Log 1523 SPB2 20 formerly A-82-4

# NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD
## WASHINGTON, D.C.

ISSUED: September 9, 1982

Forwarded to:

Users of multiengine turbine-powered airplanes and rotorcraft
(See attached list)

SAFETY RECOMMENDATION(S)

A-82-104 and -105

On October 1, 1981, Sky Train Air, Inc., Gates Learjet 24, N44CJ, made an unexpected descent from its cruising altitude of flight level (FL) 450 (45,000 feet). No radio transmissions were received from the flightcrew just prior to and during the uncontrolled descent. The aircraft crashed near Felt, Oklahoma, and disintegrated on ground impact, fatally injuring the three company pilots onboard. 1/

Although air traffic control radar does provide information on altitude (assuming the altitude encoding transponder is operational and the aircraft signal is within range of a ground-based antenna), position, and ground speed, the data are very limited in their usefulness in an accident investigation. Data points are not sampled frequently enough, nor is the precision of the data good enough, to derive more than trend information regarding the flight. With regard to this accident, there was no radar capability in the vicinity of the accident site below 15,000 feet m.s.l. according to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). The last secondary radar (transponder beacon code Mode A and Mode C) return was received with the aircraft at FL 380. Further, all secondary radar returns were lost for a 37- to 40-second period during the initial loss-of-control period with the aircraft at FL 452.

The degree of aircraft destruction and the lack of cockpit voice recorder (CVR) and flight data recorder (FDR) information prevented the Safety Board from determining precisely the circumstances of the accident, which was similar to two other recent Learjet accidents involving uncontrolled descents from high cruise altitude flight. 2/ The safety of the flying public and the prevention of accidents through knowledge of the causes of previous accidents is a major concern of aircraft manufacturers, aircraft users, the FAA, and the Safety Board. The Safety Board's determination of probable cause in a number of accidents involving multiengine, turbine-powered aircraft that were not

1/ For more detailed information read Aircraft Accident Report--"Sky Train Air, Inc., Gates Learjet 24, Felt, Oklahoma, October 1, 1981" (NTSB-AAR-82-4).
2/ See appendix F, "Learjet Accident and Incident History," in Aviation Accident Report--"Northeast Jet Company, Gates Learjet 25D, N125NE, Gulf of Mexico, May 19, 1980" (NTSB-AAR-81-15).

equipped with flight recorders since they were not subject to the requirements of 14 CFR 121.343 (FDR) or 14 CFR 121.359, 135.151, and 127.127 (CVR) has been severely hampered by the lack of FDR and CVR information. Our experience in air carrier accident investigation has proven that these devices are exceptionally valuable tools in identifying operational and mechanical problems, weather- and turbulence-induced occurrences, and other subtle human factor influences that can contribute to an accident. In the past 10 years, one or both of the recorders has provided investigators with the necessary clues to piece together the circumstances of the accident in virtually all cases. The availability of recorder information has clearly enhanced the aviation community's ability to improve flying safety and to prevent accidents.

Advances now being made in the design of complex aircraft intended for commercial, air taxi, and corporate flying operations, e.g., the use of composite materials for the airframe and critical control surfaces, the all-digital cockpit, and advanced automatic flight control systems, portend an even greater need for CVR and FDR information for accident/incident investigation purposes. With such innovations as all-digital cockpits, much information presented to crewmembers will no longer be in the form of mechanical displays or switch positions. Hence, clues such as impact marks on displays, selected autopilot mode, and frequency settings for navigation and communications receivers will no longer be available to the investigator in postaccident cockpit documentation. Accordingly, crucial data should be earmarked early in the design process for storage by the FDR.

The 1981 Annual Report of the Regional Airline Association indicated that the U.S. Commuter fleet continued to grow in capacity and in the use of turboprop airplanes. Total available seat capacity was up 4.1 percent compared to the figures in the 1980 Annual Report, with airplanes having more than 20 seats providing almost 40 percent of the 1981 total. Seating capacity for turbine-powered airplanes was up 3.1 percent from 1980, representing over 76 percent of the total.

