ADOPTED: 3/1/90

Leg # 2017



## **National Transportation Safety Board**

Washington, D.C. 20594 Safety Recommendation

Date: March 13, 1990 In reply refer to: A-90-20 and 21

Honorable James B. Busey Administrator Federal Aviation Administration Washington, D.C. 20591

On May 24, 1988, a British Aircraft BAC-1-11, N1544, encountered severe weather turbulence as it descended through 13,000 feet during thunderstorm activity about 35 miles west of Orlando, Florida. Three seatbelts detached from their shackles during the turbulence; the three passengers in the seats were displaced and sustained minor injuries. A fourth passenger and two flight attendants also sustained minor injuries resulting from the turbulence. The flightcrew and 53 passengers were not injured. The airplane, operated by Braniff as flight 723 from Indianapolis, Indiana, to Orlando, sustained minor damage but landed at the Orlando airport without further incident.1/

The passenger seatbelts were typical of the type commonly used in air carrier, air taxi, and commercial airplanes. The seatbelt assembly comprised the standard release buckle, webbing, and an attachment fitting with a spring clip keeper at each end of the belt. The attachment fittings clip over shackles that are bolted to the seatframes.

During the Safety Board's investigation of the incident, investigators found that other seatbelts began to detach from seats after they forceably pulled on the belts. Investigators also learned that at least one air carrier had installed a modification on the seatbelts in its airplanes to correct the problem.

Using the facilities of the Civil Aeromedical Institute (CAMI), Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Safety Board investigators and CAMI engineers conducted tests to identify ways that seatbelt attachment fittings could detach from the shackles bolted to seatframes. The tests revealed that when the bolt used to fasten the shackle to the seatframe is overtightened, the shackle cannot move vertically to self-center. The seatbelt end

<sup>1/</sup> NTSB Field Accident Report MIA 881A177, Brief No. 5006 (attached).

fitting is thus prevented from centering on the shackle. Under this condition, the end fitting cannot align with the seat occupant, minimal side loads will force open the spring loaded keeper of the end fitting, and the end fitting will detach from the shackle.

On November 25, 1988, the FAA's Northwest Mountain Region reported the findings of the tests (attached) to FAA headquarters in Washington, D.C., and recommended that a general notice (GENOT) be issued to alert operators of the problem. Safety Board investigators were told that the Office of Flight Standards would be responsible for examining the report and, if warranted, for issuing appropriate corrective measures. Corrective measures have not been taken, and the Safety Board is concerned that operators may be unaware of this unsafe condition related to passenger seatbelts.

Therefore, the National Transportation Safety Board recommends that the Federal Aviation Administration:

Issue a maintenance alert to principal maintenance inspectors to inspect seatbelt attachment shackles installed on passenger seats on air carrier, air taxi, and commercial airplanes to verify that the correct bolts are used to fasten the shackles to the seats, the bolts are torqued to the correct value, and the shackles are free to self-center after the correct torque has been applied to the bolts. (Class II, Priority Action) (A-90-20)

Require principal maintenance inspectors to verify that air carrier, air taxi, and commercial operators have maintenance instructions for the proper installation of passenger seatbelt attachment shackles. (Class II, Priority Action) (A-90-21)

KOLSTAD, Chairman, COUGHLIN, Acting Vice Chairman, LAUBER and BURNETT, Members, concurred in these recommendations.

