Knowledge of operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the CSS:		Reduction of temperature and pressure in containment after a LOCA by condensing steam, to reduce radiological			
K4.06       Iodine scavenging via the CSS       2.8       3.2*         K4.07       Adequate level in containment sump for suction (interlock)       3.8*       4.1*         K4.08       Automatic swapover to containment sump suction for recirculation phase after LOCA (RWST low-low level alarm)       4.1*       4.3*         K4.09       Prevention of path for escape of radioactivity from containment to the outside (interlock on RWST isolation after swapover)       3.7*       4.1*         K5       Knowledge of operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the CSS: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.7)         K5.01       Water chemistry relationship to corrosion control       2.2       2.9*         K5.02       Principle of eductor flow       1.9*       2.2*         K5.03       Stratification of liquids: concentrated NaOH solution has a higher specific gravity than weak boric acid solution, so they must be vigorously mixed to make an effective spray       2.0       2.5*         K5.04       Chemistry control       2.0       2.5*         K5.04       Chemistry control       2.0       2.7         K6       Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction of the following will have on the CSS: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.7)       2.0       2.1         K6.01       Valves       2.0       2.1         K6.02       Pumps       2.4*       2.4*       2.4* <td>TT 4 0 5</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td>	TT 4 0 5				
K4.07       Adequate level in containment sump for suction (interlock)       3.8*       4.1*         K4.08       Automatic swapover to containment sump suction for recirculation phase after LOCA (RWST low-low level alarm)       4.1*       4.3*         K4.09       Prevention of path for escape of radioactivity from containment to the outside (interlock on RWST isolation after swapover)       3.7*       4.1*         K5       Knowledge of operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the CSS: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.7)       2.2       2.9*         K5.01       Water chemistry relationship to corrosion control       2.2       2.9*         K5.02       Principle of eductor flow       1.9*       2.2*         K5.03       Stratification of liquids: concentrated NaOH solution has a higher specific gravity than weak boric acid solution, so they must be vigorously mixed to make an effective spray       2.0       2.5*         K5.04       Chemistry control       2.0       2.7         K6       Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction of the following will have on the CSS: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.7)       2.0       2.1         K6.01       Valves       2.0       2.1         K6.02       Pumps       2.4*       2.4*         K6.03       Sensors and detectors       2.2*       2.3         K6.04       Controllers and positioners       2.0		55 5			
K4.08 Automatic swapover to containment sump suction for recirculation phase after LOCA (RWST low-low level alarm) 4.1* 4.3*  K4.09 Prevention of path for escape of radioactivity from containment to the outside (interlock on RWST isolation after swapover) 3.7* 4.1*  K5 Knowledge of operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the CSS: (CFR: 41.5/45.7)  K5.01 Water chemistry relationship to corrosion control 2.2 2.9*  K5.02 Principle of eductor flow 1.9* 2.2*  K5.03 Stratification of liquids: concentrated NaOH solution has a higher specific gravity than weak boric acid solution, so they must be vigorously mixed to make an effective spray 2.0 2.5*  K5.04 Chemistry control 2.0 2.7  K6 Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction of the following will have on the CSS: (CFR: 41.7/45.7)  K6.01 Valves 2.0 2.1  K6.02 Pumps 2.4* 2.4*  K6.03 Sensors and detectors 2.2* 2.3  K6.04 Controllers and positioners 2.0 2.1					
K4.09 Prevention of path for escape of radioactivity from containment to the outside (interlock on RWST isolation after swapover).  K5 Knowledge of operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the CSS: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.7)  K5.01 Water chemistry relationship to corrosion control 2.2 2.9* K5.02 Principle of eductor flow 1.9* 2.2* K5.03 Stratification of liquids: concentrated NaOH solution has a higher specific gravity than weak boric acid solution, so they must be vigorously mixed to make an effective spray 2.0 2.5* K5.04 Chemistry control 2.0 2.7  K6 Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction of the following will have on the CSS: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.7)  K6.01 Valves 2.0 2.1  K6.02 Pumps 2.4* 2.4* K6.03 Sensors and detectors 2.2* 2.3 K6.04 Controllers and positioners 2.0 2.1		Automatic swapover to containment sump suction for	3.8*	4.1*	
Knowledge of operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the CSS:   (CFR: 41.5 / 45.7)   CFR: 41.5 / 45.7)	K4.09		4.1*	4.3*	
Apply to the CSS: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.7)			3.7*	4.1*	
K5.02       Principle of eductor flow       1.9*       2.2*         K5.03       Stratification of liquids: concentrated NaOH solution has a higher specific gravity than weak boric acid solution, so they must be vigorously mixed to make an effective spray       2.0       2.5*         K5.04       Chemistry control       2.0       2.7         K6       Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction of the following will have on the CSS: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.7)       2.0       2.1         K6.01       Valves       2.0       2.1         K6.02       Pumps       2.4*       2.4*         K6.03       Sensors and detectors       2.2*       2.3         K6.04       Controllers and positioners       2.0       2.1	K5	apply to the CSS:			
K5.02       Principle of eductor flow       1.9*       2.2*         K5.03       Stratification of liquids: concentrated NaOH solution has a higher specific gravity than weak boric acid solution, so they must be vigorously mixed to make an effective spray       2.0       2.5*         K5.04       Chemistry control       2.0       2.7         K6       Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction of the following will have on the CSS: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.7)       2.0       2.1         K6.01       Valves       2.0       2.1         K6.02       Pumps       2.4*       2.4*         K6.03       Sensors and detectors       2.2*       2.3         K6.04       Controllers and positioners       2.0       2.1	K5 01	Water chemistry relationship to corrosion control	22	2 9*	ı
K5.03       Stratification of liquids: concentrated NaOH solution has a higher specific gravity than weak boric acid solution, so they must be vigorously mixed to make an effective spray       2.0       2.5*         K5.04       Chemistry control       2.0       2.7         K6       Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction of the following will have on the CSS: (CFR: 41.7/45.7)       2.0       2.1         K6.01       Valves       2.0       2.1         K6.02       Pumps       2.4*       2.4*         K6.03       Sensors and detectors       2.2*       2.3         K6.04       Controllers and positioners       2.0       2.1					
K5.04       Chemistry control       2.0       2.5*         K5.04       Chemistry control       2.0       2.7         K6       Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction of the following will have on the CSS:		Stratification of liquids: concentrated NaOH solution has a higher specific	2.0		'
K5.04       Chemistry control       2.0       2.7         K6       Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction of the following will have on the CSS: (CFR: 41.7/45.7)       2.0       2.1         K6.01       Valves       2.0       2.1         K6.02       Pumps       2.4*       2.4*         K6.03       Sensors and detectors       2.2*       2.3         K6.04       Controllers and positioners       2.0       2.1			2.0	2.5*	
on the CSS:         (CFR: 41.7 / 45.7)         K6.01       Valves       2.0       2.1         K6.02       Pumps       2.4*       2.4*         K6.03       Sensors and detectors       2.2*       2.3         K6.04       Controllers and positioners       2.0       2.1	K5.04	± •		2.7	
K6.02       Pumps       2.4*       2.4*         K6.03       Sensors and detectors       2.2*       2.3         K6.04       Controllers and positioners       2.0       2.1	К6	on the CSS:			
·	K6.02 K6.03	Pumps	2.4* 2.2*	2.4* 2.3	I
		•			- 1

	SYSTEM:	026 Containment Spray System (CSS)		
		<u>ABILITY</u>		
	A1	Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the CSS controls including: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.5)		
	A1.01 A1.02 A1.03 A1.04 A1.05 A1.06	Containment pressure Containment temperature Containment sump level Containment humidity Chemical additive tank level and concentration Containment spray pump cooling	3.9 3.6* 3.5 3.1 3.1 2.7	4.2 3.9 3.5 3.3 3.4 3.0
	A2	Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the CSS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:  (CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.13)		
	A2.01	Reflux boiling pressure spike when first going on re-		
		circulation	2.7	3.0
	A2.02	Failure of automatic recirculation transfer	4.2*	4.4*
	A2.03	Failure of ESF	4.1	4.4
	A2.04	Failure of spray pump	3.9	4.2
	A2.05	Failure of chemical addition tanks to inject	3.7	4.1
	A2.06	Increase in spray flow following swapover, because of		
	A2.07	higher pump suction pressure	3.6	<ul><li>2.6</li><li>3.9</li></ul>
	A2.08	Safe securing of containment spray when it can be done)	3.2	3.7
	A2.09	Radiation hazard potential of BWST	2.5*	2.9*
	112.07	Radiation nazara potential of BW51	2.3	2.7
	A3	Ability to monitor automatic operation of the CSS, including: $(CFR\colon41.7/45.5)$		
	A3.01 A3.02	Pump starts and correct MOV positioning	4.3	4.5
	113.02	spray heat exchanger	3.9*	4.2*

## SYSTEM: 026 Containment Spray System (CSS)

A4	Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: (CFR: $41.7 / 45.5$ to $45.8$ )			
A4.01	CSS controls	4.5	4.3	
A4.02	The remote location and use of spool pieces and other equipment to set up portable recirculation pump for			
	additive tank, including power supply	2.3*	2.6*	
A4.03	The remote location and use of the special tank needed			
	for draining CSS	2.2*	2.5*	
A4.04	The remote sampling of the NaOH tank and RWST/BWST for			
	chemical analysis	2.2*	2.6*	
A4.05	Containment spray reset switches	3.5	3.5	

027	Containment Iodine Removal System (CIRS)		
TASK:	Operate the containment iodine removal units Monitor the containment iodine removal units		
<u>K/A NO.</u>	<u>KNOWLEDGE</u>	IMPOF RO	RTANCE SRO
K1	Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the CIRS and the following systems: (CFR: 41.2 to 41.9 / 45.7 to 45.8)		
K1.01	CSS	3.4*	3.7*
K2	<b>Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following:</b> (CFR: 41.7)		
K2.01	Fans	3.1*	3.4*
К3	Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the CIRS will have on the following: $(CFR:\ 41.7\ /\ 45.6)$		
	None		
K4	Knowledge of CIRS design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: (CFR: 41.7)		
	None		
K5	Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as the apply to the CIRS: $(CFR:\ 41.7/45.7)$	y	
K5.01	Purpose of charcoal filters	3.1*	3.4*
K6	Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction on the following will have on the CIRS: $(CFR:\ 41.7/45.7)$		
	None		
	<u>ABILITY</u>		
A1	Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the CIRS controls including: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.5)		
	None		

SYSTEM:	027 Containment Iodine Removal System (CIRS)		
A2	Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the CIRS; and (b) based on those predictions, use Procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:  (CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.13)		
A2.01	High temperature in the filter system	3.0*	3.3*
A3	Ability to monitor automatic operation of the CIRS, including: (CFR: $41.7 / 45.5$ )		
	None		
A4	Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: (CFR: $41.7 / 45.5$ to $45.8$ )		
A4.01	CIRS controls	3.3*	3.3*
A4.02	Remote operation and handling of iodine filters	2.8*	3.0*
A4.03	CIRS fans	3.3*	3.2*
A4.04	Filter temperature	2.8*	2.9*

TASK:	Perform lineups of the HRPS Perform hydrogen recombiner test Start up the hydrogen recombiners Start up the hydrogen purge system Monitor the HRPS Shut down the hydrogen purge system Operate the hydrogen analyzer		
K/A NO.	KNOWLEDGE	IMPOF RO	RTANCE SRO
K1	Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the HRPS and the following systems: (CFR: 41.2 to 41.9 / 45.7 to 45.8)		
K1.01 K1.02	Containment annulus ventilation system (including pressure limits) Air supply system	2.5* 2.0*	2.5 2.2*
K2	<b>Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following:</b> (CFR: 41.7)		
K2.01	Hydrogen recombiners	2.5*	2.8*
К3	Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the HRPS will have on the following: (CFR: $41.7/45.6$ )		
K3.01	Hydrogen concentration in containment	3.3	4.0
K4	Knowledge of HRPS design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: (CFR: 41.7)		
	None		
K5	Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the HRPS: $(CFR:\ 41.5\ /\ 45.7)$		
K5.01 K5.02 K5.03 K5.04	Explosive hydrogen concentration Flammable hydrogen concentration Sources of hydrogen within containment The selective removal of hydrogen	3.4 3.4 2.9 2.6?	3.9 3.9 3.6* 3.2?
K6	Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction on the following will have on the HRPS: $(CFR:\ 41.7/45.7)$		
K6.01	Hydrogen recombiners	2.6	3.1

**Hydrogen Recombiner and Purge Control System (HRPS)** 

028

SYSTEM:	028 Hydrogen Recombiner and Purge Control System (HRPS)		
K/A NO.	<u>ABILITY</u>	IMPOI RO	RTANCE <u>SRO</u>
A1	Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameter (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the HRPS controls including: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.5)		
A1.01 A1.02	Hydrogen concentration	3.4 3.4*	3.8 3.7*
A2	Malfunctions or operations on the HRPS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:  (CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.13)		
A2.01	Hydrogen recombiner power setting, determined by		
A2.02 A2.03	using plant data book	3.4* 3.5	3.6* 3.9
	age in containment	3.4	4.0
A3	Ability to monitor automatic operation of the HRPS, including:		
	None		
A4	Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: (CFR: $41.7 / 45.5$ to $45.8$ )		
A4.01	HRPS controls	4.0*	4.0*

Location and interpretation of containment pressure indications ......

A4.02

A4.03

3.7\*

3.1

3.9

3.3

TASK:	Perform cycling of manual containment isolation value surveillance Perform containment integrity verification Perform containment isolation valve test Perform containment leak test Perform trip valve timing checks and leak detection to verify Isolation valve integrity		
V/A NO	KNOWLEDGE	IMPOF RO	RTANCE
K/A NO.	KNOWLEDGE	KO	SRO
K1	Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the containment system and the following systems: (CFR: 41.2 to 41.9 / 45.7 to 45.8)		
K1.01 K1.02 K1.03 K1.04 K1.05 K1.06 K1.07 K1.08	CCS Containment isolation/containment integrity Shield building vent system Electrical penetrations Personnel access hatch and emergency access hatch Subsurface drain system Containment vacuum system SIS, including action of safety injection reset	3.6 3.9 3.1* 2.3 2.8* 2.4* 3.5* 3.6	3.9 4.1* 3.5* 2.7 3.0* 2.7* 3.7* 3.8
K2	<b>Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following:</b> (CFR: 41.7)		
K3	Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the containment system will have on the following: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.6)		
K3.01 K3.02 K3.03	Loss of containment integrity under shutdown conditions	3.3* 3.8 3.7	3.7* 4.2 4.1
K4	Knowledge of containment system design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: (CFR: 41.7)		
K4.01 K4.02 K4.03 K4.04 K4.05 K4.06	Vacuum breaker protection  Containment penetration cooling  Prevention of radiation streaming  Personnel access hatch and emergency access hatch  Containment construction  Containment isolation system  Knowledge of operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the Containment System:  (CFR: 41.5 / 45.7)	3.0* 2.1 2.1 2.5 1.9 3.1	3.7* 2.6 2.6* 3.2 2.2 3.7
	None		

103 Containment System

SYSTEM:	103 Containment System		
K6	Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction on the following will have on the containment system: (CFR: $41.7/45.7$ )		
K6.01 K6.02 K6.03 K6.04 K6.05 K6.06	Valves Controllers and positioners Pumps Heat exchangers and condensers Breakers, relays, and disconnects Sensors and detectors  ABILITY	2.1* 1.9 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.9	2.3 2.1* 1.6 1.7 1.7 2.1
A1	Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the containment system controls including: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.5)		
A1.01	Containment pressure, temperature, and humidity	3.7	4.1
A2	Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the containment systemand (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations (CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.13)		
A2.01 A2.02 A2 03 A2 04 A2.05	Integrated leak rate test  Necessary plant conditions for work in containment  Phase A and B isolation  Containment evacuation (including recognition of the alarm)  Emergency containment entry	2.0* 2.2 3.5* 3.5* 2.9	2.6* 3.2* 3.8* 3.6* 3.9
A3	Ability to monitor automatic operation of the containment system, including: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5)		
A3.01	Containment isolation	3.9	4.2
A4	Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: (CFR: $41.7 / 45.5$ to $45.8$ )		
A4.01 A4.02 A4.03 A4.04	Flow control, pressure control, and temperature control valves, including pneumatic valve controller  Excess letdown divert valves to reactor coolant drain tank  ESF slave relays  Phase A and phase B resets	3.2* 2.1* 2.7* 3.5*	3.3 2.2* 2.7* 3.5*

#### **SYSTEM: 103 Containment System** A4 05 2.4\* 2.2\* Operation of the containment personnel airlock door ..... A4.06 2.7\* 2.9\* A4.07 Use of the air lock rate test panel ..... 2.5\* 2.4\* Operation of refueling drain valves (for draining re-

fueling canal to lower containment sump) .....

1.9

3.1\*

2.2

3.7\*

A4.08

A4.09

# **Safety Function 6:**

<b>Electrical</b>		<u>page</u>
062	A.C. Electrical Distribution	3.6-2
063	D.C. Electrical Distribution	3.6-6
064	Emergency Diesel Generators	3.6-8

#### 062 A.C. Electrical Distribution

TASK: Line up the ac electrical distribution system

Circuit breaker tests Operate a static inverter

Equipment/bus testing for faults

Monitor the ac electrical distribution system De-energize a motor control center (MCC) bus

Perform transfer of power supply to 4kV unit service buses Restore a motor control center (MCC) bus to service

Perform ac breaker lineup

De-energize an engineering safeguards (4160V vital) bus

Station blackout

Restore an engineering safeguards bus to service

Perform operation of circuit breakers and generator motor-operated

disconnects

Backfeed unit auxiliary transformer from main transmission

switchboard (main T/G links removed) Rack out a 480V/600V bus load breaker Rack in a 480V/600V bus load breaker Rack out an auxiliary bus breaker

Rack in an auxiliary bus breaker (4160V/6900V) Transfer a vital (120V) instrument power supply What if normal supply breaker failed to open?

Perform ground isolation

What if normal feedbreaker to the unit board does not close?

Isolate the power control breakers (PCBs) What if the D/G does not start satisfactorily?

K/A NO.	KNOWLEDGE	IMPOR RO	TANCE SRO
К1	Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the ac distribution system and the following systems: (CFR: 41.2 to 41.9)		
K1.01 K1.02 K1.03 K1.04	CO2 deluge ED/G DC distribution Off-site power sources	2.4 4.1 3.5 3.7	2.1* 4.4 4.0 4.2
K2	Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following: (CFR: 41.7)		
K2.01	Major system loads	3.3	3.4
K3	Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the ac distribution system will have on the following: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.6)		

K3.01 Major system loads	3.5	3.9
K3.02 ED/G	4.1	4.4
K3.03 DC system	3.7	3.9
Knowledge of ac distribution system design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: (CFR: 41.7)		
K4.01 Bus lockouts	2.6	3.2
K4.02 Circuit breaker automatic trips	2.5	2.7
K4.03 Interlocks between automatic bus transfer and breakers	2.8*	3.1
K4.04 Protective relaying	2.2	2.9
K4.05 Paralleling of ac sources (synchroscope)	2.7*	3.2
K4.06 One-line diagram of 6.9kV distribution, including		
sources of normal and alternative power	2.9*	3.3*
K4.07 One-line diagram of 4kV to 480V distribution, including		
sources of normal and alternative power	2.7	3.1
K4.08 One-line diagram of 230kV system, including sources of		0.1
normal and alternative power	2.3*	2.9*
of normal and alternative power	2.4*	2.9*
K4.10 Uninterruptable ac power sources	3.1	3.5
K4.10 Chiliterruptable ac power sources	3.1	3.3
Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as the apply to the ac distribution system:  (CFR: 41.5 / 45.7)	y	
K5.01 Basic transformer theory (tap setting)	1.6	1.9
K5 02 Definition of open circuit	1.6	2.0
K5 03 Principles involved with paralleling between two ac sources	2.4	2.6
K5.04 General principles of operation of a static inverter	1.9	2.5
Ceneral principles of operation of a static inverter	1.7	2.3
Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction of the following will have on the ac distribution system:  (CFR: 41.7 / 45.7)		
K6.01MotorsK6.02Breakers, relays, and disconnects	1.7 1.9	1.8 2.2
ABILITY		
Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the ac distribution system controls including:  (CFR: 41.5 / 45.5)		
A1.01 Significance of D/G load limits	3.4 2.2	3.8 2.6

## SYSTEM: 062 AC Electrical Distribution System

	A1.03	Effect on instrumentation and controls of switching		
		power supplies	2.5	2.8
	A1.04	Effects on loads of energizing a bus	2.4	2.7
	A1.05	Bus voltages	2.3	2.4
	A1.06	Load currents	2.2	2.3
	A1.07	Inverter outputs	2.4	2.6
	A2	Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operati	ons	
		on the ac distribution system; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:		
		(CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.13)		
	A2.01	Types of loads that, if de-energized, would degrade or hinder		
		plant operation	3.4	3.9
	A2.02	Causes and significance of grounds	2.2	2.6
	A2.03	Consequences of improper sequencing when transferring to		
		or from an inverter	2.9	3.4
	A2.04	Effect on plant of de-energizing a bus	3.1	3.4*
	A2.05	Methods for energizing a dead bus	2.9	3.3*
·	A2.06	Keeping the safeguards buses electrically separate	3.4*	3.9
	A2.07	Consequences of opening a disconnect under load	3.0*	3.4*
	A2.08	Consequences of exceeding voltage limitations	2.7	3.0*
	A2.09	Consequences of exceeding current limitations	2.7	3.0*
-	A2.10	Effects of switching power supplies on instruments and controls	3.0	3.3
	A2.11	Aligning standby equipment with correct emergency power source (D/G) .	3.7	4.1
	A2.12	Restoration of power to a system with a fault on it	3.2	3.6
	A2.13	Identification and ranking of the most probable cause of		
		grounds, referring to electrical distribution diagrams	2.2*	2.6*
	A2.14	Performance of ground isolation procedures: determina-		
		tion of their effect on interface systems	2.3*	2.9*
	A2.15	Consequence of paralleling out-of-phase/mismatch in volts	2.8	3.2
	A2.16	Degraded system voltages	2.5	2.9
	A3	Ability to monitor automatic operation of the ac distribution system, including:		
		(CFR: 41.7 / 45.5)		
	A3.01	Vital ac bus amperage	3.0	3.1
	A3.02	Main T/G exciter current indicator	2.4*	2.2*
	A3.03	Adequate transformer/inverter operation	2.3*	2.3
•	A3.04	Operation of inverter (e.g., precharging synchronizing light, static transfer)	2.7	2.9
	A3.05	Safety-related indicators and controls	3.5	3.6

# A4 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 / to 45.8) A4.01 All breakers (including available switchyard) 3.3 3.1 A4.02 Remote racking in and out of breakers 2.5 2.8

117.01	7 In breakers (including available switchydra)	5.5	J.1
A4.02	Remote racking in and out of breakers	2.5	2.8
A4.03	Synchroscope, including an understanding of running and		
	incoming voltages	2.8	2.9
A4.04	Local operation of breakers	2.6	2.7
A4.05	Remote preparation of breakers for testing	2.1	2.2
A4.06	Remote removal and re-installation of control power		
	fuses	2.3	2.5
A4.07	Synchronizing and paralleling of different ac supplies	3.1*	3.1*

#### 063 D.C. Electrical Distribution

Energize dc switchboards

Start up and shift a vital battery charger Monitor the dc electrical distribution system Monitor the dc electrical system for grounds

TASK:

K5.01

K5.02

	De-energize dc switchboards		
	Energize dc equipment		
	De-energize de equipment		
	Secure a battery charger		
<u>K/A NO.</u>	KNOWLEDGE	IMPOI RO	RTANCE SRO
MANO.	MIOWEEDGE	KO	<u> </u>
K1	Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the DC electrical system and the following systems:  (CFR: 41.2 to 41.9 / 45.7 to 45.8)		
K1.01	Ground detection system	2.4	2.9
K1.02	AC electrical system	2.7	3.2
K1.03	Battery charger and battery	2.9	3.5
K1.04	Battery ventilation system	2.2	2.7
K2	<b>Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following:</b> (CFR: 41.7)		
K2.01	Major DC loads	2.9*	3.1*
K2.02	Battery room ventilation	2.0	2.2
К3	Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the DC electrical system will have on the following: (CFR: $41.7/45.6$ )		
K3.01 K3.02	ED/G Components using DC control power	3.7* 3.5	4.1 3.7
K4	Knowledge of DC electrical system design feature(s) and/ or interlock(s) which provide for the following: (CFR: 41.7)		
K4.01	Manual/automatic transfers of control	2.7	3.0*
K4.02	Breaker interlocks, permissives, bypasses and cross-ties	2.9*	3.2*
K4.03	Effect of jumpering out cells	2.1	2.4
K4.04	Trips	2.6?	2.9?
	r-	<b>2</b> .0.	,,
K5	Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as the apply to the DC electrical system: (CFR: $41.5 / 45.7$ )	•	

Knowledge of basic DC electrical theory .....

Hydrogen generation during battery charging .....

1.9

2.2

2.1

2.6\*

SYSTEM:	063 DC Electrical Distribution System		
K6	Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction on the following will have on the DC electrical system: (CFR: $41.7/45.7$ )		
K6.01 K6.02 K6.03	Motors	1.8 1.9 1.5	1.7 2.1 1.5
	ABILITY		
A1	Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters associated with operating the DC electrical system controls including: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.5)		
A1.01 A1.02	Battery capacity as it is affected by discharge rate	2.5 2.2	3.3 2.7*
A2	Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the DC electrical systems; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: (CFR: $41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.13$ )		
A2.01 A2.02	Grounds	2.5 2.3	3.2* 3.1
A3	Ability to monitor automatic operation of the DC electrical system, including: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5)		
A3.01	Meters, annunciators, dials, recorders, and indicating lights	2.7	3.1
A4	Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: (CFR: $41.7 / 45.5$ to $45.8$ )		
A4.01 A4.02 A4.03	Major breakers and control power fuses  Battery voltage indicator  Battery discharge rate	2.8* 2.8* 3.0*	3.1 2.9 3.1

## **Emergency Diesel Generators (ED/G)**

TASK: Perform a lineup of the ED/G system

Start an ED/G Load the ED/G

Perform ED/G load tests Monitor the ED/G

Perform ED/G inoperative test (loss of reserve power)

Unload the ED/G Shut down the ED/G

Operate the diesel-starting air compressor

Restart an ED/G with an automatic start signal present

What if emergency loads are not shed when time sequence starts

during emergency diesel inoperative test?

What if ED/G breaker closed at other than 12:00 position on

synchroscope?

What if ED/G load is not reduced?

K/A NO.	KNOWLEDGE	_	RTANCE SRO
К1	Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the ED/G system and the following systems: (CFR: 41.2 to 41.9 / 45.7 to 45.8)		
K1.01	AC distribution system	4.1	4.4
K1.02	D/G cooling water system	3.1	3.6*
K1.03	Diesel fuel oil supply system	3.6	4.0
K1.04	DC distribution system	3.6	3.9
K1.05	Starting air system	3.4	3.9
K2	<b>Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following:</b> (CFR: 41.7)		
K2.01	Air compressor	2.7*	3.1
K2.02	Fuel oil pumps	2.8*	3.1
K2.03	Control power	3.2*	3.6
K3	Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the ED/G system will have on the following: (CFR: $41.7/45.6$ )		
K3.01	Systems controlled by automatic loader	3.8*	4.1
K3.02	ESFAS controlled or actuated systems	4.2	4.4
K3.03	ED/G (manual loads)	3.6	3.9*

SYSTEM:	064 Emergency Diesel Generator (ED/G) System			
K4	Knowledge of ED/G system design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: (CFR: 41.7)			
K4.01 K4.02 K4.03 K4.04 K4.05 K4.06 K4.07 K4.08 K4.09 K4.10 K4.11	Trips while loading the ED/G (frequency, voltage, speed) Trips for ED/G while operating (normal or emergency) Governor valve operation Overload ratings Incomplete-start relay Speed droop control Field flashing ED/G fuel isolation valves Field on ED/G Automatic load sequencer: blackout Automatic load sequencer: safeguards  Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as applied to the ED/G system:	3.8 3.9 2.5 3.1 2.8 2.2 2.2 2.9* 2.4 3.5 3.5	4.1 4.2 3.0 3.7 3.2 2.7 2.8 3.5 3.0 4.0	
K5.01 K5.02 K5.03	(CFR: 41.5 / 45.7)  Definition of frequency and synchronous frequency	2.0 1.9 1.9	2.2 2.4* 2.4*	
	following will have on the ED/G system: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.7)			
K6.01 K6.02 K6.03 K6.04 K6.05 K6.06 K6.07	Valves Sensors and detectors Controllers and positioners Pumps Motors Breakers, relays, and disconnects Air receivers Fuel oil storage tanks	2.4 2.4* 2.4* 2.2 2.1 2.3* 2.7 3.2	2.4* 2.4* 2.4* 2.3 2.1 2.5* 2.9 3.3	
	ABILITY			
A1	Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the ED/G system controls including: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.5)			
A1.01 A1.02 A1.03 A1.04 A1.05 A1.06	ED/G lube oil temperature and pressure  Fuel consumption rate with load  Operating voltages, currents, and temperatures  Crankcase temperature and pressure  ED/G room temperature  Cylinder temperature differential	3.0 2.5 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.3	3.1 2.8 3.3 2.9 2.5 2.5	
A1.07 A1.08	Deleted Maintaining minimum load on ED/G (to prevent reverse power)	3.1	3.4	1

	SYSTEM:	064 Emergency Diesel Generator (ED/G) System		
	A2	Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the ED/G system; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: (CFR: $41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.13$ )		
	A2.01 A2.02	Failure modes of water, oil, and air valves	3.1*	3.3
		frequency, voltage, fuel oil level, temperatures	2.7	2.9
	A2.03	Parallel operation of ED/Gs	3.1	3.1
	A2.04	Unloading prior to securing an ED/G	2.7	3.0
- [	A2.05	Loading the ED/G	3.1	3.2*
'	A2.06	Operating unloaded, lightly loaded, and highly loaded time limit	2.9	3.3
	A2.07	Consequences of operating under/over-excited	2.5	2.7
	A2.08	Consequences of opening/closing breaker between buses		
		(VARS, out-of-phase, voltage)	2.7	3.1
	A2.09	Synchronization of the ED/G with other electric power supplies	3.1	3.3
	A2.10	Unloading (reduction of generated power) in steps over a period of time	2.4	2.9
	A2.11	Conditions (minimum load) required for unloading an ED/G	2.6	2.9
	A2.12	Loss of air-cooling fans	2.8*	3.1*
-	A2.13	Consequences of opening auxiliary feeder bus (ED/G sub supply)	2.6*	2.8*
٠	A2.14	Effects (verification) of stopping ED/G under load on isolated bus	2.7	2.9
	A2.15	Water buildup in cylinders	2.6	3.1
	A2.16	Loss of offsite power during full-load testing of ED/G	3.3	3.7
	A2.17	Consequences of not shedding loads during nonoperability test	2.3*	2.6*
	A2.18	Consequences of premature opening of breaker under load	2.6*	2.7
	A2.19	Consequences of high VARS on ED/G integrity	2.5	2.7
	A2.20	Identification and analysis of loads not shed during test	2.4*	2.7*
	A2.21	Significance and interpretation of opening of ring bus during test	2.6*	2.9*
	A2.22	Potential automatic safety sequences (water/CO2)and		
		electrical damage (loose wires)	2.4	2.8*
	A3	Ability to monitor automatic operation of the ED/G system, including: $(CFR\colon41.7/45.5)$		
	A3.01	Automatic start of compressor and ED/G	4.1	4.0
	A3.02	Minimum time for load pickup	3.4	3.7
	A3.03	Indicating lights, meters, and recorders	3.4	3.3
	A3.04	Number of starts available with an air compressor	3.1	3.5
	A3.05	Operation of the governor control of frequency and		
		voltage control in parallel operation	2.8	2.9

SYSTEM:	064 Emergency Diesel Generator (ED/G) System		
A3.06	Start and stop	3.3	3.4
A3.07	Load sequencing	3.6*	3.7*
A3.08	Consequences of automatic transfer to automatic position after		
	the ED/G is stopped	3.7?	4.0
A3.09	Functions (modes) of automatic transfer switch (to a startup bank)	4.0*	4.0
A3.10	Function of ED/G megawatt load controller	2.8	2.8*
A3.11	Need for setting offsite power breaker to automatic	3.1*	2.9*
A3.12	Purpose of automatic load sequencer	3.3*	3.5
A3.13	Rpm controller/megawatt load control (breaker-open/		
	breaker-closed effects)	3.0*	2.9
A4	Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: (CFR: $41.7 / 45.5$ to $45.8$ )		
A4 01	Local and remote operation of the ED/G	4.0	4.3
A4 02	Adjustment of exciter voltage (using voltage control switch)	3.3	3.4
A4.03	Synchroscope	3.2	3.3
A4.04	Remote operation of the air compressor switch (different modes)	3.2*	3.2
A4.05	Transfer of ED/G control between manual and automatic	3.1	3.2
A4.06	Manual start, loading, and stopping of the ED/G	3.9	3.9
A4.07	Transfer ED/G (with load) to grid	3.4	3.4
A4.08	Opening of the ring bus	3.2*	3.2*
A4.09	Establishing power from the ring bus (to relieve ED/G)	3.2*	3.3*
A4.10	Need for, and consequences of, manually shedding (loads) safeguards bus.	3.3	3.4
A4.11	The setting of droop voltage to zero	2.2	2.4
A4.12	Synchroscope	2.7*	2.6

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# **Safety Function 7:**

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016	Non-Nuclear Instrumentation System	3.7-9
017	In-Core Temperature Monitor System	3.7-11
072	Area Radiation Monitoring System	3.7-13
073	Process Radiation Monitoring System	3.7-15

	TASK:	Place an RPS channel in the tripped condition Bypass a trip condition on a reactor protection panel Monitor the RPS		
	K/A NO.	<u>KNOWLEDGE</u>	IMPOR RO	RTANCE SRO
	K1	Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause effect relationships between the RPS and the following systems:		
		(CFR: 41.2 to 41.9 / 45.7 to 45.8)		
•	K1.01 K1.02 K1.03 K1.04 K1.05 K1.06 K1.07 K1.08	120V vital/instrument power system 125V dc system CRDS RPIS ESFAS T/G SDS MFW	3.4 3.4 3.7 3.2* 3.8* 3.1* 3.2*3.2 2.9*	3.7 3.7 3.8 3.3* 3.9 3.1 2* 3.1
	K2	<b>Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following:</b> (CFR: 41.7)		
	K2.01	RPS channels, components, and interconnections	3.3	3.7
	К3	Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the RPS will have on the following: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.6)		
	K3.01 K3.02 K3.03 K3.04	CRDS	3.9 3.2* 3.1* 3.8*	4.0 3.3 3.3 4.1*
	K4	Knowledge of RPS design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: (CFR: 41.7)		
	K4.01 K4.02	Trip logic when one channel OOC or in test	3.7 3.9	4.0 4.3
	K4.03	Function generator processing and combining of detector signals in RPS channels	2.3	2.7*
	K4.04	Redundancy	3.1	3.3
	K4 05	Spurious trip protection	2.7	2.9
ı	K4 06	Automatic or manual enable/disable of RPS trips	3.2	3.5
	K4.07	First-out indication	3.0	3.2*

**Reactor Protection System** 

012

K4.08

K4.09

Logic matrix testing ......

Separation of control and protection circuits .....

2.8\*

2.8

3.3\*

3.1

SYSTEM:	012 Reactor Protection System (RPS)			
K5	Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as the apply to the RPS: $(CFR:\ 41.5\ /\ 45.7)$			
K5.01 K5.02	DNB Power density	3.3* 3.1*	3.8 3.3*	
К6	Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction of the following will have on the RPS: (CFR: $41.7/45/7$ )			
K6.01 K6.02 K6.03 K6.04 K6.05 K6.06 K6.07 K6.08 K6.09 K6.10	Bistables and bistable test equipment Redundant channels Trip logic circuits Bypass-block circuits Test circuits Sensors and detectors Core protection calculator COLSS CEAC Permissive circuits Trip setpoint calculators	2.8 2.9 3.1 3.3 2.4 2.7* 2.9* 3.6* 3.6* 3.3 2.9*	3.3 3.1 3.5 3.6 2.8 2.8 3.2* 3.7* 3.7* 3.5 2.9	
A1	Ability to predict and/or monitor Changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the RPS controls including: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.5)			
A1.01	Trip setpoint adjustment	2.9*	3.4*	
A2	Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the RPS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:  (CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.5)			
A2.01 A2.02 A2.03 A2.04 A2.05 A2.06 A2.07	Faulty bistable operation  Loss of instrument power  Incorrect channel bypassing  Erratic power supply operation  Faulty or erratic operation of detectors and function generators  Failure of RPS signal to trip the reactor  Loss of dc control power	3.1 3.6 3.4 3.1 3.1* 4.4 3.2*	3.6 3.9 3.7 3.2 3.2* 4.7 3.7	

SYSTEM:	012 Reactor Protection System (RPS)		
A3	Ability to monitor automatic operation of the RPS, including: $(CFR:\ 41.7/45.5)$		
A3.01	Individual channel	3.8	3.9
A3.02	Bistables	3.6	3.6
A3.03	Power supply	3.4	3.5
A3.04	Circuit breaker	2.8*	2.9
A3.05	Single and multiple channel trip indicators	3.6	3.7
A3.06	Trip logic	3.7	3.7
A3.07	Trip breakers	4.0	4.0
A4	Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: (CFR: $41.7 / 45.5$ to $45.8$ )		
A4.01	Manual trip button	4.5	4.5
A4.02	Components for individual channels	3.3	3.4
A4.03	Channel blocks and bypasses	3.6	3.6
A4.04	Bistable, trips, reset and test switches	3.3*	3.3
A4.05	Channel defeat controls	3.6	3.6
A4.06	Reactor trip breakers	4.3	4.3
A4.07	M/G set breakers	3.9*	3.9*

## 015 Nuclear Instrumentation System

TASK: Perform reactor power-range instrumentation calibration test

Perform axial power distribution monitoring test (alarm)

Perform calorimetric heat balance calculation

Perform hot-functional and low-power physics tests (meter refueling)

Perform source-range tests Perform intermediate-range test

Perform power range permissives and trip test

Operate the scaler-timer

Operate the audio count-rate drawer Perform a power imbalance calculation Perform a quadrant-power-tilt calculation

Monitor the NIS

What if quadrant-power-tilt ratio exceeds tech-spec limits?

Perform full-core flux mapping

K/A NO.	KNOWLEDGE	IMPOR RO	RTANCE SRO
K1	Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the NIS and the following systems: (CFR: $41.2$ to $41.9$ / $45.7$ to $45.8$ )		
K1.01 K1.02 K1.03 K1.04 K1.05 K1.06 K1.07 K1.08	RPS Vital ac systems CRDS ESF ICS Reactor regulating system Plant computer RCS (pump start)	4.1 3.4 3.1* 3.5* 3.9* 3.1* 2.4* 2.6*	4.2 3.6 3.1 3.5* 3.9* 3.4* 2.4 2.9*
K2	Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following: (CFR: 41.7)		
K2.01	NIS channels, components, and interconnections	3.3	3.7
К3	Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the NIS will have on the following: $(CFR:\ 41.7/45.6)$		
K3.01 K3.02 K3.03 K3.04 K3.05 K3.06	RPS CRDS Fuel handling system ICS. Plant computer Reactor regulating system	3.9 3.3* 2.7 3.4* 2.3* 2.9*	4.3 3.5* 3.4* 4.0* 2.4 3.2*

	SYSTEM:	015 Nuclear Instrumentation System (NIS)		
	K4	Knowledge of NIS design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) provide for the following: (CFR: 41.7)		
	K4.01	Source-range detector power shutoff at high powers	3.1	3.3
	K4.02	Rod motion inhibits	3.7	3.9
	K4.03	Reading of source range/intermediate range/power range		
		outside control room	3.9*	4.0*
	K4.04	Slow response time of SPNDs	3.4?	3.6?
	K4.05	Reactor trip	4.3	4.5
	K4.06	Reactor trip bypasses	3.9	4.2
	K4.07	Permissives	3.7	3.8
	K4.08	Automatic rod motion on demand signals	3.4	3.7
	K4.09	Redundant sources of information on axial flux density distribution	2.8	3.3
	K4.10	Redundant sources of information on power level	3.2	3.5
	K5	Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the NIS: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.7)		
	K5.01	Deleted		
٠	K5.02	Discriminator/compensation operation	2.7	2.9
	K5.03	Calibration adjustments	2.3*	2.6
	K5.04	Factors affecting accuracy and reliability of calorimetric calibrations	2.6	3.1
	K5.05	Criticality and its indications	4.1	4.4
	K5.06	Subcritical multiplications and NIS indications	3.4	3.7
	K5.07	Effects of burning on axial flux density	2.7?	2.9?
	K5.08	Enthalpy	2.0	2.3*
'	K5.09	In-core detector operation	2.5	2.9
	K5.10	Ex-core detector operation	2.8	3.0
	K5.11	Axial flux imbalance, including long-range effects	3.3	3.7
	K5.12	Quadrant power tilt, including long-range effects	3.2	3.6
	K5.13	Peaking and hot-channel factor	3.1	3.5
	K5.14	Neutron flux density, definition and relation to reactor power	2.8	3.1
•	K5.15	Effects of xenon on local flux, and factors affecting xenon concentrations	3.3	3.7
	K5.16	Definition and calculation of quadrant tilt ratio	2.9	3.4
	K5.17	DNB and DNBR definition and effects	3.5	3.7
	K5.18	Definition of reactor poison	2.9	3.2
	K5.19	Heat balance	2.9	3.2

SYSTEM:	015 Nuclear Instrumentation System (NIS)			
К6	Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction on the following will have on the NIS: (CFR: $41.7/45.7$ )			
K6.01	Sensors, detectors, and indicators	2.9	3.2	
K6.02	Discriminator/compensation circuits	2.6	2.9	
K6.03	Component interconnections	2.6	3.0	
K6.04	Bistables and logic circuits	3.1	3.2	
K6.05	Audio indication, including deaf spots in control room and containment	2.2	2.6	
K6.06	Scaler-timers	2.1	2.6	
K6.07	Imbalance indication	2.4	2.9*	
K6.08	In-core detector locations, radially and axially	2.1	2.4	
	<u>ABILITY</u>			
A1	Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the NIS controls including: (CFR: 41.5 . 45.5)			
A1.01	NIS calibration by heat balance	3.5	3.8	
A1.02	SUR	3.5	3.6	
A1.03	NIS power indication	3.7	3.7	
A1.04	Quadrant power tilt ratio	3.5	3.7	
A1.05	Imbalance (axial shape)	3.7	3.9	
A1.06	Fuel burnup	2.5*	2.9*	
A1.07	Changes in boron concentration	3.3*	3.4*	
A1.08	Changes in RCS temperature	3.3*	3.4	
A2	Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the NIS; and (b based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: (CFR: $41.5/43.5/45.3/45.5$ )			
A2.01	Power supply loss or erratic operation	3.5	3.9	
A2.02	Faulty or erratic operation of detectors or compensating components	3.1	3.5*	
A2.03	Xenon oscillations	3.2	3.5*	
A2.04	Effects on axial flux density of control rod alignment and sequencing, xenon			
	production and decay, and boron vs. control rod reactivity changes	3.3	3.8	
A2.05	Core void formation	3.3	3.8	

	SYSTEM:	015 Nuclear Instrumentation System (NIS)		
	A3	Ability to monitor automatic operation of the NIS, including: (CFR: $41.7 / 45.5$ )		
	A3.01	Console and cabinet indications	3.8	3.8
	A3.02	Annunciator and alarm signals	3.7	3.9
	A3.03	Verification of proper functioning/operability	3.9	3.9
	A3.04	Maximum disagreement allowed between channels	3.3	3.5
1	A3.05	Recognition of audio output expected for a given plant condition	2.6	2.7*
•	A3.06	Interpretation of in-core flux density maps from in-core detectors	2.4*	3.2*
	A4	Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: (CFR: $41.7 / 45.5$ to $45.8$ )		
I	A4.01	Selection of controlling NIS channel	3.6*	3.6*
•	A4.02	NIS indicators	3.9	3.9
	A4.03	Trip bypasses	3.8	3.9

## Non-Nuclear Instrumentation System (NNIS)

TASK: Line up the NNIS

		IMPOI	RTANCE
K/A NO.	KNOWLEDGE	RO	SRO
K1	Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the NNIS and the following systems: (CFR: $41.2$ to $41.9$ / $45.7$ to $45.8$ )		
K1.01	RCS	3.4*	3.4*
K1.02	PZR LCS	3.4*	3.3*
K1.03	SDS	3.2*	3.2*
K1.04	MFW system	2.7*	2.7*
K1.05	Condensate	2.1*	2.2*
K1.06	AFW system	3.6*	3.5*
K1.07	ECCS .	3.7*	3.7*
K1.07	PZR PCS	3.4*	3.4*
K1.09	ESFAS	3.7*	3.7*
K1.09	CCS	3.1*	3.1*
			2.2*
K1.11	MT/G	2.3*	
K1.12	S/G	3.5*	3.5*
K2	<b>Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following:</b> (CFR: 41.7)		
K2.01	NNIS channels	2.4*	2.5*
К3	Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the NNIS will have on the following: (CFR: 41.7/45.6)		
K3.01	RCS	3.4*	3.6*
K3.01	PZR LCS	3.4*	3.5*
K3.02 K3.03		3.4*	3.1*
	SDS		2.7*
K3.04	MFW system	2.6*	
K3.05	Condensate	1.8*	2.0*
K3.06	AFW system	3.5*	3.7*
K3.07	ECCS	3.6*	3.7*
K3.08	PZR PCS	3.5*	3.7*
K3.09	ESFAS	3.5*	3.7*
K3.10	CCS	3.0*	3.2*
K3.11	MT/G	2.2*	2.2*
K3.12	S/G	3.4*	3.6*
K4	Knowledge of NNIS design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: (CFR: 41.7)		
K4.01	Reading of NNIS channel values outside control room	2.8*	2.9*

SYSTEM:	016 Non-Nuclear Instrumentation System (NNIS)		
K4.02 K4.03	Sensing, signal processing, display, recording, and alarms Input to control systems	2.3* 2.8*	2.7* 2.9*
K5	Knowledge of the operational implication of the following concepts as they apply to the NNIS: $(CFR:\ 41.5\ /\ 45.7)$		
K5.01	Separation of control and protection circuits	2.7*	2.8*
K6	Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction of the following will have on the NNIS: $(CFR:\ 41.7/45.7)$		
K6.01	Sensors and detectors	2.3*	2.5*
	ABILITY		
A1	Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the NNIS controls including: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.5)		
	None		
A2	Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the NNIS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:  (CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.5)		
A2.01 A2.02 A2.03 A2.04	Detector failure  Loss of power supply  Interruption of transmitted signal  Voltage to instruments, both too high and too low	3.0* 2.9* 3.0 2.5*	3.1* 3.2* 3.3* 2.6*
A3	Ability to monitor automatic operation of the NNIS, including: (CFR: $41.7 / 45.5$ )		
A3.01 A3.02	Automatic selection of NNIS inputs to control systems	2.9* 2.9*	2.9* 2.9*
A4	Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: (CFR: $41.7 / 45.5$ to $45.8$ )		
A4.01 A4.02	NNI channel select controls	2.9* 2.7	2.8* 2.6*

#### TASK: Operate the ITM Monitor the ITM **IMPORTANCE** K/A NO. **KNOWLEDGE** RO SRO **K1** Knowledge of the physical connections and/or causeeffect relationships between the ITM system and the following systems: (CFR: 41.2 to 41.9 / 45.7 to 45.8) K1.01 Plant computer ..... 3.2\* 3.2\* K1.02 RCS ..... 3.3 3.5 **K2** Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following: (CFR: 41.5) K2.01 2.0 2.2 **K3** Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the ITM system will have on the following: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.6) K3.01 3.5\* 3.7\* **K4** Knowledge of ITM system design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: (CFR: 41.7) K4.01 3.4 3.7 Input to subcooling monitors ..... K4.02 Sensing and determination of location core hot spots ..... 3.1 3.6 K4.03 3.1 3.3 **K5** Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the ITM system: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.7) K5.01 3.1 3.9 K5.02 4.0 3.7 K5.03 Indication of superheating ..... 3.7 4.1 **K**6 Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction of the following ITM system components: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.7) K6.01 2.7 3.0

**In-Core Temperature Monitor System (ITM)** 

017

SYSTEM:	017 In-Core Temperature Monitor (ITM) System		
A1	Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the ITM system controls including: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.7)		
A1.01	Core exit temperature	3.7	3.9
A2	Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the ITM system; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:  (CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.5)		
A2.01 A2.02	Thermocouple open and short circuits	3.1 3.6	3.5 4.1
A3	Ability to monitor automatic operation of the ITM system including: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5)		
A3.01	Indications of normal, natural, and interrupted circulation of RCS	3.6*	3.8*
A3.02	Measurement of in-core thermocouple temperatures at panel outside control room	3.4*	3.1*
<b>A4</b>	Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: (CFR: $41.7 / 45.5$ to $45.8$ )		
A4.01 A4.02	Actual in-core temperatures	3.8	4.1
117.02	core cooling (i.e., if applicable, average of five highest values)	3.8	4.1

#### 072 Area Radiation Monitoring (ARM) System

TASK:

Perform lineups of the ARM system Perform the ARM instrumentation functional test

Operate ARM monitors Monitor ARM operation

Perform the ARM equipment check

K/A NO.	KNOWLEDGE	IMPORTANCE RO SRO	
K1	Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the ARM system and the following systems: (CFR: 41.2 to 41.9 / 45.7 to 45.8)		
K1.01 K1.02 K1.03 K1.04 K1.05	Plant ventilation systems Containment isolation Fuel building isolation Control room ventilation MRSS	3.1* 3.5 3.6* 3.3* 2.8*	3.5* 3.9 3.7* 3.5* 2.9*
K2	<b>Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following:</b> (CFR: 41.7)		
K2.01	Radiation monitoring systems	2.3*	2.5
K3	Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the ARM system will have on the following: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.6)		
K3.01 K3.02	Containment ventilation isolation	3.2* 3.1	3.4* 3.5
K4	Knowledge of ARM system design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: (CFR: 41.7)		
K4.01 K4.02	Containment ventilation isolation	3.3* 3.2*	3.6* 3.4*
K4.03	Plant ventilation systems	3.2*	3.6*
K5	Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the ARM system: $(CFR:\ 41.5\ /\ 45.7)$		
K5.01 K5.02	Radiation theory, including sources, types, units, and effects	2.7 2.5	3.0 3.2

#### **K6** Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction of the following will have on the ARM system: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 to 45.8) K6.01 Sensors and detectors ..... 2.1 2.6 K6.02 Valves ..... 1.6 1.9 **ABILITY** K/A NO. **A1** Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the ARM system controls including: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.5) A1.01 Radiation levels ..... 3.4 3.6 **A2** Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the ARM system- and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: (CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 43.3 / 45.13) A2.01 2.9 2.7 A2.02 Detector failure ..... 2.8 2.9 A2.03 2.7 2.9 **A3** Ability to monitor automatic operation of the ARM system. including: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5) A3.01 Changes in ventilation alignment ..... 2.9\* 3.1 **A4** Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 to 45.8) A4.01 Alarm and interlock setpoint checks and adjustments ..... 3.0\* 3.3

2.5

3.1

2.5\*

3.1

072 Area Radiation Monitoring (ARM) System

SYSTEM:

