

McGuire 2

1Q/2004 Plant Inspection Findings

Initiating Events

Mitigating Systems

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Significance: Mar 13, 2004

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Failure to have pre-fire plans for the Unit 1 and 2 interior and exterior doghouses

The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of the operating license condition for fire protection (2.C.4 for Unit 1, 2.C.7 for Unit 2) for failure to have pre-fire (strategy) plans for the interior and exterior doghouse fire areas as part of the fire fighting procedures. The dog houses contain safety-related main steam piping and main steam isolation valves, steam generator power operated relief valves, main steam safety valves, main feed piping and isolation valves, and auxiliary feedwater piping and isolation valves.

This finding was considered to be more than minor because the manual fire suppression defense-in-depth feature was moderately impacted, which affected the mitigating systems cornerstone objective of protection from external factors including fire. This finding was considered to be of very low safety significance because the dog houses are physically independent (separated by distance and enclosed in 3-hour fire barriers) and either the interior or exterior doghouse can independently provide the necessary safe shutdown functions.

Inspection Report# : [2004003\(pdf\)](#)

Significance: SL-IV Mar 13, 2004

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Failure to update the UFSAR for fire protection safe shutdown

The inspectors identified a non-cited violation for failure to update the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) as required by 10 CFR 50.71(e) for inclusion of all aspects of the fire protection program, including the standby shutdown facility (SSF) and fire protection safe shutdown methodology.

This issue is greater than minor because the failure to include descriptive information on fire protection defense-in-depth features in the UFSAR could have an impact on future design or operational changes to the safe shutdown methodology or SSF. However, it is of very low safety significance because use of the un-updated UFSAR did not result in unacceptable changes to the facility or procedures.

Inspection Report# : [2004003\(pdf\)](#)

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Significance: Mar 13, 2004

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Failure to have a rated 3-hour barrier around the SSF power system

The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of the operating license condition for fire protection (2.C.4 for Unit 1, 2.C.7 for Unit 2) for failure to have a 3-hour-rated fire barrier that enclosed the SSF power system equipment as described in the McGuire Safety Evaluation Report Supplement 6.

This finding was considered to be more than minor because it is a degradation of the fire protection defense-in-depth feature to protect structures, systems, and components important to safety in order to minimize the affect of fire, which affects the mitigating systems cornerstone objective of protection from external factors including fire. This finding was considered to be of very low safety significance because B safe shutdown train equipment can independently provide the necessary safe shutdown functions and is physically independent of the SSF.

Inspection Report# : [2004003\(pdf\)](#)

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Significance: Mar 13, 2004

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Failure to Include Valve 2CA0007A in the Fire Protection Safe Shutdown Analysis for Control Room Fire

The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of Unit 2 license condition 2.C.(7), in that, the licensee failed to properly analyze the impact of a fire on Unit 2 auxiliary feedwater system valve 2CA0007A for potential fires in the control room and Fire Area 4. Immediate corrective action by the licensee was to revise fire response procedures to incorporate a time critical local operator manual action to de-energize the valve to preclude spurious closure.

This finding is greater than minor because it is associated with the protection against external factors attribute and degraded the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone of Reactor Safety objective. This performance deficiency potentially degraded the defense-in-depth for fire protection. However, the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because review and analysis could not identify credible or likely fire scenarios in the chosen fire areas that would lead to loss or degradation of the secondary heat removal function as a result of spurious closure of 2CA007A, auxiliary feedwater turbine pump suction valve.

Inspection Report# : [2004003\(pdf\)](#)

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Significance: Feb 13, 2004

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Deviation from Design Requirements for Line Slope and Drain Legs for Containment Pressure Transmitter Impulse Lines Was not Identified or Evaluated

The team identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control requirements. The licensee had failed to identify and evaluate the impact on design of sloping the impulse lines for the containment pressure transmitters downward from the containment towards the transmitters without low point drain legs installed. This configuration was a deviation from the licensee's design requirements, and introduced the potential for water intrusion in the instrument impulse lines during normal operation and accident conditions. In response to this condition, the licensee performed an operability evaluation and entered the finding into their corrective program (Problem Investigation Process (PIP) Report No. M-04-00713). The finding is greater than minor because it affects the design control attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone objective, in that the formation of a loop seal would have the potential to affect the performance capability of instruments used for automatic initiation of engineered safety features, containment pressure control, and post-accident monitoring. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it is a design deficiency that will not result in loss of automatic initiation of engineered safety features, containment pressure control, or post-accident monitoring capability (loss of function). (Section 1R21.21. b).

Inspection Report# : [2004002\(pdf\)](#)

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Significance: Dec 13, 2003

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Failure to perform an adequate risk assessment for removing from service the auxiliary feedwater isolation valve to the 1D steam generator

A non-cited violation (NCV) was identified by the inspectors for failure to perform an adequate risk assessment as required by 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(4) when the 1B motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pump containment isolation valve for the 1D steam generator (1CA42B) was closed to perform maintenance on October 14, 2003 (Section 1R13). This finding was considered to be more than minor because the inadequate risk assessment resulted in the assignment of an incorrect risk action level (color) for this maintenance activity. This finding was considered to be of very low safety significance because had the error not occurred the only additional action required would have been management awareness of the additional risk associated with the activity.

Inspection Report# : [2003005\(pdf\)](#)

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Significance: Sep 13, 2003

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Failure to take Prompt Actions to Resolve Control Room Environmental Chiller Issue

A non-cited violation (NCV) of 10CFR50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, was identified by the inspectors for failure to take prompt action to remedy an identified problem documented in a Problem Investigation Process report (PIP) associated with the ability to restart control room cooling following a station blackout (SBO) event. This finding was considered to be more than minor based on the fact that subsequent NRC review revealed that the licensee had been untimely in initiation of corrective action. The lack of corrective actions in an existing PIP could lead to untimely action to mitigate response to a SBO event. The licensee had committed to respond to a SBO event by re-energizing a train of control room chillers shared between the two Units within forty five minutes. However, on March 31, 1999, the licensee identified that the time for chiller re-energization may be as great as 2 hours. The licensee did not identify the corrective actions necessary to understand the expected consequences of the temperature rise in the control room as a result of the increased time to re-energization. Therefore, the mitigation systems and cornerstone objective of ensuring the continued reliability of equipment needed to respond to a postulated event (10 CFR 50.63) could be affected. This issue was considered to be of very low safety significance because there was no actual loss of function of a safety train or system and no design or qualification issue. (Section 1R12)

Inspection Report# : [2003004\(pdf\)](#)

Barrier Integrity

Emergency Preparedness

Occupational Radiation Safety

Public Radiation Safety

Physical Protection

Miscellaneous

Last modified : May 05, 2004