. مرتبع الم

James L. Kolstad By:

Chairman

2

Multunel fra Lation Safety Board Wash n. D.C. 20544

File No 5006	5/24/88	ORLANDO, FL		A/C Reg.	No. N1544		Time (Lul) -	1530 EDI	
	_ 0 دب	-AIR CARRIER - FLAG/DOMESTIC -BRANIFF, INC, -SCHEDULED,DOMESTIC,FASSENGER -14 CFR 121 -DESCENT	/TOMESTIC /PASSENGER	Alrcraft Da Alrcraft Da Alnor Fire None	Пападе Стеи Стеи	66 Fatal 55 00	Serious M	а М 1 С С С С С С С	ם ביוחי היים א
Aırcraft Informatı Make/ndel Landıng Gear Max Gross Wt No. of Seats	H AIRCRAFT Le-Retracta	BAC-111-203 ARLE	Ens Make/Model Number Ensines Ensine Type Ratne Fower	del - ROLLS ROYCE res - 10410 HF - 10410 HF	котсе 506-140 БЕТ	0 1 2 2 2 2 1 1	ELT Installed/Activated - UNK/NR Stall Warning System - YES	tivated	UNKZI
rronment/Orerat ther Data Rethod Comrleteness Sate Weather Wind Dir/Sreed Visibility Lowest Sky/Clo Lowest Sky/Clo Lowest Ceiling Ubstructions th Freeiritation	ris Information	SCATTERED	A Province of the second secon	terture Foint AAFOLIS,IN ten ten ter 0.FL Flight Flan - IFR Clearance - IFR Clearance - HONE		AITPORT Fro AITPORT Fro AITPORT Deta Runway Id Runway Lu Frunway St	RT/STRTP RT/STRTP RT/STRTP Rt/STRTP A/Bid atus atus		
	14(S)	Ase	45 45 Flisht Re ent Since raft Tyre		Medical Certificate Medical Certificate Flight Total Make/Model - 56 Instrument- UNK, Multi-Eng - UNK,		CAL-NO ast 24 ast 30 ast 90 otorra	LUERS/L	IMIT 190 230 230
Inst	- AIRP	ANE							
Narrative THE FLT WAS DESCENDING THRU 13000 FT WHEN TURRULENCE W WERE INJURED. THE FASSENGERS WERE INJURED WHEN THEIR S SHACKLES AND THE FASSENGERS STRUCK CABIN FURNISHINGS. OVERTIGHTENED (AND THE SHACKLE WAS NOT FREE TO SELF-CE END FITTING AND THE FITTING WOULD OPEN AND DETACH FROM	1 13000 FT WHE NS WERE INJURE STRUCK CABIN STRUCK CABIN STRUCK CABIN STRUCK CABIN NULD OPEN P	HEN TURRULENCE W HEN TURRULENCE W RED WHEN THEIR S IN FURNISHINGS. FREE TO SELF-CC AND DETACH FROM	TES THES	AS ENCOUNTERED, FOUR PASSENGERS EATBELTS' END FITTINGS DETACHED TESTS DETERMINED THAT WHEN A SHA NTER) A SEATRELT LOAD WOULD REND THE SHACKLE.	ENCOUNTERED. FOUR PASSENGERS AND TWO FLIGHT ATTENDENTS ENCOUNTERED. FOUR PASSENGERS AND TWO FLIGHT ATTENDENTS RELTS' END FITTINGS DETACHED FROM THEIR SEATS' TIE-DOWN IS DETERMINED THAT WHEN A SHACKLE'S ATTACHMENT POLT WAS R) A SEATRELT LOAD WOULD BEND THE KEEPER ON THE BELT'S E SHACKLE.	AND THEIR SEA FROM THEIR SEA CRLE'S ATTACHM	CONTRACTORNAL CONTRACTORNAC		1 2 2 2 2 3

j.46E

ł

## Brief of Incident (Continued)

ĺ

~

.

