Prepared Statement of
t he Federal Trade Commission
on
The Fair Credit
Reporting Act
Before the
Senate Committee on Banking, Housing,
and Urban Affairs
Washington, D.C.
July 10, 2003
Mister Chairman and members of the Committee,
my name is Timothy J. Muris, and I am Chairman of the Federal
Trade Commission ("Commission" or "FTC"). I am pleased to
present the Commission's views on amending the Fair Credit
Reporting Act ("FCRA").(1)
The Commission endorses the FCRA amendments and other statutory
changes proposed by the Treasury Department on June 30, 2003,
including permanent renewal of the uniform national standards
in Section 624 of the FCRA.
The national consumer reporting framework
the FCRA established has played a central role in the expansion
of consumer credit, which in turn has contributed so much
to the nation's economy. Making the uniform national standards
permanent would help ensure the continued effectiveness of
our national consumer reporting system.(2)
At the same time, it is critical that our
credit system protect the rights of consumers in the privacy,
security, and accuracy of their financial information. More
types of businesses are using consumer reports than ever before.
The Commission supports the legislative amendments proposed
by the Treasury Department, which provide important protections
for consumers. The proposals include:
- provisions aimed at helping consumers prevent, detect,
and mitigate the harms that result from identity theft;(3)
- free annual access to consumer reports and better information
about credit scores for consumers; and
- enhanced rights to adverse action notices that better
comport with modern credit practices.
The Commission recommends two additional FCRA amendments:
(1) a modest strengthening of the duties of information furnishers
and (2) changes to the obligations of employers when investigating
employees.
I. Economic Growth,
Consumer Reporting, and the FCRA(4)
The enactment of the FCRA in 1970, and
its amendment in 1996, have fostered the development of our
modern credit system. Consumer spending accounts for over
two-thirds of U.S. gross domestic product, and the wide availability
of affordable credit drives this spending.(5)
In 2001, 75 percent of U.S. households participated in the
consumer and mortgage credit markets.(6)
Well-functioning credit markets are an essential component
of economic prosperity.
The modernization of consumer reporting
has played a key role in providing U.S. consumers with rapid
access to consumer credit. Federal Reserve Chairman
Alan Greenspan noted the benefits of this system to both consumers
and lenders in his April testimony to the House Financial
Services Committee.(7)
The development of a national consumer reporting system, with
its sophisticated risk models and automated underwriting,
has contributed greatly to making credit more widely, inexpensively,
and rapidly available.(8)
The national system also has narrowed the gap in credit availability
between high and low income consumers.(9)
The information in the consumer reporting
system is derived from creditors, insurers, and others (also
called "furnishers") that voluntarily report account histories
to consumer reporting agencies ("CRAs").(10)
The flow of information between furnishers, CRAs, and consumer
report users, as governed by the FCRA, facilitates more expeditious
and accurate credit decisions.(11)
II. Proposed Legislative
Action
The Commission supports the Treasury Department's
proposals for amending the FCRA. We believe these proposals
would (1) ensure the continuing viability of the FCRA's uniform
national framework that has been a cornerstone of our consumer
credit-driven economy, and (2) improve the FCRA to the benefit
of consumers, especially in preventing and mitigating the
ravages of identity theft and other fraud. We also support
the related initiatives to combat identity theft, and recommend
two further legislative refinements to the FCRA.
A. Making the FCRA's uniform
national standards permanent
The FCRA currently provides uniform standards
and preempts state laws with respect to (1) the prescreening
of consumer reports, (2) the time within which CRAs must investigate
consumer disputes, (3) the adverse action duties of users
of consumer reports, (4) the duties of furnishers, (5) the
age of information allowed in consumer reports, (6) the exchange
of information among affiliated companies, and (7) certain
consumer disclosures. The impact of removing the uniform national
standards might not be the same for each standard, and of
course would depend on what actions individual states decided
to take. Nonetheless, the entire package of national standards
mandated by Congress in 1996 has proven effective. Accordingly,
the Commission recommends that all of the standards be made
permanent.
