# Braidwood 2
# 1Q/2005 Plant Inspection Findings

## Initiating Events

**Significance:** G Jun 30, 2004
Identified By: NRC
Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation
**FAILURE TO SECURE OR REMOVE LOOSE SCAFFOLD MATERIAL IN THE UNIT 2 TRANSFORMER YARD**
The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance when unauthorized loose scaffold material was found in the Unit 2 transformer yard during a period of frequent high winds, severe thunderstorm warnings, and tornado watches. Once identified to licensee management, the material was rapidly removed from the area. The causes for the finding were related to the cross-cutting areas of Human Performance, because operators failed to identify the material despite numerous walkdowns of the area using a procedure that specifically directed them to look for that type of material, and Problem Identification and Resolution because the implementation of corrective actions for two previous loss of offsite power events and a Non-Cited Violation, all involving loose material in the transformer yards, did not prevent this finding. The finding was more than minor because it increased the likelihood of a loss of offsite power or reactor trip event. The finding was of very low safety significance because it did not contribute to both the likelihood of a reactor trip and the likelihood that mitigating equipment or functions would not be available. This issue was determined to be a non-cited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a for failure to follow procedures.
Inspection Report# : 2004004*(pdf)*

## Mitigating Systems

## Barrier Integrity

**Significance:** G Sep 30, 2004
Identified By: NRC
Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation
**FAILURE TO HAVE APPROPRIATE PROCEDURES FOR OPERATION OF THE HYDROGEN RECOMBINERS**
The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance when they noted that the procedures for operating the hydrogen recombiners, if followed as written, would have resulted in the recombiners operating at too low of a temperature to be effective. This was due to a revision that changed the startup procedure, but not the panel lineup and shutdown procedures. The causes of this violation were related to the cross-cutting areas of Human Performance, because a system engineer failed to properly revise the procedures, and Problem Identification and Resolution, because the purpose of the revision was as a corrective action for a previously identified violation and was not effective. The condition existed for a period of 2 weeks before being identified and corrected through another procedure revision. The finding was more than minor because it affected the Barrier Integrity cornerstone objective of providing reasonable assurance that the physical containment barrier would protect the public from radio nuclide releases caused by accidents or events. The finding was of very low safety significance because the hydrogen recombiner system is not a significant contributor to the large early release frequency for pressurized water reactors with large dry containments. This issue was determined to be a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criteria V, for procedures that were not appropriate to the circumstances.
Inspection Report# : 2004007*(pdf)*

**Significance:** G Jun 30, 2004
Identified By: NRC
Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation
**0A HYDROGEN RECOMBINER INOPERABLE FOR LONGER THAN TS ALLOWED OUTAGE TIME**
The inspectors identified a finding of very low significance when they determined that the 0A hydrogen recombiner had been inoperable for at least 43 days, longer than its Technical Specifications allowed outage time of 30 days. The train was inoperable because of a combination of conditions which degraded it to the point where it could not be relied upon to perform its intended safety function. Specifically (1) the temperature controller for the reaction chamber temperature was erratic, causing unexpected trips of the heater breaker; (2) a procedure revision to direct operators to gradually bring up reaction chamber temperature by manually adjusting the temperature controller was not completed in a timely manner, nor was training held on the procedure; and (3) annunciators intended to alert operators to a trip of the heater breaker, or other

malfunctions of the recombiner, were not functional. At the time the finding was identified, the temperature controller had already been replaced and tested, the procedure revision had been incorporated, and the repairs of the annunciators had been scheduled. The causes of this violation were related to the cross-cutting areas of Human Performance, because engineering personnel did not properly assess operability, and Problem Identification and Resolution, because untimely corrective actions resulted in the recombiner being inoperable for longer than the allowed outage time in the Technical Specifications. The finding was more than minor because it affected the barrier integrity cornerstone objective of providing reasonable assurance that the physical containment barrier would protect the public from radio nuclide releases caused by accidents or events. The finding was of very low safety significance because the hydrogen recombiner system is not a significant contributor to the large early release frequency for pressurized water reactors with large dry containments. This issue was determined to be a non-cited violation of Technical Specification 3.6.8 for failure to maintain the hydrogen recombiner operable.
Inspection Report# : 2004004*(pdf)*

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## Emergency Preparedness

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## Occupational Radiation Safety

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## Public Radiation Safety

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## Physical Protection

Physical Protection information not publicly available.

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## Miscellaneous

Last modified : June 17, 2005