105th Congress 1st
Session COMMITTEE PRINT
_______________________________________________________________________
REPORT OF THE ETHICS REFORM TASK FORCE ON H. RES. 168
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RECOMMENDING REVISIONS TO THE RULES OF THE HOUSE AND THE RULES OF THE
COMMITTEE ON STANDARDS OF OFFICIAL CONDUCT
WITH ADDITIONAL VIEWS
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June 17, 1997.--Printed for the use of the Committee on Rules
105th Congress
1st Session COMMITTEE PRINT
_______________________________________________________________________
REPORT
OF
THE ETHICS REFORM TASK FORCE
ON
H. RES. 168
__________
RECOMMENDING REVISIONS TO THE RULES OF THE HOUSE AND THE RULES OF THE
COMMITTEE ON STANDARDS OF OFFICIAL CONDUCT
WITH ADDITIONAL VIEWS
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June 17, 1997.--Printed for the use of the Committee on Rules
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ETHICS REFORM TASK FORCE
Robert L. Livingston, Louisiana, Co-Chairman
Benjamin L. Cardin, Maryland, Co-Chairman
GERALD B.H. SOLOMON, New York LOUIS STOKES, Ohio
WILLIAM M. THOMAS, California JOHN JOSEPH MOAKLEY, Massachusetts
PORTER J. GOSS, Florida MARTIN FROST, Texas
MICHAEL N. CASTLE, Delaware NANCY PELOSI, California
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JAMES V. HANSEN, Utah, Ex Officio HOWARD L. BERMAN, California, Ex
Officio
Richard J. Leon, Special Counsel
David H. Laufman, Assistant to the Special Counsel
C O N T E N T S
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Page
I. Introduction.....................................................1
II. Method of Operation..............................................2
III. Summary of Recommendations.......................................3
IV. Section-by-Section Analysis......................................6
Section 1. Use of Non-Committee Members.................. 6
Section 2. Duration of Service on the Committee on
Standards of Official Conduct........................ 7
Section 3. Committee Agendas............................. 8
Section 4. Committee Staff............................... 8
Section 5. Meetings and Hearings......................... 10
Section 6. Confidentiality Oaths......................... 10
Section 7. Public Disclosure............................. 11
Section 8. Confidentiality of Committee Votes............ 12
Section 9. Filings By Non-Members of Information Offered
as a Complaint....................................... 12
Section 10. Requirements to Constitute a Complaint....... 13
Section 11. Duties of Chairman and Ranking Minority
Member Regarding Properly Filed Complaints........... 15
Section 12. Duties of Chairman and Ranking Minority
Member Regarding Information Not Constituting a
Complaint............................................ 19
Section 13. Investigative and Adjudicatory Subcommittees. 20
Section 14. Standard of Proof for Adoption of Statement
of Alleged Violation................................. 21
Section 15. Subcommittee Powers.......................... 22
Section 16. Due Process Rights of Respondents............ 24
Section 17. Committee Reporting Requirements............. 27
Section 18. Referrals to Federal or State Authorities.... 29
Section 19. Frivolous Filings............................ 29
Section 20. Technical Amendments......................... 30
V. Conclusion......................................................30
VI. Additional Views................................................31
VII. Appendix........................................................52
Resolution............................................... 52
Relevant House Rules..................................... 78
Rules of the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct.. 87
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I. Introduction
Under the U.S. Constitution, the House of Representatives
is responsible for establishing rules to govern the conduct of
its Members, as well as judging Members alleged to have
violated those rules.<SUP>1</SUP> The perceived success with
which the House administers this system of peer review plays an
important part in influencing both internal and public
confidence in the work of the Committee on Standards of
Official Conduct (''Standards Committee'' or ''the
Committee'').
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\1\ Article I, Section 5, Clause 2 of the U.S. Constitution states
that ''[e]ach House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings, punish
its Members for disorderly Behaviour, and, with the Concurrence of two
thirds, expel a Member.''
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While House Members generally regarded the existing
standards process <SUP>2</SUP> as fundamentally sound, no
reassessment of the standards process in its entirety had
occurred since 1989, and by the end of the 104th Congress, a
consensus had developed within the House that such a
reassessment was appropriate. In particular, interest had grown
in reexamining ways to better ensure that the standards process
in the House functions in a manner that is nonpartisan,
efficient, and fair.
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\2\ Hereafter, the term ''standards process'' shall at all times
throughout this report relate to the process by which Members,
officers, and employees of the House of Representatives are
investigated and adjudged following the receipt of information
questioning whether such Member, officer, or employee violated the
ethical standards of the House.
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On February 12, 1997, the House established, by unanimous
consent, a bipartisan Task Force to review the existing House
standards process and recommend reforms of that process. The
House also approved, by unanimous consent, a 65-day moratorium
on the filing of new ethics complaints to enable the Task Force
to conduct its work ''in a climate free from specific questions
of ethical propriety.'' <SUP>3</SUP>
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\3\ 143 Cong. Rec. H456 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1997) (statement of
Rep. Armey).
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Representatives Robert L. Livingston and Benjamin L. Cardin
were appointed by House Majority Leader Richard Armey and House
Minority Leader Richard Gephardt, respectively, to co-chair the
Task Force. Representative Livingston had served as a member of
the Bipartisan Task Force on Ethics which reviewed the House
standards process in 1989. Representative Cardin had recently
completed six years as a member of the Standards Committee.
Other Republican members of the Task Force were Representatives
Gerald B.H. Solomon, William M. Thomas, Porter J. Goss, Michael
N. Castle, and James V. Hansen (ex officio). Other Democratic
members of the Task Force were Representatives Louis Stokes,
John Joseph Moakley, Martin Frost, Nancy Pelosi, and Howard L.
Berman (ex officio).
II. Method of Operation
The Task Force began its work by holding hearings to
solicit the views and ideas of House Members and interested
members of the public regarding possible reforms of the House
standards process. Most of the hearings occurred in executive
session in order to encourage candor on the part of witnesses
and members of the Task Force.
On February 27, 1997, the Task Force received testimony in
executive session from Representatives James V. Hansen, Nancy
L. Johnson, Steven Schiff, Lee Hamilton, David Dreier, Curt
Weldon, and Sue Myrick.
On March 4, 1997, the Task Force held a public hearing at
which it received testimony from Jack Maskell, a Legislative
Attorney at the Congressional Research Service; Norman
Ornstein, Resident Scholar at the American Enterprise Institute
for Public Policy Research; Gary Ruskin, Director of the
Congressional Accountability Project; Meredith McGehee, Vice
President of Legislative Policy at Common Cause; and David
Mason, Senior Fellow at the Heritage Foundation.
On March 5, 1997, the Task Force reconvened in executive
session to receive testimony from Representatives Julian Dixon,
Jim Bunning, Stephen Buyer, Lamar Smith, Christopher Shays, and
Paul McHale. The Task Force also heard testimony from Jonathan
S. Feld, a Washington, D.C. attorney who represented a
respondent before the Committee during the 104th Congress.
On March 6, 1997, the Task Force held its final hearing, at
which it received testimony in executive session from James M.
Cole, Special Counsel to the Standards Committee during the
104th Congress; J. Randolph Evans, counsel to a respondent
before the Committee during the 104th Congress; and Edward
Bethune, a former House Member who served as co-counsel with
Mr. Evans to the same respondent.
Following the completion of the hearings, the co-chairmen
presented to the Task Force an outline of issues relating to
the existing standards process to serve as a guide to the Task
Force's deliberations.<SUP>4</SUP> Task Force members
supplemented the outline with additional issues throughout the
deliberative process.
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\4\ The outline was organized into six topics: (1) structural
reform; (2) access to the ethics process and the disposition of
complaints; (3) grounds for initiating investigations and charging
members with violations; (4) conduct of the investigation; (5) due
process for respondents; and (6) the final disposition of ethics cases.
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Between March 12 and March 21, 1997, the Task Force met
five times to discuss the various issues set forth in the
outline presented to them by the co-chairmen. In order to
facilitate a more candid exchange of views and proposals, the
Task Force's deliberations occurred in executive session and
were not recorded or transcribed.
On April 8, 1997, the co-chairmen presented the Task Force
with a draft Resolution for discussion. Based on the consensus
reached during the Task Force's deliberations, the draft
Resolution recommended several changes to the House rules
regarding the existing House standards process, as well as
significant changes to the rules of the Standards Committee.
During the period of April 8 to April 23, 1997, the Task Force
met seven times to consider and debate the draft
Resolution.<SUP>5</SUP> Task Force members offered numerous
amendments to the draft Resolution.
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\5\ On April 11, 1997, the original moratorium on the filing of
ethics complaints was extended by unanimous consent of the House until
April 14, 1997. On April 14, 1997, the House again extended the
moratorium by unanimous consent to May 2, 1997. These extensions were
followed by further extensions to enable the Task Force to complete its
debate of the draft Resolution and prepare a report to the House.
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On May 7, 1997, the co-chairmen presented Task Force
members with a revised draft Resolution for their review. After
further discussion, the Task Force voted unanimously to close
the amendment process and schedule a final vote on the draft
Resolution and its accompanying Report. The Task Force also
agreed that any further amendment to the draft Resolution could
occur only by a joint amendment offered by both co-chairmen.
Thereafter, a draft Report to the House explaining the
recommendations contained in the Resolution was prepared under
the direction of the co-chairmen. On the evening of June 12,
1997, the staff began distributing the draft Report to Task
Force members for their review. On June 17, 1997, the Task
Force reconvened in executive session and voted to adopt the
Resolution and accompanying Report.
III. Summary of Recommendations
The Task Force recommends the following changes to the
Rules of the House and the Rules of the Standards Committee. It
has grouped the description of these recommended changes under
various objectives, the accomplishment of which it believes
will ultimately improve the trust and confidence that the
Members, and the American people, have in the House standards
process.