Because information reporting is voluntary,
the entire system depends on cooperation. The 1996 amendments
established a balance - imposing important responsibilities
on furnishers with respect to the information they provide,
but not making those duties so onerous that furnishers report
more selectively or stop entirely. Allowing the uniform national
standards to expire would risk upsetting this balance.
The Commission believes that the national
character of our credit markets is a powerful argument for
retaining the uniform standards. The current system functions
well, and we believe there is no compelling justification
for fundamental changes. The FCRA forms the baseline of consumer
protections that the marketplace has now incorporated into
its thinking and behavior.
This is not to say that the FCRA is perfect;
in the Commission's view, the amendments discussed in this
testimony would improve the Act. The Commission believes,
however, that both businesses and consumers would best benefit
from improvements made at the national level. Indeed, the
Commission has a number of recommendations to strengthen the
expiring national standards. We propose, among other things,
improving the prescreening process to enhance opt-out rights,
streamlining the investigation duties of CRAs that resell
consumer reports, expanding consumers' rights to adverse action
notices, requiring furnishers to reinvestigate disputes received
directly from consumers, and improving consumer disclosures
with respect to credit scoring.
To the extent that states are allowed to
promulgate different standards than those in the FCRA, the
resulting inconsistency could undermine the value of predictive
models without a countervailing consumer benefit. For example,
one result might be a reduction in the information available
to the consumer reporting system. A robust credit information
database is critical to creditors offering credit as broadly
as possible at the lowest cost.(12)
In general, the credit markets are best positioned to determine
the type and quantity of information needed to make credit
decisions.
Moreover, if states could pass differing
laws that imposed additional duties on furnishers, who now
provide information voluntarily, fewer furnishers might report
or they might report less information, thereby degrading the
quality of the data upon which decisions are made. Similarly,
if states were free to shorten reinvestigation time limits,
furnishers might determine that their reinvestigation duties
were too onerous and simply exit the system. By the same token,
state enactment of shorter data obsolescence periods, governing
how long negative information can continue to be reported,
would necessarily reduce the amount of data in consumer reports.
The result would be to restrict creditors' ability to consider
information that may be predictive of risk.(13)
Preliminary research indicates
that allowing the national standards to expire could have
deleterious effects for consumers. One study measures the
impact of different scenarios of possible state regulation
on credit score modeling and, ultimately, on the cost and
availability of credit. The results suggest that the hypothesized
changes in FCRA standards would alter most consumers' credit
scores and lower the predictive power of scoring models, leading
to increased delinquency rates or (to maintain current delinquency
rates) restricted availability of credit.(14)
B. Improving the FCRA -
the Treasury Department's proposals
In conjunction with making permanent the
uniform national standards, the Commission supports the following
proposals to amend the FCRA, which would provide important
protections for consumers.
1.
Access to free consumer reports and credit score information
Currently, under the FCRA consumers are
entitled a free consumer report only under limited circumstances.(15)
The Commission supports amending the FCRA so that consumers
have the right to request a free consumer report annually.
In addition, the Commission supports a requirement that
the report be accompanied by information on how credit scores
are derived and what consumers can do to improve them.(16)
These proposals would (a) enhance consumers' ability to
discover and correct errors, thereby improving the accuracy
of the system; (b) educate consumers about the importance
of consumer reports and scores and how to improve them;
and (c) in some cases provide an early alert to identity
theft victims about crimes committed in their names. In
an environment with consumer reports and scores used more
and more frequently in eligibility and pricing decisions
for a myriad of products and services, consumers' knowledge
of their credit records is crucial.