A4.02

A4.03

#### Perform PRM instrumentation functional check Operate the PRMs Perform PRM equipment check Monitor the PRM system **IMPORTANCE** K/A NO. **KNOWLEDGE** RO SRO **K1** Knowledge of the physical connections and/or causeeffect relationships between the PRM system and the following systems: (CFR: 41.2 to 41.9 / 45.7 to 45.8) K1.01 3.9 Those systems served by PRMs ..... 3.6 **K2** Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following: (CFR: 41.7) 2.7\* K2.01 2.3\* **K3** Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the PRM system will have on the following: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.6) K3.01 Radioactive effluent releases ..... 3.6 4.2 K4 Knowledge of PRM system design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: (CFR: 41.7) Release termination when radiation exceeds setpoint ..... K4.01 4.0 4.3 3.3\* 3.9\* K4.02 **K**5 Knowledge of the operational implications as they apply to concepts as they apply to the PRM system: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.7) K5.01 Radiation theory, including sources, types, units, and effects ..... 2.5 3.0 K5.02 Radiation intensity changes with source distance ..... 2.5 3.1 2.9\* K5.03 3.4

**Process Radiation Monitoring (PRM) System** 

Perform lineups of air PRM system

073

TASK:

SYSTEM:	073 Process Radiation Monitoring (PRM) System		
K6	Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction of the following will have on the PRM system: (CFR: $41.7/45.7$ )		
K6.01 K6.02 K6.03	Sensors and detectors  Moving filters  Sample blowers  ABILITY	2.2 2.0 1.9	2.4 2.1 2.0
A1	Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the PRM system controls including: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.7)		
A1.01	Radiation levels	3.2	3.5
A2	Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the PRM system; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:  (CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.13)		
A2.01 A2.02 A2.03	Erratic or failed power supply  Detector failure  Calibration drift	2.5 2.7 2.4	2.9* 3.2 2.9*
A3	Ability to monitor automatic operation of the PRM system, including: $(CFR\colon41.7/45.5)$		
	None		
<b>A4</b>	Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: (CFR: $41.7 / 45.5$ to $45.8$ )		
A4.01 A4.02 A4.03	Effluent release  Radiation monitoring system control panel  Check source for operability demonstration	3.9 3.7 3.1	3.9 3.7 3.2

#### Safety Function 8: Plant Service Systems page 008 **Component Cooling Water System** 3.8-2 **Containment Purge System** 029 **3.8-6 Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System** 033 3.8-9 **Fuel Handling** 034 3.8-12 **Circulating Water System** 3.8-14 075 **Instrument Air System** 078 3.8-19 079 **Station Air System** 3.8-21 086 **Fire Protection System** 3.8-23

#### 008 Component Cooling Water System (CCWS)

TASK: Perform CCWS component operability test

Perform CCWS flow path verification

Perform CCWS pump test Perform CCW flow balance

Determine CCWS leak rate from RCS

Perform lineups of the CCWS

Fill the CCWS

Fill the OCWS components

Start up the CCWS
Shut down the CCWS
Drain the CCWS (one loop)
Add chemical to the CCWS

Coordinate bleed and feed of component cooling

system for chemistry control

Operate CCWS pumps in different combinations

Operate CCW heat exchangers in different combinations

Monitor component cooling system operation

K/A NO.	KNOWLEDGE	IMPOI RO	RTANCE SRO
K1	Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the CCWS and the following systems: (CFR: $41.2 \text{ to } 41.9 / 45.7 \text{ to } 45.9$ )		
K1.01	SWS	3.1	3.1
K1.02	Loads cooled by CCWS	3.3	3.4
K1.03	PRMS	2.8*	3.0
K1.04	RCS, in order to determine source(s) of RCS leakage into the CCWS	3.3	3.3
K1.05	Sources of makeup water	3.0	3.1
K2	<b>Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following:</b> (CFR: 41.7)		
K2.01 K2.02	CCW valves	2.1 3.0*	2.2 3.2*

SYSTEM:	008 Component Cooling Water System (CCWS)		
К3	Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the CCWS will have on the following:		
K3.01 K3.02 K3.03	Loads cooled by CCWS  CRDS  RCP	3.4 2.9 4.1	3.5 3.1 4.2
K4	Knowledge of CCWS design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: (CFR: 41.7)		
K4.01	Automatic start of standby pump	3.1	3.3
K4.02	Operation of the surge tank, including the associated valves and controls	2.9	3.3 2.7
K4.02 K4.03		2.9	2.1
<b>K4.</b> 03	Sensing elements for the measurement of flow rates for the total CCW flow rate and for the flow rates to the components	2.4*	2.4*
K4.04	Weir design aspect of the surge tank	2.4*	2.7*
K4.05		2.1	2.7
<b>K4.</b> 03	CCW pump pressure head and water inventory (capacity of CCWS	2.4	2.5
V4.06	surge tank	2.4	
K4.06	Auxiliary building CCWS isolation	2.3*	2.6*
K4.07	Operation of the CCW swing-bus power supply and its	0.64	0.74
T/ 1 00	associated breakers and controls	2.6*	2.7*
K4.08	Protection of ion exchange resins from high letdown temperature	2.3	2.3
K4.09	The "standby" feature for the CCW pumps	2.7	2.9
K5	Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the CCWS: $(CFR:\ 41.5/45.7)$		
K5.01	Chemistry control	1.8	2.3
K5.02	"Water hammer" and how such might be produced in the CCWS`	2.2*	2.3*
K5.03	Flow rate and velocity of a liquid and of a gas, including temperature	2.2	2.3
113.03	effects and their various units of measure	1.7	2.1
K5.04	Purpose of venting components when filling or draining the CCWS	2.3	2.4
K5.05	Theory of the measurement of flow rate	1.6	1.8
K5.06	The concentration level of a chemical solution; how to change the	1.0	1.0
K3.00	concentration level	1.6	2.0*
K5.07	Causes and effects of corrosion on carbon steel and stainless steel;	1.0	2.0
113.07	the effects on heat transfer through such materials	1.6	2.1
K5.08	Effects on corrosion rate of steels due to corrosion inhibiting chemicals .	1.5	2.1*
K5.09	Knowledge of which chemicals are used for corrosion inhibitors	1.3	∠ <b>.</b> 1 '
IXJ.U7	in the CCWS	1.6	2.1

S	YSTEM:	008 Component Cooling Water System (CCWS)		
K	56	Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction on the following will have on the CCW: (CFR: $41.7/45.7$ )		
K K K K	6.01 6.02 6.03 6.04 6.05 6.06 6.07	Valves Sensors and detectors Controllers and positioners Pumps Motors Heat exchangers and condensers Breakers, relays, and disconnects	1.9 1.9 1.8 2.1 1.7 2.1* 1.8	2.1 2.0 2.0 2.3* 1.8 2.4* 2.1
		<u>ABILITY</u>		
A	1	Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the CCWS controls including: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.5)		
A A	1.01 1.02 1.03 1.04	CCW flow rate CCW temperature CCW pressure Surge tank level	2.8 2.9 2.7 3.1	2.9 3.1 2.9 3.2
A	2	Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the CCWS, and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:  (CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.13)		
A A	2.01 2.02 2.03	Loss of CCW pump  High/low surge tank level  High/low CCW temperature	3.3 3.2 3.0	3.6 3.5 3.2
A A	.2.04 .2.05	PRMS alarm Effect of loss of instrument and control air on the	3.3	3.5*
	.2.06	position of the CCW valves that are air operated	3.3*	3.5
Δ	.2.07	addition	1.7*	2.0*
		ture; the flow rate at which the CCW standby pump will start	2.5*	2.8*
	.2.08	Effects of shutting (automatically or otherwise) the isolation valves of the letdown cooler	2.5	2.7*
A	.2.09	Results of excessive exit temperature from the letdown cooler, including the temperature effects on ion-exchange resins	2.3	2.8

### SYSTEM: 008 Component Cooling Water System (CCWS)

A3	Ability to monitor automatic operation of the CCWS, including: $(CFR:\ 41.7/45.5)$		
A3.01	Setpoints on instrument signal levels for normal opera-tions, warnings, and trips that are applicable to the CCWS	3.2*	3.0
A3.02	Operation of the CCW pumps, including interlocks and the CCW booster pump	3.2	3.2
A3.03	All flow rate indications and the ability to evaluate the performance of this closed-cycle cooling system	3.0	3.1
A3.04	Requirements on and for the CCWS for different conditions of the power plant	2.9	3.2
A3.05	Control of the electrically operated, automatic isolation valves in the CCWS	3.0	3.1
A3.06	Typical CCW pump operating conditions, including vibration and sound levels and motor current	2.5	2.5
A3.07 A3.08	Effects of recirculation within the CCWS	2.3*	2.2*
A3.09	as a result of a safety injection signal	3.6* 2.4*	3.7* 2.3
A3.10	Normal CRDM temperatures	2.4"	2.3
	pressure, oil level, and discharge temperature	2.9*	3.0
A4	Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: (CFR: $41.7 / 45.5$ )		
A4.01 A4.02	CCW indications and controls	3.3	3.1
	the proper venting of the components	2.5*	2.5
A4.03	Throttling of the CCW pump discharge valve	2.7*	2.5*
A4.04 A4.05	Startup of a CCW pump when the system is shut down	2.6*	2.6
A4.06	to the components cooled by the CCWS	2.7*	2.5*
	regulate CCW flow rate	2.5*	2.5
A4.07	Control of minimum level in the CCWS surge tank	2.9*	2.9
A4.08	CCW pump control switch	3.1*	2.8
A4.09	CCW temperature control valve	3.0*	2.9*
A4.10 A4.11	Conditions that require the operation of two CCW coolers	3.1* 3.0*	3.1 2.9*

#### **Containment Purge System (CPS)** 029

TASK:

Perform lineups of the CPS Start up the CPS Shut down the CPS

Vent the containment building
Initiate a containment radiation signal

	K/A NO.	<u>KNOWLEDGE</u>	IMPOF RO	RTANCE SRO
	K1	Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the Containment Purge System and the following systems:  (CFR: 41.2 to 41.9 / 45.7 to 45.8)		
	K1.01 K1.02 K1.03 K1.04 K1.05	Gaseous radiation release monitors  Containment radiation monitor  Engineered safeguards  Purge system  Containment air cleanup and recirculation system	3.4 3.3 3.6 3.0? 2.9*	3.7 3.6 3.8 3.1? 3.1*
	K2	<b>Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following:</b> (CFR: 41.7)		
	K2.01 K2.02 K2.03 K2.04 K2.05	Purge fans Recirculation fans Purge exhaust radiation monitors Purge valves Supply air heaters	2.1 2.0 2.3* 2.1 1.7	2.3* 2.4* 2.7* 2.3 1.9
	K3	Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the Containment Purge System will have on the following: $(CFR: 41.7/45.6)$		
	K3.01 K3.02	Containment parameters	2.9 2.9*	3.1 3.5*
	K4	Knowledge of design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: (CFR: 41.7)		
	K4.01 K4.02 K4.03 K4.04 K4.05	Use of filters for purging to the atmosphere  Negative pressure in containment  Automatic purge isolation  Prevention of damage to fans from lack of flow rate  Temperature limits on dampers	2.4 2.9 3.2* 2.4 2.0*	2.9 3.1 3.5 2.6 2.1*

### SYSTEM: 029 Containment Purge System (CPS)

K5	Knowledge of the operational implication of the following concepts as they apply to the Containment Purge System: $(CFR:\ 41.5\ /\ 45.7)$		
K5.01 K5.02	Maximum concentration permissible	2.4 2.3	2.9* 2.8
K6	Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction on the following will have on the Containment Purge System: $(CFR:\ 41.7/45.7)$		
K6.01	Valves	1.9	2.0
K6.02	Sensors and detectors	2.1*	2.3*
K6.03	Controllers and positioners	1.9	2.1
K6.04	Pumps	1.6	1.9
K6.05	Motors	1.6	1.9
K6.06	Heat exchangers and condensers	1.8	1.9
K6.07	Breakers, relays, and disconnects	1.8	1.9
A1	ABILITY Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the Containment Purge System controls including:  (CFR: 41.5 / 45.5)		
A1.01	Supply air temperature	1.9	2.1
A1.02	Radiation levels	3.4	3.4
A1.03	Containment pressure, temperature, and humidity	3.0*	3.3*
A2	Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the Containment Purge System; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: (CFR: $41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.13$ )		
A2.01	Maintenance or other activity taking place inside containment	2.9	3.6
A2.02	Continuance of outdoor temperature inversion	2.2	2.9
A2.03	Startup operations and the associated required valve lineups	2.7	3.1
A2.04	Health physics sampling of containment atmosphere	2.5*	3.2*
	ility to monitor automatic operation of the  Containment Purge System including:  (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5)		
A3.01	CPS isolation	3.8	4.0

#### SYSTEM: 029 Containment Purge System (CPS)

# A4 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room:

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 to 45.8)

A4.01	Containment purge flow rate	2.5	2.5
A4.02	Outside atmospheric conditions (prior to purge)	2.2	2.5
A4.03	Inlet filtration and heating system	1.7	1.8
A4.04	Containment evacuation signal	3.5	3.6

## **Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System (SFPCS)**

TASK: Fill the spent fuel pools

Operate the SFPCS between refueling pool and spent fuel pool

Perform BWST purification using filter/demineralizer

Lower refueling pool level (fuel transfer canal)

Perform decay heat removal using the SFPCS

<u>K/A</u> <u>NO.</u>	KNOWLEDGE.	IMPORTANCE RO SRO	
K1	Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System and the following systems: (CFR: 41.2 to 41.9 / 45.7 to 45.8)		
K1.01 K1.02 K1.03 K1.04 K1.05 K1.06 K1.07	RCS RHRS SIS BWST RWST Boric acid storage tank Emergency makeup water systems	2.4 2.5 2.4 2.4 2.7* 2.2 2.4	2.5 2.7 2.5 2.4 2.8* 2.3 2.5
K2	Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following: (CFR: 41.7)		
K2.01	SFPCS components	1.9	2.1
К3	Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System will have on the following: (CFR: $41.7/45.6$ )		
K3.01 K3.02 K3.03	Area ventilation systems  Area and ventilation radiation monitoring systems  Spent fuel temperature	2.6 2.8 3.0	3.1 3.2 3.3
K4	Knowledge of design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: (CFR: 41.7)		
K4.01 K4.02 K4.03 K4.04 K4.05	Maintenance of spent fuel level  Maintenance of spent fuel cleanliness  Anti-siphon devices  Maintenance of spent fuel pool radiation  Adequate SDM (boron concentration)	2.9 2.5 2.6 2.7? 3.1	3.2 2.7 2.9 2.9? 3.3

SYSTEM:	033 Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System (SFPCS)		
K5	Knowledge of the operational implication of the following concepts as they apply to the Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System: $(CFR:\ 41.5\ /\ 45.7)$		
K5.01	Pump theory Heat transfer D/P detector theory of OPS K-eff Decay heat Shielding  Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction on the following will have on the Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.7)	1.6	1.9
K5.02		1.7	1.9
K5.03		1.5	1.6
K5.04		2.1	2.3*
K5.05		2.1	2.3
K5.06		2.1	2.5
K6.01	Pumps Heat exchangers Valves Motors Pressure and pressure detectors Temperature sensors Filters and demineralizers	1.7	1.9
K6.02		1.8	1.9
K6.03		1.7	1.7
K6.04		1.7	1.7
K6.05		1.7	1.7
K6.06		1.8	1.8
K6.07		1.7	1.8
A1	Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System operating the controls including: (CFR: 41.5/45.5)		
A1.01	Spent fuel pool water level	2.7	3.3
A1.02		2.8	3.3
A1.03		2.4	2.7
A2	Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: (CFR: $41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.13$ )		
A2.01	Inadequate SDM	3.0	3.5
A2.02		2.7	3.0
A2.03		3.1	3.5
A3	Ability to monitor automatic operation of the Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System including: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5)		
A3.01	Temperature control valves	2.5*	2.7*
A3.02		2.9	3.1

### SYSTEM: 033 Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System (SFPCS)

#### A4 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room:

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 to 45.8)

A4.01 A4.02	SFPCS pumps SFPCS valves	2.4 2.4	2.9 2.8
A4.03	Support systems for fill and transfer of SFPCS water	2.4	2.9
A4.04	Deleted		
A4.05	Deleted		
A4.06	Deleted		

### Fuel Handling Equipment System (FHES)

TASK: Operate the spent fuel handling machine/bridge/platform crane
Operate the new fuel elevator
Operate the refueling machine/main fuel handling bridge (fuel element change)

Operate the control rod change machine/fuel handling bridge/reactor

building crane (control rod change)

Operate the fuel transfer system/fuel transfer carriages and upenders

Operate the auxiliary fuel handling bridge manipulator crane

Operate the auxiliary building overhead crane (general load handling)

What if a spent fuel assembly is dropped in containment?

K/A NO.	KNOWLEDGE	IMPORTANCI RO SRO	
K1	Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the Fuel Handling System and the following systems: (CFR: 41.2 to 41.9 / 45.7 to 45.8)		
K1.01 K1.02 K1.03 K1.04 K1 05 K1 06	RCS RHRS CVCS NIS Shutdown monitor SFPCS	2.5 2.5 2.1 2.6 2.5* 2.4	3.2 3.2 2.7* 3.5 3.4* 3.0*
K2	<b>Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following:</b> (CFR: 41.7)		
K2.01 K2.02 K2.03	All fuel handling equipment (e.g., cranes, fuel elevators, handling bridge) .  Air supply	1.5 1.6 1.9	2.0 1.9 2.2
К3	Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the Fuel Handling System will have on the following: (CFR: $41.7/45.6$ )		
K3.01	Containment ventilation	2.4*	2.9*
K4	Knowledge of design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: (CFR: 41.7)		
K4.01 K4.02 K4.03	Fuel protection from binding and dropping  Fuel movement	2.6 2.5 2.6	3.4 3.3 3.3

SYSTEM:	034 Fuel Handling Equipment System (FHES)		
K5	Knowledge of the operational implication of the following concepts as they apply to the Fuel Handling System: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.7)		
K5.01 K5.02 K5.03	General principles of mechanical lifting  Limiting of load  Residual heat removal; decay	1.7? 2.0 2.2	2.1? 2.6 2.7
К6	Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction on the following will have on the Fuel Handling System : $(CFR:\ 41.7/45.7)$		
K6.01 K6.02	Fuel handling equipment	2.1 2.6	3.0 3.3
	ABILITY		
A1	Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the Fuel Handling System controls including: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.5)		
A1.01 A1.02	Load limits	2.4 2.9	3.2 3.7
A2	Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the Fuel Handling System; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: (CFR: $41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.13$ )		
A2.01 A2.02 A2.03	Dropped fuel element Dropped cask Mispositioned fuel element	3.6 3.4 3.3	4.4 3.9 4.0
A3	Ability to monitor automatic operation of the Fuel Handling System, including: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5)		
A3.01 A3.02 A3.03	Travel limits  Load limits  High flux at shutdown	2.5* 2.5* 2.9	3.1 3.1 3.3
A4	Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: (CFR: $41.7 / 45.5$ to $45.8$ )		
A4.01 A4.02	Radiation levels	3.3 3.5	3.7 3.9

#### 075 Circulating Water System

TASK: Perform circulating water/service water systems test

Remove marine growth from main condenser circulating water passages

Perform lineups of the circulating water system

Start up the circulating water system

Monitor circulating water system operations

Shut down the circulating water system

Operate the water box priming subsystem

Monitor water box priming subsystem operation Monitor condenser cleaning subsystem operation

Start up and shut down the de-icing subsystem

Operate circulating water pumps in different combinations

Isolate a water box (salt water operations)

Restore flow to a water box

Operate the vacuum priming system on the circulating water system vacuum loop

Operate the cooling towers Isolate a water box (fresh water)

Operate the cooling tower blowdown subsystem

Operate cooling tower makeup subsystem

<u>K/A NO</u> . <b>K1</b>	KNOWLEDGE`  Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause- effect relationships between the circulating water system and the following systems: (CFR: 41.2 to 41.9 / 45.7 to 45.8)	IMPOR RO	RTANCE SRO
K1.01	SWS	2.5	2.5
K1.02	Liquid radwaste discharge	2.9	3.1
K1.03	Condenser	1.9	1.9
K1.04	S/GB	1.7	1.8
K1.05	MRSS and SDS	2.0	1.9
K1.06	Cooling towers	1.9*	1.7*
K1.07	Recirculation spray system	2.2*	2.1*
K1.08	Emergency/essential SWS	3.2*	3.2*
K1.09	Vacuum priming	1.5	1.4
K2	<b>Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following:</b> (CFR: 41.7)		
K2.01	Circulating water pumps	1.6	1.7
K2.02	MOVs	1.7	1.7
K2.03	Emergency/essential SWS pumps	2.6*	2.7*
K2.04	Lube oil pumps	1.4*	1.4*

SYSTEM:	075 Circulating Water System		
К3	Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunctions of the circulating water system will have on the following: $(CFR:\ 41.7/45.6)$		
K3.01 K3.02 K3.03 K3.04 K3.05 K3.06 K3.07	SWS Main condenser SDS MT/G Recirculation spray system Plant efficiency ESFAS	2.3 2.1 2.3 1.9 2.1* 1.5 3.4*	2.6 2.4 2.4 2.1 2.3* 1.7 3.5*
K4	Knowledge of circulating water system design feature(s) and interlock(s) which provide for the following: (CFR: 41.7)		
K4.01 K4.02	Heat sink  Interlocks between circulating water system pumps and	2.5	2.8
K4.03	discharge valve	2.0*	2.1*
	cooling tower pumps	1.7*	2.1*
K4.04	Automatic pickup of backup lube oil pumps (AC and DC)	1.7*	1.9
K4.05	Operation of condenser tube cleaning system	1.5*	1.5*
K4.06	Traveling screen operation	1.6	1.8
K4.07	Relationship between water box inlet valve position and circulating pump		
	logic (including switching time required to close water		
	box inlet valve switch)	1.7*	1.7*
K5	Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the circulating water system: $(CFR:\ 41.5\ /\ 45.7)$		
K5.01	Definition and units of measure of a vacuum	1.4	1.5
K5.02	Purpose of a vacuum on the main condenser	1.5	1.5
K5.03	Factors that affect main condenser vacuum	1.5	1.6
K5.04	Principle of operation of the main condenser	1.4	1.6
K5.05	Principle of operation of the cooling towers	1.6*	1.9*
K5.06	Principle of cooling by evaporation	1.4	1.6
K5.07	Relationship of seawater temperature to marine growth	1.4*	1.6*
K5.08	Purpose of the vacuum priming system	1.6	1.6
K5.09	Relationship between circulating water conductivity and corrosion	1.5	1.7
K5.10	Damage to piping and components from hydraulic shock	1.7	1.8

K6         Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction of the following will have on the circulating water system: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.7)           K6.01         Valves         1.5         1.6           K6.02         Sensors and detectors         1.5         1.5           K6.03         Controllers and positioners         1.5         1.5           K6.04         Pumps         1.5         1.6           K6.05         Motors         1.5         1.5           K6.06         Breakers, relays, and disconnects         1.5         1.5           ABILITY           A1         Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the circulating water system controls including: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.5)           A1.01         Cooling water temperature         1.8         2.0           A1.02         Intake levels         2.2*         2.5           A1.03         Pump amperage (normal range and limitations)         1.7         1.7           A1.04         Pump oil levels and seal flows (normal range and limitations)         1.7         1.6           A1.05         Lube oil temperature and pressure         1.5         1.6           A1.06         Circulating water temperature (inlet and outlet)         1.7         1.7           A1.08
K6.02         Sensors and detectors         1.5         1.5           K6.03         Controllers and positioners         1.5         1.5           K6.04         Pumps         1.5         1.6           K6.05         Motors         1.5         1.5           K6.06         Breakers, relays, and disconnects         1.5         1.5           ABILITY           A1         Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the circulating water system controls including: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.5)           A1.01         Cooling water temperature         1.8         2.0           A1.02         Intake levels         2.2*         2.5           A1.03         Pump amperage (normal range and limitations)         1.7         1.7           A1.04         Pump oil levels and seal flows (normal range and limitations)         1.7         1.6           A1.05         Lube oil temperature and pressure         1.5         1.6           A1.06         Circulating water temperature (inlet and outlet)         1.7         1.7           A1.08         Circulating water makeup pump motor current (within limits)         1.6*         1.6*           A1.09         Normal conditions for pump oil levels and seal water pressure         1.4
Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the circulating water system controls including: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.5)  A1.01 Cooling water temperature 1.8 2.0 A1.02 Intake levels 2.2* 2.5 A1.03 Pump amperage (normal range and limitations) 1.7 1.7 A1.04 Pump oil levels and seal flows (normal range and limitations) 1.7 1.6  A1.05 Lube oil temperature and pressure 1.5 1.6 A1.06 Circulating water temperature (inlet and outlet) 1.7 1.7 A1.07 Circulating water pump motor current and pump discharge pressure 1.5 1.5 A1.08 Circulating water makeup pump motor current (within limits) 1.6* 1.6* A1.09 Normal conditions for pump oil levels and seal water pressure 1.4 1.5  A2 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions
(to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the circulating water system controls including: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.5)  A1.01 Cooling water temperature
A1.02 Intake levels
A1.06 Circulating water temperature (inlet and outlet)
or operations on the circulating water system; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:  (CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.13)
A2.01 Loss of intake structure
vacuum, turbine trip, and steam dump

SYSTEM:	075 Circulating Water System		
A2.06	Operating two circulating water pumps when power level		
	exceeds 50% of plant rating	1.7*	1.8*
A2.07	Potential effects of improper cooling water system flow	1.7	1.7
A2.08	Ice buildup on intake structure	2.0*	2.0*
A2.09	Operation of amertap ball collector flaps and screens	2.0	2.0
A2.10	in normal, backwash, and emergency backwash modes	1.7*	1.7*
112/10	minimum vacuum	1.5*	1.6*
A2.11	Time required for fill of piping by induction of water		
	into circulating system using vacuum system	1.5*	1.6*
A3	Ability to monitor automatic operation of the circulating water system, including:		
	(CFR: 41.7 / 45.5)		
A3.01	Automatic isolation of circulating water valves	2.1*	2.1*
A3.02	Alternate flow paths for circulating water	2.3*	2.3*
A3.02 A3.03	Pump amperage (normal range and limitations).	1.7	1.7
			1.7
A3.04 A3.05	Pump oil levels and seal flows (normal range and limitations) Verification that pump discharge valve closes when	1.7	1.0
A3.03	circulating water pump stops	1.7	1.6
A3.06	Normal and abnormal collector flap differential pressures and setpoints	1.6*	1.5*
A3.07	Makeup flow control valve controller and indicator	1.7*	1.6*
A4	<b>Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room:</b> (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 to 45.8)		
A4.01	Emergency/essential SWS pumps	3.2*	3.2*
A4.02	Circulating water pump	2.2*	2.3
A4.03	The circulating water system, such that the correct number of pumps are operating for all plant power		
	levels	2.3*	2.2
A4.04	Air eductor system	1.8*	1.8*
A4.05	The circulating water system, to maintain a vacuum in	1.0	1.0
	the main condenser during shutdown as long as is necessary	2.3*	2.3
A4.06	Water box vacuum priming isolation valves, control		
	switches, and indicators	1.8*	1.7*
A4.07	Vacuum priming tank/priming compressor controller	1.7*	1.6*
A4.08	Gland seal water supply system	1.6	1.6
A4.09	Circulating water box inlet and outlet valves	1.9*	1.8*
A4.10	Circulating water pump and circulating pump discharge valve	1.9	1.8

#### SYSTEM: 075 Circulating Water System

A4.11	Startup and shutdown of the circulating water pump	1.9	1.9
A4.12	Discharge valve interlock system	1.8*	1.7*
A4.13	Cooling tower operations	1.8*	1.7*
A4.14	Lube oil pumps for circulating water pump	1.5*	1.7*
A4.15	Operation of the vacuum priming system	1.4	1.5
A4.16	Traveling screens in manual operation	1.6	1.6
A4.17	Isolation of a water box	1.5	1.5
A4.18	Operation of the circulating water bay sluice gate	1.6*	1.7*
A4.19	De-icing valve	1.6*	1.7*
A4.20	Blowout preventers	1.7*	1.8*

## 078 Instrument Air System (IAS)

Start up the IAS Monitor IAS

Shift instrument air compressors Operate system air dryers

Perform testing of automatic operation of IAS

K/A NO.	KNOWLEDGE	IMPOF RO	RTANCE SRO
K1	Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the IAS and the following systems: (CFR: $41.2$ to $41.9$ / $45.7$ to $45.8$ )		
K1.01 K1.02 K1.03 K1.04 K1.05	Sensor air Service air Containment air Cooling water to compressor MSIV air	2.8* 2.7* 3.3* 2.6 3.4*	2.7* 2.8 3.4* 2.9 3.5*
К2	<b>Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following:</b> (CFR: 41.7)		
K2.01 K2.02	Instrument air compressor Emergency air compressor	2.7 3.3*	2.9 3.5*
К3	Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the IAS will have on the following: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.6)		
K3.01 K3.02 K3.03	Containment air system	3.1* 3.4 3.0	3.4* 3.6 3.4
K4	Knowledge of IAS design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: (CFR: 41.7)		
K4.01 K4.02 K4.03	Manual/automatic transfers of control	2.7 3.2 3.1*	2.9 3.5 3.3*
K5	Knowledge of the operational implications of following concepts as they apply to the IAS: (CFR: $41.5 / 45.7$ )		
K5.01 K5.02	Gas laws Diesel effect	1.5 1.7	1.7 1.8

К6	Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction on the following will have on the IAS: (CFR: $41.7/45.7$ )		
K6.01 K6.02 K6.03 K6.04 K6.05 K6.06 K6.07 K6.08 K6.09 K6.10	Air compressors Pressure gauges Temperature indicators Service air refusal valve Air dryers Cross-tie valve Valves Sensors and detectors Controllers and positioners Motors Heat exchangers and condensers	2.4 1.9 1.8 2.2* 2.1 2.1 1.7 1.7 1.5	2.6 2.1 2.1 2.4* 2.2 2.4 1.9 1.9 2.1 1.7
K6.12 K6.13	Breakers, relays, and disconnects  Filters  ABILITY	1.5 1.6	1.8 1.9
A1	Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the IAS controls including: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.5)		
A2	Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the IAS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:  (CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.13)		
A2.01	Air dryer and filter malfunctions	2.4	2.9
A3	Ability to monitor automatic operation of the IAS, including: $(CFR:\ 41.7/45.5)$		
A3.01 A3.02	Air pressure	3.1 2.3	3.2 2.3
A4	Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: (CFR: $41.7 / 45.5$ to $45.8$ )		
A4.01	Pressure gauges	3.1	3.1

SYSTEM:

078 Instrument Air System (IAS)

#### TASK: Perform lineups of SAS Start up a station air compressor Monitor SAS operation Shut down the SAS **IMPORTANCE** K/A NO. **KNOWLEDGE** RO SRO **K1** Knowledge of the physical connections and/or causeeffect relationships between the SAS and the following systems: (CFR: 41.2 to 41.9 / 45.7 to 45.8) K1.01 IAS ..... 3.0 3.1 K1.02 2.2 2.2 Cooling water to compressor ..... **K2** Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following: (CFR: 41.7) K2.01 2.3 2.3 Station air compressors ..... **K3** Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the SAS will have on the following: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.6) K3.01 1.9 Ventilation system ..... 1.7 **K**4 **Knowledge of SAS design feature(s) and/or interlock(s)** which provide for the following: (CFR: 41.7) K4.01 2.9 Cross-connect with IAS ..... 3.2 K4.02 Automatic control of station air pressure ...... 2.2 2.4 **K5** Knowledge of the operational implication of the following concepts as they apply to the SAS: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.7) K5.01 1.4 1.6 Diesel effect: safety implications ..... K5.02 1.5 1.7 **K6** Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction on the following will have on the SAS: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.7) K6.01 1.6 1.7 K6.02 Sensors and detectors ..... 1.4 1.5 K6.03 1.7 1.8 K6.04 1.3 1.4 K6.05 1.3 1.4 K6.06 1.4 1.4 K6.07 Filters 1.5 1.6

079

**Station Air System (SAS)** 

SYSTEM:	079 Station Air System (SAS)		
A1	Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the SAS controls including: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.5)		
	None		
A2	Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operation the SAS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations (CFR: $41.5/43.5/45.3/45.13$ )	,	
A2.01	Cross-connection with IAS	2.9	3.2
A3	Ability to monitor automatic operation of the SAS including: $(CFR:\ 41.7/45.5)$		
A3.01 A3.02 A3.03	Normal operating pressure	2.0* 1.8 1.9	2.1* 1.9 2.0
A4	Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: (CFR: $41.7 / 45.5$ to $45.8$ )		
A4.01 A4.02	Cross-tie valves with IAS	2.7 2.1	2.7 2.1

TASK:	Perform lineup of the FPS		
	Place the FPS in standby		
	Shut down the FPS		
		IMPORTANCE	
K/A NO.	KNOWLEDGE	RO	SRO
K1	Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-		
	effect relationships between the Fire Protection System		
	and the following systems:		
	(CFR: 41.2 to 41.9 / 45.7 to 45.8)		
TZ 1 O 1	TT' 1	2.0*	2.44
K1.01	High-pressure service water	3.0*	3.4*
K1.02	Raw service water	2.7*	3.2*
K1.03	AFW system	3.4*	3.5*
K2	Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following:		
132	(CFR: 41.7)		
	(CI R. 41.7)		
	None		
K3	Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the Fire Protection Sy	ystem	
	will have on the following:		
	(CFR: 41.7 / 45.6)		
K3.01	Shutdown capability with redundant equipment	2.7	3.2
K4	Vnowledge of design feature(s) and/an interlegic(s)		
N4	Knowledge of design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following:		
	(CFR: 41.7)		
	(CFR. 41.7)		
K4.01	Adequate supply of water for FPS	3.1	3.7
K4.02	Maintenance of fire header pressure	3.0	3.4
K4.03	Detection and location of fires	3.1	3.7
K4.04	Personnel safety	3.1*	3.4
K4.05	Halon	3.0*	3.4*
K4.06	CO <sub>2</sub>	3.0	3.3
K4.07	MT/G and T/G protection	2.5	2.8
K5	Knowledge of the operational implication of the following concepts as the	y	
	apply to the Fire Protection System:		
	(CFR: 41.5 / 45.7)		
TT 0.1		2.5	2.5
K5.01	Effect of CO <sub>2</sub> on fire	2.2	2.6
K5.02	Effect of halon on fire	2.2	2.6
K5.03	Effect of water spray on electrical components	3.1	3.4
K5.04	Hazards to personnel as a result of fire type and methods of protection	2.9	3.5*

Fire Protection System (FPS)

086

SYSTEM:	086 Fire Protection System (FPS)		
K6	Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction on the Fire Protection System following will have on the : (CFR: 41.7 / 45.7)		
K6.01 K6.02 K6.03 K6.04	Pumps Valves Motors Fire, smoke, and heat detectors	2.1 1.9 1.7 2.6	2.3 1.9 1.9 2.9
A1	Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with Fire Protection System operating the controls including: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.5)		
A1.01 A1.02 A1.03 A1.04 A1.05	Fire header pressure Fire water storage tank level Fire doors Fire dampers FPS lineups	2.9 3.0* 2.7 2.7 2.9	3.3 3.2* 3.2* 3.3 3.1
A2	Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the Fire Protection System; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:  (CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.13)		
A2.01 A2.02 A2.03 A2.04	Manual shutdown of the FPS	2.9 3.0 2.7 3.3	3.1 3.3 2.9 3.9
A3	Ability to monitor automatic operation of the Fire Protection System in (CFR: $41.7/45.5$ )	cluding:	
A3.01 A3.02 A3.03	Starting mechanisms of fire water pumps Actuation of the FPS Actuation of fire detectors	2.9 2.9 2.9	3.3 3.3 3.3
A4	Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: (CFR: $41.7 / 45.5$ to $45.8$ )		
A4.01 A4.02 A4.03 A4.04 A4.05 A4.06	Fire water pumps Fire detection panels Fire alarm switch Fire water storage tank makeup pumps Deluge valves Halon system	3.3 3.5 3.5 3.4* 3.0 3.2	3.3 3.5 3.4 3.3* 3.5 3.2*

# **Safety Function 9:**

Radioactivity Release		page	
068 071	Liquid Radwaste System (LRS) Waste Gas Disposal System (WGDS)	3.9-2 3.9-5	I

#### 068 Liquid Radwaste System (LRS)

	TASK:	Perform lineups of the reactor coolant waste (RCW) system (clean radwaste system)	)
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Perform transfer operations from an RCW holdup/receiver tank Perform transfer operations from a reactor coolant monitor tank

Perform transfer operations from reactor coolant drain/pressurizer relief tank

Monitor the RCW/boron recovery system Start up the RCW/boron evaporator

Transfer waste/boron recovery evaporator concentrates

Shut down the RCW/boron recovery evaporator

Recirculate distillate through the polishing demineralizer Perform transfer of distillate to primary water storage tank

K/A NO.	KNOWLEDGE	IMPOF RO	RTANCE SRO
K1	Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause effect relationships between the Liquid Radwaste System and the following systems: (CFR: 41.2 to 41.9 / 45.7 to 45.8)		
K1.01	RCS and CVCS Waste gas vent header PRT Reactor drain tank CWS/CCWS Boron recovery equipment	2.4	2.6
K1.02		2.5	2.6
K1.03		2.2	2.3
K1.04		2.4*	2.5*
K1.05		2.3	2.6
K1.06		2.1*	2.3*
K1.07	Sources of liquid wastes for LRS	2.7	2.9
K1.08		1.9*	2.2*
K2	Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following: (CFR: 41.7)		
K2.01	Transfer pump	1.7*	1.9
K2.02		1.9	2.1
K2.03		2.1	2.2
K3	Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the Liquid Radwaste System will have on the following: $(CFR:\ 41.7\ /\ 45.6)$		
K3.01	CVCS	2.2	2.4
K3.02		2.1	2.4

SYSTEM:	068 Liquid Radwaste System (LRS)		
K4	Knowledge of design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: (CFR: 41.7)		
K4.01	Safety and environmental precautions for handling hot, acidic, and radioactive liquids	3.4	4.1
K5	Knowledge of the operational implication of the following concepts as the apply to the Liquid Radwaste System: $(CFR:\ 41.5/45.7)$	y	
K5.01	Thermal stress on equipment	1.7	2.2*
K5.02	Relationships between temperature and pressure of a water-based fluid	1.7	1.9
K5.02 K5.03	Units of radiation, dose, and dose rate	2.6	2.6
K5.04	Biological hazards of radiation and the resulting goal of ALARA	3.2	3.5
K5.05	Relationship between evaporator reboiler steam pressure	3.2	3.3
143.03	and the heatup rate	1.7	1.9
K5.06	Evaporation-condensation cycle of distilling units	1.6*	1.8*
K6	Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction on the following will have on the Liquid Radwaste System : $(CFR:\ 41.7/45.7)$		
K6.01	Filters	1.7	1.9
K6.02	Demineralizers and ion exchangers	1.9	2.0
K6.03	Boron recovery evaporator	1.9	1.9
K6.04	Valves	1.8	1.9
K6.05	Pumps	1.7	1.8
K6.06	Controllers and positioners	1.7	1.7
K6.07	Sensors and detectors	1.9	1.9
K6.08	Breakers, relays, and disconnects	1.6	1.7
K6.09	Miscellaneous liquid radiation waste drain tanks and waste holdup tanks	1.9	2.1
K6.10	Radiation monitors	2.5	2.9
K6.11	Waste evaporators	1.8	2.1
A1	ABILITY  Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent		
	exceeding design limits) associated with Liquid Radwaste System operation the controls including: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.5)	ıg	
A1.01	Waste coolant monitor tank	2.2*	2.5*
A1.02	Evaporator pressure control	2.2*	2.3*
	-		

SYSTEM:	068 Liquid Radwaste System (LRS)		
A2	Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the Liquid Radwaste System; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: (CFR: $41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.13$ )		
A2.01	A boric-acid "freeze"	2.3?	2.2?
A2.02	Lack of tank recirculation prior to release	2.7*	2.8*
A2.03	Insufficient sampling frequency of the boric acid in the evaporator bottoms	2.5*	2.6*
A2.04	Failure of automatic isolation	3.3	3.3
<b>A3</b>	Ability to monitor automatic operation of the Liquid Radwaste System in (CFR: $41.7 / 45.5$ )	cluding:	
A3.01	Evaporator pressure control	2.5*	2.4*
A3.02	Automatic isolation	3.6	3.6
A4	Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: (CFR: $41.7 / 45.5$ to $45.8$ )		
A4.01	Control board for boron recovery	2.7*	2.4*
A4.02	Remote radwaste release	3.2*	3.1*
A4.03	Stoppage of release if limits exceeded	3.9	3.8
A4.04	Automatic isolation	3.8	3.7

### 071 Waste Gas Disposal System (WGDS)

TASK: Perform lineups of the WGDS

Start up the WGDS

Shift WGDS compressors Shift waste gas decay tanks

Return gas to the CYCS holdup tank Conduct authorized waste gas release

Monitor WGDS operation

Purge the waste gas surge tank and compressors

Sample the waste gas decay tanks

Recover from automatic termination of gas release due to PRMS system alarm

Shut down the WGDS

<u>K/A NO.</u>	KNOWLEDGE	IMPORTANCE RO SRO	
K1	Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the Waste Gas Disposal System and the following systems: (CFR: 41.2 to 41.9 / 45.7 to 45.8)		
K1.01	Nitrogen gas	2.1	2.1
K1.02	Sealing water	2.2	2.2
K1.03	LRS	2.1	2.1
K1.04	Station ventilation	2.7	2.8
K1.05	Meteorological tower	2.7	2.8
K1.06	ARM and PRM systems	3.1*	3.1
K1.07	RCS	2.1	2.1
K1.08	CVCS	2.2	2.2
K1.09	Plant sampling system	2.1	2.2
<b>K2</b> .01	Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following: (CFR: 41.7) WGDS	1.9	2.1
K2.01 K2.02	Isolation valve	2.0*	2.1
K2.02 K2.03	ARM and PRM systems	2.0*	2.3
<b>K2.03</b>	ARM and I RM systems	2.1	2.3
К3	Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the Waste Gas Dispos System will have on the following: $(CFR:\ 41.7/45.6)$	al	
K3.01	LRS	2.0	2.3
K3.02	CVCS	2.1	2.1
K3.03	RCS	2.2	2.1
K3.04	Ventilation system	2.7	2.9
K3.05	ARM and PRM systems	3.2	3.2

### SYSTEM: 071 Waste Gas Disposal System (WGDS)

K4	Knowledge of design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: (CFR: 41.7)		
K4.01 K4.02	Pressure capability of the waste gas decay tank	2.6 2.5*	3.0 2.5*
K4.02 K4.03	Sealing water around the shaft of the gas compressor	2.5*	2.6*
K4.03 K4.04	Isolation of waste gas release tanks	2.9	3.4
K4.05	Point of release	2.7	3.0
K4.06	Sampling and monitoring of waste gas release tanks	2.7*	3.5*
K5	Knowledge of the operational implication of the following concepts as the apply to the Waste Gas Disposal System: (CFR: $41.5/45.7$ )	ey	
K5.01	Relative pressure measurements	1.7	2.1
K5.02	Relationships and measurements of gas temperature,		
	pressure, and flow rate	1.7	1.9
K5.03	Sources of hydrogen that could accumulate in the decay tank	2.3	2.9
K5.04	Relationship of hydrogen/oxygen concentrations to flammability	2.5	3.1
K5.05	Methods of measuring hydrogen gas concentration	2.1	2.7
K5.06	Radioactive decay	2.3	2.4
К6	Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction on the Waste Gas Dispos System following will have on the : $(CFR:\ 41.7\ /\ 45.7)$	al	
K6.01	Valves	1.9	2.1
K6.02	Sensors and detectors	1.9	1.9
K6.03	Controllers and positioners	1.8	1.9
K6.04	Pumps	1.6	1.7
K6.05	Motors	1.6	1.7
K6.06	Breakers, relays, and disconnects	1.7	1.8
K6.07	Compressors	1.9	2.1
K6.08	Rupture disks	2.2	2.5
K6.09	Waste gas header	2.3	2.5
K6.10	Surge and decay tanks	2.3	2.5

Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with Waste Gas Disposal System operating the controls including:   (CFR: 41.5 / 45.5)	SYSTEM:	071 Waste Gas Disposal System (WGDS)		
Al.02	A1	design limits) associated with Waste Gas Disposal System operating the controls including:	ling	
A1.03       Holdup tank pressure and level       2.3       2.4         A1.04       Waste gas header pressure vs. compressor operation       2.3       2.5         A1.05       Decay tank pressure vs. liquid levels       2.0       2.1         A1.06       Ventilation system       2.5       2.8         A1.07       Surge tank pressure and level       2.0       2.2         A2       Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the Waste Gas Disposal System; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:         (CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.13)         A2.01       Use of WGDS to prevent entry of oxygen into holdup tanks during liquid transfers       2.3?       2.8?         A2.02       Use of waste gas release monitors, radiation, gas flow rate, and totalizer       3.3       3.6         A2.03       Rupture disk failures       2.7*       3.3*         A2.04       Loss of cover gas       2.3*       2.7*         A2.05       Power failure to the ARM and PRM Systems       2.5       2.6         A2.06       Supply failure to the isolation valve       2.4       2.5         A2.07       Loss of meteorological tower       2.5       2.9         A2.08       Meteorological changes       2.5	A1.01	Time response of radiation levels to release of waste gas	2.2	2.9
A1.03       Holdup tank pressure and level       2.3       2.4         A1.04       Waste gas header pressure vs. compressor operation       2.3       2.5         A1.05       Decay tank pressure vs. liquid levels       2.0       2.1         A1.06       Ventilation system       2.5       2.8         A1.07       Surge tank pressure and level       2.0       2.2         A2       Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the Waste Gas Disposal System; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:         (CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.13)         A2.01       Use of WGDS to prevent entry of oxygen into holdup tanks during liquid transfers       2.3?       2.8?         A2.02       Use of waste gas release monitors, radiation, gas flow rate, and totalizer       3.3       3.6         A2.03       Rupture disk failures       2.7*       3.3*         A2.04       Loss of cover gas       2.3*       2.7*         A2.05       Power failure to the ARM and PRM Systems       2.5       2.6         A2.06       Supply failure to the isolation valve       2.4       2.5         A2.07       Loss of meteorological tower       2.5       2.9         A2.08       Meteorological changes       2.5	A1.02	Nitrogen addition to the decay tank	2.0	2.3
A1.04       Waste gas header pressure vs. compressor operation       2.3       2.5         A1.05       Decay tank pressure vs. liquid levels       2.0       2.1         A1.06       Ventilation system       2.5       2.8         A1.07       Surge tank pressure and level       2.0       2.2         A2       Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the Waste Gas Disposal System; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:	A1.03		2.3	2.4
A1.06 Ventilation system	A1.04	Waste gas header pressure vs. compressor operation	2.3	2.5
A1.07 Surge tank pressure and level	A1.05	Decay tank pressure vs. liquid levels	2.0	2.1
A1.07 Surge tank pressure and level	A1.06	Ventilation system	2.5	2.8
operations on the Waste Gas Disposal System; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:  (CFR: 41.5/43.5/45.3/45.13)  A2.01 Use of WGDS to prevent entry of oxygen into holdup tanks during liquid transfers 2.3? 2.8?  A2.02 Use of waste gas release monitors, radiation, gas flow rate, and totalizer 3.3 3.6  A2.03 Rupture disk failures 2.7* 3.3*  A2.04 Loss of cover gas 2.3* 2.7*  A2.05 Power failure to the ARM and PRM Systems 2.5* 2.6  A2.06 Supply failure to the isolation valve 2.4 2.5  A2.07 Loss of meteorological tower 2.5 2.9  A2.08 Meteorological changes 2.5 2.8*  A2.09 Stuck-open relief valve 3.0* 3.5*  A3 Ability to monitor automatic operation of the Waste Gas Disposal System including:  (CFR: 41.7/45.5)	A1.07		2.0	2.2
A2.02       Use of waste gas release monitors, radiation, gas flow rate, and totalizer       3.3       3.6         A2.03       Rupture disk failures       2.7*       3.3*         A2.04       Loss of cover gas       2.3*       2.7*         A2.05       Power failure to the ARM and PRM Systems       2.5*       2.6         A2.06       Supply failure to the isolation valve       2.4       2.5         A2.07       Loss of meteorological tower       2.5       2.9         A2.08       Meteorological changes       2.5       2.8*         A2.09       Stuck-open relief valve       3.0*       3.5*          A3       Ability to monitor automatic operation of the Waste Gas Disposal System including:       (CFR: 41.7/45.5)	A2	operations on the Waste Gas Disposal System; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequence of those malfunctions or operations:	ces	
A2.02 Use of waste gas release monitors, radiation, gas flow rate, and totalizer 3.3 3.6 A2.03 Rupture disk failures 2.7* 3.3* A2.04 Loss of cover gas 2.3* 2.7* A2.05 Power failure to the ARM and PRM Systems 2.5* 2.6 A2.06 Supply failure to the isolation valve 2.4 2.5 A2.07 Loss of meteorological tower 2.5 2.9 A2.08 Meteorological changes 2.5 2.8* A2.09 Stuck-open relief valve 3.0* 3.5*  Ability to monitor automatic operation of the Waste Gas Disposal System including: (CFR: 41.7/45.5)	A2.01	Use of WGDS to prevent entry of oxygen into holdup		
A2.03       Rupture disk failures       2.7*       3.3*         A2.04       Loss of cover gas       2.3*       2.7*         A2.05       Power failure to the ARM and PRM Systems       2.5*       2.6         A2.06       Supply failure to the isolation valve       2.4       2.5         A2.07       Loss of meteorological tower       2.5       2.9         A2.08       Meteorological changes       2.5       2.8*         A2.09       Stuck-open relief valve       3.0*       3.5*          A3       Ability to monitor automatic operation of the Waste Gas Disposal System including:         (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5)		tanks during liquid transfers	2.3?	2.8?
A2.04 Loss of cover gas	A2.02	Use of waste gas release monitors, radiation, gas flow rate, and totalizer	3.3	3.6
A2.05 Power failure to the ARM and PRM Systems 2.5* 2.6 A2.06 Supply failure to the isolation valve 2.4 2.5 A2.07 Loss of meteorological tower 2.5 2.9 A2.08 Meteorological changes 2.5 2.8* A2.09 Stuck-open relief valve 3.0* 3.5*  Ability to monitor automatic operation of the Waste Gas Disposal System including: (CFR: 41.7/45.5)	A2.03	Rupture disk failures	2.7*	3.3*
A2.05 Power failure to the ARM and PRM Systems 2.5* 2.6 A2.06 Supply failure to the isolation valve 2.4 2.5 A2.07 Loss of meteorological tower 2.5 2.9 A2.08 Meteorological changes 2.5 2.8* A2.09 Stuck-open relief valve 3.0* 3.5*  Ability to monitor automatic operation of the Waste Gas Disposal System including: (CFR: 41.7/45.5)	A2.04	Loss of cover gas	2.3*	2.7*
A2.07 Loss of meteorological tower	A2.05		2.5*	2.6
A2.08 Meteorological changes	A2.06	Supply failure to the isolation valve	2.4	2.5
A2.09 Stuck-open relief valve	A2.07	Loss of meteorological tower	2.5	2.9
A2.09 Stuck-open relief valve	A2.08	Meteorological changes	2.5	2.8*
including: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5)	A2.09	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	3.0*	3.5*
A3.01 HRPS 2.6* 2.7*	A3	including:		
	A3.01	HRPS	2.6*	2.7*
A3.02 Pressure-regulating system for waste gas vent header 2.8 2.8				
A3.03 Radiation monitoring system alarm and actuating signals				

