1930



National Transportation Safety Board

Washington, D.C. 20594
Safety Recommendation

Date: July 22, 1987

In reply refer to: A-87-94 and -95

Mr. Robert E. Whittington Acting Administrator Federal Aviation Administration Washington, D.C. 20591

On February 15, 1986, a Lockheed L-1011 operated by Eastern Air Lines as flight 27, 1/a scheduled flight from New York's John F. Kennedy International Airport to Miami, Florida, with 242 passengers and 11 crewmembers on board, was parked on taxiway "J" waiting to take off on runway 31L. When the No. 3 engine was started, a tailpipe fire occurred and the flames were visible to some of the airplane's occupants. Some passengers, primarily those in the aft cabin, panicked and rushed to various exits. The flight attendant who was assigned the L3 exit was away from her duty station getting a blanket for a passenger. Passengers opened the unattended L3 exit and initiated an evacuation. The L4 exit was opened by the L4 flight attendant after she observed an evacuation in progress at the L3 exit. Approximately 30 to 50 people evacuated the airplane; 1 passenger was seriously injured and 14 passengers received minor injuries.

Flight attendants at other exits were able to prevent passengers from opening exits. The R3 flight attendant "physically prevented a man from opening the R3 door," and the R1 and L2 flight attendants "physically blocked" their exits to prevent the doors from being opened.

The evacuation of flight 27 was unnecessary and may have been prevented if the L3 flight attendant had been at her duty station as required by 14 CFR 121.391(d). As one of the flight attendants required by 14 CFR 121.391, the L3 flight attendant should have remained at her duty station with her safety belt and shoulder harness fastened during taxi unless she was performing a safety-related duty. In 1982, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) issued Air Carrier Operations Bulletin (ACOB) No. 1-76-11 - Distribution and Duty Assignment of Required and Non-Required Flight Attendants. This ACOB clarified which of the flight atter lants were required crewmembers as well as what duties were safety related. Examples of safety-related duties were conducting passenger briefings; ensuring passenger compliance with food and beverage tray requirements; ensuring passenger compliance with seatbelt/no smoking requirements; and checking for proper storage of carry-on baggage. Examples of nonsafety-related duties were serving food and beverages; distributing magazines and newspapers; selling tickets; and returning carry-on baggage after landing.

^{1/} For more detailed information, see Brief of Accident, File No. 1179, February 15, 1986.

A review of other Safety Board investigations revealed other incidents in which required flight attendants were away from their duty stations for nonsafety-related duties.

The investigation of a B-727 evacuation incident in Boston, Massachusetts, on March 26, 1986, 2/ revealed that two of the three required flight attendants were distributing coats during taxi to the gate after landing. During taxi to the gate, smoke from an overheated air conditioning pack filled the cabin. The two flight attendants did return to their duty stations before the airplane reached the gate. When the airplane reached the gate, 90 passengers evacuated the airplane using a jetway, overwing exits, and the aft airstairs. Two passengers received minor injuries. However, if the airplane had stopped before the flight attendants had reached their duty stations, they would not have been able to direct an evacuation effectively.

As a result of a blown tire on the right main landing gear, the captain of a B-747 aborted a takeoff in Honolulu, Hawaii, on November 16, 1984. 3/ After the airplane stopped, the second officer announced that everything was all right and that passengers should remain seated. However, a short time later the captain ordered an evacuation when he learned that there was a fuel spill on the right side of the airplane. Of the 395 passengers who evacuated, 2 were seriously injured and 38 suffered minor injuries as a result of the evacuation. When the evacuation was initiated, one flight attendant was not at her assigned exit because she had taken a small child to the lavatory. Once the evacuation began, she was unable to reach her assigned exit.

Finally, a report of the National Air Transportation Inspection Program (NATI) conducted by the FAA in 1984 also identified problems concerning compliance with the requirement that flight attendants be seated with their seatbelts fastened during taxi.

The NATI report indicated that on every en route inspection conducted with prior notice, no violations were observed. However, the report also notes: "On most no-notice en route flights, flight attendants ignored the requirements of [14 CFR] FAR 121.391(d) to remain in their seats during taxi except for safety related duties. Flight attendants were observed talking with one another, talking with other passengers, taking drink orders, and passing out magazines."

