adapted 9/24/90

Log 2325



National Transportation Safety Board

Washington, D.C. 20594

Safety Recommendation

Date: September 24, 1990
In reply refer to: A-90-121 through -123

Honorable James B. Busey Administrator Federal Aviation Administration Washington, D.C. 20591

The National Transportation Safety Board is concerned about the potential for loss of pitch control of Nihon YS-11 airplanes as a result of tailplane icing.

On March 15, 1989, Mid Pacific Airlines flight 101, crashed while on approach to Purdue University Airport, West Lafayette, Indiana. The airplane was being positioned for a revenue flight and contained no cargo or passengers. Eyewitnesses noted that the airplane's nose suddenly pitched downward while on short final approach. The airplane struck an embankment 20 feet high, about 1/4 mile from the runway threshold. The landing gears were extended and the flaps were extended to 35° when the impact occurred. As a result of the accident, the two crewmembers were killed and the airplane was destroyed. A substantial quantity of ice was found on the leading edges of the horizontal stabilizer shortly after the crash. No evidence of ice was found on the vertical stabilizer or wings. The examination and testing of the pneumatic deicing system components revealed no anomalies.

The Safety Board determined that tailplane icing was a cause of the March 15, 1989 accident. An accident brief, containing the board's probable cause is attached.

On April 3, 1990, N112MP, another Nihon YS-11 operated by Mid Pacific Airlines, experienced a loss of pitch control while on final approach to Purdue University Airport. At 1,100 feet agl, with a speed of 130 to 135 KIAS, 35° of landing flap was selected. The airplane began to buffet and at 800 feet agl, the airplane pitched downward approximately 20°. The captain applied full power, and the first officer retracted the flaps to 15°. The airplane did not respond to elevator control, but with the application of full power and selection of 15° flaps, the airplane began to respond and accelerate on runway heading at 200 feet agl. The captain reported that the airplane continued to buffet and that there was no pitch response when the control yoke was initially moved about 12 inches fore and aft from the neutral position. Upon reaching approximately 180 KIAS, the buffeting subsided and pitch control was regained. The captain diverted to Indianapolis, Indiana, and made an uneventful landing, maintaining airspeed

above 180 KIAS. An inspection of the airplane revealed a substantial amount of ice still adhering to the tail surfaces not covered by deicing boots. The investigation of the April 3 incident is continuing.

The Nihon YS-11 is a twin-engine airplane powered by Rolls Royce Dart engines. The airplane was manufactured in Japan by Nihon Industries in the 1960's. Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Ltd., now maintains the airworthiness certification responsibilities for the airplane. One hundred eighty-eight YS-11 airplanes were manufactured. Approximately 150 of them are still operating around the world. The FAA's January 1990 Air Carrier Aircraft Utilization and Propulsion Reliability Report listed 21 YS-11's in service in the United States. These aircraft are operated by three U.S. companies for passenger and cargo transport.

During the Safety Board's investigation into the 1989 accident, it was learned that at least one YS-11 operator, Airborne Express Inc., currently imposes a 20° limitation on landing flap extension during known icing conditions. The operator does not recall the source of the restriction, and the approved Nihon manual currently has no such restriction.

Discussions with Reeve Aleutian Airways Inc., a current YS-11 operator, indicate that the potential for adverse handling characteristics with tailplane icing may be aggravated by operating the airplane near the forward center of gravity limits. Therefore, it has restricted airplane loading to no further forward than 25 percent MAC at all times.

Mitsubishi customer support has notified the Safety Board that it agrees with the assessment that in the presence of excessive ice buildup on the horizontal stabilizer, control of the airplane may be adversely affected. To avoid a recurrence of similar incidents, it intends to propose flight manual changes to the Japan Civil Aviation Board. The proposed changes include using the minimum flap setting required for the landing condition, not increasing flap settings below 1,000 feet agl or, if full flaps are to be used, selecting full flaps above 1,000 feet agl.

The Safety Board believes that there is a potential for loss of pitch control when the YS-11 encounters tailplane icing with flaps greater than 20° selected. Operation of the airplane at or near the forward CG limit may aggravate the condition.

Therefore, the National Transportation Safety Board recommends that the Federal Aviation Administration:

Conduct a directed safety review of the Nihon YS-11 icing certification to include the effects of flap extension and forward CG loading on pitch control with tailplane ice accumulation. (Class II, Priority action)(A-90-121)

As an interim measure to the completion of the directed safety review, issue an emergency airworthiness directive applicable to YS-11 airplanes that limits the use of flaps to 20° or less

for landing in the presence of known icing conditions. Require that a placard be installed, and that the Pilot's Operational Handbook be modified accordingly. (Class II, Priority Action)(A-90-122)

Issue an air carrier operation bulletin to principal operations inspectors to advise YS-11 operators of the potential for loss of pitch control of the airplane when using flaps greater than 20° for landing with ice on the tailplane. (Class II, Priority Action) (A-90-123)

KOLSTAD, Chairman, COUGHLIN, Vice Chairman, and LAUBER, BURNETT, and HART, Members, concurred in these recommendations.