#### SYSTEM: 071 Waste Gas Disposal System (WGDS)

# Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 to 45.8)

A4.01	Valva to put the holdun tenk into comical indications		
A4.01	Valve to put the holdup tank into service; indications of valve positions and tank pressure	2.7*	2.2*
A4.02	Waste-gas compressor, including control switch, un-	2.7	2.2
A4.02	loading valve, and drain valve	2.5*	2.3*
A4.03	Valves and indications for sealing water to the gas-	2.5	2.5
A4.03	compressor shaft	2.6*	2.2*
<b>A 4 O 4</b>	1		
A4.04 A4.05	Radwaste liquid transfer pumps	2.4 2.6*	2.1* 2.6*
	Gas decay tanks, including valves, indicators, and sample line	2.0	2.0
A4.06	Meteorological charts and recorders, along with the	2.0	2.2
A 4 07	stop-time and waste-gas release number	2.8	3.3 3.0*
A4.07	Waste gas release flow meter	3.0*	
A4.08	Nitrogen gas addition	2.3*	2.0*
A4.09	Waste gas release rad monitors	3.3	3.5
A4.10	WGDS sampling	2.5*	2.4*
A4.11	WGDS startup and shutdown	2.5*	2.3*
A4.12	Air purge of WGDS release radiation monitors	2.3*	2.4*
A4.13	Recovery from automatic termination of gas release due	2.0	2.1
	to PRM system alarm	3.0	3.1
A4.14	WDGS status alarms	2.8	3.0
A4.15	Procedure for putting the waste gas compressor in	2 41	2 24
	service and for removing it from service	2.4*	2.3*
A4.16	Waste gas decay tank shifts	2.5*	2.2*
A4.17	Stopping transfer of radioactive liquids to WGDS decay tank	2.6*	2.5*
A4.18	Operation of radwaste liquid transfer pumps	2.2*	2.0*
A4.19	Bringing an empty WDGS decay tank on line and shutting		
	down a full tank	2.5*	2.2*
A4.20	Placing WGDS gas compressors in automatic operation	2.5*	2.2*
A4.21	Valve lineup for returning gas to the CVCS holdup tank		
	from a waste gas decay tank	2.4*	2.1*
A4.22	Use of recycle gas header	2.3*	2.2*
A4.23	Procedure for regulating pressure in CVCS holdup tanks	2.3*	2.1*
A4.24	The double verification required before waste gas release	2.9*	3.4*
A4.25	Setting of process radiation monitor alarms, automatic		
	functions, and adjustment of setpoints	3.2*	3.2
A4.26	Authorized waste gas release, conducted in compliance		
	with radioactive gas discharge permit	3.1	3.9
A4.27	Opening and closing of the decay tank discharge control valve	3.0*	2.7*
A4.28	Nitrogen additions to the decay tank, and knowledge of limits	2.4*	2.4
A4.29	Sampling oxygen, hydrogen and nitrogen concentrations		
	in WDGS decay tank; knowledge of limits	3.0*	3.6*
A4.30	Water drainage from the WGOS decay tanks	2.9*	2.6*

<u>Gener</u>	Generic Emergency Plant Evolutions		
007	Reactor Trip	4.1-2	
009	Small Break LOCA	4.1-4	
011	Large Break LOCA	4.1-7	
029	Anticipated Transient Without Scram (ATWS)	4.1-9	
038	Steam Generator Tube Rupture	4.1-11	
055	Station Blackout	4.1-14	
074	Inadequate Core Cooling	4.1-16	

EPE:	007 Reactor Trip		
K/A NO.	KNOWLEDGE	RO	RTANCE SRO
EK1	Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the reactor trip: $(CFR\ 41.8\ /\ 41.10\ /\ 45.3)$		
EK1.01	Principles of neutron detection	2.4	2.9
EK1.02	Shutdown margin	3.4	3.8
EK1.03	Reasons for closing the main turbine governor valve and the main turbine stop valve after a reactor trip	3.7	4.0
EK1.04	Decrease in reactor power following reactor trip (prompt	3.7	
	drop and subsequent decay)	3.6	3.9
EK1.05	Decay power as a function of time	3.3	3.8
EK1.06	Relationship of emergency feedwater flow to S/G and		
	decay heat removal following reactor trip	3.7	4.1
EK2	Knowledge of the interrelations between a reactor trip and the following: $(\text{CFR}\ 41.7\ /\ 45.7)$		
EK2.01	Sensors and detectors	2.3	2.3
EK2.02	Breakers, relays and disconnects	2.6	2.8
EK2.03	Reactor trip status panel	3.5	3.6
EK2.04	Controllers and positioners	2.3	2.4
ЕК3	Knowledge of the reasons for the following as the apply to a reactor trip: (CFR $41.5\ / 41.10\ /\ 45.6\ /\ 45.13)$		
EK3.01	Actions contained in EOP for reactor trip	4.0	4.6
	<u>ABILITY</u>		
EA1	Ability to operate and monitor the following as they apply to a reactor trip (CFR $41.7/45.5/45.6)$	•	
EA1.01	T/G controls	3.7	3.4
EA1.02	MFW System	3.8	3.7
EA1.03	RCS pressure and temperature	4.2	4.1
EA1.04	RCP operation and flow rates	3.6	3.7
EA1.05	Nuclear instrumentation	4.0	4.1
EA1.06	Reactor trip (scram): verification that the control		
	and safety rods are in after the trip	4.4	4.5
EA1.07	MT/G trip; verification that the MT/G has been tripped	4.3	4.3
EA1.08	AFW System	4.4	4.3
EA1.09	CVCS	3.2	3.3
EA1.10	S/G pressure	3.7	3.7
EA2	Ability to determine or interpret the following as they apply to a reactor to (CFR $41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6$ )	rip:	
EA2.01 EA2.02	Decreasing power level, from available indications	4.1	4.3
	tions have not taken place	4.3	4.6
EA2.03	Reactor trip breaker position	4.2	4.4

EPE:	007 Reactor Trip		
EA2.04	If reactor should have tripped but has not done so, manually trip the reactor and carry out actions in		
	ATWS EOP	4.4	4.6
EA2.05	Reactor trip first-out indication	3.4	3.9
EA2.06	Occurrence of a reactor trip	4.3	4.5

## EPE: 009 Small Break LOCA

	K/A NO.	<u>KNOWLEDGE</u>	IMPOR RO	TANCE SRO
	EK1	Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the small break LOCA: $(CFR\ 41.8\ /\ 41.10\ /\ 45.3)$		
	EK1.01	Natural circulation and cooling, including reflux		
	EK1.02	boiling	4.2 3.5	4.7 4.2
	EK2	Knowledge of the interrelations between the small break LOCA and the following: $(CFR\ 41.7\ /\ 45.7)$		
	EK2.01	Valves	2.2	2.3
	EK2.02	Pumps	2.3	2.6*
	EK2.03	S/Gs	3.0	3.3*
'	EK2.04	Sensors and detectors	2.3	2.6
	EK3	Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as the apply to the small break LOCA: $(CFR\ 41.5\ /\ 41.10\ /\ 45.6\ /\ 45.13)$		
	EK3.01	CCW System automatic isolation on high delta flow/		
		temperature to RCP thermal barrier	3.1*	3.6*
	EK3.02	Opening excess letdown isolation valve	2.8*	3.2*
•	EK3.03	Reactor trip and safety initiation	4.1	4.4
	EK3.04	Starting additional charging pumps	4.1	4.3
	EK3.05	CCWS radiation alarm	3.4	3.8
	EK3.06	RCS inventory balance	3.9	4.0
	EK3.07	Increasing indication on CCWS process monitor: indicates		
		in-leakage of radioactive liquids	3.3	3.6
	EK3.08	PTS limits on RCS pressure and temperature - NC and FC	3.6	4.1
I	EK3.09	Closing CCW surge tank vent	3.1*	3.4*
1	EK3.10	Observation of PZR level	3.4	3.6
	EK3.11	Dangers associated with inadequate core cooling	4.4	4.5
	EK3.12	Letdown isolation	3.4	3.7
	EK3.13	Stopping the affected RCP	3.4	3.7
	EK3.14	Monitoring RCP lower bearings	3.1	3.2
	EK3.15	Closing of RCP thermal barrier outlet valves	3.2	3.2
	EK3.16	Containment temperature, pressure, humidity and level limits	3.8	4.1
	EK3.17	Automatic isolation of containment	4.0	4.3
	EK3.18	Monitoring containment radiation levels	3.9	4.3
I	EK3.19	Operator initiation of containment vent isolation/indication	3.6?	3.9?
ı	EK3.20	Tech-Spec leakage limits	3.5	4.3
	EK3.21	Actions contained in EOP for small break LOCA/leak	4.2	4.5
	EK3.22	Maintenance of heat sink	4.4	4.5
	EK3.23	RCP tripping requirements	4.2	4.3
	EK3.24	ECCS throttling or termination criteria	4.1	4.6
	EK3.25	Monitoring of in-core T-cold	3.6	3.9
	EK3.26	Maintenance of RCS subcooling	4.4	4.5
	EK3.27	Manual depressurization or HPI recirculation for sustained high pressure .	3.6	3.8
	EK3.28	Manual ESFAS initiation requirements	4.5	4.5

#### EPE: 009 Small Break LOCA

#### **ABILITY**

EA1	Ability to operate and monitor the following as they apply to a small break LOCA: (CFR 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6)		
	(CFR 41.77 45.57 45.0)		
EA1.01	RCS pressure and temperature	4.4	4.3
EA1.02	RB sump level	3.8	3.8
EA1.03	Low-pressure SWS activity monitor	3.2*	3.2*
EA1.04	CVCS	3.7*	3.5
EA1.05	CCWS	3.4*	3.4
EA1.06	Plant computer	3.0*	3.3
EA1.07	CCS	3.7	3.9
EA1.08	Containment isolation system	4.0	4.1
EA1.09	RCP	3.6	3.6
EA1.10	Safety parameter display system	3.8*	3.9*
EA1.11	AFW/MFW	4.1	4.1
EA1.12	RPS	4.2	4.2
EA1.13	ESFAS	4.4	4.4
EA1.14	Secondary pressure control	3.4	3.4
EA1.15	PORV and PORV block valve	3.9	4.1
EA1.16	Subcooling margin monitors	4.2	4.2
EA1.17	PRT	3.4	3.4
EA1.18	Balancing of HPI loop flows	3.4*	3.2*
EA1.19	LRS	2.3	2.4
EA2	Ability to determine or interpret the following as they apply to a small break LOCA: (CFR $43.5 / 45.13$ )		
EA2.01	Antique to be taken based on DCS townsometring and		
EA2.01	Actions to be taken, based on RCS temperature and	4.2	1.0
EA2.02	pressure, saturated and superheated	4.2	4.8
EA2.02 EA2.03	Possible leak paths		20
EA2.03 EA2.04	CCWS high rediction clarm	3.5	3.8
LA2.04	CCWS high-radiation alarm	3.5 3.4	3.8
EA2.05	PZR level	3.5	
EA2.05	PZR level	3.5 3.4 3.8	3.8 4.0
	PZR level	3.5 3.4 3.8 3.4*	3.8 4.0 3.9
EA2.06	PZR level  The time available for action before PZR is empty, given the rate of decrease of PZR level  Whether PZR water inventory loss is imminent	3.5 3.4 3.8 3.4* 3.8	3.8 4.0 3.9 4.3
EA2.06 EA2.07	PZR level  The time available for action before PZR is empty, given the rate of decrease of PZR level  Whether PZR water inventory loss is imminent  CCWS surge tank vent isolation valve indication	3.5 3.4 3.8 3.4* 3.8 2.7*	3.8 4.0 3.9 4.3 3.1*
EA2.06 EA2.07 EA2.08	PZR level  The time available for action before PZR is empty, given the rate of decrease of PZR level  Whether PZR water inventory loss is imminent  CCWS surge tank vent isolation valve indication  Letdown isolation valve position indication	3.5 3.4 3.8 3.4* 3.8 2.7* 2.9*	3.8 4.0 3.9 4.3 3.1* 2.9*
EA2.06 EA2.07	PZR level	3.5 3.4 3.8 3.4* 3.8 2.7* 2.9* 2.8*	3.8 4.0 3.9 4.3 3.1* 2.9* 3.3*
EA2.06 EA2.07 EA2.08 EA2.09 EA2.10	PZR level  The time available for action before PZR is empty, given the rate of decrease of PZR level  Whether PZR water inventory loss is imminent  CCWS surge tank vent isolation valve indication  Letdown isolation valve position indication  Low-pressure SWS activity monitor  Airborne activity	3.5 3.4 3.8 3.4* 3.8 2.7* 2.9* 2.8* 3.1	3.8 4.0 3.9 4.3 3.1* 2.9* 3.3* 3.7
EA2.06 EA2.07 EA2.08 EA2.09	PZR level The time available for action before PZR is empty, given the rate of decrease of PZR level Whether PZR water inventory loss is imminent CCWS surge tank vent isolation valve indication Letdown isolation valve position indication Low-pressure SWS activity monitor Airborne activity Containment temperature, pressure, and humidity	3.5 3.4 3.8 3.4* 3.8 2.7* 2.9* 2.8*	3.8 4.0 3.9 4.3 3.1* 2.9* 3.3*
EA2.06 EA2.07 EA2.08 EA2.09 EA2.10 EA2.11	PZR level The time available for action before PZR is empty, given the rate of decrease of PZR level Whether PZR water inventory loss is imminent CCWS surge tank vent isolation valve indication Letdown isolation valve position indication Low-pressure SWS activity monitor Airborne activity Containment temperature, pressure, and humidity Charging pump ammeter	3.5 3.4 3.8 3.4* 3.8 2.7* 2.9* 2.8* 3.1 3.8	3.8 4.0 3.9 4.3 3.1* 2.9* 3.3* 3.7 4.1
EA2.06 EA2.07 EA2.08 EA2.09 EA2.10 EA2.11 EA2.12	PZR level The time available for action before PZR is empty, given the rate of decrease of PZR level Whether PZR water inventory loss is imminent CCWS surge tank vent isolation valve indication Letdown isolation valve position indication Low-pressure SWS activity monitor Airborne activity Containment temperature, pressure, and humidity Charging pump ammeter Charging pump flow indication	3.5 3.4 3.8 3.4* 3.8 2.7* 2.9* 2.8* 3.1 3.8 2.8	3.8 4.0 3.9 4.3 3.1* 2.9* 3.3* 3.7 4.1 2.7
EA2.06 EA2.07 EA2.08 EA2.09 EA2.10 EA2.11 EA2.12 EA2.13	PZR level The time available for action before PZR is empty, given the rate of decrease of PZR level Whether PZR water inventory loss is imminent CCWS surge tank vent isolation valve indication Letdown isolation valve position indication Low-pressure SWS activity monitor Airborne activity Containment temperature, pressure, and humidity Charging pump ammeter Charging pump flow indication Actions to be taken if PTS limits are violated	3.5 3.4 3.8 3.4* 3.8 2.7* 2.9* 2.8* 3.1 3.8 2.8 3.4	3.8 4.0 3.9 4.3 3.1* 2.9* 3.3* 3.7 4.1 2.7 3.6
EA2.06 EA2.07 EA2.08 EA2.09 EA2.10 EA2.11 EA2.12 EA2.13 EA2.14	PZR level The time available for action before PZR is empty, given the rate of decrease of PZR level Whether PZR water inventory loss is imminent CCWS surge tank vent isolation valve indication Letdown isolation valve position indication Low-pressure SWS activity monitor Airborne activity Containment temperature, pressure, and humidity Charging pump ammeter Charging pump flow indication Actions to be taken if PTS limits are violated RCS parameters	3.5 3.4 3.8 3.4* 3.8 2.7* 2.9* 2.8* 3.1 3.8 2.8 3.4	3.8 4.0 3.9 4.3 3.1* 2.9* 3.3* 3.7 4.1 2.7 3.6 4.4
EA2.06 EA2.07 EA2.08 EA2.09 EA2.10 EA2.11 EA2.12 EA2.13 EA2.14 EA2.15	PZR level The time available for action before PZR is empty, given the rate of decrease of PZR level Whether PZR water inventory loss is imminent CCWS surge tank vent isolation valve indication Letdown isolation valve position indication Low-pressure SWS activity monitor Airborne activity Containment temperature, pressure, and humidity Charging pump ammeter Charging pump flow indication Actions to be taken if PTS limits are violated	3.5 3.4 3.8 3.4* 3.8 2.7* 2.9* 2.8* 3.1 3.8 2.8 3.4 3.8 3.3	3.8 4.0 3.9 4.3 3.1* 2.9* 3.3* 3.7 4.1 2.7 3.6 4.4 3.4
EA2.06 EA2.07 EA2.08 EA2.09 EA2.10 EA2.11 EA2.12 EA2.13 EA2.14 EA2.15 EA2.16	PZR level The time available for action before PZR is empty, given the rate of decrease of PZR level Whether PZR water inventory loss is imminent CCWS surge tank vent isolation valve indication Letdown isolation valve position indication Low-pressure SWS activity monitor Airborne activity Containment temperature, pressure, and humidity Charging pump ammeter Charging pump flow indication Actions to be taken if PTS limits are violated RCS parameters CCW suction pressure guage	3.5 3.4 3.8 3.4* 3.8 2.7* 2.9* 2.8* 3.1 3.8 2.8 3.4 3.8 2.3*	3.8 4.0 3.9 4.3 3.1* 2.9* 3.3* 3.7 4.1 2.7 3.6 4.4 3.4 2.4
EA2.06 EA2.07 EA2.08 EA2.09 EA2.10 EA2.11 EA2.12 EA2.13 EA2.14 EA2.15 EA2.16 EA2.17	PZR level The time available for action before PZR is empty, given the rate of decrease of PZR level Whether PZR water inventory loss is imminent CCWS surge tank vent isolation valve indication Letdown isolation valve position indication Low-pressure SWS activity monitor Airborne activity Containment temperature, pressure, and humidity Charging pump ammeter Charging pump flow indication Actions to be taken if PTS limits are violated RCS parameters CCW suction pressure guage Total flow meter	3.5 3.4 3.8 3.4* 3.8 2.7* 2.9* 2.8* 3.1 3.8 2.8 3.4 3.8 3.3 2.3* 3.3?	3.8 4.0 3.9 4.3 3.1* 2.9* 3.3* 3.7 4.1 2.7 3.6 4.4 3.4 2.4 3.9?
EA2.06 EA2.07 EA2.08 EA2.09 EA2.10 EA2.11 EA2.12 EA2.13 EA2.14 EA2.15 EA2.16 EA2.17	PZR level The time available for action before PZR is empty, given the rate of decrease of PZR level Whether PZR water inventory loss is imminent CCWS surge tank vent isolation valve indication Letdown isolation valve position indication Low-pressure SWS activity monitor Airborne activity Containment temperature, pressure, and humidity Charging pump ammeter Charging pump flow indication Actions to be taken if PTS limits are violated RCS parameters CCW suction pressure guage Total flow meter CCW temperature indication for RCP oil coolers	3.5 3.4 3.8 3.4* 3.8 2.7* 2.9* 2.8* 3.1 3.8 2.8 3.4 3.3 2.3* 3.3? 2.3	3.8 4.0 3.9 4.3 3.1* 2.9* 3.3* 3.7 4.1 2.7 3.6 4.4 3.9? 2.4 3.9? 2.6*
EA2.06 EA2.07 EA2.08 EA2.09 EA2.10 EA2.11 EA2.12 EA2.13 EA2.14 EA2.15 EA2.16 EA2.17 EA2.18 EA2.19	PZR level The time available for action before PZR is empty, given the rate of decrease of PZR level Whether PZR water inventory loss is imminent CCWS surge tank vent isolation valve indication Letdown isolation valve position indication Low-pressure SWS activity monitor Airborne activity Containment temperature, pressure, and humidity Charging pump ammeter Charging pump flow indication Actions to be taken if PTS limits are violated RCS parameters CCW suction pressure guage Total flow meter CCW temperature indication for RCP oil coolers Containment air cooler run indication	3.5 3.4 3.8 3.4* 3.8 2.7* 2.9* 2.8* 3.1 3.8 2.8 3.4 3.3 2.3* 3.3? 2.3	3.8 4.0 3.9 4.3 3.1* 2.9* 3.3* 3.7 4.1 2.7 3.6 4.4 3.9? 2.6* 3.1
EA2.06 EA2.07 EA2.08 EA2.09 EA2.10 EA2.11 EA2.12 EA2.13 EA2.14 EA2.15 EA2.16 EA2.17 EA2.18 EA2.19 EA2.20 EA2.21 EA2.21	PZR level The time available for action before PZR is empty, given the rate of decrease of PZR level Whether PZR water inventory loss is imminent CCWS surge tank vent isolation valve indication Letdown isolation valve position indication Low-pressure SWS activity monitor Airborne activity Containment temperature, pressure, and humidity Charging pump ammeter Charging pump flow indication Actions to be taken if PTS limits are violated RCS parameters CCW suction pressure guage Total flow meter CCW temperature indication for RCP oil coolers Containment air cooler run indication Containment vent damper position indicator	3.5 3.4 3.8 3.4* 3.8 2.7* 2.9* 2.8* 3.1 3.8 2.8 3.4 3.8 3.3 2.3* 3.3? 2.3* 2.3* 2.3*	3.8 4.0 3.9 4.3 3.1* 2.9* 3.3* 3.7 4.1 2.7 3.6 4.4 3.9? 2.6* 3.1 2.9
EA2.06 EA2.07 EA2.08 EA2.09 EA2.10 EA2.11 EA2.12 EA2.13 EA2.14 EA2.15 EA2.16 EA2.17 EA2.18 EA2.19 EA2.20 EA2.21	PZR level The time available for action before PZR is empty, given the rate of decrease of PZR level Whether PZR water inventory loss is imminent CCWS surge tank vent isolation valve indication Letdown isolation valve position indication Low-pressure SWS activity monitor Airborne activity Containment temperature, pressure, and humidity Charging pump ammeter Charging pump flow indication Actions to be taken if PTS limits are violated RCS parameters CCW suction pressure guage Total flow meter CCW temperature indication for RCP oil coolers Containment air cooler run indication Containment vent damper position indicator Containment radiation trend recorder	3.5 3.4 3.8 3.4* 3.8 2.7* 2.9* 2.8* 3.1 3.8 2.8 3.4 3.8 2.3* 3.3? 2.3* 2.3* 2.3* 2.3*	3.8 4.0 3.9 4.3 3.1* 2.9* 3.3* 3.7 4.1 2.7 3.6 4.4 3.4 2.4 3.9? 2.6* 3.1 2.9 3.9

EPE:	009 Small Break LOCA		
EA2.24	RCP temperature setpoints	2.6	2.9
EA2.25	Reactor trip setpoints	3.9	4.1
EA2.26	Activity waste tank level gauges	2.1*	2.5*
EA2.27	Activity waste tank trend recorder	2.1*	2.4*
EA2.28	Leak rate, from change in reactor coolant drain tank level	2.8	3.1*
EA2.29	CVCS pump indicating lights for determining pump status	3.2	3.4
EA2.30	Tech-Spec limits for plant operation with less than four loops	2.5*	3.5*
EA2.31	Tech-Spec limits for plant operation with an idle loop	2.5*	3.5*
EA2.32	SDM	3.2*	3.6*
EA2.33	RCS water inventory balance and Tech-Spec limits	3.3	3.8
EA2.34	Conditions for throttling or stopping HPI	3.6	4.2
EA2.35	Conditions for throttling or stopping reflux boiling spray	3.4*	4.1*
EA2.36	Difference between overcooling and LOCA indications	4.2	4.6
EA2.37	Existence of adequate natural circulation	4.2	4.5
EA2.38	Existence of head bubble	3.9	4.3
EA2.39	Adequate core cooling	4.3	4.7

EPE:	011 Large Break LOCA		
		PORTANC	Έ
K/A NO.	KNOWLEDGE	RO	SRO
EK1	Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the Large Break LOCA : $(CFR\ 41.8\ /\ 41.10\ /\ 45.3)$		
EK1.01	Natural circulation and cooling, including reflux boiling	4.1	4.4
EK2	Knowledge of the interrelations between the and the following Large Break LOCA: $(CFR\ 41.7\ /\ 45.7)$		
EK2.01	Valves	2.4	2.4
EK2.01 EK2.02	Pumps	2.6*	2.7*
ЕК3	Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as the apply to the Large Break LOCA: $(CFR\ 41.5\ /\ 41.10\ /\ 45.6\ /\ 45.13)$		
EK3.01	Verifying main steam isolation valve position	3.4*	3.5*
EK3.02	Feedwater isolation	3.5*	3.7*
EK3.03	Starting auxiliary feed pumps and flow, ED/G, and service water pumps	4.1	4.3
EK3.04	Placing containment fan cooler damper in accident position	4.0*	4.3
EK3.05	Injection into cold leg	4.0*	4.1
EK3.06	Actuation of Phase A and B during LOCA initiation	4.3*	4.3*
EK3.07	Stopping charging pump bypass flow	3.5*	3.6*
EK3.08	Flowpath for sump recirculation	3.9	4.1
EK3.09	Maintaining D/Gs available to provide standby power	4.2	4.5
EK3.10	PTS limits on RCS pressure and temperature	3.7	3.9
EK3.11	NC and PC	3.3?	3.4?
EK3.12	Actions contained in EOP for emergency LOCA (large break)	4.4	4.6
EK3.13	Hot-leg injection/recirculation	3.8	4.2
EK3.14	RCP tripping requirement	4.1	4.2
EK3.15	Criteria for shifting to recirculation mode	4.3	4.4
EA1	Ability to operate and monitor the following as they apply to a Large Break LOCA: $(CFR\ 41.7\ /\ 45.5\ /\ 45.6)$		
EA1.01	Control of RCS pressure and temperature to avoid violat-		
	ing PTS limits	3.7*	3.8*
EA1.02	Reflux boiling sump level indicators	3.8	4.1
EA1.03	Securing of RCPs	4.0	4.0
EA1.04	ESF actuation system in manual	4.4	4.4
EA1.05	Manual and/or automatic transfer of suction of charging		
	pumps to borated source	4.3	3.9
EA1 06	D/Gs	4.2	4.2
EA1.07	Containment isolation system	4.4	4.4
EA1.08	Valves to prevent water hammer	2.7*	2.6*
EA1.09	Core flood tank initiation	4.3	4.3
EA1.10	AFW and SWS pumps	4.1	3.8
EA1.11	Long-term cooling of core	4.2	4.2
EA1.12	Long-term containment of radioactivity	4.1	4.4

EPE:	011 Large Break LOCA		
EA1.13	Safety injection components	4.1*	4.2
EA1.14	Subcooling margin monitors	3.9	4.1
EA1.15	RCS temperature and pressure	4.2	4.2
EA1.16	Balancing of HPI loop flows	3.5*	3.5*
EA1.17	Safety parameter display system	3.5*	4.1*
EA2	Ability to determine or interpret the following as they apply to a Large Break LOCA: (CFR 43.5 / 45.13)		
EA2.01	Actions to be taken, based on RCS temperature and		
	pressure - saturated and superheated	4.2	4.7
EA2.02	Consequences to RHR of not resetting safety injection	3.3*	3.7*
EA2.03	Consequences of managing LOCA with loss of CCW	3.7	4.2
EA2.04	Significance of PZR readings	3.7	3.9
EA2.05	Significance of charging pump operation	3.3	3.7*
EA2.06	That fan is in slow speed and dampers are in accident mode during LOCA .	3.7*	4.0*
EA2.07	That equipment necessary for functioning of critical		
	pump water seals is operable	3.2?	3.4*
EA2.08	Conditions necessary for recovery when accident reaches stable phase	3.4*	3.9*
EA2.09	Existence of adequate natural circulation	4.2	4.3
EA2.10	Verification of adequate core cooling	4.5	4.7
EA2.11	Conditions for throttling or stopping HPI	3.9	4.3
EA2.12	Conditions for throttling or stopping reflux boiling spray	3.6*	3.8*
EA2.13	Difference between overcooling and LOCA indications	3.7*	3.7*
EA2.14	Actions to be taken if limits for PTS are violated	3.6*	4.0

## **EPE:** 029 Anticipated Transient Without Scram (ATWS)

K/A NO.	KNOWLEDGE	IMPOR RO	RTANCE SRO
EK1	Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the ATWS: $(CFR\ 41.8\ /\ 41.10\ /\ 45.3)$		
EK1.01	Reactor nucleonics and thermo-hydraulics behavior	2.8	3.1
EK1.02	Definition of reactivity	2.6	2.8
EK1.03	Effects of boron on reactivity	3.6	3.8
EK1.04	Interpretation of terms: milliamps, logs, mils, per-		
EK1.05	cent, and reactivity units	2.2	2.5*
EK1.03	applied to large PWR coolant systems	2.8	3.2
EK2	Knowledge of the interrelations between the and the following an ATWS: $(CFR\ 41.7\ /\ 45.7)$		
EK2.01	Valves	1.9	2.1
EK2.02	Sensors and detectors	2.2	2.5
EK2.03	Controllers and positions	2.1	2.3
EK2.04	Pumps	2.1	2.1
EK2.05	Motors	1.9	1.9
EK2.06	Breakers, relays, and disconnects	2.9*	3.1*
EK3	Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as the apply to the ATWS: $(CFR\ 41.5\ /\ 41.10\ /\ 45.6\ /\ 45.13)$		
EK3.01	Verifying a reactor trip; methods	4.2	4.5
EK3.02	Starting a specific charging pump	3.1	3.1
EK3.03	Opening BIT inlet and outlet valves	3.7*	3.6*
EK3.04	Closing the normal charging header isolation valves	3.1*	3.1*
EK3.05	Closing the centrifugal charging pump recirculation valve	3.4*	3.5*
EK3.06	Verifying a main turbine trip; methods	4.2	4.3
EK3.07	Using local turbine trip lever	3.1*	3.4*
EK3.08	Closing the main steam isolation valve	3.6*	3.8
EK3.09	Opening centrifugal charging pump suction valves from RWST	3.7*	4.0*
EK3.10	Manual rod insertion	4.1	4.1
EK3.11	Initiating emergency boration	4.2	4.3
EK3.12	Actions contained in EOP for ATWS	4.4	4.7
	<u>ABILITY</u>		
EA1	Ability to operate and monitor the following as they apply to a ATWS: $(CFR\ 41.7\ /\ 45.5\ /\ 45.6)$		
EA1.01	Charging pumps	3.4*	3.1
EA1.02	Charging pump suction valves from RWST operating switch	3.6*	3.3
EA1.03	Charging pump suction valves from VCT operating switch	3.5*	3.2
EA1.04	BIT inlet valve switches	3.9*	3.8*
EA1.05	BIT outlet valve switches	3.7*	3.6*
EA1.06	Operating switches for normal charging header isolation valves	3.2*	3.1
EA1.07	Operating switch for charging pump recirculation valve	3.4*	3.1*
EA1.08	Reactor trip switch pushbutton	4.5	4.5

EPE:	029 Anticipated Transient Without Scram (ATWS)		
EA1.09	Manual rod control	4.0	3.6
EA1.10	Rod control function switch	3.6	3.2
EA1.11	Manual opening of the CRDS breakers	3.9*	4.1
EA1.12	M/G set power supply and reactor trip breakers	4.1	4.0
EA1.13	Manual trip of main turbine	4.1	3.9
EA1.14	Driving of control rods into the core	4.2	3.9
EA1.15	AFW system	4.1	3.9
EA2	Ability to determine or interpret the following as they apply to a ATWS: (CFR $43.5/45.13)$		
EA2.01	Reactor nuclear instrumentation	4.4	4.7
EA2.02	Reactor trip alarm	4.2	4.4
EA2.03	Centrifugal charging pump ammeter	2.9*	3.1*
EA2.04	CVCS centrifugal charging pump operating indication	3.2*	3.3*
EA2.05	System component valve position indications	3.4*	3.4*
EA2.06	Main turbine trip switch position indication	3.8	3.9
EA2.07	Reactor trip breaker indicating lights	4.2	4.3
EA2.08	Rod bank step counters and RPI	3.4	3.5
EA2.09	Occurrence of a main turbine/reactor trip	4.4	4.5
EA2.10	Positive displacement charging pumps	3.1*	3.4*

## **EPE:** 038 Steam Generator Tube Rupture (SGTR)

		IMPOF	RTANCE
K/A NO.	KNOWLEDGE	RO	SRO
EK1	Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as		
	they apply to the SGTR:		
	(CFR 41.8 / 41.10 / 45.3)		
EV1 01	Has of steem tables	2.1	2.4
EK1.01 EK1.02	Use of steam tables	3.1 3.2	3.4 3.5
EK1.02 EK1.03	Natural circulation	3.2	4.2
EK1.04	Reflux boiling	3.1*	3.3
LIXI.O	Relian boiling	5.1	5.5
EK2	Knowledge of the interrelations between the and the following a SGTR:		
	(CFR 41.7 / 45.7)		
EK2.01	Valves	2.2*	2.2
EK2.02	Sensors and detectors	2.4	2.5
EK2.03	Controllers and positioners	2.1	2.2
EK2.04	Pumps	2.3*	2.4
EK2.05	Motors	2.1	2.2
EK2.06	Heat exchangers and condensers	2.1	2.4
EK2.07	Breakers, relays, and disconnects	2.1*	2.3
ЕК3	Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as the apply to the		
	SGTR:		
	(CFR 41.5 / 41.10 / 45.6 / 45.13)		
	(22.22.23.27.22.27.22.27)		
EK3.01	Equalizing pressure on primary and secondary sides of ruptured S/G	4.1	4.3
EK3.02	Prevention of secondary PORV cycling	4.4	4.5
EK3.03	Automatic actions associated with high radioactivity in S/G sample lines	3.6*	4.0*
EK3.04	Automatic actions provided by each PRM	3.9	4.1
EK3.05	Normal operating precautions to preclude or minimize SGTR	4.0	4.3
EK3.06	Actions contained in EOP for RCS water inventory balance,		
	S/G tube rupture, and plant shutdown procedures	4.2	4.5
EK3.07	RCS loop isolation values	3.4*	3.8
EK3.08	Criteria for securing RCP	4.1	4.2
EK3.09	Criteria for securing/throttling ECCS	4.1	4.5
	ABILITY		
	ADILIT I		
EA1	Ability to operate and monitor the following as they apply to a SGTR:		
	(CFR 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6)		
EA1.01	S/G levels, for abnormal increase in any S/G	4.5	4.4
EA1.02	Steam and feedwater flow, for mismatched condition	4.2	4.1
EA1.03	SWS to the turbine building	1.9*	2.0
EA1.04	PZR spray, to reduce coolant system pressure	4.3	4.1
EA1.05	Maximum controlled depressurization rate for affected S/G	4.1	4.3
EA1.06	Cleanup of a contaminated S/G	2.1*	2.5*
EA1.07	PRT tank temperature, pressure, and setpoints	2.5*	2.6*
EA1.08	Core cooling monitor	3.7*	3.8*
EA1.09	PZR tank level/pressure indicators, gauges, and recorder	3.2	3.3
EA1.10 EA1.11	Control room radiation monitoring indicators and alarms	3.7* 3.8	3.7 3.9
EA1.11 EA1.12	S/G blowdown line radiation monitors	5.8 4.3	3.9 4.3
EA1.12 EA1.13	Steam flow indicators	4.3 3.7*	4.5 3.6
<i>∟</i> (11.1 <i>J</i>	Steam now indicators	٥.١	5.0

	EPE:	038 Steam Generator Tube Rupture (SGTR)		
	EA1.14	AFW pump control and flow indicators	4.1	3.9
	EA1.15	AFW source level and capacity (chart)	3.9	3.9
	EA1.16	S/G atmospheric relief valve and secondary PORV		
		controllers and indicators	4.4	4.3
	EA1.17	S/G sample isolation valve indicators	3.2*	3.2
	EA1.18	S/G blowdown valve indicators	4.0	3.9
	EA1.19	MFW System status indicator	3.4	3.4
	EA1.20	AFW flow control valve reset switches and indicators	3.8*	3.6*
	EA1.21	Charging pump ammeter and running indicator	3.4*	3.1*
'	EA1.22	RHR operating pump ammeter and indicators	2.7*	2.6
1	EA1.23	Boric acid pumps	2.6*	2.5*
'	EA1.24	Safety injection pump ammeter and indicators	3.6*	3.4
	EA1.25	CCW pump ammeter and indicators	2.6*	2.4
	EA1.26	High-head safety injection mini-flow valves and position indicators	3.6	3.4
	EA1.27	Steam dump valve status lights and indicators	3.9	3.9
	EA1.28	Interlock between MSIV and bypass valve	3.6*	3.5
	EA1.29	CVCS tank indicators and water charging sources	3.5*	3.3
	EA1.30	Safety injection and containment isolation systems	4.0	3.8
	EA1.31	Reactor trip breaker and safety injection interlock	4.1	4.0
	EA1.32	Isolation of a ruptured S/G	4.6	4.7
	EA1.33	Use of S/G for natural circulation cooldown	4.4	4.3
	EA1.34	Obtaining shutdown with natural circulation	4.2	4.3
	EA1.35	Steam dump condenser	3.5	3.6
	EA1.36	Cooldown of RCS to specified temperature	4.3	4.5
	EA1.37	Controlling of thermal shock during PZR spray operation	3.5*	3.4
	EA1.38	PZR heaters	3.3*	3.3
	EA1.39	Drawing S/G into the RCS, using the "feed and bleed" method	3.6*	3.7
	EA1.40	Adding boron, to raise its ppm to the required shutdown	5.0	3.1
	LATTO	concentration	4.0	4.0
Ι	EA1.41	Venting of the S/G to the atmosphere	3.4*	3.4*
	EA1.42	Shutting of high-head safety injection mini-flow valves	3.3*	3.3*
	EA1.43	Manual isolation of steam dump valves	3.6*	3.5*
ı	EA1.44	Level operating limits for S/Gs	3.4*	3.4
ī	EA1.45	Safely parameter display system	3.9*	4.0*
ı	LA1.43	Safety parameter display system	3.9	4.0
	EA2	Ability to determine or interpret the following as they apply to a SGTR: (CFR $43.5  /  45.13$ )		
	EA2.01	When to isolate one or more S/Gs	4.1	4.7
	EA2.02	Existence of an S/G tube rupture and its potential consequences	4.5	4.8
	EA2.03	Which S/G is ruptured	4.4	4.6
-1	EA2.04	Radiation levels (MREM/hr)	3.9	4.2*
ı	EA2.05	Causes and consequences of shrink and swell in S/Gs	2.8*	2.9
	EA2.06	Shutdown margins and required boron concentrations	3.8	4.4
	EA2.07	Plant conditions, from survey of control room indications	4.4	4.8
	EA2.08	Viable alternatives for placing plant in safe condition		
	E 4 2 00	when condenser is not available	3.8	4.4
	EA2.09	Existence of natural circulation, using plant parameters	4.2	4.2
	EA2.10	Flowpath for charging and letdown flows	3.1	3.3
	EA2.11	Local radiation reading on main steam lines	3.7*	3.9*
	EA2.12	Status of MSIV activating system	3.9*	4.2
	EA2.13	Magnitude of rupture	3.1*	3.7

EPE:	038 Steam Generator Tube Rupture (SGTR)		
EA2.14	Magnitude of atmospheric radioactive release if cooldown		
	must be completed using steam dumps or if atmospheric		
	reliefs lift	3.3*	4.6
EA2.15	Pressure at which to maintain RCS during S/G cooldown	4.2	4.4
EA2.16	Actions to be taken if S/G goes solid and water enters steam line	4.2	4.6
EA2.17	RCP restart criteria	3.8	4.4

EPE:	055 Loss of Offsite and Onsite Power (Station Blackout)
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	K/A NO.	KNOWLEDGE	IMPOR RO	TANCE <u>SRO</u>
	EK1	Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the Station Blackout : $(CFR\ 41.8\ /\ 41.10\ /\ 45.3)$		
	EK1.01 EK1.02	Effect of battery discharge rates on capacity	3.3 4.1	3.7 4.4
	EK2	Knowledge of the interrelations between the and the following Station Blackout: (CFR 41.7 / 45.7)		
1	EK2.01 EK2.02 EK2.03 EK2.04 EK2.05 EK2.06 EK2.07	Valves Sensors, detectors and indicators Controllers and positioners Pumps Motors Heat exchangers and condensers Breakers, relays, and disconnects	2.0 2.1* 1.9 2.0 1.7 2.2*	2.2 2.2* 2.1 2.2 2.1 2.4*
•	EK3	Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as the apply to the Station Blackout: $(CFR\ 41.5\ /\ 41.10\ /\ 45.6\ /\ 45.13)$		
	EK3.01 EK3.02	Length of time for which battery capacity is designed	2.7 4.3	3.4 4.6
	EA1	ABILITY  Ability to operate and monitor the following as they apply to a Station Blackout: (CFR 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6)		
	EA1.01 EA1.02 EA1.03 EA1.04 EA1.05 EA1.06 EA1.07	In-core thermocouple temperatures  Manual ED/G start  Manual MT jacking  Reduction of loads on the battery  Battery, when approaching fully discharged  Restoration of power with one ED/G  Restoration of power from offsite	3.7 4.3 1.9* 3.5 3.3 4.1 4.3	3.9 4.4 1.9* 3.9 3.6 4.5 4.5

EPE:	055 Loss of Offsite and Onsite Power (Station Blackout)		
EA2	Ability to determine or interpret the following as they apply to a Station Blackout: (CFR 43.5 / 45.13)		
EA2.01	Existing valve positioning on a loss of instrument air system	3.4	3.7
EA2.02	RCS core cooling through natural circulation cooling to S/G cooling	4.4	4.6
EA2.03	Actions necessary to restore power	3.9	4.7
EA2.04	Instruments and controls operable with only dc battery power available	3.7	4.1
EA2.05	When battery is approaching fully discharged	3.4	3.7
FA2 06	Faults and lockouts that must be cleared prior to re-energizing buses	3.7	<i>4</i> 1

## **EPE:** 074 Inadequate Core Cooling

K/A NO.	KNOWLEDGE	IMPOF RO	RTANCE SRO
EK1	Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the Inadequate Core Cooling : $(CFR\ 41.8\ /\ 41.10\ /\ 45.3)$		
EK1.01	Methods of calculating subcooling margin	4.3	4.7
EK1.02	Potential consequences of uncovering the core	4.6	4.8
EK1.03	Processes for removing decay heat from the core	4.5	4.9
EK1.04	Use of steam tables, including subcooled, saturated,		
	and superheated regions	3.7	4.1
EK1.05	Definition of saturated liquid	2.8	3.2
EK1.06	Definition of superheated steam	3.0	3.3
EK1.07	Definition of saturated steam	2.8	3.2
EK1.08	Definition of subcooled liquid	2.8	3.1
EK1.09	Calculation of volume of water added to the RCS, using		
	tank level indicators	3.1	3.6
EK2	Knowledge of the interrelations between the and the following Inadequate Core Cooling: $(CFR\ 41.7\ /\ 45.7)$		
EK2.01	RCP	3.6	3.8
EK2.02	PORV	3.9	4.0
EK2.03	AFW pump	4.0	4.0
EK2.04	HPI pumps	3.9	4.1
EK2.05	LPI pumps	3.9	4.1
EK2.06	Turbine bypass and atmospheric dump valves	3.5*	3.6
EK2.07	Valves	2.4*	2.5
EK2.08	Sensors and detectors	2.5*	2.5
EK2.09	Controllers and positioners	2.6*	2.6*
EK2.10	Pumps	2.2	2.3
EK2.11	Motors	1.9	2.1
EK2.12	Heat exchangers and condensers	2.2	2.4
EK2.13	Breakers, relays, and disconnects	2.0	2.1
ЕК3	Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as the apply to the Inadequate Core Cooling: $(CFR\ 41.5\ /\ 41.10\ /\ 45.6\ /\ 45.13)$		
EK3.01	Maintaining cooldown rates within specified limits	3.4	4.2
EK3.02	Maintaining S/G level and pressure within specified limits	3.7	4.2
EK3.03	Placing the plant in hot standby status	3.4	3.8
EK3.04	Tripping RCPs	3.9	4.2
EK3.05	Activating the HPI system	4.2	4.5
EK3.06	Confirming that the PORV cycles open at the specified setpoint	3.9	4.2
EK3.07	Starting up emergency feedwater and RCPs	4.0	4.4
EK3 08	Securing RCPs	4.1	4.2
EK3 09	Opening the cross-connect valve from the LPI to the HPI suction	4.4*	4.6*
EK3.10	Isolating core flood tanks to prevent inadvertent discharge	3.5	3.8*
EK3.11	Guidance contained in EOP for Inadequate Core Cooling	4.0	4.4

#### **EPE:** 074 Inadequate Core Cooling

#### EA1 Ability to operate and monitor the following as they apply to a **Inadequate Core Cooling:** (CFR 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6) EA1.01 4.2 4.4 EA1.02 3.9 4.2 EA1.03 The alternate control station for turbine bypass valve operation . . . . . . . . 3.9\* 3.9\* EA1.04 Turbine bypass or atmospheric dump valves, to obtain and maintain the desired pressure ..... 3.9 4.1 EA1.05 PORV 3.9 4.1 3.9 EA1.06 RCPs ..... 3.6 EA1.07 4.2 4.3 HPI System ..... 4.2 4.2 EA1.08 EA1.09 CVCS ..... 3.7 3.8 4.0\* 4.1\* EA1.10 EA1.11 Reactor building sump and its interlocks ..... 3.6 3.7 RCS temperature and pressure indicators ..... EA1.12 4.1 4.4 EA1.13 Subcooling margin indicators ..... 4.3 4.6 EA1.14 4.1 4.2 3.9 4.1 EA1.15 Hot-leg and cold-leg temperature recorders ..... EA1.16 RCS in-core thermocouple indicators ..... 4.4 4.6 4.1 EA1.17 S/G pressure and level indicators ..... 4.0 EA1.18 3.9 3.9 EA1.19 AFW supply tank level indicators ..... 3.7 3.8 EA1.20 4.2 4.2 3.7 3.7 EA1.21 Condensate storage tank level gauge ...... AFW discharge control valve controllers, indicators, and lights ...... EA1.22 3.9 3.9 EA1.23 PORV block valve indicators, switches, controls (for both RCS and S/G)... 3.9 4.0 EA1.24 Turbine bypass valve hand/automatic controls, indicators, and setpoints . . . 3.6 3.8 EA1.25 Atmospheric dump valve controllers and indicators ..... 3.8 3.8 EA1.26 Reactor building emergency sump isolation valve control 3.8\* switches and indicators ..... 3.8\* ECCS valve control switches and indicators ..... EA1.27 4.2 4.2 EA1.28 Core flood tank isolation valve controls and indicators ..... 3.7\* 3.9\* EA1.29 Quench tank temperature, pressure, and level instrumentation ...... 3.4 3.7 EA2 Ability to determine or interpret the following as they apply to a **Inadequate Core Cooling:** (CFR 43.5 / 45.13) EA2.01 Subcooling margin ..... 4.9 4.6 EA2.02 Availability of main or auxiliary feedwater ..... 4.3 4.6 EA2.03 Availability of turbine bypass valves for cooldown ..... 3.8 4.1 EA2.04 Relationship between RCS temperature and main steam pressure ...... 3.7 4.2 EA2.05 Trends in water levels of PZR and makeup storage tank caused by various sized leaks in the RCS ..... 3.4 4.2 EA2.06 Changes in PZR level due to PZR steam bubble transfer to the RCS during inadequate core cooling ...... 4.0 4.6 EA2.07 The difference between a LOCA and inadequate core cooling, from trends and indicators ..... 4.1 4.7 EA2.08 The effect of turbine bypass valve operation on RCS temperature and pressure ..... 4.6\*

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#### **APE:** 001 Continuous Rod Withdrawal

