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D.C. Cook 1 & 2 - Docket
Nos. 050-00315; 050-00316
NRC Action Number(s) and
Facility Name |
Action Type
(Severity) &
Civil Penalty
(if any) |
Date
Issued |
Description |
EA-06-295
D.C. Cook |
ORDER |
04/04/2007 |
On April 4, 2007, a Confirmatory Order (Effective Immediately)
was issued to the Indiana Michigan Power Company (I&M) as part
of a settlement agreement between I&M and the NRC regarding an
apparent violation of 10 CFR 50.7, "Employee Protection," issued
by the NRC to I&M. In response to an NRC choice letter, I&M
requested Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) to resolve the apparent
violation. As part of the settlement agreement that resulted from
the ADR session, I&M agreed to complete a number of actions,
including the completion of the training of all non-supervisory plant
workforce and long-tern contractors on the subject of a safety-conscious
work environment (SCWE), the completion of a Nuclear Safety Culture
(including SCWE) survey, the reinforcement of I&M’s policy
and expectation of its management relating to a SCWE as communicated
by an executive level manager, and the implementation of a periodic
assessment of I&M’s compliance with its hours of work limitation
program and evaluation of the results for trends. In exchange for
I&M’s actions, the NRC agreed to not pursue further enforcement
action; however, the NRC will evaluate the implementation of the
Confirmatory Order during future inspections. |
EA-06-177
D.C. Cook, Units 1, 2 |
NOVCP
(SL III)
$ 60,000 |
10/06/2006 |
On October 6, 2006, a Severity Level III Notice of Violation and
Proposed Civil Penalty in the amount of $60,000 was issued
to the Indiana Michigan Power Company (I&M). The violation resulted
from changes the licensee made to its D. C. Cook Emergency Plan in
April 2003. In accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(q), a licensee may make
changes to emergency plans without Commission approval only if the
changes do not decrease the effectiveness of the plans and the plans,
as changed, continue to meet the standards of 10 CFR 50.47(b). In
April 2003, I&M made changes, without Commission approval, to
the Fission Product Barrier Matrix Emergency Action Level (EAL) in
the D. C. Cook Emergency Plan that decreased the effectiveness of
the plan and resulted in use of a non-standard scheme of EALs. |
EA-05-171
D.C. Cook, Units 1, 2 |
NOVCP
(SL III)
$ 60,000 |
11/23/2005 |
On November 23, 2005, a Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition
of a Civil Penalty in the amount of $60,000, was issued for a Severity
Level III problem involving the licensee’s failure to provide
complete and accurate information, and meet reporting requirements
regarding NRC-licensed operators at the D. C. Cook Nuclear Plant.
Specifically, the licensee failed to: (1) provide complete and accurate
information to the NRC concerning corrective actions associated with
a previous Severity Level III violation (EA-04-109); (2) notify the
NRC within 30 days of NRC-licensed operators experiencing a permanent
disability or illness; and (3) provide complete and accurate information
concerning the medical condition of individuals on new or renewal
NRC reactor operator license applications. |
EA-04-109
D.C. Cook, Units 1, 2 |
NOV
(SL III) |
09/29/2004 |
On September 29, 2004, a Notice of Violation was issued for a Severity
Level III violation involving an application for renewal of a Senior
Reactor Operator license that was not complete and accurate in all
material respects. |
EA-04-006
D.C. Cook, Units 1, 2 |
NOV
(White) |
03/12/2004 |
On March 12, 2004, a Notice of Violation was issued for a violation
associated with a White SDP finding involving the failure to properly
prepare a package of radioactive material for shipment. The violation
cited the licensee’s failure to prepare the radioactive material
package for shipment so that the radiation level did not exceed 200
millirem per hour at any point on the external surface of the package. |
EA-01-286
D.C. Cook, Units 1, 2 |
NOV
(White) |
10/03/2002 |
On October 3, 2002, a Notice of Violation was issued
for a violation associated with a White SDP finding involving a failed
essential service water (ESW) strainer basket that resulted in a debris
intrusion event. The violation cited that the installation instructions
for the ESW strainer baskets, an activity affecting quality, were
not appropriate. |
EA-02-010
D.C. Cook, Unit 2 |
NOV
(White) |
05/06/2002 |
On May 6, 2003, a Notice of Violation was issued for
a violation associated with a White SDP finding involving the failure
to take corrective action to preclude a repetitive failure of the
Unit 2 Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump, a significant condition
adverse to quality. |
EA-99-329
D.C. Cook 1 & 2 |
NOV
(SL III) |
05/05/2000 |
On May 5, 2000, a Notice of Violation was issued for
a Severity Level III violation based on discrimination against an
employee for engaging in protected activities. |
EA-98-113
D.C. Cook 1 & 2 |
NOV
(SL III) |
04/21/1998 |
