Farley 2
2Q/2005 Plant Inspection Findings

Initiating Events

Significance: G Sep 25, 2004
Identified By: Self Disclosing
Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation
Backhoe Struck Support in High Voltage Switchyard
A self-revealing non-cited violation was identified for failure to follow procedure for control of switchyard activities in accordance with TS 5.4.1.a. which resulted in a backhoe striking and damaging a 500KV bus support in the high voltage switchyard.

This finding is more than minor because it adversely affected the protection against external factors attribute of the Initiating Event cornerstone for switchyard activities. The licensee considers activities in the high voltage switchyard as risk significant. The damage to the support occurred due to not following the procedural requirements in place to reduce the risk for work in the high voltage switchyard. This finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because it did not contribute to the likelihood of a reactor trip or the likelihood that mitigation equipment or functions would not be available. This finding involved the cross-cutting aspect of Human Performance.
Inspection Report# : 2004004*(pdf)*

Mitigating Systems

Significance: G May 23, 2005
Identified By: NRC
Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation
Unapproved Local Manual Operator Actions for Post-Fire Safe Shutdown
The team identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2, for failure to physically protect or separate cables from fire damage and instead relying on unapproved local manual operator actions. The operator actions were to be accomplished outside the main control room (MCR) and were relied on to achieve and maintain a safe shutdown from the MCR during a fire in the Unit 2 Train B 4 kV Switchgear Room and the Diesel Building Train B Switchgear Room.

This finding is greater than minor because it degraded the defense in depth for fire protection. It is associated with the protection against external factors attribute and degraded the reactor safety mitigating systems cornerstone objective. The finding adversely affected the reliability and capability of equipment required to achieve and maintain a safe shutdown condition following a fire. Because the operator actions were feasible and could reasonably be accomplished, the finding was determined to have very low safety significance.
Inspection Report# : 2005006*(pdf)*

Significance: G Mar 31, 2005
Identified By: Self Disclosing
Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation
Loss of Running RHR Pump
A self-revealing non-cited violation was identified for failure to comply with 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings. Procedures for conducting surveillance testing were not appropriate to the circumstances and resulted in the loss of the operating residual heat removal pump during shutdown operations.

The finding is greater than minor since it is associated with the Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone for equipment availability and because it affects the associated Cornerstone objective. Specifically, the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone objective is to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. This finding is of very low safety significance (Green) because the opposite train RHR pump was started within one minute and an adequate shutdown cooling (SDC) thermal margin was maintained. The SDC thermal margin was verified as maintained by a calculated reactor coolant system time-to-boil of greater than 20 hours.
Inspection Report# : 2005002*(pdf)*

Significance: G Sep 25, 2004
Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation
Failure to Properly Reactive Senior Reactor Operator License
A non-cited violation was identified for failure to follow the requirements of licensee procedures FNP-0-AP-16, Conduct of Operations - Operations Group, and FNP-0-TCP-17.5, License Administration, as required by Technical Specification 5.4.1.a. This resulted in the incorrect certification of the reactivation of two SRO licenses.

The inspectors determined that the finding is greater than minor because it involves the Mitigating System Cornerstone objective of the reliability and capability of operators to respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The NRC considers the reactivation and proficiency of licensed operators an element of the human performance attribute which helps to minimize potential human errors. The finding was evaluated using the Operator Requalification Human Performance significance determination process and was determined to be a finding of very low safety significance because more than 20 percent of the reactivation records reviewed had deficiencies.
Inspection Report# : 2004004*(pdf)*

Barrier Integrity

Emergency Preparedness

Occupational Radiation Safety

Public Radiation Safety

Physical Protection

Physical Protection information not publicly available.

Miscellaneous

Last modified : August 24, 2005