NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD
Public Meeting of September 16, 2008
(Information subject to editing)

Aviation Accident Report
Crash of Skydive Quantum Leap
DeHavilland DNC-6-100, N203E
Sullivan, Missouri, July 29, 2006
NTSB/AAR-08/03/SUM 

This is a synopsis from the Safety Board’s report and does not include the Board’s rationale for the conclusions, probable cause, and safety recommendations.  Safety Board staff is currently making final revisions to the report from which the attached conclusions and safety recommendations have been extracted.  The final report and pertinent safety recommendation letters will be distributed to recommendation recipients as soon as possible.  The attached information is subject to further review and editing. 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On July 29, 2006, about 1345 central daylight time, a de Havilland DHC‑6‑100, N203E, registered to Adventure Aviation, LLC, and operated by Skydive Quantum Leap as a local parachute operation flight, crashed into trees and terrain after takeoff from Sullivan Regional Airport, near Sullivan, Missouri. The pilot and five parachutists were killed, and two parachutists were seriously injured. The flight was operated under 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 with no flight plan filed. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed. Witnesses at the airport reported (and photographic evidence showed) that, shortly after the airplane lifted off from the runway, flames emitted from the airplane’s right engine. They reported that the airplane continued to fly low above the treetops before turning right and diving nose first into the ground.

The safety issues discussed in this report relate to the inadequate protection provided by single‑point restraints for parachutists. Two safety recommendations to the Federal Aviation Administration and two to the United States Parachute Association are included.

CONCLUSIONS

1. Although damage to the accident airplane’s right engine precluded determination of the initial event that precipitated the overload fracturing of the compressor turbine blades, and although the operator was not required to comply with the engine manufacturer’s service bulletins, it is possible that the initiating fracture event within the engine resulted from a condition that could have been detected and corrected during an engine overhaul performed within the manufacturer’s recommended time between overhauls.
2.  Although engine wear would have likely prevented the accident airplane from obtaining its maximum published single‑engine climb performance, the pilot’s failure to maintain airspeed, according to the technique specified in the published emergency procedures following the loss of power in one engine, negated any possibility of continued, controlled flight that could have allowed for a return to the airport or other suitable landing area.
3.  Although the airplane’s autofeather system, had it been operative, would have helped the pilot promptly feather the propeller of the inoperative engine, there is insufficient evidence to suggest that the inoperative autofeather system was a factor in the accident.
4.  The pilot’s decision to use only 1,700 feet of the available runway diminished the margin of safety during takeoff because it eliminated the option of discontinuing the takeoff and performing a straight‑ahead, emergency landing on the runway.
5.  Greater Federal Aviation Administration surveillance of the operator would have discouraged improper aircraft maintenance procedures, such as dispatching the airplane with an inoperative autofeather system and an undocumented cabin seating configuration.
6.  Based on the results of the Civil Aerospace Medical Institute’s past testing and the serious and fatal injuries sustained by some of the restrained parachutists in this crash, a single‑point restraint system is not sufficient to provide adequate restraint for parachutists.
7.  More parachutists may have survived, and injuries may have been reduced, if more effective restraints had been used.
8.  Testing could identify the best method for dual‑point restraint for the accident airplane’s configuration and for the configurations of other airplanes commonly used in parachute operations.

PROBABLE CAUSE

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the pilot’s failure to maintain airspeed following a loss of power in the right engine due to the fracturing of compressor turbine blades for undetermined reasons. Contributing to some parachutists’ injuries was the lack of a more effective restraint system on the airplane.

SAFETY RECOMMENDATIONS

The National Transportation Safety Board recommends:

To the Federal Aviation Administration:

1. Conduct research, in conjunction with the United States Parachute Association, to determine the most effective dual‑point restraint systems for parachutists that reflects the various aircraft and seating configurations used in parachute operations. (A‑08‑xx)
2.  Once the most effective dual‑point restraint systems for parachutists are determined, as requested in Safety Recommendation A‑08‑xx, revise Advisory Circular 105‑2C, Sport Parachute Jumping, to include guidance information about these systems. (A‑08‑xx)

To the United States Parachute Association:

3.  Work with the Federal Aviation Administration to conduct research to determine the most effective dual‑point restraint systems for parachutists that reflects the various aircraft and seating configurations used in parachute operations. (A‑08‑xx)
4.  Once the most effective dual‑point restraint systems for parachutists are determined, as requested in Safety Recommendation A‑08‑xx, educate your members on the findings and encourage them to use the most effective dual‑point restraint systems. (A‑08‑xx)