K/A NO.         KNOWLEDGE         RO         SRO           AK1.         Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to Continuous Rod Withdrawal:				IMPORTANCE	
AK1.01		K/A NO.	KNOWLEDGE	RO	SRO
AKI.02         SUR         3.6         3.9           AKI.03         Relationship of reactivity and reactor power to rod movement         3.9         4.0           AKI.04         Effect of continuous rod withdrawal on insertion limits and SDM         3.7         3.9           AKI.05         Effects of turbine-reactor power mismatch on rod control         3.5         3.8           AKI.06         Relationship of reactivity and reactor power to rod movement         4.0         4.2           AKI.07         Effects of power level and control position on flux         3.5         3.8           AKI.08         Control rod motion on S/G pressure         2.9         3.2           AKI.09         Reason for use of pulse/analog converter (determination of actual rod positions)         2.1*         2.6           AKI.10         Definition of T-ave., T-ref., "F, linear scale, % megawatts, reactor power, Kg/fe, pcm., ?k/k, rate, % of level         2.4         2.6           AKI.11         Definitions of core quadrant power tilt         2.8         3.3           AKI.12         Long-range effects of core quadrant power tilt         2.8         3.8           AKI.13         Units of measure for power range indication         2.4         2.9           AKI.14         Interaction of ICS control stations as well as purpose, function, and modes of operation of rod drive motors		AK1.	they apply to Continuous Rod Withdrawal:		
AKI.02         SUR         3.6         3.9           AKI.03         Relationship of reactivity and reactor power to rod movement         3.9         4.0           AKI.04         Effect of continuous rod withdrawal on insertion limits and SDM         3.7         3.9           AKI.05         Effects of turbine-reactor power mismatch on rod control         3.5         3.8           AKI.06         Relationship of reactivity and reactor power to rod movement         4.0         4.2           AKI.07         Effects of power level and control position on flux         3.5         3.8           AKI.08         Control rod motion on S/G pressure         2.9         3.2           AKI.09         Reason for use of pulse/analog converter (determination of actual rod positions)         2.1*         2.6           AKI.10         Definition of T-ave., T-ref., "F, linear scale, % megawatts, reactor power, Kg/fe, pcm., ?k/k, rate, % of level         2.4         2.6           AKI.11         Definitions of core quadrant power tilt         2.8         3.3           AKI.12         Long-range effects of core quadrant power tilt         2.8         3.8           AKI.13         Units of measure for power range indication         2.4         2.9           AKI.14         Interaction of ICS control stations as well as purpose, function, and modes of operation of rod drive motors		AK1.01	Prompt criticality	3.4*	3.7
AK1.03 Relationship of reactivity and reactor power to rod movement 3.9 4.0 AK1.04 Effect of continuous rod withdrawal on insertion limits and SDM 3.7 3.9 3.9 AK1.05 Effects of turbine-reactor power mismatch on rod control 3.5 3.8 RK1.06 Relationship of reactivity and reactor power to rod movement 4.0 4.2 AK1.07 Effects of power level and control position on flux 3.5 3.8 AK1.08 Control rod motion on S/G pressure 2.9 3.2 AK1.09 Reason for use of pulse/analog converter (determination of actual rod positions) 2.1* 2.6 Definition of T-ave., T-ref., °F, linear scale, % megawatts, reactor power, Kg/fc, pcm, ?k/k, rate, % of level 2.4 2.6 AK1.11 Definitions of core quadrant power tilt 2.8 3.3 AK1.12 Long-range effects of core quadrant power tilt 2.8 3.8 AK1.13 Units of measure for power range indication 2.4 2.9 AK1.14 Interaction of ICS control stations as well as purpose, function, and modes of operation of ICS ak1.15 Theory of operation of rod drive motors 1.7 2.0 AK1.16 Definition and application of power defect 3.0 3.4 AK1.17 MTC 3.4 3.7 AK1.18 Fuel temperature coefficient 3.4 3.8 AK1.20 Differential rod worth 3.1 3.3 AK1.21 Integral rod worth 3.1 3.3 AK1.21 Integral rod worth 3.1 3.3 AK1.22 Delta flux (?1) 3.2 3.6 AK1.23 Calculation of power defect: algebraic sum of moderator temperature and fuel temperature defects 2.6 2.9 AK2.0 Rod bank step counters 2.9 3.2 AK2.0 Rod bank step counters 2.9 3.2 AK2.01 Rod bank step counters 2.9 3.2 AK2.02 Controllers and positioners 2.4 2.5 AK2.03 Sensors and detectors 2.3 2.6 AK2.04 Breakers, relays, disconnects, and control room switches 2.4 2.5 AK2.04 Breakers, relays, disconnects, and control room switches 2.4 2.6 AK2.04 Breakers, relays, disconnects, and control room switches 2.4 2.6 AK2.04 Breakers, relays, disconnects, and control room switches 2.4 2.6 AK2.04 Breakers, relays, disconnects, and control room switches 2.4 2.6 AK2.04 Breakers, relays, disconnects, and control room switches 2.4 2.6 AK2.04 Breakers, relays, disconnects, and control room switches 2.4 2.6 AK2.04			•		
AK1.04 Effect of continuous rod withdrawal on insertion limits and SDM 3.7 3.9 AK1.05 Effects of turbine-reactor power mismatch on rod control 3.5 3.8 AK1.06 Relationship of reactivity and reactor power to rod movement 4.0 4.2 AK1.07 Effects of power level and control position on flux 3.5 3.8 AK1.08 Control rod motion on S/G pressure 2.9 3.2 AK1.09 Reason for use of pulse/analog converter (determination of actual rod positions) 2.1* 2.6 AK1.10 Definition of T-ave., T-ref., °F, linear scale, % megawatts, reactor power, Kg/fe, pcm, ?k/k, rate, % of level 2.4 2.6 AK1.11 Definitions of core quadrant power tilt 2.8 3.3 AK1.12 Long-range effects of core quadrant power tilt 2.8 3.8 AK1.13 Units of measure for power range indication 2.4 2.9 AK1.14 Interaction of ICS control stations as well as purpose, function, and modes of operation of ICS 3.4* 3.7 AK1.15 Theory of operation of rod drive motors 1.7 2.0 AK1.16 Definition and application of power defect 3.0 3.4 AK1.17 MIC 3.4 3.7 AK1.18 Fuel temperature coefficient 3.4 3.7 AK1.19 Voids coefficient 2.6 2.8 AK1.20 Differential rod worth 3.1 3.3 AK1.21 Integral rod worth 2.9 3.2 AK1.22 Delta flux (?1) 3.2 3.6 AK1.23 Calculation of power defect: algebraic sum of moderator temperature and fuel temperature defects 2.9  AK2. Knowledge of the interrelations between the Continuous Rod Withdrawal and the following: (CFR 41.7 / 45.7)  AK2.01 Rod bank step counters 2.9 3.2 AK2.02 Controllers and positioners 2.4 2.5 AK2.03 Sensors and detectors 2.3 2.6 AK2.04 Breakers, relays, disconnects, and control room switches 2.4 2.6					
AK1.05       Effects of turbine-reactor power mismatch on rod control       3.5       3.8         AK1.06       Relationship of reactivity and reactor power to rod movement       4.0       4.2         AK1.07       Effects of power level and control position on flux       3.5       3.8         AK1.08       Control rod motion on S/G pressure       2.9       3.2         AK1.09       Reason for use of pulse/analog converter (determination of actual rod positions)       2.1*       2.6         AK1.10       Definition of T-ave., T-ref., °F, linear scale, % mega-watts, reactor power, Kg/fe, pcm, ?k/k, rate, % of level       2.4       2.6         AK1.11       Definitions of core quadrant power tilt       2.8       3.3         AK1.12       Long-range effects of core quadrant power tilt       2.8       3.8         AK1.13       Units of measure for power range indication       2.4       2.9         AK1.14       Interaction of ICS control stations as well as purpose, function, and modes of operation of ICS       3.4*       3.7         AK1.15       Theory of operation of rod drive motors       1.7       2.0         AK1.16       Definition and application of power defect       3.0       3.4         AK1.17       MTC       3.4       3.8         AK1.18       Fuel temperature coefficient       3.4					
AK1.06					
AK1.07       Effects of power level and control position on flux       3.5       3.8         AK1.08       Control rod motion on S/G pressure       2.9       3.2         AK1.09       Reason for use of pulse/analog converter (determination of actual rod positions)       2.1*       2.6         AK1.10       Definition of T-ave., T-ref., °F, linear scale, % megawatts, reactor power, Kg/fe, pcm. ? k/k, rate, % of level       2.4       2.6         AK1.11       Definitions of core quadrant power tilt       2.8       3.3         AK1.12       Long-range effects of core quadrant power tilt       2.8       3.8         AK1.13       Units of measure for power range indication       2.4       2.9         AK1.14       Interaction of ICS control stations as well as purpose, function, and modes of operation of ICS       3.4*       3.7         AK1.15       Theory of operation of rod drive motors       1.7       2.0         AK1.16       Definition and application of power defect       3.0       3.4         AK1.17       MIC       3.4       3.7         AK1.18       Fuel temperature coefficient       3.4       3.8         AK1.19       Voids coefficient       2.6       2.8         AK1.20       Differential rod worth       3.1       3.3         AK1.21       Integral ro	I				
AK1.08	'				
AK1.09       Reason for use of pulse/analog converter (determination of actual rod positions)       2.1*       2.6         AK1.10       Definition of T-ave., T-ref., °F, linear scale, % megawatts, reactor power, Kg/fe, pcm, ?k/k, rate, % of level       2.4       2.6         AK1.11       Definitions of core quadrant power tilt       2.8       3.3         AK1.12       Long-range effects of core quadrant power tilt       2.8       3.8         AK1.13       Units of measure for power range indication       2.4       2.9         AK1.14       Interaction of ICS control stations as well as purpose, function, and modes of operation of ICS       3.4*       3.7         AK1.15       Theory of operation of rod drive motors       1.7       2.0         AK1.16       Definition and application of power defect       3.0       3.4         AK1.17       MTC       3.4       3.7         AK1.18       Fuel temperature coefficient       3.4       3.8         AK1.19       Voids coefficient       2.6       2.8         AK1.20       Differential rod worth       3.1       3.3         AK1.21       Integral rod worth       3.2       3.6         AK1.23       Calculation of power defect: algebraic sum of moderator temperature and fuel temperature defects       2.6       2.9         AK2.0					
AK1.10       Definition of T-ave., T-ref., °F, linear scale, % megawatts, reactor power, Kg/fe, pcm, ?k/k, rate, % of level       2.4       2.6         AK1.11       Definitions of core quadrant power tilt       2.8       3.3         AK1.12       Long-range effects of core quadrant power tilt       2.8       3.8         AK1.13       Units of measure for power range indication       2.4       2.9         AK1.14       Interaction of ICS control stations as well as purpose, function, and modes of operation of ICS       3.4*       3.7         AK1.15       Theory of operation of rod drive motors       1.7       2.0         AK1.16       Definition and application of power defect       3.0       3.4         AK1.17       MTC       3.4       3.7         AK1.18       Fuel temperature coefficient       3.4       3.8         AK1.19       Voids coefficient       2.6       2.8         AK1.20       Differential rod worth       3.1       3.3         AK1.21       Integral rod worth       3.2       3.6         AK1.23       Calculation of power defect: algebraic sum of moderator temperature and fuel temperature defects       2.6       2.9         AK2.       Knowledge of the interrelations between the Continuous Rod Withdrawal and the following: (CFR 41.7 / 45.7)       2.9       3.2					
AK1.11       Definitions of core quadrant power tilt       2.8       3.3         AK1.12       Long-range effects of core quadrant power tilt       2.8       3.8         AK1.13       Units of measure for power range indication       2.4       2.9         AK1.14       Interaction of ICS control stations as well as purpose, function, and modes of operation of ICS       3.4*       3.7         AK1.15       Theory of operation of rod drive motors       1.7       2.0         AK1.16       Definition and application of power defect       3.0       3.4         AK1.17       MTC       3.4       3.7         AK1.18       Fuel temperature coefficient       3.4       3.8         AK1.19       Voids coefficient       2.6       2.8         AK1.20       Differential rod worth       2.6       2.8         AK1.21       Integral rod worth       2.9       3.2         AK1.22       Delta flux (? I)       3.2       3.6         AK1.23       Calculation of power defect: algebraic sum of moderator temperature and fuel temperature defects       2.6       2.9         AK2.       Knowledge of the interrelations between the Continuous Rod Withdrawal and the following: (CFR 41.7 / 45.7)       2.9       3.2         AK2.01       Rod bank step counters       2.9       <			of actual rod positions)	2.1*	2.6
AK1.12       Long-range effects of core quadrant power tilt       2.8       3.8         AK1.13       Units of measure for power range indication       2.4       2.9         AK1.14       Interaction of ICS control stations as well as purpose, function, and modes of operation of ICS       3.4*       3.7         AK1.15       Theory of operation of rod drive motors       1.7       2.0         AK1.16       Definition and application of power defect       3.0       3.4         AK1.17       MTC       3.4       3.7         AK1.18       Fuel temperature coefficient       3.4       3.8         AK1.19       Voids coefficient       2.6       2.8         AK1.20       Differential rod worth       3.1       3.3         AK1.21       Integral rod worth       2.9       3.2         AK1.22       Delta flux (?1)       3.2       3.6         AK1.23       Calculation of power defect: algebraic sum of moderator temperature and fuel temperature defects       2.6       2.9         AK2.       Knowledge of the interrelations between the Continuous Rod Withdrawal and the following: (CFR 41.7 / 45.7)       2.9       3.2         AK2.01       Rod bank step counters       2.9       3.2         AK2.02       Controllers and positioners       2.4       2.5			watts, reactor power, Kg/fe, pcm, ? k/k, rate, % of level	2.4	2.6
AK1.13       Units of measure for power range indication       2.4       2.9         AK1.14       Interaction of ICS control stations as well as purpose, function, and modes of operation of ICS       3.4*       3.7         AK1.15       Theory of operation of rod drive motors       1.7       2.0         AK1.16       Definition and application of power defect       3.0       3.4         AK1.17       MTC       3.4       3.7         AK1.18       Fuel temperature coefficient       3.4       3.8         AK1.19       Voids coefficient       2.6       2.8         AK1.20       Differential rod worth       3.1       3.3         AK1.21       Integral rod worth       3.2       3.6         AK1.22       Delta flux (? I)       3.2       3.6         AK1.23       Calculation of power defect: algebraic sum of moderator temperature and fuel temperature defects       2.6       2.9         AK2.       Knowledge of the interrelations between the Continuous Rod Withdrawal and the following: (CFR 41.7 / 45.7)       2.9       3.2         AK2.01       Rod bank step counters       2.9       3.2         AK2.02       Controllers and positioners       2.4       2.5         AK2.03       Sensors and detectors       2.3       2.6		AK1.11	Definitions of core quadrant power tilt	2.8	3.3
AK1.13       Units of measure for power range indication       2.4       2.9         AK1.14       Interaction of ICS control stations as well as purpose, function, and modes of operation of ICS       3.4*       3.7         AK1.15       Theory of operation of rod drive motors       1.7       2.0         AK1.16       Definition and application of power defect       3.0       3.4         AK1.17       MTC       3.4       3.7         AK1.18       Fuel temperature coefficient       3.4       3.8         AK1.19       Voids coefficient       2.6       2.8         AK1.20       Differential rod worth       3.1       3.3         AK1.21       Integral rod worth       3.2       3.6         AK1.22       Delta flux (? I)       3.2       3.6         AK1.23       Calculation of power defect: algebraic sum of moderator temperature and fuel temperature defects       2.6       2.9         AK2.       Knowledge of the interrelations between the Continuous Rod Withdrawal and the following: (CFR 41.7 / 45.7)       2.9       3.2         AK2.01       Rod bank step counters       2.9       3.2         AK2.02       Controllers and positioners       2.4       2.5         AK2.03       Sensors and detectors       2.3       2.6		AK1.12	Long-range effects of core quadrant power tilt	2.8	3.8
function, and modes of operation of ICS       3.4*       3.7         AK1.15       Theory of operation of rod drive motors       1.7       2.0         AK1.16       Definition and application of power defect       3.0       3.4         AK1.17       MTC       3.4       3.7         AK1.18       Fuel temperature coefficient       3.4       3.8         AK1.19       Voids coefficient       2.6       2.8         AK1.20       Differential rod worth       3.1       3.3         AK1.21       Integral rod worth       2.9       3.2         AK1.22       Delta flux (? I)       3.2       3.6         AK1.23       Calculation of power defect: algebraic sum of moderator temperature and fuel temperature defects       2.6       2.9         AK2.       Knowledge of the interrelations between the Continuous Rod Withdrawal and the following: (CFR 41.7 / 45.7)       2.9       3.2         AK2.01       Rod bank step counters       2.9       3.2         AK2.02       Controllers and positioners       2.4       2.5         AK2.03       Sensors and detectors       2.3       2.6         AK2.04       Breakers, relays, disconnects, and control room switches       2.4       2.6		AK1.13		2.4	2.9
AK1.15       Theory of operation of rod drive motors       1.7       2.0         AK1.16       Definition and application of power defect       3.0       3.4         AK1.17       MTC       3.4       3.7         AK1.18       Fuel temperature coefficient       3.4       3.8         AK1.19       Voids coefficient       2.6       2.8         AK1.20       Differential rod worth       3.1       3.3         AK1.21       Integral rod worth       2.9       3.2         AK1.22       Delta flux (? I)       3.2       3.6         AK1.23       Calculation of power defect: algebraic sum of moderator temperature and fuel temperature defects       2.6       2.9         AK2.       Knowledge of the interrelations between the Continuous Rod Withdrawal and the following: (CFR 41.7 / 45.7)       2.9       3.2         AK2.01       Rod bank step counters       2.9       3.2         AK2.02       Controllers and positioners       2.4       2.5         AK2.03       Sensors and detectors       2.3       2.6         AK2.04       Breakers, relays, disconnects, and control room switches       2.4       2.5		AK1.14	Interaction of ICS control stations as well as purpose,		
AK1.16       Definition and application of power defect       3.0       3.4         AK1.17       MTC       3.4       3.7         AK1.18       Fuel temperature coefficient       3.4       3.8         AK1.19       Voids coefficient       2.6       2.8         AK1.20       Differential rod worth       3.1       3.3         AK1.21       Integral rod worth       2.9       3.2         AK1.22       Delta flux (? I)       3.2       3.6         AK1.23       Calculation of power defect: algebraic sum of moderator temperature and fuel temperature defects       2.6       2.9         AK2.       Knowledge of the interrelations between the Continuous Rod Withdrawal and the following: (CFR 41.7 / 45.7)       2.9       3.2         AK2.01       Rod bank step counters       2.9       3.2         AK2.02       Controllers and positioners       2.4       2.5         AK2.03       Sensors and detectors       2.3       2.6         AK2.04       Breakers, relays, disconnects, and control room switches       2.4       2.6			function, and modes of operation of ICS	3.4*	3.7
AK1.17       MTC       3.4       3.7         AK1.18       Fuel temperature coefficient       3.4       3.8         AK1.19       Voids coefficient       2.6       2.8         AK1.20       Differential rod worth       3.1       3.3         AK1.21       Integral rod worth       2.9       3.2         AK1.22       Delta flux (? I)       3.2       3.6         AK1.23       Calculation of power defect: algebraic sum of moderator temperature and fuel temperature defects       2.6       2.9         AK2.       Knowledge of the interrelations between the Continuous Rod Withdrawal and the following: (CFR 41.7 / 45.7)       2.9       3.2         AK2.01       Rod bank step counters       2.9       3.2         AK2.02       Controllers and positioners       2.4       2.5         AK2.03       Sensors and detectors       2.3       2.6         AK2.04       Breakers, relays, disconnects, and control room switches       2.4       2.6		AK1.15	Theory of operation of rod drive motors	1.7	2.0
AK1.18       Fuel temperature coefficient       3.4       3.8         AK1.19       Voids coefficient       2.6       2.8         AK1.20       Differential rod worth       3.1       3.3         AK1.21       Integral rod worth       2.9       3.2         AK1.22       Delta flux (? I)       3.2       3.6         AK1.23       Calculation of power defect: algebraic sum of moderator temperature and fuel temperature defects       2.6       2.9         AK2.       Knowledge of the interrelations between the Continuous Rod Withdrawal and the following: (CFR 41.7 / 45.7)       2.9       3.2         AK2.01       Rod bank step counters       2.9       3.2         AK2.02       Controllers and positioners       2.4       2.5         AK2.03       Sensors and detectors       2.3       2.6         AK2.04       Breakers, relays, disconnects, and control room switches       2.4       2.5		AK1.16	Definition and application of power defect	3.0	3.4
AK1.19       Voids coefficient       2.6       2.8         AK1.20       Differential rod worth       3.1       3.3         AK1.21       Integral rod worth       2.9       3.2         AK1.22       Delta flux (? I)       3.2       3.6         AK1.23       Calculation of power defect: algebraic sum of moderator temperature and fuel temperature defects       2.6       2.9         AK2.       Knowledge of the interrelations between the Continuous Rod Withdrawal and the following: (CFR 41.7 / 45.7)       2.9       3.2         AK2.01       Rod bank step counters       2.9       3.2         AK2.02       Controllers and positioners       2.4       2.5         AK2.03       Sensors and detectors       2.3       2.6         AK2.04       Breakers, relays, disconnects, and control room switches       2.4       2.5		AK1.17	MTC	3.4	3.7
AK1.20 Differential rod worth		AK1.18	Fuel temperature coefficient	3.4	3.8
AK1.21       Integral rod worth       2.9       3.2         AK1.22       Delta flux (? I)       3.2       3.6         AK1.23       Calculation of power defect: algebraic sum of moderator temperature and fuel temperature defects       2.6       2.9         AK2.       Knowledge of the interrelations between the Continuous Rod Withdrawal and the following: (CFR 41.7 / 45.7)       2.9       3.2         AK2.01       Rod bank step counters       2.9       3.2         AK2.02       Controllers and positioners       2.4       2.5         AK2.03       Sensors and detectors       2.3       2.6         AK2.04       Breakers, relays, disconnects, and control room switches       2.4       2.6		AK1.19	Voids coefficient	2.6	2.8
AK1.22 Delta flux (? I)		AK1.20	Differential rod worth	3.1	3.3
AK1.23 Calculation of power defect: algebraic sum of moderator temperature and fuel temperature defects 2.6 2.9  AK2. Knowledge of the interrelations between the Continuous Rod Withdrawal and the following: (CFR 41.7 / 45.7)  AK2.01 Rod bank step counters 2.9 3.2  AK2.02 Controllers and positioners 2.4 2.5  AK2.03 Sensors and detectors 2.3 2.6  AK2.04 Breakers, relays, disconnects, and control room switches 2.4 2.6		AK1.21	Integral rod worth	2.9	3.2
AK2. Knowledge of the interrelations between the Continuous Rod Withdrawal and the following: (CFR 41.7 / 45.7)  AK2.01 Rod bank step counters		AK1.22		3.2	3.6
AK2. Knowledge of the interrelations between the Continuous Rod Withdrawal and the following: (CFR 41.7 / 45.7)  AK2.01 Rod bank step counters		AK1.23	Calculation of power defect: algebraic sum of moderator		
and the following: (CFR 41.7 / 45.7)  AK2.01 Rod bank step counters 2.9 3.2 AK2.02 Controllers and positioners 2.4 2.5 AK2.03 Sensors and detectors 2.3 2.6 AK2.04 Breakers, relays, disconnects, and control room switches 2.4 2.6			temperature and fuel temperature defects	2.6	2.9
AK2.02 Controllers and positioners		AK2.	and the following:		
AK2.02 Controllers and positioners		AK2.01	Rod bank step counters	2.9	3.2
AK2.03 Sensors and detectors					
AK2.04 Breakers, relays, disconnects, and control room switches 2.4 2.6			Sensors and detectors		

APE:	001 Continuous Rod Withdrawal			
AK2.06 AK2.07 AK2.08	T-ave./ref. deviation meter	3.0* 2.8 3.1	3.1 2.9 3.0	
AK3.	Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Continuous Rod Withdrawal: $(CFR\ 41.5,41.10\ /\ 45.6\ /\ 45.13)$			
AK3.01 AK3.02	Manually driving rods into position that existed before start of casualty  Tech-Spec limits on rod operability	3.2 3.2	3.6 4.3	
	ABILITY			
AA1.	Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the Continuous Rod Withdrawal: $(CFR\ 41.7\ /\ 45.5\ /\ 45.6)$			
AA1.01 AA1.02 AA1.03 AA1.04	Bank select switch  Rod in-out-hold switch  Boric acid pump control switch  Operating switch for emergency boration motor-operated valve operating switch  Reactor trip switches	3.5 3.6 3.4 3.8 4.3	3.2 3.4 3.2 3.6 4.2	1
AA1.06 AA1.07	Rod transfer switches	3.0* 3.3	2.9* 3.1	I
AA2.	Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Continuous Rod Withdrawal: (CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)			
AA2.01 AA2.02 AA2.03	Reactor tripped breaker indicator	4.2 4.2	4.2 4.2	1
AA2.04 AA2.05	have not taken place	4.5 4.2 4.4	4.8 4.3 4.6	

	APE:	003 Dropped Control Rod		
				RTANCE
	K/A NO.	KNOWLEDGE	RO	SRO
	AK1.	Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to Dropped Control Rod: $(CFR\ 41.8\ /\ 41.10\ /\ 45.3)$		
	AK1.01	Reason for turbine following reactor on dropped rod event	3.2	3.7
	AK1.02	Effects of turbine-reactor power mismatch on rod control	3.1	3.4
	AK1.03	Relationship of reactivity and reactor power to rod movement	3.5	3.8
	AK1.04	Effects of power level and control position on flux	3.1	3.7
Ι	AK1.05	CVCS response to dropped rod	2.3*	2.6*
ı	AK1.06	Control rod motion on S/G pressure	2.3	2.7
	AK1.07	Effect of dropped rod on insertion limits and SDM	3.1	3.9
	AK1.08	Reason for use of pulse/analog converter	3.1	3.7
ı	71111.00	(determination of actual rod positions)	2.1*	2.5*
ı	AK1.09	Definition of T-ave., T-ref., °F, linear scale, % megawatts, reactor power,	2.1	2.5
	AK1.07	Kw/ft, pcm, ? k/k, rate, % of level	2.3	2.6
I	AK1.10	Definitions of core quadrant power tilt	2.6	2.9
	AK1.10 AK1.11	Long-range effects of core quadrant power tilt	2.5	3.5
ı	AK1.11 AK1.12	Units of measure for power range indication	2.3*	2.5*
I	AK1.12 AK1.13	Interaction of ICS control stations as well as purpose, function, and modes	2.3	2.3
	AK1.13	of operation of ICS	3.2*	3.6
	AK1.14		1.5	1.8
		Theory of operation of rod drive motors	2.8	3.0
	AK1.15	Definition and application of power defect		
	AK1.16	MTC	2.9	3.2
	AK1.17	Fuel temperature coefficient	2.9	3.1
	AK1.18	Voids coefficient	2.1	2.2
	AK1.19	Differential rod worth	2.8	2.9
	AK1.20	Integral rod worth	2.6	2.7
	AK1.21	Delta flux (? I)	2.7	3.2
	AK1.22	Calculation of power defect: algebraic sum of moderator temperature and		
		fuel temperature defects	2.5	2.6
	AK2.	Knowledge of the interrelations between the Dropped Control Rod and the following: $(CFR\ 41.7\ /\ 45.7)$		
	AK2.01	Controllers and positioners	2.1	2.1
	AK2.02	Breakers, relays, and disconnects	2.1	2.2
Ι	AK2.03	Metroscope	3.1*	3.2*
'	AK2.04	Sensors and detectors	2.4	2.4
	AK2.05	Control rod drive power supplies and logic circuits	2.5	2.8
		Tarrest and Paris Louis and Laborator and La		

APE:	003 Dropped Control Rod			
AK3.	Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Dropped Control Rod: (CFR 41.5,41.10 / 45.6 / 45.13)			
AK3.01	When ICS logic has failed on a dropped rod, the load must be reduced until			
	flux is within specified target bank	3.5*	3.9*	
AK3.02	Reactor runback with a dropped control rod	3.3*	3.7	
AK3.03	Turbine automatic runback with reactor in order to balance power output	3.4*	3.7*	
AK3.04	Actions contained in EOP for dropped control rod	3.8*	4.1	
AK3.05	Tech-Spec limits for reduction of load to 50% power if flux cannot be			
	brought back within specified target band	3.4*	4.1*	
AK3.06	Reset of demand position counter to zero	2.7*	3.0*	
AK3.07	Tech-Spec limits for T-ave	3.8*	3.9*	
AK3.08	Criteria for inoperable control rods	3.1	4.2	•
AK3.09	Recording of group bank position for dropped rod (reference point used to			
	withdraw dropped rod to equal height with other rods in the bank)	3.0*	3.5*	
AK3.10	RIL and PDIL	3.2?	4.2?	
AA1.	ABILITY  Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the Dropped Control Rod: (CFR 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6)			
AA1.01	Demand position counter and pulse/analog converter	2.9*	2.9	
AA1.02	Controls and components necessary to recover rod	3.6	3.4	
AA1.03	Rod control switches	3.6	3.3	
AA1.04	Control rod drive safety rod out limit bypass switch or key	3.4*	3.3	
AA1.05	Reactor power - turbine power	4.1	4.1	
AA1.06	RCS pressure and temperature	4.0	4.1	
AA1.07	In-core and ex-core instrumentation	3.8	3.8	
1 1110,	21. VOIC UILO VII VOIC 11.01.01.01.01.01.01.01.01.01.01.01.01.0			
AA2.	Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Dropped Control Rod: (CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)			
AA2.01	Rod position indication to actual rod position	3.7	3.9	
AA2.02	Signal inputs to rod control system	2.7	2.8	
AA2.03	Dropped rod, using in-core/ex-core instrumentation, in-core or loop			
1112.00	temperature measurements	3.6	3.8	
AA2.04	Rod motion stops due to dropped rod	3.4*	3.6*	1
AA2.04 AA2.05	Interpretation of computer in-core TC map for dropped rod location	2.5*	3.2*	
AA2.03	interpretation of computer in-core 10 map for dropped fod location	4.3	3.2"	I

## APE: 005 Inoperable/Stuck Control Rod

K/A NO.	KNOWLEDGE	IMPOF RO	RTANCE SRO
AK1.	Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to Inoperable / Stuck Control Rod: $(CFR\ 41.8\ /\ 41.10\ /\ 45.3)$		
AK1.01	Axial power imbalance	3.1	3.8
AK1.02	Flux tilt	3.1	3.9
AK1.03	Xenon transient	3.2	3.6
AK1.04	Definitions of axial imbalance, neutron error, power demand, actual	3.2	5 0
	power tracking mode, ICS tracking	3.0*	3.4*
AK1.05	Calculation of minimum shutdown margin	3.3	4.1
AK1.06	Bases for power limit, for rod misalignment	2.9	3.8
AK2.	Knowledge of the interrelations between the Inoperable / Stuck Control Rod and the following: $(CFR\ 41.7\ /\ 45.7)$		
AK2.01 AK2.02	Controllers and positioners	2.5	2.5
	switches	2.5	2.6
AK2.03	Metroscope	3.1*	3.3*
AK2.04	Sensors and detectors	2.4	2.6
AK3.	Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Inoperable / Stuck Control Rod: $(CFR\ 41.5,\!41.10\ /\ 45.6\ /\ 45.13)$		
AK3.01	Boration and emergency boration in the event of a stuck rod during trip		
	or normal evolutions	4.0	4.3
AK3.02	Rod insertion limits	3.6	4.2
AK3.03	Tech-Spec limits for rod mismatch	3.6	4.1
AK3.04	Tech-Spec limits for inoperable rods	3.4	4.1
AK3.05	Power limits on rod misalignment	3.4	4.2
AK3.06	Actions contained in EOP for inoperable/stuck control rod	3.9	4.2
	ABILITY		
AA1.	Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the Inoperable / Stuck Control Rod: (CFR 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6)		
AA1.01	CRDS	3.6	3.4
AA1.02	Rod selection switches	3.7	3.5
AA1.03	Metroscope	3.4*	3.4*
AA1.04	Reactor and turbine power	3.9	3.9
AA1.05	RPI	3.4	3.4
AA2.	Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Inoperable / Stuck Control Rod: (CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)		

3.3	4.1
2.5*	3.0*
3.5	4.4
2.3*	3.4
	2.5*

4.2-7

# APE: 008 Pressurizer (PZR) Vapor Space Accident (Relief Valve Stuck Open)

K/A NO.	<u>KNOWLEDGE</u>	IMPORTANCE RO SRO	
AK1.	Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to a Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident: $(CFR\ 41.8\ /\ 41.10\ /\ 45.3)$		
AK1.01	Thermodynamics and flow characteristics of open or leak-		
AK1.02	ing valves	3.2 3.1	3.7 3.7
AK2.	Knowledge of the interrelations between the Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident and the following: (CFR 41.7 / 45.7)		
AK2.01 AK2.02 AK2.03 AK2.04	Valves Sensors and detectors Controllers and positioners Pumps	2.7* 2.7* 2.5 1.9	2.7 2.7 2.4 2.0
AK3.	Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident: (CFR 41.5,41.10 / 45.6 / 45.13)		
AK3.01 AK3.02	Why PZR level may come back on scale if RCS is saturated	3.7	4.4
AK3.03	or PZR temperature	3.6 4.1	4.1 4.6
AK3.03 AK3.04	RCP tripping requirements	4.1	4.6
AK3.05	ECCS termination or throttling criteria	4.0	4.5
	<u>ABILITY</u>		
AA1.	Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident: (CFR 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6)		
AA1.01 AA1.02 AA1.03 AA1.04 AA1.05 AA1.06 AA1 07 AA1 08	PZR spray block valve and PORV block valve HPI pump to control PZR level/pressure Turbine bypass in manual control to maintain header pressure Feedwater pumps LPI System Control of PZR level Reseating of code safety and PORV PRT level pressure and temperature	4.2 4.1 2.8 2.8* 3.4 3.6 4.0 3.8	4.0 3.9 2.6 2.5 3.3 3.6 4.2 3.8

#### APE: 008 Pressurizer (PZR) Vapor Space Accident (Relief Valve Stuck Open)

# AA2. Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident: (CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)

AA2.01	RCS pressure and temperature indicators and alarms	3.9	4.2
AA2.02	PZR spray valve position indicators and acoustic monitors	3.9	4.1
AA2.03	PORV position indicators and acoustic monitors	3.9	3.9
AA2.04	High-temperature computer alarm and alarm type	3.2	3.4
AA2.05	PORV isolation (block) valve switches and indicators	3.9	3.9
AA2.06	PORV logic control under low-pressure conditions	3.3	3.6
AA2.07	Feedwater flow indicators and pump controllers	2.4	2.4
AA2.07 AA2.08	Rod position indicators	2.4	2.4
AA2.06 AA2.09	PZR spray block valve controls and indicators	3.6	3.7
AA2.09 AA2.10	± •	3.6	3.6
	High-pressure injection valves and controllers		
AA2.11	Turbine bypass header pressure indicators	2.3	2.4
AA2.12	PZR level indicators	3.4	3.7
AA2.13	High-pressure safety injection pump flow indicator,	• •	•
	ammeter, and controller	3.8	3.9
AA2.14	Saturation temperature monitor	4.2	4.4
AA2.15	ESF control board, valve controls, and indicators	3.9	4.2
AA2.16	RCS in-core thermocouple indicators; use of plant com-		
	puter for interpretation	3.8	4.1
AA2.17	Steam dump valve controller (position)	2.5	2.7*
AA2.18	Computer indications for RCS temperature and pressure	3.0	3.0*
AA2.19	PZR spray valve failure, using plant parameters	3.4	3.6
AA2.20	The effect of an open PORV on code safety, based on		
	observation of plant parameters	3.4	3.6
AA2.21	The feed flow of different channels, using the feed		
	regulator valve controller and indicators	2.1	2.2*
AA2.22	Consequences of loss of pressure in RCS; methods for		
	evaluating pressure loss	3.8	4.2
AA2.23	Criteria for throttling high-pressure injection after a		
1 11 12 12 0	small LOCA	3.6	4.3
AA2.24	Value at which turbine bypass valve maintains header	2.0	
1 11 12.2 1	pressure after a reactor trip	2.6	2.6*
AA2.25	Expected leak rate from open PORV or code safety	2.8	3.4
AA2.26	Probable PZR steam space leakage paths other than PORV	2.0	3.4
AA2.20	or code safety	3.1	3.4
AA2.27	Effects on indicated PZR pressure and/or level of sens-	3.1	3.4
AA2.21		2.9	3.2
AA2.28	ing line leakage	2.9 3.3*	3.2
· -	Safety parameter display system indications		
AA2.29	The effects of bubble in reactor vessel	3.9	4.2
AA2.30	Inadequate core cooling	4.3	4.7

## **APE:** 015/017 Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) Malfunctions

		IMPOF	RTANCE
K/A NO.	KNOWLEDGE	RO	SRO
AK1.	Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to Reactor Coolant Pump Malfunctions (Loss of RC Flow): (CFR 41.8 / 41.10 / 45.3)		
AK1.01	Natural circulation in a nuclear reactor power plant	4.4	4.6
AK1.02 AK1.03	Consequences of an RCPS failure  The basis for operating at a reduced power level when	3.7	4.1
	one RCP is out of service	3.0 *	4.0*
AK1.04	Basic steady state thermodynamic relationship between RCS loops and S/Gs resulting from unbalanced RCS flow	2.9	3.1*
AK1.05	Effects of unbalanced RCS flow on in-core average		
	temperature, core imbalance, and quadrant power tilt	2.7	3.3
AK2.	Knowledge of the interrelations between the Reactor Coolant Pump Malfunctions (Loss of RC Flow) and the following: (CFR 41.7 / 45.7)		
AK2.01	Valves	1.5	1.6
AK2.02	Sensors and detectors	2.0	2.1
AK2.03	Controllers and positioners	1.7	1.7
AK2.04	Pumps	2.0	2.1
AK2.05	Motors	1.9	2.0
AK2.06	Breaker, relays, and disconnects	1.6	1.7
AK2.07	RCP seals	2.9	2.9
AK2.08	CCWS	2.6	2.6
AK2.09	RCP flywheel	2.2	2.2
AK2.10	RCP indicators and controls	2.8*	2.8
AK3.	Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Reactor Coolant Pump Malfunctions (Loss of RC Flow) : (CFR 41.5,41.10 / 45.6 / 45.13)		
AK3.01	Potential damage from high winding and/or bearing temperatures	2.5	3.1
AK3.02	CCW lineup and flow paths to RCP oil coolers	3.0	3.1
AK3.03	Sequence of events for manually tripping reactor and		
	RCP as a result of an RCP malfunction	3.7	4.0
AK3.04	Reduction of power to below the steady state power- to-flow limit	3.1*	3.2*
AK3.05	Shift of T-ave. sensors to the loop with the highest flow	2.8*	3.0*
AK3.06	Performance of a core power map, calculations of quad-		
AK3.07	rant power tilt, monitoring of core imbalance	2.4	3.1*
	natural circulation enhancement	4.1	4.2
	ABILITY		
AA1.	Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the Reactor Coolant Pump Malfunctions (Loss of RC Flow): (CFR 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6)		
AA1.01	RCP lube oil system	2.4*	2.4

APE:	015/017 Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) Malfunctions		
AA1.02	RCP oil reservoir level and alarm indicators	2.8	2.7
AA1.03	Reactor trip alarms, switches, and indicators	3.7*	3.8
AA1.04	RCP ventilation cooling fan run indicators	2.5	2.5
AA1.05	RCS flow	3.8	3.8
AA1.06	CCWS	3.1	2.9
AA1.07	RCP seal water injection subsystem	3.5	3.4
AA1.08	S/G LCS	3.0*	2.9
AA1.09	RCS temperature detection subsystem	3.1	3.2
AA1.10	RCP ammeter and trip alarm	2.7	2.6
AA1.11	RCP on/off and run indicators	2.5	2.4
AA1.12	Reactor coolant loop flow meters	2.8*	3.1
AA1.13	Reactor power level indicators	3.4*	3.4*
AA1.14	Power range remote flux meter	2.9*	3.0*
AA1.15	High-power/low-flow reactor trip block status lights	3.5*	3.6*
AA1.16	Low-power reactor trip block status lights	3.2*	3.5*
AA1.17	Station auxiliary transformer volt-amp meters	2.2*	2.2
AA1.18	Station auxiliary power supply breakers and indicators	2.3*	2.4
AA1.19	Power transfer confirm lamp	2.9*	3.0*
AA1.20	RCP bearing temperature indicators	2.7	2.7
AA1.21	Development of natural circulation flow	4.4	4.5
AA1.22	RCP seal failure/malfunction	4.0	4.2
AA1.23	RCP vibration	3.1	3.2
AA2.	Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Reactor Coolant Pump Malfunctions (Loss of RC Flow): (CFR $43.5 / 45.13$ )		
AA2.01	Cause of RCP failure	3.0	3.5*
AA2.02	Abnormalities in RCP air vent flow paths and/or oil cooling system	2.8	3.0
AA2.03	Temperature differential across the RCP oil cooler	2.2	2.2
AA2.04	Temperature differential across the RCP air cooler	1.9	2.1
AA2.05	Relationship between RCP ammeter readings and RCS aver-		
	age temperature	1.9	2.2
AA2.06	Relationship between cooling air flow and oil reservoir		
	temperature/level for RCP	1.8	2.3
AA2.07	Calculation of expected values of flow in the loop with RCP secured	2.1	2.9
AA2.08	When to secure RCPs on high bearing temperature	3.4	3.5
AA2.09	When to secure RCPs on high stator temperatures	3.4	3.5
AA2.10	When to secure RCPs on loss of cooling or seal injection	3.7	3.7
AA2.11	When to jog RCPs during ICC	3.4*	3.8*

## APE: 022 Loss of Reactor Coolant Makeup

		IMPORTANCE	
K/A NO.	<u>KNOWLEDGE</u>	<u>RO</u>	<u>SRO</u>
AK1.	Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to Loss of Reactor Coolant Makeup: (CFR $41.8 / 41.10 / 45.3$ )		
AK1.01 AK1.02	Consequences of thermal shock to RCP seals	2.8	3.2*
	between charging and RCS	2.7	3.1
AK1.03 AK1.04	Relationship between charging flow and PZR level	3.0	3.4
	charging flow valve controller	2.9	3.0
AK2.	Knowledge of the interrelations between the Loss of Reactor Coolant Makeup and the following: (CFR $41.7 / 45.7$ )		
AK2.01	Valves	2.4	2.4
AK2.02	Sensors and detectors	1.9	2.1
AK2.03	Controllers and positioners	2.2	2.3
AK2.04	Pumps	2.3	2.3
AK2.05	Motors	2.1	2.1
AK2.06	Heat exchangers and condensers	1.9	2.1
AK3.	Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Loss of Reactor Coolant Makeup: (CFR 41.5, $41.10 / 45.6 / 45.13$ )		
AK3.01	Adjustment of RCP seal backpressure regulator valve to		
AK3.02	obtain normal flow	2.7	3.1
	makeup, loss of charging, and abnormal charging	3.5	3.8
AK3.03	Performance of lineup to establish excess letdown after determining need .	3.1*	3.3*
AK3.04	Isolating letdown	3.2	3.4
AK3.05	Need to avoid plant transients	3.2	3.4
AK3.06	RCP thermal barrier cooling	3.2	3.3
AK3.07	Isolating charging	3.0*	3.2

APE:	022 Loss of Reactor Coolant Makeup		
	<u>ABILITY</u>		
AA1.	Ability to operate and $/$ or monitor the following as they apply to the Loss of Reactor Coolant Makeup: (CFR 41.7 $/$ 45.5 $/$ 45.6)		
AA1.01	CVCS letdown and charging	3.4	3.3
AA1.02	CVCS charging low flow alarm, sensor, and indicator	3.0	2.9
AA1.03	PZR level trend	3.2	3.2
AA1.04	Speed demand controller and running indicators (positive		
	displacement pump)	3.3	$3.2^{\circ}$
AA1.05	RCP seal back pressure regulator valves and flow indicators	2.9*	$2.8^{\circ}$
AA1.06	CVCS charging pump ammeters and running indicators	2.9	2.7
AA1.07	Excess letdown containment isolation valve switches and indicators	2.8*	$2.7^{\circ}$
AA1.08	VCT level	3.4	3.3
AA1.09	RCP seal flows, temperatures, pressures, and vibrations	3.2	3.3
AA2.	Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Reactor Coolant Makeup: (CFR 43.5/45.13)		
AA2.01	Whether charging line leak exists	3.2	3.8
AA2.02	Charging pump problems	3.2	3.7
AA2.03	Failures of flow control valve or controller	3.1	3.6
AA2.04	How long PZR level can be maintained within limits	2.9	3.8

## APE: 024 Emergency Boration

		IMPORTANCE	
K/A NO.	<u>KNOWLEDGE</u>	RO	<u>SRO</u>
AK1.	Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to Emergency Boration: (CFR $41.8 / 41.10 / 45.3$ )		
AK1.01	Relationship between boron addition and change in T-ave	3.4	3.8
AK1.02 AK1.03	Relationship between boron addition and reactor power	3.6	3.9
	addition and addition rate	2.4	2.9
AK1.04	Low temperature limits for born concentration	2.8	3.6
AK2.	Knowledge of the interrelations between Emergency Boration and the following: (CFR $41.7 / 45.7$ )		
AK2.01	Valves	2.7	2.7
AK2.02	Sensors and detectors	2.1	2.2
AK2.03	Controllers and positioners	2.6	2.5
AK2.04	Pumps	2.6	2.5
AK2.05	Motors	2.1	2.1
AK2.06	Breakers, relays, and disconnects	2.0	2.1
AK3.	Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to Emergency Boration: (CFR 41.5, $41.10 / 45.6 / 45.13$ )		
AK3.01	When emergency boration is required	4.1	4.4
AK3.02	Actions contained in EOP for emergency boration	4.2	4.4
	<u>ABILITY</u>		
AA1.	Ability to operate and $/$ or monitor the following as they apply to Emergency Boration: (CFR 41.7 $/$ 45.5 $/$ 45.6)		
AA1.01	Use of spent fuel pool as backup to BWST	2.7*	3.4*
AA1.02	Boric acid pump	3.7	3.5
AA1.03	Boric acid controller	3.5	3.3
AA1.04	Manual boration valve	3.6*	3.7
AA1.05	Performance of letdown system during emergency boration	3.1	3.2

APE:	024 Emergency Boration		
AA1.06	BWST temperature	3.2	3.1
AA1.07	BWST level	3.3	3.4
AA1.08	Pump speed controlled to protect pump seals	2.7*	3.0*
AA1.09	Safety injection	3.5*	3.5*
AA1.10	CVCS centrifugal charging pumps	3.5*	3.4*
AA1.11	BIT suction and recirculation valves	2.9*	2.7*
AA1.12	Normal boron flow meter	2.4	2.3
AA1.13	Boric acid flow controller	3.2	3.0
AA1.14	RCS makeup isolation valve indicators	2.6*	2.4
AA1.15	Boric acid transfer pump speed selector switch and running lights	3.1*	2.9*
AA1.16	T-ave. meters	3.3	3.2
AA1.17	Emergency borate control valve and indicators	3.9	3.9
AA1.18	Emergency boron flow meter	3.7*	3.6*
AA1.19	Makeup control system selector switch for CVCS isolation valve	3.2*	3.1*
AA1.20	Manual boration valve and indicators	3.2*	3.3
AA1.21	CVCS charging pump miniflow isolation valves and indicators	2.8*	2.7*
AA1.22	Safety injection valves, switches, flow meters, and indicators	3.2*	3.2
AA1.23	CVCS centrifugal charging pump switches and indicators	3.3*	3.3*
AA1.24	BIT inlet and outlet valve switches and indicators	3.2*	3.1*
AA1.25	Boration valve indicators	3.4*	3.3
AA1.26	Boric acid storage tank	3.3	3.3
AA2.	Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to		
	the Emergency Boration:		
	(CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)		
AA2.01	Whether boron flow and/or MOVs are malfunctioning,		
	from plant conditions	3.8*	4.1
AA2.02	When use of manual boration valve is needed	3.9	4.4
AA2.03	Correlation between boric acid controller setpoint and boric acid flow	2.9*	3.0
AA2.04	Availability of BWST	3.4	4.2
AA2.05	Amount of boron to add to achieve required SDM	3.3	3.9
AA2.06	When boron dilution is taking place	3.6	3.7

## APE: 025 Loss of Residual Heat Removal System (RHRS)

K/A NO.	KNOWLEDGE	IMPOR RO	RTANCE SRO
AK1.	Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to Loss of Residual Heat Removal System: $(CFR\ 41.8\ /\ 41.10\ /\ 45.3)$		
AK1.01	Loss of RHRS during all modes of operation	3.9	4.3
AK2.	Knowledge of the interrelations between the Loss of Residual Heat Removal System and the following: (CFR 41.7 / 45.7)		
AK2.01	RHR heat exchangers	2.9	2.9
AK2.02	LPI or Decay Heat Removal/RHR pumps	3.2*	3.2
AK2.03	Service water or closed cooling water pumps	2.7	2.7
AK2.04	Raw water or sea water pumps	2.4	2.4
AK2.05	Reactor building sump	2.6	2.6
AK2.06	Valves	2.2	2.1
AK2.07	Sensors and detectors	2.1	2.2
AK2.08	Controllers and positioners	2.2	2.2
AK2.09	Pumps	2.2	2.2
AK2.10	Motors	1.8	1.7
AK2.11	Heat exchangers and condensers	2.1*	2.1
AK2.12	Breakers, relays, and disconnects	1.7	1.8
AK3.	Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Loss of Residual Heat Removal System: $(CFR\ 41.5,\!41.10/\ 45.6/\ 45.13)$		
AK3.01 AK3.02	Shift to alternate flowpath	3.1	3.4
	increase above specified level	3.3	3.7
AK3.03	Immediate actions contained in EOP for Loss of RHRS	3.9	4.1

#### APE: 025 Loss of Residual Heat Removal System (RHRS)

#### **ABILITY**

## AA1. Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the Loss of Residual Heat Removal System: (CFR 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6)

AA1.01	RCS/RHRS cooldown rate	3.6	3.7
AA1.02	RCS inventory	3.8	3.9
AA1.03	LPI pumps	3.4	3.3
AA1.04	Closed cooling water pumps	2.8*	2.6
AA1.05	Raw water or sea water pumps	2.7	2.6
AA1.06	Not Used	N/A	N/A
AA1.07	Not Used	N/A	N/A
AA1.08	RHR cooler inlet and outlet temperature indicators	2.9*	2.9
AA1.09	LPI pump switches, ammeter, discharge pressure gauge,		
	flow meter, and indicators	3.2	3.1
AA1.10	LPI pump suction valve and discharge valve indicators	3.1*	2.9
AA1.11	Reactor building sump level indicators	2.9	3.0
AA1.12	RCS temperature indicators	3.6	3.5
AA1.13	SWS radiation monitors	2.5	2.6
AA1 14	Waste tank radiation monitors	2.1*	2.1
AA1.15	Waste tank level gauges and recorders	2.1	2.1
AA1.16	Service water pump manual switch, flow gauge, running		
	lights, and ammeters	2.2	2.2
AA1.17	Service water block valve indicators and flow valve controllers	2.1	2.0*
AA1.18	LPI header cross-connect valve controller and indicators	2.6*	2.8*
AA1.19	Block orifice bypass valve controller and indicators	2.6*	2.4*
AA1.20	HPI pump control switch, indicators, ammeter running		
	lights, and flow meter	2.6*	2.5*
AA1.21	Letdown flow indicator	2.3	2.5
AA1.22	Obtaining of water from BWST for LPI system	2.9*	2.8
AA1.23	RHR heat exchangers	2.8	2.9
	····· 6· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		
AA2.	Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to		
	the Loss of Residual Heat Removal System:		
	(CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)		
AA2.01	Proper amperage of running LPI/decay heat removal/RHR pump(s)	2.7	2.9
AA2.02	Leakage of reactor coolant from RHR into closed cooling		
	water system or into reactor building atmosphere	3.4	3.8
AA2.03	Increasing reactor building sump level	3.6	3.8
AA2.04	Location and isolability of leaks	3.3*	3.6
AA2.05	Limitations on LPI flow and temperature rates of change	3.1*	3.5*
AA2.06	Existence of proper RHR overpressure protection	3.2*	3.4*
AA2.07	Pump cavitation	3.4	3.7

	APE:	026 Loss of Component Cooling Water (CCW)	IMPOR'	TANCE
	K/A NO.	KNOWLEDGE	RO	SRO
	AK1.	Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to Loss of Component Cooling Water: $(CFR\ 41.8\ /\ 41.10\ /\ 45.3)$		
		None		
	AK2.	Knowledge of the interrelations between the Loss of Component Cooling Water and the following: $(CFR\ 41.7\ /\ 45.7)$		
		None		
	AK3.	Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Loss of Component Cooling Water: $(CFR\ 41.5,41.10\ /\ 45.6\ /\ 45.13)$		
	AK3.01	The conditions that will initiate the automatic opening and closing of the SWS isolation valves to the CCWS coolers	3.2*	3.5*
	AK3.02	The automatic actions (alignments) within the CCWS resulting from the actuation of the ESFAS	3.6	3.9
	AK3.03	Guidance actions contained in EOP for Loss of CCW	4.0	4.2
	AK3.04	Effect on the CCW flow header of a loss of CCW	3.5	3.7
	AA1.	Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the Loss of Component Cooling Water: (CFR 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6)		
	AA1.01 AA1.02 AA1.03 AA1.04 AA1.05	CCW temperature indications  Loads on the CCWS in the control room  SWS as a backup to the CCWS  CRDM high-temperature alarm system  The CCWS surge tank, including level control and level	3.1 3.2 3.6* 2.7*	3.1 3.3 3.6* 2.8
	AA1.06 AA1.07	alarms, and radiation alarm	3.1 2.9	3.1 2.9
		by the CCWS; interactions among the components	2.9	3.0

APE:	026 Loss of Component Cooling Water (CCW)		
AA2.	Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Component Cooling Water: (CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)		
AA2.01	Location of a leak in the CCWS	2.9	3.5
AA2.02	The cause of possible CCW loss	2.9	3.6
AA2.03	The valve lineups necessary to restart the CCWS while bypassing the		
	portion of the system causing the abnormal condition	2.6	2.9
AA2.04	The normal values and upper limits for the temperatures		
	of the components cooled by CCW	2.5	2.9*
AA2.05	The normal values for CCW-header flow rate and the flow		
	rates to the components cooled by the CCWS	2.4*	2.5*
AA2.06	The length of time after the loss of CCW flow to a component		
	before that component may be damaged	2.8*	3.1*

#### **IMPORTANCE** K/A NO. **KNOWLEDGE** RO SRO AK1. Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to Pressurizer Pressure Control Malfunctions: (CFR 41.8 / 41.10 / 45.3) AK1.01 3.1 3.4 Definition of saturation temperature ..... AK1.02 Expansion of liquids as temperature increases ...... 2.8 3.1 2.9 AK1.03 Latent heat of vaporization/condensation..... 2.6 AK2. Knowledge of the interrelations between the Pressurizer Pressure Control Malfunctions and the following: (CFR 41.7 / 45.7) AK2.01 2.1 2.2 AK2.02 Sensors and detectors ..... 2.4 2.6 AK2.03 2.6 2.8 1.9 AK2.04 Pumps ..... 2.1 AK2.05 1.8 2.0 AK3. Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Pressurizer Pressure Control Malfunctions: (CFR 41.5,41.10 / 45.6 / 45.13) AK3.01 3.5\* 3.8 AK3.02 Verification of alternate transmitter and/or plant 2.9\* computer prior to shifting flow chart transmitters ..... 3.0 AK3.03 3.7 4.1 AK3.04 Why, if PZR level is lost and then restored, that pressure recovers much more slowly ..... 2.8 3.3 **ABILITY** AA1. Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the Pressurizer Pressure Control Malfunctions: (CFR 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6) AA1.01 PZR heaters, sprays, and PORVs ..... 4.0 3.9 3.1\* AA1.02 SCR-controlled heaters in manual mode ...... 3.0 AA1.03 Pressure control when on a steam bubble ...... 3.6 3.5 AA1.04 Pressure recovery, using emergency-only heaters ..... 3.9\* 3.6\* 3.3\* 3.2\* AA1.05

027 Pressurizer Pressure Control System (PZR PCS) Malfunction

APE:

#### **APE:** 027 Pressurizer Pressure Control System (PZR PCS) Malfunction

# AA2. Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Pressurizer Pressure Control Malfunctions: (CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)

AA2.01	Conditions which will cause an increase in PZR level	3.4	3.8
AA2.02	Normal values for RCS pressure	3.8	3.9
AA2.03	Effects of RCS pressure changes on key components in plant	3.3	3.4
AA2.04	Tech-Spec limits for RCS pressure	3.7	4.3
AA2.05	PZR heater setpoints	3.2	3.3
AA2.06	Conditions requiring plant shutdown	3.5	3.9
AA2.07	Makeup flow indication	3.1	3.1
AA2.08	Letdown flow indication	3.2	3.2
AA2.09	Reactor power	3.5	3.6
AA2.10	PZR heater energized/de-energized condition	3.3	3.6
AA2.11	RCS pressure	4.0	4.1
AA2.12	PZR level	3.7	3.8
AA2.13	Seal return flow	2.8	2.9
AA2.14	RCP injection flow	2.8	2.9
AA2.15	Actions to be taken if PZR pressure instrument fails high	3.7	4.0
AA2.16	Actions to be taken if PZR pressure instrument fails low	3.6	3.9
AA2.17	Allowable RCS temperature difference vs. reactor power	3.1	3.3
AA2.18	Operable control channel	3.4	3.5

### **APE:** 028 Pressurizer (PZR) Level Control Malfunction

	<u>K/A NO.</u>	<u>KNOWLEDGE</u>	IMPOR RO	TANCE SRO
	AK1.	Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to Pressurizer Level Control Malfunctions: $(CFR\ 41.8\ /\ 41.10\ /\ 45.3)$		
	AK1.01	PZR reference leak abnormalities	2.8*	3.1*
	AK2.	Knowledge of the interrelations between the Pressurizer Level Control Malfunctions and the following: $(CFR\ 41.7\ /\ 45.7)$		
	AK2.01	Valves	2.2	2.2
	AK2.02	Sensors and detectors	2.6	2.7
	AK2.03	Controllers and positioners	2.6	2.9
	AK2.04	Pumps	2.3	2.4
	AK2.05	Heat exchangers and condensers	1.9	2.1
	AK2.06	Motors	1.8	2.1
	AK2.07	Breakers, relays, and disconnects	1.8	2.2
	AK3.	Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Pressurizer Level Control Malfunctions: $(CFR\ 41.5,\!41.10/\ 45.6/\ 45.13)$		
	AK3.01	Relationship between the letdown flow rate and capacity		
	AK3.02	rating of orifices	2.4	2.8
	71113.02	makeup/letdown imbalance	2.9	3.2
	AK3.03	False indication of PZR level when PORV or spray valve	2.,	3.2
	11120.00	is open and RCS saturated	3.5	4.1
	AK3.04	Change in PZR level with power change, even though RCS		
l		T-ave. constant, due to loop size difference	2.9*	3.0*
•	AK3.05	Actions contained in EOP for PZR level malfunction	3.7	4.1

APE:	028 Pressurizer (PZR) Level Control Malfunction		
	ABILITY		
AA1.	Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the Pressurizer Level Control Malfunctions: (CFR 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6)		
AA1.01	PZR level reactor protection bistables	3.8*	3.9
AA1.02	CVCS	3.4	3.4
AA1.03	RCP and seal water system	2.9	2.9
AA1.04	Regenerative heat exchanger and temperature limits	2.7	2.8
AA1.05	Initiation of excess letdown per the CVCS	2.8	2.9
AA1.06	Checking of RCS leaks	3.3	3.6
AA1.07	Charging pumps maintenance of PZR level (including manual backup)	3.3	3.3
AA1.08	Selection of an alternate PZR level channel if one has failed	3.7	3.6
AA2.	Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Pressurizer Level Control Malfunctions: (CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)		
AA2.01	PZR level indicators and alarms	3.4	3.6
AA2.02	PZR level as a function of power level or T-ave. including		
	interpretation of malfunction	3.4	3.8
AA2.03	Charging subsystem flow indicator and controller	2.8	3.3
AA2.04	Ammeters and running indicators for CVCS charging pumps	2.6	3.1
AA2.05	Flow control valve isolation valve indicator	2.6	2.7
AA2.06	Letdown flow indicator	2.7	2.8
AA2.07	Seal water flow indicator for RCP	2.6	2.9
AA2.08	PZR level as a function of power level	3.1	3.5
AA2.09	Charging and letdown flow capacities	2.9	3.2
AA2.10	Whether the automatic mode for PZR level control is		
	functioning improperly, necessity of shift to manual modes	3.3	3.4
AA2.11	Leak in PZR	3.2	3.6
AA2.12	Cause for PZR level deviation alarm: controller mal-		
	function or other instrumentation malfunction	3.1	3.5
AA2.13	The actual PZR level, given uncompensated level with an		
	appropriate graph	2.9	3.2

The effect on indicated PZR levels, given a change in

ambient pressure and temperature of reflux boiling .....