The Safety Board believes that flight attendants should remain at their duty stations during taxi (or after an unusual occurrence such as an aborted takeoff) so that they are available to perform their safety-related duties properly and quickly. The Board believes that air carriers should emphasize the importance of compliance with the regulation that requires flight attendants to be at their duty stations during taxi. In addition, the FAA should more aggressively enforce compliance with the regulation.

Therefore, the National Transportation Safety Board recommends that the Federal Aviation Administration:

 $[\]frac{2}{7}$ For more detailed information, see Brief of Accident, File No. 5043, March 26, 1986. $\frac{3}{7}$ For more detailed information, see Brief of Accident, File No. 3322, November 16, 1984.

Require Air Carrier principal operations inspectors to review Air Carrier Operations Bulletin No. 1-76-11 with their respective carriers and verify that the air carrier emphasizes to its flight attendants the requirement during airplane taxi for flight attendants to remain at their duty stations with safety belts and shoulder harnesses fastened except when required to perform safety-related duties. (Class II, Priority Action) (A-87-94)

Direct all principal operations inspectors to emphasize surveillance for flight attendant compliance with the provisions of 14 CFR 121.391(d), which requires them to remain at their duty stations, during airplane taxi, with safety belts and shoulder harnesses fastened except when performing duties related to the safety of the airplane and its occupants. (Class II, Priority Action) (A-87-95)

BURNETT, Chairman, GOLDMAN, Vice Chairman, and LAUBER, NALL, and KOLSTAD, Members, concurred in these recommendations.

Jim Burnett Chairman

Brief of Accident

Tine (Lc1) - 1830 EST	Injuries Fatal Serious Minor None 0 0 0 11 0 1 14 227	ELT Installed/Activated - UNK/NR Stall Warning System - YES	Airport Froximity ON AIRPORT Airport Data JFK INTERNATL Runway Ident UNK/NR Runway Lth/Wid UNK/NR Runway Surface UNK/NR Runway Status UNK/NR	ficate - UNK/NR Flisht Time (Hours) - 14468 Last 24 Hrs - UNK/NR 1- 3509 Last 30 Days- UNK/NR t- UNK/NR Last 90 Days- UNK/NR - UNK/NR Rotorcraft - UNK/NR
A/C Res. No. N309EA	Altcraft Damade NONE Fire ON GROUNI Fass	odel - ROLLS-ROYCE RR-211-28 1nes - 3 e - TURROJET r - 42000 LBS THRUST	ure Foint Y Sht Flan - IFR araice - IFR nds - NONE	Hedical Certi 5 Total Make/Hode 1011 Instrumen Multi-Ens
786 JAMATCA,NY	-AIR CARRIER - FLAU/DOMESTIC -EASTERN AIR LINES -SCHEDULED, DOMESTIC, FASSENGER -14 CFR 121 -STANDING	Ens Make/Nodel TRACTABLE Ensine Type Rated Fower	mation Itinerary Last Departure Foint JAMAICA,NY NUT FERTINENT Destination MIAMI,FL MIGHT SCATTERED Type of Flight Flan NONE Type Apch/Lnds NONE Type Apch/Lnds NONE Type Apch/Lnds NONE	Ase – 59 Biennial Flight Review Current – YEO Honths Since – 2 Aircraft Type – L-1
File No 1179 2/15/86	ficate ring	Aircraft Information Hake/Model - LOCKHEED L-1011-385-1 Landing Gear - TRICYCLF-KETRACTABLE Max Gross Wt - 496000 No. of Seals - 293	Weather Data Weather Data Weather Data Whethod Completeness - UNK/NR Resto Weather - UNK/NR Resto Weather - UNCANN Resto Wishinty - 15.0 Sh Lowest Sky/Clouds - 5000 FT S Lowest Ceiling Obstructions to Vision - NONE Frecipitation of Lisht - NIGHT(RRIG	Pilot-In-Commation Pilot-In-Command Certificate(%)/Rating(s) ATP HE LAND

