Ginna
3Q/2007 Plant Inspection Findings

Initiating Events

Significance: G Mar 30, 2007
Identified By: NRC
Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation
Failure of "B" MSIV due to Inadequate Design Control
A self-revealing NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control," was identified because Ginna failed to control the proper design configuration of installed plant equipment. Specifically, Ginna failed to update records and procedures reflecting the design requirement for a vent hole to be drilled in the exhaust port plug for the main steam isolation valve (MSIV) air actuators. As a result, a replacement actuator was installed during the October 2006 refueling outage on the "B" MSIV with a solid vent plug. This caused an inadvertent closure of the MSIV on March 16, 2007, and resulted in a reactor trip. Ginna replaced the actuator with a modified version and placed this issue in the corrective action program.
The finding is more than minor because it is associated with the design control attribute of the Initiating Events cornerstone, and it adversely affected the cornerstone objective of limiting the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability during power operations. Specifically, the closure of "B" MSIV caused a reactor trip with a safety injection system actuation. The inspectors determined the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) using a Phase 1 screening of the finding in accordance with IMC 0609, Appendix A, "Determining the Significance of Reactor Inspection Findings for At-Power Situations." The finding screened to Green because it did not contribute to the likelihood of a primary or secondary system loss-of-coolant-accident (LOCA) initiator, or to both the likelihood of a reactor trip and the likelihood that mitigation equipment or functions would not be available.
Inspection Report# : 2007002 *(pdf)*

Mitigating Systems

Significance: G Dec 31, 2006
Identified By: NRC
Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation
ECCS Rendered Inoperable While in Mode 4
The inspectors identified a non-cited violation (NCV) of Technical Specification (TS) 3.5.3, "Emergency Core Cooling Systems" (ECCS) due to lead blankets covering the 'B' containment recirculation sump grating with the plant in the Hot Standby Mode. As a result of the covered sump grating, the recirculation function was degraded and the ECCS was not operable for approximately six hours while the plant transitioned to the Cold Shutdown Mode.
This finding is more than minor because it is associated with the Mitigating System Cornerstone and affects the cornerstone objective of ensuring the reliability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. This finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) by using Phase 1 Appendix G, of the SDP. The finding screened to Green since the ECCS remained available to supply high and low pressure injection into the reactor coolant system if needed. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution because Ginna did not ensure all of the lead blankets had been removed from the 'B' containment sump grating when the error was initially identified.
Inspection Report# : 2006005 *(pdf)*

Barrier Integrity

Significance: G Dec 31, 2006
Identified By: NRC
Item Type: FIN Finding
Did Not Maintain the Containment Penetration Cooling System in accordance with the UFSAR and System Drawings
The inspectors identified a finding in that Ginna did not adequately maintain the containment penetration cooling system as described in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) and system drawings to ensure it would be capable of performing its intended function in a reliable manner.
This finding is more than minor because it is associated with the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone and affects the cornerstone objective of providing reasonable assurance that the physical design barriers (fuel cladding, RCS, and containment) protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. This finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) using the Phase 1 screening of the SDP. The finding screened to Green since it did not represent an actual open pathway in the physical integrity of the reactor containment. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution because Ginna personnel did not identify the containment penetration cooling system deficiencies issues during periodic system walkdowns.
Inspection Report# : 2006005 *(pdf)*

Emergency Preparedness

Significance: G Mar 30, 2007
Identified By: NRC
Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation
Ginna Communicators Not Adequately Trained To Implement EPIP 5-7
The inspectors identified an NCV of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(15), radiological emergency response training, when they noted that the assigned Emergency Response Organization (ERO) communicators have not been fully trained on all communicator responsibilities as outlined in Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure (EPIP) 5-7. For example, since December 2006, contrary to EPIP 5-7, maintenance personnel who were filling the role of ERO communicator have not been trained to respond to the control room when medical and fire events have occurred at the station and properly implement their communicator duties. Ginna issued a condition report to address the training deficiency.
The inspectors determined that the failure to ensure that control room communicators were fully trained on ERO communicator responsibilities as described in procedure EPIP 5-7 was more than minor because it was associated with the ERO readiness aspect of the Emergency Preparedness cornerstone, and it affected the objective to ensure Ginna is capable of implementing adequate measures to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of a radiological emergency. The EP SDP was used to assess the safety significance of this finding related to the non-risk significant planning standard 10 CFR 50.47(b)(15). Based on IMC 0609 Appendix B, “Emergency Preparedness SDP” Sheet 1 for the failure to comply with an NRC requirement and the examples provided in Section 4.15, this finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green). The finding screened to Green, because the individuals were not trained to the expectations outlined in EPIP 5-7; however, they had received training on their communicator duties for declared events. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance, because Ginna maintenance personnel who were filling the role of ERO communicator were not fully trained on the roles and responsibilities of the position as outlined in EPIP 5-7.
Inspection Report# : 2007002 *(pdf)*

Occupational Radiation Safety

Public Radiation Safety

Physical Protection

Although the NRC is actively overseeing the Security cornerstone, the Commission has decided that certain findings pertaining to security cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that potentially useful information is not provided to a possible adversary. Therefore, the cover letters to security inspection reports may be viewed.

Miscellaneous

Last modified : December 07, 2007