

## National Transportation Safety Board

Washington, D.C. 20594 Safety Recommendation

Date: December 5, 1989 In reply refer to: R-89-66 and -67

William H. Dempsey President and Chief Executive Officer Association of American Railroads 50 F Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20001

On May 11, 1987, a freight train derailed in Elm City, North Carolina. 1/ The cause of the accident was determined to have been a burned-off journal on a tank car carrying ethylene glycol. The derailment resulted in the piercing of a tank car carrying oleum and the subsequent evacuation of the 2,500 residents of Elm City. The journal burn-off was caused by the failure of a field-lubricated roller bearing mounted inside a friction-bearing journal box on a modified truck side frame. The train had passed a hotbox detector located 15 miles from the derailment site. Postaccident testing showed the detector to have been functioning properly and calibrated correctly. Bearing failure was, found to have resulted from loosening of the end cap screws, which had been in service almost 15 years.

On December 11, 1987, 25 freight cars derailed within Scott Air Force Base near Belleville, Illinois.2/ The cause of the derailment was determined to have been a burned-off journal on a tank car carrying white phosphorous that was coupled to three cars carrying liquefied petroleum gas. A precautionary evacuation took place although none of the cars ruptured. The burned-off journal was caused by the failure of a roller bearing mounted inside a friction-bearing journal box on a modified truck side frame. The train had traveled only 17 miles since its initial inspection and would have passed a hotbox detector in another 14 miles.

In both accidents, the potential danger of derailed cars carrying hazardous material was evident, and the failed bearings were mounted in modified freight car truck sides. Inspecting and servicing (field lubricated) roller bearings mounted in friction-bearing journal boxes on

 $\frac{1}{2}$  For detailed information, read Field Accident Brief 7058 (attached).  $\frac{2}{2}$  For detailed information, read Field Accident Brief 7147 (attached).

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modified truck side frames is more difficult and awkward than standard roller bearing truck sides. The friction-bearing journal box surrounds the roller bearing, obscuring much of the bearing and limiting access.

The friction-bearing journal box may act as a heat dissipator for failing and overheated roller bearings and might also screen the roller bearing from proper detection by hotbox sensors. The elimination of cabooses and the loss of direct observation of the rear of a train, the greater length of trains, and the greater reliance on hotbox detectors has made accurate reading of roller-bearing temperatures critical, particularly when roller bearings can fail and burn off a journal in only a few miles.

Modification of friction-bearing journal boxes was originally intended as a short-term economic measure to minimize the initial shortage of rollerbearing truck sides while railroads and builders began wholesale conversion to roller bearings. Relatively few such modified truck sides are now in service, and of those remaining, many have been in service for more than 30 years and have fulfilled their economic life. Elimination of the modified truck sides from the car fleet should have little effect on interchange or commerce.

The Association of American Railroads (AAR) has recently recognized the problems associated with detecting roller-bearing temperatures within modified friction-bearing journal boxes by issuing two letters to its members and private car owners. Although the AAR letter dated March 10, 1988, does not prohibit the use of modified freight car truck sides, it does prohibit new modifications pending results of hotbox compatibility tests. The September 20, 1988, letter prohibits combining freight car trucks having modified truck sides with trucks having standard roller-bearing truck sides on the same car. The AAR has completed the hotbox compatibility tests. However, on February 28, 1989, the Safety Board was informed by the AAR Manager of Equipment and Construction Engineering that the results were inconclusive. In light of such results, eliminating the use of modified freight car truck sides appears prudent.

The Safety Board understands, through communications with the AAR Assistant Vice President, that plain bearings are scheduled to be eliminated from interchange service by January 1, 1994 and consideration given to eliminate plain bearings from hazardous material cars (tank cars) by January 1, 1991. Such a schedule presents an excellent opportunity to also remove modified truck side frames from interchange service, eliminating friction type side frames in any form. This would prevent any possibility of future conversions and minimize any confusion as to interchange acceptance.

