

Hatch 1

2Q/2005 Plant Inspection Findings

Initiating Events

Mitigating Systems

Significance:  Dec 31, 2004

Identified By: Self Disclosing

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Lube Oil Cooler Failure Results in Emergency Diesel Generator Inoperability

A self-revealing non-cited violation was identified for a failure to take prompt action to correct a condition adverse to quality which resulted in a 1C Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) Lube Oil Cooler tube failure which rendered the 1C EDG inoperable.

The finding is greater than minor because it adversely affected the Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone in that the availability of the 1C EDG to respond to Initiating Events was impacted. The finding was determined to be of a very low safety significance because the required redundant equipment trains were operable and the 1C EDG was restored to operable status within the Technical Specification allowed outage time. This finding involved the cross cutting aspect of Problem Identification and Resolution. Inspection Report# : [2004005\(pdf\)](#)

Significance: SL-IV Sep 25, 2004

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Failure to Perform 10 CFR 50.59 Evaluation

The inspectors identified a SL-IV non-cited violation (NCV) when the licensee failed to perform a 10 CFR 50.59 screening or evaluation for failing closed the RHRSW minimum flow valves. This evaluation was required to demonstrate that the change did not create the possibility of a malfunction of equipment important to safety with a different result than any previously evaluated in the updated final safety analysis report (UFSAR).

As described in the NRC Enforcement Policy, violations of 10 CFR 50.59 are considered to potentially impede or impact the regulatory process. Therefore, the significance of this finding was assessed using the Enforcement Policy Supplements. The inspectors determined the finding was more than minor because the inspectors could not reasonably determine that the change would not ultimately require NRC approval, based on the lack of licensee documentation related to compensatory measures, short or long term corrective actions. Based on the inspectors review of the licensee's 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation, this violation was determined to be of very low safety significance. Inspection Report# : [2004004\(pdf\)](#)

Barrier Integrity

Emergency Preparedness

Significance: TBD Jun 30, 2005

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: AV Apparent Violation

Failure to Maintain Facilities and Equipment to Support Emergency Response

The NRC identified an apparent violation associated with emergency preparedness planning standard 10 CFR 50.47(b)(8). [The Technical Support Center (TSC) was rendered inoperable for greater than seven days due to planned modification activities.]

This finding is greater than minor because it is associated with the Facilities and Equipment attribute of the Emergency Preparedness (EP) Cornerstone and impacts the objective of the Hatch TSC to maintain facilities and equipment to support emergency response in that the TSC was inoperable during the modification activities and could not be returned to operable within a short period. Based upon IMC 0609, Appendix B, Emergency Preparedness Significance Determination Process, Sheet 1, and the examples provided in Section 4.8, this finding was

[preliminarily] determined to be of low to moderate safety significance (White) because the PS function was lost in that the TSC was inoperable for greater than seven days due to a planned outage in which activities were not scheduled to proceed with high priority for completion.

Inspection Report# : [2005003\(pdf\)](#)

Occupational Radiation Safety

Public Radiation Safety

Significance:  Mar 31, 2005

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Failure to Implement Appropriate DOT Type A Package Closure Requirements

An NRC-identified non-cited violation of 10 CFR 71.5 was identified for failure to implement current package design specifications for proper closing of Type A shipping packages (CRDM shipment boxes) as required by DOT regulations. Specifically, for Type A packages containing CRDM equipment shipped between January 2003 and February 2005, the licensee failed to prepare the package closures in accordance with vendor package specifications as required by 49 CFR 173.475(e).

This finding is more than minor because it is associated with the public radiation cornerstone program and process attribute and it affected the cornerstone objective to ensure adequate protection of public health and safety from exposure to radioactive material released into the public domain. The issue was reviewed using the Public Radiation Safety Significance Determination Process and was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because a radiation limit was not exceeded nor was the packaging breached. In addition, previous shipments made by the licensee had arrived at their destination with no identified degradation of the subject packaging and immediate corrective actions assured that on-going CRDM equipment packages were prepared properly prior to shipment.

Inspection Report# : [2005002\(pdf\)](#)

Physical Protection

[Physical Protection](#) information not publicly available.

Miscellaneous

Last modified : August 24, 2005