



Saving Lives and Property Through Improved Interoperability

***LI NYC Emergency Management
Conference—Lessons Learned From The
World Trade Center Attack***

Final

June 2002

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On May 20–22, 2002, a conference, entitled “LI NYC Emergency Management,” was held at the Sheraton New York in New York City, New York. The 3-day conference consisted of a variety of sessions focusing on the events of September 11, 2001, in New York City and exhibits of concern by emergency management and public safety professionals. The key findings and recommendations resulting from the conference included—

- The Fire Department of New York encountered substantial difficulties with its land mobile radio system during the initial response efforts.
- After the collapse of the World Trade Center towers, the lack of in-building wireless communications hindered building evacuation, search and rescue, and damage assessment operations.
- The Federal Emergency Management Agency has three main priorities for improving the preparedness and response of the Nation’s public safety community: better and standardized communications, including interoperability; fully equipped and trained public safety personnel; and improved cross-agency information exchange.
- The Blackberry wireless messaging system remained operational and was used by several public and private entities during the response and recovery operation.
- A common incident management system should be adopted by emergency management organizations to facilitate greater operational effectiveness and wireless communications interoperability.
- The value of ongoing planning and preparedness could not be overstated by several of the presenters from both public and private entities.
- Many of the executives from the local public safety agencies firmly believe that interoperable communications and interoperability remain major needs of the public safety community.
- The State of New York created the Office of Public Security in response to the need for a more comprehensive approach to preventing and responding to terrorism.
- The Office of Homeland Security is actively designing a national homeland security strategy and is placing some level of emphasis on the need for interoperable communications.

1. INTRODUCTION

The ninth annual LI NYC Emergency Management Conference was held on May 20–22, 2002, in New York City, New York. The conference was sponsored by a consortium of local governments in and around the New York City region and was specifically designed to review the events of September 11, 2002, in New York City. In that context, the presenters provided their organization’s perspective on the event and role within the overall response. Approximately 1,100 persons, from approximately 35 states and 7 countries, attended the conference, which was a venue for topical presentations, high-profile speeches, and an exhibition.

The 3-day conference provided numerous sessions, and Public Safety Wireless Network (PSWN) Program support staff attended all of them. Unfortunately, several of the speakers and sessions were cancelled due to scheduling conflicts. None of the sessions focused specifically on wireless communications or interoperability, although those topics were mentioned by several of the presenters either during their presentation or in response to a question from an audience member.

This report consists of concise summaries for each of the sessions attended by the PSWN Program support staff. Specifically, 16 session reports are presented in 3 sections. Each section contains the session reports related to one of the three conference days. Within each section, sessions are described in chronological order.

2. DAY ONE SESSIONS

The following sections provide detailed reports on the sessions related to the first day of the conference—

- New York City and New York State Response—Command and Control of a City in Crisis
- Reestablishment of the New York City Emergency Operations Center
- Ground Zero—The First Responders—In Their Own Words, the Scene Through the Eyes of the First Responders.

2.1 New York City and New York State Response—Command and Control of a City in Crisis

Synopsis

This panel-based session provided an executive-level overview of the public safety response to the September 11, 2001, incident at the World Trade Center (WTC) in New York City. Senior-level representatives from the New York Police Department (NYPD), New York Fire Department (FDNY), New York City Office of Emergency Management (OEM), Port Authority of New York, New Jersey Police Department (PAPD), and the New York State Emergency Management Office (SEMO) all gave high-level overviews of the command and control challenges and lessons learned related to their agencies' responses. The panel discussion was moderated by a network news anchor, who posed particular questions to each of the panelists and then fielded questions from the audience.

Presenter Information

This session was presented in panel format. The panel members were—

- Moderator—David Bloom, Anchor, “NBC Weekend Today”
- Thomas Von Essen, Former New York City Fire Commissioner
- Richard Sheirer, Former Commissioner, OEM
- Allan H. Hoehl, Chief of Patrol Borough Manhattan South, NYPD (Retired)
- Joseph Morris, Chief of Department, PAPD
- Edward F. Jacoby, Jr., Director, SEMO.

Presentation Overview

This session described the command and control complexities of the initial public safety response to the terrorist attacks at the WTC on September 11, 2001. The panelists represented the command level of most of the first responder public safety agencies in New York City. The moderator allowed each panelist a few moments to relate personal observations of the initial response from a command and control perspective. From the panel, it was learned that—

- Within the initial minutes of the response, the scene was so chaotic and the loss of leaders within the FDNY so severe, that it was extremely difficult to get accurate information with which to make decisions.
- Communications between FDNY personnel in the buildings were almost non-existent.
- The 1993 bombing of the WTC probably created false perceptions about the strength of the WTC buildings.
- The OEM was activated immediately. Rescue operations were “normal,” but communications were extremely difficult. The Emergency Operations Center (EOC) was ordered evacuated immediately following the impact of the second plane. Work began immediately to identify a new EOC site for both continuity of government and emergency operations.
- SEMO had a state of emergency declared almost immediately. The statewide fire mutual aid plan was activated along with all other “major event plans.” SEMO personnel had to use satellite telephones to communicate with each other in the New York City area.
- As soon as the event was recognized as an attack, command personnel also recognized the need to stage their personnel. This would limit subsequent mass casualties of public safety personnel in the event of additional “secondary devices or attacks” or other unperceived danger during response.

After the initial statements by the panel members, Mr. Bloom asked each panel member what public safety agencies needed to do differently when responding to a known terrorist event. Several of the panel members responded with similar information. The responses included—

- Slow the operation down and exert tighter control over the response of the public safety personnel. The tendency to rush in and the initial response by off-duty personnel should both be controlled to avoid unnecessary loss of life.
- Anticipate communications issues and plan for them ahead of time. This advice applies to both basic communications channels and the need for interoperability among command staff during initial responses. Do not assume that telephones or radio networks will work.
- Plan for losing your primary EOC. Have backup locations identified ahead of time. Know how you will staff and equip your backup locations should they become necessary.
- Assess what you know and what is possible, and assume secondary attacks after the initial response. Train your people to expect the unexpected at any potential terrorist incident.

Mr. Bloom then asked each panel member to relay one mistake that he made that others could learn from when facing a similar situation. Again, some of the panelists gave similar responses. The responses included—

- Tighter control on both the initial response and agency personnel as they responded from home could have saved lives. Many of the initial responders were ill equipped for the scenario at hand, although their initial instinct was to get to the scene and help.
- Interoperable communications at the command levels could have eased some of the early chaos and limited the inaccurate information that circulated. The deployment of interoperable communications should be carefully thought out, however, to avoid overloading the existing networks. All communications networks must have redundant features that have been tested ahead of time.
- More redundancy in government operations centers is necessary to cope with a major event such as this one. Unexpected resource drains like donation management must also be planned for well in advance.

Mr. Bloom invited members of the audience to ask questions of the panel. The questions and responses are listed below—

Q: How can we use what has been learned to increase the safety of schools?

A: By expanding all school safety and critical incident response plans to include “unforeseeable” terrorism events such as this one.