AA2.14

2.6

2.8

#### **APE:** 032 Loss of Source Range Nuclear Instrumentation **IMPORTANCE** K/A NO. **KNOWLEDGE** RO SRO AK1. Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to Loss of Source Range Nuclear Instrumentation: (CFR 41.8 / 41.10 / 45.3) AK1.01 2.5 3.1 AK2. Knowledge of the interrelations between the Loss of Source Range **Nuclear Instrumentation and the following:** (CFR 41.7 / 45.7) AK2.01 Power supplies, including proper switch positions ..... 2.7\* 3.1 AK2.02 Sensors and detectors ..... 2.4 2.7 AK3. Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Loss of Source Range Nuclear Instrumentation: (CFR 41.5,41.10 / 45.6 / 45.13) AK3.01 Startup termination on source-range loss ..... 3.2 3.6 AK3.02 Guidance contained in EOP for loss of source-range 3.7\* 4.1 **ABILITY** AA1. Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the Loss of Source Range Nuclear Instrumentation: (CFR 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6) AA1.01 Manual restoration of power ..... 3.1\* 3.4\*

#### APE: 032 Loss of Source Range Nuclear Instrumentation

AA2.05

AA2.06

AA2.07

AA2.08

AA2.09

#### AA2. Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Source Range Nuclear Instrumentation: (CFR: 43.5 / 45.13) AA2.01 2.6 2.9\* AA2.02 Expected change in source range count rate when rods are moved ...... 3.6 3.9 AA2.03 Expected values of source range indication when high 2.8 3.1\* voltage is automatically removed ..... AA2.04 3.1 3.5

Nature of abnormality, from rapid survey of control room data ......

Confirmation of reactor trip .....

Maximum allowable channel disagreement ......

Effect of improper HV setting .....

2.9\*

3.9\*

2.8

2.2

2.5

3.2\*

4.1\*

3.4\*

3.1

2.9

#### **APE:** 033 Loss of Intermediate Range Nuclear Instrumentation **IMPORTANCE** K/A NO. **KNOWLEDGE** RO SRO AK1. Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to Loss of Intermediate Range Nuclear Instrumentation: CFR 41.8 / 41.10 / 45.3) AK1.01 2.7 3.0 AK2. Knowledge of the interrelations between the Loss of Intermediate Range **Nuclear Instrumentation and the following:** (CFR 41.7 / 45.7) 2.9 AK2.01 2.4 Power supplies, including proper switch position..... AK2.02 Sensors and detectors ..... 2.3 2.6 AK3. Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Loss of Intermediate Range Nuclear Instrumentation: (CFR 41.5,41.10 / 45.6 / 45.13) AK3.01 Termination of startup following loss of intermediate-3.2 3.6 AK3.02 Guidance contained in EOP for loss of intermediate-3.6 3.9 **ABILITY** AA1. Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the Loss of Intermediate Range Nuclear Instrumentation: (CFR 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6) AA1.01 Power-available indicators in cabinets or equipment drawers ..... 2.9 3.1 AA1.02 3.0 3.1 Manual restoration of power ..... 3.0\* 3.2\* AA1.03

#### APE: 033 Loss of Intermediate Range Nuclear Instrumentation AA2. Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Intermediate Range Nuclear Instrumentation: (CFR: 43.5 / 45.13) AA2.01 Equivalency between source-range, intermediate-range, and power-range channel readings ..... 3.0 3.5 AA2.02 Indications of unreliable intermediate-range channel 3.3 3.6 AA2.03 Indication of blown fuse ..... 2.8 3.1 AA2.04 Satisfactory overlap between source-range, 3.2 3.6 AA2.05 Nature of abnormality, from rapid survey of control 3.0\* 3.1? Cause of failure of an intermediate-range channel ..... AA2.06 2.8\* 2.3 AA2.07 Confirmation of reactor trip ..... 3.9 4.2 AA2.08 Intermediate range channel operability ..... 3.3 3.4 AA2.09 Conditions which allow bypass of an intermediate-range level trip switch ..... 3.4\* 3.7\* AA2.10 Tech-Spec limits if both intermediate-range channels 3.8 have failed ..... 3.1 AA2.11 3.1 3.4 AA2.12 Maximum allowable channel disagreement ..... 2.5\* 3.1\* AA2.13 2.2\* 2.8\*

# **APE** 036 Fuel Handling Incidents

K/A NO.	<u>KNOWLEDGE</u>	IMPOI RO	RTANCE SRO
AK1.	Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to Fuel Handling Incidents: $CFR\ 41.8\ /\ 41.10\ /\ 45.3)$		
AK1.01 AK1.02 AK1.03	Radiation exposure hazards	3.5 3.4 4.0	4.1 3.8 4.3
AK2.	Knowledge of the interrelations between the Fuel Handling Incidents and the following: $(CFR\ 41.7\ /\ 45.7)$		
AK2.01 AK2.02	Fuel handling equipment	2.9 3.4	3.5 3.9
AK3.	Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Fuel Handling Incidents: $(CFR\ 41.5,\!41.10/\ 45.6/\ 45.13)$		
AK3.01 AK3.02 AK3.03	Different inputs that will cause a reactor building evacuation  Interlocks associated with fuel handling equipment  Guidance contained in EOP for fuel handling incident	3.1 2.9 3.7	3.7 3.6 4.1
	<u>ABILITY</u>		
AA1.	Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the Fuel Handling Incidents: (CFR 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6)		
AA1.01 AA1.02 AA1.03 AA1.04	Reactor building containment purge ventilation system	3.3 3.1 3.5 3.1	3.8 3.5 3.9 3.7
AA2.	Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Fuel Handling Incidents: (CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)		
AA2.01 AA2.02 AA2.03	ARM system indications	3.2 3.4 3.1*	3.9 4.1 4.2*

# APE: 037 Steam Generator (S/G) Tube Leak

		IMPOF	RTANCE
K/A NO.	KNOWLEDGE	RO	SRO
AK1.	Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to Steam Generator Tube Leak: CFR 41.8 / 41.10 / 45.3)		
AK1.01	Use of steam tables	2.9*	3.3
AK1.02	Leak rate vs. pressure drop	3.5	3.9
1111102	20m2 rule 13/ p2033420 420p		0.5
AK2.	Knowledge of the interrelations between the Steam Generator Tube Leak and the following: (CFR 41.7 / 45.7)		
AK2.01	Valves	2.1	2.0
AK2.02	Sensors and detectors	2.4	2.4
AK2.03	Controllers and positioners	2.3	2.2
AK2.04	Pumps	2.1	2.1
AK2.05	Motors	1.9	1.9
AK2.06	Heat exchangers and condensers	2.4	2.5
AK2.07	Breakers, relays, and disconnects	1.9	2.0
AK3.	Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Steam Generator Tube Leak: $(CFR\ 41.5,\!41.10\ /\ 45.6\ /\ 45.13)$		
AK3.01	Collection of Condensate in air ejector monitor due to its failure	2.3	2.6
AK3.02	Reset and check of Condensate air ejector exhaust monitor	3.2	3.5
AK3.03	Comparison of makeup flow and letdown flow for various		
	modes of operation	3.1	3.3
AK3.04	Use of "feed and bleed" process	2.5	2.9
AK3.05	Actions contained in procedures for radiation monitoring,		
	RCS water inventory balance, S/G tube failure, and plant		
	shutdown	3.7	4.0
AK3.06	Normal operating precautions to preclude or minimize		
	SGTR	3.6	4.1
AK3.07	Actions contained in EOP for S/G tube leak	4.2	4.4
AK3.08	Criteria for securing RCP	4.1	4.3
AK3.09	Maximum load change capability of facility	2.7*	3.1*
AK3.10	Automatic actions associated with high radioactivity in S/G sample lines	3.3*	3.7*

APE:	037 Steam Generator (S/G) Tube Leak		
AA1.	Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the Steam Generator Tube Leak: $(CFR\ 41.7\ /\ 45.5\ /\ 45.6)$		
AA1.01	Maximum controlled depressurization rate for affected S/G	3.7	3.6
AA1.02	Condensate exhaust system	3.1*	2.9
AA1.03	Loop isolation valves	3.0*	2.9
AA1.04	Condensate air ejector exhaust radiation monitor and failure indicator	3.6	3.9
AA1.05	Radiation monitor for auxiliary building exhaust processes	3.3	3.5
AA1.06	Main steam line rad monitor meters	3.8*	3.9*
AA1.07	CVCS letdown flow indicator	3.1	3.2
AA1.08	Charging flow indicator	3.3	3.1
AA1.09	RCS loop pressure indicators	3.3	3.2
AA1.10	CVCS makeup tank level indicator	2.9	3.1
AA1.11	PZR level indicator	3.4	3.3
AA1.12	Control panel power range channel recorders	2.3*	2.5
AA1.13	S/G blowdown radiation monitors	3.9	4.0
AA2.	Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Steam Generator Tube Leak:		
	(CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)		
AA2.01	Unusual readings of the monitors; steps needed to verify readings	3.0	3.4
AA2.02	Agreement/disagreement among redundant radiation monitors	3.4	3.9
AA2.03	That the expected indication on main steam lines from		
	the S/Gs should show increasing radiation levels	3.4	3.9
AA2.04	Comparison of RCS fluid inputs and outputs, to detect leaks	3.4	3.7
AA2.05	Past history of leakage with current problem	2.8	3.3
AA2.06	S/G tube failure	4.3	4.5
AA2.07	Flowpath for dilution of ejector exhaust air	3.1	3.6
AA2.08	Failure of Condensate air ejector exhaust monitor	2.8	3.3
AA2.09	System status, using independent readings from redundant		
	Condensate air ejector exhaust monitor	2.8*	3.4*
AA2.10	Tech-Spec limits for RCS leakage	3.2	4.1
AA2.11	When to isolate one or more S/Gs	3.8	3.8*
AA2.12	Flow rate of leak	3.3	4.1
AA2.13	Which S/G is leaking	4.1	4.3
AA2.14	Actions to be taken if S/G goes solid and water enters steam lines	4.0	4.4
AA2.15	Magnitude of atmospheric radioactive release if cool-down must be		
	completed using steam dump or atmospheric reliefs	3.4*	4.2
AA2.16	Pressure at which to maintain RCS during S/G cooldown	4.1	4.3

# APE: 040 Steam Line Rupture

		IMPOF	RTANCE
K/A NO.	<u>KNOWLEDGE</u>	RO	SRO
AK1.	Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to Steam Line Rupture: $(CFR\ 41.8\ /\ 41.10\ /\ 45.3)$		
AK1.01	Consequences of PTS	4.1	4.4
AK1.02	Leak rate versus pressure change	3.2	3.6
AK1.03	RCS shrink and consequent depressurization	3.8	4.2
AK1.04	Nil ductility temperature	3.2	3.6
AK1.05	Reactivity effects of cooldown	4.1	4.4
AK1.06	High-energy steam line break considerations	3.7	3.8
AK1.07	Effects of feedwater introduction on dry S/G	3.4	4.2
AK2.	Knowledge of the interrelations between the Steam Line Rupture and the following: $(CFR\ 41.7\ /\ 45.7)$		
AK2.01	Valves	2.6*	2.5
AK2.02	Sensors and detectors	2.6*	2.6
AK2.03	Controllers and positioners	2.4*	2.4
AK2.04	Pumps	2.0	2.1
AK2.05	Breakers, relays, and disconnects	1.9	2.1
AK2.06	Motors	2.0	2.1
AK3.	Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Steam Line Rupture: (CFR $41.5,41.10$ / $45.6$ / $45.13$ )		
AK3.01	Operation of steam line isolation valves	4.2	4.5
AK3.02	ESFAS initiation	4.4	4.4
AK3.03	Steam line non-return valves	3.2*	3.5*
AK3.04	Actions contained in EOPs for steam line rupture	4.5	4.7
AK3.05	Airlock leak tests	2.1*	2.3
AK3.06	Containment temperature and pressure considerations	3.4	3.9
	<u>.</u>		

#### **APE:** 040 Steam Line Rupture

	ABILITY		
AA1.	Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the Steam Line Rupture: $(CFR\ 41.7\ /\ 45.5\ /\ 45.6)$		
AA1.01	Manual and automatic ESFAS initiation	4.6	4.6
AA1.02	Feedwater isolation	4.5	4.5
AA1.03	Isolation of one steam line from header	4.3	4.3
AA1.04	Isolation of all steam lines from header	4.3	4.3
AA1.05	Manual and automatic RPS trip initiation	4.5	4.5
AA1.06	S/G and steam line pressures and flows	4.0	4.1
AA1.07	Steam pressures and flow rates via computer, safety		
	parameter display system, and other indications	3.4*	3.7
AA1.08	Normal operating steam parameters, as a function of power	3.6	3.7
AA1.09	Setpoints of main steam safety and PORVs	3.4*	3.4
AA1.10	AFW system	4.1	4.1
AA1.11	MFW system	3.2*	3.1
AA1.12	RCS pressure and temperature	4.2	4.2
AA1.13	Steam line isolation valve indications	4.2	4.2
AA1.14	Nuclear instrumentation	4.2	4.2
AA1.15	T-ave. protection indicators	3.9*	3.8
AA1.16	Reactor coolant loop delta temperature gauges	3.4	3.4
AA1.17	Reactor trip breaker indicators	4.3	4.3
AA1.18	Control rod position indicators	4.2	4.2
AA1.19	Postaccident monitoring panel indicators	3.8*	3.9
AA1.20	Containment pressure and temperature trends	4.1	4.2
AA1.21	Vibration alarm	2.3*	2.5
AA1.22	Load sequencer status lights	3.0*	3.0
AA1.23	All pressure gauges per steam generator (for pressure drop)	3.6	3.5
AA1.24	Main steam header pressure gauges	3.8	3.8
AA2.	Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Steam Line Rupture: (CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)		
AA2.01	Occurrence and location of a steam line rupture from		
	pressure and flow indications	4.2	4.7
AA2.02	Conditions requiring a reactor trip	4.6	4.7
AA2.03	Difference between steam line rupture and LOCA	4.6	4.7
AA2.04	Conditions requiring ESFAS initiation	4.5	4.7
AA2.05	When ESFAS systems may be secured	4.1	4.5

APE:	051 Loss of Condenser Vacuum		
			RTANCE
K/A NO.	KNOWLEDGE	RO	SRO
AK1.	Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to Loss of Condenser Vacuum: $(CFR\ 41.8\ /\ 41.10\ /\ 45.3)$		
AK1.01	Relationship of condenser vacuum to circulating water, flow rate, and temperature	2.4*	2.4*
AK2.	Knowledge of the interrelations between the Loss of Condenser Vacuum and the following: (CFR 41.7 / 45.7)		
AK2.01 AK2.02 AK2.03 AK2.04 AK2.05 AK2.06 AK2.07	Valves Controllers and positioners Pumps Motors Heat exchangers and condensers Sensors and detectors Steam jet air ejectors and vacuum pumps	1.6 1.6 1.6 1.7* 1.6 1.9*	1.6 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.5 1.7
AK3.	Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Loss of Condenser Vacuum: (CFR $41.5,41.10$ / $45.6$ / $45.13$ )		
AK3.01	Loss of steam dump capability upon loss of condenser vacuum	2.8*	3.1*
AA1.	Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the Loss of Condenser Vacuum: $(CFR\ 41.7\ /\ 45.5\ /\ 45.6)$		
AA1.01 AA1.02 AA1.03 AA1.04 AA1.05 AA1.06 AA1.07 AA1.08 AA1.09	Condenser vacuum pump Condenser vacuum Gland steam header pressure Rod position Turbine header pressure Turbine throttle and governor valves position Feedwater flow Air ejector steam supply Circulating water system	1.9* 2.3* 2.0* 2.5* 1.8* 2.0* 2.2* 2.3* 2.1*	1.9 2.2* 1.9 2.5* 1.7 2.0 2.2* 2.1 2.0

APE:	051 Loss of Condenser Vacuum		
AA2.	Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Condenser Vacuum: (CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)		
AA2.01 AA2.02	Cause for low vacuum condition	2.4* 3.9	2.7* 4.1

<b>APE:</b>	054 Loss of Main Feedwater (MFW)		
	` ,	IMPOI	RTANCE
K/A NO.	KNOWLEDGE	RO	SRO
AK1.	Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to Loss of Main Feedwater (MFW): $(CFR\ 41.8\ /\ 41.10\ /\ 45.3)$		
AK1.01	MFW line break depressurizes the S/G (similar to a steam	4.4	4.0
AK1.02	line break)	4.1 3.6	4.3 4.2
AK2.	Knowledge of the interrelations between the Loss of Main Feedwater (MF and the following: $(CFR\ 41.7\ /\ 45.7)$	<b>'W</b> )	
AK2.01	Valves	2.4*	2.3
AK2.02	Controller and positioners	2.2*	2.2
AK2.03	Pumps	2.1	2.2
AK2.04	Motors	1.9	2.0
AK2.05	Heat exchangers and condensers	1.9	2.1
AK2.06	Breakers, relays, and disconnects	1.8	1.9
AK2.07	Sensors and detectors	2.1	2.2
AK3.	Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Loss of Main Feedwater (MFW): (CFR 41.5,41.10 / $45.6$ / $45.13$ )		
AK3.01	Reactor and/or turbine trip, manual and automatic	4.1	4.4
AK3.02	Matching of feedwater and steam flows	3.4*	3.7*
AK3.03	Manual control of AFW flow control valves	3.8	4.1
AK3.04	Actions contained in EOPs for loss of MFW	4.4	4.6
AK3.05	HPI/PORV cycling upon total feedwater loss	4.6	4.7
	<u>ABILITY</u>		
AA1.	Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the Loss of Main Feedwater (MFW): $(CFR\ 41.7\ /\ 45.5\ /\ 45.6)$		
AA1.01	AFW controls, including the use of alternate AFW sources	4.5	4.4
AA1.02	Manual startup of electric and steam-driven AFW pumps	4.4	4.4
AA1.03	AFW auxiliaries, including oil cooling water supply	3.5	3.7
AA1.04	HPI, under total feedwater loss conditions	4.4	4.5

APE:	054 Loss of Main Feedwater (MFW)		
AA2.	Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Main Feedwater (MFW): (CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)		
AA2.01	Occurrence of reactor and/or turbine trip	4.3	4.4
AA2.02	Differentiation between loss of all MFW and trip of one MFW pump	4.1	4.4
AA2.03	Conditions and reasons for AFW pump startup	4.1	4.2
AA2.04	Proper operation of AFW pumps and regulating valves	4.2	4.3
AA2.05	Status of MFW pumps, regulating and stop valves	3.5	3.7
AA2.06	AFW adjustments needed to maintain proper T-ave. and S/G level	4.0	4.3
AA2.07	Reactor trip first-out panel indicator	3.4*	3.9
A A 2 O8	Steam flow food trand recorder	2.0	2 2*

#### **APE: 056 Loss of Offsite Power**

K/A NO.	KNOWLEDGE	IMPOR RO	RTANCE SRO
AK1.	Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to Loss of Offsite Power: CFR $41.8 / 41.10 / 45.3$ )		
AK1.01 AK1.02	Principle of cooling by natural convection	3.7	4.2
	psig, inches of mercury, gpm	1.9	2.1
AK1.03	Definition of subcooling: use of steam tables to determine it	3.1*	3.4*
AK1.04	Definition of saturation conditions, implication for the systems	3.1*	3.2*
AK2.	Knowledge of the interrelations between the Loss of Offsite Power and the following: $(CFR\ 41.7\ /\ 45.7)$	2	
AK2.01	Valves	1.8	1.8
AK2.02	Sensors, detectors, and indicators	2.0*	1.9
AK2.03	Controllers and positioners	1.9	1.9
AK2.04	Pumps	1.7	1.7
AK2.05	Motors	1.7	1.7
AK2.06	Heat exchangers and condensers	1.6	1.7
AK2.07	Demineralizers and ion exchangers	1.6	1.6
AK2.08	Breakers, relays, and disconnects	2.1*	2.1
AK3.	Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Loss of Offsite Power: $(CFR\ 41.5,\!41.10/\ 45.6/\ 45.13)$		
AK3.01	Order and time to initiation of power for the load		
	sequencer	3.5	3.9
AK3.02	Actions contained in EOP for loss of offsite power	4.4	4.7
AA1.	Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the Loss of Offsite Power: $(CFR\ 41.7\ /\ 45.5\ /\ 45.6)$		
AA1.01	Power relief controllers to maintain no-load T-ave	4.0*	3.8*
AA1.02	ESF bus synchronization select switch to close bus tie breakers	4.0*	3.9
AA1.03	Adjustment of ED/G load by selectively energizing PZR backup heaters	3.2*	3.3*
AA1.04	Adjustment of speed of ED/G to maintain frequency and voltage levels	3.2	3.1
AA1.05	Initiation (manual) of safety injection process	3.8	3.9
AA1.06	Safety injection pump	3.6*	3.6*
AA1.07	Service water pump	3.2*	3.2*
AA1.08	HVAC chill water pump and unit	2.5*	2.5
AA1.09	CCW pump	3.3	3.3
AA1.10	Auxiliary/emergency feedwater pump (motor driven)	4.3	4.3
AA1.11	HPI system	3.7*	3.7
AA1.12	Reactor building cooling unit	3.2	3.3
AA1.13	Fuel handling building exhaust fan	2.2	2.2
AA1.14	Relay room cooling unit	2.3*	2.3*
AA1.15	Service water booster pump	2.7*	2.9*
AA1.16	ESF switch gear room cooling unit	2.5	2.5
AA1.17	Service water building normal ventilation supply fan	2.3*	2.4*

APE:	056 Loss of Offsite Power		
AA1.18	Control room normal ventilation supply fan	3.2	3.2
AA1.19	Battery room ventilation exhaust fan	2.4*	2.4*
AA1.20	Speed switch room ventilation fan	3.0*	3.0*
AA1.21	Reset of the ESF load sequencers	3.3*	3.3*
AA1.22	Main turbine lube oil system	1.8	1.9
AA1.23	Turbine turning gear (manually)	1.9*	1.9
AA1.24	Plant computer, to call up in-core temperature monitoring group	2.9*	3.0*
AA1.25	Main steam supply valve control switch	2.9*	2.9*
AA1.26	Circuit breakers	2.5*	2.6
AA1.27	Normal letdown isolation valve	2.3*	2.3
AA1.28	SWS flow control valve for the CCW cooler to control	2.3	2.3
1111120	CCW outlet temperature	3.1*	3.1
AA1.29	CCW heat exchanger temperature control valves	2.7	2.7
AA1.30	AFW flow control valve operating switches	3.5	3.6
AA1.31	PZR heater group control switches	3.3	3.3
AA1.32	PZR PORV hand switch	3.4*	3.4
AA1.33	PORV block valve control switch	3.3	3.5
AA1.34	Normal makeup flow controller	2.7	2.8
AA1.35	Control switches for the reactor makeup water pump	2.3*	2.3*
AA1.36	Gland seal and condenser air removal systems	1.8	1.8
AA1.37	Instrument air	3.4	3.5
AAI.37	instrument an	3.4	3.3
AA2.	Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Offsite Power: (CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)		
AA2.01	PORV controller indicator and setpoint	3.3*	3.4
AA2.02	ESF load sequencer status lights	3.5*	3.6*
AA2.03	Operational status of safety injection pump	3.8	3.9
AA2.04	Operational status of service water pump	3.5	3.7
AA2.05	Operational status of HVAC chill water pump	2.6*	2.8*
AA2.06	Operational status of CCW pump	3.5	3.6
AA2.07	Operational status of emergency feedwater pump (motor driven)	4.2	4.3
AA2.08	Operational status of fuel-handling building exhaust fan	2.2	2.3*
AA2.09	Operational status of reactor building cooling unit	2.7	2.9
AA2.10	Operational status of relay room cooling unit	2.0*	2.2*
AA2.11	Operational status of service water booster pump	2.9*	2.9*
AA2.12	Operational status of ESF switch gear room cooling unit	2.4*	2.6*
AA2.13	Operational status of ventilation supply fans for the		
	service water building, control room and battery room	2.5	2.6
AA2.14	Operational status of ED/Gs (A and B)	4.4	4.6
AA2.15	Operational status of main generator emergency bearing oil pumps	1.9	2.1
AA2.16	Operational status of feedwater pump turbine emergency oil pumps	1.9*	2.1*
AA2.17	Operational status of PZR backup heaters	3.4	3.6
AA2.18	Reactor coolant temperature, pressure, and PZR level recorders	3.8	4.0
AA2.19	T-cold and T-hot indicators (wide range)	4.0	4.2
AA2.20	AFW flow indicator	3.9	4.1
AA2.21	ED/G frequency and voltage indicators	3.6	3.8
AA2.22	Emergency lube oil pump indicators and low-pressure alarms on ED/G	3.4	3.6
AA2.23	Turbine trip-reactor button and indicator	3.7	3.9
AA2.24	CCW pump ammeter, flowmeter and run indicator	3.0	3.1
AA2 25	Emergency feedwater ammeter and flowmeter	3.9	4.0
AA2 26	Reactor building cooling unit ammeter and run indicator	2.2*	2.4*
AA2.27	Fuel-handling building exhaust fan indicator	1.8*	1.9*
AA2.28	Auxiliary building gas treatment indicator	2.2*	2.6*
AA2.29	Service water booster pump ammeter and flowmeter	3.0*	3.2*
	0.54		

APE:

056 Loss of Offsite Power

AA2.30	Switch gear room cooling unit run indicator	2.0	2.2
AA2.31	Ventilation supply fan and run indicators for the ser-	-	
	vice water building, control room and battery room	2.1	2.2
AA2.32	Transient trend of coolant temperature toward no-load T-ave	4.3	4.3
AA2.33	ESF channels, A and B breaker-trip alarms, indicators		
	and bus voltage indicators	3.6?	3.7?
AA2.34	Rod bottom lights	4.1	4.2
AA2.35	Reactor trip alarm	4.1	4.1
AA2.36	Turbine stop valve indicator	3.9	4.1
AA2.37	ED/G indicators for the following: voltage, frequency,		
	load, load-status, and closure of bus tie breakers	3.7*	3.8
AA2.38	Load sequencer status lights	3.7*	3.8
AA2.39	Safety injection pump ammeter and flowmeter	3.5*	3.6
AA2.40	Service water pump ammeter and flowmeter	3.3	3.4
AA2.41	HVAC chill water pump run and alarm indicators	2.3*	2.3*
AA2.42	Occurrence of a reactor trip	4.1	4.1
AA2.43	Occurrence of a turbine trip	3.9	4.1
AA2.44	Indications of loss of offsite power	4.3	4.5
AA2.45	Indicators to assess status of ESF breakers (tripped/	7.5	т.5
MA2.43	not-tripped) and validity of alarms (false/not-false)	3.6*	3.9
AA2.46	That the ED/Gs have started automatically and that the	3.0	3.9
AA2.40	bus tie breakers are closed	4.2	4.4
A A 2 47			
AA2.47	Proper operation of the ED/G load sequencer	3.8	3.9
AA2.48	Reactor coolant temperature, pressure, and PZR level	4.2	4.4
1 1 2 10	following a power outage transient	4.3	4.4
AA2.49	Nonessential equipment to be secured to avoid overload of ED/Gs	3.0	3.4
AA2.50	That load and VAR limits, alarm setpoints, frequency	• 0.1	
	and voltage limits for ED/Gs are not being exceeded	2.8*	3.1
AA2.51	_T, (core, heat exchanger, etc.)	3.3*	3.4*
AA2.52	PZR level required for a given power level	2.6*	2.8*
AA2.53	Status of emergency bus under voltage relays	2.9	3.2
AA2.54	Breaker position (remote and local)	2.9	3.0
AA2.55	Subcooled margin monitors	3.8	3.9
AA2.56	RCS T-ave	3.6*	3.7
AA2.57	RCS hot-leg and cold-leg temperatures	3.9	4.1
AA2.58	Air compressors (indicating lights)	2.3	2.6*
AA2.59	Gland seal pressure gauge	1.5	1.6
AA2.60	MSIV open	2.7*	2.9*
AA2.61	Condensate pump	1.6	1.7
AA2.62	Breaker for feedwater pumps	1.7	1.9*
AA2.63	Feedwater heater drain pump breaker trip	1.5	1.5
AA2.64	Circulating water pump switch	1.6	1.7
AA2.65	Screen wash pump	1.5	1.7
AA2.66	CVCS charging flow	3.2	3.4
AA2.67	Seal injection flow (for the RCPs)	2.9	3.1
AA2.68	CVCS letdown flow	2.7	2.9
AA2.69	Valve position	2.3*	2.5*
AA2.70	Reactor building CCW temperature	2.1	2.2
AA2.71	Turbine service water heat exchange	1.7	1.7
AA2.72	Auxiliary feed flow	4.1	4.3
AA2.73	PZR heater on/off	3.5	3.6
AA2.74	PORV position	3.6	3.7
AA2.75	CVCS makeup	3.0	3.7
AA2.76	Reactor makeup water pump (running)	2.6	2.6
AA2.77	Auxiliary feed pump (running)	4.1	4.4
AA2.78	Bus voltmeters	2.7	3.0
APE:	056 Loss of Offsite Power		
AA2.79	Turbine turning gear status light	1.7	1.7
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AA2.80	Input/output voltage alarm	2.1*	2.2*
AA2.81	S/G level meter scale and pressure gauge	3.7	3.8
AA2.82	Temperatures displayed on plant computer CRT monitor	2.6	2.7
AA2.83	Instrument air pressure gauge	2.7	3.0
AA2.84	Turbine bearing pressure meter	1.6	1.8
AA2.85	Condenser vacuum gauge readings	1.8*	1.9*
AA2.86	Main steam pressure meter scale	2.7*	2.7*
AA2.87	Circulation water pump ammeter readings	1.6	1.6
AA2.88	Necessary S/G water level for natural circulation	4 1	4.2

#### **IMPORTANCE** K/A NO. **KNOWLEDGE** RO SRO AK1. Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to Loss of Vital AC Instrument Bus: (CFR 41.8 / 41.10 / 45.3) None AK2. Knowledge of the interrelations between the Loss of Vital AC Instrument Bus and the following: (CFR 41.7 / 45.7) AK2.01 Valves ..... 1.9 2.1 2.2\* 2.3\* AK2.02 Sensors, detectors, and indicators ...... AK2.03 2.2\* 2.4 AK2.04 2.0 1.9 Pumps ..... Breakers, relays and disconnects ..... 2.2\* 2.3 AK2.05 Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to AK3. the Loss of Vital AC Instrument Bus: (CFR 41.5,41.10 / 45.6 / 45.13) AK3.01 Actions contained in EOP for loss of vital ac electrical instrument bus ... 4.1 4.4 **ABILITY** AA1. Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the Loss of Vital AC Instrument Bus: (CFR 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6) AA1.01 Manual inverter swapping ..... 3.7\* 3.7 AA1.02 3.7 3.8 Feedwater pump speed to control pressure and level in S/G ..... AA1.03 3.6\* 3.6 RWST and VCT valves ..... 3.5 3.6 AA1.04 AA1.05 Backup instrument indications ..... 3.2 3.4 Manual control of components for which automatic control is lost . . . . . . 3.5 35 AA1.06

057 Loss of Vital AC Electrical Instrument Bus

**APE:** 

APE:	057 Loss of Vital AC Electrical Instrument Bus		
AA2.	Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Vital AC Instrument Bus: (CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)		
AA2.01	Safety injection tank pressure and level indicators	3.7	3.8
AA2.02	Core flood tank pressure and level indicators	3.7*	3.8
AA2.03	RPS panel alarm annunciators and trip indicators	3.7	3.9
AA2.04	ESF system panel alarm annunciators and channel status indicators	3.7	4.0
AA2.05	S/G pressure and level meters	3.5	3.8
AA2.06	AC instrument bus alarms for the inverter and alternate power source	3.2	3.7
AA2.07	Valve indicator of charging pump suction valve from RWST	3.3	3.5
AA2.08	Reactor power digital display and remote flux meter	3.4*	3.5
AA2.09	T-ave. and T-ref. chart recorder	3.1*	3.4
AA2.10	Turbine load limiter control	2.3	2.5
AA2.11	Main feed pump running indicator and controller	2.9*	3.0
AA2.12	PZR level controller, instrumentation, and heater indications	3.5	3.7
AA2.13	VCT level and pressure indicators and recorders	3.0	3.4
AA2.14	That substitute power sources have come on line on a loss of initial ac	3.2	3.6
AA2.15	That a loss of ac has occurred	3.8	4.1
AA2.16	Normal and abnormal PZR level for various modes of plant operation	3.0	3.1
AA2.17	System and component status, using local or remote controls	3.1	3.4
AA2.18	The indicator, valve, breaker, or damper position which		
	will occur on a loss of power	3.1	3.1
AA2.19	The plant automatic actions that will occur on the loss		
	of a vital ac electrical instrument bus	4.0	4.3
AA2.20	Interlocks in effect on loss of ac vital electrical instrument bus that must be		
	bypassed to restore normal equipment operation	3.6	3.9

#### APE: 058 Loss of DC Power

K/A NO.	<u>KNOWLEDGE</u>	IMPOF RO	RTANCE SRO
AK1.	Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to Loss of DC Power: $(CFR\ 41.8\ /\ 41.10\ /\ 45.3)$		
AK1.01 AK1.02	Battery charger equipment and instrumentation	2.8 2.0	3.1* 2.3
AK2.	Knowledge of the interrelations between the Loss of DC Power and the following: $(CFR\ 41.7\ /\ 45.7)$		
AK2.01 AK2.02	Motors	1.9 2.2*	2.2 2.4*
AK3.	Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Loss of DC Power: $(CFR\ 41.5,\!41.10/\ 45.6/\ 45.1)$		
AK3.01 AK3.02	Use of dc control power by D/Gs	3.4* 4.0	3.7 4.2
	ABILITY		
AA1.	Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the Loss of DC Power: $(CFR\ 41.7\ /\ 45.5\ /\ 45.6)$		
AA1.01 AA1.02	Cross-tie of the affected dc bus with the alternate supply  Static inverter dc input breaker, frequency meter, ac	3.4*	3.5
AA1.03	output breaker, and ground fault detector	3.1* 3.1	3.1 3.3
AA2.	Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of DC Power: (CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)		
AA2.01	That a loss of dc power has occurred; verification that substitute power sources have come on line	3.7	4.1
AA2.02 AA2.03	125V dc bus voltage, low/critical low, alarm  DC loads lost; impact on ability to operate and monitor plant systems	3.3* 3.5	3.6 3.9

# APE: 059 Accidental Liquid Radwaste Release

K/A NO.	KNOWLEDGE	IMPOR RO	RTANCE SRO
AK1.	Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to Accidental Liquid Radwaste Release: $(CFR\ 41.8\ /\ 41.10\ /\ 45.3)$		
AK1.01	Types of radiation, their units of intensity and the location of the sources of radiation in a nuclear power plant	2.7	3.1
AK1.02	Biological effects on humans of various types of radiation, exposure levels that are acceptable for nuclear power plant personnel, and the units used for	2.7	5.1
AK1.03	radiation-intensity measurements and for radiation exposure levels  Effects of placing a radioactive source near a radiation monitor; in particular,	2.6	3.2*
AK1.04	near a radioactive-liquid radiation monitor	2.3	2.9*
	and the alarm setpoints on a radioactive liquid monitor	2.3	2.9*
AK1.05	The calculation of offsite doses due to a release from the power plant	2.6*	3.6*
AK2.	Knowledge of the interrelations between the Accidental Liquid Radwaste Release and the following: $(CFR\ 41.7\ /\ 45.7)$		
AK2.01	Radioactive-liquid monitors	2.7	2.8
AK2.02	Radioactive-gas monitors	2.7	2.7
AK2.03	Valves	2.0	2.0
AK2.04	Sensors, detectors, and indicators	1.9	1.9
AK3.	Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Accidental Liquid Radwaste Release: $(CFR\ 41.5,\!41.10/\ 45.6/\ 45.13)$		
AK3.01 AK3.02	Termination of a release of radioactive liquid	3.5 3.2*	3.9 4.5
AK3.02 AK3.03	Declaration that a radioactive-liquid monitor is inoperable	3.0	3.7
AK3.04	Actions contained in EOP for accidental liquid radioactive-waste release .	3.8	4.3

APE:	059 Accidental Liquid Radioactive-Waste Release			
	ABILITY			
AA1.	Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the Accidental Liquid Radwaste Release: (CFR 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6)			
AA1.01	Radioactive-liquid monitor	3.5	3.5	
AA1.02	ARM system	3.3	3.4	
AA1.03	Flow rate controller	3.0*	2.9	
AA2.	Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Accidental Liquid Radwaste Release: (CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)			
AA2.01	The failure-indication light arrangement for a			
	radioactive-liquid monitor	3.2	3.5	
AA2.02	The permit for liquid radioactive-waste release	2.9	3.9	
AA2.03	Failure modes, their symptoms, and the causes of			
	misleading indications on a radioactive-liquid monitor	3.1	3.6	
AA2.04	The valve lineup for a release of radioactive liquid	3.2*	3.5*	
AA2.05	The occurrence of automatic safety actions as a result			
	of a high PRM system signal	3.6	3.9	
AA2.06	That the flow rate of the liquid being released is less			
	than or equal to that specified on the release permit	3.5*	3.8	

## **APE:** 060 Accidental Gaseous Radwaste Release

K/A NO.	KNOWLEDGE	IMPOR RO	RTANCE SRO
AK1.	Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to Accidental Gaseous Radwaste Release: $(CFR\ 41.8\ /\ 41.10\ /\ 45.3)$		
AK1.01	Types of radiation, their units of intensity and the location of sources of radiation in a nuclear reactor power plant	2.5	3.1*
AK1.02	Biological effects on humans of the various types of radiation, exposure levels that are acceptable for personnel in a nuclear reactor power plant; the units used for radiation intensity measurements and for radiation	2.3	J.1
AK1.03	exposure levels	2.5	3.1*
	by the use of ionization chambers and scintillation type radiation detectors	2.1	2.5*
AK1.04	Calculation of offsite doses due to a release from the power plant	2.5*	3.7*
AK2.	Knowledge of the interrelations between the Accidental Gaseous Radwaste Release and the following: (CFR 41.7 / 45.7)	<del>)</del>	
AK2.01	ARM system, including the normal radiation-level	2.6	0.0*
AK2.02	indications and the operability status	2.6 2.7	2.9* 3.1
AK2.02 AK2.03	Valves	2.7	2.1
AK2.04	Sensors, detectors, and indicators	1.9	1.9
AK3.	Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Accidental Gaseous Radwaste: $(CFR\ 41.5,\!41.10\ /\ 45.6\ /\ 45.13)$		
AK3.01	Implementation of E-plan	2.9	4.2
AK3.02	Isolation of the auxiliary building ventilation	3.3*	3.5*
AK3.03	Actions contained in EOP for accidental gaseous-waste release	3.8	4.2
AK3.04	Startup of the gas treatment system	2.2*	2.7*

APE:	060 Accidental Gaseous-Waste Release		
	A <u>BILITY</u>		
AA1.	Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the Accidental Gaseous Radwaste: (CFR 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6)		
AA1.01	Area radiation monitors	2.8	3.0
AA1.02	Ventilation system	2.9	3.1
AA2.	Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Accidental Gaseous Radwaste: (CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)		
AA2.01	A radiation-level alarm, as to whether the cause was due to a gradual (in time) signal increase or due to a sudden increase (a "spike"), including the use of strip-chart recorders, meter and alarm observations	3.1	3.7
AA2.02	The possible location of a radioactive-gas leak, with	0.1	
	the assistance of PEO, health physics and chemistry personnel	3.1	4.0
AA2.03	The steps necessary to isolate a given radioactive-gas leak, using P&IDs	3.2	3.9
AA2.04	The effects on the power plant of isolating a given radioactive-gas leak	2.6	3.4*
AA2.05	That the automatic safety actions have occurred as a		
	result of a high ARM system signal	3.7	4.2
AA2.06	Valve lineup for release of radioactive gases	3.6*	3.8

APE:	061 Area Radiation Monitoring (ARM) System Alarms		
AK1.	Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to Area Radiation Monitoring (ARM) System Alarms: CFR 41.8 / 41.10 / 45.3)		
AK1.01	Detector limitations	2.5*	2.9?
AK2.	Knowledge of the interrelations between the Area Radiation Monitoring (Assystem Alarms and the following: (CFR 41.7 / 45.7)	ARM)	
AK2.01	Detectors at each ARM system location	2.5*	2.6*
AK3.	Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Area Radiation Monitoring (ARM) System Alarms: (CFR 41.5,41.10 / $45.6$ / $45.13$ )		
AK3.01 AK3.02	Effect of temperature inversion on ARM system channel indications Guidance contained in alarm response for ARM system	2.3 3.4	2.6 3.6
	<u>ABILITY</u>		
AA1.	Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the Area Radiation Monitoring (ARM)System Alarms: (CFR 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6)		
AA1.01	Automatic actuation	3.6	3.6
AA2.	Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Area Radiation Monitoring (ARM) System Alarms: (CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)		
AA2.01 AA2.02 AA2.03 AA2.04 AA2.05 AA2.06	ARM panel displays  Normal radiation intensity for each ARM system channel  Setpoints for alert and high alarms  Whether an alarm channel is functioning properly  Need for area evacuation; check against existing limits  Required actions if alarm channel is out of service	3.5 2.9 3.0 3.1 3.5 3.2	3.7 3.2 3.3 3.5 4.2 4.1

<b>APE:</b>	062 Loss of Nuclear Service Water		
AK1.	Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to Loss of Nuclear Service Water: $(CFR\ 41.8\ /\ 41.10\ /\ 45.3)$		
	None		
AK2.	Knowledge of the interrelations between the Loss of Nuclear Service Wat following: (CFR 41.7 / 45.7)	er and the	e
	None		
AK3.	Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Loss of Nuclear Service Water: (CFR 41.4, 41.8 $/$ 45.7 )		
AK3.01	The conditions that will initiate the automatic opening and closing of the . SWS isolation valves to the nuclear service water coolers	3.2*	3.5*
AK3.02	The automatic actions (alignments) within the nuclear service water resulting from the actuation of the ESFAS	3.6	3.9
AK3.03 AK3.04	Guidance actions contained in EOP for Loss of nuclear service water Effect on the nuclear service water discharge flow header of a loss of CCW	4.0 3.5	4.2 3.7
AA1.	Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the Loss of Nuclear Service Water (SWS): (CFR 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6)		I
AA1.01	Nuclear service water temperature indications	3.1	3.1
AA1.02	Loads on the SWS in the control room	3.2	3.3
AA1.03 AA1.04	SWS as a backup to the CCWS	3.6* 2.7*	3.6 2.8
AA1.05	The CCWS surge tank, including level control and level alarms,	2.1	2.6
	and radiation alarm	3.1	3.1
AA1.06 AA1.07	Control of flow rates to components cooled by the SWS	2.9	2.9
	interactions among the components	2.9	3.0
AA2.	Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Nuclear Service Water: (CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)		
AA2.01	Location of a leak in the SWS	2.9	3.5
AA2.02	The cause of possible SWS loss	2.9	3.6
AA2.03	The valve lineups necessary to restart the SWS while bypassing the portion of the system causing the abnormal condition	2.6	2.9
AA2.04	The normal values and upper limits for the temperatures	2.5	2.0*
AA2.05	of the components cooled by SWS	2.5	2.9*
AA2.06	rates to the components cooled by the SWS	2.4*	2.5*
1112.00	before that component may be damaged	2.8*	3.1*

#### APE: 065 Loss of Instrument Air

K/A NO.	KNOWLEDGE	IMPOR RO	RTANCE SRO
AK1.	Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to Loss of Instrument Air: $(CFR\ 41.8\ /\ 41.10\ /\ 45.3)$		
AK1.01	Understanding units of flow and pressure SCFM, linear, meter, psig	1.9	2.2
AK2.	Knowledge of the interrelations between the Loss of Instrument Air and the following: $(CFR\ 41.7\ /\ 45.7)$		
AK2.01	Compressors	2.2	2.4
AK2.02	Valves	1.9	2.1
AK2.03	Pumps	1.7	1.8
AK2.04	Motors	1.6	1.7
AK2.05	Air dryers, filters, and heat exchangers	2.0	2.2
AK3.	Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Loss of Instrument Air: $(CFR\ 41.5,41.10\ /\ 45.6\ /\ 45.13)$		
AK3.01	Placing previously running compressor switch "off"	2.2*	2.3
AK3.02	Checking previously running compressor electrical breaker	2.2	2.4
AK3.03	Knowing effects on plant operation of isolating certain		
	equipment from instrument air	2.9	3.4
AK3.04	Cross-over to backup air supplies	3.0	3.2
AK3.05	Checking electric loads on a running compressor	2.2?	2.7?
AK3.06	Blocking open certain valves during recovery	2.3*	2.7*
AK3.07	Backup of compressor cooling water	2.3*	2.5*
AK3.08	Actions contained in EOP for loss of instrument air	3.7	3.9

APE:	065 Loss of Instrument Air		
	<u>ABILITY</u>		
AA1.	Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the Loss of Instrument Air: $(CFR\ 41.7\ /\ 45.5\ /\ 45.6)$		
AA1.01	Remote manual loaders	2.7*	2.5
AA1.02	Components served by instrument air to minimize drain on system	2.6	2.8
AA1.03	Restoration of systems served by instrument air when pressure is regained	2.9	3.1
AA1.04	Emergency air compressor	3.5*	3.4*
AA1.05	RPS	3.3*	3.3*
AA2.	Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Instrument Air: (CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)		
AA2.01	Cause and effect of low-pressure instrument air alarm	2.9	3.2
AA2.02	Relationship of flow readings to system operation	2.4*	2.6*
AA2.03	Location and isolation of leaks	2.6	2.9
AA2.04	Typical conditions which could cause a compressor trip		
	(e.g., high temperature)	2.2	2.7
AA2.05	When to commence plant shutdown if instrument air pressure is decreasing	3.4*	4.1
AA2.06	When to trip reactor if instrument air pressure is de-creasing	3.6*	4.2
AA2.07	Whether backup nitrogen supply is controlling valve position	2.8*	3.2*
AA2.08	Failure modes of air-operated equipment	2.9*	3.3

