FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE: July 26, 2007 SB-07-38
NTSB DETERMINES COMAIR 5191 FLIGHT CREW FAILED TO USE AVAILABLE CUES TO DETERMINE LOCATION DURING TAKEOFF
Washington, DC -- The National Transportation Safety Board today determined the probable cause of the Comair flight 5191 accident in Lexington, Kentucky was the flight crew's failure to use available cues and aids to identify the airplane's location on the airport surface during taxi and their failure to cross check and verify that the airplane was on the correct runway before takeoff. Contributing to this accident were the flight crew's nonpertinent conversation during taxi, which resulted in loss of positional awareness and the Federal Aviation Administration's failure to require that all runway crossings be authorized only by specific air traffic control clearances.
"This accident was caused by poor human performance," said
NTSB Chairman Mark V. Rosenker. "Forty-nine lives could
have been saved if the flightcrew had been concentrating on
the important task of operating the airplane in a safe
manner."
On August 27, 2006, about 6:07 a.m., Comair flight 5191, a
Bombardier CRJ-100, (N431CA) crashed upon takeoff from Blue
Grass Airport in Lexington, Kentucky. The flight crew was
instructed to take off from runway 22, an air carrier runway
that is 7,003 feet long. Instead, the flight crew lined up
the airplane on runway 26, a 3,501-foot-long runway, and
began the takeoff roll. Runway 26 crosses runway 22 about
700 feet south of the runway 22 threshold. Of the 47
passengers and 3 crewmembers onboard, 49 were fatally
injured and one (the first officer) received serious
injuries. Impact forces and a postcrash fire destroyed the
airplane.
As a result of this accident, the safety Board made the
following recommendations:
To the Federal Aviation Administration:
The Safety Board reiterated two previously issued recommendations to the FAA:
Amend 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Section 91.129(i) to require that all runway crossings be authorized only by specific air traffic control clearance, and ensure that U.S. pilots, U.S. personnel assigned to move aircraft, and pilots operating under 14 CFR Part 129 receive adequate notification of the change.
Amend Federal Aviation Administration Order 7110.65, "Air Traffic Control," to require that, when aircraft need to cross multiple runways, air traffic controllers an issue explicit crossing instruction for each runway after the previous runway has been crossed.
Previously issued recommendations to the FAA resulting from this accident include:
Require that all 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 operators establish procedures requiring all crewmembers on the flight deck to positively confirm and cross-check the airplane's location at the assigned departure runway before crossing the hold- short line for takeoff.
Require that all 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 operators provide specific guidance to pilots on the runway lighting requirements for takeoff operations at night.
Work with the National Air Traffic Controllers Association to reduce the potential for controller fatigue by revising controller work-scheduling policies and practices to provide rest periods that are long enough for controllers to obtain sufficient restorative sleep and by modifying shift rotations to minimize disrupted sleep patterns, accumulation of sleep debt, and decrease cognitive performance. Develop a fatigue awareness and countermeasures training program for controllers and for personnel who are involved in the scheduling of controllers for operational duty that will address the incidence of fatigue in the controller workforce, causes of fatigue, effects of fatigue on controller performance and safety, and the importance of using personal strategies to minimize fatigue. This training should be provided in a format that promotes retention, and recurrent training should be provided at regular intervals.
Require all air traffic controllers to complete instructor-led initial and recurrent training in resource management skills that will improve controller judgment, vigilance, and safety awareness.
Earlier this year, the Board issued the following recommendation to the National Air Traffic Controller Association:
Work with the Federal Aviation Administration to reduce the potential for controller fatigue by revising controller work-scheduling policies and practices to provide rest periods that are long enough for controllers to obtain sufficient restorative sleep and by modifying shift rotations to minimize disrupted sleep patterns, accumulation of sleep debt, and decreased cognitive performance.
A synopsis of the Board's report, including the probable
cause and recommendations, is available on the NTSB's
website, www.ntsb.gov, under "Board Meetings." The Board's
full report will be available on the website in several
weeks.
NTSB Media Contact: Terry N. Williams
(202) 314-6100
williat@ntsb.gov
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