2. National
fraud alert system
The Commission supports standardizing
the means by which consumers who reasonably suspect they
have been or may be victimized by identity theft, or who
are military personnel on active duty away from home, can
place an alert on their credit files. The alert would put
potential creditors on notice that they should proceed with
caution when granting credit in the consumer's name. The
proposal would also codify and standardize the "joint fraud
alert" policy whereby an identity theft victim only needs
to call one national CRA to place a fraud alert and obtain
a free consumer report from all three. The three major CRAs
voluntarily follow these procedures now (except for the
military alert). The Commission supports the codification
of this system in the FCRA.
3. Identity theft account blocking
The Treasury Department's proposal would
require CRAs immediately to cease reporting ("block") allegedly
fraudulent account information on consumer reports when
the consumer submits a police report or similar document,
unless there is reason to believe the report is false. Blocking
would mitigate the harm to consumers' credit record that
can result from identity theft. We understand that the three
major CRAs do this voluntarily now, and recommend that it
be codified in the FCRA.
4. Reinvestigation duties with
respect to resellers
Persons who purchase consumer reports
for resale (also known as "resellers") are covered by the
FCRA as consumer reporting agencies and have all the obligations
of other CRAs, including the duty to reinvestigate information
disputed by consumers. Typically, resellers combine information
from the three major CRAs (also sometimes referred to as
"repositories" in this context) to produce reports for mortgage
lenders. Resellers are an important source of consumer reports,
but the current FCRA dispute obligations of CRAs and furnishers
do not work well when applied to resellers. The Commission
supports amending the FCRA to better address reinvestigation
duties when a reseller is involved. If a consumer disputes
information in the report, the reseller may meet resistance
in getting the creditor who originally furnished the information
to investigate the dispute, because the creditor has no
relationship with the reseller. Yet, if the reseller sends
the dispute to the relevant repository, that repository
currently has no legal obligation to reinvestigate, because
the dispute did not come directly from the consumer.(17)
The Commission supports an amendment that would require
resellers to submit disputes to the originating repository
and the source furnisher to investigate these disputes.
Such an amendment would ensure that the dispute process
functions more efficiently.
5. FTC rulemaking
on adverse action notices
The FCRA requires that when adverse action
is taken against a consumer based even in part on a consumer
report,(18)
the user must notify the consumer of (1) the identity of
the CRA from which the creditor obtained the report; (2)
the right to obtain a free copy of the report; and (3) the
right to dispute the accuracy of information in the report.
Adverse action notices are a critical first step in the
"self help" system for correcting inaccuracies in the consumer
reporting system. Consumers are in the best position to
know whether the data in their consumer reports are accurate.
The adverse action notice informs a consumer that a denial
was based, at least in part, on the report. With the notice,
consumers have specific incentives to correct inaccurate
data.
Currently, the definition of "adverse
action" for credit transactions is imported into the FCRA
from the Equal Credit Opportunity Act ("ECOA").(19)
Under the ECOA definition, there is no adverse action in
many situations when the consumer is offered less favorable
terms, such as a higher interest rate, because of information
in her consumer report. For example, there is no adverse
action when the consumer accepts a "counteroffer" that includes
those less favorable terms. The ECOA definition does not
adequately address modern credit markets, in which consumers
do not necessarily apply for specific credit terms, but
rather for the best terms for which they can qualify. In
turn, creditors offer terms tailored to the consumer's risk
profile, which may often mean a higher price than would
otherwise have been the case but for the consumer's consumer
report. Yet, under current law, consumers who accept this
higher price would not receive an adverse action notice,
and thus would never know about a problem in the consumer
report that caused the higher price. We support the proposal
to grant specific rulemaking authority to the FTC to address
the definition of adverse action in credit transactions
to better reflect the modern credit market.(20)
6. Improving opt-out notices
for pre-screened offers
Prescreened offers provide many benefits
for consumers, and can enhance competition, leading to greater
credit availability, better terms, and lower costs for consumers.(21)
At the same time, the 1996 amendments appropriately gave
consumers the right to opt-out of receiving such offers,
and required that creditors and insurers clearly and conspicuously
disclose this right in the offer itself. The Commission
has observed that these notices in many cases have been
buried in locations difficult to find, and that the language
of the notice is often difficult to understand. The Commission
supports the proposed amendment to the FCRA directing the
Commission and bank regulators to clarify and strengthen
the opt-out notice requirements. A regulatory proceeding
would allow the agencies to provide more specific direction
on this requirement, based on empirical evidence of the
costs and benefits of various disclosure options and their
effectiveness in communicating to consumers.