# **APE 067:** Plant fire on site

K/A NO.	<u>KNOWLEDGE</u>	IMPOI RO	RTANCE <u>SRO</u>
AK1.	Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to Plant Fire on Site: $(CFR\ 41.8\ /\ 41.10\ /\ 45.3)$		
AK1.01 AK1.02	Fire classifications, by type	2.9 3.1	3.9 3.9
AK2.	Knowledge of the interrelations between the Plant Fire on Site and the following: $(CFR\ 41.7\ /\ 45.7)$		
AK2.01 AK2.02 AK2.03 AK2.04	Sensors, detectors and valves  Controllers and positioners  Motors  Breakers, relays, and disconnects	2.3 2.0 1.9 1.9	2.5* 2.3 2.1 2.1
AK3.	Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Plant Fire on Site: (CFR $41.5,41.10$ / $45.6$ / $45.13$ )		
AK3.01 AK3.02	Installation of fire detectors	2.3	2.8
AK3.03 AK3.04	manual, and fire zone manual	2.5 2.0* 3.3	3.3 2.5* 4.1
AA1.	Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to		
AAI.	the Plant Fire on Site: (CFR 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6)		
AA1.01 AA1.02 AA1.03 AA1.04 AA1.05 AA1.06 AA1.07 AA1.08 AA1.09	Respirator air pack Re-installation of a fire detector Bypass of a fire zone detector Bypass of a heat detector Plant and control room ventilation systems Fire alarm Fire alarm reset panel Fire fighting equipment used on each class of fire Plant fire zone panel (including detector location)	3.6 2.4* 2.5* 2.5* 3.0 3.5 2.9 3.4 3.0	3.6 2.5* 2.8* 2.7* 3.1 3.7 3.0 3.7 3.3

#### APE: 067 Plant Fire On Site

# AA2. Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Plant Fire on Site: (CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)

AA2.01	Auxiliary building gas treatment system	2.5*	2.8*	
AA2.02	Damper position	2.5	2.9	
AA2.03	Fire alarm	3.3	3.5	
AA2.04	The fire's extent of potential operational damage to plant equipment	3.1	4.3	
AA2.05	Ventilation alignment necessary to secure affected area	3.2	3.6	
AA2.06	Need for pressurizing control room (recirculation mode)	3.3	3.6	
AA2.07	Whether malfunction is due to common-mode electrical failures	2.6	3.1*	
AA2.08	Limits of affected area	2.9	3.6	
AA2.09	That a failed fire alarm detector exists	2.4	2.7	
AA2.10	Time limit of long-term-breathing air system for control room	2.9*	3.6*	
AA2.11	Time limit for use of respirators	3.3*	3.5	
AA2.12	Location of vital equipment within fire zone	2.9	3.9	
AA2.13	Need for emergency plant shutdown	3.3	4.4	
AA2.14	Equipment that will be affected by fire suppression activities in each zone.	3.2	4.3	
AA2.15	Requirements for establishing a fire watch	2.9	3.9	
AA2.16	Vital equipment and control systems to be maintained			
	and operated during a fire	3.3	4.0	
AA2.17	Systems that may be affected by the fire	3.5	4.3	

## **APE:** 068 Control Room Evacuation

	K/A NO.	KNOWLEDGE	IMPORTANCE RO SRO	
	AK1.	Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to Control Room Evacuation: $(CFR\ 41.8\ /\ 41.10\ /\ 45.3)$		
	AK1.01	Use of steam tables	2.4*	2.7*
	AK2.	Knowledge of the interrelations between the Control Room Evacuation and the following: $(CFR\ 41.7\ /\ 45.7)$		
	AK2.01	Auxiliary shutdown panel layout	3.9	4.0
	AK2.02	Reactor trip system	3.7	3.9
	AK2.03	Controllers and positioners	2.9	3.1
Ī	AK2.04	Pumps	2.2	2.4*
ı	AK2.05	Motors	2.1	2.1
	AK2.06	Breakers, relays, and disconnects	2.4*	2.7
	AK2.07	ED/G	3.3	3.4
	AK3.	Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Control Room Evacuation: (CFR 41.5,41.10 / 45.6 / 45.13)		
	AK3.01	System response to reactor trip	3.9	4.2
	AK3.02	System response to turbine trip	3.7	4.1
	AK3.03	Transfer of AFW flow control valves and pumps to local control	3.7	4.3
	AK3.04	Filling the feedwater system and closing the AFW pump discharge valve	3.0*	3.2*
	AK3.05	Repositioning valves to isolate and drain the AFW pump		
		turbine and steam supply header	2.5*	3.0*
	AK3.06	Transfer of S/G atmospheric relief valves to local con-		
		trol; operation to maintain specified T-ave	3.9	4.3
	AK3.07	Maintenance of S/G level, using AFW flow control valves	4.0	4.3
	AK3.08	Trip of the MFW and necessary Condensate pumps	3.4	3.9
	AK3.09	Transfer of the following to local control: charging pumps, charging header		
		flow control valve, PZR heaters, and boric acid transfer pumps	3.9	4.4
	AK3.10	Maintenance of PZR level, using pumps and heaters	3.9	4.2
	AK3.11	Tech-Spec limits and tables for quantity of boric acid	3.2	3.6
	AK3.12	Required sequence of actions for emergency evacuation		
		of control room	4.1	4.5

#### APE: 068 Control Room Evacuation

AK3.13	Performing a shutdown margin calculation, including			
	boron needed and boration time	3.3	3.9	
AK3.14	Safety injection setpoint of main steam line pressure	3.2*	3.4*	
AK3.15	Turbine trip setpoint for automatic-stop because of low oil pressure	2.2*	2.4*	•
AK3.16	Fail-open of the control room doors for personnel			
	evacuation	2.8*	3.3*	
AK3.17	Injection of boric acid into the RCS	3.7	4.0	
AK3.18	Actions contained in EOP for control room evacuation			
	emergency task	4.2	4.5	
K/A NO.	<u>ABILITY</u>			
AA1.	Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to			
	the Control Room Evacuation:			
	(CFR 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6)			
AA1.01	S/G atmospheric relief valve	4.3	4.5	ı
AA1.02	AFW emergency pump	4.3	4.5	ı
AA1.03	S/G level	4.1	4.3	
AA1.04	MFW pump trip	3.3*	3.6	
AA1.05	Condensate pump trip	2.7*	2.9*	
AA1.06	Charging pump	4.1	4.2	
AA1.07	PZR heaters	4.1	4.2	
AA1.08	Local boric acid flow	4.2*	4.2*	
AA1.09	Synchroscope key	3.1*	2.7*	
AA1.10	Power distribution: ac and dc	3.7*	3.9	
AA1.11	Emergency borate valve controls and indicators	3.9	4.1	
AA1.12	Auxiliary shutdown panel controls and indicators	4.4	4.4	
AA1.13	Charging pump controllers (to maintain PZR level)	4.1	4.2	
AA1.14	Reactor trip breakers and switches	4.2	4.4	
AA1.15	Turbine trip lights and indicators	3.7	3.7	
AA1.16	Turbine throttle valve indicating lights and position indicators	3.2*	3.3	
AA1.17	Turbine stop valve bistable lights	3.2*	3.3*	
AA1.18	Turbine automatic-stop oil pressure indicators and lights	2.8*	2.8*	
AA1.19	Boric acid transfer pump	3.7	3.9	
AA1.20	Indicators for operation of startup transformer	3.2*	3.2*	
AA1.21	Transfer of controls from control room to shutdown panel or local control	3.9	4.1	
AA1.22	Flow control valve for RCS charging header	4.0	4.3	
AA1.23	Manual trip of reactor and turbine	4.3	4.4	
AA1.24	Control room re-accessibility	3.0*	3.6	•
AA1.25	Plant emergency alarm	3.2*	3.7	

APE:	068 Control Room Evacuation		
AA1.26	Unlocking of switches and operation of AFW valves	3.6*	3.8*
AA1.27	Local trip of main feed pumps and Condensate pumps	3.2*	3.4*
AA1.28	PZR level control and pressure control	3.8	4.0
AA1.29	Calculation of boron needed for xenon-free shutdown	3.1	3.6
AA1.30	Operation of the letdown system	3.4	3.6
AA1.31	ED/G	3.9	4.0
AA1.32	Natural circulation flow	3.9	4.1
AA2.	Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Control Room Evacuation: (CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)		
AA2.01	S/G level	4.0	4.3
AA2.02	Local boric acid flow	3.7*	4.2*
AA2.03	T-hot, T-cold, and in-core temperatures	4.0	4.2
AA2.04	S/G pressure	3.7	4.0
AA2.05	Availability of heat sink	4.2	4.3
AA2.06	RCS pressure	4.1	4.3
AA2.07	PZR level	4.1	4.3
AA2.08	S/G pressure	3.9	4.1
AA2.09	Saturation margin	4.1	4.3
AA2.10	Source range count rate	4.2*	4.4*
AA2.11	Indications of natural circulation	4.3	4.4

# **APE:** 069 Loss of Containment Integrity

K/A NO.	<u>KNOWLEDGE</u>	IMPORTANCE RO SRO	
AK1.	Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to Loss of Containment Integrity: $(CFR\ 41.8\ /\ 41.10\ /\ 45.3)$		
AK1.01	Effect of pressure on leak rate	2.6	3.1
AK2.	Knowledge of the interrelations between the Loss of Containment Integrity and the following: $(CFR\ 41.7\ /\ 45.7)$	7	
AK2.01	Valves	2.4*	2.4
AK2.02	Sensors and detectors	2.4*	2.4
AK2.03	Personnel access hatch and emergency access hatch	2.8*	2.9
AK3.	Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Loss of Containment Integrity: $(CFR\ 41.5,\!41.10\ /\ 45.6\ /\ 45.13)$		
AK3.01	Guidance contained in EOP for loss of containment integrity	3.8*	4.2
	ABILITY		
AA1.	Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the Loss of Containment Integrity: $(CFR\ 41.7\ /\ 45.5\ /\ 45.6)$		
AA1.01	Isolation valves, dampers, and electropneumatic devices	3.5	3.7
AA1.02	Blind flanges, as part of containment isolation	2.2	2.5
AA1.03	Fluid systems penetrating containment	2.8	3.0
AA2.	Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Containment Integrity: (CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)		
AA2.01	Loss of containment integrity	3.7	4.3
AA2.02	Verification of automatic and manual means of restoring integrity	3.9	4.4

# APE 076: High Reactor Coolant Activity

			RTANC
K/A NO.	<u>KNOWLEDGE</u>	RO	SRO
AK1.	Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to High Reactor Coolant Activity: $(CFR\ 41.8\ /\ 41.10\ /\ 45.3)$		
AK1.01	Radioactivity units	2.1	2.5
AK1.02	Radiation source term and transport pathway	2.0	2.5
AK1.03	Channeling in a demineralizer	1.9	2.0
AK1.04	Effects of excessive temperature on a demineralizer resin	2.1	2.3
AK1.05	Definition and use of the following terms: °F, log scale,		
	CPM, multipoint, setpoint, gpm, pH, D/F, conductivity	1.9	2.3
AK1.06	Chemical shock and crud burst	2.1	2.6
AK1.07	Thermal shock	2.2	2.4
AK1.08	Hydraulic shock	2.1	2.3
AK1.09	Relationship between letdown flow rate and letdown temperature	2.2	2.3
AK2.	Knowledge of the interrelations between the High Reactor Coolant Activity and the following: (CFR 41.7 / 45.7)		
AK2.01	Process radiation monitors	2.6	3.0
AK2.02	CCW pump and heat exchangers	2.1	2.3
AK2.03	Sensors and detectors	1.9	1.9
AK2.04	Valves	1.8	1.9
AK2.05	Controllers and positioners	1.9	1.9
AK2.06	Demineralizers and ion exchangers	2.0	2.1
AK3.	Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the High Reactor Coolant Activity : $(CFR\ 41.5,\!41.10\ /\ 45.6\ /\ 45.13)$		
AK3.01	RCS differentiating activity due to fission products		
	and due to corrosion products, from chemistry report	2.4	3.1
AK3.02	Increased CCW flow	2.4	2.6
AK3.03	Orifice controls for minimum letdown flow rates	2.1*	2.1
AK3.04	Setpoint controls for maximum demineralizer flow rates	2.3	2.5
AK3.05	Corrective actions as a result of high fission-product		
	radioactivity level in the RCS	2.9	3.6
AK3.06	Actions contained in EOP for high reactor coolant activity	3.2	3.8

APE:	076 High Reactor Coolant Activity		
	<u>ABILITY</u>		
AA1.	Ability to operate and $/$ or monitor the following as they apply to the High Reactor Coolant Activity: (CFR 41.7 $/$ 45.5 $/$ 45.6)		
AA1.01	Interlocks associated with orifice isolation valve	2.4	2.2
AA1.02	CCWS standby pump and outlet valves	2.1	2.0
AA1.03	CVCS letdown flow rate and temperature	2.3*	2.1
AA1.04	Failed fuel-monitoring equipment	3.2	3.4
AA2.	Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the High Reactor Coolant Activity: (CFR: $43.5 / 45.13$ )		
AA2.01	Location or process point that is causing an alarm	2.7	3.2
AA2.02	Corrective actions required for high fission product activity in RCS	2.8	3.4
AA2.03	RCS radioactivity level meter	2.5	3.0
AA2.04	Process effluent radiation chart recorder	2.6	3.0
AA2.05	CVCS letdown flow rate indication	2.2	2.5
AA2.06	Response of PZR LCS to changes in the letdown flow rate	2.2	2.5
AA2.07	When demineralizer resin needs to be replaced	2.4	2.7

APE:	077 Generator Voltage and Electric Grid Disturbances					
<u>K/A NO.</u>	<u>KNOWLEDGE</u>	IMPO <u>RO</u>	RTANCE <u>SRO</u>			
AK1.	Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts a they apply to Generator Voltage and Electric Grid Disturbances: (CFR: 41.4, 41.5, 41.7, 41.10 / 45.8)	as				
AA1.01	Definition of terms: volts, watts, amps, VARs, power factor	3.3	3.5			
AK1.02	Over-excitation	3.3	3.4			
AA1.03	Under-excitation	3.3	3.4			
AK2.	Knowledge of the interrelations between Generator Voltage and Electric Grid Disturbances and the following: (CFR: 41.4, 41.5, 41.7, 41.10 / 45.8)					
AK2.01	Motors	3.1	3.2			
AK2.02	Breakers, relays	3.1	3.3			
AK2.03	Sensors, detectors, indicators	3.0	3.1			
AK2.04	Controllers, positioners	3.0	3.0			
AK2.05	Pumps	3.1	3.2			
AK2.06	Reactor power	3.9	4.0			
AK2.07	Turbine / generator control	3.6	3.7			
AK3.	Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to Generator Voltage and Electric Grid Disturbances: (CFR: 41.4, 41.5, 41.7, 41.10 / 45.8)	to				
AK3.01 AK3.02	Reactor and turbine trip criteria	3.9	4.2			
	voltage and grid disturbances.	3.6	3.9			
	<u>ABILITY</u>					
AA1.	Ability to operate and/or monitor the following as they apply to Generator Voltage and Electric Grid Disturbances: (CFR: 41.5 and 41.10 / 45.5, 45.7, and 45.8)					
AA1.01	Grid frequency and voltage	3.6	3.7			
AA1.02	Turbine / generator controls	3.8	3.7			
AA1.03	Voltage regulator controls	3.8	3.7			
AA1.04	Reactor controls	4.1	4.1			
AA1.05	Engineered safety features.	3.9	4.0			

APE:	077 Generator Voltage and Electric Grid Disturbances					
AA2.	Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to Generator Voltage and Electric Grid Disturbances: (CFR: 41.5 and 43.5 / 45.5, 45.7, and 45.8)					
AA2.01	Operating point on the generator capability curve	3.5	3.6			
AA2.02	Voltage outside the generator capability curve	3.5	3.6			
AA2.03	Generator current outside the capability curve	3.5	3.6			
AA2.04	VARs outside the capability curve	3.6	3.6			
AA2.05	Operational status of offsite circuit	3.2	3.8			
AA2.06	Generator frequency limitations	3.4	3.5			
AA2.07	Operational status of engineered safety features	3.6	4.0			
AA2.08	Criteria to trip the turbine or reactor	4.3	4.4			
AA2.09	Operational status of emergency diesel generators	3.9	4.3			
AA2.10	Generator overheating and the required actions	3.6	3.8			

# 4.3 Babcock and Wilcox EPEs / APEs

# **Babcock and Wilcox**

# **E02** Vital System Status Verification

K/A NO. KNOWLEDGE

EK1. Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the (Vital System Status Verification);

(CFR: 41.8 / 41.10 / 45.3)

EK1.1 Components, capacity, and function of emergency systems.

IMPORTANCE RO 3.6

EK1.2 Normal, abnormal and emergency operating procedures associated with (Vital System Status Verification).

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.8

SRO 4.0

SRO 3.6

EK1.3 Annunciators and conditions indicating signals, and remedial actions associated with the (Vital System Status Verification).

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.8

SRO 3.8

**EK2.** Knowledge of the interrelations between the (Vital System Status Verification) and the following:

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.7)

EK2.1 Components, and functions of control and safety systems, including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.8

SRO 4.0

EK2.2 Facility's heat removal systems, including primary coolant, emergency coolant, the decay heat removal systems, and relations between the operation of these systems to the operation of the facility.

proper

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 4.2

SRO 4.2

EK3. Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply (Vital System Status Verification):

(CFR: 41.5 / 41.10, 45.6, 45.13)

**EPE:** Vital System Status Verification (Continued)

#### K/A NO. KNOWLEDGE

EK3.1 Facility operating characteristics during transient conditions, including c coolant chemistry and the effects of temperature, pressure, and reactivity changes and operating limitations and reasons for these operating characteristics.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.2

SRO 3.8

EK3.2 Normal, abnormal and emergency operating procedures associated with (Vital System Status Verification).

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.0

SRO 4.0

EK3.3 Manipulation of controls required to obtain desired operating results during abnormal, and emergency situations.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.6

SRO 3.4

EK3.4 RO or SRO function within the control room team as appropriate to the assigned position, in such a way that procedures are adhered to and the limitations in the facilities license and amendments are not violated.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.5

SRO 3.7

#### **ABILITY**

EA1. Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the (Vital System Status Verification):

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6)

EA1.1 Components, and functions of control and safety systems, including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 4.0

SRO 3.6

EA1.2 Operating behavior characteristics of the facility.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.2

SRO 3.6

EA1.3 Desired operating results during abnormal and emergency situations.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.0

**EPE:** Vital System Status Verification (Continued)

## K/A NO. KNOWLEDGE

- EA2. Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the (Vital System Status Verification): (CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)
- EA2.1 Facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during abnormal and emergency operations.

IMPORTANCE RO 2.5 SRO 4.0

EA2.2 Adherence to appropriate procedures and operation within the limitations in the facility's license and amendments.

IMPORTANCE RO 3.2 SRO 3.8

# **E03** Inadequate Subcooling Margin

#### K/A NO. KNOWLEDGE

- EK1. Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the (Inadequate Subcooling Margin): (CFR: 41.8 / 41.10, (CFR: 45.3)
- EK1.1 Components, capacity, and function of emergency systems.

IMPORTANCE

RO 3.1

SRO 3.5

EK1.2 Normal, abnormal and emergency operating procedures associated with (Inadequate Subcooling Margin).

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.8

SRO 4.0

EK1.3 Annunciators and conditions indicating signals, and remedial actions associated with the (Inadequate Subcooling Margin).

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 4.0

SRO 4.0

EK2. Knowledge of the interrelations between the (Inadequate Subcooling Margin) and the following:

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.7)

EK2.1 Components, and functions of control and safety systems, including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.4

SRO 3.8

EK2.2 Facility's heat removal systems, including primary coolant, emergency coolant, the decay heat removal systems, and relations between the proper operation of these systems to the operation of the facility.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 4.3

SRO 4.3

**EPE:** Inadequate Subcooling Margin (Continued)

#### K/A NO. KNOWLEDGE

EK3. Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the (Inadequate Subcooling Margin)

(CFR: 41.5 / 41.10, 45.6, 45.13)

EK3.1 Facility operating characteristics during transient conditions, including coolant chemistry and the effects of temperature, pressure, and reactivity changes and operating limitations and reasons for these operating characteristics.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.2

SRO 3.8

EK3.2 Normal, abnormal and emergency operating procedures associated with (Inadequate Subcooling Margin).

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.6

SRO 3.8

EK3.3 Manipulation of controls required to obtain desired operating results during abnormal, and emergency situations.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 4.4

SRO 3.8

EK3.4 RO or SRO function within the control room team as appropriate to the assigned position, in such a way that procedures are adhered to and the limitations in the facilities license and amendments are not violated.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.2

SRO 3.5

#### **ABILITY**

EA1. Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the (Inadequate Subcooling Margin)

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6)

EA1.1 Components, and functions of control and safety systems, including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 4.1

SRO 3.8

EA1.2 Operating behavior characteristics of the facility.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.8

SRO 3.8

EA1.3 Desired operating results during abnormal and emergency situations.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.6

**EPE:** Inadequate Subcooling Margin (Continued)

K/A NO. KNOWLEDGE

EA2. Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the (Inadequate Subcooling Margin)

(CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)

EA2.1 Facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during abnormal and emergency operations.

SRO 4.0

IMPORTANCE RO 3.0

EA2.2 Adherence to appropriate procedures and operation within the limitations in the facility's license and amendments.

IMPORTANCE RO 3.5 SRO 4.0

# **E04** Inadequate Heat Transfer

K/A NO. KNOWLEDGE

EK1. Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the (Inadequate Heat Transfer):

(CFR: 41.8 / 41.10 / 45.3)

EK1.1 Components, capacity, and function of emergency systems.

IMPORTANCE

RO 3.4

SRO 3.8

EK1.2 Normal, abnormal and emergency operating procedures associated with (Inadequate Heat Transfer).

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 4.0

SRO 4.2

EK1.3 Annunciators and conditions indicating signals, and remedial actions associated with the (Inadequate Heat Transfer).

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 4.0

SRO 4.0

EK2. Knowledge of the interrelations between the (Inadequate Heat Transfer) and the following:

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.7)

EK2.1 Components, and functions of control and safety systems, including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.8

SRO 4.0

EK2.2 Facility's heat removal systems, including primary coolant, emergency coolant, the decay heat removal systems, and relations between the proper operation of these systems to the operation of the facility.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 4.2

SRO 4.2

EK3. Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the (Inadequate Heat Transfer)

(CFR: 41.5 / 41.10, 45.6, 45.13)

EK3.1 Facility operating characteristics during transient conditions, including coolant chemistry and the effects of temperature, pressure, and reactivity changes and operating limitations and reasons for these operating characteristics.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.5

**EPE:** Inadequate Heat Transfer (Continued)

#### K/A NO. KNOWLEDGE

EK3.2 Normal, abnormal and emergency operating procedures associated with (Inadequate Heat Transfer).

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.5

SRO 4.0

EK3.3 Manipulation of controls required to obtain desired operating results during abnormal, and emergency situations.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 4.2

SRO 3.8

EK3.4 RO or SRO function within the control room team as appropriate to the assigned position, in such a way that procedures are adhered to and the limitations in the facilities license and amendments are not violated.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.5

SRO 3.5

#### **ABILITY**

EA1. Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the (Inadequate Heat Transfer)

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6)

EA1.1 Components, and functions of control and safety systems, including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 4.4

SRO 4.2

EA1.2 Operating behavior characteristics of the facility.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.4

SRO 3.8

EA1.3 Desired operating results during abnormal and emergency situations.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.6

SRO 3.8

EA2. Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the (Inadequate Heat Transfer)

(CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)

EA2.1 Facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during abnormal and emergency operations.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.2

SRO 4.4

EA2.2 Adherence to appropriate procedures and operation within the limitations in the facility's license and amendments.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.6

SRO 4.4

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Excessive Heat Transfer

K/A NO. KNOWLEDGE

**K1.** Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the (Excessive Heat Transfer)

(CFR: 41.8 / 41.10 / 45.3)

EK1.1 Components, capacity, and function of emergency systems.

IMPORTANCE RO 3.8

EK1.2 Normal, abnormal and emergency operating procedures associated with (Excessive Heat Transfer).

SRO 3.8

IMPORTANCE RO 4.0 SRO 4.2

EK1.3 Annunciators and conditions indicating signals, and remedial actions associated with the (Excessive Heat Transfer).

IMPORTANCE RO 3.8 SRO 3.8

EK2. Knowledge of the interrelations between the (Excessive Heat Transfer) and the following:

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.7)

EK2.1 Components, and functions of control and safety systems, including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features.

IMPORTANCE RO 3.8 SRO 4.0

EK2.2 Facility's heat removal systems, including primary coolant, emergency coolant, the decay heat removal systems, and relations between the proper operation of these systems to the operation of the facility.

IMPORTANCE RO 4.2 SRO 4.4

EK3. Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the (Excessive Heat Transfer)

(CFR: 41.5 / 41.10, 45.6, 45.13)

EK3.1 Facility operating characteristics during transient conditions, including coolant chemistry and the effects of temperature, pressure, and reactivity changes and operating limitations and reasons for these operating characteristics.

IMPORTANCE RO 3.5 SRO 3.7

**EPE:** Excessive Heat Transfer (Continued)

#### K/A NO. KNOWLEDGE

EK3.2 Normal, abnormal and emergency operating procedures associated with (Excessive Heat Transfer).

IMPORTANCE RO 3.5 SRO 4.0

EK3.3 Manipulation of controls required to obtain desired operating results during abnormal, and emergency situations.

IMPORTANCE RO 4.2 SRO 3.8

EK3.4 RO or SRO function within the control room team as appropriate to the assigned position, in such a way that procedures are adhered to and the limitations in the facilities license and amendments are not violated.

IMPORTANCE RO 3.8 SRO 3.8

#### **ABILITY**

EA1. Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the (Excessive Heat Transfer)

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6)

EA1.1 Components, and functions of control and safety systems, including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features.

IMPORTANCE RO 4.2 SRO 4.2

EA1.2 Operating behavior characteristics of the facility.

IMPORTANCE RO 3.6 SRO 3.6

EA1.3 Desired operating results during abnormal and emergency situations.

IMPORTANCE RO 3.8 SRO 4.2

EA2. Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the (Excessive Heat Transfer)

(CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)

EA2.1 Facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during abnormal and emergency operations.

IMPORTANCE RO 3.0 SRO 4.2

**Excessive Heat Transfer (Continued)** EPE:

K/A NO. **KNOWLEDGE** 

EA2.2 Adherence to appropriate procedures and operation within the limitations in the facility's license and amendments.

IMPORTANCE RO 3.6 SRO 4.0

E08 LOCA Cooldown

K/A NO. KNOWLEDGE

EK1. Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the (LOCA Cooldown)

(CFR: 41.8 / 41.10 / 45.3)

EK1.1 Components, capacity, and function of emergency systems.

RO 3.5

IMPORTANCE

SRO 3.8

EK1.2 Normal, abnormal and emergency operating procedures associated with (LOCA Cooldown).

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.5

SRO 3.8

EK1.3 Annunciators and conditions indicating signals, and remedial actions associated with the (LOCA Cooldown).

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.3

SRO 3.5

EK2. Knowledge of the interrelations between the (LOCA Cooldown) and the following:

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.7)

EK2.1 Components, and functions of control and safety systems, including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.7

SRO 3.9

EK2.2 Facility's heat removal systems, including primary coolant, emergency coolant, the decay heat removal systems, and relations between the proper operation of these systems to the operation of the facility.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 4.0

SRO 4.0

EK3. Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the (LOCA Cooldown)

(CFR: 41.5 / 41.10, 45.6, 45.13)

EK3.1 Facility operating characteristics during transient conditions, including coolant chemistry and the effects of temperature, pressure, and reactivity changes and operating limitations and reasons for these operating characteristics.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.0

SRO 3.4

1

**EPE:** LOCA Cooldown (Continued)

#### K/A NO. KNOWLEDGE

EK3.2 Normal, abnormal and emergency operating procedures associated with (LOCA Cooldown).

IMPORTANCE RO 3.0 SRO 3.6

EK3.3 Manipulation of controls required to obtain desired operating results during abnormal, and emergency situations.

IMPORTANCE RO 4.0 SRO 3.6

EK3.4 RO or SRO function within the control room team as appropriate to the assigned position, in such a way that procedures are adhered to and the limitations in the facilities license and amendments are not violated.

IMPORTANCE RO 3.8 SRO 3.8

#### **ABILITY**

EA1. Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the (LOCA Cooldown)

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6)

EA1.1 Components, and functions of control and safety systems, including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features.

IMPORTANCE RO 4.0 SRO 3.7

EA1.2 Operating behavior characteristics of the facility.

IMPORTANCE RO 3.1 SRO 3.1

EA1.3 Desired operating results during abnormal and emergency situations.

IMPORTANCE RO 3.3 SRO 3.8

EA2. Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the (LOCA Cooldown)

(CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)

EA2.1 Facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during abnormal and emergency operations.

IMPORTANCE RO 2.8 SRO 4.2

**LOCA Cooldown (Continued)** EPE:

K/A NO. **KNOWLEDGE** 

EA2.2 Adherence to appropriate procedures and operation within the limitations in the facility's license and amendments.

IMPORTANCE RO 3.3 SRO 4.0

### E09 Natural Circulation Cooldown

K/A NO. KNOWLEDGE

EK1. Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the (Natural Circulation Cooldown)

(CFR: 41.8 / 41.10, 45.3)

EK1.1 Components, capacity, and function of emergency systems.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.5

SRO 3.7

EK1.2 Normal, abnormal and emergency operating procedures associated with (Natural Circulation Cooldown).

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.7

SRO 4.0

EK1.3 Annunciators and conditions indicating signals, and remedial actions associated with the (Natural Circulation Cooldown).

IMPORTANCE

RO 3.5

SRO 3.5

EK2. Knowledge of the interrelations between the (Natural Circulation Cooldown) and the following:

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.7)

EK2.1 Components, and functions of control and safety systems, including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.7

SRO 4.0

EK2.2 Facility's heat removal systems, including primary coolant, emergency coolant, the decay heat removal systems, and relations between the proper operation of these systems to the operation of the facility.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 4.0

SRO 4.0

EK3. Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the (Natural Circulation Cooldown)

(CFR: 41.5 / 41.10, 45.6, 45.13)

EK3.1 Facility operating characteristics during transient conditions, including coolant chemistry and the effects of temperature, pressure, and reactivity changes and operating limitations and reasons for these operating characteristics.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.2

**EPE:** Natural Circulation Cooldown (Continued)

#### K/A NO. KNOWLEDGE

EK3.2 Normal, abnormal and emergency operating procedures associated with (Natural Circulation Cooldown).

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.0

SRO 3.8

EK3.3 Manipulation of controls required to obtain desired operating results during abnormal, and emergency situations.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.8

SRO 3.4

EK3.4 RO or SRO function within the control room team as appropriate to the assigned position, in such a way that procedures are adhered to and the limitations in the facilities license and amendments are not violated.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.8

SRO 3.8

#### **ABILITY**

EA1. Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the (Natural Circulation Cooldown)

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6)

EA1.1 Components, and functions of control and safety systems, including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.7

SRO 3.5

EA1.2 Operating behavior characteristics of the facility.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.2

SRO 3.5

EA1.3 Desired operating results during abnormal and emergency situations.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.3

SRO 3.7

EA2. Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the (Natural Circulation Cooldown)

(CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)

EA2.1 Facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during abnormal and emergency operations.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 2.8

SRO 4.2

**Natural Circulation Cooldown (Continued)** EPE:

K/A NO. **KNOWLEDGE** 

EA2.2 Adherence to appropriate procedures and operation within the limitations in the facility's license and amendments.

IMPORTANCE RO 3.5 SRO 4.0

# E10 Post-Trip Stabilization

K/A NO. KNOWLEDGE

EK1. Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the (Post-Trip Stabilization)

(CFR: 41.8 / 41.10 / 45.3)

EK1.1 Components, capacity, and function of emergency systems.

IMPORTANCE RO 4.0 SRO 4.0

EK1.2 Normal, abnormal and emergency operating procedures associated with (Post-Trip Stabilization).

IMPORTANCE RO 3.5 SRO 4.0

EK1.3 Annunciators and conditions indicating signals, and remedial actions associated with the (Post -Trip Stabilization).

IMPORTANCE RO 4.0 SRO 4.0

EK2. Knowledge of the interrelations between the (Post-Trip Stabilization) and the following:

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.7)

EK2.1 Components, and functions of control and safety systems, including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features.

IMPORTANCE RO 3.5 SRO 4.0

EK2.2 Facility's heat removal systems, including primary coolant, emergency coolant, the decay heat removal systems, and relations between the proper operation of these systems to the operation of the facility.

IMPORTANCE RO 3.5 SRO 4.0

EK3. Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the (Post-Trip Stabilization)

(CFR: 41.5 / 41.10, 45.6, 45.13)

EK3.1 Facility operating characteristics during transient conditions, including coolant chemistry and the effects of temperature, pressure, and reactivity changes and operating limitations and reasons for these operating characteristics.

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IMPORTANCE RO 3.0 SRO 4.0

**EPE:** Post-Trip Stabilization (Continued)

K/A NO. KNOWLEDGE

EK3.2 Normal, abnormal and emergency operating procedures associated with

(Post-Trip Stabilization).

IMPORTANCE RO 3.0 SRO 4.0

EK3.3 Manipulation of controls required to obtain desired operating results during abnormal, and emergency situations.

IMPORTANCE RO 4.0 SRO 3.0

EK3.4 RO or SRO function within the control room team as appropriate to the assigned position, in such a way that procedures are adhered to and the limitations in the facilities license and amendments are not violated.

IMPORTANCE RO 4.0 SRO 4.0

#### **ABILITY**

EA1. Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the (Post-Trip Stabilization )

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6)

EA1.1 Components, and functions of control and safety systems, including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features.

IMPORTANCE RO 4.0 SRO 3.5

EA1.2 Operating behavior characteristics of the facility.

IMPORTANCE RO 3.5 SRO 4.0

EA1.3 Desired operating results during abnormal and emergency situations.

IMPORTÂNCE RO 3.5 SRO 4.0

EA2. Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the (Post-Trip Stabilization)

(CFR: 43.5, 45.13)

EA2.1 Facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during abnormal and emergency operations.

IMPORTANCE RO 2.5 SRO 4.0

Post-Trip Stabilization (Continued) EPE:

K/A NO. **KNOWLEDGE** 

EA2.2 Adherence to appropriate procedures and operation within the limitations in the facility's license and amendments.

IMPORTANCE RO 3.5 SRO 4.0

# E13 EOP Rules

K/A NO. KNOWLEDGE

EK1. Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the (EOP Rules)

(CFR: 41.8 / 41.10 / 45.3)

EK1.1 Components, capacity, and function of emergency systems.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 2.4

SRO 2.6

EK1.2 Normal, abnormal and emergency operating procedures associated with (EOP Rules).

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.0

SRO 3.6

EK1.3 Annunciators and conditions indicating signals, and remedial actions associated with the (EOP Rules).

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.0

SRO 3.2

EK2. Knowledge of the interrelations between the (EOP Rules) and the following

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.7)

EK2.1 Components, and functions of control and safety systems, including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.6

SRO 3.4

EK2.2 Facility's heat removal systems, including primary coolant, emergency coolant, the decay heat removal systems, and relations between the proper operation of these systems to the operation of the facility.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.2

SRO 3.4

EK3. Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the (EOP Rules)

(CFR: 41.5 / 41.10, 45.6, 45.13)

EK3.1 Facility operating characteristics during transient conditions, including coolant chemistry and the effects of temperature, pressure, and reactivity changes and operating limitations and reasons for these operating characteristics.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.0

**EPE: EOP Rules (Continued)** 

#### K/A NO. KNOWLEDGE

EK3.2 Normal, abnormal and emergency operating procedures associated with (EOP Rules).

IMPORTANCE RO 3.2 SRO 4.0

EK3.3 Manipulation of controls required to obtain desired operating results during abnormal, and emergency situations.

IMPORTANCE RO 3.2 SRO 2.7

EK3.4 RO or SRO function within the control room team as appropriate to the assigned position, in such a way that procedures are adhered to and the limitations in the facilities license and amendments are not violated.

IMPORTANCE RO 3.5 SRO 3.7

#### **ABILITY**

EA1. Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the (EOP Rules)

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6)

EA1.1 Components, and functions of control and safety systems, including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features.

IMPORTANCE RO 3.4 SRO 3.2

EA1.2 Operating behavior characteristics of the facility.

IMPORTANCE RO 2.8 SRO 3.0

EA1.3 Desired operating results during abnormal and emergency situations.

IMPORTANCE RO 3.4 SRO 3.8

EA2. Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the (EOP Rules)

(CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)

EA2.1 Facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during abnormal and emergency

IMPORTANCE RO 3.4 SRO 4.0

**EOP Rules (Continued)** EPE:

K/A NO. **KNOWLEDGE** 

EA2.2 Adherence to appropriate procedures and operation within the limitations in the facility's license and amendments.

IMPORTANCE RO 3.8 SRO 4.0

#### E14 EOP Enclosures

K/A NO. KNOWLEDGE

EK1. Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the (EOP Enclosures)

(CFR: 41.8 / 41.10 / 45.3)

EK1.1 Components, capacity, and function of emergency systems.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.4

SRO 3.4

EK1.2 Normal, abnormal and emergency operating procedures associated with (EOP Enclosures).

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.6

SRO 3.8

EK1.3 Annunciators and conditions indicating signals, and remedial actions associated with the (EOP Enclosures).

IMPORTANCE

RO 3.2

SRO 3.2

EK2. Knowledge of the interrelations between the (EOP enclosures) and the following

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.7)

EK2.1 Components, and functions of control and safety systems, including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.6

SRO 3.4

EK2.2 Facility's heat removal systems, including primary coolant, emergency coolant, the decay heat removal systems, and relations between the proper operation of these systems to the operation of the facility.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.8

SRO 3.8

EK3. Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the (EOP Enclosures)

(CFR: 41.5 / 41.10, 45.6, 45.13)

EK3.1 Facility operating characteristics during transient conditions, including coolant chemistry and the effects of temperature, pressure, and reactivity changes and operating limitations and reasons for these operating characteristics.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.0

SRO 3.2

1

**EPE: EOP Enclosures (Continued)** 

#### K/A NO. KNOWLEDGE

EK3.2 Normal, abnormal and emergency operating procedures associated with (EOP Enclosures).

IMPORTANCE RO 3.0 SRO 3.7

EK3.3 Manipulation of controls required to obtain desired operating results during abnormal, and emergency situations.

IMPORTANCE RO 3.7 SRO 3.5

EK3.4 RO or SRO function within the control room team as appropriate to the assigned position, in such a way that procedures are adhered to and the limitations in the facilities license and amendments are not violated.

IMPORTANCE RO 3.5 SRO 3.5

#### **ABILITY**

EA1. Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the (EOP Enclosures)

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6)

EA1.1 Components, and functions of control and safety systems, including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features.

IMPORTANCE RO 3.8 SRO 3.6

EA1.2 Operating behavior characteristics of the facility.

IMPORTANCE RO 2.8 SRO 3.2

EA1.3 Desired operating results during abnormal and emergency situations.

IMPORTANCE RO 3.6 SRO 3.8

EA2. Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the (EOP Enclosures)

(CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)

EA2.1 Facility conditions and selection of appropriated procedures during abnormal and emergency operations.

IMPORTANCE RO 3.4 SRO 4.0

EA2.2 Adherence to appropriate procedures and operation within the limitations in the facility's license and amendments.

IMPORTANCE RO 4.0 SRO 4.0

#### A01 Plant Runback

K/A NO. KNOWLEDGE

AK1. Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the (Plant Runback)

(CFR: 41.8 / 41.10 / 45.3)

AK1.1 Components, capacity, and function of emergency systems.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.0

SRO 3.0

AK1.2 Normal, abnormal and emergency operating procedures associated with (Plant Runback).

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.5

SRO 3.8

AK1.3 Annunciators and conditions indicating signals, and remedial actions associated with the (Plant Runback).

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.7

SRO 3.7

AK2. Knowledge of the interrelations between the (Plant Runback) and the following:

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.7)

AK2.1 Components, and functions of control and safety systems, including

instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features.

IMPORTANCE

RO 3.7

SRO 3.5

AK2.2 Facility's heat removal systems, including primary coolant, emergency coolant, the decay heat removal systems, and relations between the proper operation of these systems to the operation of the facility.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.5

SRO 3.5

AK3. Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the (Plant Runback)

(CFR: 41.5 / 41.10, 45.6, 45.13)

AK3.1 Facility operating characteristics during transient conditions, including coolant chemistry and the effects of temperature, pressure, and reactivity changes and operating limitations and reasons for these operating characteristics.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.2

SRO 3.4

1

### **APE:** Plant Runback (Continued)

#### K/A NO. KNOWLEDGE

AK3.2 Normal, abnormal and emergency operating procedures associated with (Plant Runback).

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.2

SRO 3.6

AK3.3 Manipulation of controls required to obtain desired operating results during abnormal, and emergency situations.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.6

SRO 3.2

AK3.4 RO or SRO function within the control room team as appropriate to the assigned position, in such a way that procedures are adhered to and the

limitations in the facilities license and amendments are not violated.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.2

SRO 3.4

#### **ABILITY**

# AA1. Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the (Plant Runback)

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6)

AA1.1 Components, and functions of control and safety systems, including

instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features.

IMPORTANCE

RO 3.7

SRO 3.7

AA1.2 Operating behavior characteristics of the facility.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.2

SRO 3.5

AA1.3 Desired operating results during abnormal and emergency situations.

**IMPORTANCE** 

**ŘO** 3.7

SRO 3.7

# AA2. Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the (Plant Runback)

(CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)

AA2.1 Facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during abnormal and emergency operations.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.0

SRO 3.7

AA2.2 Adherence to appropriate procedures and operation within the limitations in the facility's license and amendments.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.5

A02 Loss of NNI-X

K/A NO. KNOWLEDGE

AK1. Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the (Loss of NNI-X)

(CFR: 41.8 / 41.10 / 45.3)

AK1.1 Components, capacity, and function of emergency systems.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.2

SRO 3.2

AK1.2 Normal, abnormal and emergency operating procedures associated with (Loss of NNI-X).

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.4

SRO 4.0

AK1.3 Annunciators and conditions indicating signals, and remedial actions associated with the (Loss of NNI-X).

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.8

SRO 3.8

AK2. Knowledge of the interrelations between the (Loss of NNI-X) and the following:

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.7)

AK2.1 Components, and functions of control and safety systems, including

instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and

manual features.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.8

SRO 4.0

AK2.2 Facility's heat removal systems, including primary coolant, emergency coolant, the decay heat removal systems, and relations between the proper operation of these systems to the operation of the facility.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.8

SRO 3.8

AK3. Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the (Loss of NNI-X)

(CFR: 41.5 / 41.10, 45.6, 45.13)

AK3.1 Facility operating characteristics during transient conditions, including coolant chemistry and the effects of temperature, pressure, and reactivity changes and operating limitations and reasons for these operating characteristics.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.7

SRO 3.0

1

# **APE:** Loss of NNI-X (Continued)

#### K/A NO. KNOWLEDGE

AK3.2 Normal, abnormal and emergency operating procedures associated with (Loss of NNI-X).

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.7

SRO 4.0

AK3.3 Manipulation of controls required to obtain desired operating results during abnormal, and emergency situations.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.7

SRO 3.2

AK3.4 RO or SRO function within the control room team as appropriate to the assigned position, in such a way that procedures are adhered to and the

limitations in the facilities license and amendments are not violated.

IMPORTANCE

RO 3.7

SRO 3.7

#### **ABILITY**

# AA1. Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the (Loss of NNI-X)

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6)

AA1.1 Components, and functions of control and safety systems, including

instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features.

manual features. IMPORTANCE

RO 4.0

SRO 3.8

AA1.2 Operating behavior characteristics of the facility.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.4

SRO 3.2

AA1.3 Desired operating results during abnormal and emergency situations.

**IMPORTANCE** 

ŘO 3.4

SRO 3.6

# AA2. Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the (NNI-X)

(CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)

AA2.1 Facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during abnormal and emergency operations.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.6

SRO 4.0

AA2.2 Adherence to appropriate procedures and operation within the limitations in the facility's license and amendments.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 4.0

SRO 4.0

A03 Loss of NNI-Y

K/A NO. KNOWLEDGE

AK1. Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the (Loss of NNI-Y)

(CFR: 41.8 / 41.10 / 45.3)

AK1.1 Components, capacity, and function of emergency systems.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 2.5

SRO 3.0

AK1.2 Normal, abnormal and emergency operating procedures associated with (Loss of NNI-Y).

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.0

SRO 3.7

AK1.3 Annunciators and conditions indicating signals, and remedial actions associated with the (NNI-Y).

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.0

SRO 3.3

AK2. Knowledge of the interrelations between the (Loss of NNI-Y) and the following:

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.7)

AK2.1 Components, and functions of control and safety systems, including

instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and

manual features.

IMPORTANCE

RO 3.7

SRO 3.7

AK2.2 Facility's heat removal systems, including primary coolant, emergency coolant, the decay heat removal systems, and relations between the proper operation of these systems to the operation of the facility.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.3

SRO 3.3

AK3. Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the (Loss of NNI-Y)

(CFR: 41.5 / 41.10, 45.6, 45.13)

AK3.1 Facility operating characteristics during transient conditions, including coolant chemistry and the effects of temperature, pressure, and reactivity changes and operating limitations and reasons for these operating characteristics.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 2.5

SRO 3.0

I

### **APE:** Loss of NNI-Y (Continued)

#### K/A NO. KNOWLEDGE

AK3.2 Normal, abnormal and emergency operating procedures associated with (Loss of NNI-Y).

IMPORTANCE

RO 3.0

SRO 3.5

AK3.3 Manipulation of controls required to obtain desired operating results during abnormal, and emergency situations.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 2.5

SRO 3.0

AK3.4 RO or SRO function within the control room team as appropriate to the assigned position, in such a way that procedures are adhered to and the

limitations in the facilities license and amendments are not violated.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.5

SRO 3.5

#### **ABILITY**

# AA1. Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the (Loss of NNI-Y)

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6)

AA1.1 Components, and functions of control and safety systems, including

instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features.

manual features. IMPORTANCE

RO 4.0

SRO 4.0

AA1.2 Operating behavior characteristics of the facility.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.0

SRO 3.3

AA1.3 Desired operating results during abnormal and emergency situations.

**IMPORTANCE** 

**RO** 3.3

SRO 3.3

# AA2. Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the (Loss of NNI-Y)

(CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)

AA2.1 Facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during abnormal and emergency operations.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.7

SRO 4.0

AA2.2 Adherence to appropriate procedures and operation within the limitations in the facility's license and amendments.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 4.0

SRO 4.0

A04 Turbine Trip

K/A NO. KNOWLEDGE

AK1. Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the (Turbine Trip)

(CFR: 41.8 / 41.10 / 45.3)

AK1.1 Components, capacity, and function of emergency systems.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.0

SRO 3.3

AK1.2 Normal, abnormal and emergency operating procedures associated with (Turbine Trip).

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.2

SRO 3.8

AK1.3 Annunciators and conditions indicating signals, and remedial actions associated with the (Turbine Trip).

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.2

SRO 3.3

AK2. Knowledge of the interrelations between the (Turbine Trip) and the following:

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.7)

AK2.1 Components, and functions of control and safety systems, including

instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and

manual features.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.5

SRO 3.3

AK2.2 Facility's heat removal systems, including primary coolant, emergency coolant, the decay heat removal systems, and relations between the proper operation of these systems to the operation of the facility.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.3

SRO 3.5

AK3. Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the (Turbine Trip)

(CFR: 41.5 / 41.10, 45.6, 45.13)

AK3.1 Facility operating characteristics during transient conditions, including coolant chemistry and the effects of temperature, pressure, and reactivity changes and operating limitations and reasons for these operating characteristics.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.2

SRO 3.2

1

**APE:** Turbine Trip (Continued)

K/A NO. KNOWLEDGE

AK3.2 Normal, abnormal and emergency operating procedures associated with (Turbine Trip).

IMPORTANCE

RO 3.4

SRO 3.6

AK3.3 Manipulation of controls required to obtain desired operating results during abnormal, and emergency situations.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.4

SRO 3.4

AK3.4 RO or SRO function within the control room team as appropriate to the assigned position, in such a way that procedures are adhered to and the

limitations in the facilities license and amendments are not violated.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.4

SRO 3.2

**ABILITY** 

AA1. Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the (Turbine Trip)

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6)

AA1.1 Components, and functions of control and safety systems, including

instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and

manual features.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.5

SRO 3.3

AA1.2 Operating behavior characteristics of the facility.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.2

SŘO 3.0

AA1.3 Desired operating results during abnormal and emergency situations.

**IMPORTANCE** 

**RO** 3.5

SRO 3.7

AA2. Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the (Turbine Trip)

(CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)

AA2.1 Facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during abnormal and emergency operations.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.3

SRO 3.7

AA2.2 Adherence to appropriate procedures and operation within the limitations in the facility's license and amendments.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.7

### **Babcock and Wilcox**

**A05** Emergency Diesel Actuation

K/A NO. KNOWLEDGE

AK1. Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the (Emergency Diesel Actuation)

(CFR: 41.8 / 41.10, 45.3)

AK1.1 Components, capacity, and function of emergency systems.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.7

SRO 3.7

AK1.2 Normal, abnormal and emergency operating procedures associated with (Emergency Diesel Actuation).

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.3

SRO 4.0

AK1.3 Annunciators and conditions indicating signals, and remedial actions associated with the (Emergency Diesel Actuation).

IMPORTANCE

RO 3.8

SRO 3.7

AK2. Knowledge of the interrelations between the (Emergency Diesel Actuation) and the following:

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.7)

AK2.1 Components, and functions of control and safety systems, including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 4.0

SRO 3.8

AK2.2 Facility's heat removal systems, including primary coolant, emergency coolant, the decay heat removal systems, and relations between the proper operation of these systems to the operation of the facility.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.5

SRO 3.7

AK3. Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the (Emergency Diesel Actuation)

(CFR: 41.5 / 41.10, 45.6, 45.13)

AK3.1 Facility operating characteristics during transient conditions, including coolant chemistry and the effects of temperature, pressure, and reactivity changes and operating limitations and reasons for these operating characteristics.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.2

SRO 3.4

1

### **APE:** Emergency Diesel Actuation (Continued)

#### K/A NO. KNOWLEDGE

AK3.2 Normal, abnormal and emergency operating procedures associated with (Emergency Diesel Actuation).

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.4

SRO 3.8

AK3.3 Manipulation of controls required to obtain desired operating results during abnormal, and emergency situations.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 4.2

SRO 3.8

AK3.4 RO or SRO function within the control room team as appropriate to the assigned position, in such a way that procedures are adhered to and the

limitations in the facilities license and amendments are not violated.

IMPORTANCE

RO 3.6

SRO 3.6

#### **ABILITY**

# AA1. Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the (Emergency Diesel Actuation)

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.5,45.6)

AA1.1 Components, and functions of control and safety systems, including

instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features.

IMPORTANCE

RO 4.3

SRO 4.2

AA1.2 Operating behavior characteristics of the facility.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.0

SRO 3.3

AA1.3 Desired operating results during abnormal and emergency situations.

