



Panel 1 – How SSNs are Used to Commit ID Theft: Synthetic Identity Theft

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Security in Numbers: SSNs and ID Theft Workshop, Dec.
10-11, 2007

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TRUST

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Hypothesis

- Over-reliance on SSN is driving fraud:
 - Some credit grantors authenticate applicants relying upon SSN and DOB primarily (or alone), therefore,
 - “Synthetic” identity theft is possible: an impostor uses a fake name and address, combined with a real individual’s SSN and DOB
 - Also is possible to use fake SSN with corresponding DOB

“Making purchases on credit using your own name and someone else's Social Security number may sound difficult...But investigators say it is happening with alarming frequency because businesses granting credit do little to ensure names and Social Security numbers match and credit bureaus allow perpetrators to establish credit files using other people's Social Security numbers.”

–Lesley Mitchell, New wrinkle in ID theft; Thieves pair your SS number with their name, buy with credit, never get caught; Social Security numbers a new tool for thieves, The Salt Lake Tribune, June 6, 2004, at E1

Impostors Know SSN-DOB Link



http://www.ssa.gov/em
SSA http://www.ssa.gov/employer/highgroup.txt

HIGHEST GROUP ISSUED AS OF 11/01/07

Anything with an asterisk (*) is a change effective 11/01/07.
This list shows the SSN area and group numbers that are in
the process of being issued as of the date at the top of this page.

NOTE: INDICATES GROUP CHANGE SINCE LAST MONTH.

001 06	002 06*	003 04	004 08	005 08	006 08
007 06	008 90	009 90	010 90	011 90	012 90
013 90	014 90	015 90	016 90	017 90	018 90
019 90	020 90	021 90	022 90	023 90	024 90
025 90	026 90	027 90	028 90	029 90*	030 90*
031 88	032 88	033 88	034 88	035 72	036 72
037 72	038 72	039 70	040 11	041 11	042 11
043 11	044 11	045 11	046 11	047 11	048 11
049 11*	050 96	051 96	052 96	053 96	054 96
055 96	056 96	057 96	058 96	059 96	060 96
061 96	062 96	063 96	064 96	065 96	066 96
067 96	068 96	069 96	070 96	071 96	072 96
073 96	074 96	075 96	076 96	077 96	078 96
079 96	080 96	081 96	082 96	083 96	084 96
085 96	086 96	087 96	088 96	089 96	090 96
091 96	092 96	093 96	094 96	095 96	096 96
097 96	098 96	099 96	100 96	101 96	102 96
103 96	104 96	105 96	106 96	107 96	108 96
109 96	110 96	111 96	112 96	113 96	114 96

US v. Rose (D. Ariz. 2006)


Count	Date (on or about)	False Name	Amount of money obtained from use	Credit card #
1	05/02/2002	Hanna Curin (SSN 7483 assigned to Haqqani Saifullah)	\$3,481.00	Fleet #0519
2	05/02/2002	Danni Curin (SSN 1969 assigned to Polly Hatch)	\$4,981.00	HHB #5179
3	05/02/2002	Adam Gregory (Las Vegas) (SSN 9855 assigned to Mary Harry)	\$4,983.00	HHB #0141
4	05/24/2002	A.J. Rose (Seattle) (SSN 4487, assigned to Mehdi Sonboli)	\$3,486.00	Fleet #3988
5	05/28/2002	Jamei Enrico (SSN 3707 assigned to Manuel Hernandez)	\$2,984.00	Nova #4595

- 250 credit cards issued; fake name, fake address, real SSN.

See Indictment *passim*, United States v. Rose, No. CR06-0787PHX (D. Ariz. Aug. 22, 2006)

Synthetic May Be Costly

Figure 3: Volume and Loss Distribution of True-Name Identity Theft vs. Synthetic Identity Fraud



Source: ID Analytics

Source: Id Analytics, National Fraud Ring Analysis, February 2005



Panel 6 - Recommendations

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Bad Matching Pervasive



- I MBNA telemarketer approves application with false address, phone #, relative.
 - 21 yo student applicant earning \$55k annually
 - MBNA: "Nothing was verified."
- I Other cases
 - Vazquez: Matching SSN, incorrect DOB, address 1000s of miles away from the victim.
 - Aylward: Bank issued 2 credit cards based on matching name and SSN but wrong address.
 - Dimezza: Matching SSN but incorrect address.

"Recommendations," Hoofnagle

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Wolfe v. MBNA, 485 F. Supp. 2d 874 (WD. Tenn. 2007)(Plaintiff's Response in Opposition to Defendant MBNA's Motion to Dismiss Fourth Amendment Complaint)

Others, respectively:

Vazquez-Garcia v. Trans Union De P.R., Inc.

Aylward v. Fleet Bank

Dimezza v. First USA Bank, Inc.

Solutions: Credit Grantors

- In best position to avoid theft, because they issue accounts
- Match more than SSN
 - In many cases, just matching geography would help.
- Red flag guidelines should help
 - But SSN + wrong name ≠ specific red flag

Solutions: Consumers

- Legal approaches
 - Negligence suits
 - Red flag rules
- Self help
 - Move from credit monitoring to identity scoring

Solutions: CRAs

- Must address “no hit” mess
- Check for same info spanning multiple consumers’ files
- Must address partial matching of identities
- Disclosures to consumers should contain all data associated with consumers’ SSNs
- “Add on” products should be in standard granting suite
- Embrace 1 to 1 relationship w/ consumers
 - See Solove, *Identity Theft, Privacy, and the Architecture of Vulnerability*, 54 *Hastings L.J.* 1227 (April 2003)

“Recommendations,” Hoofnagle

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“The FTC has estimated that the no-hit phenomenon has created “tens of millions” more files in the credit bureaus’ databases than there are actual consumers. It has said the bureaus don’t routinely investigate these files, pointing to cost as a factor.

[...]

The credit bureaus say they view the automatic creation of such files as a legal requirement. TransUnion says it deletes files containing nothing besides an initial inquiry “within a set period of time,” which it won’t specify.

[...]

Regulators are torn over what, if anything, to do about the problem.

Tweaking the system too far in the direction security could slow down credit granting and economic activity. But today’s looser approach continues to invite fraud.”

–Christopher Conkey, *The Borrower Who Never Was, Synthetic-Identity Fraud Hits Credit Bureaus, Banks; A Night at the Ritz-Carlton*, *The Wall Street Journal*, Oct. 29, 2007 at B1.

Solutions: FTC

- Bring actions against companies that use SSN as authenticator
- Promote competition among CRAs; technology can bring a 1 to 1 relationship b/t CRAs and consumers
- Bring actions against credit lenders who ignore fraud alerts
- Add new red flags for name, other PII mismatches