

# Browns Ferry 2

## 1Q/2007 Plant Inspection Findings

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### Initiating Events

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### Mitigating Systems

**Significance:**  Mar 31, 2007

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

#### **Inadequate Corrective Actions to Resolve Deficiencies in SBO Mitigation Capabilities**

The inspectors identified a Green non-cited violation of 10CFR50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, for ineffective corrective actions by the licensee to ensure that the operating emergency diesel generators (EDGs) during a Unit 2 Station Blackout (SBO) event would have sufficient cooling water under worst case licensing-basis conditions. The licensee developed a new simplified mitigation strategy to address the issue. This finding was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as PER 119778.

This finding was greater than minor because it was associated with the Procedure Quality attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone, and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability and reliability of systems that mitigate initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because of the low frequency of occurrence of the specific combination of multiple EDG failures that could lead to a loss of cooling water flow to all of the running EDGs. The cause of finding was directly related to the appropriate and timely corrective action aspect of the Problem Identification and Resolution cross-cutting area because corrective actions developed for Unit 2 SBO mitigation strategy deficiencies were not effective in ensuring timely restoration of cooling water to the EDGs.

Inspection Report# : [2007002](#) (*pdf*)

**Significance:**  Dec 31, 2006

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

#### **Lack of Assured Cooling Water for Emergency Diesel Generators During SBO Conditions**

The inspectors identified a non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, that affected Units 2 and 3. The licensee's calculations and procedures did not adequately implement the plant's licensing basis for Station Blackout (SBO), in that, they did not ensure the operating emergency diesel generators (EDGs) would have an adequate cooling water supply during a SBO with certain plant equipment configurations.

This finding is of greater than minor safety significance because it affected the objectives of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone. It affected the availability and reliability of systems that mitigate initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The finding has very low safety significance due to the few very specific combinations of EDG failures that could lead to a loss of cooling water flow to all of the running EDGs. The licensee took prompt corrective action by revising procedures to add immediate operator actions to ensure adequate cooling water supply to the EDGs.

Inspection Report# : [2006005](#) (*pdf*)

**Significance:**  Sep 15, 2006

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

#### **Safe Shutdown Instruction Directs Operators to Connect 4 KV SD BD "A" to a Potentially Fire-Induced Fault in FA 8**

The team identified a non-cited violation (NCV) of Unit 2 Operating License Condition 2.C.14 for an inadequate Safe

Shutdown Instruction (SSI) which directed the operator to align credited 4 kV Shutdown Board (SD BD) "A" to its alternate supply (Shutdown Bus 2). This could connect 4kV SD BD "A" to a fire-induced fault and result in a lockout of the "A" emergency diesel generator (EDG), one of two required EDGs for Unit 2 to complete Safe Shutdown (SSD) for a fire in fire area 8 (FA 8). The licensee established compensatory measures for the issue and entered this performance deficiency into their corrective action program (CAP) for resolution.

The finding is more than minor because this performance deficiency is associated with the reactor safety mitigating system cornerstone attribute of protection against external events, i.e., fire. It also affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring availability of systems that respond to events in that 4kV SD BD "A" could have been de-energized and locked out in response to a postulated fire in FA 8. The inspectors determined that the issue was of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding was judged to have a low degradation impact on safe shutdown in that the deficiency would not have caused a failure of the SSD strategy for FA 8. There was a very short period of time when the fault could have affected 4 kV SD BD "A" and there was significant recovery time available (approximately 2 hours) due to the required SSD loads not being powered from 4 kV SD BD "A".

Inspection Report# : [2006014](#) (*pdf*)

**Significance:**  Sep 15, 2006

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

### **Cellular Phone Communications Unreliable for Alternate Shutdown in FA16**

The team identified a non-cited violation (NCV) of Unit 2 Operating License Condition 2.C.14 and Unit 3 Operating License Condition 2.C.7 for failure to have adequate communications to implement alternate shutdown for a fire in fire area (FA) 16 using procedure 2/3-SSI-16.

This issue is a performance deficiency because the cell phone system was unreliable and the F4 portable radio system was not credited for a fire in FA 16. The finding is greater than minor because it affected the ability of the licensee to maintain communications for a fire in FA 16 and is associated with the mitigating systems cornerstone and respective attribute of protection against external factors, i.e., fire in that degraded communications would impact the ability to achieve SSD following a fire. This finding was determined to be a finding of very low safety significance (Green) because it only affected the ability to reach and maintain cold shutdown conditions due to the availability of alternate communications measures (F4 radios) for a time period sufficient to achieve hot shutdown conditions.

Inspection Report# : [2006014](#) (*pdf*)

**Significance:**  Jun 30, 2006

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

### **Failure to Implement Required Fire Watches**

A Green non-cited violation of TS 5.4.1.d, Fire Protection Program Implementation, was identified by the inspectors for the licensee's failure to implement compensatory measures (i.e., roving fire watches) as prescribed by the Browns Ferry Fire Protection Plan for disabled fire detection systems in multiple Fire Areas in the Control Building. This issue was documented in the licensee's corrective action program as Problem Evaluation Report 102745.

This finding was more than minor since it was associated with the Protection Against External Factors attribute of the Reactor Safety Mitigating Systems cornerstone, and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The finding was of very low safety significance because the capability of other principal defense-in-depth fire protection features were unaffected, such as the associated fire barriers, control of transient combustibles, manual fire suppression equipment, and the fire brigade. This finding has a crosscutting element in the area of human performance because the fire protection impairment permits and Fire Watch/Coverage sheets did not provide instructions for conducting compensatory measures (i.e., roving fire watches) in all the necessary fire areas.