Instrument Katıng(s) - AİKFLANE

ENGS REMAINED RUNNING DURING THE INCIDENT AND CREATED A HAZARDOUS CONDITION FOR CFRZEVACUEES. FNGS WERE LATER STOFFED. THE NO. 3 ENG TORCHED DURING A START ATTEMPT AND RESULTED IN A INTERNAL ENG TAILCOME FIRE, SEVERAL PAXS FANICKED UPON SELING THE TORCH FLAME/TA(LCONE FIRE AND RETWEEN 30 TO 30 PAXS HADE AN UNAUTHORIZED EVACUATION OF THE ACFT VIA THE L3 AND L4 EXIST AND THE EVACUATION OF THE AUTHORIZED AND L4 EXIST PAXS INTITIATED THE EVACUATION OF THE UNATTENDED L3 EXIT, A F/A MISTAKENLY ASSUMED THAT AN AUTHORIZED EVACUATION WAS IN EFFECT AND THEREFORE OFFENED L4 AND ALLOWED FURTHER PAXS TO EVACUATE, THE EVACUATION OF THE ACFT WAS LATER STOPPED AND BROUGHT UNDER CONTROL, THE FIT CREW WAS AT FIRST NEITHFR AWARE OF THE ENG TOKCH AND SUBSEQUENT TAILCONE FIRE NOR THE EVACUATION. WHEN THEY LEARNED OF THE TAILCONE FIRE THEY MOTORED THE MOSIN ORDER TO EXTINGUISH THE FIRE WHICH THEY RELIEVED WAS DURIER CONTROL AND THEREFORE REQUESTED NO ENERGENCY ASSISTANCE, HUMBUER, ALC WAS ALERED BY FILLOTS IN NEARBY ACFT ABOUT THE OCCURRENCE AND ATC NOTIFIED OFF WHO RESPONDED TO THE SITE, THE NOS. I 8.2.

Brief of Accident (Continued)

A/C Res. No. N309EA

JAMAICA, NY 2/15/86 File No. - 1179

Time (Lc1) - 1830 EST

Occurrence

MISCELLANEOUS/OTHER

Phase of Operation

Finding(s)

1. JUDGEMENT - MISJUDGED - PASSENGER 2. IMPROPER MECISION, PANIC - OTHER FERSONNEL 3. SUPERVISION - INADEQUATE - FLIGHT ATTENDANT 4. CREW/GROUF COORDINATION - DELAYED - FILOT IN COMMAND 5. JUDGEMENT - MISJUDGED - FILOT IN COMMAND

----Probable Cause----

The National Transportation Safety Roard determines that the Probable Cause(s) of this accident is/are finding(s) 1

Factor(s) relating to this accident is/are finding(s) 2,3

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Brief of Incident

File No 5043 3/26/86	ROSTON•MA	A/C Reg. No. N52311		Time (Lc1)	2341 EST	! ! ! ! !
Basic Information Type Operatins Certificate-AIR CARRIER - FLAG/NOMESTIC Name of Carrier Type of Operation -SCHEDULEN,NOMESTIC, FASSENGE Flight Conducted Under -14 CFR 121 Incident Occurred Durins -14XI	-AIR CARRIER - FLAG/DOMESTIC -TRANS WORLD AIRLINES -SCHEDULED, DOMESTIC, PASSENGER -14 CFR 121	Aircraft Damade NONE Fire Crew NOME Fass	Fatal	Serious M 0 0 0	45 Hinor 0 22	8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
Hake/Model - BOEING 727-231 Landing Gear - TRICYCLE-RETRACTARLE Hax Gross Wt - 142000 No. of Seats - 134	Eng Make/Nodel Number Engines Engine Type Rated Power	udei – FRW J18D-94 1nes – 3 e – TURBOFAN r – UNK/NR	日 - 	ELT Installed/Activated Stall Warning System	tavated System -	YES/NO YES
	Itinerary Last Departure Foin ST LOUIS,MO festination SAME AS ACC/INC ATC/Airspace FT SCATTERED Type of Flight Plan Type of Clearance Type APCh/Lndd	ure Foint MO CC/INC Sht Plan - IFR arance - IFR nds - ILS-COMPLETE	Airport Frox ON AIRPORT Airport Data LOGAN INTL Runmay Ide Runmay Sur Kunmay Sta	xx mits for the contract of th	22L 10005/ 150 ASPHALT DRY	0
Filot-Information Filot-In-Command Certificate(s)/Rating(s) ATF ME LAND	Ase ~ 48 Riemial Flisht Review Current - YE Months Since - UN	Hedical Certi S Total K/NR Make/Mode 7 Instrumen 7 Multi-End	ficate - VALID MFDI Flisht Time (Hours) - 7792 L 702 t- UNK/NR L 7792	D MFDICAL-NO WAI Hours) Last 24 Hrs Last 30 Day Last 90 Day	WAIVERS/LIMI Hrs - A Tays- UNK/NR Tays- UNK/NR	T 4 W W W W W W W W W W W W W W W W W W
	i.					

