

FitzPatrick

3Q/2003 Plant Inspection Findings

Initiating Events

Mitigating Systems

Significance:  Sep 27, 2003

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Inadequate corrective actions associated with the failure of RCIC pump discharge flow controller 13FIC-91.

A self-revealing finding occurred during a reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) surveillance test on June 10, in which the system's flow controller did not automatically respond to maintain the proper RCIC flow after RCIC flow was manually decreased. This degraded condition resulted from inadequate preventive maintenance on the flow controller. The inspectors identified a violation for ineffective corrective action based on a similar flow controller problem, which had occurred in July 2000, but for which corrective actions did not properly address the extent of the condition, and the RCIC flow degradation recurred.

The finding is more than minor, because it affected the mitigating systems cornerstone attribute of equipment performance. The degraded condition of RCIC could have prevented the system from providing adequate flow to the reactor. Therefore, this deficiency affected the reliability and capability of a system that responds to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. In accordance with MC 0609, Appendix A, "Significance Determination of Reactor Inspection Findings for At-Power Situations," the inspectors determined that this finding is of very low safety significance, because it was not a design or qualification deficiency, and it did not result in an actual loss of safety function for the RCIC system with respect to internal or external events.

Inspection Report# : [2003008\(pdf\)](#)

Significance:  Jul 31, 2003

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Inadequate and untimely corrective action for a 1996 RHR pump discharge check valve failure resulted in a similar failure in Oct 2002 and a violation of 10CFR50 Appendix B Criterion XVI.

The inspector identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI concerning the failure of the D residual heat removal (RHR) pump discharge check valve during the October 2002 refueling outage. This failure resulted due to inadequate corrective action for a similar December 1996 A RHR pump discharge check valve disk hangar arm failure and involved an inappropriate deferral of actions and planned engineering work which was lost track of.

This finding is more than minor because it impacted the mitigating systems cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability and reliability of mitigating systems. During the refueling outage the failure of the D RHR pump discharge check valve could have prevented the B RHR train from performing its shutdown cooling safety function. At the time of the finding the plant was in the refuel mode, with both RHR shutdown cooling systems out of service for

maintenance and the decay heat removal system in service. In accordance with NRC Manual 609, Appendix G, "Shutdown Operation Significance Determination Process," the finding is considered to be of very low safety significance because the shutdown cooling safety function was not significantly degraded.
Inspection Report# : [2003005\(pdf\)](#)

Barrier Integrity

Significance:  Mar 20, 2003

Identified By: Self Disclosing

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Inadequate corrective action for 1997 part 21 caused D inboard MSIV to fail to close during fast-closure surveillance testing on 3/20/2003 and resulted in a violation of 10CFR50 App. B, Criterion XVI.

A self-revealing non-cited violation of 10CFR50 Appendix B, Criterion XVI, was identified when inadequate corrective action for a May 2, 1997 10CFR21 notification, regarding Automative Valve Company (AVC) solenoid valve degradation, caused the D inboard main steam isolation valve (MSIV) to fail to close during fast-closure surveillance testing on March 20, 2003. As corrective action for this violation Entergy revised its preventative maintenance procedures for installed pilot solenoid valves to ensure identification of valve degradation before future failures occur.

This finding is more than minor because it affected the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone objective of providing reasonable assurance of the functionality of containment. The failure of MSIVs to close during an event could provide a release path for radio nuclides from the reactor coolant system to the environment. The finding is of very low safety significance because all of the remaining seven MSIVs closed during the fast closure surveillance testing, and thus the finding did not represent an actual open pathway in the physical integrity of the reactor containment.

Inspection Report# : [2003005\(pdf\)](#)

Emergency Preparedness

Occupational Radiation Safety

Public Radiation Safety

Physical Protection

Miscellaneous

Last modified : December 01, 2003