**IMPORTANCE** 

**ŘO** 3.7

SRO 3.7

# AA2. Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the (Emergency Diesel Actuation)

(CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)

AA2.1 Facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during abnormal and emergency operations.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.5

SRO 4.2

AA2.2 Adherence to appropriate procedures and operation within the limitations in the facility's license and amendments.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.5

### **Babcock and Wilcox**

#### A06 Shutdown Outside Control Room

K/A NO. KNOWLEDGE

AK1. Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the (Shutdown Outside Control Room):

(CFR: 41.8 / 41.10 / 45.3)

AK1.1 Components, capacity, and function of emergency systems.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 4.0

SRO 4.0

AK1.2 Normal, abnormal and emergency operating procedures associated with (Shutdown Outside Control Room).

IMPORTANCE

RO 4.3

SRO 4.3

AK1.3 Annunciators and conditions indicating signals, and remedial actions associated with the (Shutdown Outside Control Room).

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.4

SRO 3.4

AK2. Knowledge of the interrelations between the (Shutdown Outside Control Room) and the following:

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.7)

AK2.1 Components, and functions of control and safety systems, including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.8

SRO 3.8

AK2.2 Facility's heat removal systems, including primary coolant, emergency coolant, the decay heat removal systems, and relations between the proper operation of these systems to the operation of the facility.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 4.2

SRO 4.2

AK3. Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the (Shutdown Outside Control Room):

(CFR: 41.5 / 41.10, 45.6, 45.13

AK3.1 Facility operating characteristics during transient conditions, including coolant chemistry and the effects of temperature, pressure, and reactivity changes and operating limitations and reasons for these operating characteristics.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.4

SRO 3.6

I

#### **APE:** Shutdown Outside Control Room (Continued)

#### K/A NO. KNOWLEDGE

AK3.2 Normal, abnormal and emergency operating procedures associated with (Shutdown Outside Control Room).

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.8

SRO 3.8

AK3.3 Manipulation of controls required to obtain desired operating results during abnormal, and emergency situations.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 4.2

SRO 4.2

AK3.4 RO or SRO function within the control room team as appropriate to the assigned position, in such a way that procedures are adhered to and the

limitations in the facilities license and amendments are not violated.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.8

SRO 3.8

#### **ABILITY**

AA1. Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the (Shutdown Outside Control Room )

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6)

AA1.1 Components, and functions of control and safety systems, including

instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features.

manual features. IMPORTANCE

RO 4.3

SRO 4.2

AA1.2 Operating behavior characteristics of the facility.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.2

SRO 3.5

AA1.3 Desired operating results during abnormal and emergency situations.

**IMPORTANCE** 

**RO** 3.8

SRO 4.0

AA2. Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the (Shutdown Outside Control room)

(CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)

AA2.1 Facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during abnormal and emergency operations.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.6

SRO 4.2

AA2.2 Adherence to appropriate procedures and operation within the limitations in the facility's license and amendments.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.7

SRO 4.2

## **Babcock and Wilcox A07** Flooding

#### K/A NO. KNOWLEDGE

AK1. Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the (Flooding)

(CFR: 41.8 / 41.10 / 45.3)

AK1.1 Components, capacity, and function of emergency systems.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.5

SRO 3.5

AK1.2 Normal, abnormal and emergency operating procedures associated with (Flooding).

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.3

SRO 3.7

AK1.3 Annunciators and conditions indicating signals, and remedial actions associated with the (Flooding).

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.3

SRO 3.5

AK2. Knowledge of the interrelations between the (Flooding) and the following:

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.7)

AK2.1 Components, and functions of control and safety systems, including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.7

SRO 3.5

AK2.2 Facility's heat removal systems, including primary coolant, emergency coolant, the decay heat removal systems, and relations between the proper operation of these systems to the operation of the facility.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.3

SRO 3.3

AK3. Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the (Flooding)

(CFR: 41.5 / 41.10, 45.6, 45.13

AK3.1 Facility operating characteristics during transient conditions, including coolant chemistry and the effects of temperature, pressure, and reactivity changes and operating limitations and reasons for these operating characteristics.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 2.6

SRO 3.0

1

**APE:** Flooding (Continued)

K/A NO. KNOWLEDGE

AK3.2 Normal, abnormal and emergency operating procedures associated with (Flooding).

IMPORTANCE

RO 3.2

SRO 3.4

AK3.3 Manipulation of controls required to obtain desired operating results during abnormal, and emergency situations.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.6

SRO 3.2

AK3.4 RO or SRO function within the control room team as appropriate to the assigned position, in such a way that procedures are adhered to and the limitations in the facilities license and amendments are not violated.

IMPORTANCE RO 3.6 SRO 3.6

**ABILITY** 

- AA1. Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the (Flooding): (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6)
- AA1.1 Components, and functions of control and safety systems, including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.7

SRO 3.5

AA1.2 Operating behavior characteristics of the facility.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 2.8

SRO 3.0

AA1.3 Desired operating results during abnormal and emergency situations.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.3

SRO 3.5

AA2. Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the (Flooding)

(CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)

AA2.1 Facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during abnormal and emergency operations.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.0

SRO 3.6

AA2.2 Adherence to appropriate procedures and operation within the limitations in the facility's license and amendments.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.3

### **Babcock and Wilcox**

### A08 Refueling Canal Level Decrease

K/A NO. KNOWLEDGE

AK1. Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the (Refueling Canal Level Decrease)

(CFR: 41.8 / 41.10 / 45.3)

AK1.1 Components, capacity, and function of emergency systems.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.7

SRO 3.8

AK1.2 Normal, abnormal and emergency operating procedures associated with (Refueling Canal Level Decrease).

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.7

SRO 4.0

AK1.3 Annunciators and conditions indicating signals, and remedial actions associated with the (Refueling Canal Level Decrease).

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.8

SRO 4.0

AK2. Knowledge of the interrelations between the (Refueling Canal Level Decrease) and the following:

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.7)

AK2.1 Components, and functions of control and safety systems, including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and

manual features.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 4.0

SRO 3.8

AK2.2 Facility's heat removal systems, including primary coolant, emergency coolant, the decay heat removal systems, and relations between the proper operation of these systems to the operation of the facility.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.8

SRO 4.0

AK3. Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the (Refueling Canal Level Decrease)

(CFR: 41.5 / 41.10 / 45.6,45.13)

AK3.1 Facility operating characteristics during transient conditions, including coolant chemistry and the effects of temperature, pressure, and reactivity changes and operating limitations and reasons for these operating characteristics.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.4

SRO 3.6

1

### **APE:** Refueling Canal Level Decrease (Continued)

#### K/A NO. KNOWLEDGE

AK3.2 Normal, abnormal and emergency operating procedures associated with (Refueling Canal Level Decrease).

IMPORTANCE

RO 3.2

SRO 3.4

AK3.3 Manipulation of controls required to obtain desired operating results during abnormal, and emergency situations.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 4.0

SRO 3.8

AK3.4 RO or SRO function within the control room team as appropriate to the assigned position, in such a way that procedures are adhered to and the

limitations in the facilities license and amendments are not violated.

IMPORTANCE

RO 3.6

SRO 3.6

#### **ABILITY**

AA1. Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the (Refueling Canal Level Decrease )

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6)

AA1.1 Components, and functions of control and safety systems, including

instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and

manual features.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 4.2

SRO 3.8

AA1.2 Operating behavior characteristics of the facility.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 2.8

SRO 3.0

AA1.3 Desired operating results during abnormal and emergency situations.

**IMPORTANCE** 

**ŘO** 3.7

SRO 3.7

AA2. Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the (Refueling Canal Level Decrease)

(CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)

AA2.1 Facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during abnormal and emergency operations.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.8

SRO 4.0

AA2.2 Adherence to appropriate procedures and operation within the limitations in the facility's license and amendments.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.8

SRO 4.0

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## 4.4 Combustion Engineering EPEs / APEs

**Combustion Engineering** 

**E02** Reactor Trip Recovery

K/A NO. KNOWLEDGE

EK1. Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the (Reactor Trip Recovery)

(CFR: 41.8 / 41.10, 45.3)

EK1.1 Components, capacity, and function of emergency systems.

IMPORTANCE

RO 2.9

SRO 3.2

EK1.2 Normal, abnormal and emergency operating procedures associated with (Reactor Trip Recovery).

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.0

SRO 3.4

EK1.3 Annunciators and conditions indicating signals, and remedial actions associated with the (Reactor Trip Recovery).

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.0

SRO 3.4

EK2. Knowledge of the interrelations between the (Reactor Trip Recovery) and the following:

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.7)

EK2.1 Components, and functions of control and safety systems, including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.3

SRO 3.7

EK2.2 Facility's heat removal systems, including primary coolant, emergency coolant, the decay heat removal systems, and relations between the proper operation of these systems to the operation of the facility.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.5

SRO 4.0

EK3. Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the (Reactor Trip Recovery)

(CFR: 41.5 / 41.10, 45.6, 45.13)

### **EPE:** Reactor Trip Recovery (Continued)

#### K/A NO. KNOWLEDGE

EK3.1 Facility operating characteristics during transient conditions, including coolant chemistry and the effects of temperature, pressure, and reactivity changes and operating limitations and reasons for these operating characteristics.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.2

SRO 3.7

EK3.2 Normal, abnormal and emergency operating procedures associated with (Reactor Trip Recovery).

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 2.8

SRO 3.5

EK3.3 Manipulation of controls required to obtain desired operating results during abnormal, and emergency situations.

**IMPORTANCE** 

**RO** 3.7

SRO 3.7

EK3.4 RO or SRO function within the control room team as appropriate to the assigned position, in such a way that procedures are adhered to and the limitations in the facilities license and amendments are not violated.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.2

SRO 3.7

#### **ABILITY**

EA1. Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the (Reactor Trip Recovery)

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6)

EA1.1 Components, and functions of control and safety systems, including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.7

SRO 3.7

EA1.2 Operating behavior characteristics of the facility.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.3

SRO 3.9

EA1.3 Desired operating results during abnormal and emergency situations.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.3

## **EPE:** Reactor Trip Recovery (Continued)

### K/A NO. KNOWLEDGE

EA2. Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the (Reactor Trip Recovery)
(CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)

EA2.1 Facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during abnormal and emergency operations.

IMPORTANCE RO 2.7 SRO 3.7

EA2.2 Adherence to appropriate procedures and operation within the limitations in the facility's license and amendments.

IMPORTANCE RO 3.0 SRO 4.0

## **Combustion Engineering**

E05 Excess Steam Demand

K/A NO. KNOWLEDGE

## EK1. Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the (Excess Steam Demand)

(CFR: 41.8 / 41.10 / 45.3)

EK1.1 Components, capacity, and function of emergency systems.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.0

SRO 3.3

EK1.2 Normal, abnormal and emergency operating procedures associated with (Excess Steam Demand).

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.2

SRO 3.8

EK1.3 Annunciators and conditions indicating signals, and remedial actions associated with the (Excess Steam Demand).

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.4

SRO 3.7

## **EK2.** Knowledge of the interrelations between the (Excess Steam Demand) and the following:

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.7)

EK2.1 Components, and functions of control and safety systems, including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.3

SRO 3.6

EK2.2 Facility's heat removal systems, including primary coolant, emergency coolant, the decay heat removal systems, and relations between the proper operation of these systems to the operation of the facility.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.7

SRO 4.2

## EK3. Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the (Excess Steam Demand)

(CFR: 41.5 / 41.10, 45.6, 45.13)

EK3.1 Facility operating characteristics during transient conditions, including coolant chemistry and the effects of temperature, pressure, and reactivity changes and operating limitations and reasons for these operating characteristics.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.6

#### **EPE: Excess Steam Demand (Continued)**

#### K/A NO. KNOWLEDGE

EK3.2 Normal, abnormal and emergency operating procedures associated with (Excess Steam Demand).

IMPORTANCE

RO 3.3

SRO 3.8

EK3.3 Manipulation of controls required to obtain desired operating results during abnormal, and emergency situations.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.8

SRO 4.0

EK3.4 RO or SRO function within the control room team as appropriate to the assigned position, in such a way that procedures are adhered to and the limitations in the facilities license and amendments are not violated.

IMPORTANCE

RO 3.2

SRO 3.6

#### **ABILITY**

## EA1. Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the (Excess Steam Demand)

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6)

EA1.1 Components, and functions of control and safety systems, including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.9

SRO 4.2

EA1.2 Operating behavior characteristics of the facility.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.5

SRO 3.9

EA1.3 Desired operating results during abnormal and emergency situations.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.4

SRO 4.0

## EA2. Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the (Excess Steam Demand)

(CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)

EA2.1 Facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during abnormal and emergency operations.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 2.7

SRO 4.0

**EPE:** Excess Steam Demand (Continued)

#### K/A NO. **KNOWLEDGE**

EA2.2 Adherence to appropriate procedures and operation within the limitations in the facility's license and amendments.

IMPORTANCE RO 3.4 SRO 4.2

## **Combustion Engineering**

E06 Loss of Feedwater

K/A NO. KNOWLEDGE

EK1. Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the (Loss of Feedwater)

(CFR: 41.8 / 41.10 / 45.3)

EK1.1 Components, capacity, and function of emergency systems.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.2

SRO 3.8

EK1.2 Normal, abnormal and emergency operating procedures associated with (Loss of Feedwater).

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.2

SRO 3.7

EK1.3 Annunciators and conditions indicating signals, and remedial actions associated with the (Loss of Feedwater).

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.2

SRO 3.7

**EK2.** Knowledge of the interrelations between the (Loss of Feedwater) and the following:

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.7)

EK2.1 Components, and functions of control and safety systems, including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.3

SRO 3.7

EK2.2 Facility's heat removal systems, including primary coolant, emergency coolant, the decay heat removal systems, and relations between the proper operation of these systems to the operation of the facility.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.5

SRO 4.0

EK3. Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the (Loss of Feedwater)

(CFR: 41.5 / 41.10, 45.6 / 45.13)

EK3.1 Facility operating characteristics during transient conditions, including coolant chemistry and the effects of temperature, pressure, and reactivity changes and operating limitations and reasons for these operating characteristics.

**IMPORTANCE** 

**RO 3.2** 

EPE: **Loss of Feedwater (Continued)** 

#### K/A NO. KNOWLEDGE

EK3.2 Normal, abnormal and emergency operating procedures associated with (Loss of Feedwater).

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.2

SRO 3.7

EK3.3 Manipulation of controls required to obtain desired operating results during abnormal, and emergency situations.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.7

SRO 3.8

EK3.4 RO or SRO function within the control room team as appropriate to the assigned position, in such a way that procedures are adhered to and the limitations in the facilities license and amendments are not violated.

IMPORTANCE

RO 3.2

SRO 3.7

#### **ABILITY**

EA1. Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the (Loss of Feedwater)

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6)

EA1.1 Components, and functions of control and safety systems, including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 4.0

SRO 3.9

EA1.2 Operating behavior characteristics of the facility.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.4

SRO 4.0

EA1.3 Desired operating results during abnormal and emergency situations.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.2

SRO 4.0

EA2. Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the (Loss of Feedwater)

(CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)

EA2.1 Facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during abnormal and emergency operations.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 2.8

**Loss of Feedwater (Continued)** EPE:

KNOWLEDGE K/A NO.

EA2.2 Adherence to appropriate procedures and operation within the limitations in the facility's license and amendments.

IMPORTANCE RO 3.0 SRO 4.2

## **Combustion Engineering E09 Functional Recovery**

#### K/A NO. KNOWLEDGE

EK1. Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the (Functional Recovery)

(CFR: 41.8 / 41.10 / 45.3)

EK1.1 Components, capacity, and function of emergency systems.

IMPORTANCE

RO 3.4 SRO 3.7

EK1.2 Normal, abnormal and emergency operating procedures associated with (Functional Recovery).

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.2

SRO 4.0

EK1.3 Annunciators and conditions indicating signals, and remedial actions associated with the (Functional Recovery).

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.2

SRO 3.7

**EK2.** Knowledge of the interrelations between the (Functional Recovery) and the following:

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.7)

EK2.1 Components, and functions of control and safety systems, including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.6

SRO 3.9

EK2.2 Facility's heat removal systems, including primary coolant, emergency coolant, the decay heat removal systems, and relations between the proper operation of these systems to the operation of the facility.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.7

SRO 4.2

EK3. Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the (Functional Recovery)

(CFR: 41.5 / 41.10, 45.6, 45.13)

EK3.1 Facility operating characteristics during transient conditions, including coolant chemistry and the effects of temperature, pressure, and reactivity changes and operating limitations and reasons for these operating characteristics.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.5

**EPE:** Functional Recovery (Continued)

K/A NO. KNOWLEDGE

EK3.2 Normal, abnormal and emergency operating procedures associated with (Functional Recovery).

IMPORTANCE R

RO 3.0

SRO 3.5

EK3.3 Manipulation of controls required to obtain desired operating results during abnormal, and emergency situations.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.7

SRO 3.9

EK3.4 RO or SRO function within the control room team as appropriate to the assigned position, in such a way that procedures are adhered to and the limitations in the facilities license and amendments are not violated.

IMPORTANCE

RO 3.3

SRO 3.9

**ABILITY** 

EA1. Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the (Functional Recovery)

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6)

EA1.1 Components, and functions of control and safety systems, including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 4.2

SRO 4.0

EA1.2 Operating behavior characteristics of the facility.

IMPORTANCE

RO 3.6

SRO 3.9

EA1.3 Desired operating results during abnormal and emergency situations.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.6

SRO 3.8

EA2. Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the (Functional Recovery)

(CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)

EA2.1 Facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during abnormal and emergency operations.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.2

SRO 4.4

**Functional Recovery (Continued)** EPE:

K/A NO. **KNOWLEDGE** 

EA2.2 Adherence to appropriate procedures and operation within the limitations in the facility's license and amendments.

IMPORTANCE RO 3.5 SRO 4.0

## **Combustion Engineering**

## A11 RCS Overcooling

K/A NO. KNOWLEDGE

AK1. Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the (RCS Overcooling)

(CFR: 41.8 / 41.10 / 45.3)

AK1.1 Components, capacity, and function of emergency systems.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.1

SRO 3.3

AK1.2 Normal, abnormal and emergency operating procedures associated with (RCS Overcooling).

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.0

SRO 3.3

AK1.3 Annunciators and conditions indicating signals, and remedial actions associated with the (RCS Overcooling).

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.0

SRO 3.2

AK2. Knowledge of the interrelations between the (RCS Overcooling) and the following:

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.7)

AK2.1 Components, and functions of control and safety systems, including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.2

SRO 3.4

AK2.2 Facility's heat removal systems, including primary coolant, emergency coolant, the decay heat removal systems, and relations between the proper operation of these systems to the operation of the facility.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.2

SRO 3.4

AK3. Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the (RCS Overcooling)

(CFR: 41.5 / 41.10, 45.6, 45.13

AK3.1 Facility operating characteristics during transient conditions, including coolant chemistry and the effects of temperature, pressure, and reactivity changes and operating limitations and reasons for these operating characteristics.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.2

### **APE:** RCS Overcooling (Continued)

#### K/A NO. KNOWLEDGE

AK3.2 Normal, abnormal and emergency operating procedures associated with (RCS Overcooling).

IMPORTANCE

RO 2.9

SRO 3.4

AK3.3 Manipulation of controls required to obtain desired operating results during abnormal, and emergency situations.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.1

SRO 3.5

AK3.4 RO or SRO function within the control room team as appropriate to the assigned position, in such a way that procedures are adhered to and the limitations in the facilities license and amendments are not violated.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.1

SRO 3.3

#### **ABILITY**

## AA1. Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the (RCS Overcooling)

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6)

AA1.1 Components, and functions of control and safety systems, including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and

manual features.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.3

SRO 3.5

AA1.2 Operating behavior characteristics of the facility.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.2

SRO 3.4

AA1.3 Desired operating results during abnormal and emergency situations.

**IMPORTANCE** 

**RO** 3.0

SRO 3.5

## AA2. Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the (RCS Overcooling)

(CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)

AA2.1 Facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during abnormal and emergency operations.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 2.9

SRO 3.3

AA2.2 Adherence to appropriate procedures and operation within the limitations in the facility's license and amendments.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.0

## **Combustion Engineering**

### A13 Natural Circulation Operations

K/A NO. KNOWLEDGE

AK1. Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the (Natural Circulation Operations)

(CFR: 41.8 / 41.10 / 45.3)

AK1.1 Components, capacity, and function of emergency systems.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.0

SRO 3.5

AK1.2 Normal, abnormal and emergency operating procedures associated with (Natural Circulation Operations).

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.2

SRO 3.5

AK1.3 Annunciators and conditions indicating signals, and remedial actions associated with the (Natural Circulation Operations).

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.1

SRO 3.4

AK2. Knowledge of the interrelations between the (Natural Circulation Operations) and the following:

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.7)

AK2.1 Components, and functions of control and safety systems, including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.0

SRO 3.4

AK2.2 Facility's heat removal systems, including primary coolant, emergency coolant, the decay heat removal systems, and relations between the proper operation of these systems to the operation of the facility.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.4

SRO 3.6

AK3. Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the (Natural Circulation Operations)

(CFR: 41.5 / 41.10, 45.6, 45.13)

AK3.1 Facility operating characteristics during transient conditions, including coolant chemistry and the effects of temperature, pressure, and reactivity changes and operating limitations and reasons for these operating characteristics.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.4

### **APE:** Natural Circulation Operations (Continued)

#### K/A NO. KNOWLEDGE

AK3.2 Normal, abnormal and emergency operating procedures associated with (Natural Circulation Operations).

IMPORTANCE

RO 2.9

SRO 3.4

AK3.3 Manipulation of controls required to obtain desired operating results during abnormal, and emergency situations.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.4

SRO 3.8

AK3.4 RO or SRO function within the control room team as appropriate to the assigned position, in such a way that procedures are adhered to and the limitations in the facilities license and amendments are not violated.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.1

SRO 3.4

#### **ABILITY**

## AA1. Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the (Natural Circulation Operations)

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6)

AA1.1 Components, and functions of control and safety systems, including

instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.3

SRO 3.6

AA1.2 Operating behavior characteristics of the facility.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.1

SRO 3.6

AA1.3 Desired operating results during abnormal and emergency situations.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.2

SRO 3.8

## AA2. Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the (Natural Circulation Operations)

(CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)

AA2.1 Facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during abnormal and emergency operations.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 2.7

**Natural Circulation Operations (Continued) APE:** 

K/A NO. **KNOWLEDGE** 

AA2.2 Adherence to appropriate procedures and operation within the limitations in the facility's license and amendments.

IMPORTANCE RO 2.9 SRO 3.8

## **Combustion Engineering**

### A16 Excess RCS Leakage

K/A NO. KNOWLEDGE

AK1. Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the (Excess RCS Leakage)

(CFR: 41.8 / 41.10 / 45.3)

AK1.1 Components, capacity, and function of emergency systems.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.2

SRO 3.5

AK1.2 Normal, abnormal and emergency operating procedures associated with (Excess RCS Leakage).

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.0

SRO 3.4

AK1.3 Annunciators and conditions indicating signals, and remedial action associated with the (Excess RCS Leakage).

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.2

SRO 3.5

AK2. Knowledge of the interrelations between the (Excess RCS Leakage) and the following:

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.7)

AK2.1 Components, and functions of control and safety systems, including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.2

SRO 3.5

AK2.2 Facility's heat removal systems, including primary coolant, emergency coolant, the decay heat removal systems, and relations between the proper operation of these systems to the operation of the facility.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.0

SRO 3.3

AK3. Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the (Excess RCS Leakage)

(CFR: 41.5 / 41.10, 45.6, 45.13)

AK3.1 Facility operating characteristics during transient conditions, including coolant chemistry and the effects of temperature, pressure, and reactivity changes and operating limitations and reasons for these operating characteristics.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.2

SRO 3.7

1

### **APE:** Excess RCS Leakage (Continued)

#### K/A NO. KNOWLEDGE

AK3.2 Normal, abnormal and emergency operating procedures associated with (Excess RCS Leakage).

IMPORTANCE

RO 2.8

SRO 3.3

AK3.3 Manipulation of controls required to obtain desired operating results during abnormal, and emergency situations.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.3

SRO 3.7

AK3.4 RO or SRO function within the control room team as appropriate to the assigned position, in such a way that procedures are adhered to and the limitations in the facilities license and amendments are not violated.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 2.9

SRO 3.4

#### **ABILITY**

## AA1. Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the (Excess RCS Leakage)

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6)

AA1.1 Components, and functions of control and safety systems, including

instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.4

SRO 3.6

AA1.2 Operating behavior characteristics of the facility.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.0

SRO 3.5

AA1.3 Desired operating results during abnormal and emergency situations.

**IMPORTANCE** 

**ŘO** 3.0

SRO 3.6

## AA2. Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the (Excess RCS Leakage)

(CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)

AA2.1 Facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during abnormal and emergency operations.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 2.7

**Excess RCS Leakage (Continued) APE:** 

K/A NO. **KNOWLEDGE** 

AA2.2 Adherence to appropriate procedures and operation within the limitations in the facility's license and amendments.

IMPORTANCE RO 2.9 SRO 3.7

## 4.5 Westinghouse EPEs / APEs

Westinghouse

E01 Rediagnosis

K/A NO. KNOWLEDGE

EK1. Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the (Reactor Trip or Safety Injection/Rediagnosis)

(CFR: 41.8 / 41.10 / 45.3)

EK1.1 Components, capacity, and function of emergency systems.

IMPORTANCE RO 3.1

EK1.2 Normal, abnormal and emergency operating procedures associated with (Reactor Trip or Safety Injection / Rediagnosis).

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.4

SRO 4.0

SRO 3.5

- EK1.3 Annunciators and conditions indicating signals, and remedial actions associated with the (Reactor Trip or Safety Injection/Rediagnosis).
- IMPORTANCE RO 3.1 SRO 3.5
- EK2. Knowledge of the interrelations between the (Reactor Trip or Safety Injection/Rediagnosis) and the following:

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.7)

EK2.1 Components, and functions of control and safety systems, including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.3

SRO 3.5

EK2.2 Facility's heat removal systems, including primary coolant, emergency coolant, the decay heat removal systems, and relations between the proper operation of these systems to the operation of the facility.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.5

SRO 3.8

EK3. Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the (Reactor Trip or Safety Injection/Rediagnosis)

(CFR: 41.5, 41.10, 45.6, 45.13)

**EPE:** Rediagnosis(Continued)

#### K/A NO. KNOWLEDGE

EK3.1 Facility operating characteristics during transient conditions, including coolant chemistry and the effects of temperature, pressure, and reactivity changes and operating limitations and reasons for these operating characteristics.

IMPORTANCE RO 3.0 SRO 3.3

EK3.2 Normal, abnormal and emergency operating procedures associated with (Reactor Trip or Safety Injection/Rediagnosis).

IMPORTANCE RO 3.0 SRO 3.9

EK3.3 Manipulation of controls required to obtain desired operating results during abnormal, and emergency situations.

IMPORTANCE RO 3.5 SRO 3.3

EK3.4 RO or SRO function within the control room team as appropriate to the assigned position, in such a way that procedures are adhered to and the limitations in the facilities license and amendments are not violated.

IMPORTANCE RO 3.3 SRO 3.6

#### **ABILITY**

EA1. Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the (Reactor Trip or Safety Injection/Rediagnosis)

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.5, 45.6)

EA1.1 Components, and functions of control and safety systems, including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features.

IMPORTANCE RO 3.7 SRO 3.7

EA1.2 Operating behavior characteristics of the facility.

IMPORTANCE RO 3.3 SRO 3.6

EA1.3 Desired operating results during abnormal and emergency situations. IMPORTANCE RO 3.4 SRO 3.8

EA2. Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the (Reactor Trip or Safety Injection Rediagnosis)

(CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)

**Rediagnosis**(Continued) EPE:

K/A NO. **KNOWLEDGE** 

EA2.1 Facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during abnormal and emergency operations.
IMPORTANCE

RO 3.2 SRO 4.0

EA2.2 Adherence to appropriate procedures and operation within the limitations in the facility's license and amendments.

SRO 3.9 **IMPORTANCE** RO 3.3

4.5-3

Westinghouse

E02 SI Termination

K/A NO. KNOWLEDGE

EK1. Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the (SI Termination)

(CFR: 41.8 / 41.10, 45.3)

EK1.1 Components, capacity, and function of emergency systems.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.2

SRO 3.8

EK1.2 Normal, abnormal and emergency operating procedures associated with (SI Termination).

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.4

SRO 3.9

EK1.3 Annunciators and conditions indicating signals, and remedial actions associated with the (SI Termination).

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.5

SRO 3.8

EK2. Knowledge of the interrelations between the (SI Termination) and the following:

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.7)

EK2.1 Components, and functions of control and safety systems, including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.4

SRO 3.9

EK2.2 Facility's heat removal systems, including primary coolant, emergency coolant, the decay heat removal systems, and relations between the proper operation of these systems to the operation of the facility.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.5

SRO 3.9

EK3. Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the (SI Termination)

(CFR: 41.5 / 41.10, 45.6, 45.13)

EK3.1 Facility operating characteristics during transient conditions, including coolant chemistry and the effects of temperature, pressure, and reactivity changes and operating limitations and reasons for these operating characteristics.

IMPORTANCE

RO 3.3

SRO 3.6

1

### **EPE: SI Termination (Continued)**

#### K/A NO. KNOWLEDGE

EK3.2 Normal, abnormal and emergency operating procedures associated with (SI Termination).

IMPORTANCE RO 3.3 SRO 3.8

EK3.3 Manipulation of controls required to obtain desired operating results during abnormal, and emergency situations.

IMPORTANCE RO 3.9 SRO 3.9

EK3.4 RO or SRO function within the control room team as appropriate to the assigned position, in such a way that procedures are adhered to and the limitations in the facilities license and amendments are not violated.

IMPORTANCE RO 3.5 SRO 3.8

#### **ABILITY**

## EA1. Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the (SI Termination)

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6)

EA1.1 Components, and functions of control and safety systems, including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features.

IMPORTANCE RO 4.0 SRO 3.9

EA1.2 Operating behavior characteristics of the facility.

IMPORTANCE RO 3.6 SRO 3.8

EA1.3 Desired operating results during abnormal and emergency situations. IMPORTANCE RO 3.8 SRO 4.0

EA2. Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the (SI Termination)

(CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)

EA2.1 Facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during abnormal and emergency operations.

IMPORTANCE RO 3.3 SRO 4.2

**EPE: SI Termination (Continued)** 

## K/A NO. KNOWLEDGE

EA2.2 Adherence to appropriate procedures and operation within the limitations in the facility's license and amendments.

IMPORTANCE RO 3.5 SRO 4.0

## Westinghouse

## **E03** LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization

#### K/A NO. KNOWLEDGE

EK1. Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the (LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization)

(CFR: 41.8 / 41.10 / 45.3)

EK1.1 Components, capacity, and function of emergency systems.

IMPORTANCE RO 3.4 SRO 4.0

EK1.2 Normal, abnormal and emergency operating procedures associated with (LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization).

IMPORTANCE RO 3.6 SRO 4.1

EK1.3 Annunciators and conditions indicating signals, and remedial actions associated with the (LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization).

IMPORTANCE RO 3.5 SRO 3.8

EK2. Knowledge of the interrelations between the (LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization) and the following:

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.7)

EK2.1 Components, and functions of control and safety systems, including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features.

IMPORTANCE RO 3.6 SRO 4.0

EK2.2 Facility's heat removal systems, including primary coolant, emergency coolant, the decay heat removal systems, and relations between the proper operation of these systems to the operation of the facility.

IMPORTANCE RO 3.7 SRO 4.0

EK3. Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the (LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization)

(CFR: 41.5 / 41.10, 45.6 / 45.13)

EK3.1 Facility operating characteristics during transient conditions, including coolant chemistry and the effects of temperature, pressure, and reactivity changes and operating limitations and reasons for these operating characteristics.

IMPORTANCE RO 3.3 SRO 3.7

# **EPE:** LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization (Continued)

### K/A NO. KNOWLEDGE

EK3.2 Normal, abnormal and emergency operating procedures associated with (LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization).

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.4

SRO 3.9

EK3.3 Manipulation of controls required to obtain desired operating results during abnormal, and emergency situations.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.9

SRO 3.9

EK3.4 RO or SRO function within the control room team as appropriate to the assigned position, in such a way that procedures are adhered to and the limitations in the facilities license and amendments are not violated.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.5

SRO 3.9

#### **ABILITY**

# EA1. Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the (LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization)

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6)

EA1.1 Components, and functions of control and safety systems, including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 4.0

SRO 4.0

EA1.2 Operating behavior characteristics of the facility.

IMPORTANCE

RO 3.7

SRO 3.9

EA1.3 Desired operating results during abnormal and emergency situations.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.7

SRO 4.1

# EA2. Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the (LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization)

(CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)

EA2.1 Facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during abnormal and emergency operations.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.4

SRO 4.2

EA2.2 Adherence to appropriate procedures and operation within the limitations in the facility's license and amendments.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.5

SRO 4.1

## E04 LOCA Outside Containment

#### K/A NO. KNOWLEDGE

EK1. Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the (LOCA Outside Containment)

(CFR: 41.8 / 41.10, 45.3)

EK1.1 Components, capacity, and function of emergency systems.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.5

SRO 3.9

EK1.2 Normal, abnormal and emergency operating procedures associated with (LOCA Outside Containment).

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.5

SRO 4.2

EK1.3 Annunciators and conditions indicating signals, and remedial actions associated with the (LOCA Outside Containment).

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.5

SRO 3.9

EK2. Knowledge of the interrelations between the (LOCA Outside Containment) and the following:

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.7)

EK2.1 Components, and functions of control and safety systems, including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.5

SRO 3.9

EK2.2 Facility's heat removal systems, including primary coolant, emergency coolant, the decay heat removal systems, and relations between the proper operation of these systems to the operation of the facility.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.8

SRO 4.0

EK3. Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the (LOCA Outside Containment)

(CFR: 41.5 / 41.10, 45.6, 45.13)

EK3.1 Facility operating characteristics during transient conditions, including coolant chemistry and the effects of temperature, pressure, and reactivity changes and operating limitations and reasons for these operating characteristics.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.2

#### EPE: **LOCA Outside Containment (Continued)**

#### K/A NO. **KNOWLEDGE**

EK3.2 Normal, abnormal and emergency operating procedures associated with (LOCA Outside Containment).

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.4

SRO 4.0

EK3.3 Manipulation of controls required to obtain desired operating results during abnormal, and emergency situations.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.8

SRO 3.8

EK3.4 RO or SRO function within the control room team as appropriate to the assigned position, in such a way that procedures are adhered to and the limitations in the facilities license and amendments are not violated.

IMPORTANCE

RO 3.6

SRO 3.8

## **ABILITY**

# EA1. Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the (LOCA Outside Containment)

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6)

EA1.1 Components, and functions of control and safety systems, including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 4.0

SRO 4.0

EA1.2 Operating behavior characteristics of the facility.

IMPORTANCE

RO 3.6

SRO 3.8

EA1.3 Desired operating results during abnormal and emergency situations.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.8

SRO 4.0

# EA2. Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the (LOCA Outside Containment)

(CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)

EA2.1 Facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during abnormal and emergency operations.

4.5-10

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.4

SRO 4.3

**LOCA Outside Containment (Continued)** EPE:

#### K/A NO. **KNOWLEDGE**

EA2.2 Adherence to appropriate procedures and operation within the limitations in the facility's license and amendments.

IMPORTANCE RO 3.6 SRO 4.2

E05 Loss of Secondary Heat Sink

K/A NO. KNOWLEDGE

EK1. Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the (Loss of Secondary Heat Sink)

(CFR: 41.8 / 41.10, 45.3)

EK1.1 Components, capacity, and function of emergency systems.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.8

SRO 4.1

EK1.2 Normal, abnormal and emergency operating procedures associated with (Loss of Secondary Heat Sink).

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.9

SRO 4.5

EK1.3 Annunciators and conditions indicating signals, and remedial actions associated with the (Loss of Secondary Heat Sink).

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.9

SRO 4.1

EK2. Knowledge of the interrelations between the (Loss of Secondary Heat Sink) and the following:

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.7)

EK2.1 Components, and functions of control and safety systems, including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.7

SRO 3.9

EK2.2 Facility's heat removal systems, including primary coolant, emergency coolant, the decay heat removal systems, and relations between the proper operation of these systems to the operation of the facility.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.9

SRO 4.2

EK3. Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the (Loss of Secondary Heat Sink)

(CFR: 41.5 / 41.10, 45.6, 45.13)

EK3.1 Facility operating characteristics during transient conditions, including coolant chemistry and the effects of temperature, pressure, and reactivity changes and operating limitations and reasons for these operating characteristics.

IMPORTANCE

RO 3.4

SRO 3.8

1

**EPE:** Loss of Secondary Heat Sink (Continued)

K/A NO. KNOWLEDGE

EK3.2 Normal, abnormal and emergency operating procedures associated with (Loss of Secondary Heat Sink).

IMPORTANCE RO 3.7 SRO 4.1

EK3.3 Manipulation of controls required to obtain desired operating results during abnormal, and emergency situations.

IMPORTANCE RO 4.0 SRO 4.1

EK3.4 RO or SRO function within the control room team as appropriate to the assigned position, in such a way that procedures are adhered to and the limitations in the facilities license and amendments are not violated.

IMPORTANCE RO 3.7 SRO 3.9

**ABILITY** 

EA1. Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the (Loss of Secondary Heat Sink)

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6)

EA1.1 Components, and functions of control and safety systems, including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features.

IMPORTANCE RO 4.1 SRO 4.0

EA1.2 Operating behavior characteristics of the facility.

IMPORTANCE RO 3.7 SRO 4.0

EA1.3 Desired operating results during abnormal and emergency situations.

IMPORTANCE RO 3.8 SRO 4.2

EA2. Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the (Loss of Secondary Heat Sink)

(CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)

EA2.1 Facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during abnormal and emergency operations.

IMPORTANCE RO 3.4 SRO 4.4

**Loss of Secondary Heat Sink (Continued)** EPE:

K/A NO. **KNOWLEDGE** 

EA2.2 Adherence to appropriate procedures and operation within the limitations in the facility's license and amendments.

IMPORTANCE RO 3.7 SRO 4.3

E06 Degraded Core Cooling

K/A NO. KNOWLEDGE

EK1. Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the (Degraded Core Cooling)

(CFR: 41.8 / 41.10, 45.3)

EK1.1 Components, capacity, and function of emergency systems.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.6

SRO 4.0

EK1.2 Normal, abnormal and emergency operating procedures associated with (Degraded Core Cooling).

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.5

SRO 4.1

EK1.3 Annunciators and conditions indicating signals, and remedial actions associated with the (Degraded Core Cooling).

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.7

SRO 3.9

**EK2.** Knowledge of the interrelations between the (Degraded Core Cooling) and the following:

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.7)

EK2.1 Components, and functions of control and safety systems, including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.6

SRO 3.8

EK2.2 Facility's heat removal systems, including primary coolant, emergency coolant, the decay heat removal systems, and relations between the proper operation of these systems to the operation of the facility.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.8

SRO 4.1

EK3. Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the (Degraded Core Cooling)

(CFR: 41.5 / 41.10, 45.6, 45.13)

EK3.1 Facility operating characteristics during transient conditions, including coolant chemistry and the effects of temperature, pressure, and reactivity changes and operating limitations and reasons for these operating characteristics.

IMPORTANCE

RO 3.4

EPE: **Degraded Core Cooling (Continued)** 

K/A NO. KNOWLEDGE

EK3.2 Normal, abnormal and emergency operating procedures associated with (Degraded Core Cooling).

**IMPORTANCE** RO 3.5 SRO 4.0

EK3.3 Manipulation of controls required to obtain desired operating results during abnormal, and emergency situations.

SRO 3.9 **IMPORTANCE** RO 4.0

EK3.4 RO or SRO function within the control room team as appropriate to the assigned position, in such a way that procedures are adhered to and the limitations in the facilities license and amendments are not violated.

RO 3.5 SRO 3.7 IMPORTANCE

**ABILITY** 

EA1. Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the (Degraded Core Cooling)

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6)

EA1.1 Components, and functions of control and safety systems, including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features.

**IMPORTANCE** RO 3.8 SRO 3.8

EA1.2 Operating behavior characteristics of the facility.

IMPORTANCE RO 3.5 SRO 3.8

EA1.3 Desired operating results during abnormal and emergency situations.

**IMPORTANCE** RO 3.7 SRO 4.0

EA2. Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the (Degraded Core Cooling)

(CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)

EA2.1 Facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during abnormal and emergency operations.

**IMPORTANCE** RO 3.4 SRO 4.2

**Degraded Core Cooling (Continued)** EPE:

KNOWLEDGE K/A NO.

EA2.2 Adherence to appropriate procedures and operation within the limitations in the facility's license and amendments.

IMPORTANCE RO 3.5 SRO 4.1

**E07** Saturated Core Cooling

K/A NO. KNOWLEDGE

EK1. Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the (Saturated Core Cooling)

(CFR: 41.8 / 41.10, 45.3)

EK1.1 Components, capacity, and function of emergency systems.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.4

SRO 3.8

EK1.2 Normal, abnormal and emergency operating procedures associated with (Saturated Core Cooling).

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.1

SRO 3.6

EK1.3 Annunciators and conditions indicating signals, and remedial actions associated with the (Saturated Core Cooling).

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.2

SRO 3.6

**EK2.** Knowledge of the interrelations between the (Saturated Core Cooling) and the following:

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.7)

EK2.1 Components, and functions of control and safety systems, including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.2

SRO 3.5

EK2.2 Facility's heat removal systems, including primary coolant, emergency coolant, the decay heat removal systems, and relations between the proper operation of these systems to the operation of the facility.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.5

SRO 3.9

EK3. Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the (Saturated Core Cooling)

(CFR: 41.5 / 41.10, 45.6, 45.13)

EK3.1 Facility operating characteristics during transient conditions, including coolant chemistry and the effects of temperature, pressure, and reactivity changes and operating limitations and reasons for these operating characteristics.

IMPORTANCE

RO 3.1

SRO 3.7

1

# **EPE:** Saturated Core Cooling (Continued)

#### K/A NO. KNOWLEDGE

EK3.2 Normal, abnormal and emergency operating procedures associated with (Saturated Core Cooling).

IMPORTANCE RO 3.2 SRO 3.7

EK3.3 Manipulation of controls required to obtain desired operating results during abnormal, and emergency situations.

IMPORTANCE RO 3.8 SRO 3.6

EK3.4 RO or SRO function within the control room team as appropriate to the assigned position, in such a way that procedures are adhered to and the limitations in the facilities license and amendments are not violated.

IMPORTANCE RO 3.3 SRO 3.6

#### **ABILITY**

# EA1. Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the (Saturated Core Cooling)

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6)

EA1.1 Components, and functions of control and safety systems, including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features.

IMPORTANCE RO 3.6 SRO 3.6

EA1.2 Operating behavior characteristics of the facility.

IMPORTANCE RO 3.2 SRO 3.7

EA1.3 Desired operating results during abnormal and emergency situations.

IMPORTANCE RO 3.5 SRO 3.9

EA2. Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the (Saturated Core Cooling)

(CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)

EA2.1 Facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during abnormal and emergency operations.

IMPORTANCE RO 3.2 SRO 4.0

EA2.2 Adherence to appropriate procedures and operation within the limitations in the facility's license and amendments.

IMPORTANCE RO 3.3 SRO 3.9

E08 Pressurized Thermal Shock

K/A NO. KNOWLEDGE

EK1. Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the (Pressurized Thermal Shock)

(CFR: 41.8 / 41.10, 45.3)

EK1.1 Components, capacity, and function of emergency systems.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.5

SRO 3.8

EK1.2 Normal, abnormal and emergency operating procedures associated with (Pressurized Thermal Shock).

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.4

SRO 4.0

EK1.3 Annunciators and conditions indicating signals, and remedial actions associated with the (Pressurized Thermal Shock).

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.5

SRO 4.0

EK2. Knowledge of the interrelations between the (Pressurized Thermal and the following:

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.7)

EK2.1 Components, and functions of control and safety systems, including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.4

SRO 3.7

EK2.2 Facility's heat removal systems, including primary coolant, emergency coolant, the decay heat removal systems, and relations between the proper operation of these systems to the operation of the facility.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.6

SRO 4.0

EK3. Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the (Pressurized Thermal Shock)

(CFR: 41.5 / 41.10, 45.6, 45.13)

EK3.1 Facility operating characteristics during transient conditions, including coolant chemistry and the effects of temperature, pressure, and reactivity changes and operating limitations and reasons for these operating characteristics.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.4

SRO 3.9

1

# **EPE: Pressurized Thermal Shock (Continued)**

#### K/A NO. KNOWLEDGE

EK3.2 Normal, abnormal and emergency operating procedures associated with (Pressurized Thermal Shock).

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.6

SRO 4.0

EK3.3 Manipulation of controls required to obtain desired operating results during abnormal, and emergency situations.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.7

SRO 3.8

EK3.4 RO or SRO function within the control room team as appropriate to the assigned position, in such a way that procedures are adhered to and the limitations in the facilities license and amendments are not violated.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.4

SRO 3.7

## **ABILITY**

EA1. Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the (Pressurized Thermal Shock)

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6)

EA1.1 Components, and functions of control and safety systems, including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.8

SRO 3.8

EA1.2 Operating behavior characteristics of the facility.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.6

SRO 3.9

EA1.3 Desired operating results during abnormal and emergency situations.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.6

SRO 4.0

EA2. Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the (Pressurized Thermal Shock)

(CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)

EA2.1 Facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during abnormal and emergency operations.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.4

SRO 4.2

# **EPE: Pressurized Thermal Shock (Continued)**

#### K/A NO. **KNOWLEDGE**

EA2.2 Adherence to appropriate procedures and operation within the limitations in the facility's license and amendments.

IMPORTANCE RO 3.5 SRO 4.1

# **E09** Natural Circulation Operations

K/A NO. KNOWLEDGE

EK1. Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the (Natural Circulation Operations)

(CFR: 41.8 / 41.10, 45.3)

EK1.1 Components, capacity, and function of emergency systems.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.0

SRO 3.4

EK1.2 Normal, abnormal and emergency operating procedures associated with (Natural Circulation Operations).

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.3

SRO 3.7

EK1.3 Annunciators and conditions indicating signals, and remedial actions associated with the (Natural Circulation Operations).

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.3

SRO 3.6

EK2. Knowledge of the interrelations between the (Natural Circulation Operations) and the following:

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.7)

EK2.1 Components, and functions of control and safety systems, including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.2

SRO 3.4

EK2.2 Facility's heat removal systems, including primary coolant, emergency coolant, the decay heat removal systems, and relations between the proper operation of these systems to the operation of the facility.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.6

SRO 3.9

EK3. Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the (Natural Circulation Operations)

(CFR: 41.5 / 41.10, 45.6, 45.13)

EK3.1 Facility operating characteristics during transient conditions, including coolant chemistry and the effects of temperature, pressure, and reactivity changes and operating limitations and reasons for these operating characteristics.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.3

# **EPE:** Natural Circulation Operations(Continued)

#### K/A NO. KNOWLEDGE

EK3.2 Normal, abnormal and emergency operating procedures associated with (Natural Circulation Operations ).

IMPORTANCE

RO 3.2

SRO 3.6

EK3.3 Manipulation of controls required to obtain desired operating results during abnormal, and emergency situations.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.5

SRO 3.6

EK3.4 RO or SRO function within the control room team as appropriate to the assigned position, in such a way that procedures are adhered to and the limitations in the facilities license and amendments are not violated.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.4

SRO 3.6

#### **ABILITY**

EA1. Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the (Natural Circulation Operations)

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6)

EA1.1 Components, and functions of control and safety systems, including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.5

SRO 3.5

EA1.2 Operating behavior characteristics of the facility.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.6

SRO 3.9

EA1.3 Desired operating results during abnormal and emergency situations.

**IMPORTANCE** 

**ŘO** 3.5

SRO 3.8

EA2. Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the (Natural Circulation Operations)

(CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)

EA2.1 Facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during abnormal and emergency operations.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.1

SRO 3.8

EA2.2 Adherence to appropriate procedures and operation within the limitations in the facility's license and amendments.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.4

# E10 Natural Circulation with Steam Void in Vessel with/without RVLIS

### K/A NO. KNOWLEDGE

EK1. Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the (Natural Circulation with Steam Void in Vessel with/without RVLIS)

(CFR: 41.8 / 41.10 / 45.3)

EK1.1 Components, capacity, and function of emergency systems.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.3

SRO 3.6

EK1.2 Normal, abnormal and emergency operating procedures associated with (Natural Circulation with Steam Void in Vessel with/without RVLIS).

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.4

SRO 3.6

EK1.3 Annunciators and conditions indicating signals, and remedial actions associated with the (Natural Circulation with Steam Void in Vessel with/without RVLIS).

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.3

SRO 3.6

EK2. Knowledge of the interrelations between the (Natural Circulation with Steam Void in Vessel with/without RVLIS) and the following:

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.7)

EK2.1 Components, and functions of control and safety systems, including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.3

SRO 3.5

EK2.2 Facility's heat removal systems, including primary coolant, emergency coolant, the decay heat removal systems, and relations between the proper operation of these systems to the operation of the facility.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.6

SRO 3.9

EK3. Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the (Natural Circulation with Steam Void in Vessel with/without RVLIS)

(CFR: 41.5 / 41.10, 45.6 / 45.13)

EPE: Natural Circulation with Steam Void in Vessel with/without RVLIS Continued)

## K/A NO. KNOWLEDGE

EK3.1 Facility operating characteristics during transient conditions, including coolant chemistry and the effects of temperature, pressure, and reactivity changes and operating limitations and reasons for these operating characteristics.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.4

SRO 3.7

EK3.2 Normal, abnormal and emergency operating procedures associated with (Natural Circulation with Steam Void in Vessel with/without RVLIS).

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.2

SRO 3.7

EK3.3 Manipulation of controls required to obtain desired operating results during abnormal, and emergency situations.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.4

SRO 3.6

EK3.4 RO or SRO function within the control room team as appropriate to the assigned position, in such a way that procedures are adhered to and the limitations in the facilities license and amendments are not violated.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.4

SRO 3.7

## **ABILITY**

EA1. Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the (Natural Circulation with Steam Void in Vessel with/without RVLIS)

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6)

EA1.1 Components, and functions of control and safety systems, including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.8

SRO 3.6

EA1.2 Operating behavior characteristics of the facility.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.6

SRO 3.8

EA1.3 Desired operating results during abnormal and emergency situations.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.4

EPE: Natural Circulation with Steam Void in Vessel with/without RVLIS Continued)

K/A NO. KNOWLEDGE

EA2. Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the (Natural Circulation with Steam Void in Vessel with/without RVLIS)

(CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)

EA2.1 Facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during abnormal and emergency operations.

IMPORTANCE RO 3.2 SRO 3.9

EA2.2 Adherence to appropriate procedures and operation within the limitations in the facility's license and amendments.

IMPORTANCE RO 3.4 SRO 3.9

# E11 Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation

#### K/A NO. KNOWLEDGE

EK1. Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the (Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation)

(CFR: 41.8 / 41.10 / 45.3)

EK1.1 Components, capacity, and function of emergency systems.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.7

SRO 4.0

EK1.2 Normal, abnormal and emergency operating procedures associated with (Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation).

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.6

SRO 4.1

EK1.3 Annunciators and conditions indicating signals, and remedial actions associated with the (Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation).

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.6

SRO 4.0

EK2. Knowledge of the interrelations between the (Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation) and the following:

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.7)

EK2.1 Components, and functions of control and safety systems, including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.6

SRO 3.9

EK2.2 Facility's heat removal systems, including primary coolant, emergency coolant, the decay heat removal systems, and relations between the proper operation of these systems to the operation of the facility.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.9

SRO 4.3

EK3. Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the (Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation)

(CFR: 41.5 / 41.10, 45.6, 45.13)

EK3.1 Facility operating characteristics during transient conditions, including coolant chemistry and the effects of temperature, pressure, and reactivity changes and operating limitations and reasons for these operating characteristics.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.3

SRO 3.9

1

# **EPE:** Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation (Continued)

#### K/A NO. KNOWLEDGE

EK3.2 Normal, abnormal and emergency operating procedures associated with (Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation).

