

Farley 2

4Q/2004 Plant Inspection Findings

Initiating Events

Significance:  Sep 25, 2004

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Backhoe Struck Support in High Voltage Switchyard

A self-revealing non-cited violation was identified for failure to follow procedure for control of switchyard activities in accordance with TS 5.4.1.a. which resulted in a backhoe striking and damaging a 500KV bus support in the high voltage switchyard.

This finding is more than minor because it adversely affected the protection against external factors attribute of the Initiating Event cornerstone for switchyard activities. The licensee considers activities in the high voltage switchyard as risk significant. The damage to the support occurred due to not following the procedural requirements in place to reduce the risk for work in the high voltage switchyard. This finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because it did not contribute to the likelihood of a reactor trip or the likelihood that mitigation equipment or functions would not be available. This finding involved the cross-cutting aspect of Human Performance.

Inspection Report# : [2004004\(pdf\)](#)

Mitigating Systems

Significance:  Sep 25, 2004

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Failure to Properly Reactive Senior Reactor Operator License

A non-cited violation was identified for failure to follow the requirements of licensee procedures FNP-0-AP-16, Conduct of Operations - Operations Group, and FNP-0-TCP-17.5, License Administration, as required by Technical Specification 5.4.1.a. This resulted in the incorrect certification of the reactivation of two SRO licenses.

The inspectors determined that the finding is greater than minor because it involves the Mitigating System Cornerstone objective of the reliability and capability of operators to respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The NRC considers the reactivation and proficiency of licensed operators an element of the human performance attribute which helps to minimize potential human errors. The finding was evaluated using the Operator Requalification Human Performance significance determination process and was determined to be a finding of very low safety significance because more than 20 percent of the reactivation records reviewed had deficiencies.

Inspection Report# : [2004004\(pdf\)](#)

Significance:  Mar 27, 2004

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Failure to Perform Required Repairs of Service Water System ASME Class 3 Piping

A Green NRC-identified NCV was identified for failure to meet the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code requirements of 10 CFR 50.55a section (a)(2) for systems and components of a pressurized water-cooled reactor or seek a proposed alternative as permitted by section (a)(3) for three through-wall leaks in ASME Code Class 3 piping of the Service Water (SW) system. The leaks, when identified, were not repaired to ASME code requirements or a proper evaluation performed for an alternative non-code repair as discussed in Generic Letter (GL) 90-05, Guidance for Performing Temporary Non-Code Repair of ASME Code Class 1,2, and 3 Piping.

This finding is more than minor because it adversely affected the equipment performance attribute of the mitigating system cornerstone because it had the potential to affect the reliability of the SW system. This finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because there was not a large leak or loss of SW system safety function.

Inspection Report# : [2004002\(pdf\)](#)

Barrier Integrity

Emergency Preparedness

Occupational Radiation Safety

Public Radiation Safety

Physical Protection

[Physical Protection](#) information not publicly available.

Miscellaneous

Last modified : March 09, 2005