Therefore, the National Transportation Safety Board recommends that the Association of American Railroads:

Eliminate freight car truck sides that have been modified to incorporate roller bearings in a friction-bearing journal box on all freight cars used in hazardous material interchange service no later than January 1, 1991. (Class II, Priority Action) (R-89-66) Eliminate freight car truck sides that have been modified to incorporate roller bearings in a friction-bearing journal box on all freight cars used in interchange service no later than January 1, 1994. (Class II, Priority Action) (R-89-67)

KOLSTAD, Acting Chairman, BURNETT, LAUBER, NALL, and DICKINSON, Members, concurred in these recommendations.

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By: James L. Kolstad Acting Chairman

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD MASHINGTON, D.C. 20594

NTSB # ATL87FR014 File No 7058 05/11/87	BRIEF OF ACCIDENT	RUNDATE: 10/18/88 Time (151) _ 1020 EDT
Tufounction		1-4-1
Reporting Railroad - CSX Reporting Railroad - CSX Type of Accident - DERAILMENT Operating Phase - ENROUTE Method of Operation - AUTOMATIC BLOCK	Property Losses Railroad - \$ 703,479.00 Non-Railroad - \$ 347,000.00	Injuries Fatal Serious Minor None Employees 0 0 0 4 Passengers 0 0 0 0
TDANCDADT	Fire - NO	00
Railroad/Personnel Information		
Train Data Railroad - CSX Type of Train - FREIGHT Train ID - EXTRA 7007 NORTH Direction - MOTU	Train Consist/Damage No. Loco. Units - 6 No. Cars/Caboose - 137/1 End of Train Monitor - N/A	Crew Information Front End - 2 Rear End - 2 Toxicology Performed - YES
t.) - th.) -		Radio Communications Radio Available – YES
CSX - CSX TRANSPORTATION	vars vallayeu/veraileu - 20/20	uperational - YES
Environment/Operations Information		
Weather Data Weather Condition – CLEAR Condition of Light – DAYLIGHT	Itinerary Last Departure Point HAMLET, NC	Hazardous Materials Involved - YES Cars Involved - 5
Line of Sight - 1300		Type/No. of Tracks - MAIN/2
Evacuation - YES	KICHMOND, VA	Gradient - LEVEL Alignment - TANGENT
Narrative CSX freight train Extra 7007 North, consisting of 6 locomotive units and 137 freight cars, traveling at 40 mph, CSX freight train Extra 7007 North, consisting of 6 locomotive units and 137 freight cars, traveling at 40 mph, had 26 cars derail. There was a spill of Oleum from a damaged tank car and the entire population of about 2500 persons was evacuated from town. There was no fire or personal injury. A failed freight car journal and overheated bearing associated with one of the derailed cars was found at the site. The train had passed over a hot detector without any indication of hot bearing about 15 miles prior to the derailment location. The roller bearing equipped truck had been modified from a friction bearing type about 15 years prior to the derailment.	sisting of 6 locomotive units and 137 fre of Oleum from a damaged tank car and the was no fire or personal injury. A faile of the derailed cars was found at the sit bearing about 15 miles prior to the derai friction bearing type about 15 years pri	eight cars, traveling at 40 mph, entire population of about 2500 ad freight car journal and te. The train had passed over a hotbox ilment location. The roller bearing ior to the derailment.

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BRIEF OF ACCIDENT, continued	
File No 7058 05/11/87 ELM CITY, NC Time	Time (Lcl) - 1030 EDT
Occurrence #1 - TRAIN COMPONENT SYSTEM/FAILURE/MALFUNCTION Phase - MAINTAINING SPEED	
Finding(s) 1. ROLLER TRUCK SIDE - FAILURE (TOTAL) 2. AXLE JOURNAL - BURN-OFF	
Occurrence #2 - DERAILMENT,INITIAL Phase - MAINTAINING SPEED	
Finding(s) 3. WHEELS - SHEARED	
Occurrence #3 - DERAILMENT, GENERAL Phase - MAINTAINING SPEED	
Occurrence #4 - RUPTURE OF TANK CAR Phase - STOPPING	
Finding(s) 4. DOME - OVERTORGUE	
Probable Cause	
The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable Cause(s) of this accident is/are finding(s) 1, 2, 3	