Q: What are the lessons learned from this incident for the private sector?

A: There is nothing better than preparation; so prepare for the unexpected and take it seriously. Take advantage of the “psychological window” to implement programs, get safety equipment, and sponsor preparation drills.

Q: What have you done to specifically include public works type organizations into your emergency preparedness plans?

A: Both the Port Authority construction division and the New York Department of Transportation were included in all previous planning and had very specific roles in any large-scale emergency response.

Q: Eight months after these events, what do you still need from policy makers?

A: We need more public safety spectrum, a better way to communicate with each other on demand, a communications systems with built- in flexibility, state-of-the-art technology for EOCs, and adequately funded and streamlined equipment and technology procurement processes.

Summary and Analysis

This session provided a thorough overview of the command and control difficulties experienced at the WTC. The themes of communication failures and a lack of interoperability came up repeatedly. It was obvious from the descriptions of the initial response that more effective communications could have alleviated some of the chaos during the initial response and might have limited the loss of life by public safety responders by allowing a tighter control over their response.

2.2 Reestablishment of the New York City Emergency Operations Center

Synopsis

This session reviewed the process of reestablishing the EOC after it was completely destroyed during the WTC attacks on September 11, 2001.

Presenter Information

Henry Jackson is the Deputy Commissioner for Technology in the New York City OEM. It was his responsibility to locate, equip, and staff a new EOC after the original EOC was ordered evacuated immediately following the impact of the second plane at the WTC.

Presentation Overview

This presentation provided information about the process of rebuilding an EOC in New York City immediately following the terrorist attack on the WTC. Mr. Jackson began by providing some background information on the New York City OEM. The office was created in 1996 by former Mayor Giuliani and was organized into six functional areas: response, preparedness, public information, watch command, administration, and technology. The mission of the office is to, “Coordinate multiagency response to citywide emergencies, develop contingency plans, design and conduct preparedness drills, and to activate and staff the emergency operations center.”

Mr. Jackson explained that the New York City EOC had been located in the building at 7 WTC. The EOC was activated immediately following the impact of the first plane at the WTC. As soon as the second plane hit, the EOC was ordered evacuated. Initially, a mobile command post was set up behind 7 WTC, and the first task was to figure out where they should go from there. All initial efforts were focused on staying as close as possible, which led to command posts being established within the Houston Street firehouse, the NYPD Police Academy, and a few other dispersed locations. The EOC was totally and permanently lost when 7 WTC collapsed at 5:30 p.m. on September 11, 2001.

While trying to pull together all of the resources required to set up another EOC, Mr. Jackson and his staff realized that the NYPD Police Academy would not work for the long term. The decision to move again was made, and the search for a location began again. Staff thought that Pier 92, a large open-floor style warehouse that the city had leased for an upcoming emergency preparedness exercise, might work for an EOC.

The Pier 92 building was deemed suitable for several reasons. It had plenty of raw, easily configurable space, plenty of infrastructure potential (i.e., it would be easy to run network cable and electricity throughout the building), it was easily securable, and the pier staff was accustomed to rapid turnaround space configurations. Requirements for the EOC included 300 computer seats and a central command platform, an executive area for the mayor and his staff, an area to serve as an “alternate seat of government,” a joint information center, a press room, geographic information system (GIS) capabilities, a watch command station, food service, and sleeping quarters. To put together the EOC, a team consisting of 150 personnel from local, state, and federal government agencies, utility companies, information technology consultants, private sector companies, and nonprofit organizations was assembled. They worked nonstop and had the new EOC operational 36 hours after the original EOC was evacuated.

The EOC housed more than 100 different government and private sector agencies, had more than 300 computer positions, a Nortel phone switch, 12 copy machines, 100 fax lines, a data center and software application development center, GIS plotting operations, an identification card production center, full audio/visual capabilities, a weather monitoring station, a radio communications and distribution center, and fully employed both cable and wireless network solutions.

In closing, Mr. Jackson outlined several lessons learned from his experience of reestablishing an EOC to handle an incident of this magnitude. They included identifying backup locations in advance and having emergency vendor and/or supplier agreements in place in advance for specific materials and equipment required in the case of a total loss of the primary EOC. He also observed that teamwork made his effort possible and that planning was everything.

Summary and Analysis

The September 11 terrorist attack at the WTC first necessitated the evacuation of New York City’s only EOC and then destroyed it. The need for a new EOC was both immediate and substantial. Together, a team of more than 150 individuals from government, nonprofit, and private sector organizations built a fully functional EOC in 36 hours. The most important lesson learned from the experience was to plan for the possibility that the primary EOC could be destroyed.

2.3 Ground Zero—The First Responders—In Their Own Words, the Scene Through the Eyes of the First Responders

Synopsis

This session described the initial response to the WTC from the perspectives of the NYPD, FDNY, and the PAPD. Each agency gave a presentation and then the moderator asked questions of several of the panelists.

Presenter Information

This session was presented in panel format. The panel members were—

- Moderator—John Schiumo, NY 1 News
- Lieutenant John McArdle, Emergency Services Unit (ESU), NYPD
- Walter M. Kowalczyk, EMT-P, FDNY
- John Peruggia, EMT-P, FDNY
- Battalion Chief Joseph Pfeifer, FDNY
- Lieutenant Mark Winslow, PAPD
- Lieutenant John Messina, Citywide Interagency Coordinator, New York City OEM.

Presentation Overview

This session provided presentations from the NYPD, FDNY, and PAPD on each agency's response to the WTC attack on September 11. The presentations were brief and all covered much of the same material (e.g., timeline of WTC events and flight paths of planes). However, each presentation did contain some subject matter that was specific to the actions and responsibilities of the presenter's agency. The agency-specific information is provided below for each of the three agencies.

NYPD Presentation: Presented by Lieutenant John McArdle

The NYPD presentation began with a geographical profile of the WTC complex as a “city within a city” and a chronological timeline of events on the morning of September 11, 2001. Lieutenant McArdle then began explaining the specifics of the response as he experienced them from the NYPD perspective. In doing so, he explained the following events as they occurred in chronological order—

- The public safety response was both immediate and massive, involving members of the NYPD, FDNY, and PAPD.
- Initial response units were on-scene within 1 minute of the first plane's impact.
- NYPD ESU, and FDNY personnel immediately formed into rescue teams, as called for in their high-rise rescue procedure, and entered the affected building.
- Emergency Medical Teams (EMT) began treating victims immediately as they encountered them on the street in front of the WTC complex.
- As soon as the second plane hit, public safety officials confirmed the event was a terrorist attack and activated the New York City emergency and security plan.
- As soon as the first building collapsed, the NYPD issued a mandatory evacuation order and regrouped all of its personnel at a central location for roll call and redeployment.
- After the collapse of the second building, the ensuing deployment of a “bucket brigade” was meant to rescue those on the surface of the debris field.

- The command staff of the NYPD quickly realized that the bucket brigade work that went on for days following the incident was nothing more than a “psychological band aid” for the survivors, but felt it was worth that given the devastating loss the departments had suffered.

