

# Arkansas Nuclear 2

## 4Q/2006 Plant Inspection Findings

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### Initiating Events

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### Mitigating Systems

**Significance:**  Mar 24, 2006

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

#### **FAILURE TO ENSURE FIRE DOORS WERE LATCHED**

Four examples of an NRC identified noncited violation of Unit 1 License Condition 2.C.(8), "Fire Protection," and ANO Unit 2 License Condition 2.C.(3)(b), "Fire Protection," were identified for the failure of licensee personnel to ensure fire doors were latched. On various days in January 2006, four fire doors were found unlatched. These four failures degraded the doors' fire confinement capability assumed in the fire hazards analyses. This issue was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Report ANO-C-2006-0067.

The finding is greater than minor because it is associated with the mitigating systems cornerstone attribute of protection against external factors and affects the associated cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Using the fire protection significance determination process, the finding was determined to have very low safety significance because the fire areas adjacent to the unlatched doors either were covered by an automatic suppression system, did not contain redundant equipment, or were only unlatched for a very short time. The cause of the finding is related to the crosscutting element of human performance in that licensee personnel did not ensure fire doors were being maintained shut and latched.

Inspection Report# : [2006002](#) (*pdf*)

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### Barrier Integrity

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### Emergency Preparedness

**Significance:**  Jun 23, 2006

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

#### **FAILURE TO MEET IMMEDIATE NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS DURING TRANSIENT EVENTS**

A noncited violation of 10 CFR 50.54(q), 10 CFR 50.47(b)(5), and 10 CFR 50, Appendix E.IV.D.3. was identified for programmatic and procedure inadequacies that allow the licensee to not make immediate offsite notifications for certain situations after a valid emergency classification was made. Specifically, following certain transient events, the licensee developed a practice of not completing immediate notifications to local authorities if the emergency action level conditions cleared before the notifications were completed. The licensee entered the deficiency into their corrective action program as condition report CR-ANO-C-2006-00665 for resolution.

The finding was assessed through the Emergency Preparedness Significance Determination Process. The finding is a performance deficiency in that the current interpretation and implementation of Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure

1903.010, "Emergency Action Level Classification," could result in failure to conduct a 15 minute notification following declaration of an emergency condition, potentially delaying offsite emergency response. Because the finding affected the reactor safety emergency preparedness cornerstone objective, the finding is greater than minor. The finding was determined to have very low safety significance because it represented a degradation and not a loss of the notification emergency planning standard function.

Inspection Report# : [2006003](#) (*pdf*)

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## Occupational Radiation Safety

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## Public Radiation Safety

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## Physical Protection

[Physical Protection](#) information not publicly available.

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## Miscellaneous

Last modified : March 01, 2007