NonPartisan Operation of the Standards Committee
<bullet> The Standards Committee staff shall be
nonpartisan, professional, and available as a resource to all
Members of the Committee (Section 4).
<bullet> The ranking minority member shall have an equal
opportunity to place matters on the Committee's agenda (Section
3).
Confidentiality of the Standards Committee's Workings
<bullet> All Standards Committee meetings and proceedings
(except adjudicatory and sanction hearings) shall occur in
closed session, unless otherwise voted open by a majority of
the Committee (Section 5).
<bullet> Members, as well as staff, shall take a
confidentiality oath regarding matters learned while serving on
the Standards Committee (Section 6).
<bullet> Roll call votes of the Standards Committee, or any
subcommittee thereof, may be released only by a majority vote
of the full Committee (Section 8).
<bullet> Respondent, and his counsel, shall execute a non-
disclosure agreement regarding the content of any discovery
material provided to them prior to the vote to adopt a
Statement of Alleged Violation (''SAV'') (Section 16).
<bullet> The Standards Committee, by a two-thirds vote, may
directly report any substantial evidence of a violation of the
law to the appropriate state or federal authorities (Section
18).
Improved System for Filing Information Offered As a Complaint
The three-Member refusal rule shall be abolished as a
prerequisite to ''direct'' filing by non-Members (Section 9).
<bullet> Non-Members shall be able to directly file
information offered as a complaint upon the satisfaction of a
''personal knowledge'' requirement (Section 10).
<bullet> Non-Member filers who base information offered as
a complaint exclusively upon newspaper articles shall not have
the requisite ''personal knowledge'' (Section 10).
<bullet> Members who sponsor a non-Member's filing of
information offered as a complaint shall certify that the
complainant is acting in ''good faith'' and that the matter
described in the filing warrants the attention of the Committee
(Section 9).
Efficient Administration of the Standards Committee
<bullet> Only the chairman and ranking minority member may
conduct initial fact-gathering (Section 11).
<bullet> Subpoenas issued by an investigative subcommittee
may be authorized and issued only by a majority vote of the
members of the subcommittee (Section 15).
<bullet> The scope of a subcommittee's investigation may be
expanded by a majority vote of the members of that subcommittee
(Section 15).
<bullet> An investigative subcommittee may amend its SAV
anytime prior to transmitting the SAV to the full Committee
(Section 15).
<bullet> When an adjudicatory hearing is waived, the
members of the Committee shall have at least 72 hours to review
an SAV and the related subcommittee report, prior to voting to
adopt sanctions or to adopt the subcommittee's report (Section
17).
Due Process for Members, Officers, and Employees
<bullet> Respondents shall be provided a draft of the SAV,
and all of the evidence the investigative subcommittee intends
to introduce to prove it, prior to the subcommittee's vote to
adopt the SAV (Section 16).
<bullet> Written notice shall be provided to the respondent
of an unsuccessful vote to establish an investigative
subcommittee (Section 16).
<bullet> Written notice shall be provided to the respondent
that an investigative subcommittee has voted to authorize its
first subpoena or take testimony under oath, whichever occurs
first (Section 16).
<bullet> Statements or information derived solely from a
respondent or his counsel during settlement discussions shall
be treated as confidential, unless waived by the respondent
(Section 16).
<bullet> Settlement agreements shall be in writing, unless
the respondent requests otherwise (Section 16).
<bullet> The investigative subcommittee shall provide the
respondent a draft of its report at least 15 days prior to its
adoption and the opportunity to submit views for attachment or
inclusion therewith to the full Committee (Section 17).
<bullet> Written notice shall be given to the respondent of
any expansion of the scope of the investigation by an
investigative subcommittee (Section 16).
<bullet> The evidentiary standard to vote an SAV against a
respondent shall be increased from ''reason to believe'' to a
''substantial reason to believe'' a violation has occurred
(Section 16).
Greater Involvement by Members in the Process
<bullet> A twenty-person ''pool'' of members (ten
Republicans and ten Democrats) shall be created to supplement
the Standards Committee membership as potential appointees to
investigative subcommittees (Section 1).
<bullet> The maximum service on the Committee shall be
decreased from six years to four years during any period of
three successive Congresses (Section 2).
<bullet> No fewer than four members shall be rotated off of
the Committee at the end of each Congress (Section 2).
Timely Resolution of Matters Before the Standards Committee
<bullet> The chairman and ranking minority member shall
determine whether information offered as a complaint
constitutes a complaint within 14 calendar days or 5
legislative days (Section 11).
<bullet> The time for informal fact-gathering by the
chairman and ranking minority member shall be limited (Section
11).
<bullet> The chairman and ranking minority member may
recommend the resolution of a matter to the full Committee in
any manner that does not require action by the House (Section
11).
IV. Section-by-Section Analysis
section 1. use of non-committee members
The first issue the Task Force considered was whether the
current standards process should be restructured by utilizing
persons other than members of the Standards Committee to
comprise investigative and adjudicatory subcommittees. The Task
Force heard testimony from several witnesses who proposed that
distinguished private citizens--such as retired judges and
former House members--should supplement or replace House
Members in the fact-finding and other functions currently
performed only by members of the Standards Committee.
Alternatively, the Task Force considered proposals to augment
the limited resources of Committee members with non-Committee
Members of the House.
Witnesses favoring the inclusion of private citizens to
investigate and judge ethics cases commented that the
participation of such ''outsiders'' would enhance public trust
and confidence in the standards process by mitigating the
perception that House Members face an inherent conflict of
interest when they judge their fellow Members. Others
maintained that reliance on private citizens would minimize the
possibility that political partisanship might affect the
disposition of ethics cases.
The Task Force opted to forego the recommendations that
non-House Members participate in disposing of misconduct
allegations. Task Force Members were concerned with the
explicit Constitutional responsibility of the House. They
expressed the view that House Members better understand the
rules, customs, and practices of the House, and they expressed
the strong preference that House Members accused of misconduct
be judged by their peers. However, the Task Force recognized
the need to broaden the group of potential investigators beyond
the Standards Committee membership. Therefore, the Task Force
adopted the recommendation that a bipartisan reserve ''pool''
of House Members be established to serve on investigative
subcommittees as designated.
Section 1 of the Task Force Resolution amends current House
Rules to establish procedures for the designation of non-
Committee House Members to perform investigative functions
currently performed only by Committee members. At the beginning
of each Congress, the Speaker and minority leader (or their
designees) each will designate 10 members from their respective
parties, who are not currently members of the Standards
Committee for potential service on an investigative
subcommittee. Whether such non-Committee Members actually will
be designated to serve will depend on the investigative demands
confronting the Committee and the workload of Committee
members. Whenever the Committee chairman and ranking minority
member jointly determine that designated ''pool'' Members
should be assigned to serve on an investigative subcommittee of
the Committee, an equal number of members from the respective
political parties will be designated from the ''pool'' to serve
on the subcommittee. Service on the subcommittee by ''pool''
Members will not count against the limitation on subcommittee
service contained in clause 6(b)(2)(A) of House Rule X, which
prohibits Members from serving simultaneously on more than four
subcommittees of the standing committees of the House.
Under this new process, an investigative subcommittee could
consist exclusively of designated non-Committee Members.
Because Committee members may be expected to have greater
familiarity with applicable rules and precedent, however, the
Task Force recommends that subcommittees to which non-Committee
Members are appointed be divided evenly between Committee
members and designated non-Committee Members. Preserving
thisbalance will help to ensure consistency and predictability in the
application of House and Committee rules and precedent.
Designated House Members selected for service in the
''pool'' will serve only on one investigative subcommittee
during each Congress, and that assignment may continue into a
successive Congress. In order to ensure consistency between and
within Congresses as to Standards Committee rulings and
judgements, adjudicatory proceedings and sanction hearings will
continue to be conducted solely by Committee members.
The Task Force believes that establishing a reserve pool of
Members to assist in ethics investigations will improve the
current system in two ways. First, the onerous time burdens
shouldered by Committee members will be alleviated,
particularly in the event that several investigations are
occurring simultaneously. Second, the inclusion of non-
Committee Members in the investigative process may help to
educate Members at large about applicable rules and laws
governing the conduct of Members, and facilitate greater
understanding within the House of the unique challenges
confronted by members of the Standards Committee.
The Task Force reiterates its support for the continuation
of the bifurcation system <SUP>6</SUP> based on the importance
of avoiding prejudgment of information filed as a complaint.
Bifurcation creates a ''firewall'' between the Committee
functions of investigation and adjudication, ensuring that
Committee members who charge a respondent with a violation do
not also participate in a judgment of whether liability has
been established. It also allocates responsibility within the
Committee so that the review of information offered as a
complaint is less time-consuming for members of the Committee
and is consistent with the confidentiality imposed on the
complaint process. For these reasons, the Task Force encourages
Committee members to protect the integrity of the ''firewall''
to the greatest degree possible.
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\6\ The Ethics Reform Act of 1989 established a ''bifurcation'' of
the investigation and adjudication of ethics complaints before the
Standards Committee.
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section 2. duration of service on the committee on standards of
official conduct
The Task Force Resolution shortens the duration of service
for members of the Standards Committee. Under current House
Rules,<SUP>7</SUP> House Members may serve up to six years on
the Committee in any period of five successive Congresses
(i.e., during a ten-year period). In recent years, Committee
members regularly served terms of six consecutive years. As
time demands and other unique pressures confronting Committee
members grew, service on the Committee became more burdensome,
often at the expense of Committee members' work on legislative
matters.
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\7\ House Rule X, clause 6(a)(2).
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Section 2 reduces from six to four years the maximum amount
of service on the Committee during any period of three
successive Congresses (i.e., during a six-year period). In
order to take advantage of the experience gained by Committee
members after service for four years, the Task Force concluded
that Committee members who already have served four years may
extend their service by a maximum of two additional years to
serve as chairman or ranking minority member.