PAPD Presentation: Presented by Lieutenant Mark Winslow

As the owner of the WTC complex, the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey has primary responsibility and jurisdiction over the buildings within the complex. Lieutenant Winslow began by describing the uniqueness of the PAPD—its police personnel received dual training as both police officers and firefighters. He explained that the PAPD patrols all Port Authority owned and managed properties, including John F. Kennedy, La Guardia, and Newark airports, all rail and bus terminals within the regions public transportation system, all marine ports, all bridges and tunnels in the New York City area, and the WTC complex. Lieutenant Winslow presented a brief overview of the WTC complex and the 1993 bombing of the WTC. He then provided specifics about the PAPD response to the incident on September 11, 2001. While doing so, he explained the following events in chronological order—

- The PAPD set up a command post immediately following the impact of the first plane.
- The PAPD had an off-site police facility at the WTC.
- An immediate mass mobilization of PAPD personnel took place at the WTC.
- As soon as the first WTC building collapsed, the PAPD issued a mandatory recall of all members to a central staging area.
- PAPD quickly realized that many of the top Port Authority executives, including the executive director, the chief of police, and the chief of patrol, were all missing and presumed dead.
- A new chain of command had to be established immediately and rescue planning commenced.
- During rescue efforts, only eight people were pulled from the collapsed buildings.
- The activities at the scene quickly shifted to an evidence recovery operation.
- As of May 16, 2002, 2,823 victims were believed to have perished at the WTC site.
- A major portion of the PAPD efforts also focused on property recovery because several large banks had safes in the buildings. \$500 million in gold was recovered for the Bank of Nova Scotia and \$14 million in cash for Bank of America.

FDNY Presentation: Presented by Battalion Chief Joseph Pfeifer

Chief Pfeifer began by relating his personal story about the events of September 11. He observed the first plane hit the WTC and immediately began to respond. After arriving on scene, he and other FDNY personnel could tell there was heavy structural damage to the building. He then began a chronological review of events explaining the response of the FDNY. He explained that—

- The FDNY in-building radio repeaters were knocked out of service when the first plane struck.
- The FDNY chiefs agreed almost immediately that they would NOT try to put out the fire—it was too big and too intense.
- Evacuation teams were sent up stairwells with fire hoses simply to cool the evacuation routes and knock down smoke so people could get out.
- Chief Pfeifer’s brother was a member of one of the evacuation teams the Chief sent up the stairwells—he never came back.
- Radio communications were extremely troubled, in that the repeaters in the buildings were demolished and the “talk around” mode sometimes worked and sometimes did not.
- As soon as the first WTC building collapsed, the FDNY ordered all personnel out of the second building but did not know whether the radio transmission was received by any of the personnel in the building.
- The FDNY immediately enacted its “collapse rescue plan,” which called for the four-part process of reconnaissance and survey, removal of surface victims, search of voids, and selected debris removal.
- The reconnaissance and survey teams used a grid map of the site to log locations of possible victims and voids to be searched. The maps were later converted to global positioning system (GPS) based maps.
- Thermal imaging, GPS, and satellite imagery were all used during the first few days after the incident in an attempt to locate survivors in the rubble.
- The last victim recovered alive at the site was recovered 36 hours after the collapse.

Mr. Schiumo then asked panel members what tactical lessons they or their agencies learned regarding the response to high-rise fires learned. Three of the panel members responded and their responses are provided below:

Battalion Chief Pfeifer said that the FDNY used to worry about search and rescue at the scene of a high-rise fire; now it was forced to worry about the structural integrity of the building and the level of risk the agency could afford with regard to its people.

Lieutenant Messina stated that when it came to unexpected events, it was imperative that people be trained to do what they could with what they had at their disposal at the time.

Lieutenant Winslow reported that the procedures enacted by many of the companies within the WTC buildings as a result of the 1993 bombings paid off. Most of the people in the North tower began evacuating as soon as they learned of the first plane's impact into the South tower. This type of high-rise preparation by civilians should be stressed everywhere because it undoubtedly saved thousands of lives.

Summary and Analysis

This session provided an overview of the response to the WTC complex by the three main public safety agencies in New York City. The graphic depictions of the panelists' experiences highlighted their brief but powerful presentations. The FDNY experienced radio communications problems, specifically in-building communications, almost as soon as they arrived on scene and may have contributed to the loss of life within their department.

3. DAY TWO SESSIONS

The following sections provide detailed reports on the sessions related to the second day of the conference—

- Statement by Michael Brown, Acting Deputy Director/General Counsel, Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
- Overview of Urban Search and Rescue (USAR) System and FEMA’s USAR Response to the Events at the WTC
- Logistics—Procurement, Distribution, and Management of Equipment Resources
- Donations Management—The complexities Involved in Managing the Outpouring of Donations
- Debris, Construction, and Engineering Management—The City’s Response to Coordinated Efforts of Government and Private Sector Debris Removal, Construction, Demolition, and Engineering Complexities
- Rapid Assessment of Building Conditions to Ensure Safe Reoccupancy
- Remarks by Mr. Dan Rather
- Utility Response—Reestablishing Utilities and Communications to Lower Manhattan
- Public Information—Managing the Media
- Business Continuity—Impact of 9/11 on the Insurance and Financial Industries.

3.1 Statement by Michael Brown, Acting Deputy Director/General Counsel, Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)

Synopsis

Mr. Brown delivered a prepared statement to the audience, which focused on the priorities of FEMA with regard to improved first responder capabilities in the wake of the September 11, 2001, incidents.

Presenter Information

Michael Brown is the General Counsel and Acting Deputy Director of FEMA. As such, he serves as both the head legal advisor and the chief operating officer for the agency.

Presentation Overview

The session provided an explanation of what FEMA was doing to improve public safety preparedness, what FEMA's priorities would be for funding, and what lessons FEMA had learned as a result of the events of September 11. Mr. Brown began his remarks by explaining that FEMA was moving forward aggressively toward the goal of dispersing the \$3.5 billion that the President has identified in his Fiscal Year 2003 Budget for first responders. He explained that this funding would be used to support the beginnings of a multiyear grant program. Currently, it was thought that the grant funds would be used to pay for personnel training, more and better equipment, improved security, and better communications capabilities.

Mr. Brown then explained that FEMA currently had three main priorities for improving the preparedness and response of the Nation's public safety community to disasters—

- Better and standardized communications, including interoperability
- Fully equipped and trained public safety personnel
- Much improved cross-agency information exchange.

Mr. Brown concluded by outlining the three main lessons learned by FEMA as a result of the terrorist attacks at the WTC—

- Planning efforts should be expanded to ensure that all government branches (i.e., executive, legislative, and judicial) are included from the beginning.
- Interoperable communications and personnel monitoring equipment were major needs of the public safety community. The Federal Government had heard the need and the President had included funding for these types of items in his budget, but FEMA stressed the need for standards.
- Preparedness exercises were one of the most valuable components of an effective response and FEMA would continue to fund them.

Summary and Analysis

The presenter promoted the role of FEMA as the disperser of public safety grant monies being pursued by the President. He outlined the priorities that FEMA has been promoting for the past few months and covered a few key observations about planning, communications, and exercises. What remains to be seen however, is how much of this money materializes and how it will be used to assist public safety personnel nationwide.