Inspection Report# : [2006003](#) (*pdf*)

**G****Significance:** Mar 31, 2007

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

**Operation of Unit 2 Outside the Limits Allowed by the Power-Flow Map**

The inspectors identified a Green non-cited violation of TS 5.4.1.a for the operators' failure to maintain Unit 2 core flow within the bounds of the Core Power/Flow Map established by operating procedures. When notified, the licensee promptly reduced reactor recirculation pump flow. This finding was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as PER 119305.

This finding was more than minor because if left uncorrected, operators could have unknowingly allowed core flow to exceed the analytical bounds of the fuel vendor's reload report transient analysis which would have been a more significant safety concern. This finding was of very low safety significance because it is associated with fuel barrier integrity. Furthermore, core flow was still within the envelope of the fuel vendor's analytical limits and none of the reactor fuel thermal limits were exceeded. The cause of the finding was directly related to the procedure compliance aspects of the Human Performance cross-cutting area because of inadequate communication of management and supervisory expectations for unit operations in the increased core flow region and lack of operator attention to the proceduralized power/flow map limits.

Inspection Report# : [2007002](#) (*pdf*)**G****Significance:** Jun 30, 2006

Identified By: Self-Revealing

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

**Primary Containment Leak Via The 2A RHR Heat Exchanger In Excess Of Analyzed Limits**

A Green self-revealing non-cited violation of TS 3.6.1.1 was identified due to the licensee's failure to adequately evaluate the significance of a leak from the Unit 2 2A Residual Heat Removal heat exchanger that would have constituted a direct pathway from the suppression pool to the environment during accident conditions. This issue was documented in the licensee's corrective action program as Problem Evaluation Reports 81236 and 83123.

This finding is greater than minor because it is associated with the System, Structure or Component and Barrier Performance attribute of the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone, and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of assuring a containment barrier for protecting the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. In addition, if left uncorrected it would become a more significant safety concern. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because of the short exposure time, and the ability of the operators to detect and isolate the leak. This finding has a cross-cutting element in the area of problem identification and resolution because the licensee did not adequately evaluate an identified problem that adversely affected primary containment integrity, and as such failed to affect a resolution that addressed the cause and extent-of-condition.

Inspection Report# : [2006003](#) (*pdf*)

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## Emergency Preparedness

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## Occupational Radiation Safety

**G****Significance:** Mar 31, 2007

Identified By: Self-Revealing

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

**Two Examples of Failure to Perform Adequate Surveys.**

Two examples of a Green self-revealing non-cited violation of 10 CFR 20.1501(a)(2)(i) were identified for failure to conduct surveys that were reasonable under the circumstances to evaluate the magnitude and extent of radiation levels in areas where work was performed. On February 9 and 16, 2007, investigation into electronic dosimeter dose rate alarms, received during work activities, revealed dose rates in excess of those measured during pre-job surveys. Since the new dose

rates exceeded the criteria for posting as a high radiation area, the licensee immediately posted and controlled these areas as high radiation areas. This finding was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as PERs 119482 and 119829.

This finding is more than minor because it is associated with the Occupational Radiation Safety Cornerstone attribute of Program and Process, and it adversely affected the cornerstone objective because the failure to conduct adequate surveys did not ensure adequate protection of worker health and safety from exposure to radiation. Using the Occupational Radiation Safety Significance Determination Process, the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because the failures to survey did not pose a substantial potential for over exposure and did not affect the ability to assess doses. The cause of the finding was directly related to the work activity coordination aspect of the human performance cross-cutting area because pre-job radiological surveys were inadequate to apprise personnel of plant conditions that affected work activities.

Inspection Report# : [2007002](#) (*pdf*)

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## Public Radiation Safety

**Significance:**  Mar 31, 2007

Identified By: Self-Revealing

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

### **Failure to Properly Prepare a Radioactive Materials Package for Shipment**

A Green self-revealing non-cited violation of 10 CFR 71.5 was identified for failure to properly package radiological material such that, under conditions normally incident to transportation, the radiation levels at the external surface of the package would not exceed applicable Department of Transportation (DOT) limits. When the two shipments arrived at a processing facility on April 21, 2005, the radiation dose rates measured on portions of the external surface of the packages were as high as 300 mrem/hr, which was in excess of the 200 mrem/hr limit specified by the regulation. The licensee established additional supervisory review and approval prior to shipping packages approaching DOT limits. This finding was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as PER 81364.

This finding is more than minor because it is associated with the Plant Facilities/ Equipment and Instrument attribute of the Public Radiation Safety cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective, in that, the improper transportation packaging resulted in a shipping container with external dose levels exceeding regulatory requirements. Using the Public Radiation Significance Determination Process, the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because the areas on the packages with elevated radiation levels were inaccessible to the public and the radiation levels were less than two times the DOT limit.

Inspection Report# : [2007002](#) (*pdf*)

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## Physical Protection

[Physical Protection](#) information not publicly available.

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## Miscellaneous

**Significance:**  Mar 31, 2007

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

### **Work Hours for I&C Mechanics Exceeded Overtime Limits Without Prior Authorization**

The inspectors identified a Green non-cited violation of Technical Specification 5.2.2.d due to inadequate management oversight and awareness of the administrative requirements for controlling overtime which resulted in multiple instances of Instrumentation and Control personnel exceeding overtime limits without prior authorization and documentation.

Management immediately changed work schedules to comply with the Technical Specification requirements and entered the issue into their corrective action program as PER 119016.

This finding was greater than minor because if left uncorrected it could become a more significant safety concern due to excessive fatigue by key maintenance personnel performing safety-related activities. An NRC management review determined that the finding was of very low safety significance because no specific performance deficiencies were identified for the individuals during the time they exceeded the established overtime limits

Inspection Report# : [2007002](#) (*pdf*)

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