Section 2 also specifies that not less than four members of
the Committee--two from each political party--must rotate off
the Committee at the end of each Congress. Current House rules
impose only a six-year limitation on Committee service, without
requiring rotations off the Committee at the end of each
Congress. The new rule will ensure the orderly, systematic
turnover on the Committee, while ensuring that the Committee
retains experienced Members.
section 3. committee agendas
One of the principal goals of the Task Force was to
identify ways to enhance the bipartisan nature of the
Committee. One way to promote this goal is by ensuring that the
majority and minority are provided with equal opportunity to
place matters on the Committee's agenda.
Under current House and Committee rules, the authority of
the chairman to set the agenda of the Committee is implicit in
his authority to call meetings of the Committee. Although the
administration of the Committee historically has been
characterized by bipartisan collegiality, the rules have not
assured the right of the ranking minority member to place items
on the agenda.
Section 3 institutionalizes a bipartisan approach to
setting the Committee's agenda. While it requires the Committee
to establish rules providing that the chairman establish the
agenda for Committee meetings, it allows the ranking minority
member to place any item on the agenda.
section 4. committee staff
In order for the Standards Committee to function
effectively, its professional staff must operate in a
completely nonpartisan manner, and each member of the staff
must have the trust and confidence of all Committee members. A
nonpartisan staff is also essential to engendering confidence,
both within and outside the House, in the impartiality of the
Committee as a whole.
Unlike the rules of the Senate Select Committee on Ethics,
current Standards Committee rules are silent on the subject of
hiring Committee staff and the importance of a nonpartisan
staff. Clause 6(a)(1) of House Rule XI provides only that each
standing committee of the House may appoint professional staff
members by a majority vote of the committee (i.e., a majority
of a quorum). In addition, House and Committee rules are silent
concerning the hiring of outside counsel.
Section 4 of the Task Force Resolution requires the
Committee to adopt rules governing the hiring and conduct of
professional staff. Modeled on rules of the Senate Select
Committee on Ethics, Section 4 requires that the Committee
staff be assembled and retained as a professional, nonpartisan
staff, and that all staff members must be appointed by an
affirmative vote of a majority of the members of the Committee,
thereby ensuring that each hiring decision has bipartisan
support.
In what constitutes a grant of new authority, Section 4 of
the Task Force Resolution permits the Committee chairman and
ranking minority member to each appoint one individual as a
shared staff member from his personal staff to perform service
for the Committee. Such shared staff may work on an
investigative subcommittee only if the chairman or ranking
minority member for whom the shared staffer works has assigned
himself to that subcommittee. To afford the Committee
additional flexibility in circumstances where work demands may
exceed current staff capacity, Section 4 also authorizes the
Committee to retain staff members for the purpose of a
particular investigation or other proceeding, provided that
such staff is retained only for the duration of that particular
investigation or other proceeding.
The rules to be adopted by the Committee must state
explicitly that each member of the professional staff,
including shared staff, shall perform all official duties in a
nonpartisan manner. To enhance the appearance of impartiality,
the rules also prohibit Committee staff (but not shared staff)
from engaging in any partisan political activity that directly
affects any congressional or presidential election. Thus,
Committee staff (in contrast to other House employees) would be
prohibited from working on a Federal election campaign, even on
a volunteer basis. In addition, Committee staff (but not shared
staff) would be prohibited from making financial contributions
to campaign committees, political action committees, and
national party organizations (i.e., ''soft money''
contributions).
Section 4 establishes a clear and flexible framework for
the hiring of outside counsel. It provides that the Committee
(subject to funding approval by the Committee on House
Oversight) may retain counsel not employed by the House of
Representatives whenever the Committee determines, by an
affirmative vote of a majority of its members, that the
retention of such counsel is ''necessary and appropriate.''
Thus, the hiring of any outside counsel may occur only by means
of a bipartisan vote of the Committee. Similarly, outside
counsel may be dismissed only by an affirmative vote of a
majority of the members of the Committee.
Section 4 also imposes new restrictions on professional
Committee staff, shared staff, and outside counsel to enhance
the confidentiality of the Committee's work. It provides that
no member of the staff or outside counsel may accept public
speaking engagements or write for any publication on any
subject that is in any way related to his employment or duties
with the Committee without specific prior approval from the
chairman and ranking minority member. In addition, no member of
the staff or outside counsel may make public, without Committee
approval, any information, document, or other material that is
confidential, derived from executive session, classified, or
that is obtained during the course of employment with the
Committee.
Section 5. Meetings and Hearings
Another important goal of the Task Force was to enhance the
confidentiality of sensitive Committee operations and
deliberations. One area where the Task Force was able to
achieve this objective concerns Committee meetings and
hearings.
Under clause 2(g)(1) of current House Rule XI, each
Committee or subcommittee meeting to transact business must be
open to the public unless the Committee or subcommittee, in
open session, votes to close the meeting to the public. Under
clause 2(g)(2) of House Rule XI, each hearing conducted by a
House Committee or subcommittee must be open to the public
unless the Committee or subcommittee, in open session and with
a majority present, votes to close all or part of the hearing
to the public. Consequently, under current House Rules,
meetings of the Standards Committee at which sensitive matters
may be discussed, as well as meetings of investigative
subcommittees, are open unless voted closed. Motions to close
an otherwise open meeting or hearing may prevail on the basis
of a simple majority vote, a quorum being present.
The Task Force determined that existing rules should be
changed to provide for greater confidentiality, while ensuring
that the Standards Committee or a subcommittee thereof retains
the necessary flexibility to close or open meetings or
hearings. Section 5 of the Task Force Resolution amends clause
4(e)(3) of House Rule X to require that any meeting of the
Standards Committee or any subcommittee thereof, must occur in
executive session unless the Committee or subcommittee, by an
affirmative vote of a majority of its members, opens the
meeting to the public. Conversely, any hearing held by an
adjudicatory subcommittee, or any sanction hearing conducted by
the full Committee, must be open to the public unless the
Committee, by an affirmative vote of a majority of its members,
closes the hearing to the public. In both cases, the votes
required under Section 5 of the Resolution are more demanding
than under current rules, which require only a majority of a
quorum to reverse the standard procedure.
section 6. confidentiality oaths
Ensuring the confidentiality of Standards Committee
deliberations and matters pending before the Committee is
essential to protect the rights of individuals accused of
misconduct, preserve the integrity of the investigative
process, and cultivate collegiality among Committee members.
Section 6 of the Task Force Resolution amends Clause 4(e) of
House Rule X to require Committee members and staff--including
shared staff and House Members designated as a ''pool'' of
members--to execute a confidentiality oath before they have
access to information that is confidential under Committee
rules. The text of the proposed oath is as follows: ''I do
solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will not disclose, to any
person or entity outside the Committee on Standards of Official
Conduct, any information received in the course of my service
with the committee, except as authorized by the Committee or in
accordance with its rules.''
To underscore the seriousness with which the Task Force
views this confidentiality oath, Section 6 of the Resolution
states that the requirement of the oath ''establishes a
standard of conduct'' within the meaning of clause 4(e)(1)(B)
of House Rule X. Section 6 also provides that breaches of
confidentiality shall be investigated by the Standards
Committee, and that appropriate action shall be taken. Thus, a
proven violation of the confidentiality oath by a member or
employee of the Committee would be a violation of House rules.
Section 7. Public Disclosure
Circumstances may develop when it is necessary and
appropriate for the chairman or ranking minority member of the
Standards Committee to comment publicly on matters before the
Committee. It may be appropriate, for example, to respond to
misinformation about actions taken by the Committee, the status
of matters before the Committee, or unauthorized press accounts
of investigations.
Current Standards Committee rules prohibit the chairman and
ranking minority member from making public statements about
matters before the Committee, unless authorized by the
Committee. Committee Rule 10(b) states that
Members and staff of the Committee shall not disclose
to any person or organization outside the Committee,
unless authorized by the Committee, any information
regarding the Committee's or a subcommittee's
investigative, adjudicatory or other proceedings,
including, but not limited to: (i) the fact or nature
of any complaints; (ii) executive session proceedings;
(iii) information pertaining to or copies of any
Committee or subcommittee report, study, or other
document which purports to express the views, findings,
conclusions, or recommendations of the Committee or
subcommittee in connection with any of its activities
or proceedings; or (iv) the conduct of a Member,
officer, or employee. (Emphasis added.)
Similarly, Committee Rule 9 prohibits Committee members and
staff from disclosing ''any evidence relating to an
investigation to any person or organization outside the
Committee unless authorized by the Committee * * * .''
Section 7 of the Task Force Resolution requires the
Standards Committee to modify its rules to accord discretion to
the chairman and ranking minority member to make public
statements, while preserving the authority of the full
Committee to limit or prohibit such statements. Under the rule
change required by this section, either the Committee chairman
or ranking minority member may make public statements regarding
matters before the Committee or any subcommittee thereof,
provided that the chairman or ranking minority member seeking
to make a public statement first consults the other.
The recommended rule change does not require prior
agreement between the Committee chairman and ranking minority
member before one or the other makes a public statement.
Rather, the proposed rule requires only prior consultation. In
addition, joint public statements or appearances are not
required, although they are strongly encouraged. Either the
chairman or ranking minority member is free to issue his own
public statement, provided the requirement of prior
consultation has been satisfied. The Task Force stresses that
the chairman and ranking minority member, in exercising this
authority, shall use caution so as not to compromise the
confidentiality of matters pending before the Committee.