3.2 Overview of Urban Search and Rescue (USAR) System and FEMA's USAR Response to the Events at the WTC

Synopsis

This session addressed the role and function of the FEMA USAR teams and their deployment to the WTC disaster.

Presenter Information

Raymond Lynch is the Deputy Director for Disaster Preparedness at the New York City OEM and is a 23-year veteran of the FDNY.

Presentation Overview

The session reviewed the role, function, and process of FEMA USAR teams. It also reviewed the actual deployment of specific USAR teams to the WTC disaster. Mr. Lynch began by reviewing the creation of FEMA-sponsored USAR teams. FDNY Deputy Chief Ray Downey, who died in the WTC collapse, was credited with originating the idea of USAR teams in 1980. By 1989, FEMA was sponsoring 25 national USAR teams. It was reported that there are currently 28 teams, with a total of more than 5,000 personnel, and with each team staffed and equipped to respond around the clock as a national asset.

Mr. Lynch explained that the notification system used by FEMA included three levels of status for the USAR teams—

- FEMA Notice: USAR teams are made aware of a specific event by FEMA
- FEMA Alert: USAR teams are notified that a deployment of USAR resources appears imminent, and each team is required to report its deployment readiness to FEMA within 1 hour
- FEMA Activation: USAR teams are requested to respond and are provided briefing information. They must be ready to deploy within 6 hours of activation.

Mr. Lynch stated that when activated, FEMA usually deployed the three nearest USAR teams to the location in need and could support them with more teams as necessary. The main role of a USAR team was to support state and local responders to locate, extricate, and provide initial medical treatment to victims trapped in collapsed structures or areas.

Each USAR team had 62 members and functioned in 2 teams of 31 personnel each. This allowed the team to operate 24 hours by cycling each half of the team through 12-hour shifts. Each team was required to bring enough supplies for itself so that it was totally self-sufficient for at least 72 hours.

Mr. Lynch explained that each USAR team had four specialized functions—

- Search and rescue—basic locate and extract functions of the team
- Medical—including trauma nurses, physicians, and EMTs
- Technical—including structural engineers, hazardous materials specialists, and communications specialists
- Logistics—including equipment support and maintenance, food, medical supplies, base camp setup, and liaison with command posts.

Between September 11 and September 20, 20 USAR teams were activated for deployment to New York City. By September 28, all of the teams had been demobilized due to the heavy construction and demolition nature of the WTC collapse recovery.

Summary and Analysis

The presentation reviewed the organization and deployment of FEMA USAR teams to the WTC disaster. The 28 teams in existence represent a substantial national resource that is available for deployment anywhere in the world within 6 hours of activation.

3.3 Logistics—Procurement, Distribution, and Management of Equipment Resources

Synopsis

This presentation reviewed the challenges of logistics management at the WTC for the rescue and recovery phases of the operations and explained some of the processes that were established as a result.

Presenter Information

Deputy Inspector John Carlsen is the Director of the Nassau County Office of Emergency Management and is a 30-year veteran of the Nassau County Police Department.

Presentation Overview

This session reviewed the inherent logistical challenges involved in a disaster as large as the WTC building collapses. With response resources coming into New York City from throughout the state and around the rest of the country, logistical processes and systems had to be established quickly and then refined throughout the initial stages of the operation.

Deputy Inspector Carlsen began by explaining that he had been placed in command of the logistics section of the EOC after Nassau County offered mutual aid to the City of New York. He immediately discovered that there were no preestablished procedures or coordination points for the logistical needs of the overall operation, nor could he find a logistics expert to assist. There was no single point of contact or central logistics point within the incident command structure, which led to a lack of coordination between agencies, a lack of record keeping, a lack of overall resource visibility, and extreme communications difficulties between agencies as they tried to find

out where or how they could get the equipment or resources they needed for their particular effort within the operation.

Deputy Inspector Carlsen organized a core logistics group that initially included personnel from approximately 15 different agencies from all over the East Coast. An organizational structure was immediately established for the involved personnel when deciding how a particular issue had to be handled. They then began designing processes and procedures for all logistical needs and putting them on paper as well. They refined the processes for such items as equipment requests so often that they had to put date and time references on the documents to make sure people were using the latest version.

Flow charts displaying the process for requesting particular resources were distributed to all other divisions within the EOC and to incident commanders in the field. Each flow chart provided a step-by-step guide to those in need of resources, while controlling purchase requests and expenditure authorizations.

The logistics command team used a new command and control software package, manufactured by E-Team, as their primary logistics management tool. E-Team software technicians were on-scene at the EOC for technical support and built custom applications for the logistical functions required. The tools developed included online equipment requests, request tracking, inventory tracking, and reporting. Approximately 1,700 users made more than 4,000 requests on the system, and more than 350,000 items were inventoried through the system.

Equipment was sorted and staged at one of several sites based on type of equipment. The Army National Guard completed all distribution and delivery of requested equipment and the U.S. Forest Service managed the equipment warehouse at Pier 36.

Deputy Inspector Carlsen explained that once the processes and flow charts were developed, they also tried to find ways to save money on the overall recovery operation through logistics efforts. Examples of this included having coveralls and turnout gear professionally cleaned by a chemical/environmental firm that was able to set up a temporary cleaning facility near the operations site, refining processes to eliminate duplicate or repeat requests for equipment, and use of donated equipment and supplies whenever possible to avoid buying the materials.

As a result of the effort, Deputy Inspector Carlsen learned several lessons that he thought were important enough to pass on to the audience. He thought the rotation of EOC personnel through the logistics command hindered the overall logistics operation due to the learning curve associated with what turned out to be very complex processes. He also pointed out that, in an incident of this magnitude, duplicate requests for resources were a major issue and emphasized the need to put measures in place to control duplication as soon as possible.

Summary and Analysis

This session provided a thorough review of the logistics management issues involved in an event of this magnitude. A function largely overlooked in large-scale disaster recovery efforts, logistics management is an important part of the overall operation. Because most of the money

expended in an operation of this nature is for the procurement of needed equipment and materials, the logistics function is an area where those expenditures can be controlled.

3.4 Donations Management—The Complexities Involved in Managing the Outpouring of Donations

Synopsis

This presentation provided an overview of the efforts involved in the management of the large number of donations that were sent to the New York City region as a result of the terrorist incident at the WTC on September 11, 2001.

Presenter Information

Andrew Feeney is the Deputy Director of the New York State OEM.

Presentation Overview

The session provided a thumbnail view of some of the considerations that must be addressed when attempting to manage a large number of donations received in response to a disaster. Mr. Feeney explained that city officials anticipated receiving a large volume of donated items in response to the WTC incident. Their immediate concern was keeping the goods from arriving directly in New York City and further taxing an already overburdened response operation.

Miscellaneous items began showing up in the street in and around the operations centers soon after they were set up. Most of the items were loosely packed in boxes or plastic bags and just piled on top of one another. The mayor's office assembled a WTC donation task force whose first priority was to ensure that all public officials making comments to the press were using a standard message with regard to donations.

