

Catawba 1

Initiating Events



Significance: Jun 22, 2002

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Failure to Follow Procedures Resulting in Conducting Penetrant Examination on the Wrong Weld

The inspectors identified a non-cited violation for failure to assure that a Penetrant Examination (PT) was performed on the correct weld or component in accordance with requirements of Technical Specification 5.4.1, which requires the use of written procedures; specifically in this case, Procedure NDE-35 and Drawing No. ISI CN-1NV-4488, Chemical & Volume Control System to Reactor Coolant Pump "1A." This finding was of very low safety significance because, although the inspectors identified that the licensee examiners performed the PT on the wrong weld, the PT was subsequently performed on the correct weld and found to be acceptable (Section 1R08).

Inspection Report# : [2002002\(pdf\)](#)

Mitigating Systems



Significance: Jun 22, 2002

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Failure to Perform Testing with Written Procedures

The inspectors identified a failure to perform testing activities with written test procedures. Specifically, testing activities associated with the 1A Component Cooling Water heat exchanger were conducted on June 5, 2002, without the approval of licensed senior reactor operators, or in accordance with written test procedures. This was dispositioned as a non-cited violation. The failure was of very low safety significance because the heat exchanger was returned to service in a short period of time and redundant components were available. (Section 1R07)

Inspection Report# : [2002002\(pdf\)](#)



Significance: Jun 22, 2002

Identified By: Licensee

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Failure to Maintain Both Trains of Control Room Area Chilled Water System Operable per Technical Specification 3.7.11 and TS 3.0.3

Operation of Both Units in Mode 1 with Both Trains of Control Room Area Chilled Water System Inoperable from February 24 to February 27, 2002, Resulting in Violation of Technical Specification 3.7.11 and TS 3.0.3. The licensee unknowingly operated both units with the A and B trains of CRACWS system inoperable because of inadequate troubleshooting of an existing problem with the A-train chiller, which allowed it to remain inoperable when the licensee removed the B-train chiller from service for planned maintenance. This issue was captured in the licensee's corrective action program as PIP C-02-01042. This finding was of very low safety significance because the chillers' function to maintain control room temperatures could have been compensated by operator actions contained in the licensee's procedures. (Section 4OA7)

Inspection Report# : [2002002\(pdf\)](#)



Significance: Jun 22, 2002

Identified By: Licensee

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Failure to Follow Procedures Resulting in Operation of the 1B Auxiliary Feedwater Pump with its Suction Valve Closed for Seven Minutes

Failure to Follow Operating Procedure OP/1/A/6250/02, Auxiliary Feedwater System, Revision 118, Resulting in a Violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1. This procedure governs operation of the auxiliary feedwater (CA) system, and on May 11, 2002, operators failed to have the system aligned in accordance with Encl. 4.5, Manual Operation of the Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps When Not Aligned for Standby Readiness, and Encl. 4.7, Valve Checklist, while operating the 1B CA pump during a test. As a result the pump was operated for seven minutes with its suction valve 1CA-9B closed. This issue was captured in the licensee's corrective action program as PIP C-02-02726. This finding was of very low safety significance because the pump's damage appeared to be minimal and the pump passed surveillance tests and

other checks afterwards. (Section 4OA7)

Inspection Report# : [2002002\(pdf\)](#)

Barrier Integrity



Significance: Jun 22, 2002

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Failure to Enter Ice Condenser Door Test Failures into the Corrective Action Program for Proper Dispositioning

The inspectors identified a Non-Cited Violation against 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI for the licensee's failure to enter ice condenser lower door test failures into its corrective action program. Specifically, Unit 1 door test failures from the last three refueling outages were not documented in Program Investigation Process reports and thus not evaluated for past-operability impact, causal analyses, performance trending, or possible maintenance rule functional failures. The finding was of very low safety significance because the doors were tested satisfactorily before Unit 1 was returned to an operating mode in which the ice condenser was required to be operable, and because of the likelihood that the failures were caused by maintenance that occurred just prior to the testing while Unit 1 was shutdown. (Section 1R22)

Inspection Report# : [2002002\(pdf\)](#)

Emergency Preparedness

Occupational Radiation Safety

Public Radiation Safety

Physical Protection

Miscellaneous

Significance: N/A Aug 23, 2002

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: FIN Finding

Problem Identification and Resolution Inspection

There were no findings of significance identified during this inspection. The inspection concluded that problems were properly identified, evaluated, and resolved within the problem identification and resolution programs (PI&R). However, during the inspection, several isolated examples were noted of incomplete corrective action implementation and a lack of detail in operability reviews.

Inspection Report# : [2002007\(pdf\)](#)

Last modified : March 25, 2003