Beaver Valley 1
2Q/2004 Plant Inspection Findings

Initiating Events

Significance: G Dec 31, 2003
Identified By: Self Disclosing
Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation
REACTOR TRIP DUE TO PERSONNEL ERROR DURING SOLID STATE PROTECTION SYSTEM TESTING
The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of Technical Specification (TS) 6.8.1, for failure to follow a procedure associated with safety-related equipment on Unit 1. This failure involved human performance errors and resulted in an automatic reactor trip. The corrective actions for this event included procedural improvements and increased management oversight for risk significant activities.

This finding is greater than minor because it affected the Initiating events cornerstone in that the probability of a reactor trip was increased. The finding is of very low safety significance because the event did not increase the likelihood that mitigation equipment or functions would not be available.
Inspection Report# : 2003005*(pdf)*

Mitigating Systems

Significance: G Dec 31, 2003
Identified By: Self Disclosing
Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation
FAILURE TO PERFORM ADEQUATE AND TIMELY CORRECTIVE ACTIONS FOR SPURIOUS 480-VOLT CIRCUIT BREAKER TRIPS
The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Actions, for the failure to take adequate and timely corrective actions associated with the spurious trip of Unit 1 480V circuit breaker 9P7. This failure rendered an Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) out of service for over 7 hours. The licensee is currently in the planning stages to resolve the spurious trip issue associated with the affected 480 volt circuit breakers.

The finding was considered a performance deficiency since there was existing generic communications, i.e., NRC IN 93-75, as well as similar failures that occurred in 1997, that were not adequately addressed. The finding is more than minor because it affected the Mitigating System cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability and reliability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The finding is of very low safety significance because the EDG was out of service for less than the technical specification allowed outage time of 72 hours.

Inspection Report# : 2003005*(pdf)*

Significance: G Sep 27, 2003
Identified By: NRC
Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation
FAILURE TO DECLARE RIVER WATER PUMP INOPERABLE WITH HIGH VIBRATION READINGS
The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.4.1, on Unit 1, because one train of River Water (RW) was inoperable for a time period that exceeded the Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) action time of 72 hours and the additional six hours required to place the unit in Mode 3 (78 total hours). Vibration measurements taken on the 'A' RW pump exceeded the ASME limit for operability, however, the pump remained in operation for 78.5 hours.

This finding is greater than minor because it affected the Mitigating System cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability and reliability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The finding is of very low safety significance because the pump was operating at required flow and pressure during the entire time period and thus remained in an available status.
Inspection Report# : 2003004*(pdf)*

Significance: G Jul 25, 2003
Identified By: NRC
Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation
FAILURE TO TAKE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS FOR A SIGNIFICANT CONDITION ADVERSE TO QUALITY INVOLVING THE USE OF UNCALIBRATED M&TE

The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10CFR50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, "Corrective Action," for failure to ensure that a significant condition adverse to quality was promptly identified and corrected. Specifically, the licensee used uncalibrated measuring and test equipment (M&TE) during a surveillance test of safety-related equipment.

The finding was greater that minor because the use of un-calibrated M&TE during surveillance tests of safety-related systems affected the availability and reliability of safety-related mitigating systems required to respond to initiating events. The use of un-calibrated test equipment could result in the failure to identify unavailable mitigating equipment. The finding was of very low safety significance since an actual loss of the safety function of any mitigating system did not occur or go undetected.
Inspection Report# : 2003008*(pdf)*

Significance: G Jul 25, 2003
Identified By: NRC
Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation
FAILURE TO RE-EVALUATE A CONDITION ADVERSE TO QUALITY ASSOCIATED WITH THE PERFORMANCE OF MCCBs DURING TESTING
The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, "Corrective Action," because First Energy Nuclear Operating Company (FENOC) failed to properly evaluate a condition adverse to quality involving the trip function of molded case circuit breakers (MCCBs).

The finding was greater than minor since potentially degraded MCCBs remained in- service and a fault on a supplied load could have resulted in the loss of an entire motor control center and, hence, affect the ability of multiple safety-related systems to perform their safety-related function. The finding was of very low safety significance since no actual conditions were identified where a motor control center was lost as a result of this problem.
Inspection Report# : 2003008*(pdf)*

Barrier Integrity

Emergency Preparedness

Significance: G May 13, 2004
Identified By: NRC
Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation
PAR DEVELOPMENT DEFICIENCY NOT IDENTIFIED BY THE LICENSEE IN ITS CRITIQUE
The inspectors identified a non-cited violation against 10 CFR 50 Appendix E, Section IV.F.2.g, when the licensee's critique did not identify an invalid radiological release duration time used in dose projections during the May 11, 2004, exercise.

This finding is more than minor because it affects the emergency response organization performance attribute of the emergency preparedness cornerstone. Failing to identify and correct an invalid radiological release duration time could impact the EP cornerstone objective of ensuring that the licensee is capable of implementing adequate measures to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of a radiological emergency. Because the performance problem occurred with a protective action recommendation developed in association with a successful Drill and Exercise Performance (DEP) Performance Indicator (PI) opportunity, it is not considered to be a loss of planning standard function of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14) and therefore is of very low safety significance.
Inspection Report# : 2004008*(pdf)*

Occupational Radiation Safety

Public Radiation Safety

Physical Protection

Physical Protection information not publicly available.

Miscellaneous

Last modified : September 08, 2004