A donations database and hotline were constructed within the New York State Office of Tax and Finance, with the assistance of the Office for Technology, while the task force members worked to identify and confirm multiple warehouse locations for the goods.

The call center was fully operational on September 11, and was staffed 24 hours a day by as many as 300 personnel. The donations database, which was operational on September 14, allowed the input and tracking of all items received or disbursed. Five warehouses, with a total of 1.5 million square feet of storage space, were secured and operational by September 16.

The donations management operation was managed from the Pier 93 EOC and included security, space management, waste disposal, and safety elements. It was operational until January 28, 2002. Aside from perishable or totally unusable items (e.g., broken or dirty), all items were distributed by the conclusion of the operation.

Summary and Analysis

As with the logistics operation, donation management is not usually considered by emergency managers when planning for disasters or writing emergency response plans. Emergency management professionals would be wise to use the experiences of New York City as an impetus for planning to manage donations in advance.

3.5 Debris, Construction, and Engineering Management—The City’s Response to Coordinated Efforts of Government and Private Sector Debris Removal, Construction, Demolition, and Engineering Complexities

Synopsis

This session provided a brief overview of the role the New York City Department of Design and Construction (DDC) played in assessing and organizing the demolition and debris removal operation at the WTC.

Presenter Information

Mr. Ken Holden is the Commissioner of the DDC.

Presentation Overview

The session explained the role of the DDC within the operation at the WTC site. Initially the DDC worked through the NYPD to arrange for a site tour for a group of engineers and heavy construction contractors. The goal was to have the site assessed for debris removal and to begin to organize the efforts of the contractors that would actually do the work.

After the assessment, the site was divided into quadrants, and each of the four main heavy construction contractors were assigned responsibility for debris removal in one of the quadrants. Other immediate work included netting of damaged buildings surrounding the site to prevent additional debris from falling off the buildings, establishing a site safety plan, and organizing the placement of extremely large cranes and related apparatus.

During the initial stages of the debris removal, more than 40 surveyor teams were called in by the DDC. Their job was to monitor the movement of foundations and facades of the buildings in the area and to pay special attention to a slurry wall that was under one of the collapsed WTC buildings and contained Hudson River water.

The DDC arranged for a nearby pier area to be dredged so that it could be used to support the transport of debris away from the site by barge. Approximately 600 trucks were used each day to carry debris from the WTC site to the pier for barge loading.

Mr. Holden explained that one of the biggest challenges of the debris removal effort was the maintenance of equipment because of the harsh conditions (e.g., heat and heavy dust) at the

site and the fact that the debris removal operation was running 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. The demolition and debris removal operation was set to conclude on May 30, 2002.

Summary and Analysis

Mr. Holden provided an overview of the complexities and considerations involved in a debris removal and demolition project such as this one. The larger scale implications for public safety personnel include the need to facilitate site tours as soon as possible for the construction representatives and the need to consider heavy equipment placement when deciding on road closures, traffic restrictions, and other operational elements.

3.6 Rapid Assessment of Building Conditions to Ensure Safe Reoccupancy

Synopsis

This session provided a brief overview of the role played by the New York City Department of Buildings as a rapid structural assessment resource within the WTC response operation.

Presenter Information

Patricia Lancaster is the Commissioner of the New York City Department of Buildings.

Presentation Overview

The session was intended to give the audience an understanding of the role of the Department of Buildings within the WTC response operation, while also explaining the challenges the teams faced while assessing the buildings in the area. Ms. Lancaster explained that the rapid assessment teams, which consisted of structural engineers and other building officials, were tasked with assessing the structural safety of the buildings in and around the WTC complex as quickly as possible. She reported that 240 people were mobilized to inspect the buildings for occupancy, structural integrity, elevator safety, and integrity of the electrical service. Each of the inspected structures was rated based on the range and level of damage. In total, 5 buildings were rated as partial or total collapses in need of demolition, 10 buildings had heavy structural damage, and 35 to 40 buildings had some form of nonstructural damage.

In reviewing the rapid assessment experiences with some of the people involved, Ms. Lancaster collect several lessons learned. Mobilizing and managing the necessary resources was a major challenge from a logistical perspective. The teams resorted to using spray paint on the sides of building or on foundations to note the inspection date, time, and observations. Communication and coordination was extremely difficult mainly because of the lack of good radio coverage in and around the WTC site after the building collapses. She mentioned the lack of in-building coverage as one of the biggest problems for the assessment teams.

In looking forward, Ms. Lancaster pointed to two specific efforts that were outcomes of the experiences. The first was a WTC building code task force formed to examine the current

building codes in light of the WTC incident. She said the goal of the task force was to see whether changes could be made to the building codes that would help protect people better in the future (e.g., more fire retardant materials in stairwells). The second effort was aimed at forming structural teams that could assist in initial public safety responses to large-scale incidents (i.e., manmade or natural) when the assessment of structural safety was a necessary component of the response.

Summary and Analysis

The rapid assessment teams put together by the Department of Buildings were a critical asset to the overall response operation. All buildings within a several block radius of the WTC complex had to be evaluated, and the quick assessment process allowed residents in undamaged buildings to return to their homes sooner. The in-building coverage needs of the assessment teams are unique in that the conditions at the time of their deployment cannot be predicted. The PSWN Program may wish to conduct further analyses on the in-building needs of public safety personnel working in and around collapsed structures or evaluate portable or deployable solutions suitable for those types of operations.

3.7 Remarks by Mr. Dan Rather

Synopsis

Mr. Rather addressed the audience with a prepared commentary on the events of September 11, 2001, and their impact on America.

Presenter Information

Dan Rather is the Anchor and Managing Editor of the “CBS Evening News”.

Presentation Overview

Mr. Rather began by reviewing the unprecedented television coverage of the WTC incident, which began almost from the moment the first plane hit and continued around the clock for weeks afterward. He believes that this type of coverage of such a gruesome and emotional event had had an irreversible impact on the American psyche. He did, however, worry that the unequivocal remembrance of reality fostered by the saturation broadcasting could interfere with the American public’s ability to understand the true impact of the attacks.

Mr. Rather encouraged the country to ask deeper, more probing questions about the incidents and then seek answers in a much less partisan environment. He said he believed that the American people should worry about what went wrong, but only so that they could make sure it did not happen again.

Mr. Rather also explained the inherent dangers in allowing the American public to believe that the war in Afghanistan was a success. He was quick to point out that the conversion of

former Taliban and terrorist troops into guerrilla units had actually increased the threat they posed to U.S. soldiers abroad.

In closing, Mr. Rather also expressed concern about the recent disclosure by federal authorities that there might still be terrorist cells within the United States. He pointed out that very real danger still existed in this country and that the enemy was smart to lie in wait. He felt that the psychological window of opportunity to implement real and lasting change within the country was passing with each day. He explained that a continuing threat of terrorism within our towns and cities would place a burden on public safety personnel unlike any other they had faced because they had never before been charged with those types of responsibilities.