Transportation violations; no shipping papers or emergency
contact number. |
EA-96-020
D.C. Cook 1 & 2 |
NOV
(SL III) |
03/11/1996 |
Both centrifugal charging pumps were rendered inoperable
and action was not taken within the technical specification requirements. |
EA-93-059
D.C. Cook 1 & 2 |
NOVCP
(SL III)
$ 25,000 |
08/05/1993 |
Withdrawal of Notice of Violation and proposed imposition
of Civil Penalty on an action based on discrimination against a technician
for engaging in protected activity. |
Davis-Besse - Docket
No. 050-00346
NRC Action Number(s) and
Facility Name |
Action Type
(Severity) &
Civil Penalty
(if any) |
Date
Issued |
Description |
EA-07-199
Davis Besse |
ORDER |
08/15/2007 |
On August 15, 2007, a Confirmatory Order (Effective Immediately)
was issued to FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company (FENOC) to formalize
commitments made by FENOC following the NRC staff’s issuance
of a Demand for Information (DFI) on May 14, 2007. The DFI was issued
in response to the information provided by FENOC relative to its
re-analysis of the time line and root causes for the 2002 Davis-Besse
reactor pressure vessel head degradation event following its receipt
of a report prepared by Exponent Failure Analysis Associates and
Altran Solutions Corporation (Exponent). On June 13, 2007, FENOC
provided its response to the DFI. On July 16, 2007, FENOC provided
a supplemental response to the DFI which provided additional detail
regarding the planned implementation of commitments established in
its June 13, 2007, response to the DFI. |
EA-07-123
Davis Besse |
DFI |
05/14/2007 |
On May 14, 2007, a Demand for Information (DFI) was issued to FirstEnergy
Nuclear Operating Company (FENOC) in response to information provided
by FENOC in a report, dated December 15, 2006, prepared by its contractor,
Exponent Failure Analysis Associates and Altran Solutions Corporation
(Exponent), associated with the root causes and time line for the
2002 Davis Besse reactor pressure vessel head degradation event.
In particular, the DFI required FENOC to provide detailed and specific
information relative to the timing of FENOC’s review of the
Exponent Report and the factors FENOC considered when determining
whether the conclusions in the report should be communicated to the
NRC. The DFI also required FENOC to provide information in order
for the NRC to understand the depth and completeness of FENOC’s
evaluation of the assumptions, methods, and conclusions of the Exponent
Report and to understand the differences between the Exponent Report
and the technical and programmatic root cause reports previously
developed by FENOC relative to the 2002 Davis-Besse event. In addition,
the DFI required information in order for the NRC to understand FENOC’s
position regarding a second contractor report prepared for FENOC
entitled, "Report of Reactor Pressure Vessel Wastage at the
Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Plant," dated December 2006. Regarding
the second report, the DFI required specific information relative
to FENOC’s endorsement of the report’s conclusions and
the implications of any new positions taken by FENOC compared to
those previously communicated to the NRC in response to the Notice
of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalties, dated April
21, 2005. After reviewing FENOC’s response to the DFI the NRC
will determine whether further action is necessary to ensure compliance
with regulatory requirements. |
EA-04-224
Davis Besse |
ORDER |
07/15/2005 |
On July 15, 2005, an immediately effective Confirmatory Order was
issued to establish certain requirements as set forth in the Order
including training related to employee protection for contractor
personnel who are granted unescorted access at Davis-Besse and the
other FENOC nuclear facilities. The Order was discussed during Alternative
Dispute Resolution and, subject to satisfactory implementation of
said requirements, the NRC will not pursue further enforcement action
on this issue. |
EA-04-231 Davis Besse |
NOV (White) |
05/05/2005 |
On May 5, 2005, a Notice of Violation was issued for a violation
associated with a White SDP finding involving the failure of the
emergency planning zone (EPZ) sirens. The violation cited the licensee’s
failure to implement the means to provide early notification and
clear instruction to the populace within the plume exposure pathway
EPZ. |
EA-05-071 EA-05-068 EA-05-066 EA-05-067 EA-05-072 EA-03-025 EA-05-069 EA-05-070
Davis-Besse
|
NOVCP
(SL
I, Red)
$5,450,000 |
04/21/2005 |
On April 21, 2005, a Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition
of Civil Penalties in the amount of $5,450,000 was issued for multiple
violations (some willful) related to the significant degradation
of the reactor pressure vessel head identified in February and March
2002. The significant violations included, (1) operation with reactor
coolant system pressure boundary leakage (associated with a Red SDP
finding, $5,000,000), (2) failure to provide complete and accurate
information (Severity Level I, $110,000), (3) failure to promptly
