

Fermi 2

4Q/2004 Plant Inspection Findings

Initiating Events

G**Significance:** Dec 31, 2004

Identified By: Self Disclosing

Item Type: FIN Finding

Multiple Failures of the North Main Turbine Lube Oil Pump Due to Inadequate Lubrication of Motor Bearings

Green. A finding of very low safety significance was self-revealed when licensee personnel failed to adequately lubricate and prevent repetitive failures of the motor bearings for the north main turbine lube oil pump.

This finding was more than minor because if left uncorrected, it would become a more significant safety concern. The finding was of very low safety significance because although the finding contributed to the likelihood of a reactor trip, it did not contribute to the likelihood that mitigating equipment or functions would be unavailable. No violation of regulatory requirements occurred. Immediate corrective actions included the installation of a motor lubricated in accordance with the vendor's lubrication instructions. The primary cause of this finding was related to the cross-cutting area of Problem Identification and Resolution. (Section 4OA3.2)

Inspection Report# : [2004008\(pdf\)](#)

Mitigating Systems

G**Significance:** Dec 31, 2004

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Cover Not Installed in a Cable Conduit Junction Box Penetrating a Fire Barrier

Green. The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance for the failure to have a conduit junction box cover installed in a cable conduit located in a 3-hour fire barrier separating the cable spreading room and the main control room.

This finding was more than minor because it was associated with the Protection Against External Factors attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely impacted the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences since the fire boundary separating two fire zones was not maintained which could result in the loss of mitigating equipment if a fire was to propagate between the cable spreading room and the main control room. The finding was of very low safety significance because the automatic Halon system in the cable spreading room remained operable. A Non-Cited Violation of Fermi-2 operating license condition 2.C(9) which required that the licensee maintain and implement their approved fire protection plan was identified. As part of their immediate corrective actions, the licensee initiated a fire watch until the covers were replaced. The primary cause of this finding was related to the cross-cutting area of Human Performance. (Section 1R05)

Inspection Report# : [2004008\(pdf\)](#)**G****Significance:** Sep 30, 2004

Identified By: Self Disclosing

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Use of Incorrect Fitting in RHR Seal Cooling Line

Green. A finding of very low safety significance was self-revealed when a compression fitting on a seal cooling line for Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Pump "A" separated rendering the pump inoperable. The pump was operating in the shutdown cooling mode at the time of the event. Design control measures during plant construction were inadequate in that a ferrule on a compression fitting was constructed of carbon steel instead of stainless steel, as required.

The finding was determined to be more than minor because the finding increased the likelihood of a loss of decay heat removal, affected the licensee's ability to add reactor coolant system inventory, and degraded the licensee's ability to establish an alternate core cooling path. The finding was of very low safety significance because the makeup capability of the control rod drive pumps, which were in service at the time of the event, exceeded the leakage rate through the failed seal cooling line. A Non-Cited Violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control," was identified. Immediate corrective actions included replacing the carbon steel ferrule with a stainless steel ferrule. (Section 4OA3.1)

Inspection Report# : [2004007\(pdf\)](#)

G**Significance:** Sep 30, 2004

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Inadequate Test Acceptance Criteria for HPCI and RCIC

Green. The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance for the failure to incorporate the requirements and acceptance limits contained in applicable design documents into the surveillance tests for the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) and the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) systems.

This finding was determined to be more than minor because if left uncorrected, it would become a more significant safety concern since surveillance testing would not have ensured that the HPCI and RCIC design functions were able to be accomplished if system performance degraded. The finding was of very low safety significance because there was no actual loss of safety function of either system. A Non-Cited Violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI, "Test Control," was identified. Immediate corrective actions included ensuring that both systems remained operable through analysis or testing. (Section 1R22.1)

Inspection Report# : [2004007\(pdf\)](#)**G****Significance:** Sep 30, 2004

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Failure to Quarantine Degraded Electrical Components

The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance for the failure to quarantine degraded components inside the motor operator for the HPCI Turbine Steam Supply Outboard Containment Isolation Valve after the valve failed to close during surveillance testing activities. The primary cause of this finding was related to the cross-cutting area of human performance.