With the continued growth in the numbers of complex aircraft in commercial, air taxi, and corporate operations, the Safety Board believes that broader use of recorders is urgently needed. In fact, the Safety Board believes that these recorders are as justified as those required to be installed in the air carrier fleet since 1959. At that time, high speed, increased reliance on avionic equipment, and lack of eyewitnesses combined to limit the investigative evidence and often eliminated the possibility of determining causation. These same factors are hindering today's investigations of accidents involving complex aircraft in commercial, air taxi, and corporate operations, with a resultant adverse effect on the safety of flight.

The Safety Board realizes that presently available air carrier-type recording systems are generally unsuitable for the smaller lightweight aircraft comprising much of the fleet not already covered by requirements for FDRs and CVRs. On the other hand, we continue to believe that smaller, lighter, lower cost recorders using up-to-date technology are needed and should be required.

The Safety Board issued Safety Recommendations A-78-27 through -29 on April 13, 1978, which called for the development and installation of recorders on such complex aircraft because of its concern with the number of accidents involving these aircraft about which many of the accident circumstances could not be ascertained with confidence. Recommendation A-78-27 called for the development of flight recorder standards. Recommendation A-78-28 called for research and development of low-cost recorders and asked that installation guidelines be established. Recommendation A-78-29 called for an interim requirement that cockpit voice recorders be installed on

turbine-powered aircraft certificated to carry six or more passengers which are required by their certificate to have two pilots. The Safety Board considers these recommendations so important that it has reiterated them eight times since their original issue. 3/

At this time, CVRs are required on turbojet aircraft operating under 14 CFR 135 if they are certificated for 10 passengers or more. The FAA published its intention (45 FR 13341) to issue a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) in February 1980 proposing that a CVR be required on all turbojet-powered airplanes configured with six or more passenger seats (14 CFR 23, 25, 91, and 121). However, no such NPRM was published, and no other regulatory activity has been initiated.

Industry acceptance of the proposed requirement for installation of FDRs and CVRs up to this time has been limited to a few airframe manufacturers and corporate aircraft operators who have installed recorders and to persons who have participated in the development of recorder standards, including representatives of several airframe manufacturers. The Safety Board has encouraged the development of standards for small, lightweight, less expensive recorders specifically designed for complex aircraft, and has been working closely with the Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) in developing standards intended primarily for multiengine, turbine-powered, fixed-wing aircraft and rotorcraft.

The SAE is currently reviewing a document which defines minimum performance standards for "general aviation" flight recorders. 4/ This specification allows for the use of separate CVR and FDR equipment or a combination CVR/FDR. Presently being considered are CVRs that will record two channels of audio information for a period of at least 15 minutes and FDRs that will be capable of recording many flight data parameters digitally as a function of time for a period of at least 15 minutes, plus storing critical data from the takeoff regime. This document, when approved by the SAE, should serve as the basis for an FAA Technical Standard Order (TSO) on "general aviation" recorders. 5/

Several recorder manufacturers have indicated that such recorders have been under development for some time, and could be produced and marketed within 7 to 12 months after issuance of the TSO. While exact figures are unavailable until the issuance of the TSO, the recorder manufacturers indicate that prices for this equipment should be compatible with other general aviation equipment and, thus, acceptable to the industry.

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3/ Aviation Accident Reports--"Columbia Pacific Airlines, Beech 99, Richland, Washington, February 10, 1978" (NTSB-AAR-78-15); "Champion Home Builders Company, Gates Learjet 25B, Sanford, North Carolina, September 8, 1977" (NTSB-AAR-79-15); "Inlet Marine, Inc., Gates Learjet 25C, Anchorage, Alaska, December 4, 1978" (NTSB-AAR-79-18); "Massey-Ferguson, Inc., Gates Learjet 25D, Detroit, Michigan, January 19, 1979" (NTSB-AAR-80-47); "Downeast Airlines, Inc., deHavilland DHC-6-200, Rockland, Maine, May 30, 1979" (NTSB-AAR-80-5); "Cascade Airways, Inc., Beechcraft 99A, Spokane, Washington, January 20, 1981" (NTSB-AAR-81-11); "Texasgulf Aviation, Inc., Lockheed Jetstar, White Plains, New York, February 11, 1981" (NTSB-AAR-81-13); and Special Study--"Commuter Airline Safety 1970-79," issued July 22, 1980 (NTSB-AAS-80-1).