The Task Force recognizes than an investigative
subcommittee may desire to issue a public statement concerning
a matter under investigation. In that event, the subcommittee
may not issue a public statement unilaterally. Rather, it must
transmit a proposed public statement in writing to the full
Committee chairman and ranking minority member, who, in their
discretion, may release the statement under the procedures
discussed above. However, in that circumstance, the Task Force
recommends that such statements only be made jointly by the
chairman and ranking minority member.
Section 8. Confidentiality of Committee Votes
The Task Force concluded that the confidentiality of
Committee proceedings also could be enhanced by amendments to
House rules governing public access to information concerning
roll call votes of standing committees. Under clause 2(e)(1) of
House Rule XI, each committee must make available for public
inspection the records of any roll call vote. Information
available for public inspection pursuant to clause 2(e)(1) must
include ''a description of the amendment, motion, order, other
proposition and the name of each Member voting for and each
Member voting against such amendment, motion, order
orproposition, and the names of those Members present but not voting.''
Similarly, clause 2(l)(2)(B) of House Rule XI provides that ''with
respect to each roll call vote on a motion to report any measure or
matter of a public character, and on any amendment offered to the
measure or matter, the total number of votes cast for and against, and
the names of those members voting for and against, shall be included in
the Committee report on the measure or matter.'' Neither clause of
House Rule XI contains any exemption for votes occurring in executive
session.
Section 8 of the Task Force Resolution exempts the
Committee on Standards of Official Conduct from the reporting
requirement contained in clause 2(l)(2)(B) of House Rule XI. It
also prohibits the Committee from providing public access to
the results of roll call votes, as otherwise required by clause
2(e)(1) of House Rule XI, without an affirmative vote of a
majority of the members of the Committee.
Section 9. Filings By Non-Members of Information Offered As a Complaint
Among the issues most extensively debated by the Task Force
were possible amendments to the current House Rules regarding
the filing by non-Members of information offered as a complaint
with the Standards Committee. The current House rule provides
two methods by which a non-Member can file information offered
as a complaint. Under clause 4(e)(2)(B) of House Rule X, an
individual who is not a Member of the House may submit
information offered as a complaint ''directly'' with the
Standards Committee only if at least three House Members
previously have refused in writing to transmit the complaint to
the Committee. A non-Member may also file information offered
as a complaint indirectly if a Member of the House transmits
information from the non-Member to the Committee. The rules
regarding such a transmittal, however, do not presently require
the Member to certify either the ''good faith'' of the
complainant or the Member's assessment that the allegations
warrant the Committee's attention.
The Task Force concluded that the two present methods for
non-Member filing needed modification in order to enhance
public confidence in the House standards process and increase
Member accountability in the situation where a Member sponsors
a non-Member's information offered as a complaint. With regard
to ''direct'' filing by non-Members, the Task Force recommends
the elimination of the ''three-refusal'' rule as a precondition
to ''direct'' filing. The Task Force found that conditioning
access by non-Members to the complaint procedures of the
Standards Committee on the refusal of Members to transmit a
complaint to the Committee has not worked as intended. The
refusal of three Members to transmit to the Committee
information offered as a complaint by a non-Member should
indicate that the information does not merit serious
examination by the Committee. The Task Force also concluded
that, in recent years, the ''three-refusal'' rule has been used
increasingly by Members as a device to support complaints
originated by non-Members.
The Task Force accordingly recommends that the ''three-
refusal'' rule be abolished. In its place, the Task Force
recommends a system of actual direct filing by non-Members who
can satisfy requirements (the ''personal knowledge test'')
which are specified in Section 10 of the Resolution, as well as
those requirements presently required for filing a complaint
under current rules. By ''opening up'' the procedures for
submitting information offered as a complaint to the Committee,
the Task Force believes it will engender greater public
confidence in the standards process and ameliorate the
perception that the standards process is designed to insulate
House Members from legitimate allegations of misconduct by
outsiders.
With regard to indirect filing, the Task Force recommends
strengthening the current transmittal method by proposing a new
''sponsorship'' system, whereby the Member certifies to the
Standards Committee his belief that the complainant is acting
in ''good faith'' and that the allegations the non-Member is
transmitting warrant the review and consideration of the
Committee. In this situation, however, the information offered
as a complaint by the non-Member need not meet the new
''personal knowledge'' test for non-Members seeking to file
directly with the Standards Committee.<SUP>8</SUP>
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\8\ In order to constitute a properly filed complaint, the
information transmitted must be under oath and meet other threshold
requirements specified in Committee rules.
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Section 10. Requirements to Constitute a Complaint
In recommending the elimination of the ''three-refusal''
rule, the Task Force recognizes the need to set different
standards to protect the system against potential abuse by
those over whom the Standards Committee has no jurisdiction.
Section 10 of the Task Force Resolution sets forth new
requirements that non-Members filing directly with the
Committee must satisfy in order for information offered as a
complaint to be accorded the status of a properly filed
complaint. These requirements, representing the Task Force's
best effort to achieve a consensus with regard to direct non-
Member filing, are embodied in a ''personal knowledge''
requirement which excludes filings based exclusively on
newspaper stories.
A non-Member directly filing information offered as a
complaint with the Standards Committee must satisfy one of two
requirements in order to meet the requirements of a properly
filed complaint. The individual must either have ''personal
knowledge'' of the conduct which is the basis of the violation
alleged in the information, or base the information offered as
a complaint upon information received from another individual
whom the complainant has ''a good faith reason to believe has
personal knowledge of such conduct.'' Alternatively, the
complainant may base the information offered as a complaint on
his personal review of documents, photographs, films,
videotapes, or recordings that contain information regarding
the conduct which is the basis of a violation alleged in the
information offered as a complaint. Any documents relied on by
the complainant must be documents kept in the ordinary course
of business, government, or personal affairs. Such documents
may include documents obtained from Federal, State, or local
governments, records kept in the course of a regularly
conducted business activity,<SUP>9</SUP> or regularly
maintained personal records such as a checkbook or diary.
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\9\ The Task Force intends that the type of business records
referred to in the Resolution be similar to the type admissible as
hearsay pursuant to Rule 803(6) of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Items
admissible under Rule 803(6) consist of ''[a] memorandum, report,
record, or data compilation, in any form, of acts, events, conditions,
opinions, or diagnoses, made at or near the time by, or from
information transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the
course of a regularly conducted business activity, and if it was the
regular practice of that business activity to make the memorandum,
report, record, or data compilation * * *. The term 'business' as used
in this [rule] includes business, institution, association, profession,
occupation, and calling of every kind, whether or not conducted for
profit.'' For purposes of determining whether the information offered
as complaint meets the requirements of Committee rules for what
constitutes a complaint, the Committee would not be required to
authenticate business records on which the allegations were based by
means of testimony of the record custodian or other qualified witness,
as would be required of the party offering such evidence in a Federal
judicial proceeding.
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As defined by the Task Force, the ''personal knowledge''
test will impose a significant, but reasonable, threshold
requirement upon non-Member complainants. Under Section 10 of
the Resolution, a complainant or an individual from whom the
complainant obtains information will be found to have personal
knowledge of conduct which is the basis of the alleged
violation if the complainant or that individual ''witnessed or
was a participant in such conduct * * *.'' Thus, the non-Member
filer may base information offered as a complaint either upon
his own personal knowledge or upon first-degree hearsay,
provided that the filer has a good faith reason to believe that
the source of his information actually witnessed or was a
participant in the conduct which is the basis of the alleged
violation. Second-degree hearsay--where the complainant's
source received the information in question from a third
party--would not suffice.
Moreover, Section 10 specifically provides that a non-
Member lacks the requisite ''personal knowledge'' if the
information he offers as a complaint consists solely of
information contained in a news or opinion source or
publication, even if the filer believes it to be true. Such
information, however, can still be an exclusive basis for
information offered as a complaint by a non-Member if it is
sponsored by a Member who certifies in writing that he believes
the information is submitted in good faith and warrants the
review and consideration of the Standards Committee. As under
current rules, a Member may personally file information offered
as a complaint based exclusively upon a newspaper article, and
the Committee may self-initiate an investigation based on news
reports or similar matter.
Finally, one of the leading concerns about the standards
process expressed by Task Force members, and others, is the
length of time used to resolve allegations of misconduct. There
is a perception, both within and outside of the House, that the
Standards Committee is sometimes faced with endless delays or
periods of unexplained, noninvestigatory, inaction. To minimize
such delay and inactivity in assessing whether there is initial
compliance with the requirements for constituting a complaint,
the Task Force recommends the establishment of a deadline for
that determination. Subsection (b) of Section 10 of the Task
Force Resolution directs the Standards Committee to amend its
rules regarding complaints to provide that whenever information
offered as a complaint is submitted to the Committee, the
chairman and ranking minority member shall have 14 calendar
days or 5 legislative days,whichever occurs first, to determine
whether the information meets the requirements of what constitutes a
complaint under the Committee's rules.
The Task Force intends that the determination of whether
information submitted to the Standards Committee constitutes a
properly filed complaint will be made jointly by the chairman
and ranking minority member. If the chairman and ranking
minority member agree that it does not meet the requirements
for a complaint, they are not obligated to take any further
action on the matter except to notify the appropriate parties
pursuant to current Committee rules.<SUP>10</SUP> If they
disagree over whether information offered as a complaint meets
the requirements to constitute a complaint, either may submit
the matter to the full Committee for resolution. In that
situation, if the Committee, by an affirmative vote by a
majority of its members, finds that the information submitted
to the Committee meets the requirements of a properly filed
complaint, the Committee may proceed to exercise any of the
options available for the disposition of a complaint. If the
Committee is deadlocked on the threshold procedural issue, the
information submitted to the Committee as a complaint may not
be accorded the status of a complaint.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ The process which occurs when the chairman and ranking
minority member agree that the information submitted does constitute a
complaint is described in Section 11 below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Section 11. Duties of Chairman and Ranking Minority Member Regarding
Properly Filed Complaints
Task Force members agreed that information deemed to
constitute a proper complaint, whether by the chairman and
ranking member, acting jointly, or by a majority vote of the
full Standards Committee, should not remain pending before the
full Standards Committee for an indeterminate period of time.