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NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD WASHINGTON, D.C. 20594

NTSB # CHI88FR008 File No 7147 12/11/87	BRIEF OF ACCIDENT BELLEVILLE, IL	RUNDATE: 10/18/88 Time (Lcl) - 2245 CST
Basic Information Reporting Railroad - NS Type of Accident - DERAILMENT Operating Phase - ENROUTE Method of Operation - AUTOMATIC BLOCK TIMETABLE NS - NORFOLK SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY	Property Losses Railroad - \$ 469,300.00 Non-Railroad - \$ 0 Fire - NO	Inj Il Ser
Railroad/Personnel Information Train Data Railroad Type of Train - FREIGHT Train ID Direction - EAST Speed (Est.) - 43 Speed (Auth.) - 45 NS - NORFOLK SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY.	Train Consist/Damage 3 No. Loco. Units - 3 No. Cars/Caboose - 99/0 End of Train Monitor - N/A Length (Feet) - 5900 Trailing Tons - 8119 Loco. Damaged/Derailed - 25/25	Crew Information Front End - 5 Rear End - 0 Toxicology Performed - YES Radio Communications Radio Available - YES Operational - YES
Environment/Operations Information Weather Data Weather Condition - CLEAR Condition of Light - DARK Line of Sight - 1000 Evacuation - YES	Itinerary Last Departure Point EAST ST. LOUIS, IL Destination LOUISVILLE, KY	Hazardous Materials Involved - YES Cars Involved - 4 Track Information Type/No. of Tracks - MAIN/1 Gradient - DES. 0.02 Alignment - IANGENT
Narrative NS FREIGHT TRAIN EXTRA 7006 EAST WITH 3 LOCOMOTI BELLEVILLE, IL. THE TRAIN WAS TRAVELING AT A RE FAILED, OVERHEATED AND THE AXLE JOURNAL BURNT OF LOCATION. INVOLVED IN THE DERAILMENT WERE 3 CAR PERSONNEL BEGAN A CAUTIONARY EVACUATION DUE TO T	VE UNITS AND 99 CARS HAD 25 ( CORDED SPEED OF 43 MPH WHEN F. THE FIRST HOT BOX DETECT S OF L.P. GAS AND I CAR OF WI HE CLOSE PROXIMITY OF HOUSIN	CARS DERAIL AT SCOTT AFB NEAR THE TOWN OF THE BL-1 WHEEL BEARING OF THE 37TH CAR OR WAS 12.1 MILES PASSED THE ACCIDENT HITE PHOSPHORUS. SCOTT AIR FORCE 3 TO THE L.P. GAS.

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12/11/87 svetem/eatimpe/	ENT, continued E, IL Time (Lcl) - 2245 CST	
OCCURTENCE #1 - IKAIN COMPONENT SYSTEM/FAILURE/MALFUNCTION Phase - MAINTAINING SPEED Finding(s) 1. AXLE JOURNAL - BURN-OFF 2. EQUIPMENT INSPECTION - INADEQUATE - CARMAN 3. EQUIPMENT MAINTENANCE - INADEQUATE - OTHER GOVERNMENT PERSONNEL 4. INSUFFICIENT STANDARDS/REQUIREMENTS - OTHER GOVERNMENT PERSONNEL	RSONNEL NT PERSONNEL	
Occurrence #2 - DERAILMENT Phase - MAINTAINING SPEED Finding(s) 5. LIGHT CONDITION - NIGHT		
Frobable Cause The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the praccident is/are finding(s) 1 Factor(s) relating to this accident is/are finding(s) 2, 3, 4	nes that the probable Cause(s) of this ng(s) 2, 3, 4	
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