C. Other Treasury Department
legislative proposals
The Commission also supports the non-FCRA
proposals to prevent identity theft, limit the damage from
that crime, and help victims restore their reputations.
1. Truncation
of credit and debit card receipts
In many instances, identity theft results
from thieves obtaining access to card numbers on
receipts. This source of fraud could be
reduced by requiring merchants to truncate (i.e.,
print less than the full card number on the receipt). The
use of truncation technology is becoming widespread, and
some card issuers already require merchants to truncate.
The Commission supports requiring truncation, but recommends
that the law be phased in over a period of time to allow
for the replacement of existing equipment.
2. Enhanced
criminal penalties for identity theft
One way to deter identity theft is to
make it easier to prosecute. Legislation proposed last year
would have created a new crime of "aggravated identity theft,"
with stiff penalties and streamlined proof provisions. The
Commission continues to support that proposal.(22)
3. "Red flag"
indicators of identity theft
The Treasury Department's proposal would
direct banking regulators to identify and maintain a list
of "red flag" indicators of identity theft and provide the
list to financial institutions they regulate. Banking regulators
also would be required to examine the institutions for use
of red flag indicators, with authority to assess fines when
an institution's failure to use the indicators causes losses
to customers. The goal of this proposal is to give financial
institutions up-to-date information on identity theft patterns
and practices and to encourage them to take action to prevent
this crime. The proposal seeks to achieve this goal through
the bank examination process, in which the regulators and
the regulated entities can share information.(23)
The Commission supports this proposal.
4. Information sharing by debt
collectors and creditors with identity theft victims
Some identity theft victims have complained
that debt collectors and creditors refuse to tell them about
accounts opened in their names. The Treasury Department's
proposal would authorize debt collectors and creditors to
share with a victim the information they have on allegedly
fraudulent accounts in the victim's name. This information
may help victims clear their names.(24)
5. Keeping fraudulent debt from
being transferred or reported
The Treasury Department proposes legislation
requiring a debt collector to notify the creditor when it
learns that an account it is collecting is fraudulent. In
turn, a creditor, once it learns that an identity theft
caused a debt, would be prohibited from selling or transferring
the debt for collection, and from reintroducing the fraudulent
information into a consumer report. Some identity theft
victims complain that bad data reappear on their consumer
reports long after they have had them removed, and it appears
that creditors may be partly responsible - they may sell
debts or place them for collection, even after they should
know they are fraudulent.
D. Improving the FCRA - the
Commission's additional proposals
1. Duty of furnishers to respond
to disputes directed to them
Under Section 623(b) of the FCRA, furnishers
have a duty to investigate only disputes that are sent to
them from a CRA.(25)
Unfortunately, many consumers who learn about errors in
their report may contact the furnisher directly, and may
not know that they must notify the CRA to trigger the furnisher's
obligation to investigate. The result may be confusion and
delay in resolving disputes. The Commission recommends that
the FCRA be amended to provide that disputes raised with
furnishers receive the same treatment as disputes filed
with a CRA.
2. Clarification of the application
of the FCRA to investigations of employee misconduct
The Commission continues to recommend
that Congress amend the FCRA to clarify the duties of employers
with respect to third party investigations of employees.(26)
Since its inception, the FCRA has applied to the collection
and use of certain information for employment purposes,
including for workplace misconduct investigations. The 1996
amendments specified that an employer cannot (1) obtain
an employee's consumer report for employment purposes without
written authorization from the employee; or (2) take adverse
action based on the report without giving a copy of the
report to the consumer with a description of the employee's
FCRA rights, e.g., to dispute errors.