For reasons similar to those explained above regarding the
establishment of a deadline in which to determine whether
information offered as a complaint meets the procedural
requirements under the rules, the Task Force decided it would
be appropriate to assign a deadline either for disposing of a
properly filed complaint or submitting it to an investigative
subcommittee. Task Force members also agreed that the chairman
and ranking minority member, but not the full Committee, should
have the discretion to engage in informal fact-gathering in
order to make an informed judgment about how to dispose of a
complaint.
Under current Standards Committee rules, the scope of
informal fact-gathering is limited. The chairman and ranking
minority member may direct staff only to ''request information
from the respondent prior to the consideration of a Resolution
of Preliminary Inquiry.'' <SUP>11</SUP> Despite this
limitation, the full Committee often has conducted fact-
gathering. The Task Force decided to codify rules regarding
fact gathering at the full Committee level to ensure that the
chairman and ranking minority member have sufficient
information to make a recommendation. In addition, the Task
Force believes that such clarification will help to ensure that
the bifurcation system is not compromised.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ See Standards Committee Rule 15(d).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As discussed earlier in Section 1, the bifurcation system
was created to ensure that the investigatory phase and the
adjudicatory phase of the standards process are kept completely
separate, much like a grand jury is kept separate from the
trial jury. Therefore, it is imperative that those Committee
members sitting on an adjudicatory subcommittee not participate
in the investigation of a complaint, including initial fact-
gathering. Although the chairman and the ranking minority
member may sit on an adjudicatory subcommittee, by limiting the
initial fact-gathering to only those two Members and by
limiting the initial fact gathering only to information that is
necessary to determine how to initially dispose of the
complaint, the Task Force believes that the bifurcation system
can be preserved.
Therefore, under Section 11, whenever the chairman and
ranking minority member of the Standards Committee jointly
determine that information offered as a complaint meets the
requirements of the Committee's rules for what constitutes a
complaint, they must take action regarding the complaint within
45 calendar days or 5 legislative days, whichever is later.
During that period, the chairman and ranking minority member
may jointly gather additional information concerning the
alleged conduct which is the basis of the complaint. Fact-
gathering by the chairman and ranking minority member would be
informal and limited during this preliminary period to
information necessary for them to ascertain whether to make a
recommendation to the Committee that the complaint be disposed
of in a manner that does not require action by the House, or
that an investigative subcommittee be established to
investigate counts within the complaint. The Task Force intends
that the chairman and ranking minority member will not seek to
issue subpoenas, and that any fact-gathering will be limited to
unsworn witness interviews and requests for the voluntary
production of documents. The Task Force also intends that such
fact-gathering will be carried out only by the chairman and
ranking minority member and such Committee staff as they may
assign to the matter, rather than by the full Committee.
By the end of the requisite time period, the chairman and
ranking minority member must take one of three actions, unless
the Committee, by an affirmative vote of a majority of its
members, votes otherwise. First, the chairman and ranking
minority member may recommend to the Committee that it dispose
of the complaint (or any portion thereof) in any manner that
does not require action by the House. For example, they may
recommend that the Committee dismiss the complaint or resolve
it by means of a letter to the respondent.The ultimate decision
regarding how to dispose of the complaint would remain vested in the
full Committee.
Second, if the chairman and ranking minority member agree
that the complaint (or any portion thereof) should be forwarded
to an investigative subcommittee, they may jointly establish an
investigative subcommittee without submitting that question to
a vote by the full Committee. In that regard, the Task Force
recommends the elimination of the current threshold for the
establishment of an investigative subcommittee, whereby the
full Committee, by an affirmative vote of a majority of its
members, must first determine that allegations ''merit further
inquiry.'' In addition, the full Committee no longer would be
required to adopt a ''Resolution of Preliminary Inquiry,'' as
presently required by Committee rules, <SUP>12</SUP> to specify
the scope of an investigative subcommittee's investigation. By
eliminating the standard of ''merits further inquiry'' and the
need to adopt a Resolution of Preliminary Inquiry, the Task
Force intends that no undue inference be drawn from the
establishment of an investigative subcommittee. The Task Force
intends, additionally, that the chairman and ranking minority
member specify in writing to the chairman and ranking minority
member of the investigative subcommittee those counts or
allegations within the complaint that should be investigated.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ See Standards Committee Rule 15(f).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Third, because the Task Force recognizes that it may prove
difficult in some cases to complete informal fact-gathering
within the specified period of 45 calendar days or 5
legislative days, particularly if the chairman and ranking
minority member are awaiting the production of documents,
Section 11 also authorizes the chairman and ranking minority
member to request that the Committee extend the original time
period by one additional period of 45 calendar days if the
chairman and ranking minority member determine that more time
is necessary in order to make a recommendation to the Committee
about how to dispose of the complaint. To minimize delay, only
one such extension is permitted under the proposed rules.
Subsections (c) and (d) of Section 11 address the
circumstance in which the chairman and ranking minority member
have jointly determined that information submitted to the
Standards Committee meets the requirements for what constitutes
a complaint, but the complaint is not disposed of within the
requisite period of 45 calendar days or 5 legislative days (or
an extension of that period) and an investigative subcommittee
has not been established. In that event, the chairman and
ranking minority member must establish an investigative
subcommittee and forward the complaint, or any portion thereof,
to that subcommittee for its consideration. <SUP>13</SUP> As
indicated above, neither the chairman and ranking minority
member, nor the full Committee, would be required to make a
threshold determination that the complaint ''merits further
inquiry,'' or adopt a Resolution of Preliminary Inquiry.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ The Task Force notes that this procedure and its related
timetables apply only in the situation where a properly filed complaint
is before the Committee. Neither the chairman nor ranking minority
member, nor the Committee, would be required to take any particular
action, or be prohibited from taking any particular action, in the
situation where the Committee was determining whether to self-initiate
an investigation. Even in that instance, however, the Task Force
recommends that any preliminary fact-gathering be conducted by the
chairman and ranking minority member (rather than by the full
Committee), and that more formal investigative activity (e.g.,
subpoenas, depositions, and affidavits) be undertaken only by an
investigative subcommittee.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Automatic transmittal of the complaint to a subcommittee
could not occur, however, if either the chairman or ranking
minority member, at any time during the above-specified time
period, placed on the Committee's agenda the issue of whether
to establish aninvestigative subcommittee concerning the
complaint. Such action would be taken if, for example, the chairman or
ranking minority member disagreed about whether a given complaint
should be forwarded to an investigative subcommittee and one of them
desired a vote on that question by the full Committee. Once that issue
is placed on the Committee's agenda, the ''45-day period'' stops, and
an investigative subcommittee may be established only by an affirmative
vote of a majority of the members of the Committee. In addition, any
fact-finding by the chairman and ranking minority member also must
cease upon the placing of that issue on the agenda, and no further
fact-gathering may occur, unless the Committee, by an affirmative vote
of a majority of its members, establishes an investigative
subcommittee.<SUP>14</SUP>
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\14\ When voting to establish an investigative subcommittee the
Committee will not have to determine whether the complaint (or any
portion thereof) ''merits further inquiry'' or adopt a Resolution of
Preliminary Inquiry.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Task Force stresses that merely placing the complaint
on the Committee's agenda for the purpose of general discussion
or debate will not impede the transmittal of the complaint to
an investigative subcommittee. For example, a complaint may be
placed on the agenda to dismiss one of the counts contained in
the complaint. Rather, the chairman or ranking minority member
will have to place on the agenda the specific issue of whether
to establish an investigative subcommittee regarding the
complaint in order to stop the progression of the ''45-day
period.''
The Task Force expects that in the vast majority of cases,
the chairman and ranking minority member will agree on how to
dispose of a complaint, and will make a joint recommendation to
the full Committee. Because of the procedural consequences that
result from placement on the Committee agenda of the issue of
whether to establish an investigative subcommittee, the Task
Force expects that such action by the chairman or ranking
minority member will be viewed as the option of last resort.
The Task Force includes this provision in the Resolution to
avoid the possibility that a complaint against a House Member
may be sent to an investigative subcommittee in the absence of
a consensus between the chairman and ranking minority member,
or a majority of the members of the full Committee, that such
an investigation is necessary and appropriate.
The Committee has never been faced with a situation in
which a complaint was sent to an investigative subcommittee and
the subcommittee was unable to dispose of the complaint because
of any deadlock. Subcommittees, by virtue of their size, tend
to find collegial methods to resolve any differences.
Nevertheless, the Task Force reviewed the deadlock issue
because of its desire to avoid such an occurrence.
The Task Force considered a number of proposals to address
a potential subcommittee deadlock, including: time limits,
hiring special counsel, and full Committee review. The Task
Force rejected placing time limits on the subcommittee,
believing that they could encourage deadlock. In addition, the
Task Force determined that automatically triggering the hiring
of special counsel would encourage deadlock. Furthermore, the
Task Force rejected full Committee review of the complaint for
fear that such a review would compromise the bifurcated
process.
The Task Force has a strong desire to have all complaints
dealt with fairly yet expeditiously. The Task Force stresses
that the subcommittee should make all possible efforts to
resolve any differences and move the complaint towards
disposal. However, if an investigative subcommittee determines
that it is unable to dispose of a complaint referred to it, the
Task Force recommends that the subcommittee report its
inability to do so to the full Committee. The Task Force
further recommends that the Committee take whatever action
itdeems appropriate in that circumstance, including the establishment
of a new investigative subcommittee or the appointment of a special
counsel. Should the Committee appoint a new subcommittee to consider
the complaint, those members of the original subcommittee would be
prohibited from serving on an adjudicatory committee for that same
complaint.