Summary and Analysis

Mr. Rather's comments provided an analysis of the impact of the terrorist attacks on our country from the perspective of a long-time media professional. He expressed many concerns about the continuing threat to Americans and the fleeting chance to implement high-impact changes to combat terrorism in America.

3.8 Utility Response—Reestablishing Utilities and Communications to Lower Manhattan

Synopsis

This session described the impact to and recovery of utilities in the area of the WTC. Representatives of Consolidated Edison and Verizon provided presentations, with additional comments provided by a representative of Nextel.

Presenter Information

This session was presented in panel format. The panel members were—

- George Greenwood, Vice President of Emergency Management, Consolidated Edison
- Paul Leavitt, Manager, Verizon
- Morgan O'Brien, Vice Chairman, Nextel Communications.

Presentation Overview

This session provided presentations from representatives of Consolidated Edison and Verizon, which gave details on the damage to their utility infrastructure and the process of restoring service to the area. A Nextel representative also commented on the role of commercial wireless service during a disaster response like the WTC operation. The company-specific information is provided below for each of the three entities.

Consolidated Edison Presentation: Presented by Mr. George Greenwood.

Mr. Greenwood explained that Consolidated Edison was the provider of electricity, steam, and natural gas to the entire Manhattan area. Most utility service to the area was unaffected until

the collapse of 7 WTC at 5:30 PM on September 11, 2001. As a result of that collapse, three main transmission substations were destroyed. The end result was total loss of power over five complete distribution networks totaling 450 megawatts.

The initial response of Consolidated Edison emergency crews was hindered by the extent of damage to the entire area surrounding the WTC complex and a lack of communications capabilities. Mr. Greenwood explained that Consolidated Edison operated in an Incident Command System type construct during emergency responses, staging and deploying their personnel from a central command post. Most of the communications between the deployed crews and the command post was accomplished through Blackberry wireless messaging devices, which remained reliable throughout the operation.

Although the steam and gas systems were not affected, Consolidated Edison had to shut them down to ensure the safety of the emergency crews and public safety personnel responding to the collapsed buildings. Consolidated Edison immediately recognized the importance of restoring electric service to the area as soon as possible because of the impact to the large concentration of financial services institutions in the nearby financial district and the negative impact their extended closure would have on the national economy. The initial recovery strategy for electricity was the procurement and placement of 92 generators, each the size of a tractor trailer. Each generator produced 100 megawatts of electricity. While the generators provided temporary electricity to the area, crews sited and built a totally new distribution substation. While the generators were operational, they consumed more than 500,000 gallons of diesel fuel. Mr. Greenwood reported that although the new substation was meeting the temporary electricity needs of the area, two additional substations needed to be built to replace the two that were previously located in the basements of the WTC twin towers.

Verizon Presentation: Presented by Mr. Paul Leavitt

Mr. Leavitt explained that Verizon was the largest provider of telecommunications service to the area of Manhattan affected by the WTC disaster. Verizon lost numerous switching stations when the WTC buildings collapsed. It also had a large amount of cable, conduit, and fiber either crushed, severed, or flooded in the area around the WTC complex. Verizon also had a large corporate facility located immediately adjacent to the WTC complex, which housed numerous cable vaults and an entire floor of switching equipment. That building sustained major structural damage inflicted largely by falling debris during the collapse of each of the twin tower buildings.

In total, Verizon lost 200,000 telephone lines, 150,000 private branch exchange trunks, 3.7 million data circuits, and 10 cellular repeater sites. A total of 14,000 residential and 20,000 business customers were affected as a result of these losses.

Verizon began work immediately to provide temporary communications infrastructure, using both wireline and wireless equipment. The equipment deployed in the area included portable coin-operated telephones, which the company configured to work for free; portable cellular sites (i.e., cellular on wheels); and a cache of cellular telephones, which were provided to the government agencies involved in the rescue operation.

The recovery operation concentrated on both cable and equipment repair. The first involved rerouting and/or reterminating an extensive amount of cable, fiber, and conduit so that the lost switches and compromised cable vaults could be circumvented within the network. The second involved servicing all pieces of equipment in the area, including subterranean vault equipment, because of the amount of thick dust that had infiltrated the equipment. Generators also had to be procured and placed to power the equipment until the electricity could be restored.

In closing, Mr. Leavitt stressed the importance of emergency preparedness, contingency planning, and preexisting emergency vendor agreements even for private companies such as his. He touted the agreements as invaluable during his company's effort to reestablish communications capabilities within the affected area.

Nextel Remarks: Presented by Mr. Morgan O'Brien

Mr. O'Brien focused his remarks on the role of wireless communications systems during the disaster response at the WTC. He explained that the perception that radio frequency based wireless communications systems were overly complex systems had led to an assumption of fragility. He explained that the "honeycomb layout" of cellular type systems made them very robust. He also explained that during the WTC incident on September 11, 2001, the Nextel system demonstrated its ability to lose multiple network nodes and still continue to function.

Mr. O'Brien pointed out that use of the direct connect feature of the Nextel system as a private two-way radio link between two Nextel subscriber units did not rely on or pass through the Public Switched Network. Therefore, it remained reliable despite failures in the public access communications infrastructure.

Mr. O'Brien stated that it was his belief that Nextel units could be used to overcome a lack of interoperability across functions and levels of government while providing redundancy or backup to a public safety agency's primary communications system. He said that Nextel was currently examining the possibility of instituting a priority access plan for government subscribers and was developing network features that would allow for mobile data access over the Nextel network.

Mr. O'Brien concluded by stating that Nextel was seeking input from current and potential customers on their network coverage, reliability, functionality, or anything else on which the company could get feedback.

Summary and Analysis

The total loss of electricity and communications capabilities to the entire southern portion of Manhattan was devastating to both businesses and the public safety responders. A concentrated effort to restore these vital utilities was undertaken immediately and was successful in temporarily replacing the lost infrastructure within the first few days.

3.9 Public Information—Managing the Media

Synopsis

This session reviewed the need for a centralized public information function within a response and recovery operation like the operation at the WTC. It also provided an overview of the function of the Public Information Office within the New York City WTC response operation.

Presenter Information

Francis McCarton is the Deputy Commissioner of Public Information in the New York City OEM.

Presentation Overview

The session began with an explanation of the role of the public information office within the OEM. Mr. McCarton then explained how the destruction of the EOC and the sheer magnitude of the WTC event called for innovative organizational arrangements and a large-scale effort to rebuild a public information function within the new EOC.

The public information function was charged with coordinating the public information related efforts of all involved government agencies. The immediate coordination efforts focused on combining and standardizing the content of messages being released through the NYPD, FDNY, and New York City Mayor's Office.

The next task was to create a joint information center, along with representatives from the NYPD, FDNY, OEM, SEMO, FEMA, New York Department of Transportation, DDC, and mayor's office. Mr. McCarton explained that one of the key factors in the success of the effort was the establishment of a discrete organizational chart for the joint information center. He said that the mayor ordered that all press releases and public information statements be reviewed and cleared through the person in charge of the joint center, eliminating confusion and clarified people's roles in the effort.

