DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD
May 17, 1996
MEMORANDUM FOR: | G. W. Cunningham, Technical Director | |
COPIES: | Board Members | |
FROM: | M. J. Merritt | |
SUBJECT: | Review of Preparations for Liquid Stabilization of Plutonium Solutions in Building 771 at Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site, April 29-May 1, 1996 |
The Authorization Basis (AB) for the planned activity is still in the approval process after a recent change in the development method. The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board's (Board) staff (Bamdad, et.al.) reviewed the adequacy of the AB the previous week and will report the results separately. There is no mechanism in place for verifying that applicable AB requirements have been incorporated into implementing procedures. Also, no effort has been made to check a draft process procedure against the proposed AB document. The site intends to proceed with a hydroxide precipitation process using the existing AB.
The procedures for the solution stabilization processes are still in development. The draft procedure provided to the Board's staff has several weaknesses in content and format.
The training and qualification program had several weaknesses. The qualification requirements for stabilization process specialists and supervisors did not contain items that the contractor considered essential to ensure proper capabilities for certifying personnel for these positions. The qualification program needs to be better defined to match operator qualification to the specific tasks to be performed. These specific qualifications (e.g. solution precipitation) should build on the existing qualifications for routine building operations.
Due to the lack of an approved AB, facility management had not prepared a list of safety- related systems needed for the hydroxide precipitation process scheduled to start in June 1996. The systems and components that are essential for the stabilization processes have not been defined. As a result, the Facility Manager was unable to provide an overview of the status of operability of safety-related systems and work required to bring these systems to the required state of readiness.
The two primary categories, or feed types, of solutions in Building 771 are: (1) plutonium nitrate solutions containing uranium or chloride impurities; and (2) plutonium nitrate eluate solutions with various cationic impurities. A hydroxide precipitation is planned for the first feed type. A two-step oxalate and hydroxide precipitation process is planned for the second feed type. The processes to be used were developed by Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) and are now being adapted to the equipment and conditions at RFETS.
Early this year, the site decided to develop a Basis For Operations (BFO) for planned process activities. The BFO is a new document that RFETS plans to use for all future building and activity authorization basis. This document is planned to: (1) characterize the facility, its hazards and planned activities; (2) define hazard categorization protocol; (3) define facility activity tempos; and (4) define the recognized controls. The BFO is planned to develop event scenarios in each tempo for each hazard category and determine those scenarios that are scenarios of concern (SOCs). All SOCs will be analyzed and control sets will be developed for each. The Board's staff reviewed the adequacy of this AB process the previous week and will report on it separately.
There was no mechanism for verifying that applicable AB requirements had been incorporated into procedures and no effort had been made to check a draft process procedure against the proposed AB document.
The development of a BFO has caused delays and an approved AB was not available in February 1996 as scheduled. The site is now questioning the BFO approach to developing an AB so that an approved document is not expected to be available for the start of hydroxide precipitation operations. The site intends to use the existing AB with an updated JCO for the hydroxide precipitation process.
The staff reviewed a draft hydroxide precipitation procedure and found that no standard process exists to ensure the incorporation of all applicable AB requirements.
The qualification cards for the hydroxide precipitation process specialist and supervisor were reviewed and the following weaknesses were noted:
Preventive maintenance was also limited by contract to 150 actions per year. The briefer stated that this ensures the accomplishment of about 50-60 percent of the preventative maintenance requirements. The briefer could not describe how this program ensured safety related systems and other critical components were properly maintained by a selection process.
Equipment calibrations are managed by a central group. This group maintains a recall system for identifying equipment requiring calibration. The calibration group promulgates a monthly report of overdue calibration, but does not track any further status on these items. Accomplishment of overdue calibrations is considered the responsibility of operations management. The calibration group assumes any overdue items for which no action is taken are inactive. Accordingly, after a given period items are automatically assigned an inactive status.
The Board's staff will continue to review issues relating to AB implementation, procedure development, operator training and equipment readiness to ensure adequacy prior to resumption of solution processing.