This finding was determined to be more than minor because if left uncorrected, it could become a more significant safety concern since the failure to quarantine degraded components could impede the identification of root causes for conditions adverse to quality and prevent the implementation of appropriate corrective actions to prevent their recurrence. The finding was of very low safety significance because the finding was not a design or qualification deficiency resulting in a loss of function per Generic Letter 91-18; did not represent an actual loss of safety function of a system or the loss of safety function of a train of equipment; and was not potentially risk-significant due to a seismic, fire, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. A Non-Cited Violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, "Corrective Action," was identified. As part of the licensee's immediate corrective actions, the wiring that was inappropriately discarded was retrieved. (Section 4OA2.2)

Inspection Report# : [2004007\(pdf\)](#)**Significance:** N/A Apr 23, 2004

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: FIN Finding

WHITE performance indicator in the Emergency Alternating Current (AC) Power System Unavailability

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) performed this supplemental inspection to assess the licensee's evaluation for a White performance indicator in the Emergency Alternating Current (AC) Power System Unavailability area of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone. The inspectors concluded that the licensee performed a comprehensive evaluation of the unavailability of Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) 12 from June 2, 2003, to November 8, 2003, which primarily contributed to the performance indicator crossing the Green-to-White threshold.

The licensee's evaluation identified inadequate maintenance procedures, an inadequate review of maintenance procedures, and inadequate communication as the primary causes. The licensee had planned corrective actions, including training and procedural changes, to address these root causes.

Based on the results of the inspection, the inspectors concluded that the licensee had adequately completed a root cause analysis of the event and had identified appropriate corrective actions.

Inspection Report# : [2004005\(pdf\)](#)**G****Significance:** Apr 02, 2004

Identified By: Self Disclosing

Item Type: FIN Finding

Oil Leak Caused by Lube Oil Vapor Extractor Failure

Green. A finding of very low safety significance was self-revealed during an event when the failure of the south main turbine lube oil vapor extractor caused an oil leak from the high pressure turbine bearings. The primary cause of this finding was related to the cross-cutting area of Human Performance. Despite vendor recommendations to periodically lubricate the vapor extractor motor bearings, the licensee did not lubricate the bearings.

This finding was more than minor because it increased the likelihood of a turbine trip as the large oil leak increased the likelihood of a fire which could have challenged equipment necessary to keep the turbine on-line. The finding was of very low safety significance because the duration of the leak was short and the oil did not come into contact with any equipment hot enough to ignite the oil. No violation of NRC requirements occurred. The licensee entered improvement plans for lubricating the main turbine lube oil vapor extractor motors into the corrective action program under CARD 04-20348. (Section 1R14)

Inspection Report# : [2004002\(pdf\)](#)

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Significance: Apr 02, 2004

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Failure to Follow Corrective Action Procedures

Green. A finding of very low safety significance was identified by the inspectors for the failure to follow approved corrective action procedures when identified corrective actions were not implemented. The licensee performed an engineering evaluation on November 15, 1999, wherein corrective actions identified in the evaluation were not tracked and therefore not implemented by the licensee. The primary cause of this violation was related to the cross-cutting area of Human Performance.

This finding was more than minor because of the licensee's failure to complete a required engineering analysis, or take appropriate compensatory actions to support a prompt operability evaluation, would be a more significant safety concern if not corrected. The issue was of very low safety significance because an actual loss of a safety function did not occur. This failure to follow procedures was a violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, and is classified as a Non-Cited Violation. The licensee initiated CARD 04-21296 on March 25, 2004, and entered this issue into their corrective action program. Additionally, the licensee updated CARD 99-17607 by including a corrective action to perform the water hammer analysis if the modification is delayed beyond May 15, 2004. (Section 1R15.3)

Inspection Report# : [2004002\(pdf\)](#)

Barrier Integrity

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Significance: Dec 31, 2004

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: FIN Finding

Failure to Clean Drywell Trench Drain

Green. The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance when licensee personnel failed to establish adequate procedures for cleaning the drywell basement trench which could cause inaccurate measurements in unidentified leakage.

This finding was more than minor because if left uncorrected, it could delay leakage rate information to the operators which was a more significant safety concern. Because this finding was not suitable for a significance determination process evaluation in accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter 0612, Section 05.04c., this finding was submitted for review by NRC management; and since this finding only affected the monitoring of the reactor coolant system integrity, it was determined to be of very low safety significance. No violation of regulatory requirements occurred. As part of the licensee's immediate corrective actions, the trench drain was thoroughly cleaned. (Section 1R22.2)

Inspection Report# : [2004008\(pdf\)](#)

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Significance: Dec 31, 2004

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

RPV Head Weld Examination Done in the Wrong Location

Green. The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance involving a failure to correctly follow a procedure when a magnetic particle examination was not performed at a required reactor pressure vessel head-to-flange weld location.