Section 12. Duties of Chairman and Ranking Minority Member Regarding
Information Not Constituting a Complaint
Although the Task Force focused predominantly on how the
Committee should dispose of information deemed to meet the
requirements of a complaint, it also addressed what steps
should be taken if such information is determined not to
constitute a complaint. The Task Force reviewed the issue of
submissions of information either offered as a complaint or
offered merely for informational purposes. Section 12 states
that if the chairman and ranking minority member jointly
determine that information offered as a complaint does not meet
the requirements of what constitutes a complaint, as set forth
in the Committee's rules, they may return the information to
the complainant with a statement that it fails to meet the
requirements of what constitutes a complaint. Although not
mandatory, the Task Force expects that most filings offered as
a complaint which are procedurally deficient will result in
letters from the Committee to the complainant advising the
complainant that the filing did not meet the requirements of a
complaint consistent with current Standards Committee
rules.<SUP>15</SUP> Alternatively, the chairman and ranking
minority member may recommend to the Committee that it
authorize the establishment of an investigative subcommittee,
consistent with the Committee's long-standing discretionary
authority to self-initiate investigations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ Under Standards Committee Rule 15(b), if a complaint filed
with the Standards Committee is deemed to be procedurally deficient,
the Committee must return the complaint to the complainant with a copy
of House and Committee rules ''and a statement specifying why the
complaint is not in compliance. The respondent shall be notified when a
complaint is returned and provided the reasons therefor.'' (Emphasis
added.)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Any determination by the chairman and ranking minority
member that information offered to the Committee as a complaint
did not meet the requirements for what constitutes a complaint
would be without prejudice to whether the information later
could be resubmitted to the Committee for consideration as a
complaint.
With regard to submissions of information offered merely
for informational purposes, the Task Force intends for the
Committee to accept such information even though the Committee
is not obligated to act on that information. The Task Force
understands that there are situations where a Member or non-
Member purposely forwards information to the Committee in a
less formal manner than those required in the House and
Committee rules. The Task Force recognizes the desire of some
individuals to forward information to the Committee without
imposing requirements on the Committee to act, and recommends
that the Committee consider such information on its merits. The
Task Force acknowledges that the Committee will retain
discretion as to whether investigative action is warranted.
Section 13. Investigative and Adjudicatory Subcommittees
There was consensus among Task Force members that the
Standards Committee functions more effectively and efficiently
with fewer members. The Task Force therefore recommends that
the Committee henceforth be comprised of ten Members, rather
than the fourteen Members as required by Section 803(b) of the
Ethics Reform Act of 1989.<SUP>16</SUP> The Task Force
concluded that a smaller Committee will help to facilitate
consensus and decision-making within the Committee.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ Pub. L. No. 101-194, Nov. 30, 1989.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Based on the conclusion that the full Committee will
consist of ten members, Section 13 of the Task Force Resolution
directs the Committee to amend its rules concerning the size of
investigative and adjudicatory subcommittees. Under current
Committee rules, an investigative subcommittee may consist of
four or six members. Consistent with the objective of creating
smaller working groups, and of reducing the workload of
Members, Section 13 specifically limits investigative
subcommittees to four Members (with equal representation from
the majority and minority parties). Investigative subcommittees
may consist of four full Committee members, four non-Committee
House Members selected from the ''pool'' provided for in
Section 1 of the Task Force Resolution, or they may contain a
combination of two full Committee members and two ''pool''
Members. Section 13 also provides that adjudicatory
subcommittees shall consist of the remaining members of the
Committee who did not serve on the investigative subcommittee
(i.e., six to ten members).
In order to promote greater flexibility, and to accommodate
any unexpected assignment issues arising out of the newly
created Member ''pool'' system, the Task Force recommends that
Committee rules be amended regarding the selection of a
chairman and ranking minority member appointed to investigative
and adjudicatory subcommittees. Under current Committee
rules,<SUP>17</SUP> the senior majority and minority members of
an investigative subcommittee must serve as the chairman and
ranking minority member of the subcommittee. Committee rules
also currently provide that the chairman and ranking minority
member of the full Committee must serve as the chairman and
ranking minority member of an adjudicatory
subcommittee.<SUP>18</SUP>
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\17\ See Standards Committee Rule 6(a).
\18\ See Standards Committee Rule 19(a).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Section 13 vests discretion in the full Committee chairman
and ranking minority member regarding the designation of a
chairman and ranking minority member for investigative and
adjudicatory subcommittees. It provides that at the time of
appointment, the chairman of the full Committee must designate
one member of the subcommittee to serve as chairman, and the
ranking minority member of the full Committee must designate
one member of the subcommittee to serve as the ranking minority
member, of investigative and adjudicatory subcommittees. Thus,
the appointment of a subcommittee chairman and ranking minority
member no longer would be based on seniority.
To preserve the integrity of the bifurcation system, the
Task Force also recommends changes to the Standards Committee
rules regarding the role of the full Committee chairman and
ranking minority member when they serve on investigative
subcommittees. Under current Committee Rule 6(a), the full
Committee chairman and ranking minority member may serve on an
investigative subcommittee as non-voting, ex officio, members.
The Task Force believes that the adjudicatory phase of the
bifurcation system might be compromised in that situation, as
the full Committee chairman and ranking minority member could
learn information during the investigation that could affect
their ability to render an impartial judgment during the
subsequent adjudication. Thus, in Section 13, the Task Force
recommends that the current Committee rule be amended to
authorize the full Committee chairman and ranking minority
member to appoint themselves to an investigative subcommittee,
but not as non-voting, ex officio members of the subcommittee.
Section 14. Standard of Proof for Adoption of Statement of Alleged
Violation
Throughout its deliberations, the Task Force was mindful of
the adverse consequences of an ethics investigation for a House
Member accused of misconduct, particularly if aninvestigative
subcommittee adopts an SAV. Under current Standards Committee rules, an
investigative subcommittee may adopt an SAV if it determines that there
is ''reason to believe'' that a violation occurred. It was the Task
Force's belief that past subcommittees frequently adopted an SAV upon
belief that the evidence of a violation was substantial in nature.
Therefore, in Section 14 of the Resolution, the Task Force
directs the Standards Committee to amend its rules regarding
the standard of proof for adopting an SAV. Under the Task
Force's recommendation, an investigative subcommittee may adopt
an SAV only if it determines, by an affirmative vote of a
majority of the members of the subcommittee, that there is
''substantial reason to believe'' that a violation has
occurred.
Section 15. Subcommittee Powers
The Task Force examined the powers of investigative and
adjudicatory subcommittees of the Standards Committee with the
goal of more clearly defining certain powers and ensuring that
the exercise of those powers is accompanied by appropriate and
adequate due process for respondents.
The Task Force determined that current Committee rules
concerning the expansion of the scope of an investigation by an
investigative subcommittee are unclear. Those rules provide
only that ''[a] Statement of Alleged Violation may include
offenses beyond those referenced in the Resolution of
Preliminary Inquiry.'' <SUP>19</SUP> The rules do not expressly
authorize the subcommittee to expand the scope of an
investigation, impose any procedural requirements for expanding
the scope of an investigation, or expressly address whether the
subcommittee should first consult with, or obtain the approval
of, the full Committee. In Section 15 of the Resolution, the
Task Force, in order to maximize the discretion of the
subcommittee and to avoid compromising the bifurcation system,
recommends that the Committee adopt rules specifically
authorizing an investigative subcommittee to expand the scope
of an investigation upon an affirmative vote of a majority of
its members. The subcommittee would not be required to obtain
the approval of the full Committee prior to expanding the scope
of an investigation.
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\19\ Standards Committee Rule 17(d).
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Section 15 also addresses the subject of amendments to an
SAV, which current Committee rules do not address. Under the
Task Force proposal, an investigative subcommittee may, upon an
affirmative vote of a majority of its members, amend an SAV
anytime before it is transmitted to the full Committee. For
example, if the subcommittee obtains new evidence warranting an
additional charge not contained in the original SAV, it may
amend the SAV. In the event of such an amendment, however, the
respondent must be notified in writing and must be given 30
calendar days from the date of notification to file an answer
to the amended SAV. In addition, as set forth in Section 16 of
the Resolution, the subcommittee must provide the respondent
the amended SAV and any new evidence it intends to introduce
against the respondent to prove the additional counts prior to
adopting the amended SAV.
The Task Force recommends tightening the requirements for
the issuance of subpoenas by the full Committee and by
investigative and adjudicatory subcommittees. With regard to
subpoenas issued by the full Committee, clause 2(m)(2)(A) of
House Rule XI provides that the members of the Committee, by a
majority vote, may authorize and issue subpoenas, but may
delegate that authority to the chairman of the Committee.
Authorized subpoenas must be signed by the chairman of the
Committee or any member designated by the Committee. The Task
Force Resolution amends that House rule by providing
anexception for the Standards Committee. That exception eliminates the
delegation authority in the House rule and provides that subpoenas may
be issued by the full Committee only when authorized by a majority of
the members voting, a majority being present. The Task Force, however,
discourages the use of subpoenas by the full Committee and recommends
that the use of this formal investigative tool be reserved, except in
unusual circumstances, for investigative subcommittees.
With regard to subpoenas issued by investigative and
adjudicatory subcommittees, current Committee rules provide
that a subcommittee may, by a simple majority of its members,
vote to issue a subpoena,<SUP>20</SUP> and that, in the case of
an investigative subcommittee, the issuance of a subpoena
requires the prior approval of the full Committee chairman and
ranking minority member.<SUP>21</SUP> Thus, in an investigative
subcommittee of four members, for example, a subpoena could be
issued upon the affirmative vote of only two members of the
same political party, if only three subcommittee members were
present. In addition, the full Committee chairman and ranking
minority member must review and sign each subpoena sought by an
investigative subcommittee, thereby learning the identity of
the person being subpoenaed.