Overation Deservion Deserv	File No 5006 5/24/88 ORLANDO,FL A/C Red. No. N1544 Time (Lcl) - 1530 EDT
--	--

five Nutional Transportation Safety Board determines that the Probable Cruse(s) of this incident indines of this incident

••

•

~~

National Transporta Washington,	Portzı.Jn Safety Board ⊴ton, D.C. 20594	
Rrie f	of Accident	
757 4	A/C Rud, No. N93748	Time (Lc1) - 0851 ENT
Certificate-ON-DEMAND AIR TAXI Certificate-ON-DEMAND AIR TAXI 10n ed Under -14 CFR 91 red During -APFROACH	Aircraft Damade DESTROYED Fire Fiss NONE	Fatal Serious Minor Name 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
formation End May 1 CESSNA 152 ear TRICYCLE-FIXED Wumber Wt 1670 ets 2 Rated F	ke/Model - LY: OMING O-235-L2C Ensines - L Type - RECIPROCATING-CARBURETOR Pruer - 110 HF	ELT Installed/Activated - YES-UNK/NR Stall Warning System - YES TOR
Environment/Drevations Information Itinerary Weather Data - NO RECORD OF BRIEFING Last Der Wir Briefind - N/A Destination Commeleteness - N/A Destination Commeleteness - N/A Destination Basic Weather - VMC VMC LOCAL Wind Dir/Speed- 230/010 KTS A ATC/Airspe Visibility - I5.0 SM ATC/Airspe Usibility - I5.0 SM ATC/Airspe Lowest Sky/Clouds - CLEAR Type of Lowest Ceiling - NONE Type APC Precipitation of Light - DAYLIGHT	ry Der rture Point E Å. ACC/INC ation AL AL SPace of Elisht Plan - NONE of Elistance - NONE Arch/Lnds - TRAFFIC PATTERN	Arrert Froximity ON AIRPORT Arrert Nata NUFAGE Runway Ident - 28 Runway Surface - ASPHALT Runway Status - DRY
Fersonnel Information Filot-In-Command Certificate(s)/Rating(s) Biennial Flisht Review Current - N/ Months Since - N/ Aircraft lyre - N/	hedical Certificate Review Flisht - N/A Total - e - N/A Make/Model- Pe - N/A Instrument-	e - VALID MEDICAL-WAIVERS/LIMIT t Time (Hours) 33 Last 24 Hrs - 1 32 Last 30 Days- 5 0 Last 90 Days- 12
Rating(s) - NONE		
WAS SEQUENCED TO LND BHND N97 THE STUDENT WAS CLRU TO LND. SHORT OF THE RWY, WITNESSES ST AT LOW SFEED, AS IF TO GET WI II, WITNESSES SAID N20 WAS HOU SHE WAS A STUDENT, THIS INFO FLT OF N93748 WAS A STUDENT, E FWDD, FLAPS WERE FND AT TO I E FLAPS FULL UF FOR GO-ARND; F	LE BEECH 90 (N2 FEC LTR, N20 WA THE STUDENT FL SEFN BHND N20, G ON THE RWY W N0T PASSI D TUD N0T PASSI D TUDENT CRMDD STUDENT STUDENT WAS T	0) WAS AWAITING TKOF, AS N97M WAS LNDG, S CLRT FOR TKOF, SHORTLY THEREAFTER, N93748 EW FM A CLOSE BASE TO A SHORT FINAL APCH, TOWER SUFUSR (CIC) OBSERVED INADOT SEFH HEN THE STUDENT REGAN S-TURNING, BFR TKOF, LCL CTLRS, LCL CTLR WAS IN TRNG, NEITHER ID ON INITIAL CALL TO RDD FAC, BUT, ATC RND TO USE FULL FLAPS AND USE S-TURNS ON F FLAPS UNTIL SAFE SPEED WAS OBTAINED,

3

-----

ь. Г. Н.

