Accident Notification

On June 1, 1999, at 2351 Central Daylight Time (CDT), a McDonnell Douglas MD-82, N215AA, operated by American Airlines, Incorporated, as American Airlines Flight 1420, a regularly scheduled passenger flight from Dallas, Texas, overran the end of runway 4R (4 right) and collided with the localizer antenna and approach light stanchion at the Little Rock National Airport [Adams Field] (LIT) in Little Rock, Arkansas.

The Safety Board was notified of the accident on June 2, about 0115 Eastern Daylight Time. I was assigned as the Investigator-In-Charge. At 0430 the Go-Team assembled at Ronald Reagan National Airport in Washington., D.C. and departed via the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Gulfstream IV for Little Rock. The team arrived on-scene at approximately 0700. The Board Member on duty at the time of the accident was George Black and he accompanied the team to Little Rock.

The investigative team consisted of various specialists from the Safety Board's headquarters. The specialty areas were: Aircraft Operations, Human Performance, Aircraft Structure, Aircraft Systems, Powerplants, Maintenance Records, Air Traffic Control, Meteorology, Aircraft Performance, Survival Factors, and Airport/Search/Fire Rescue. Specialists were also assigned to conduct the readout of the digital flight data recorder (DFDR) and transcribe the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) in the Safety Board laboratory in Washington, D.C.

The following organizations were given party status and provide technical assistance to the Safety Board: the FAA, American Airlines, Boeing Commercial Airplane Group (BCAG), Pratt & Whitney Engines, the Allied Pilots Association (APA), the Association of Professional Flight Attendants (APFA), the National Air Traffic Controllers Association (NATCA), the National Weather Service (NWS), the Little Rock National Airport and the Little Rock Fire Department.

History of Flight

The accident occurred on the first of a scheduled three-day sequence for the crew. According to company records, the Captain reported for the initial segment at 1038 central time, and the F/O reported at 1018. The flight segments commenced at 1143 from Chicago's O'Hare International Airport (ORD), and proceeded to Salt Lake City International Airport (SLC), and then on to Dallas-Fort Worth International Airport (DFW), Dallas-Fort Worth, Texas. The final flight segment of the day was the flight to Little Rock.

Flight 1420 was scheduled to depart Dallas/Ft. Worth (DFW) at 2028 (8:28pm), however, the airplane that had been planned for the flight to Little Rock was delayed inbound to Dallas/Ft. Worth because of adverse weather in the area. According to the American Airlines dispatcher of flight 1420, using the airplane that had been originally scheduled for the flight would have caused the flightcrew to exceed the contractual crew duty day limit of 14 hours. As a result, the accident airplane, N215AA, was substituted so that flight 1420 could be conducted.

Prior to departure from DFW, the crew received paperwork for flight 1420 that included weather information advising them of a line of thunderstorms (TRW) along the planned route of flight.

At 2240, flight 1420 departed DFW after a two hour and twelve minute delay. About 14 minutes after departure, the dispatcher sent an ACARS (Aircraft Communications Addressing Reporting System) message to the flightcrew advising them of both the en route weather and the weather condition in the Little Rock area. The dispatcher's message indicated that the deteriorating weather conditions may be a factor during the arrival at Little Rock and that "I suggest expediting our arrival in order to beat the TRWs [thunderstorms] to LIT [Little Rock] if possible." The flightcrew acknowledged receipt of the message.

At 2334:09 the CVR recorded the controller informing the crew of flight 1420, "...we have a thunderstorm just northwest of the airport moving through the area now...wind is two eight zero at two eight gusts four four...." The F/O responded, "yeah we can see the lightning...."

About 2334:41, the controller notified the crew to expect an instrument landing system (ILS) approach to runway 22 left; and 4 minutes later the controller issued a clearance to descend to an altitude of 3,000 feet and asked the crew "how is the final for two two left looking." The F/O responded "okay we can see the airport from here...we can barely make it out but we should be able to make two two...that storm is moving this way like your radar says it is -- but a little farther off than you thought."

At 2339:44, the controller notified the flightcrew of a wind shear alert at the airport and stated, "...the centerfield wind is three four zero at one zero, the north boundary wind is three three zero at two five, the northwest boundary wind is zero one zero at one five." Shortly after receiving this wind information the F/O asked to land on runway 4 and received a vector to the runway from the controller.

Between 2341:56 and 2342:25, the flightcrew attempted to visually identify the airport. At 2342:26, the controller transmitted to the crew, "...it appears we have uh second part of this storm moving through, the winds now three four zero at one six, gusts three four. The F/O acknowledged the transmission.

At 2342:39 the CVR recorded the F/O asking the captain, "you wanna accept a short approach...want to keep it in tight?" The captain responded, "yeah if you see the runway...'cause I don't quite see it." Shortly thereafter the CVR recorded the crew continuing to discuss the location of the airport, and at 2344:19, the captain said, "...see we're losing it, I don't think we can maintain visual."

At 2344:33, the F/O told the controller, "...there's a cloud between us and the airport...we just lost [sight of] the field...." The controller responded and provided vectors to the ILS approach course.

At 2346:39, the controller notified the crew of flight 1420 that they were "...three miles from the [outer] marker...cleared ILS runway 4 right approach." The F/O acknowledged the clearance. Approximately 13 seconds later the controller reported that there was heavy rain falling on the airport, the visibility was less than one mile and the runway visual range (RVR) for runway 4 right was 3,000 feet. The F/O acknowledged the report.