These requirements have been criticized
by employers and those who perform investigations on employers'
behalf as chilling their ability to investigate wrongdoing.
The Commission shares the concern that the FCRA not unduly
hinder workplace investigations, and endorses prudent amendments
to remove those procedural requirements that unnecessarily
hamper such investigations.(27)
The Commission believes, however, that Congress should retain
the other important privacy and procedural rights the FCRA
provides when third parties conduct workplace investigations
of individuals who have been accused of misconduct.(28)
III. Conclusion
In 1970, Congress recognized
that "consumer reporting agencies have assumed a vital role
in assembling and evaluating consumer credit and other information
on consumers."(29)
While Congress in 1970 may not have envisioned the specific
ways in which consumer report information would facilitate
the development of products and services that ultimately benefit
the American consumer, the thirty-three years since passage
of the Act have fully demonstrated the wisdom of Congress
in enacting the FCRA. The 1996 amendments improved the FCRA's
carefully balanced framework, making possible the benefits
that result from the free, fair, and accurate flow of consumer
data. The consumer reporting industry, furnishers, and users
can all rely on the uniform framework of the FCRA in what
has become a complex, nationwide business of making consumer
credit available to a diverse, mobile American public.
The Federal Trade Commission supports making
permanent the uniform standards of Section 624 to ensure the
continuation of these critical national standards. At the
same time, we urge the Congress to improve the FCRA and provide
other consumer protections as outlined above. The Commission
looks forward to working with the Committee on these proposals.
1.
The written statement represents the views of the Federal
Trade Commission. My oral presentation and responses are my
own and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Commission
or of any other Commissioner.
2.
It is important to keep in mind that, notwithstanding
its title, the Fair Credit Reporting Act has always covered
more than what are conventionally termed "credit reports."
It applies generally to any information collected and used
for the purpose of evaluating consumers' eligibility for products
and services that they want. Thus, the FCRA has always applied
to insurance, employment, and other non-credit consumer transactions.
See FCRA § 602(b) ("It is the purpose of this title
to require that consumer reporting agencies adopt reasonable
procedures for meeting the needs of commerce for consumer
credit, personnel, insurance, and other information . . .
."). The focus here will be on credit reporting, but the same
basic regulatory structure applies to all consumer reports.
Throughout this testimony, we will refer to "consumer reports"
rather than "credit reports," although the terms are used
interchangeably and either usage is correct.
3.
Identity theft occurs when someone commits fraud or other
unlawful activity by using another person's identifying information,
such as date of birth, social security number, or credit account
numbers. The fraud could include applying for or using credit
in another's name, obtaining bank loans, employment, or utility
services (including cell phones), or similar illegal conduct
using the identity of the consumer whose information was misappropriated.
4.
For a more extended discussion and detailed history on
these related topics, please see the Commission's May 20,
2003 testimony before this Committee at http://www.senate.gov/
%7Ebanking/03_05hrg/051503/beales.pdf.
5.
In 1946, total outstanding consumer credit stood at $55
billion; by 1970, the time of enactment of the FCRA, it had
grown to $556 billion. [Figures adjusted for inflation.] Today,
it is $7 trillion. See Fred H. Cate, Robert E. Litan,
Michael Staten, and Peter Wallison, "Financial Privacy, Consumer
Prosperity, and the Public Good: Maintaining the Balance,"
AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies, March 2003,
at 1, 8.
6.
Id. at 2.
7.
"So it is clearly in the interests of consumers to have
information continuously flowing into [credit] markets. It
keeps credit available to everybody, including the most marginal
buyers. It keeps interest rates lower than they would otherwise
be because the uncertainties which would be required otherwise
will not be there." Remarks following testimony by Alan Greenspan,
Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, April 30, 2003, House Financial Services Committee,
at ______.