Instrument Rating(s) - AIRPLANE

SHOKE FM AN OVERHEATED AIR COND. (A/C) FACK BIN ENTERING THE CARIN & THE F/A'S KETURNED TO THEIR DUTY STATIONS. THE FLT CREW STOFFED THE AFT AT THE GATE & SHUT DWN THE ENGS, BUT LEFT THE AFD KUNNING TO FROVIDE ELECTRICITY FOR LIGHTING. THE CREW STOFFED THE LEFT AND BOOK & SOW FSUL OPENED THE FAX. THE CAFT HADE AN ANNOUNCEMENT TO KEEP THE FAX CALM, BUT SHOKE BCM DENSE & PAX OPENED THE ENERG EXITS OVR THE WINGS & BGN EXITING FN THEM. TWO PAX RCUD KEEP IN THE FAX CALM, BUT SHOKE BCM DENSE & PAX OPENED THE ENERGE ENTITING FN THEM. TWO PAX RCUD HING FAN INOF AS AUTHORIZED BY THE MIN EQUIP LIST (KEL). ORG FLT, A RADIO INTERFERENCE FILTER IN THE A/C SYS FAILED WHICH ALLOWED THE FWD FACK SHUT-OFF VALVE TO OPEN, BUT NOT CLOSE, THIS PERMITTED AFU AIR TO RUN THE AFECTED FACK EVEN THO THE SWITCH WAS OFF & A CIRCUIT BRKK WAS FULLED. WITH THE ENGS SHUT DOWN & THE R COOLING FAN INOP, THE SYS OVERHEATED. TWO OF 3 REOD FLT ATTENDANTS (F/A/S) WERE DISTRIBUTING PASSENGER (FAX) COATS AS THE ACFT WAS BFING TAXIED AFTER LNDG. ----Narrative

Brief of Incident (Continued)

3/26/86 File No. - 5043

A/C Res. No. N52311

ROSTON, MA

Time (Lc1) - 2341 EST

Occurrence Phase of Operation

AIRFRAME/COMPONENT/SYSTEM FAILURE/MALFUNCTION TAXI - FROM LANDING

Finding(s)

1. AIR COND/HEATING/PRESSURIZATION,CABIN TEMP CONTROL - FAILURE,FARTIAL 2. AIR COND/HEATING/PRESSURIZATION - OVERTEMPERATURE 3. FUSELAGE,CABIN - SMOKE

----Probable Cause

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the Probable Cause(s) of this incident is/are finding(s) 1,2

Brief of Accident

A/C Reg. No. N4714U

HONOLIIL U, HI

11/16/84

3332

File No.