identify and correct a significant condition adverse to quality (Severity
Level II, $110,000), (4) failure to implement procedures (Severity
Level II, $110,000), (5) failure to provide complete and accurate
information (Severity Level I, $120,000), (6) failure to promptly
identify and correct a significant condition adverse to quality (associated
with a Red SDP finding), (7) failure to implement procedures (associated
with a Red SDP finding), and (8) failure to provide complete and
accurate information (Severity Level III). |
EA-03-209
Davis-Besse |
NOV
(SL III) |
05/07/2004 |
On May 7, 2004, a Notice of Violation was issued for a Severity
Level III violation involving the failure to provide the NRC with
complete and accurate information in the licensee’s response
to NRC Generic Letter (GL) 98-04 regarding protective coating deficiencies
and foreign material in containment. |
EA-03-214
Davis-Besse
|
ORDER
|
03/08/004 |
On March 8, 2004, an immediately effective Confirmatory Order was
issued to confirm certain commitments, as set forth in the Order,
that requires annual independent assessments for five years, in the
areas of operations, engineering, corrective actions and safety culture
and requires inspection of key reactor coolant system pressure boundary
components during a mid-cycle outage to ensure effective assessment
and sustained safe performance. The Order was issued in conjunction
with the NRC’s decision to approve the restart of the facility. |
EA-03-172
Davis-Besse
|
NOV
(White) |
03/05/2004 |
On March 5, 2004, a Notice of Violation was issued for a violation
associated with a White SDP finding involving the potential inability
of the high pressure injection (HPI) pumps to perform their safety
function under certain accident scenarios due to potential pump degradation.
The violation cited the licensee’s failure to adequately implement
design control measures for verifying the adequacy of the design
of the HPI pumps to mitigate all postulated accidents. |
EA-03-131
Davis-Besse
|
NOV
(Yellow) |
10/07/2003 |
On October 7, 2003, a Notice of Violation was issued for a violation
associated with a Yellow SDP finding involving the inability of the
emergency core cooling system sump to perform its safety function
under certain accident scenarios due to potential clogging of the
sump screen. The violation cited the licensee’s failure to
promptly identify and correct significant conditions adverse to quality
involving the potential to clog the emergency core cooling and containment
spray system sump with debris following a loss of coolant accident
(LOCA). |
EA-02-117
EA-02-257
Davis-Besse |
NOV
(White) |
02/19/2003 |
On February 19, 2003, a Notice of Violation was issued for violations
associated with two White SDP findings associated with the radiological
controls related to steam generator nozzle dam installation conducted
on February 20, 2002. The violations cited the failure of the licensee
to conduct an adequate evaluation of the radiological hazards in order
to characterize the radiological work conditions and to take timely
and suitable measurements to adequately monitor the occupational intake
of the material by workers during and following steam generator nozzle
dam installation. |
EA-99-138
Davis-Besse |
NOV
(SL III) |
08/06/1999 |
Violations involving failure to maintain the design of a pressurizer
spray valve and inadequate corrective action for the degraded condition. |
EA-96-304
Davis-Besse |
NOVCP
(SL III)
$ 50,000 |
10/22/1996 |
Failure to take actions to address hot shorts in circuits controlling
as many as 41 MOV's and to take corrective action to address the use
of combustibles for radiant energy shields. |
EA-96-122
Davis-Besse |
NOV
(SL III) |
06/13/1996 |
Missing HPI system high point. |
Diablo Canyon 1 &
2 - Docket Nos. 050-00275; 050-00323
NRC Action Number(s) and
Facility Name |
Action Type
(Severity) &
Civil Penalty
(if any) |
Date
Issued |
Description |
EA-96-123
Diablo Canyon 1 & 2 |
NOV
(SL III) |
06/07/1996 |
Licensee granted unescorted access when there was derogatory information
and a request to hold from contractor. |
Dresden 2 & 3 - Docket
Nos. 050-00237; 050-00249
NRC Action Number(s) and
Facility Name |
Action Type
(Severity) &
Civil Penalty
(if any) |
Date
Issued |
Description |
EA-07-200
Dresden 1, 2 & 3 |
NOVCP
SL III
$65,000 |
11/27/2007 |
On November 27, 2007, a Notice of Violation and Exercise of Discretion
for Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in the amount of $65,000
was issued for a Severity Level III problem consisting of four violations
involving the licensee’s failure to comply with 10 CFR 74.19
between 1959 and 2007. In summary, the licensee failed to (a) keep
complete records showing the inventory (including location and unique
identity), transfer, and disposal of all special nuclear material
(SNM) in its possession; (b) establish, maintain, and follow written
MC&A procedures that were sufficient to enable the licensee to
account for SNM in its possession; and (c) conduct a physical inventory
of all SNM in its possession at intervals not to exceed 12 months.