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.5

SRO 4.0

EK3.3 Manipulation of controls required to obtain desired operating results during abnormal, and emergency situations.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.8

SRO 3.8

EK3.4 RO or SRO function within the control room team as appropriate to the assigned position, in such a way that procedures are adhered to and the limitations in the facilities license and amendments are not violated.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.6

SRO 3.8

## **ABILITY**

EA1. Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the (Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation)

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6)

EA1.1 Components, and functions of control and safety systems, including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.9

SRO 4.0

EA1.2 Operating behavior characteristics of the facility.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.5

SRO 3.8

EA1.3 Desired operating results during abnormal and emergency situations.

**IMPORTANCE** 

**ŘO** 3.7

SRO 4.2

EA2. Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the (Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation)

(CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)

EA2.1 Facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during abnormal and emergency operations.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.4

SRO 4.2

# **EPE: Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation (Continued)**

#### K/A NO. **KNOWLEDGE**

EA2.2 Adherence to appropriate procedures and operation within the limitations in the facility's license and amendments.

IMPORTANCE RO 3.4 SRO 4.2

# E12 Uncontrolled Depressurization of all Steam Generators

#### K/A NO. KNOWLEDGE

EK1. Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the (Uncontrolled Depressurization of all Steam Generators)

(CFR: 41.8 / 41.10 / 45.3)

EK1.1 Components:, capacity, and function of emergency systems.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.4

SRO 3.8

EK1.2 Normal, abnormal and emergency operating procedures associated with (Uncontrolled Depressurization of all Steam Generators).

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.5

SRO 3.8

- EK1.3 Annunciators and conditions indicating signals, and remedial actions associated with the (Uncontrolled Depressurization of all Steam Generators).

  IMPORTANCE RO 3.4 SRO 3.7
- EK2. Knowledge of the interrelations between the (Uncontrolled Depressurization of all Steam Generators) and the following:

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.7)

EK2.1 Components, and functions of control and safety systems, including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.4

SRO 3.7

EK2.2 Facility's heat removal systems, including primary coolant, emergency coolant, the decay heat removal systems, and relations between the proper operation of these systems to the operation of the facility.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.6

SRO 3.9

EK3. Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the (Uncontrolled Depressurization of all Steam Generators)

(CFR: 41.5 / 41.10, 45.6, 45.13)

**EPE:** Uncontrolled Depressurization of all Steam Generators (Continued)

### K/A NO. KNOWLEDGE

EK3.1 Facility operating characteristics during transient conditions, including coolant chemistry and the effects of temperature, pressure, and reactivity changes and operating limitations and reasons for these operating characteristics.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.5

SRO 3.9

EK3.2 Normal, abnormal and emergency operating procedures associated with (Uncontrolled Depressurization of all Steam Generators).

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.3

SRO 3.9

EK3.3 Manipulation of controls required to obtain desired operating results during abnormal, and emergency situations.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.5

SRO 3.7

EK3.4 RO or SRO function within the control room team as appropriate to the assigned position, in such a way that procedures are adhered to and the limitations in the facilities license and amendments are not violated.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.5

SRO 3.8

## **ABILITY**

EA1. Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the (Uncontrolled Depressurization of all Steam Generators)

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6)

EA1.1 Components, and functions of control and safety systems, including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.8

SRO 3.8

EA1.2 Operating behavior characteristics of the facility.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.6

SRO 3.7

EA1.3 Desired operating results during abnormal and emergency situations.

IMPORTANCE

ŘO 3.4

**EPE:** Uncontrolled Depressurization of all Steam Generators (Continued)

K/A NO. KNOWLEDGE

EA2. Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the (Uncontrolled Depressurization of all Steam Generators)

(CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)

EA2.1 Facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during abnormal and emergency operations.

IMPORTANCE RO 3.2 SRO 4.0

EA2.2 Adherence to appropriate procedures and operation within the limitations in the facility's license and amendments.

IMPORTANCE RO 3.4 SRO 3.9

# E13 Steam Generator Overpressure

#### K/A NO. KNOWLEDGE

EK1. Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the (Steam Generator Overpressure)

(CFR: 41.8 / 41.10, 45.3)

EK1.1 Components, capacity, and function of emergency systems.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.2

SRO 3.4

EK1.2 Normal, abnormal and emergency operating procedures associated with (Steam Generator Overpressure).

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.0

SRO 3.3

EK1.3 Annunciators and conditions indicating signals, and remedial actions associated with the (Steam Generator Overpressure).

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.0

SRO 3.2

EK2. Knowledge of the interrelations between the (Steam Generator Overpressure) and the following:

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.7)

EK2.1 Components, and functions of control and safety systems, including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.0

SRO 3.1

EK2.2 Facility's heat removal systems, including primary coolant, emergency coolant, the decay heat removal systems, and relations between the proper operation of these systems to the operation of the facility.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.0

SRO 3.2

EK3. Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the (Steam Generator Overpressure)

(CFR: 41.5 / 41.10, 45.6, 45.13)

EK3.1 Facility operating characteristics during transient conditions, including coolant chemistry and the effects of temperature, pressure, and reactivity changes and operating limitations and reasons for these operating characteristics.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 2.9

SRO 3.2

1

## **EPE: Steam Generator Overpressure (Continued)**

#### K/A NO. KNOWLEDGE

EK3.2 Normal, abnormal and emergency operating procedures associated with (Steam Generator Overpressure).

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 2.9

SRO 3.3

EK3.3 Manipulation of controls required to obtain desired operating results during abnormal, and emergency situations.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.2

SRO 3.4

EK3.4 RO or SRO function within the control room team as appropriate to the assigned position, in such a way that procedures are adhered to and the limitations in the facilities license and amendments are not violated.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.1

SRO 3.3

## **ABILITY**

# EA1. Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the (Steam Generator Overpressure)

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6)

EA1.1 Components, and functions of control and safety systems, including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.1

SRO 3.3

EA1.2 Operating behavior characteristics of the facility.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.0

SRO 3.2

EA1.3 Desired operating results during abnormal and emergency situations.

**IMPORTANCE** 

ŘO 3.1

SRO 3.4

# EA2. Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the (Steam Generator Overpressure)

(CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)

EA2.1 Facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during abnormal and emergency operations.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 2.9

**EPE: Steam Generator Overpressure (Continued)** 

K/A NO. **KNOWLEDGE** 

EA2.2 Adherence to appropriate procedures and operation within the limitations in the facility's license and amendments.

IMPORTANCE RO 3.0 SRO 3.4

# E14 High Containment Pressure

#### K/A NO. KNOWLEDGE

EK1. Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the (High Containment Pressure)

(CFR: 41.8 / 41.10, 45.3)

EK1.1 Components, capacity, and function of emergency systems.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.3

SRO 3.6

EK1.2 Normal, abnormal and emergency operating procedures associated with (High Containment Pressure).

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.2

SRO 3.7

EK1.3 Annunciators and conditions indicating signals, and remedial actions associated with the (High Containment Pressure).

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.3

SRO 3.6

EK2. Knowledge of the interrelations between the (High Containment Pressure) and the following:

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.7)

EK2.1 Components, and functions of control and safety systems, including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.4

SRO 3.7

EK2.2 Facility's heat removal systems, including primary coolant, emergency coolant, the decay heat removal systems, and relations between the proper operation of these systems to the operation of the facility.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.4

SRO 3.8

EK3. Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the (High Containment Pressure)

(CFR: 41.5 / 41.10, 45.6, 45.13)

EK3.1 Facility operating characteristics during transient conditions, including coolant chemistry and the effects of temperature, pressure, and reactivity changes and operating limitations and reasons for these operating characteristics.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.2

## **EPE:** High Containment Pressure (Continued)

#### K/A NO. KNOWLEDGE

EK3.2 Normal, abnormal and emergency operating procedures associated with (High Containment Pressure).

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.1

SRO 3.7

EK3.3 Manipulation of controls required to obtain desired operating results during abnormal, and emergency situations.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.5

SRO 3.5

EK3.4 RO or SRO function within the control room team as appropriate to the assigned position, in such a way that procedures are adhered to and the limitations in the facilities license and amendments are not violated.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.3

SRO 3.6

## **ABILITY**

EA1. Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the (High Containment Pressure)

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6)

EA1.1 Components, and functions of control and safety systems, including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.7

SRO 3.7

EA1.2 Operating behavior characteristics of the facility.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.3

SRO 3.4

EA1.3 Desired operating results during abnormal and emergency situations.

**IMPORTANCE** 

**ŘO** 3.3

SRO 3.8

EA2. Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the (High Containment Pressure)

(CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)

EA2.1 Facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during abnormal and emergency operations.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.3

# **EPE:** High Containment Pressure (Continued)

#### K/A NO. **KNOWLEDGE**

EA2.2 Adherence to appropriate procedures and operation within the limitations in the facility's license and amendments.

IMPORTANCE RO 3.3 SRO 3.8

# E15 Containment Flooding

#### K/A NO. KNOWLEDGE

EK1. Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the (Containment Flooding)

(CFR: 41.8 / 41.10, 45.3)

EK1.1 Components, capacity, and function of emergency systems.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 2.8

SRO 3.0

EK1.2 Normal, abnormal and emergency operating procedures associated with (Containment Flooding).

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 2.7

SRO 2.9

EK1.3 Annunciators and conditions indicating signals, and remedial actions associated with the (Containment Flooding).

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 2.8

SRO 3.0

EK2. Knowledge of the interrelations between the (Containment Flooding) and the following:

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.7)

EK2.1 Components, and functions of control and safety systems, including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 2.8

SRO 2.9

EK2.2 Facility's heat removal systems, including primary coolant, emergency coolant, the decay heat removal systems, and relations between the proper operation of these systems to the operation of the facility.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 2.7

SRO 2.9

EK3. Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the (Containment Flooding)

(CFR: 41.5 / 41.10, 45.6, 45.13)

EK3.1 Facility operating characteristics during transient conditions, including coolant chemistry and the effects of temperature, pressure, and reactivity changes and operating limitations and reasons for these operating characteristics.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 2.7

SRO 2.9

1

# **EPE:** Containment flooding (Continued)

### K/A NO. KNOWLEDGE

EK3.2 Normal, abnormal and emergency operating procedures associated with (Containment Flooding).

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 2.8

SRO 3.1

EK3.3 Manipulation of controls required to obtain desired operating results during abnormal, and emergency situations.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 2.9

SRO 29

EK3.4 RO or SRO function within the control room team as appropriate to the assigned position, in such a way that procedures are adhered to and the limitations in the facilities license and amendments are not violated.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 2.9

SRO 3.0

## **ABILITY**

# EA1. Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the (Containment Flooding)

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6)

EA1.1 Components, and functions of control and safety systems, including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 2.9

SRO 3.0

EA1.2 Operating behavior characteristics of the facility.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 2.7

SRO 2.9

EA1.3 Desired operating results during abnormal and emergency situations.

**IMPORTANCE** 

**ŘO** 2.8

SRO 3.0

# EA2. Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the (Containment Flooding)

(CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)

EA2.1 Facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during abnormal and emergency operations.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 2.7

**EPE:** Containment flooding (Continued)

K/A NO. **KNOWLEDGE** 

EA2.2 Adherence to appropriate procedures and operation within the limitations in the facility's license and amendments.

IMPORTANCE RO 2.9 SRO 3.3

# E16 High Containment Radiation

K/A NO. KNOWLEDGE

EK1. Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the (High Containment Radiation)

(CFR: 41.8 / 41.10, 45.3)

EK1.1 Components, capacity, and function of emergency systems.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 2.7

SRO 3.0

EK1.2 Normal, abnormal and emergency operating procedures associated with (High Containment Radiation).

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 2.7

SRO 3.2

EK1.3 Annunciators and conditions indicating signals, and remedial actions associated with the (High Containment Radiation).

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.0

SRO 3.3

EK2. Knowledge of the interrelations between the (High Containment Radiation) and the following:

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.7)

EK2.1 Components, and functions of control and safety systems, including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.0

SRO 3.3

EK2.2 Facility's heat removal systems, including primary coolant, emergency coolant, the decay heat removal systems, and relations between the proper operation of these systems to the operation of the facility.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 2.6

SRO 3.0

EK3. Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the (High Containment Radiation)

(CFR: 41.5 / 41.10, 45.6, 45.13)

EK3.1 Facility operating characteristics during transient conditions, including coolant chemistry and the effects of temperature, pressure, and reactivity changes and operating limitations and reasons for these operating characteristics.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 2.9

#### **EPE:** High Containment Radiation (Continued)

#### K/A NO. KNOWLEDGE

EK3.2 Normal, abnormal and emergency operating procedures associated with (High Containment Radiation).

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 2.9

SRO 3.3

EK3.3 Manipulation of controls required to obtain desired operating results during abnormal, and emergency situations.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.0

SRO 3.0

EK3.4 RO or SRO function within the control room team as appropriate to the assigned position, in such a way that procedures are adhered to and the limitations in the facilities license and amendments are not violated.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.0

SRO 3.2

#### **ABILITY**

# EA1. Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the (High Containment Radiation)

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6)

EA1.1 Components, and functions of control and safety systems, including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 3.1

SRO 3.2

EA1.2 Operating behavior characteristics of the facility.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 2.9

SRO 3.0

EA1.3 Desired operating results during abnormal and emergency situations.

**IMPORTANCE** 

**RO** 2.9

SRO 3.3

## EA2. Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the (High Containment Radiation)

(CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)

EA2.1 Facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during abnormal and emergency operations.

**IMPORTANCE** 

RO 2.9

SRO 3.3

#### **EPE: High Containment Radiation (Continued)**

#### K/A NO. **KNOWLEDGE**

EA2.2 Adherence to appropriate procedures and operation within the limitations in the facility's license and amendments.

IMPORTANCE RO 3.0 SRO 3.3

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# **SECTION 5**

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#### COMPONENT: 191001 Valves (CFR 41.3)

		<b>IMPOR</b>	<b>FANCE</b>
K/A NO.	KNOWLEDGE	RO	SRO
K1.01	The function and operation of safety valves	3.3	3.4
K1.02	The function and operation of relief valves	3.0	3.3
K1.03	The relationship of valve position to flow rate and back pressure	2.7	2.9
K1.04	The failed-valve positions for different operators (open, closed, and as-is positions; spring loaded valves; hydraulic, pneumatically controlled valves; electric motor-drive valves)	2.8	3.2
K1.05	Equipment protection concerns in the use of valves (protect valve seals, open slowly)	2.6	2.8
K1.06	†Manual operation of MOV with motor inoperable	3.3	3.7
K1.07	Principles of operation and purpose of check valves	2.5	2.8
K1.08	Operation of valves and verification of position	3.4	3.4
K1.09	Reason for using globe valves versus gates valves for throttling	2.2*	2.4

#### **COMPONENT: 191002 Sensors and Detectors (CFR 41.7)**

K/A NO.	KNOWLEDGE	IMPORT RO	TANCE SRO
	Flow		
K1.01	Characteristics of venturis and orifices	2.2*	2.4
K1.02	Temperature/density compensation requirements	2.7	2.9
K1.03	Effects of gas or steam on liquid flow rate indications (erroneous reading)	2.7	2.9
K1.04	Modes of failure	2.7	2.7
K1.05	Explain the operation of a flow D/P cell type flow detector <u>Level</u>	2.6	2.8
K1.06	Temperature/pressure compensation requirements	2.5	2.6
K1.07	Theory and operation of level detectors	2.5	2.6
K1.08	†Effects of operating environment (pressure and temperature)	2.8	3.1
K1.09	Modes of failure	2.9	3.0
	<u>Pressure</u>		
K1.10	Theory and operation of pressure detectors (bourdon tubes, diaphragms, bellows, forced balance, and variable capacitance)	2.3	2.5
K1.11	Effects of operating environment (pressure, temperature)	2.7	3.0
K1.12	Modes of failure	2.8	2.9
	<u>Temperature</u>		
K1.13	Theory and operation of T/C, RTD, thermostats	2.6	2.8
K1.14	Failure modes of T/C and RTD	2.8	2.9
	Position Detectors		
K1.15	Failure lodes of reed switches, LVDT, limit switches, and potentiometers	2.3	2.4

#### **COMPONENT: 191002 Sensors and Detectors**

		IMPOR 7	TANCE
K/A NO.	KNOWLEDGE	RO	SRO
K1.16	Applications of reed switches, magnets, LVDT, potentiometers, and limit switches	2.3	2.7
	Nuclear Instrumentation		
K1.17	Effects of core voiding on neutron detection	3.3	3.5
	Portable and Personal Radiation Detection		
K1.18	Theory and operation of ion chambers, G-M tubes and scintillation detectors	2.6	2.8
K1.19	Use of portable and personal radiation monitoring instruments.	3.1	3.3
K1.20	Theory and operation of failed-fuel detectors	2.5	2.7

#### **COMPONENT: 191003 Controllers and Positioners (CFR 41.7)**

K/A NO.	KNOWLEDGE	IMPORTA RO	NCE SRO
MA NO.	RNOWLEDGE	KU	SKO
K1.01	†Function and operation of flow controller in manual and automatic modes	3.1	3.2
K1.02	†Function and operation of a speed controller	2.6	2.7
K1.03	Operation of valves controllers in manual and automatic mode	3.1	3.1
K1.04	Function and operation of pressure and temperature controllers, including pressure and temperature control valves	2.8	3.0
K1.05	Function and characteristics of valve positioners	2.5	2.8
K1.06	Function and characteristics of governors and other mechanical controllers	2.3	2.6
K1.07	Safety precautions with respect to the operation of controllers and positioners	2.3	2.6
K1.08	Theory of operation of the following types of controllers: electronic, electrical, and pneumatic	2.1	2.6
K1.09	Effects on operation of controllers due to proportional, integral (reset), derivative (rate), as well as their combinations	2.4	2.5
K1.10	Function and characteristics of air-operated valves, including failure modes	2.4	2.8
K1.11	†Cautions for placing a valve controller in manual mode	2.8	2.9

#### COMPONENT: 191004 Pumps (CFR 41.3)

K/A NO.	KNOWLEDGE	IMPORTA RO	NCE SRO
	<u>Centrifugal</u>		
K1.01	Identification, symptoms, and consequences of cavitation	3.3	3.5
K1.02	Reasons for venting a centrifugal pump	3.1	3.4
K1.03	Consequences of air steam binding	3.1	3.3
K1.04	Consequences of operating a pump dead headed or for extended times without adequate recirculation	3.3	3.4
K1.05	Discuss relationships among head, flow, and power as related to pump speed	2.3	2.4
K1.06	Need for net positive suction head (NPSH); effects of loss of suction	3.2	3.3
K1.07	Starting current and operating current interpretation	2.9	2.9
K1.08	Purpose of starting a pump with discharge valve closed	2.4	2.6
K1.09	Pressure and flow relationship of pumps in parallel	2.4	2.Z
K1.10	Pressure and flow relationship of pumps in series	2.4	2.4
K1.11	Definition of pump shutoff head	2.3	2.4
K1.12	"Runout" of a centrifugal pump (definition, indications, causes, effects, and corrective measures)	2.5	2.7
K1.13	Theory of operation of a centrifugal pump	2.1	2.1
K1.14	Using a centrifugal pump characteristic curve and a system characteristic curve, illustrate how the system operating point changes due to system changes	2.4	2.5
K1.15	Relationship between flow from a pump and suction heads	2.5	2.8
K1.16	Safety procedures and precautions associated with centrifugal pumps	2.8	2.9
K1.17	Define pump efficiency	1.8*	1.9*
K1.18	Explain the difference between ideal and real pumping process	1.4*	1.7*

#### **COMPONENT: 191004 Pumps**

		IMPORTA	
K/A NO.	KNOWLEDGE	RO	SRO
	Positive Displacement		
K1.19	Discuss the relationship among head, flow, speed, and power	2.4	2.4
K1.20	Net positive suction head (NPSH) requirements for a positive displacement pump	2.8	2.8
K1.21	Consequences of operating a positive displacement pump against a closed flow path	3.0	3.1
K1.22	Applications and characteristics of positive displacement pumps	2.3	2.5
K1.23	Reason for starting a positive displacement pump with the discharge valve open	2.8	2.9
K1.24	Safety procedures and precautions associated with positive displacement pumps	3.0	3.1
K1.25	Basic operation of positive displacement pumps	2.3	2.4
K1.26	Theory of operation of positive displacement pumps	1.9	2.0
K1.27	Discuss the characteristic curve for a typical positive displacement pump and explain the reason for its shape	2.1*	2.1
	Jet Pumps		
K1.28	Describe the principles of operation of a jet pump	1.8*	1.8*

## **COMPONENT: 191005 Motor and Generators (CFR 41.7)**

K/A NO.	KNOWLEDGE	IMPORTAN RO	NCE SRO
K1.01	Indication of a locked rotor	2.8	3.1
K1.02	Potential consequences of overheating insulation or bearings	2.8	2.9
K1.03	Causes of excessive current in motors and generators, such as low voltage, overloading, and mechanical binding	2.7	2.8
K1.04	Relationship between pump motor current (ammeter reading) and the following: pump fluid flow, head, speed, and stator temperature	2.7	2.8
K1.05	Explain the difference between starting current and operating (running) current in a motor	2.8	2.7
K1.06	Reason for limiting the number of motor starts in a given time period	3.0	3.1
K1.07	Electrical units: Volts, Amps, VARs, Watts, and Hertz	2.1*	2.3
K1.08	Consequences of overexcited/under excited	2.1	2.3
K1.09	Interrelations of the following: VARs, Watts, Amps, Volts, Power factor	1.9*	2.1
K1.10	Load sharing with parallel generators	2.3*	2.4
K1.11	†Motor and generator protective devices	2.3*	2.4

#### **COMPONENT: 191006 Heat Exchangers and Condensers (CFR 41.4)**

K/A NO.	KNOWLEDGE	IMPORTAN RO	NCE SRO
K1.01	Startup/shutdown of a heat exchanger	2.1	2.3
K1.02	Proper filling of a shell-and-tube heat exchanger	2.1	2.3
K1.03	Basic heat transfer in a heat exchanger	2.2	2.3
K1.04	Effects of heat exchanger flow rates that are too high or too low and methods of proper flow adjustment	2.5	2.7
K1.05	Flow paths for the heat exchanger (counterflow and U-types)	1.8*	1.9*
K1.06	Components of a heat exchanger (shells, tubes, plates, etc.)	1.7*	1.9*
K1.07	Control of heat exchanger temperatures	2.4	2.6
K1.08	Relationship between flow rates and temperatures	2.4	2.4
K1.09	Definition of thermal shock	2.8	2.8
K1.10	Principle of operation of condensers	2.3	2.4
K1.11	Relationship between condenser vacuum and backpressure	2.1*	2.1*
K1.12	Effects of tube fouling and tube failure scaling on heat exchanger operation	2.5	2.7
K1.13	Consequences of heat exchanger tube failure	2.8	2.9
K1.14	Reasons for non-condensable gas removal	2.4	2.6

#### **COMPONENT: 191007 Demineralizers and Ion Exchangers (CFR 41.3)**

K/A NO.	KNOWLEDGE	IMPORTAN RO	SRO
K1.01	Effect of excessive differential pressure on demineralizer performance	2.3	2.5
K1.02	Effects of channeling in a demineralizer	2.1	2.3
K1.03	Reason for sampling inlet and outlet of demineralizer	2.2	2.5
K1.04	Reason for demineralizer temperature and flow limits	2.4	2.4
K1.05	Principles of demineralizer operation	2.0	2.2
K1.06	Demineralizer D/P to determine condition of demineralizer resin bed	2.1	2.5
K1.07	Effects of demineralizer operation on water conductivity	2.1	2.2
K1.08	Demineralizer characteristics that can cause a change in boron concentration	3.Z	3.1
K1.09	Reasons for bypassing demineralizers	2.5	2.7
K1.10	Reasons for using mixed-bed demineralizers to process primary water	2.1	2.3
K1.11	Plant evolutions which can cause crud bursts and the effect on demineralizers	2.5	2.8
K1.12	Definition of "boron saturated" as it relates to a demineralizer	2.7	2.9
K1.13	Definition of "lithium saturated" as it relates to a demineralizer	2.1	2.1
K1.14	Effect of temperature on saturated ion exchangers	2.4	2.6

#### COMPONENT: 191008 Breakers, Relays, and Disconnects (CFR 41.7)

		<b>IMPORTANCE</b>	
K/A NO.	KNOWLEDGE	RO	SRO
K1.01	†Purpose of racking out breakers (de-energize components and associated control and indication circuits)	2.6	2.8
K1.02	Local indication that breaker is open, closed or tripped	2.8	2.9
K1.03	Loss of power supply circuit breaker indicator lights and capability in remotely open and close	2.9	3.1
K1.04	Operation of various push buttons, switches and handles and the resulting action on breakers	2.9	3.0
K1.05	Function of thermal overload protection device	2.3	2.4
K1.06	†Interpretation of symbols for breakers, relays and disconnects in a one-line diagram	2.3	2.6
K1.07	Safety procedures and precautions associated with breakers, including MCC bus breakers, high, medium and low voltage breakers, relays and disconnects	3.0	3.3
K1.08	Effects of closing breakers with current out of phase, different frequencies, high voltage differential, low current, or too much load	3.3	3.5
K1.09	Effect of racking out breakers on control and indicating circuits and removal of control power on breaker operation	2.8	3.1
K1.10	†Function, control, and precautions associated with disconnects	2.7*	3.1
K1.11	Control room indication of a breaker status	3.1	3.3
K1.12	Trip indicators for circuit breakers and protective relays	2.9	2.9

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**REACTOR THEORY** (CFR 41.1)

**REACTOR THEORY: 192001 Neutrons** 

K/A NO.	KNOWLEDGE	IMPOR RO	TANCE SRO
K1.01	Define fast, intermediate, and slow neutrons.	1.9*	2.0
K1.02	Define prompt and delayed neutrons.	2.4	2.5
K1.03	Define thermal neutrons.	2.2	2.3
K1.04	Describe neutron moderation.	2.4	2.4
K1.05	Identify characteristics of good moderators.	2.0*	2.1*
K1.06	Define neutron lifetime.	1.6*	1.6*
K1.07	Define neutron generation time.	1.6*	1.6*
K1.08	Describe fast flux, thermal flux, and flux distribution.	1.9*	2.0
K1.09	Describe sources of neutrons.	2.3	2.4

#### **REACTOR THEORY: 192002 Neutron Life Cycle**

		<b>IMPORTANCE</b>	
K/A NO.	KNOWLEDGE	RO	SRO
	<u>Describe</u> the neutron life cycle using the following terms:		
K1.01	fast fission factor.	1.4*	1.4*
K1.02	fast non-leakage probability factor.	1.4*	1.6*
K1.03	resonance escape probability factor.	1.9*	1.9*
K1.04	thermal non-leakage probability factor.	1.5*	1.6*
K1.05	thermal utilization factor.	1.9*	1.9*
K1.06	reproduction factor.	1.5*	1.6*
K1.07	Define critical, subcritical, and supercritical with respect to a reactor and in terms of the effective multiplication factor.	3.1	3.1
K1.08	Define effective multiplication factor and discuss its relationship to the state of a reactor.	2.6	2.6
K1.09	Define K-excess (excess reactivity).	2.5	2.7
K1.10	Define shutdown margin.	3.2	3.6
K1.11	Define reactivity.	2.9	3.0
K1.12	State the relationship between reactivity and effective multiplication factor.	2.4	2.5
K1.13	Calculate shutdown margin using procedures and given plant parameters.	3.5*	3.7*
K1.14	†Evaluate change in shutdown margin due to changes in plant parameters.	3.8	3.9

#### **REACTOR THEORY: 192003 Reactor Kinetics and Neutron Sources**

K/A NO.	KNOWLEDGE	IMPORTA RO	NCE SRO
K1.01	Explain the concept of subcritical multiplication.	2.7	2.8
K1.02	Given the simplified formula for subcritical multiplication, perform calculations involving steady state count rate and source count rate.	2.2	2.3
K1.03	Describe the production of delayed neutrons.	2.3	2.4
K1.04	Define delayed neutron fraction and effective delayed neutron fraction: state the reasons for variation.	2.4	2.4
K1.05	Define start-up rate.	2.7	2.8
K1.06	Describe the factors affecting start-up rate.	3.2	3.3
K1.07	Explain the effect of delayed neutrons on reactor control.	3.0	3.0
K1.08	Explain the prompt critical, prompt jump, and prompt drop.	2.8	2.9
K1.09	Given the power equation, solve problems for power changes.	2.3	2.3
K1.10	Define doubling time and calculate it using the power equation.	1.6*	1.6*
K1.11	Explain the necessity for installed neutron sources in a reactor core.	2.7	2.8

#### **REACTOR THEORY: 192004 Reactivity Coefficients**

	<b>IMPORTANCE</b>	
KNOWLEDGE	RO	SRO
Define moderator temperature coefficient of reactivity.	3.1	3.2
Define fuel temperature coefficient of reactivity.	3.0	3.2
Describe the effect on the magnitude of the temperature coefficient of reactivity from changes in moderator temperature and core age.	2.9	3.1
Explain resonance absorption.	2.4	2.4
Explain doppler broadening and self-shielding.	2.3*	2.4*
Describe time effects of core age, moderator temperature, and boron concentration on moderator temperature coefficients.	3.1	3.1
Describe the effects of core age, fuel temperature, and moderator temperature on fuel temperature (doppler) coefficient.	2.9	2.9
Describe the components of power coefficient.	3.1	3.1
Compare boron reactivity worth vs. boron concentration.	2.8	2.9
Compare boron reactivity worth vs. moderator temperature.	2.9	2.9
Explain the change in reactivity addition rate due to boration/dilution over core life.	2.9	3.1
Explain differences between reactivity coefficients and reactivity defects.	2.7	2.7
Explain and describe the effect of power defect and doppler defect on reactivity.	2.9	2.9
	Define moderator temperature coefficient of reactivity.  Describe the effect on the magnitude of the temperature coefficient of reactivity from changes in moderator temperature and core age.  Explain resonance absorption.  Explain doppler broadening and self-shielding.  Describe time effects of core age, moderator temperature, and boron concentration on moderator temperature coefficients.  Describe the effects of core age, fuel temperature, and moderator temperature on fuel temperature (doppler) coefficient.  Describe the components of power coefficient.  Compare boron reactivity worth vs. boron concentration.  Compare boron reactivity worth vs. moderator temperature.  Explain the change in reactivity addition rate due to boration/dilution over core life.  Explain differences between reactivity coefficients and reactivity defects.	Explain resonance absorption.  Describe time effects of core age, moderator temperature, and boron concentration on moderator temperature (doppler) coefficient.  Describe the effects of core age, fuel temperature, and moderator temperature on fuel temperature (doppler) coefficient.  Describe the components of power coefficient.  Compare boron reactivity worth vs. moderator temperature.  Explain the change in reactivity addition rate due to boration/dilution over core life.  Explain and describe the effect of power defect and doppler defect on  2.9  Explain and describe the effect of power defect and doppler defect on  2.9  Explain and describe the effect of power defect and doppler defect on

#### **REACTOR THEORY: 192005 Control Rods (Full and/or Part Length)**

K/A NO.	KNOWLEDGE	IMPORTANCE RO SRO	
K1.01	Name the material used for thermal neutron absorption in control rods.	1.8*	1.9*
K1.02	Describe nuclear properties of active neutron absorber material in the control rod.	1.9	2.0*
K1.03	Predict direction of change in reactor power for a chance in control rod position.	3.5	3.6
K1.04	Define reactor scram/trip.	3.2*	3.2*
K1.05	Define control rod worth, differential control rod worth, and integral control rod worth.	2.8	3.1
K1.06	Explain the shape of curves for differential and integral new versus rod position.	2.6	2.9
K1.07	Explain direction of change in magnitude of CRW far a change in moderator temperature, boron concentration, and fission product poisons.	2.5	2.8
K1.08	State the purpose of flux shaping.	2.7	2.9
K1.09	State the purpose of rod sequencing and overlap.	2.8	3.0
K1.10	†Describe axial flux imbalance, including long-range effects.	3.0	3.3
K1.11	$\ensuremath{\dagger} \textbf{D} \textbf{e} \textbf{s} \textbf{c} \textbf{r} \textbf{i} \textbf{b} \textbf{e} \textbf{f} \textbf{f} \textbf{e} \textbf{c} \textbf{t} \textbf{s} \textbf{o} \textbf{f} \textbf{q} \textbf{u} \textbf{a} \textbf{d} \textbf{r} \textbf{a} \textbf{n} \textbf{t} \textbf{p} \textbf{o} \textbf{w} \textbf{e} \textbf{r} \textbf{i} \textbf{l} \textbf{t} \textbf{(symmetric offset)}, \textbf{including long-range effects.}$	2.8	3.2
K1.12	†Describe power peaking or hot-channel factors.	2.9	3.1
K1.13	†Define and calculate quadrant tilt (symmetric offset) ratio	2.9	3.3
K1.14	Explain the effects of full and/or part length rods on Delta I (flux distribution).	3.2	3.5
K1.15	†Discuss rod insertion limits.	3.4	3.9
K1.16	$\dagger \textbf{D} \textbf{e} \textbf{s} \textbf{c} \textbf{r} \textbf{i} \textbf{b} \textbf{e} \textbf{f} \textbf{e} \textbf{c} \textbf{t} \textbf{s} \textbf{o} \textbf{f} \textbf{c} \textbf{o} \textbf{n} \textbf{r} \textbf{o} \textbf{d} \textbf{s} \textbf{o} \textbf{n} \textbf{p} \textbf{o} \textbf{w} \textbf{e} \textbf{r} \textbf{e} \textbf{a} \textbf{k} \textbf{i} \textbf{n} \textbf{g} \textbf{o} \textbf{r} \textbf{h} \textbf{o} \textbf{t} \textbf{c} \textbf{h} \textbf{a} \textbf{n} \textbf{n} \textbf{e} \textbf{f} \textbf{a} \textbf{c} \textbf{t} \textbf{o} \textbf{s} \textbf{o} \textbf{s} \textbf{o} \textbf{e} \textbf{e} \textbf{e} \textbf{e} \textbf{e} \textbf{e} \textbf{e} e$	2.8	3.1

#### **REACTOR THEORY: 192006 Fission Product Poisons**

K/A NO.	KNOWLEDGE	IMPORTA RO	ANCE SRO
K1.01	Define fission product poison.	2.5	2.6
K1.02	State the characteristics of Xenon-135 as a fission product poison.	3.0	1.1
K1.03	Describe the production of Xenon-135.	2.7	2.8
K1.04	Describe the removal of Xenon-135.	2.8	2.8
	<u>Describe the following processes and state their effect on reactor operations:</u>		
K1.05	Equilibrium Xenon	3.1	3.1
K1.06	Transient Xenon	3.2	3.4
K1.07	Xenon following a scram	3.4	3.4
K1.08	Describe the effects that Xenon concentration has on flux shape and control rod patterns.	3.3	3.4
	Plot the curve and explain the reasoning for the reactivity insertion by Xenon-124 versus time for the following:		
K1.09	Initial reactor startup and ascension to rated power.	3.0	3.1
K1.10	Reactor startup with Xenon-135 already present in the core.	3.1	3.2
K1.11	Power changes from steady-state power to another.	3.1	3.1
K1.12	Reactor scram.	3.1	3.1
K1.13	Reactor shutdown.	2.9	3.0
K1.14	Explain the methods and reasons for the operator to compensate for the time dependent behavior of Xenon 135 concentration in the reactor.	3.2	3.3
K1.15	State the characteristics of Samarium-149 as a fission product poison.	1.9*	1.9*
K1.16	Describe the production of Samarium-149.	1.8*	1.8*
K1.17	Describe the removal of Samarium-14?.	1.8*	1.8*

#### **REACTOR THEORY: 192006 Fission Product Poisons**

K/A NO.	KNOWLEDGE	IMPORTA RO	NCE SRO
K1.18	Define equilibrium samarium.	1.8*	1.8*
	Plot the curve and explain the reasoning for reactivity insertion by Samarium-149 versus time for the following		
K1.19	Initial reactor startup and ascension to rated power.	1.8*	1.9*
K1.20	Reactor shutdown.	1.7*	1.8*
K1.21	Describe the effects of power changes on samarium concentration.	1.7*	1.8*
K1.22	Compare effects of Samarium-149 on reactor operation with those of Xenon-135.	1.8*	1.8*

#### **REACTOR THEORY: 192007 Fuel Depletion and Burnable Poisons**

			<b>IMPORTANCE</b>	
K/A NO.	KNOWLEDGE	RO	SRO	
K1.01	Define burnable poison and state its use in the reactor.	2.1	2.5	
K1.02	Describe and explain distribution of burnable poisons in the core.	2.0*	2.2	
K1.03	Given a curve of K-effective versus core age, state the reasons for maximum, minimum, and inflection points.	1.7*	2.1	
K1.04	Describe how and why boron concentration changes over core life.	3.1	3.4	
K1.05	Describe the effects of boration/dilution on reactivity during forced-flow and natural circulation conditions.	3.0	3.2	

## **REACTOR THEORY: 192008 Reactor Operational Physics**

K/A NO.	KNOWLEDGE	IMPORTA RO	NCE SRO
K1.01	List parameters which should be monitored and controlled during the approach to criticality.	3.4	3.5
K1.02	$\dagger List$ reactivity control mechanisms which exist for plant conditions during the approach to criticality.	2.8	3.1
K1.03	Describe count rate and instrument response which should be observed for rod withdrawal during the approach to criticality.	3.9	4.0
K1.04	Relate the concept of subcritical multiplication to predicted count rate response for control rod withdrawal during the approach to critical.	3.8	3.8
K1.05	Explain characteristics to be observed when the reactor is very close to criticality.	3.8	3.9
K1.06	Calculate ECP using a 1/M plot.	2.9	3.1
K1.07	Calculate ECP using procedures and given plant procedures.	3.5	3.6
K1.08	List parameters which should be monitored and controlled upon reaching criticality.	3.5	3.7
K1.09	Define criticality as related to a reactor startup.	3.2	3.3
K1.10	Describe reactor power response once criticality is reached.	3.3	3.4
K1.11	Describe how to determine if a reactor is critical.	3.8	3.8
K1.12	List parameters which should be monitored and controlled during the intermediate phase of startup (from criticality to PCAH).	3.5	3.6
K1.13	Discuss the concept of the point of adding heat (POAH) and its impact on reactor power.	3.4	3.6
K1.14	Describe reactor power response prior to reaching the POAH.	3.1	3.1
K1.15	Explain characteristics to look for when the POAH is reached.	3.4	3.4
K1.16	Describe monitoring and control of reactor power and primary temperature during $0\%$ to $15\%~(B~\&~W).$	3.2	3.3

## **REACTOR THEORY: 192008 Reactor Operational Physics**

		IMPORTANCE	
K/A NO.	KNOWLEDGE	RO	SRO
K1.17	Describe reactor power response after reaching the point of adding heat.	3.3	3.4
K1.18	Describe the monitoring and control of T-ave, T-ref, and power during power operation.	3.6	3.5
K1.19	Describe means by which reactor power will be increased to rated power.	3.5	3.6
K1.20	Explain the effects of control rod motion or boration/dilution on reactor power.	3.8	3.9
K1.21	Explain the relationship between steam flow and reactor power given specific conditions.	3.6	3.8
K1.22	Explain how boron concentration affects core life.	2.6 ?	3.8?
K1.23	Explain the shape of a curve of reactor power versus time after a scram.	2.9	3.1
K1.24	Explain reactor power response to a control rod insertion.	3.5	3.6
K1.25	Explain the necessity for inserting control rods in a predetermined sequence during normal shutdown.	2.9	3.1
K1.26	Define decay heat.	3.1	3.2
K1.27	Explain the relationship between decay heat generation and: a) power level history, b) power production, and c) time since reactor shutdown.	3.1	3.4

# THERMODYNAMICS THEORY (CFR 41.14)

#### **THERMODYNAMICS: 193001 Thermodynamic Units and Properties**

		IMPORTA	NCE
K/A NO.	KNOWLEDGE	RO	SRO
K1.01	Convert between absolute and gauge pressure and vacuum scales.	2.5	2.7
K1.02	Recognize the difference between absolute and relative (Kelvin) temperature scales.	1.9*	2.0*
K1.03	Describe how pressure and level sensing instruments work.	2.6	2.6
K1.04	Explain relationships between work, power, and energy.	2.2	2.3
K1.05	Explain the law of conservation of energy.	2.1*	2.1

#### THERMODYNAMICS: 193003 Steam

K/A NO.	KNOWLEDGE	IMPORTANCE RO SRO	
K1.01	Define energy and work.	1.9*	2.0*
K1.02	Describe effects of pressure and temperature on density or specific volume of a liquid.	2.4	2.5
K1.03	Describe the effects of pressure and temperature on density or specific volume of a gas.	2.3	2.4
	<u>Define</u> the following terms:		
K1.04	Latent heat of vaporization	2.3	2.3
K1.05	Vaporization line	1.9*	1.9*
K1.06	Critical point	1.9*	1.9*
K1.07	Vapor dome	1.8*	1.8*?
K1.08	Saturated liquid	2.8	2.8
K1.09	Wet vapor	2.1*	2.1
K1.10	Saturated vapor	2.3	2.3
K1.11	Vapor pressure	1.7*	1.8*
K1.12	Moisture content	2.8	2.3
K1.13	Quality	2.3	2.3
K1.14	Superheated vapor	2.4	2.5
K1.15	Supersaturated vapor	1.8*	1.9*
K1.16	Subcooled and compressed liquids	2.6	2.7
K1.17	Subcooling	3.0	3.2
K1.18	Specific heat	2.3*	2.3
K1.19	Enthalpy	2.3	2.4
	<u>Identify the following terms on a T-s diagram:</u>		
K1.20	Critical point	1.9*	2.0*
K1.21	Saturated liquid line	2.1*	2.1

#### THERMODYNAMICS: 193003 Steam

		<b>IMPORTANCE</b>	
K/A NO.	KNOWLEDGE	RO	SRO
K1.22	Saturated vapor line	2.0	2.1
K1.23	Solid, liquid, gas, vapor, and fluid regions	1.9*	1.9*
K1.24	Explain the usefulness of steam tables to the Control Room operator.	2.8	3.1
K1.25	Explain and use saturated and superheated steam tables.	3.3	3.4
K1.26	Apply specific heat in solving heat transfer problems.	1.9*	2.0*

#### **THERMODYNAMICS: 193004 Thermodynamic Processes**

K/A NO.	KNOWLEDGE	IMPORT. RO	ANCE SRO
K1.01	Explain the relationship between real and ideal processes.	1.8*	1.9*
K1.02	Explain the shape of the T-s diagram process line for a typical secondary system.	1.7*	1.9*
	<u>Nozzles</u> :		
K1.03	Describe the functions of nozzles in flow restrictors.	1.9*	1.9*
K1.04	Describe the functions of nozzles in air ejectors.	2.0	2.0
	<u>Turbines</u>		
K1.05	Explain the function of nozzles fixed blading and moving blading in the turbine.	1.6*	1.7*
K1.06	Explain the reason turbines are multistages.	1.5*	1.7*
K1.07	Define turbine efficiency.	1.6*	1.6*
K1.08	Explain the difference between real and ideal turbine efficiency.	1.6*	1.7*
	Pumps:		
K1.09	Define pump efficiency.	1.3*	1.3*
K1.10	Explain the difference between ideal and real pumping processes.	1.3	1.3*
	<u>Condensers</u>		
K1.11	Describe the process of condensate depression and its effect on plant operation.	2.4	2.5
K1.12	Explain vacuum formation in condenser processes.	2.2	2.3
K1.13	Explain, the condensing process.	2.2	2.3
	Throttling and the throttling Process		
K1.14	Explain the reduction of process pressure from throttling.	2.1	2.3
K1.15	Determine the exit conditions for a throttling process based on the use of steam and/or water	2.8	2.8

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## THERMODYNAMICS: 193005 Thermodynamic Cycles

K/A NO.	KNOWLEDGE	IMPOR' RO	FANCE SRO
K1.01	Define thermodynamic cycle.	1.6*	1.7*
K1.02	Define thermodynamic cycle efficiency in terms of net work produced and energy applied.	1.6*	1.8*
K1.03	Describe how changes in secondary system parameter affect thermodynamic efficiency.	2.5	2.6
K1.04	Describe the moisture effects on turbine integrity and efficiency.	2.1	2.3
K1.05	State the advantages of moisture separators/repeaters and feedwater heaters for a typical steam cycle.	1.9	1.9

## THERMODYNAMICS: 193006 Fluid Statics and Dynamics

		IMPOR'	<b>TANCE</b>
K/A NO.	KNOWLEDGE	RO	SRO
K1.01	Distinguish between static pressure, dynamic pressure, and total pressure.	2.2	2.3
K1.02	Define head loss.	2.3	1.4
K1.03	Discuss operational considerations of viscosity as related to head loss.	1.7*	1.8*
K1.04	Explain operational implications of water hammer.	3.4	3.6
	<u>Define or explain the following terms and concepts:</u>		
K1.05	Mass flow rate	2.9	3.0
K1.06	Two-phase flow	2.8	2.9
K1.07	Pressure spike	2.7	2.7
K1.08	Gas binding	2.8	1.8
K1.09	Recirculation ratio	1.9*	1.9*
K1.10	Water hammer	3.3	3.4
K1.11	Cavitation	3.1	3.3
K1.12	Explain why flow measurements must be corrected for density changes.	2.5	2.6
K1.13	Explain the relationship between pressure head and velocity head in a fluid system.	2.2	2.3
K1.14	Discuss the velocity profiles for laminar flow and turbulent flow.	1.8*	1.9*
K1.15	Describe the methods of controlling system flow rates.	3.1	3.3

#### **THERMODYNAMICS: 193007 Heat Transfer**

			IMPORTANCE	
K/A NO.	KNOWLEDGE	RO	SRO	
	Heat Transfer			
K1.01	Describe three mechanisms of heat transfer.	2.5	2.5	
K1.02	Define thermal conductivity.	2.0	2.2	
K1.03	Explain the manner in which fluid films affect heat transfer.	2.2	2.4	
K1.04	Describe how the presence of gases or steam can affect heat transfer and fluid flow in heat exchangers.	2.8	3.0	
	Core Thermal Power			
K1.05	Define core thermal power.	2.7	2.9	
K1.06	Explain methods of calculating core thermal power.	3.1	3.3	
K1.07	Define percent reactor power.	2.7	2.8	
K1.08	Calculate core thermal power using a simplified heat balance.	3.1	3.4	

#### THERMODYNAMICS: 193008 Thermal Hydraulics

K/A NO.	KNOWLEDGE	IMPORT RO	SRO
	<u>Departure from Nucleate Boiling</u>		
K1.01	K1.01 Distinguish between boiling processes and other heat transfer mechanisms.		3.0
K1.02	Describe means by which boiling affects convection heat transfer.	2.8	3.0
K1.03	Describe the processes of nucleate boiling, subcooled nucleate boiling, and bulk boiling.	2.8	3.1
K1.04	Describe DNB (departure from nucleate boiling).	3.1	3.3
K1.05	List the parameters that affect DNR and DNBR and describe their effect(s). $ \\$	3.4	3.6
K1.06	Describe CHF (critical heat flux).	2.8	2.9
K1.07	Describe transition (partial film) boiling.	2.6	2.6
K1.08	Describe film boiling.	2.6	2.6
K1.09	Describe burnout and burnout heat flux.	2.3	2.4
K1.10	K1.10 Define DNBR.		3.1
	Two Phase Flow		
K1.11	Classify slug flow region along a fuel pin, experiencing two phase flow.	1.9*	2.1*
K1.12	Describe annular flow region along a hypothetical fuel pin, experiencing two phase flow.	1.8*	1.9*
K1.13	Describe dryout region or mist flow region along a hypothetical fuel pin, experiencing two phase flow.	1.9*	2.1*
K1.14	Describe effects of flowrate and phase change on the heat transfer coefficient.	2.6	2.7
K1.15	Define and describe subcooling margin (SCM).	3.6	3.8
K1.16	Draw the temperature profile from the centerline of a fuel pellet to the centerline of the flow channel.	2.4	2.6
K1.17	Explain the necessity of determining core coolant flow.	2.9	3.2

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## THERMODYNAMICS: 193008 Thermal Hydraulics

		<b>IMPORT</b>	<b>TANCE</b>
K/A NO.	KNOWLEDGE	RO	SRO
K1.18	Describe the factors affecting single- and two-phase flow resistance.	2.3	2.5
K1.19	Describe core bypass flow.	2.5	2.8
K1.20	Explain the need for adequate core bypass flow.	2.9	2.9
	Natural Circulation		
K1.21	Explain the conditions which Must exist to establish natural circulation.	3.9	4.2*
K1.22	Describe means to determine if natural circulation flow exists.	4.2*	4.2*
K1.23	Describe means by which natural circulation can be enhanced.	3.9	4.1
K1.24	$\dagger \textbf{D} \textbf{e} \textbf{s} \textbf{c} \textbf{r} \textbf{i} \textbf{b} \textbf{o} \textbf{i} \textbf{l} \textbf{i} \textbf{g} \textbf{o} \textbf{o} \textbf{d} \textbf{e} \textbf{s} \textbf{e} \textbf{r} \textbf{o} \textbf{c} \textbf{e} \textbf{s} \textbf{s} \textbf{o} \textbf{f} \textbf{e} \textbf{e} \textbf{o} \textbf{e} \textbf{s} \textbf{e} \textbf{e} \textbf{e} \textbf{e} \textbf{e} \textbf{e} \textbf{e} e$	2.7	3.1
K1.25	†Describe how gas binding affects natural circulation.	3.3	3.4
	Sketch the axial temperature and enthalpy profiles for a typical-reactor coolant channel and describe how they are affected by the following:		
K1.26	Onset of nucleate boiling	2.2*	2.4
K1.27	Axial core flux	2.2*	2.4
K1.28	Inlet temperature	2.2*	2.4*
K1.29	Heat generation rate	2.2*	2.4
K1.30	Flow rate in the channel	2.3*	2.4

#### **THERMODYNAMICS: 193009 Core Thermal Limits**

K/A NO.	KNOWLEDGE	IMPORT RO	SRO
K1.01	†Radial peaking factor (RPF)	2.3	2.8
K1.02	†Axial peaking factor (APF)	2.3	2.8
K1.03	†Local peaking factor (LPF)	2.2	2.7
K1.04	†Total peaking factor (TPF)	2.3	2.7
K1.05	†State the reason thermal limits are necessary.	3.1	3.5
K1.06	$\ensuremath{\dagger}\xspace$ Describe the function of the core protection calculator (thermal margin calculator).	2.8	3.7
K1.07	Describe factors that affect peaking and hot channel factors.	2.9	3.3

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#### **THERMODYNAMICS: 193010 Brittle Fracture and Vessel Thermal Stress**

K/A NO.	KNOWLEDGE	IMPOR RO	SRO
K1.01	State the brittle fracture made of failure.	2.8	3.2
K1.02	State the definition of Nil-Ductility Transition Temperature.	2.4	2.5
K1.03	Define reference temperature.	2.0	2.4
K1.04	State how the possibility of brittle fracture is minimized by operating limitations.	3.3	3.7
K1.05	State the effect of fast neutron irradiation on reactor vessel metals.	2.9	3.0
K1.06	Define pressurized thermal shock (PTS)	3.6	3.8
K1.07	State the operational concerns of uncontrolled cooldown.	3.8	4.1*

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