Tine (Lc1) - 1333 HST

E-RETRACTABLE End Hake/Model - UNK UNK ELT Installen/Activated - NO E-RETRACTABLE Engines - 10KROFAN	Basic Information Type Operating Certificate-AIR CARRIER - Flee Name of CarrierONITED AIRLINES Type of OperationSCHEDULED, INTL, Pr Flight Conducted Under14 CFR 121 Accident Occurred DuringTAREOFF	i - FlaG/DOMFSTIC Aircraft Damase INES SUBSTANTIAL INTL'FASSENGER Fire NOWE	Fatal Serious Minor None Crew 0 0 0 16 Pass 0 2 38 355
Itinerary Last Departure Fuint SAME AS ACC/INC Destination LOS ANGELES,CA ATC/Airspace Type of Flight Flan - IFR Type of Clearance - IFR Type of Clear	Aircraft Information Hake/Model - BOEING 747-122 Landing Gear - TRICYCLE-RETRACTABLE Hax Gross Wt - 710000 No. of Seats - 495	t # 1 1	1 fr i
Age - 54 Medical Certificate - VALID MFDICAL-WAIVERS/L Biennial Flight Review Flight Time (Hours) Current - YES Total - 20733 Last 24 Hrs - Months Since - UNK/NR Make/Model 1548 Last 30 Days-Aircraft Type - 747 Instrument - UNK/NR Last 90 Days-Hulti-Eng - UNK/NR Rotorcraft -	Weather Data Weather Data Westher Data Wx Briefins - UNK/NR Hethod - UNK/NR Completeness - UNK/NR Rasic Weather - UMC Wind Dir/Speed - 006/011 KTS Visibility - 25.0 SH Lowest Sky/Clouds - CLEAR Lowest Ceilins - NONE Dbstructions to Vision - NONE Precipitation - NONE	ture Fuint ACC/INC LES,CA 19ht Flan - earance - Lnds -	- 08R - 12000/ - ASPHALT - DRY
	 ហ **	S K/NR 7	- VALID MFDICAL-WAIVERS/L Time (Hours) 33 Last 24 Hrs - 148 Last 30 Days- NR Last 90 Days- NR Rotorcraft -

AFTER ACCELERATING TO ABOUT 153 KTS DRG THE TAKEOFF ROLL, THE #7 TORE FOLIED & THE FLT CREW ANORTED THE TAKEOFF. THE ACT WAS STOPPED WITH AFX 3000 FT OF RWY REMAINING, DUE TO A FUEL LEAK FROM THE RIGHT WING, THE CAPT ORDERED AN EVACUATION SOVE THE PA, \$ ATION PROM THE LEFT SIDE OF THE ACFT ONLY. HOWEVER, THE 2ND OFFICER DID NOT RELAY THE CAPT SINSTRUCTIONS OUR THE FA, \$ WHEN THE CAPT ACTIVATED THE EVACUATION SIGNAL, THE SLIDES/RAFTS WFRE DEPLOYED ON WOTH SIDES OF THE ACFT. AFTER AFX 20 OCCUPANTS HAD EVACUATED THRO EXIT 1L, THE STITCHING IN THE GRID BAR LUNFS FAILED AT THAT LOCATION. SUBSEQUENTLY, THE SLIDES/RAFT SEPARATED & 2 PAX WERE SERIOUSLY INJURED. ALSO, I FLT ATTENDANT HAD TAKEN A SHALL GIRL TO THE LAVORATORY & WAS NOT IN A FSN TO OPEN HER ASSIGNED EXIT (DOOR AL); HOWEVER, A FAX WHO TRAVELED OFTEN BY AIR, OFFEND THE DOOR. AN INVESTIGATION REVEALED THE #7 TIRE HAD FAILED. THIS CAUSED THE WHEEL & INVESTIGATION FEVEALED THE FISES TO MELT & BLOW OUT, THE REASION FOR THE BEARING FAILED. THIS CAUSED THE WHEEL & TIRE TO OVERHEAT, WHICH ALLOWED THE FUSES TO MELT & BLOW OUT, THE REASION FOR THE BEARING FAILED.

Brief of Accident (Continued)

Time (1.c1) - 1333 HST

A/C Reg. No. N4714U HONOLULU, HI 11/16/84 File No. - 3322

AIRFRAME/COMPONENT/SYSTEM FAILURE/MALFUNCTION TAKEOFF - GROUND RUN Fhase of Operation Occurrence #1

Finding(s)

1, LANDING GEAR'WHEEL - FAILURE,FARTIAL 2. LANDING GEAR'WHEEL - OVERTEMPERATURE 3, LANDING GEAR'TIRE - FAILURE,TOTAL

MISCELLANEOUS/OTHER STANDING Phase of Oreration Occurrence #2

Finding(s)

4, EMERGENCY FROCEDURE - INITIATED - FILOT IN COMMAND S. COMM/NAV EQUIPMENT,INTERCOM - ERRATIC 6. MISC EDPT/FURNISHINGS,SLIDES - DISCONNECTED 7. PROCEDURES/DIRECTIVES - NOT FOLLOWED - FLIGHT ATTENDANT

----Frobable Cause----

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the Probable Cause(s) of this accident is/are finding(s) 1:2:6

Factor(s) relating to this accident is/are finding(s) 5