This resulted in the failure to account for two fuel pellets and
a number of incore detectors containing SNM. |
EA-03-102
Dresden 2 & 3 |
NOV
SL III
|
08/29/2003 |
On a August 29, 2003, Notice of Violation was issued for a violation
involving the failure by Exelon to provide complete and accurate
information to the NRC regarding a request to renew a reactor operator
license. |
EA-02-265
Dresden 3 |
NOVCP
SL III
$60,000
|
06/23/2003 |
On a June 23, 2003, a Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition
of Civil Penalty in the amount of $60,000 was issued for the willful
failure to provide complete and accurate information to the NRC Region
III staff concerning the high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) system
during a telephone conference call on September 27, 2001. A Notice
of Violation was also issued for a violation associated with a White
SDP finding. |
EA-02-264
Dresden 3 |
NOV
(White) |
06/23/2003 |
On a June 23, 2003, Notice of Violation was issued for a violation
associated with a White SDP finding involving the operability of the
high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) system. The violation cited
the licensee's failure to promptly correct a damaged HPCI system support
resulting in the equipment being inoperable for greater than the allowed
outage time. A Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil
Penalty in the amount of $60,000 was also issued in conjunction with
this case. |
EA-99-313
Dresden 2 & 3 |
NOV
(SL III) |
09/06/2000 |
On September 6, 2000, a Notice of Violation was issued for a Severity
Level III violation based on discrimination against a radiation protection
technician for engaging in protected activities. |
EA-96-532
Dresden 2 & 3 |
NOV
(SL III) |
05/21/1997 |
Failure to adequately test control room emergency ventilation system. |
EA-96-493
Dresden 2 & 3 |
NOV
(SL III) |
09/18/1998 |
Problems are rooted in practices associated with the control of
examination materials and the lack of personal integrity of the individuals
involved. |
EA-96-391
Dresden 2 & 3 |
NOV
(SL III) |
05/30/1997 |
U-3 main steam line drain valve LLRT failures. Primary containment
inoperable. |
EA-96-115
Dresden 2 & 3 |
NOVCP
(SL III)
$ 50,000 |
06/13/1996 |
Corner rooms structural steel in a condition outside FSAR caused
by failure to account for modifications and errors in original design
calculations. |
Duane Arnold - Docket
No. 050-00331
NRC Action Number(s) and
Facility Name |
Action Type
(Severity) &
Civil Penalty
(if any) |
Date
Issued |
Description |
EA-07-017
Duane Arnold |
NOV
(SL III) |
April 2, 2007 |
On April 2, 2007, a Notice of Violation was issued for a violation
associated with a White Significance Determination Finding involving
the failure of the licensee’s 2006 full-scale exercise critique
to identify a weakness associated with a Risk Significant Planning
Standard which was also a Drill and Exercise Participation Performance
Indicator. The NRC has determined that this failure is a performance
deficiency and is also a violation of emergency preparedness planning
standard 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14) and associated risk significant planning
standard 10 CFR 50.54(b)(4). |
EA-06-047 Duane Arnold |
NOV (SL III) |
05/01/2006 |
On May 1, 2006, a Notice of Violation was issued for a Severity
Level III violation involving failure to complete a pre-fuel-move
checklist prior to relocating three irradiated fuel bundles in
the spent fuel/cask
pool Duane Arnold spent fuel/cask pool. Specifically, a designated
fuel handling supervisor failed to complete the checklist, as required
by a Duane Arnold fuel handling procedure, before moving the irradiated
fuel bundles.
|
EA-04-053
Duane Arnold |
NOV
(SL III) |
05/01/2006 |
On May 1, 2006, a Notice of Violation and Exercise of Enforcement
Discretion was issued for a Severity Level III violation involving
a Refueling Floor Supervisor who deliberately directed an operator
to relocate irradiated items in the cask pool without notifying
health physics or ensuring that health physics personnel were present
prior to relocating the irradiated items on July 23, 2003. Enforcement
discretion in accordance with Section VII.B.6 of the Enforcement
Policy was exercised to refrain from issuing a civil penalty for
the violation because it involved special circumstances.
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