NTSB Number: HAR-94/03 NTIS Number: PPB94-916203
SYNOPSIS
The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable causes of the collapse of the Judge William Seeber Bridge to be (1) the towboat operator's poor judgment in leaving the wheelhouse of the unsecured towboat unattended and (2) the failure of various responsible Federal, State, and local government agencies to Institute an effective program for assessing and managing risks to this bridge.
Four safety issues have been identified in this accident: adequacy of operator performance, timeliness of toxicological testing, vulnerability of the Claiborne Avenue bridge to vessel collision and subsequent collapse, and vulnerability of existing bridges nationwide to vessel collision and subsequent collapse.
The Safety Board made recommendations on these issues to the Federal Highway Administration, the U.S. Coast Guard, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development, the American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials, and the Board of Commissioners of the Port of New Orleans.
RECOMMENDATIONS
As a result of its investigation of this accident, the National Transportation Safety Board makes the following recommendations:
to the Federal Highway Administration:
In cooperation with the American Association of State Highway Transportation Officials, broaden the application of risk-assessment and management programs to existing highway bridges. Such programs should include, among other things, a formal assessment of the vulnerability of bridges to vessel collision and collapse. (Class II, Priority Action) (H-94-8)
to the U.S. Coast Guard:
Coordinate a cooperative effort with the United States Army Corps of Engineers, the Board of Commissioners of the Port of New Orleans, and bridge owners to review conditions and practices in the Inner Harbor Navigation Canal, identify hazards to the safe transit of vessels through the canal and lock system, and implement measures to reduce those hazards. (Class II, Priority Action) (M-94-10)
Provide guidelines to boarding officers investigating marine accidents about informing marine employers of their responsibility to conduct toxicological testing as soon as practicable following the occurrence of a serious marine incident and about providing assistance when necessary (such as furnishing sample collection kits or making arrangements for laboratory tests). (Class II, Priority Action) (M-94-11)
to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers:
Cooperate with the U.S. Coast Guard to review conditions and practices in the Inner Harbor Navigation Canal, identify hazards to the safe transit of vessels through the canal and lock system, and implement measures to reduce those hazards. (Class II, Priority Action) (M-94-12)
to the Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development:
Cooperate with the U.S. Coast Guard to review conditions and practices in the Inner Harbor Navigation Canal, identify hazards to the safe transit of vessels through the canal and lock system. and implement measures to reduce those hazards. (Class II, Priority Action) (M-94-13)
to the American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials:
In cooperation with the Federal Highway Administration, broaden the application of risk-assessment and management programs to existing highway bridges. Such programs should include, among other things, a formal assessment of the vulnerability of bridges to vessel collision and collapse. (Class II, Priority Action) (H-94-9)
to the Board of Commissioners of the Port of New Orleans:
Cooperate with the U.S. Coast Guard to
review conditions and practices in the Inner Harbor Navigation Canal, identify
hazards to the safe transit of vessels through the canal and lock system,
and implement measures to reduce those hazards. (Class II, Priority Action)
(M-94-14)