A public information related call center was established soon after the incident at a local public access television station that had a large call center area for fund raising functions. Although this was a preplanned event and was outlined in all of the city's emergency preparedness plans, Mr. McCarton stressed the importance of having a contingency plan in the event that the main call center facility was destroyed or otherwise inaccessible.

The public information office personnel used a variety of methods to get their messages out, and chose the appropriate method depending on the type of information they were trying to disseminate. They used electronic billboards (i.e., Times Square sign), government Web sites, established and advertised hotlines, standard press releases, on-camera interviews, and breaking news bulletins.

Within 24 hours of the WTC event, the public information office had established the first media pool within the EOC. Mr. McCarton explained that a media pool was an arrangement in which one station was given full access to a particular coverage event and in exchange, the station must agree to make the footage available to all other stations. Media pools provided uniform coverage of an event and were useful where space or media equipment was limited.

Mr. McCarton described the WTC incident as the largest media event ever covered. Coverage of the event was broadcast worldwide around the clock. The public information office of the EOC received more than 25,000 press inquiries between September 11 and December 31, 2001.

In closing, Mr. McCarton urged other public information professionals to know, in advance, what resources were available to them when dealing with an event of this nature, to maintain relationships with working members of the media in and around their jurisdictions, and to try to strike a suitable balance between allowing the media access to incident scenes and the operational aspects of the rescue and recovery operation.

Summary and Analysis

Mr. McCarton provided an overview of the functions of a public information office during large-scale disasters and educated the audience on the challenges the New York City personnel faced when assembling their own joint information center.

3.10 Business Continuity—Impact of 9/11 on the Insurance and Financial Industries

Synopsis

This session provided insight into the issue of business continuity in the context of the WTC disaster. Presentations were provided by the New York State Department of Insurance, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), Morgan Stanley Dean Witter (MSDW), and Merrill Lynch.

Presenter Information

This session was presented in panel format. The panel members were—

- Greg Serio, Superintendent, New York State Department of Insurance
- David Barkus, Managing Director of Information Technology, NYSE
- Steve Van Wyk, Chief Information Officer and Managing Director, MSDW
- Paul Honey, First Vice President of Global Contingency Planning, Merrill Lynch

Presentation Overview

This session provided presentations on business continuity from the perspectives of three private corporations and the New York State Department of Insurance. Each presentation, although very brief, presented very specific information. The company-specific information is provided below for each of the presenting organizations.

New York State Department of Insurance Presentation: Presented by Mr. Greg Serio

With regard to the impact of the WTC incident on the insurance sector, Mr. Serio explained that the events of September 11, 2001, represented the single largest insurance event ever. To date, more than 31,000 claims had been filed with insurance companies for a total of \$20 billion.

In working closely with the insurance companies since the event, the Department of Insurance had discovered that they were in fact a good source of global intelligence and an important restabilizing force within the economy. Once they realized this, state officials moved the category of “insurance” from the recovery phase of disaster operations and placed it in the response phase. The rationale behind this decision was centered around the role that insurance companies played in bringing immediate financial assistance to residents and business owners in the affected area.

Mr. Serio explained that the single biggest coverage issue had been business interruption coverage. The Department of Insurance had discovered that most policies only covered 14 to 30 days worth of business interruption and were inadequate for the level of loss experienced by those within the area of the WTC.

In planning for the future, the Department of Insurance was working closely with the insurance industry to reexamine concentration of risk as an overall mitigation strategy. The concentration of financial services companies in and around the WTC made it a prime location for an incident that would overwhelm the insurance industry. The department and the industry were exploring ways to limit the same types of occurrences in the future. Mr. Serio also reported that the Department of Insurance planned on including insurance representatives in all future preparedness and tabletop exercises so that response procedures and timelines could be tested and refined.

NYSE Presentation: Presented by Mr. David Barkus

Mr. Barkus explained that because of the role that the NYSE played in the world’s financial markets, NYSE staff had been involved in rigorous contingency and emergency planning for 15 years previous to the terrorist attacks. Although their plans performed well in response to the WTC disaster, they were already reexamining them in light of their recovery experiences.

The NYSE was closed for 4 consecutive trading days as a result of the damage done to the WTC complex. The Nation’s stock markets had not been closed for that many consecutive trading days since the Great Depression. Mr. Barkus said that 99 percent of all NYSE trades were received over data lines and that the NYSE lost more than 50 percent of its data lines on September 11. Although the NYSE maintained multiple redundant data processing centers, each of which was served by a different power grid, the loss of power to the trading facility and the extensive loss of data lines made it impossible to conduct business as usual until those pieces of the infrastructure could be repaired or recovered.

To avoid such a disruption in the future, Mr. Barkus said the NYSE was taking drastic and immediate measures. Although he declined to describe most of the new measures for security reasons, he stated that, without a doubt, one of NYSE's critical strategies was to ensure that all trading activities could be shifted to backup locations within 48 hours.

MSDW Presentation: Presented by Mr. Steve Van Wyk

Mr. Van Wyk began by describing the experiences of MSDW during the WTC incident. MSDW, the largest tenant in the WTC complex, occupied 1.3 million square feet of office space, including both the 59th and 74th floors of the second WTC building to be struck. MSDW had a total of 3,700 employees located within the WTC complex, and despite the fact that the 74th floor of the second building was the point of impact of the airplane, only 12 MSDW employees were killed during the incident.

Mr. Van Wyk credited this miraculous outcome to two main elements. The first was the extensive planning and preparation MSDW and its employees had engaged in after the bombing incident at the WTC in 1993. The second was that the evacuation plans were activated immediately after the impact of the first plane into the adjacent building, and most of the employees were already on their way out of the building when the second plane struck.

Mr. Van Wyk explained that the MSDW information technology team began work immediately on the reconfiguration of the company's corporate network and initially relocated to a MSDW facility within a block of the WTC complex. They were soon ordered to evacuate that building as well and had to move to a third location in Brooklyn. They were able to get their network ready for business by the next day.

Merrill Lynch Presentation: Presented by Mr. Paul Honey

Mr. Honey kept his presentation very brief, choosing to focus on the lessons learned by the managers of Merrill Lynch while trying to recover from the WTC disaster. Merrill Lynch managers quickly discovered that voice mail and e-mail were critical systems for their employees. He pointed out that the Blackberry wireless e-mail system (i.e., Cingular network) continued to operate throughout the recovery process and was the most reliable form of communications.

Merrill Lynch immediately activated hotlines for its employees to use to call in and report their location and status. The call center also served as a message center for the employees and their families because other forms of communications were almost non-existent during the first 2 days following the incident.

Merrill Lynch used automated calling machines to both locate employees who had not called in and broadcast firmwide messages from the Chairman and other executives. Despite that attempt at information dissemination, Merrill Lynch learned afterward that most employees who were told to stay home during the recovery process felt left out and felt that they could have been used in some way to help the company.

Mr. Honey stressed that the experiences of Merrill Lynch validated the level of effort the company had put into emergency and contingency planning, but not for the obvious reasons. He stated that the experience showed him that the plans actually needed to be rewritten in a less rigid format. The actual value came from having put people through the planning processes in the first place. He said the processes and methodologies behind the planning were invaluable in putting people into the right frame of mind when an actual incident occurred.