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\20\ Standards Committee Rules 8(b) and 17(a)(5).
\21\ Standards Committee Rule 17(a)(5) states: ''Unless the
Committee otherwise provides, the [investigative] subcommittee subpoena
power shall rest in the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member of the
Committee * * * ''
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The Task Force sought to ensure that there is bipartisan
support for each subpoena issued, and that the bifurcation
system be preserved. Accordingly, the Task Force Resolution
provides that subcommittee subpoenas may now be issued only by
an affirmative vote of a majority of subcommittee members. In
addition, investigative subcommittees no longer must obtain the
approval of the full Committee to issue a subpoena. This change
further ensures the preservation of the bifurcation system,
which is intended to segregate the investigative subcommittee
members from the Committee members not serving on that
subcommittee. If the subcommittee were required to approach the
full Committee chairman and ranking minority member for
authorization and issuance of a subpoena, even the
identification of the names of the parties subpoenaed would
constitute a partial breach of the bifurcation that is intended
to exist for the duration of the subcommittee's investigation.
That breach could be widened if the full Committee chairman and
ranking minority member sought justification for the issuance
of the subpoena. Therefore, granting the subcommittee the
ability to issue subpoenas independently, but only by a vote of
the majority of its members, will keep the subcommittee process
confidential and maintain the integrity of the bifurcation
system.
section 16. due process rights of respondents
The Task Force reevaluated the balance between the need to
preserve the integrity and confidentiality of the investigative
and adjudicatory processes and the need to enhance the
respondent's ability to work with the Committee to resolve the
complaint in a way which would reflect creditably on the House.
Section 16 sets forth a package of due process rights for
future respondents which the Task Force believes maintains a
balance between preserving the integrity of the process and the
rights of the respondent to defend himself and, when
appropriate, enter into a fair resolution of the matter.
Under existing Committee rules, a respondent is not
entitled to review any evidence in support of allegations
against him prior to the issuance of an SAV. In carrying
outcurrent Standards Committee rules,<SUP>22</SUP> past investigative
subcommittees have made information available to respondents in order
for them to be able to present their views to the subcommittees.
However, under current Committee rules, not until fifteen days before
the beginning of an adjudicatory proceeding is a respondent entitled to
see any evidence intended to be used against him, and even then his
right to evidence is extremely limited.<SUP>23</SUP> Therefore,
Subsection 1 of Section 16 establishes a respondent's right to review
both the SAV which the subcommittee intends to adopt (at least 10 days
prior to the subcommittee vote on the SAV), together with all evidence
the subcommittee intends to introduce against him regarding the charges
contained in the SAV.<SUP>24</SUP> By providing this information to the
respondent and his counsel, the respondent will have a more
comprehensive knowledge of the evidence the subcommittee intends to use
to prove the SAV, and a clear indication that there are at least three
Members of the subcommittee prepared to vote in favor of the SAV.
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\22\ Standards Committee Rule 17(a)(3) states that an
''[investigative] subcommittee shall provide the respondent an
opportunity to present, orally or in writing, a statement, which must
be under oath or affirmation, regarding the allegations and any other
relevant questions arising out of the Preliminary Inquiry.''
\23\ Under Standards Committee Rule 19(f)(1), a respondent and his
counsel are entitled only ''to inspect, review, copy or photograph
books, papers, documents, photographs, or other tangible objects that
the adjudicatory subcommittee counsel intends to use as evidence
against the respondent in a Disciplinary Hearing.'' The respondent is
also entitled only to receive the names of witnesses the subcommittee
intends to call, and a ''summary of their expected testimony'' (rather
than transcripts of depositions or memoranda of witness interviews).
\24\ An amendment to an intended SAV, either agreed to during
settlement discussions or which does not add counts or materially
change the substantive count(s), which were previously provided to the
respondent, should not require an additional 10-day review period prior
to its adoption. However, an amendment to an SAV, either prior to or
after its adoption, which either adds count(s) or materially changes
existing count(s), should require an additional 10-day review period
and the immediate presentation to the respondent of whatever new
evidence the subcommittee intends to introduce to prove the amended
count(s).
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Since there have not been any adjudicatory hearings to date
under the current rules, there is no precedent with regard to
respondents receiving this evidence in such circumstances. The
Task Force determined that the Standards Committee must provide
this evidence to respondents regardless of whether there is an
adjudicatory hearing. Furthermore, the Task Force anticipates
that providing such information will strongly encourage
realistic and productive settlement negotiations between the
parties.
The Task Force is mindful that circumstances could arise
where the subcommittee would be compelled to protect the
identity of a witness prior to publicly disclosing the SAV.
Consequently, the Task Force specifically recommends that the
subcommittee be empowered, by a majority vote of its members,
to withhold certain evidence to protect the identity of a
witness. In that event, however, the subcommittee must inform
the respondent that evidence is being withheld for that reason
and inform him of the charge(s) to which such evidence relates.
Subsection 2 of Section 16 additionally provides that
neither the respondent, nor his counsel, shall directly or
indirectly, contact the members of the investigative
subcommittee during the disclosure period prior to the SAV
vote, except for the sole purpose of settlement discussions
where counsels for the respondent and the subcommittee are
present. The Task Force believes this is necessary to avoid any
ex parte communications with subcommittee members by the
respondent or his counsel. While the Task Force wants to
encourage candid settlement discussions, it does not want the
ten-day period to become a strategic device by which the
respondent, or his counsel, try to engage in either legal (e.g.
motions) or nonlegal tactics (e.g., lobbying, unauthorized
press accounts, etc.) calculated to prolong, influence, impede
or frustrate the SAV vote.
Subsection 4 of Section 16 was added to guard against any
premature leaks of the evidence provided to the respondent and
his counsel. Under Subsection 4, both the respondent and his
counsel would be required to agree, in writing, that no
document, information, or other materials received from the
subcommittee would be revealed publicly until the SAV is made
public (if the respondent has waived his adjudicatory hearing),
or at the commencement of an adjudicatory hearing (if the
respondent does not waive such a hearing). The Task Force has
further provided that a failure of the respondent or his
counsel to so agree in writing, and therefore not receive the
evidence, shall not preclude the issuance of the SAV at the end
of the ten-day period.
As a corollary to these new rights, the Task Force
recommends in Subsection 3 of Section 16 that the respondent be
immediately provided, after an SAV has been adopted, with any
evidence the Standards Committee or a subcommittee thereof
later decides it intends to use in support of its case. The
Task Force added this provision to accommodate two particular
situations: (1) the situation where new evidence comes to the
attention of the subcommittee after its adoption of an SAV; and
(2) the situation where evidence possessed prior to the
adoption of an SAV assumes a new significance after the SAV is
voted and thereby warrants introduction at the hearing. The
existence of this remedial provision to deal with a possible
change of status regarding preexisting evidence is not intended
to encourage or permit the Committee, subcommittee, or their
respective counsel to take an overly conservative view of the
evidence that should be provided to the respondent in the
discovery period prior to the investigative subcommittee's
adoption of an SAV.
Subsections 5 and 8 of Section 16 institute requirements
for the Standards Committee or an investigative subcommittee to
notify the respondent of certain developments in the
investigative process or the Committee's consideration of a
complaint. Under Subsection 5, the respondent must be provided
written notice whenever: (1) the chairman and ranking member
determine that information the Committee has received
constitutes a complaint; (2) a complaint or allegation is
transmitted to an investigative subcommittee; (3) an
investigative subcommittee votes to issue its first subpoena or
take testimony under oath, whichever occurs first; and (4) an
investigative subcommittee votes to expand the scope of its
investigation. Each of these events represents a new
development in the investigative process that a respondent
should be advised of immediately, so that he can consult with,
or retain, counsel.
Subsection 8 of Section 16 requires that notice be given to
a respondent when a motion to establish an investigative
subcommittee does not prevail at the full Committee level. As
described previously with respect to Section 11 of the Task
Force Resolution, the placing of this issue on the agenda of
the full Committee would automatically conclude the time period
established in that section for disposition of complaints by
the full Committee. The Task Force anticipates that placing on
the agenda of the full Committee the issue of whether to
proceed to an investigative subcommittee will be rare, and that
deadlock votes will be even less frequent. Recognizing the
possibility that such deadlocks could occur, however,
particularly in a situation where a complaint is viewed as
partisan, the Task Force seeks to ensure that the respondent
will receive immediate notice of an unsuccessful vote to
establish an investigative subcommittee. While such notice
would not constitute a dismissal, however, no further fact-
gathering would occur without a majority vote of the members of
the full Committee. The Task Force agreed that the respondent
receive such notice in the form of the following letter:
Dear Respondent: Pursuant to Committee Rule ____, we are
writing to advise you of a Committee vote taken concerning a
complaint filed against you on __________, 199__.
On ____________, 199__, a motion to establish an
investigative subcommittee concerning that complaint was placed
on the agenda of the Committee for a vote of the full
Committee.
On ____________, 199__, the motion referred to above was
voted on by the full Committee and did not prevail.
Sincerely,
Chairman Ranking Minority Member
Subsections 6 and 7 of Section 16 concern settlement
discussions and agreements. In Subsection 7, the Task Force
recognized that settlement discussions between a respondent and
an investigative subcommittee should be confidential.
Accordingly, statements or information derived solely from a
respondent or his counsel during settlement discussions shall
not be included without the respondent's permission in any
report of the Committee or a subcommittee thereof, or otherwise
publicly disclosed (e.g., at an adjudicatory or sanction
hearing) without the consent of the respondent. Thus, to the
extent the subcommittee, or the full Committee, wishes to
disclose any statement made, or information provided, by a
respondent or his counsel during a settlement discussion, it
must have obtained that statement or information from a source
independent of the settlement discussion prior to, or after,
that settlement discussion. In addition, without the consent of
the respondent, the Committee or subcommittee cannot
acknowledge that the statement or information which it obtained
from an independent source was also made during, or derived
from, a settlement discussion. The Task Force recommends that
respondents receive this due process right so that they possess
similar protection that litigants have in a civil or criminal
case. The Task Force believes that ensuring the confidentiality
of settlement discussions could promote successful settlement
negotiations.