By: James L. Kolstad

Chairmar

National Transport , Safety Board Washington, ..C. 20594

Brief of Accident

No. 1 599	WEST LAFAYETIE, IN	A/C Res, No. NI	N128#F	Time (Lc1) - 0726	E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E
Type Operating Certificate-AIR CARRIEN Name of Carrier - HID PACIFI Type of Operation - NON SCHED, Flisht Conducted Under - 14 CFR 121 Accident Occurred Rusing - AFPROACH	Certificate-AIR CARRIER - FLAG/DOMESTIC - MID PACIFIC AIRLINES ton - NO SCHED, DOMESTIC, CARGO ad Under - 14 CFR 121 ed During - APPROACH	Aircraft Bamase DESTROYED Fire ON GROUND	Fatal Crew Pass 0	Injuries Serious Mir 0	Mirior None 0 0 0
Aircraft Information Hake/Model - NIHON YS-11A-600 Landing Gear - TRICYCLE-RETRACTABLE Hax Gross Wt - 55110 No. of Seats - 3	Ens Mak ABLE Number Ensine Rated F	rke/Hodel - ROLLS-ROYCE DART 542-10J Engines - 2 Tyre - TURBOFROF Fower - 2680 HF	1	ELT Installed/Activated Stall Warnins System -	sted - YES-UNK/NR n - YES
erations Inform - COMPANY - IN PERSON ss - UNK/NR r - UNC reed- 280/016 K 7Clouds - N 11ns - N 11ns - N 11ns of Lisht - D	It p AT	ture Foint MTE, IN AYETTE, IN 19ht Flan - IFR earance - IFR Lnds - VISUAL	Airport Fro OFF AIRFO Airport Bata PURNUE UN RUNWAY I RUNWAY I RUNWAY SU RUNWAY SU RUNWAY SU	ximits RT/STRIF IVERSITY ent	AIRFORT 28 6600/ 150 ASFHALT DRY
Personnel Information Filot-In-Command Certificate(s)/Rating(s) ATF SE LAND,ME LAND	Age - 36 Biennial Flight Review Current - YE Months Since - 8 Aircraft Type - YS	S 11	ficate - 72 I- 20 t- UNK/	CAL-NO ast 24 ast 30 ast 90 otorera	WAIVERS/LIHIT Hrs - 3 Days- 21 Rays- 61 ift - 0
Instrument Rating(s) - AIRFLANE	PLANE		1 7 7 2 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5		
Narrative					

AN IFR FLIGHT WAS TERMINATED WITH A VISUAL AFPROACH. CONDITIONS WERE CONDUCIVE TO AIRFRAME ICING. THE AIRCRAFT
WAS BEING FOSTIONED EMPTY, WITH A CG AT 22.1% MAC. ON SHORT FINAL, AT AFPROXIMATELY 400 FT AGL, 35 DEGREES OF
WAS BEING FORTIONED EMPTY, WITH A CG AT 22.1% MAC. ON SHORT FINANDARD TO AN UNUSUAL ATTITUDE AND TO ENTER A STEEP
LANDING AS SELECTED. THE AIRCRAFT WAS ORSERVED REFORE THE AIRCRAFT IMPACTED A DIRT HILL SOO FT SHORT OF RWY 28. EXAMINATION
OF THE AIRFRAME AFTER THE ACCIDENT REVEALED 1/2 TO 3/4 INCH OF RIME ICE APHERING TO THE LEADING ENGE OF THE
HORIZONTAL STABILIZER, NO ICE WAS FOUND ON ANY OTHER PORTION OF THE AIRFRAME, EVIDENCE IN THE COCKPIT INDICATED
THAT ENGINE, PITOT, AND WINDSHIELD ANTI-ICE SYSTEMS WERE ON, BUT WING/EMFENNAGE DEICE WAS OFF, NO EVIDENCE OF A POWERFLANT OR SYSTEMS MALFUNCTION WAS FOUND.

Brief of Accident (Continued)

A/C Res, No. N128MF WEST LAFAYETTE, IN 3/15/89 File No.

Time (Lc1) - 0726 EST

Phase of Operation Occurrence #1

LOSS OF CONTROL - IN FLIGHT APPROACH - VFR PATTERN - FINAL APPROACH

Finding(s)

1. WEATHER CONDITION - ICING CONDITIONS
2. IN-FLIGHT PLANMINGIATIONS

2. IN-FLIGHT PLANNING/DECISION - IMPROFER - FILOT IN COMMAND 3. HORIZONTAL STABILIZER SURFACE - ICE 4. ANTI-ICE/DE-ICE SYSTEM - NOT USED - COFILOT/SECOND FILOT

5. LOWERING OF FLAPS - EXCESSIVE

IN FLIGHT COLLISION WITH TERRAIN/WATER DESCENT - UNCONTROLLED Fhase of Operation Occurrence #2

Finding(s)

6. TERRAIN CONDITION - DIRT BANK

----Frobable Cause----

The National Transportation Safety Roard determines that the Probable Cause(s) of this accident was: A LOSS OF CONTROL DUE TO THE INFROPER INFLIGHT DECISIONS BY THE CREW AND THE UNDETECTED ACCUMULATION OF ICE ON THE LEADING EDGE OF THE HORIZONTAL STABILIZER, DURING FLIGHT IN A FORWARD CENTER OF GRAVITY CONDITION AND EXACERBATED BY THE EXTENSION OF FULL LANDING FLAPS.