4/ In the context of this letter, this terminology means CVRs and FDRs intended for installation in complex fixed-wing aircraft and rotorcraft in any type of operation not currently required by 14 CFR 121.343, 121.359, 135.151, and 127.127 to have a cockpit voice recorder and/or a flight data recorder.

5/ The recommendations to follow are made independently of the SAE proposed standard; the SAE has not endorsed the lists presented in Tables I and II.

Therefore, the National Transportation Safety Board recommends that the users of *multiengine, turbine-powered airplanes and rotorcraft:*

> Encourage your members who own or operate multiengine, turbine-powered aircraft (both airplanes and rotorcraft) certificated for two-pilot operation to carry six or more passengers, in any type of operation not currently required by 14 CFR 121.359, 135.151, and 127.127 to have a cockpit voice recorder, to install "general aviation" cockpit voice recorders, and urge that they record voice communications transmitted from or received in the aircraft by radio on one channel, and audio signals from a cockpit area microphone on a separate channel. (Class II, Priority Action) (A-82-104)
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> Encourage your members who own or operate multiengine, turbojet airplanes certificated to carry six or more passengers, in any type of operation not currently required by 14 CFR 121.343 to have a flight data recorder, to install "general aviation" flight data recorders as soon as they are commercially available, and urge that they provide for recording sufficient parameters to determine the following information as a function of time (see Table I (attached) for ranges, accuracies, etc):
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> altitude
> indicated airspeed
> magnetic heading
> radio transmitter keying
> pitch attitude
> roll attitude
> vertical acceleration
> longitudinal acceleration
> stabilizer trim position
> *or pitch control position.*
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> (Class III, Longer Term Action) (A-82-105)

The National Transportation Safety Board is an independent Federal agency with the statutory responsibility ". . . to promote transportation safety by conducting independent accident investigations and by formulating safety improvement recommendations." (P.L. 93-633). The Safety Board is vitally interested in any actions taken as a result of its safety recommendations. Therefore, we would appreciate a response from you regarding action taken or contemplated with respect to the recommendations in this letter.

BURNETT, Chairman, and McADAMS, BURSLEY, and ENGEN, Members, concurred in these recommendations. GOLDMAN, Vice Chairman, did not participate.

By: Jim Burnett
Chairman

TABLE

PARAMETER LIST (FIXED WING AIRCRAFT)

| PARAMETERS | RANGE | INSTALLED SYSTEM 1/ MINIMUM ACCURACY (TO RECOVERED DATA) | SAMPLING INTERVAL (PER SECOND) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Relative Time (from recorder on prior to takeoff) | 8 hrs. minimum | ±0.125% per hour | 1 |
| Indicated Airspeed | $V_{so}$ to $V_D$ (KIAS) | ±5% or ±10 kts., whichever is greater. Resolution 2 kts. below 175 KIAS | 1 |
| Altitude | -1,000 ft. to max cert. alt. of A/C | ±100 to ±700 ft. (see Table I, TSO C51-a) | 1 |
| Magnetic Heading | 360° | ±5° | 1 |
| Vertical Acceleration | -3g to +6g | ±0.2g in addition to ±0.3g maximum datum error | 4 (or 1 per second where peaks ref. to 1g are recorded) |
| Longitudinal Acceleration | ±1.0g | ±0.05g in addition to max. datum error of ±0.1g | 2 |
| Pitch Attitude | 100% of usable range | ±2° | 1 |
| Roll Altitude | ±60° or 100% of usable range, whichever is greater | ±2° | 1 |
| Stabilizer Trim Position | Full range | ±3% unless higher accuracy uniquely required | 1 |
| OR | | | |
| Pitch Control Position | Full range | ±3% unless higher accuracy uniquely required | 1 |

1/ When data sources are aircraft instruments (except altimeters) of acceptable quality to fly the aircraft, the recording system excluding these sensors (but including all other characteristics of the recording system) shall contribute no more than half the values in this column.