In Subsection 6 of Section 16, the Task Force recommends
that all future settlement agreements between investigative
subcommittees and respondents be in writing and signed by both
sides and their respective counsels, unless the respondent
requests otherwise. This provision is viewed as a mutual form
of protection against misunderstandings or mischaracterizations
of the agreement by either party to the settlement agreement.
The Task Force appreciates that in most cases a respondent's
counsel would want this protection, and includes this
requirement to ensure the respondent's ability to obtain a
written agreement whenever requested.
Section 17. Committee Reporting Requirements
The Task Force reevaluated current Standards Committee
rules regarding reports adopted by the full Committee or an
investigative subcommittee. Section 17 proposes changes to the
rules designed to: (1) enhance the flexibility of the full
Committee regarding its reporting to the House; (2) ensure that
sufficient information is reported to the full Committee before
the full Committee recommends a sanction in a situation where
the adjudicatory hearing was waived; (3) provide the respondent
with an adequate opportunity to present his views for inclusion
in any full Committee or subcommittee report; and (4) provide
Committee members with a sufficient amount of time to review
such a report prior to either a sanction hearing or a vote to
adopt a subcommittee report.
Under current Standards Committee rules, an investigative
subcommittee must submit a report to the full Committee if it
does not adopt an SAV, and the full Committee is required to
transmit that report to the House thereby making it public. The
Task Force is mindful that such reports could contain certain
sensitive investigative material. Accordingly, Subsection 1 of
Section 17 changes this requirement by giving the full
Committee discretion, by a majority vote of its members, to
refrain from sending to the House the subcommittee report
issued to the full Committee in the situation where no SAV was
ultimately brought.
Under current Standards Committee rules, an investigative
subcommittee is not required to prepare a report when it adopts
an SAV. The Task Force Resolution addresses this omission by
requiring that when the respondent has waived an adjudicatory
hearing <SUP>25</SUP> the subcommittee is required to prepare a
report and transmit it to the full Committee.
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\25\ Rule 22(b) of the rules of the Standards Committee states: ''A
respondent may seek to waive any procedural rights or steps in the
disciplinary process. A request for [a] waiver must be in writing,
signed by the respondent, and must detail what procedural stops
respondent seeks to waive. Any such request shall be subject to the
acceptance of the Committee or subcommittee, as appropriate.''
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Further, Subsection 2(A) of Section 17 provides each
respondent who has admitted to alleged violations and has
waived his right to an adjudicatory hearing, a right to review
the final draft of the subcommittee's report not less than 15
days prior to a subcommittee vote on whether to adopt the
report. Thereafter, within seven days of receiving the draft,
the respondent has a right to submit written views regarding
the subcommittee's draft report for attachment to, or inclusion
in, the final subcommittee report. The subcommittee must submit
those views together with its report to the full Committee, and
the Committee must make its views and the respondent's views
available to the public prior to any sanction hearing.
<SUP>26</SUP>
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\26\ See Standards Committee Rule 17(e). The Task Force does not
intend for this provision to require an additional seven days for
further review by the respondent if the subcommittee alters its report
after the submission of the respondent's views. But the respondent
should receive notice of any and all changes within a reasonable amount
of time prior to the release of the report.
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The subcommittee is not required to issue a report in the
circumstance where it adopts an SAV but the respondent does not
waive his right to an adjudicatory hearing. In that situation,
the Task Force believes that the full Committee would possess
sufficientinformation to make a sanction determination in light
of the complete record of the adjudicatory hearing.
Subsection 2(D) of Section 17 addresses the requirements
relating to a full Committee report to the House after a
sanction hearing has been held. The Task Force provides for the
respondent to file views and have them attached to the full
Committee's final report. The Task Force, however, does not
provide the respondent an additional 15 day pre-review period.
The Task Force concludes that at this stage of the proceedings,
the respondent is sufficiently likely to anticipate the
contents of the final report, having attended the sanction
hearing and having already extensively commented on the
subcommittee report. Under Subsection 2(D), the respondent is
provided an opportunity to submit additional views for
attachment to the final report. The Task Force expects that the
respondent will be given reasonable notice prior to the
submission of the Committee's final report to the House to be
able to prepare and transmit those additional views for their
attachment.
Finally, in Subsection 3 of Section 17, the Task Force
recommends, when an adjudicatory hearing is waived, a minimum
period of not less than 72 hours to be provided for members of
the full Committee to review an investigative subcommittee's
report prior to either a sanction hearing, or a vote to adopt a
report. The Task Force believes that full Committee members who
did not serve on the investigative subcommittee need a minimum
amount of time to become familiar with the facts of an
investigation and have an adequate opportunity to raise
questions about the report.
Section 18. Referrals to Federal or State Authorities
The Task Force considered whether the Standards Committee
should have greater flexibility to disclose information to
Federal or State authorities that may be evidence of a
violation of law applicable to the performance of a Member's
duties or to the discharge of his responsibilities. Under
current House Rules,<SUP>27</SUP> the Committee may report
''substantial evidence'' of such a violation to Federal or
State authorities only with the approval of the House.
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\27\ House Rule X, Clause 4(e)(1)(B).
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The Task Force determined that there may be situations when
the Committee would prefer to transmit information
confidentially to Federal or State authorities, rather than
transmit such information to the House, where it would be
publicly disclosed.<SUP>28</SUP> Consequently, the Task Force
recommends that House Rules be revised to permit the Committee
to report substantial evidence of a violation either with the
approval of the House or by a two-thirds vote of the members of
the Committee. The ''supermajority'' vote of the Committee
would, in effect, prevent the Committee from making direct
referrals except in cases where there was strong bipartisan
support on the Committee for a referral.
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\28\ According to the House Parliamentarian, the Committee has
never utilized the ''substantial evidence'' standard for referrals
since the provision was added to House Rules in 1978.
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The Task Force wishes to make it clear that the rules and
recommendation discussed above relate only to referrals where
the Committee, in essence, is accusing a Member, officer, or
employee of the House of a violation of law. The Committee
would retain its current discretion to make information and
records available to Federal or State authorities in response
to a specific request by such authorities, subject to the
necessary Committee approval.
section 19. frivolous filings
Although the Standards Committee always has possessed the
discretion to self-initiate action against filers subject to
its jurisdiction, the Task Force wishes to underscore its
concern about the potential filing of frivolous complaints, as
well as its desire to deter such filings. The Task Force,
therefore, recommends that House rules be amended to clarify
that if a complaint, or information offered as a complaint, is
deemed frivolous by an affirmative vote of a majority of the
members of the Committee, the Committee may take such action as
it, by an affirmative vote of a majority vote of its members,
deems appropriate. Two votes would be required under the Task
Force's recommendation: the first, a majority vote to determine
whether a filing is frivolous; and second, a subsequent vote to
determine what, if any, sanction should be recommended.
Complaints filed before the One Hundred and Fifth Congress,
however, may not be deemed frivolous by the Standards
Committee.
The Task Force refrained from defining the term
''frivolous'' in order to afford maximum flexibility to the
Standards Committee. The Task Force also wishes to emphasize
that in the event the Committee determines that a filer over
whom the Committee has jurisdiction has submitted a frivolous
filing, and that sanctions are appropriate, the Committee still
must afford all appropriate due process to the Member, officer,
or employee of the House whose filing is in question, including
the rights to an adjudicatory and sanction hearing.
section 20. technical amendments
The Task Force Resolution requires the Standards Committee
to make three additional changes to its rules of a minor or
technical nature.
First, the Committee is required to clarify its rules to
provide that whenever the Committee votes to authorize an
investigation on its own initiative, the chairman and ranking
minority member must establish an investigative subcommittee to
undertake the investigation. Current Committee rules do not
explicitly require the establishment of an investigative
subcommittee when an investigation is self-initiated.
Second, the Committee must revise its rules to refer to
hearings held by an adjudicatory subcommittee as
''adjudicatory'' hearings. Current Committee rules refer to
such hearings as ''disciplinary'' hearings. The Task Force
believes that the term ''disciplinary'' suggests that the
Committee already has found the respondent liable for the
alleged violation, and thus the term is unfairly prejudicial to
the respondent.
Finally, the Resolution requires the Committee to make
whatever additional changes to its rules are necessary in order
to conform Committee rules to the Task Force Resolution.
V. Conclusion
Reform of the standards process in the House has always
been conducted in a bipartisan manner. After four months of
extensive review and effort, the Task Force has concluded that
the recommendations in the Resolution constitute the most
comprehensive reform of the process upon which it can reach a
bipartisan consensus. The Task Force believes that the evolving
standards process will be improved by the adoption of these
changes, which were designed to: enhance the nonpartisan
operation of the Committee; increase the confidentiality of the
Committee's workings; improve the system for filing information
offered as a complaint; promote the efficient administration of
the Committee; improve the due process rights of Members,
officers and employees; foster greater involvement by Members
in the process; and ensure a more timely resolution of matters
before the Committee. The Task Force hopes that the Members and
public will view each of these changes, not in microscopic
isolation, but as a part of a new system to accomplish the
above-stated objectives. Regardless of these changes, however,
the Task Force believes that ultimately the success of the
standards process will be determined by the willingness of
Members to serve in judgment of their colleagues in a fair and
impartial manner. Only then can the House achieve its ultimate
goal: a nonpartisan peer review system which has the trust and
confidence of both the Members and the American people.
VI. Additional Views
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VII. Appendix
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