This finding was more than minor because the magnetic particle examination performed on an area other than the prescribed weld could affect the reactor coolant system barrier integrity since, if left uncorrected, it could become a more significant safety concern. Specifically, the failure to perform a required weld inspection on the correct weld location could have allowed undetected through-wall cracks to remain in service. Because this finding was not suitable for a significance determination process evaluation, in accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter 0612, Section 05.04.c, the finding was submitted for review by NRC management; and because there was no evidence of actual flaws, this finding was of very low safety significance. A Non-Cited Violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," was identified. Immediate corrective actions included stopping the examination and identifying the correct weld location. The primary cause of this finding was related to the cross-cutting area of Human Performance. (Section 1R08)

Inspection Report# : [2004008\(pdf\)](#)

G

Significance: Dec 31, 2004

Identified By: Self Disclosing

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Fuel Bundle Struck Refueling Shield Bridge Due to Improper Installation

Green. A finding of very low safety significance was self revealed when licensee personnel failed to implement the procedural guidance for the

proper installation of the refueling shield bridge (cattle chute) which caused a fuel bundle to contact the shield bridge while the bundle was being transported from the reactor core to the spent fuel pool.

This finding was more than minor because it impacted the Barrier Integrity cornerstone and if left uncorrected and a fuel bundle struck the refueling shield bridge again, it could lead to the failure of the fuel bundle cladding and the potential release of fission products, which is a more significant safety concern. Because this finding only affected the fuel barrier, this issue was determined to be of very low safety significance. A Non-Cited Violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a was identified. Immediate corrective actions included properly repositioning the refueling shield bridge before transferring another fuel bundle. The primary cause of this finding was related to the cross-cutting area of Human Performance. (Section 1R20.2)

Inspection Report# : [2004008\(pdf\)](#)

Significance:  Dec 31, 2004

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Lift of Drywell Head Over the Spent Fuel Pool

Green. The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance when licensee personnel failed to follow procedures for the movement of the drywell head. During refueling outage 10, contractors moved the drywell head over a portion of the spent fuel pool in violation of the licensee's procedures.

This finding was more than minor because if left uncorrected, the failure to follow safe load paths on the refuel floor could lead to a more significant safety concern since it would increase the likelihood of a load drop accident. Because this finding was not suitable for a significance determination process evaluation, in accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter 0612, Section 05.04.c, the finding was submitted for review by NRC management. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because the reactor building crane used to move the drywell head was single failure-proof. A Non-Cited Violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a was identified. As part of the licensee's immediate corrective actions, this issue was entered into their corrective action program as Condition Assessment Resolution Document (CARD) 04-26765. The primary cause of this finding was related to the cross-cutting area of Human Performance. (Section 1R20.3)

Inspection Report# : [2004008\(pdf\)](#)

Significance:  Dec 31, 2004

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Failure to Perform Rattle Space Variance Evaluations for Scaffold

Green. The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance when engineering personnel failed to perform a proper evaluation of a scaffold in contact with the torus. Subsequent evaluation of this finding determined that the licensee's procedure for performing the evaluation was inadequate.

This finding was more than minor because the failure to properly perform the required evaluations to support scaffold variances could become a more significant safety issue if left uncorrected. The finding was of very low safety significance because it represented neither a degradation of the control room barrier nor an actual open pathway in the physical integrity of the reactor containment. A Non-Cited Violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures and Drawings," was identified. As part of the licensee's immediate corrective actions, the scaffold in question was removed and all scaffold erection activities in safety-related areas was suspended pending re-evaluation. The primary cause of this finding was related to the cross-cutting area of Problem Identification and Resolution. (Section 40A3.1)

Inspection Report# : [2004008\(pdf\)](#)

Significance:  Jun 30, 2004

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

A High Pressure Coolant Injection outboard steam isolation valve failed to close on demand.

A finding of very low safety significance was identified during surveillance testing when a High Pressure Coolant Injection outboard steam isolation valve failed to close on demand due to the improper installation of contactors in the valve closing circuit. The primary cause of this finding was related to the cross-cutting area of Human Performance.

This finding was more than minor because the finding was associated with the SSC [Structures, Systems and Components] and Barrier Performance attribute of the Barrier Integrity cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of providing reasonable assurance that physical design barriers protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. The finding was of very low safety significance because the finding did not represent a degradation of the barrier function of the control room against smoke or a toxic atmosphere, an actual open pathway in the physical integrity of the reactor containment, or an actual reduction of the atmospheric pressure control function of the reactor containment. One Non-Cited Violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instruction, Procedures, and Drawings," was identified. Corrective actions to address this issue included replacing the contactors and training station electricians on the lessons learned from this event.

Inspection Report# : [2004004\(pdf\)](#)

Emergency Preparedness

Occupational Radiation Safety

Public Radiation Safety

Physical Protection

[Physical Protection](#) information not publicly available.

Miscellaneous

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