8.
"By most accounts, the consumer credit marketplace in
the United States is the envy of the world. In 30 short years,
balkanized local credit card markets, characterized by high
and largely undifferentiated prices on credit, very subjective
application processes, and limited access, have evolved into
a national consumer credit marketplace distinguished by dynamic
competition among lenders and broad participation by most
American consumers." Information Policy Institute, "The Fair
Credit Reporting Act: Access, Efficiency & Opportunity
- The Economic Importance of Fair Credit Reauthorization"
(June 2003; hereafter, "IPI Report") at page 5. See also
Testimony of Michael A. Turner, Ph.D, President and Senior
Scholar, The Information Policy Institute, before the House
Committee on Financial Services, Subcommittee on Financial
Institutions and Consumer Credit, May 8, 2003 (hereafter,
"Turner testimony").
9.
Preliminary research indicates that advances in risk
modeling sophistication and use have led to increased economic
activity (such as homeownership rates and use of credit) and
especially significant benefits for disadvantaged groups.
For example, from 1970, when the FCRA was passed, to 2001,
the percentage of families in the lowest income quintile with
a credit card increased from 2 percent to 38 percent. IPI
Report, at 5; Turner testimony, at 4. See also, Cate,
"Privacy, Consumer Credit, and the Regulation of Personal
Information," in The Impact of Public Policy on Consumer
Credit, Thomas A. Durkin and Michael E. Staten, eds.
(Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002), at 235-36.
10.
CRAs are also referred to "credit bureaus. Each of the
three national CRAs (often referred to as the "Big 3") receives
more than 2 billion items of information each month. See
"An Overview of Consumer Data and Credit Reporting," Federal
Reserve Bulletin, February 2003, at 49.
11.
CRAs issue between 2 and 3 million consumer reports each
day. See http://www.cdiaonline.org/about.cfm.
12.
IPI Report, at pages 40-53. See also Turner testimony,
at 4: "Full-file credit reporting, made possible by the preemptive
provisions of the FCRA, enables lenders to distinguish different
degrees of risk far better than older, less sophisticated
techniques."
13.
If the states had different obsolescence standards, CRAs
would have to implement different retention and deletion procedures
for consumers in each such state, and when a consumer moved
from one state to another, the file would have to be adjusted.
Given the high degree of transience and consumers with more
than one address (e.g., students or retirees), the
effect of one state's enactment of a more restrictive obsolescence
standard would inevitably affect consumers beyond that state's
borders. While CRAs could adopt the most restrictive obsolescence
standard and apply it nationally for ease of compliance, that
would result in a costly loss of data to lenders nationwide.
Those lenders who operate only in the state with a restrictive
obsolescence standard would lose data necessary to assess
risk accurately - they would not be able to spot the poor
risks as easily, which would increase their credit losses,
requiring them to raise prices for everyone, including the
good risks. Multistate lenders might be able to charge lower
prices, but only by spreading their increased losses to their
customer base in other states, with the net effect that consumers
elsewhere would subsidize the consumers in the state with
the most restrictive obsolescence standard.
14.
IPI Report, at 45-51. The state law changes hypothesized
included changes to the FCRA standards for prescreened offers,
furnisher obligations, and the content of consumer reports.
15.
Currently, free reports are available pursuant to the
FCRA when the consumer suffers adverse action, believes that
fraudulent information may be in his or her credit file, is
unemployed, or is on welfare. See FCRA § 612.
In addition, a small number of states require the CRAs to
provide free annual reports to consumers at their request.
Absent one of these exceptions, consumers must pay a statutory
"reasonable charge" for a file disclosure; this fee is set
each year by the Commission and is currently $9. See FCRA
§ 612(a).
16.