Summary and Analysis

A quick response from the insurance industry within any disaster area is vital to the regional economy and the welfare of the affected persons. By including the insurance industry in the planning process and working with them to develop appropriate response procedures, emergency management officials will be even better prepared to provide aid to those in need. Similarly, the experiences of and lessons learned by the private sector should be exchanged with those in the public sector.

4. DAY THREE SESSIONS

The following sections provide detailed reports on the sessions related to the final day of the conference—

- Remarks by Former Mayor Rudolph Giuliani
- Role of the New York State Office of Public Security
- Perspectives from the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey
- Role of the Office of Homeland Security.

4.1 Remarks by Former Mayor Rudolph Giuliani

Synopsis

Former Mayor Rudolph Giuliani provided remarks regarding the events at the WTC and the role emergency preparedness played in the response.

Presenter Information

Mr. Rudolph Giuliani is the former mayor of New York City and a former federal prosecutor.

Presentation Overview

This session began with Mr. Giuliani expressing his feelings about the terrorist attacks. He emphatically asserted that the American people could not ever forget what happened to us and could certainly never let it happen again. He reminded the audience that America was attacked for its beliefs and freedoms and asserted his belief that nothing matched the strength of people who live in freedom.

Mr. Giuliani said he felt that the biggest lesson learned from the WTC incident was that there was no substitute for rigorous preparation. He established the first OEM in New York City and charged it with planning and preparing the city for disasters. Mr. Giuliani insisted on relentless preparation with the understanding that to prepare for everything was physically impossible. He said that a lot of practice in the general sense prepared people for the “real thing” no matter how out of the ordinary it might be. He closed by asserting that prior to September 11, there might have been a legitimate excuse not to anticipate and prepare for events of this nature, but now there was none.

Summary and Analysis

This session provided important and valuable insight into the importance of constant emergency preparation. When advocated by the person responsible for the rescue and response operations within New York City, the information carried both additional weight and significance.

4.2 Role of the New York State Office of Public Security

Synopsis

This session provided a brief overview of the New York State Office of Public Security. The Office of Public Security is in essence the homeland security office for the state and is actively engaged in statewide threat assessments and contingency planning.

Presenter Information

James Kallstrom is a special advisor to the Governor of New York and is the Director of the Office of Public Security.

Presentation Overview

The session began with Mr. Kallstrom explaining why nobody should have been surprised by the attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001. He pointed out that at least 15 major terrorist attacks had been plotted or carried out against the United States since 1988. He said he firmly believed that government officials had to find a way to engage the “silent majority” of Americans to secure their resolve to see the “war on terrorism” through to completion both domestically and abroad.

Mr. Kallstrom explained that the Office of Public Security was currently examining each state agency’s roles and resources with regard to the prevention of and response to terrorist activities. Their main areas of concern were equipment, training, and preparedness exercises. He added that a large-scale threat assessment effort within the state was examining, among other issues, critical food, water, and dairy supply chains; the transportation grid; and power and telecommunications grids.

Mr. Kallstrom closed by asserting his belief that the best possible terrorism prevention measure was the integration of myriad stovepipe databases in existence within the states and at the national level. He used the example of the Maryland State Police trooper who stopped one of the terrorists for speeding on I-95 the day before the attacks. Because the trooper had no information that the person was a suspected terrorist or was here in violation of a student visa, he simply issued a citation to the man and released him.

Summary and Analysis

The newly created Office of Public Security is responsible for antiterrorism action within the State of New York. The office is working to improve existing agency and resource plans while also conducting expanded threat assessments and recommending state action as appropriate measures are identified.

4.3 Perspectives From the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey

Synopsis

This session provided a brief overview of the Port Authority's perspectives on the WTC incident.

Presenter Information

John Packowski is the Director of Operations and Emergency Management for the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey.

Presentation Overview

Mr. Packowski began by describing the immediate impact of the WTC disaster to the Port Authority in terms of people lost in the collapse. He reported that 75 Port Authority employees were killed during the attack on the WTC and the subsequent building collapses. Among those killed were the Executive Director, the Director of Police, the Chief of Patrol, and 37 police officers and senior police commanders.

Previous to the incident, the Port Authority had engaged in several forms of disaster preparation. Its preparedness efforts included the creation of facility specific plans and drills, security audits of all Port Authority facilities, threat awareness programs, and participation in the state-level planning efforts in both New York and New Jersey. Mr. Packowski acknowledged that despite the agency's losses, the extensive planning it had engaged in better prepared it to respond to the incident.

Mr. Packowski reported that in an attempt to both prevent and better respond to similar incidents in the future, the Port Authority was focusing on two broad areas. The first was facility security. The Port Authority was attempting to bolster facility security through an approach that used "rings of security."

The second broad area was a more defined approach to risk management at the corporate level. This approach consisted mainly of expanded threat assessments, vulnerability assessments, criticality of sites and resources studies, and overall risk assessments from an enterprisewide view. From these findings, the Port Authority would work to build risk matrixes that better reflected the current threat environment and would take action accordingly.

Summary and Analysis

This session provided information about the impact of the WTC disaster on the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey and what actions its staff was taking organizationally as a result. It is clear that their loss of a substantial number of mission-critical personnel put them at a disadvantage during the initial response, but that they quickly recovered and then went to work planning for the future.

4.4 Role of the Office of Homeland Security

Synopsis

This session provided a statement by a representative of the Office of Homeland Security that outlined the current priorities of the office with respect to bolstering first responder capabilities.

Presenter Information

Michael Burns is an employee of the Office of Homeland Security with previous experience in firefighting and emergency management.

Presentation Overview

Mr. Burns began by explaining that the President and Governor Ridge had established four main priorities for the Office of Homeland Security —

- Improving response capabilities for bioterrorism events
- Improving information sharing horizontally across federal agencies and vertically across levels of government
- Improving border security
- Bolstering the capabilities of first responders.

Mr. Burns then talked about “three big ideas” for first responders being shaped within the Office of the President that formed the underpinnings of the President’s Fiscal Year 2003 budget request of \$3.5 billion for public safety —

- Flexibility—Giving communities what they already know they need instead of telling them what they can have.
- Mutual Aid—Making mutual aid the “way we do business” with regard to local public safety response. This could include building a national asset inventory and adopting a common command and control system, among other standardization efforts.
- Evaluation—Examining methods for baselining current capabilities and then measuring progress as the money was expended. One method could include some form of exercise-based rating system.

Mr. Burns concluded by mentioning the ongoing work within the Office of Homeland Security to create the Nation’s first national strategy for homeland security. He said that although it was not yet complete, several key strategic themes had emerged. He mentioned smart borders, interoperable communications, and the standardization of public safety assets as examples.

Summary and Analysis

Mr. Burns provided perhaps more insight into the “thinking” within the Office of Homeland Security than has been previously revealed to the public safety community at large. It is clear that interoperable communications are being included as a necessary element of the national strategy and first responders needs are being considered as a top priority.