At 2347:08, the controller cleared flight 1420 to land and reported the wind as "three five zero at three zero, gusts four five." This was followed less than a minute later with a second windshear alert from the controller with the reported winds: "...centerfield wind three five zero at three two, gusts four five, north boundary wind three one zero at two niner, and northeast boundary wind at three two zero at three two."

At about 2348:12, the controller reported the runway 4 right RVR as 1,600 feet. The F/O acknowledged the transmission. This was the last communication between the controller and flight 1420.

The captain continued the approach to runway 4 right and at 2349:57, the CVR recorded an unidentified crewmember say, "aw # we're off course." Four seconds later the F/O said "we're way off." This was followed one second later by the captain who said, "I can't see it." At 2350:06, the CVR recorded the captain say, "yeah, I got it."

At 2350:21.2, the CVR recorded the sound of the airplane touching down on the runway followed by the F/O saying, "we're down." Two seconds later the F/O said "we're sliding." The first recorded sound of the airplane striking the localizer antenna occurred about 22 seconds after the landed.

I will show a video animation that depicts the motions of flight 1420 during the last 1 minute of flight. The airplane motion is based on data from the DFDR with select CVR comments annotated in the upper corner of the frame.

The captain and 10 passengers sustained fatal injuries; the remaining 134 passengers and crewmembers sustained varying degrees of injuries. The airplane was being operated in accordance with 14 CFR 121, and an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan had been filed.

The Investigation

The following are a brief synopsis of some of the facts revealed thusfar:

• The captain was a graduate of the Air Force Academy and Michigan State University. He served seven years as a member of the United States Air Force. He was hired by American Airlines in July 1979, but after one year, was furloughed for three and a half years. After recall by American Airlines, he flew all three positions in the Boeing 727, and later became a captain and check captain on the MD-80.
    
  According to American Airlines employment records, he had accumulated 10,234 hours of total flight time; 9,001 hours as Pilot-In-Command; and 5,518 hours as Pilot-In-Command on the MD-80 airplane.
    
  The captain was promoted to the position of Chief Pilot in the Chicago base on January 1, 1999.
    
• The first officer graduated from the University of Southern California and entered the United States Navy in 1988. In 1991, he was released from the Navy due to a reduction-in-force and flew corporate aircraft (the Lear 35 and a King Air E-90). In addition to his flying duties, he had been the chief pilot for one company and the Director of Operations for a charter service.
    
  The first officer was hired by American Airlines January 4, 1999. According to American Airlines employment records, he has accumulated 4,292 hours of total flight time, of which 2,887 hours is as Pilot-In-Command. Since his employment with American, the first officer has accumulated 182 hours in the MD-80, of which 65 hours were in the 30 days prior to the accident.
    
• The weather conditions at the airport shortly before the accident were reported as: wind from 180 degrees at 9 knots, visibility 7 miles with thunderstorms, few clouds at 7,000 feet in cumulonimbus clouds, ceiling broken at 10,000 feet; temperature 77 degrees F, dewpoint 73 degrees F; altimeter, 29.86 Hg; Remarks - ASOS observation - thunderstorm began at 23 minutes after the hour, frequent lightning in clouds, and cloud-to-cloud, located from the west through the northwest; thunderstorms west through northwest moving northeast. Examination of the weather data, Doppler radar images, weather satellite information and witness statements indicate that there was intense rain falling on the airport at the time flight 1420 landed. The intensity of both the rainfall and the gusting wind conditions are factors that may have affected the performance of the airplane during the landing roll, and will be discussed by several witnesses during this hearing.
    
• The Operation group examined the flightcrew procedure employed during the accident flight in relation to those setforth by American Airlines, in addition to the flightcrew's decision to land in the severe weather conditions, the non-deployment of the ground spoilers after touchdown, the crews non-use of autobrakes for the landing on a wet runway, and the use of a higher-than-recommended engine pressure ratio (EPR) during reverse thrust operation which may have affected directional control of the airplane.
    
• The Safety Board also found during the investigation that the post-accident emergency response to the crash site was delayed several minutes because the air traffic controller was not immediately aware that flight 1420 had crashed. The emergency response was further delayed because the fire equipment initially traveled to the approach end of the runway 4 right before realizing that the accident site was at the departure end. Additionally, the Safety Board is concerned about the non-frangibility of the approach light stanchion struck by the airplane and the how this may have contributed to the survivability of the occupants. Several witnesses will testify regarding these issues later in this public hearing.

Post-Accident Investigative Activity

Although the Safety Board's investigation team completed the on-site wreckage examination June 10, 1999, several post-accident investigative activities have been completed over the past six months. Some of these activities involved examination and tear down of various electronic and airplane-system components, as well as various analytical studies based on the data revealed during the on-scene investigation.

Further, the issues that were cited by the Chairman, as well as those described briefly in this statement, will be addressed by witnesses in this hearing that were selected based on their expertise, experience, or extensive knowledge of the relevant subjects or issues. The team will use this additional information to clarify factual data previously collected or pursue additional issue areas, if so needed, so that Board will have a complete factual record from which to make its determination of probable cause and Safety Recommendations.

Before I conclude my statement, I would like to take a moment to publicly thank the parties and their team representatives for their continued cooperation; the City of Little Rock --- the National Airport staff --- the local hotel staff members, and the citizens - both paid and volunteer, who assisted the Safety Board's team during the on-scene investigation activities. Also, I want to thank the Red Cross and other volunteers who supported our activities under very difficult and stressful conditions.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my remarks.

The record of investigation is contained in the documents in our public docket and the court reporter has been provided a list of such materials.