Scores are widely used by creditors and insurers to evaluate
consumers, and are based on analyses of historical consumer
credit data, which allow creditors to develop models that
help them predict the risk of default of a particular consumer.
(The products are thus sometimes referred to as "risk scores"
or "credit scores.") When the consumer applies for credit
or other goods or services, the scoring programs that are
developed from the complex analysis of past data compare the
scoring factors to the individual information of the particular
consumer, with the result reflected in a score that is generated
for that application.
17.
If the consumer is told by the reseller that he must
dispute the information to the source repository, this delays
the dispute process. Time is often of the essence in the case
of a mortgage application
18.
"Adverse action" generally means any action that is adverse
to the interests of the consumer, and can include a denial
of credit, denial of an apartment rental, or denial of a retail
purchase by check. In the insurance context, "adverse action"
means "a denial or cancellation of, an increase in any charge
for, or a reduction or other adverse or unfavorable change
in the terms of coverage or amount of, any insurance." In
the employment context, the term includes "a denial of employment
or any other decision for employment purposes that adversely
affects any current or prospective employee." See
FCRA § 603(k).
19.
The ECOA adverse action definition is not
imported into the FCRA with respect to insurance or other
noncredit transactions.
20.
Currently, the Commission has no rulemaking authority
with respect to the FCRA.
21.
IPI Report, at 54-59.
22.
Testimony of Howard Beales Before the Technology, Terrorism,
and Government Information Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary
Committee, July 9, 2002, at http://www.ftc.gov/
os/2002/07/bealesidthefttestimony.htm.
23.
Attention to identity theft "red flags" would seem readily
amenable to the bank examination process. Any exam requirements
should remain flexible to respond to unforeseen circumstances
and changes in the pattern of identity theft.
24.
Identity theft victims tell us that it is often helpful
to obtain application information on fraudulent accounts as
a part of their own investigation into the circumstances of
the theft. For example, they might recognize the handwriting
on the application or be able to prove that it is not their
own.
25.
In practice, furnishers sometimes investigate disputes
received directly from consumers because they are required
in some circumstances not to report, and to correct, inaccurate
information. See FCRA §§ 623 (a)(1) and (2).
But furnishers have no affirmative obligation to investigate
these disputes. Thus, if a consumer contacts the creditor
only by telephone to dispute, and the creditor previously
supplied to the consumer an address to submit disputes, it
is not liable under FCRA Section 623(a)(1) for continuing
to report this information, even if it is inaccurate.
26.
The Commission testified to this effect before Congress
in 2000. See Testimony of Debra Valentine Before
the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions
of the House Banking and Financial Services Committee, May
4, 2000, at http://www.ftc.gov/os
/2000/05/fcratestimony.htm. The interaction of the
FCRA and third-party investigations of workplace misconduct
is complex. To understand fully the context and implications
of proposed changes to the FCRA, we urge careful consideration
of the issues and legal analysis, which were summarized in
the Commission's earlier testimony. The Commission would appreciate
the opportunity to work with this Committee and others in
Congress to craft an appropriate resolution of this issue.
27.
In its 2000 testimony, the Commission recommended that
Congress amend the FCRA to remove the requirements that employers
(1) obtain the consent of an employee under investigation
before requesting the employee's consumer report, (2) give
the employee a copy of the consumer report before taking adverse
action based on the report, and (3) notify the employee that
an investigative consumer report is being prepared. The Commission
also recommended that the FCRA be amended to provide that
a CRA that prepares an investigative consumer report on an
employee suspected of misconduct need only provide the employee
with a summary of the "nature and substance" of the report,
rather than a full disclosure of all information
in the employee's file.
28.
These provisions include the obsolescence provisions of
Section 605; the reasonable procedures requirements of Sections
606 and 607; the Section 613 requirement regarding accuracy
of public record information; and the adverse action notice
requirements of Section 615.
29.
Section 602(a)(3) of the FCRA.
|