FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE: March 3, 1999 SB-99-05

NTSB HIGHWAY SPECIAL INVESTIGATION ON MOTORCOACH ISSUES CALLS FOR REVIEW OF DOT SAFETY RATING AND INDUSTRY DRIVER FATIGUE AWARENESS

Washington, D.C. - A special investigation conducted by the National Transportation Safety Board has determined that busdriver fatigue along with the way the U.S. Department of Transportation rates the safety of bus companies contributed to two motorcoach accidents in 1995 and 1997.

The study focused on two accidents the NTSB investigated that are typical of the type of motorcoach accidents that it has examined over the years. The first occurred on October 15, 1995 when a bus operated by Hammond Yellow Coach Line, Inc., and occupied by a driver and 40 members of a high school booster club, failed to negotiate a curve and overturned as it entered an I-70 exit ramp in Indianapolis, Indiana. Two passengers were killed and the remaining persons aboard received serious or minor injuries.

On July 29, 1997, a bus operated by Rite-Way Transportation, Inc., and occupied by a driver and 34 members of a tour group, drifted off the side of I-95 near Stony Creek, Virginia, ran down an embankment into the Nottoway River and came to rest on its left side. One passenger died and 31 others received serious or minor injuries.

The investigations by the Board into these two accidents have highlighted factors that have been repeatedly identified as issues with potentially catastrophic consequences. Those issues are bus driver fatigue and poorly maintained or out of adjustment brakes.

The special investigation concluded that in the 1997 Rite-Way accident in Stony Creek “inverted duty-sleep” schedules created fatiguing conditions that caused the bus driver to fall asleep and run off the road. Inverted duty-sleep schedules are driving schedules that call for a period of rest on one day while scheduling a driving period during the same time on the following day.

In the review of the Hammond accident, the Board noted that the driver was at the end of his allowable duty cycle at the time of the accident and was driving at a time when he would have normally been asleep. Additionally, the driver was traveling on a route with which he was unfamiliar. Although speed and mechanical problems may have contributed to the accident, the report stated, “Fatigue is capable of degrading performance, which in turn can lead to an increased potential for operating errors.”

The special investigation recommends that the proposed Federal Highway Administration fatigue video for motorcoaches include the potential dangers of inverted duty-sleep periods, and advises the American Bus Association and the United Motorcoach Association to “alert your members to the potential dangers of inverted duty-sleep periods.”

Another factor cited in the special report was the DOT’s safety rating methodology. In the Board’s investigation it was revealed that in June 1994 the Indiana State police inspected eleven buses in the Hammond fleet. All eleven buses inspected were placed out of service. However, due to the current safety rating methodology, the carrier received an overall rating of “satisfactory” from the Office of Motor Carriers.

As a result of this special investigation report, the Board has recommended that the OMC revise the safety rating system so that adverse vehicle or driver performance-based data alone are sufficient to result in an overall unsatisfactory rating for the carrier. Similarly, if a carrier does not meet the driver factor rating due to out-of-service drivers, that determination should be serious enough to rate the carrier unsatisfactory overall as well.

The final safety factors mentioned in the report were emergency egress and passenger safety briefings. The Rite-Way bus was equipped with seven 56” by 36” designated emergency exit windows. Each window was hinged at the top to allow the window to swing upward when the emergency release bar was activated. During interviews conducted with passengers aboard the Rite-Way bus, several indicated that the windows were too heavy for them to open while the bus was on its side.

Post accident tests completed by the manufacturer revealed that an upward force of 85 pounds was needed to fully open the emergency exit window when the coach was lying on its side. As a result the Safety Board concluded, “the strength and height needed to open an emergency window when a motorcoach is not upright poses a problem for some passengers, especially children, senior citizens and some injury victims.”

Based on this conclusion, the Board recommended that the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration revise regulations to require that other-than-floor-level emergency exits can be easily opened and remain open during an emergency evacuation when a motorcoach is upright or at unusual attitudes.

The Board also concluded that emergency instructions can be crucial to a safe and expedient evacuation in the event of an accident or emergency. Consequently the Board recommended that the Department of Transportation provide guidance on the minimum information to be included in safety briefing materials for motorcoach operations and require motorcoach operators to provide passengers with pretrip safety information. The Safety Board has long recognized the importance of emergency egress and passenger safety briefings and issued the first recommendations addressing the matters 30 years ago.

The National Transportation Safety Board issued 15 new recommendations in the Selective Motorcoach Issues Special Report directed to the Department of Transportation, the National Highway Traffic Administration, the American Bus Association, and the United Motorcoach Association.

A complete copy of the NTSB report number NTSB/SIR-99/01 can be purchased from the National Technical Information Service, 5285 Port Royal Road, Springfield, Virginia, 22161, (703) 487-4650. The report is also available on the NTSB web page located at http://www.ntsb.gov/publictn/publictn.htm

NTSB Media Contact: Lauren Peduzzi (202) 314-6100

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