---{

Brief of Accident (Continued)

ĺ

File No 757 4/15/89 WEST CHICAGO,IL A/C Res	A/C Res. No. N93748 Time	Time (Lc1) - 0851 EDT
Uccurrence ‡1 LOSS OF CONTROL ~ IN FLIGHT Fhase of Operation AFFROACH - VFR FATTERN - FINAL AFFROACH		
Finding(s) 1. CONTROL TOWER SERVICE - INADEQUATE - ATC FSNL(LCL/GND/CLNC) 2. VISUAL SEFARATION - INADEQUATE - ATC FSNL(LCL/GND/CLNC) 3. SUFERVISION - IMFROFER - ATC FERSONNEL(SUFERVISOR) 4. MANEUVER - IMFROPER - FILOT IN COMMAND 5. RAISING OF FLAPS - IMFROPER - PILOT IN COMMAND 6. IMFROFER TRAINING - FLIGHT INSTRUCTOR(ON GROUND) 7. LACK OF TOTAL EXPERIENCE - FILOT IN COMMAND		
Occurrence 12 IN FLIGHT COLLISION WITH TERRAIN/WATER Fhase of Operation AFFROACH		
Frobable Cause		
The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the Probable Cause(s) of this accident was: IMPROFER INSTRUCTION BY THE STUDENT'S FLIGHT INSTRUCTOR REGARDING THE EXECUTION OF S-TURNS ON FINAL APPROACH TO INCREASE SPACING AND THE RETRACTION OF FLAPS FULLY WHEN EXECUTING A GO-AROUND AND THE FAILURE OF THE STUDENT FI	ve(s) of this accident was: OUTION OF S-TUENS ON FINAL AFFROACH TO DUND AND THE FAILURE OF THE STUDENT FILOT TO	ROACH TO IDENT FILOT TO

MAINTAIN ADEQUATE FLYING SPEED WHILE MAKING STEEP S-TURNS OP FINAL APPROACH. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS WERE: INADEQUATE ATC CONTROL TOWER SERVICE AND TRAFFIC SEPARATION, IMPROPER SUPERVISION IN THE TOWER, AND INEXPERIENCE OF THE STUDENT FILDI.

ICIID

<u>ACTION</u>: Service Problems with Seat Belt Installations on Transport Airplanes

NOV 2 5 1988

Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service, ANM-100

Manager, Aircraft Maintenance Division, AFS-3007
Manager, Aircraft Engineering Division, AIR-100

On May 24, 1988, a Braniff/Florida Express BAC 1-11 enroute from Indianapolis to Orlando was descending at 13,000 feet, passing through a thunderstorm, when it encountered turbulence. Three passengers were injured when their seat belts became detached from the seat frame. The Miami NTSB office has been investigating this incident, and the initial finding was that the detachment may not be an isolated case. We were told that the Miami FSDO was advised of the problem.

Personnel from the NTSB visited the Civil Aeromedical Institute (CAMI) to discuss the incident with CAMI engineers and better understand the problem. During the visit, they determined it was possible to duplicate the failure by overtightening the bolt attaching the shackle to the seat frame. If the bolt is too tight, the shackle cannot freely rotate, which in turn prevents the belt from properly aligning with the fitting. The belt fitting is not designed to take side loads.

Since this problem could be widespread throughout the fleet of transport airplanes, and since it would be difficult to determine which airplanes are affected, we recommend a GENOT be issued requiring all operators of transport category airplanes to inspect the seat belt attachments on all airplanes for freedom of movement of the shackle, which would allow self-alignment of the belt and fittings when loaded in the normal direction.

We suggest the following words for the GENOT:

"Inspect all air carrier passenger seat belt installations at their attachment to the seats for proper installation of the shackle. Several cases of overtorquing of the shackle bolt have been reported. In each case, overtorquing prevented the shackle from freely rotating, which in turn prevented the belts from properly aligning with the fitting. Loss of the self-alignment feature of this connection may cause the belt hook keeper to distort under load allowing the hook to release from the shackle. Please forward information concerning any overtorqued shackle bolts that are discovered to ANM-100."

Original signet Leroy A. Keith

Leroy A. Keith

ANM-112:IConnally:mmd:FTS446-2112 Revised 11/9/88 WP:f.\home\mmd\StBlts cc:ANM-100L, ANM-100S File: 8042-25.785