FitzPatrick
2Q/2003 Plant Inspection Findings

Initiating Events

Mitigating Systems

Significance: G Sep 30, 2002
Identified By: Self Disclosing
Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation
The use of inadequate engineering analyas to extend the surveillance interval for the CS and RHR pump timer relays was a violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control."
Entergy failed to follow engineering procedure guidance for an analysis of the CS and RHR pump timer relays that was performed to support extending the surveillance test interval for these relays from six months to two years. The engineering procedure required that because the span of the available instrument drift data was not large enough to cover the proposed new test interval, instrument drift for this analysis must be assumed to be time dependent; however, Entergy's analysis erroneously assumed that the timer relay drift values were time independent. This issue had a credible impact on safety because failure of the relays to operate within the TS time limits could delay the injection of water to the reactor during a LOCA. The inspector determined this issue to be of very low safety significance because it did not result in an actual loss of safety function for the CS and RHR systems.
Inspection Report# : 2002007*(pdf)*

Significance: G Aug 30, 2002
Identified By: NRC
Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation
Failure to identify that the "B" ESW pump was inoperable after results of a TS required ST were less than the TSSR 3.11.D acceptance criteria was a violation of 10CFR50 Appendix B Criterion XVI.
A violation of 10CFR50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, (Corrective Action), dispositioned as a non-cited violation, was identified because licensee personnel failed to identify that, during a surveillance test, the "B" emergency service water (ESW) pump was inoperable after the flow for the "B" train of ESW was below the required value in the Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement. During the inspection, the NRC inspectors identified that the licensee had erroneously concluded that the pump was operable based on a non-safety system cooled by the "B" train of ESW being tagged out of service. This finding is greater than minor and could become a more significant safety concern because operators failed to recognize inoperable equipment during surveillance testing. The ESW system provides cooling water to the emergency diesel generators (EDGs) and the room coolers for the emergency core cooling system (ECCS) pumps. The failure of ESW is applicable to the mitigating systems cornerstone, because the failure of the ESW system could affect the safety function of the EDGs and/or the ECCS pumps. This finding was evaluated using the NRC Significance Determination Process, and was screened as having very low safety significance because the low flow condition for the "B" ESW pump was not of significant magnitude to preclude the system from meeting its safety function. (Section 4OA2.b(2)(a))
Inspection Report# : 2002006*(pdf)*

Significance: G Aug 30, 2002
Identified By: NRC
Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation
Inadequate operability evaluation for suspect agastat timers resulted in failure to promptly identify failed timer for the "D" RHR pump and a violation of 10CFR50 Appendix B Criterion XVI.
A violation of 10CFR50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, (Corrective Action), dispositioned as a non-cited violation, was identified because FitzPatrick personnel failed to adequately evaluate the operability of the emergency diesel generator (EDG) Agastat sequence timers controlling the residual heat removal (RHR) pumps. The RHR timers were of the same type and surveillance frequency as the core spray (CS) timers which had failed their Technical Specification required surveillance test. When the RHR timers were tested, the "D" RHR pump timer failed to meet the value listed in the Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement. During the inspection, the NRC inspectors identified that the FitzPatrick basis for operability failed to recognize that the surveillance frequency for the RHR timers had been extended from 6 months to 24 months, a contributing factor for the CS timers failing. This finding is greater than minor and could have become a more significant safety concern because personnel failed to perform adequate operability determinations for suspect conditions adverse to quality. The Agastat timers are used to sequence emergency equipment and system loads onto the EDGs at pre-determined intervals, in order to minimize the potential for damage to the EDGs. The failure of an RHR Agastat timer for the EDG sequencer timer is applicable to the mitigating systems cornerstone, because the failure of timers could result in multiple loads sequencing onto the EDG at the same time, which could affect the reliability of the EDGs or the loads supplied by the EDGs. This finding was evaluated using the NRC Significance Determination Process, and was screened as having very low safety significance because the out-of-tolerance condition for the "D" RHR pump timer was not of significant magnitude to preclude the system from meeting its safety function. (Section 4OA2.b(2)(b))
Inspection Report# : 2002006*(pdf)*

Barrier Integrity

Emergency Preparedness

Occupational Radiation Safety

Public Radiation Safety

Physical Protection

Miscellaneous

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