FitzPatrick

Initiating Events

Significance: G Mar 30, 2002
Identified By: NRC
Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation
Inadequate preventive maintenance of the startup feedwater control valve resulted in a violation of 10 CFR 50.65, "Maintenance Rule."
The inspectors identified that preventive maintenance performed on a startup feedwater control valve was inadequate and that two functional failures of the valve had not been properly categorized in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65. This issue was considered more than minor because failure of the valve to control feedwater flow to the reactor vessel could result in a loss of feedwater transient and plant trip. However, this issue was determined to be of very low safety significance using phase one of the SDP because it did not contribute to the likelihood of a LOCA initiator or of both a reactor trip and unavailability of mitigating equipment, and did not increase the likelihood of a fire or internal/external flood.
Inspection Report# : 2002003*(pdf)*

Significance: G Feb 09, 2002
Identified By: NRC
Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation
The failure to adequately review a design change implemented by a temporary modification resulted in a violation of 10CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion III.
The inspectors identified that a temporary modification to install a data recorder to the B reactor water recirculation pump motor generator speed control circuit was inadequate. The temporary modification failed to address seismic concerns with the control room cabinet door that could have resulted in an inadvertent plant transient. The cabinet door was left open due to the protruding wires and was not restrained. This issue was considered more than minor because of the potential for a plant transient if the door were to close on the protruding wires. However, this issue was determined to be of very low safety significance using phase one of the SDP because the modification would not cause the failure of any mitigation systems. This issue was considered a non-cited vilation of NRC requirements.
Inspection Report# : 2001013*(pdf)*

Mitigating Systems

Significance: G Sep 30, 2002
Identified By: Self Disclosing
Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation
The use of inadequate engineering analyas to extend the surveillance interval for the CS and RHR pump timer relays was a violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control."
Entergy failed to follow engineering procedure guidance for an analysis of the CS and RHR pump timer relays that was performed to support extending the surveillance test interval for these relays from six months to two years. The engineering procedure required that because the span of the available instrument drift data was not large enough to cover the proposed new test interval, instrument drift for this analysis must be assumed to be time dependent; however, Entergy's analysis erroneously assumed that the timer relay drift values were time independent. This issue had a credible impact on safety because failure of the relays to operate within the TS time limits could delay the injection of water to the reactor during a LOCA. The inspector determined this issue to be of very low safety significance because it did not result in an actual loss of safety function for the CS and RHR systems.
Inspection Report# : 2002007*(pdf)*

Significance: G Aug 30, 2002
Identified By: NRC
Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation
Failure to identify that the "B" ESW pump was inoperable after results of a TS required ST were less than the TSSR 3.11.D acceptance criteria was a violation of 10CFR50 Appendix B Criterion XVI.

A violation of 10CFR50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, (Corrective Action), dispositioned as a non-cited violation, was identified because licensee personnel failed to identify that, during a surveillance test, the "B" emergency service water (ESW) pump was inoperable after the flow for the "B" train of ESW was below the required value in the Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement. During the inspection, the NRC inspectors identified that the licensee had erroneously concluded that the pump was operable based on a non-safety system cooled by the "B" train of ESW being tagged out of service. This finding is greater than minor and could become a more significant safety concern because operators failed to recognize inoperable equipment during surveillance testing. The ESW system provides cooling water to the emergency diesel generators (EDGs) and the room coolers for the emergency core cooling system (ECCS) pumps. The failure of ESW is applicable to the mitigating systems cornerstone, because the failure of the ESW system could affect the safety function of the EDGs and/or the ECCS pumps. This finding was evaluated using the NRC Significance Determination Process, and was screened as having very low safety significance because the low flow condition for the "B" ESW pump was not of significant magnitude to preclude the system from meeting its safety function. (Section 4OA2.b(2)(a))
Inspection Report# : 2002006*(pdf)*

Significance: G Aug 30, 2002
Identified By: NRC
Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation
Inadequate operability evaluation for suspect agastat timers resulted in failure to promptly identify failed timer for the "D" RHR pump and a violation of 10CFR50 Appendix B Criterion XVI.
A violation of 10CFR50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, (Corrective Action), dispositioned as a non-cited violation, was identified because FitzPatrick personnel failed to adequately evaluate the operability of the emergency diesel generator (EDG) Agastat sequence timers controlling the residual heat removal (RHR) pumps. The RHR timers were of the same type and surveillance frequency as the core spray (CS) timers which had failed their Technical Specification required surveillance test. When the RHR timers were tested, the "D" RHR pump timer failed to meet the value listed in the Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement. During the inspection, the NRC inspectors identified that the FitzPatrick basis for operability failed to recognize that the surveillance frequency for the RHR timers had been extended from 6 months to 24 months, a contributing factor for the CS timers failing. This finding is greater than minor and could have become a more significant safety concern because personnel failed to perform adequate operability determinations for suspect conditions adverse to quality. The Agastat timers are used to sequence emergency equipment and system loads onto the EDGs at pre-determined intervals, in order to minimize the potential for damage to the EDGs. The failure of an RHR Agastat timer for the EDG sequencer timer is applicable to the mitigating systems cornerstone, because the failure of timers could result in multiple loads sequencing onto the EDG at the same time, which could affect the reliability of the EDGs or the loads supplied by the EDGs. This finding was evaluated using the NRC Significance Determination Process, and was screened as having very low safety significance because the out-of-tolerance condition for the "D" RHR pump timer was not of significant magnitude to preclude the system from meeting its safety function. (Section 4OA2.b(2)(b))
Inspection Report# : 2002006*(pdf)*

Significance: G Mar 30, 2002
Identified By: NRC
Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation
Failure to identify and correct a condition adverse to quality that prevented IST of four control room/relay room temperature control valves was a violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI.
The inspectors identified a long-standing uncorrected condition adverse to quality involving inability to perform inservice tests of four control room/relay room temperature control valves. The issue was considered more than minor, because long-standing uncorrected problems involving accident mitigating equipment could become a more significant safety concern. However, this issue was determined to be of very low safety significance using phase one of the SDP because the failed open valves were in the accident mitigating position and represented a design deficiency that was confirmed not to result in a loss of safety function per Generic Letter 91-18, Revision 1.
Inspection Report# : 2002003*(pdf)*

Barrier Integrity

Emergency Preparedness

Occupational Radiation Safety

Public Radiation Safety

Significance: G Jun 03, 2002
Identified By: Self Disclosing
Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation
Used resin shipment exceeded free standing liquid limits resulting in a violation of 10 CFR 61.56(b)(2).
The inspector identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 61.56(b)(2) having very low safety significance. On June 3, 2002, Entergy failed to assure that a spent resin waste container, received for disposal at the Chem-Nuclear Low Level Waste Disposal Facility in Barnwell, South Carolina, contained less than the allowable limit for free-standing liquid. Entergy's failure to assure that the spent resin shipped for disposal met the de-watering criteria was determined to have very low safety significance using the Public Radiation Safety Significance Determination Process. The finding involved radioactive material control relative to non-conformance with pertinent waste characteristic specifications required for radioactive waste materials tendered for disposal at a licensed waste disposal facility. In this case, the conformance issue was not significant enough to result in denial of access to the disposal facility; and no other issues involving transportation requirements, such as package integrity, Certificate of Compliance, or radiation limits were involved.
Inspection Report# : 2002005*(pdf)*

Physical Protection

Miscellaneous

Last modified : March 25, 2003