

# Monticello

## 1Q/2004 Plant Inspection Findings

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### Initiating Events



**Significance:** Mar 20, 2004

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

**FAILURE TO FOLLOW FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAM PROCEDURES WHICH REQUIRE THAT CHANGES MADE TO THE FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAM BE EVALUATED FOR IMPACTS TO SAFE-SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES.**

A finding of very low safety significance was identified by the inspectors for a violation of Technical Specification for failing to follow Fire Protection Program procedures which required that changes made to the Fire Protection Program be evaluated for impacts to safe-shutdown capabilities. The Engineering Department failed to evaluate the replacement of two dry chemical fire extinguishers with two pressurized water extinguishers in the intake structure area. The licensee has instituted corrective actions including a formal root cause evaluation to assess this issue.

This issue was more than minor because an unsuppressed electrical or oil fire could affect both trains of emergency service water. The issue was of very low safety significance because the 20-foot separation between two trains did not contain any combustibles and because the automatic fire suppression system was not affected by the finding. The issue was a Non-Cited Violation of Technical Specification 6.5.A, which requires written procedures covering the Fire Protection Program.

Inspection Report# : [2004002\(pdf\)](#)



**Significance:** Mar 20, 2004

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

**FAILURE TO TAKE PROMPT AND ADEQUATE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO CORRECT PRE-FIRE STRATEGIES.**

Three (3) examples of a finding of very low safety significance were identified by the inspectors for a violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Corrective Action requirements for failing to take prompt and adequate corrective actions to correct pre-fire strategies. The licensee has instituted corrective actions including a formal root cause evaluation to assess this issue.

This issue was more than minor because pre-fire strategies are used by the fire brigade to identify additional equipment needed and to determine the fire hazards in the fire zones. Failure to have updated and accurate pre-fire strategies could impair the fire brigade's ability to promptly and properly respond in the event of a fire. The issue was determined to be of very low safety significance as a result of an SDP evaluation which provided credit for the robustness of the fire protection methodology and the automatic fire suppression system for the fire zone. A Non-Cited Violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, "Corrective Action" was identified for failure of the licensee to take prompt actions to correct conditions adverse to quality.

Inspection Report# : [2004002\(pdf\)](#)

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### Mitigating Systems



**Significance:** Mar 30, 2004

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

**FAILURE TO MAINTAIN THE QUALIFICATION OF SAFETY-RELATED SWITCHGEAR WHEN NON-SAFETY RELATED ALARM MODULES WERE INSTALLED ON THE DIVISION I AND DIVISION II 250 VDC BUSES WITHOUT AN APPROPRIATE INTERFACE**

A finding of very low safety significance was identified by the Engineering Department, but because the finding required a Phase 2 significance determination, the finding was treated as an NRC-identified finding. The finding was associated with the failure to maintain the qualification of switchgear when non-safety related alarm modules were installed on the Division I and Division II 250 VDC buses without an appropriate interface. The alarm re-flash units were installed without safety-related fuses as the interface between the safety and non-safety components. The licensee instituted corrective actions to install an appropriate interface and review certain past modifications for similarities.

The issue was more than minor because it directly impacted the design control attributes for both the Mitigating Systems and Barrier Integrity

objectives. The results of the SDP process found the issue to be Green after consideration of the robust design of the modification and because the fuses had in the past blown to protect the source and adequately isolated the non-safety equipment from the bus. A Non-Cited Violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control" was issued for failure to maintain the safety qualification of safety-related switchgear. Inspection Report# : [2004002\(pdf\)](#)



**Significance:** Feb 18, 2004

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: FIN Finding

**FAILURE TO IDENTIFY AND CORRECT A DAMAGED 13 DG OUTPUT BREAKER RESULTS IN INCREASED PLANT RISK.**

A finding of very low safety significance with no associated violation was identified by the NRC inspectors associated with the non-safeguards 13 diesel generator (DG) output breaker. The finding was associated with the failure of the Electrical Maintenance Department to identify and correct a damaged output breaker, resulting in increased plant risk. During a monthly surveillance test in January 2004 the 13 DG output breaker failed to shut. An investigation was performed and no apparent cause of the breaker's failure to shut was identified prior to returning the 13 DG to service. During the February surveillance test, the 13 DG output breaker again failed to shut for monthly testing. Further investigation identified a bent linkage in the breaker, which was the cause of the breaker's failure to shut. The Electrical Maintenance Department repaired the bent linkage and returned the 13 DG to service.

Since the 13 DG has a cumulative impact over time on the plant's safety due to its contribution to core damage frequency (CDF), the inspectors concluded that the finding was more than minor because this finding would become a more significant safety concern if left uncorrected. This finding was of very low safety significance because there was no design deficiency, no actual loss of safety function, no single train loss of safety function for greater than the Technical Specification allowed outage time, and no risk due to external events.

Inspection Report# : [2004002\(pdf\)](#)

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## Barrier Integrity

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## Emergency Preparedness

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## Occupational Radiation Safety

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## Public Radiation Safety

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## Physical Protection

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## Miscellaneous

Last modified : May 05, 2004