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"Lessons Learned" is a series of drop-in articles prepared by the NTSB for use 
in publications of other organizations.  An index of articles is available at
http://www.ntsb.gov/events/journalist/lessons/lessons.htm
10/2005
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Lessons Learned from Accident Investigations

"Legal" Tire Tread Depths Contributed to Deadly Motorcoach Wreck

A motorcoach crash on a rain-soaked interstate highway in Texas, claiming 7 lives, has 
prompted the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) to again urge Federal highway 
regulators to update minimum acceptable tread depth requirements that have not changed since 
1969. 

The seriousness of outdated tread depth standards for larger vehicles is illustrated by an 
accident in which a motorcoach traveling on Interstate 35 near Hewitt, Texas, ran off the road, 
crossed the median, and collided with a van traveling in the oncoming lane.  Heavy rain, fog, and 
haze in the area had reduced visibility at the time of the accident. The tread depth of the       
drive-axle tires was 2/32-inch, which is the legal limit, but did not provide enough tire safety.

As the motorcoach driver approached the crest of a hill, he noticed that traffic was 
stopping ahead for a previous accident. He began to brake and move from the right lane to the 
left lane to avoid the stopped cars, but another car moving into the left lane at the same time 
forced the bus driver to brake hard. The rear of the bus skidded and the driver lost control. Five 
motorcoach passengers, the van driver and one passenger were killed in the accident.

After conducting research at an independent laboratory, NTSB investigators took issue 
with the tire tread limit that allowed the motorcoach to stay in service.  The recently released 
final report of the investigation said that the 2/32-inch minimum tread depth of the drive-axle 
tires, including the smaller tread depth on the left drive-axle tires, particularly in combination 
with the nearly new front tires, contributed to wheel lockup and the subsequent rotation of the 
motorcoach. The minimal friction available to the tires and on the roadway combined to cause 
the motorcoach to lose control when the driver attempted to maneuver to avoid stopped traffic. 

To improve safety, the NTSB urged the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) to 
conduct research on commercial vehicle tire and wet pavement surface interaction to determine 
minimum frictional quality standards for commercial tires on wet pavement.  After the research 
is completed, the NTSB wants the FHWA to revise the tire requirements for commercial vehicles 
operating on wet pavement at highway speeds, and develop minimum acceptable pavement 
coefficients of friction and maximum permissible pavement rut depths as part of roadway 
maintenance requirements, as appropriate.

The NTSB also urged the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) to 
conduct testing on the effects of differing tread depth for the steer and drive-axles.  Once the 
testing is complete, the NTSB wants the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration to modify 
the tread depth requirements for each axle to reflect the results of the research.

This is not the first time the NTSB has issued recommendations on tread depth and 
roadway friction requirements.  Almost 25 years ago, the NTSB asked NHTSA and the FHWA 
to take similar actions.  They failed to do so and NTSB classified their inaction as 
"unacceptable."

Numerous other safety issues were raised by the Hewitt accident, including sight distance 
and speed as they relate to roadway design, the need to better identify areas with a high risk of 
wet weather accidents and implement roadway improvements, road design and speed limits, 
motorcoach occupant protection, and motor carrier oversight.

For a complete copy of the accident report, visit the NTSB website at www.ntsb.gov.