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NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD WASHINGTON, D.C.

ISSUED: January 31, 1977

Forwarded to:
Mr. Howard C. Ullrich
Director of Transportation
State of California
Department of Transportation
1120 N Street
Sacramento, California 95814

SAFETY RECOMMENDATION(S) P-76-91 through 93

At 10:32 a.m., P.d.t., on June 16, 1976, a piece of construction equipment excavating for a street widening project on Venice Boulevard in Los Angeles, California, struck and punctured an 8-inch petroleum products pipeline owned by the Standard Oil Company of California. The escaping gasoline sprayed on nearby buildings and ignited 90 seconds later. As a result of this accident 9 persons were killed, 14 persons were injured, 7 buildings were destroyed, other buildings were damaged by fire and heat, and 15 vehicles were destroyed. The intense fire melted powerlines and telephone lines. 1/

The California Department of Transportation, designers and originators of the construction project; the Griffith Company, the prime contractor for the project; C. W. Poss, Inc., the subcontractor; and the Standard Oil Company of California were all aware of the existence of the 8-inch pipeline. However, the precise depth of the pipeline within the accident area was not known, although preconstruction meetings had been held, testholes to determine the pipeline depth had been dug at other locations, and the pipeline in another area had been lowered because of its insufficient depth.

No "one-call" notification system was in effect in the Los Angeles area at the time of the accident which would have enabled the contractor to request and receive specific information concerning the depth and location of buried utilities.

For more detailed information on this accident, read "Standard Oil Company of California, 8-Inch Pipeline Rupture, Venice Boulevard, Los Angeles, California, June 16, 1976." NTSB-PAR-76-8.

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Therefore, the National Transportation Safety Board recommends that the State of California Department of Transportation:

Develop guidelines for preconstruction meetings, which should include methods of preventing damage to underground utilities to be encountered during the proposed construction work. Such preconstruction meetings should be attended by all operators whose facilities are involved. (Class II, Priority Followup) (P-76-91) (The Safety Board made this recommendation to the American Public Works Association on February 2, 1973.)

Cooperate and coordinate with those groups attempting to establish a "one-call" notification system in southern California and other areas of the State where none exist, and work with systems already in existence. (Class II, Priority Followup) (P-76-92)

Require, as a prerequisite of a contract award, that the contractor be in contact with the "one-call" notification system or the individual facilities operators to determine the precise depth and location of any underground facilities before beginning the project. (Class II, Priority Followup) (P-76-93)

TODD, Chairman, BAILEY, Vice Chairman, HOGUE and HALEY, Members, concurred in the above recommendations. McADAMS, Member, did not participate.

By: Web

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Chairman

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