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Engine Power, Each Engine | | | |
| Fan or $N_1$ Speed or EPR or Cockpit Indications Used for Aircraft Certification | Maximum range | ±5% | 1 |
| OR | | | |
| Prop. Speed and Torque (Sampled Once/Sec as Close Together as Practicable) | | | 1 (prop speed)<br>1 (torque) |
| Altitude Rate 2/ (need depends on altitude resolution) | ±8,000 fpm | ±10%. Resolution 250 fpm below 12,000 ft. indicated | 1 |
| Angle of Attack 2/ (need depends on altitude resolution) | -20° to +40° or 100% of usable range | ±2° | 1 |
| Radio Transmitter Keying (Discrete) | On/Off | | 1 |
| TE Flaps (Discrete or Analog) | Each discrete position (U,D,T/O,APP) | | 1 |
| | OR | | |
| | Analog 0-100% range | ±3° | 1 |
| LE Flaps (Discrete or or Analog) | Each discrete position (U,D,T/O,APP) | | 1 |
| | OR | | |
| | Analog 0-100% range | ±3° | 1 |
| Thrust Reverser, Each Engine (Discrete) | Stowed or full reverse | | 1 |
| Spoiler/Speedbrake (Discrete) | Stowed or out | | 1 |
| Autopilot Engaged (Discrete) | Engaged or Disengaged | | 1 |

2/ If data from the altitude encoding altimeter (100 ft. resolution) is used, then either one of these parameters should also be recorded. If, however, altitude is recorded at a minimum resolution of 25 feet, then these two parameters can be omitted.

TABLE II

PARAMETER LIST (ROTORCRAFT)

| PARAMETERS | RANGE | INSTALLED SYSTEM 1/ MINIMUM ACCURACY (TO RECOVERED DATA) | SAMPLING INTERVAL (PER SECOND) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Relative Time (from recorder on prior to takeoff) | 4 hrs. minimum | ±0.125% per hour | 1 |
| Indicated Airspeed | $V_{min}$ to $V_D$ (KIAS) (minimum airspeed signal attainable with installed pitot-static system) | ±5% or ±10 kts., whichever greater | 1 |
| Altitude | -1,000 ft. to 20,000 ft. pressure altitude | ±100 to ±700 ft. (see Table I, TSO C51-a) | 1 |
| Magnetic Heading | 360° | ±5° | 1 |
| Vertical Acceleration | -3g to +6g | ±0.2g in addition to ±0.3g maximum datum error | 4 (or 1 per second where peaks ref. to 1g are recorded) |
| Longitudinal Acceleration | ±1.0g | ±0.05g in addition to maximum datum error of ±0.1g | 2 |
| Pitch Attitude | 100% of usable range | ±2° | 1 |
| Roll Attitude | ±60° or 100% of usable range, whichever is greater | ±2° | 1 |
| Altitude Rate | ±8,000 fpm | ±10%. Resolution 250 fpm below 12,000 ft. indicated | 1 |

1/ When data sources are aircraft instruments (except altimeters) of acceptable quality to fly the aircraft, the recording system excluding these sensors (but including all other characteristics of the recording system) shall contribute no more than half the values in this column.

TABLE II (2)

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Engine Power, Each Engine | | | |
| Main Rotor Speed | Max. range | ±5% | 1 |
| Free or Power Turbine Speed | Max. range | ±5% | 1 |
| Engine Torque | Max. range | ±5% | 1 |
| Flight Control Hydraulic Pressure | | | |
| Primary (Discrete) | High/Low | | 1 |
| Secondary-if applicable (Discrete) | High/Low | | 1 |
| Radio Transmitter Keying (Discrete) | On/Off | | 1 |
| Autopilot Engaged (Discrete) | Engaged/Disengaged | | 1 |
| SAS Status-Engaged (Discrete) | Engaged/Disengaged | | 1 |
| SAS Fault Status (Discrete) | Fault/OK | | 1 |
| Flight Controls | | | |
| Collective | Full range | ±3% | 2 |
| Pedal Position | Full range | ±3% | 2 |
| Lat. Cyclic | Full range | ±3% | 2 |
| Long. Cyclic | Full range | ±3% | 2 |
| Controllable Stabilator Position | Full range | ±3% | 2 |

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