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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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BRIEFING ON DESIGN CERTIFICATION ISSUES
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PUBLIC MEETING
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Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Room 1F-16
11555 Rockville Pike
Rockville, Maryland
Tuesday, August 27, 1996
The Commission met in open session, pursuant to
notice, at 9:34 a.m., the Honorable SHIRLEY A. JACKSON,
Chairman of the Commission, presiding.
COMMISSIONERS PRESENT:
SHIRLEY A. JACKSON, Chairman of the Commission
KENNETH C. ROGERS, Member of the Commission
GRETA J. DICUS, Member of the Commission
NILS J. DIAZ, Member of the Commission
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STAFF AND PRESENTERS SEATED AT COMMISSION TABLE:
JOHN C. HOYLE, Secretary
MARTIN MALSCH, Deputy General Counsel
JOE COLVIN, President & CEO, NEI
RALPH BEEDLE, Senior VP & Chief Nuclear Officer,
Nuclear Generation, NEI
DAVID REHN, President DE&S-Hanford;, Duke Power
REGIS MATZIE, Vice President, Nuclear Systems
Development, ABB/CE
STEVEN HUCIK, Manager, Advanced Reactor Programs,
GE
JAMES TAYLOR, EDO
WILLIAM RUSSELL, Director, NRR
THEODORE QUAY, Project Director, Standardization
Project Directorate, NRR
JERRY WILSON, Section Chief, Standardization
Project Directorate, NRR
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P R O C E E D I N G S
[9:34 a.m.]
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Good morning, ladies and
gentlemen. The purpose for this meeting is for the nuclear
industry, represented by the Nuclear Energy Institute,
General Electric and ABB Combustion Engineering and the NRC
staff to brief the Commission on design certification rules
before the Commission for certification.
I would like to welcome the representatives of
industry here today. As you might have already noticed, we
have a new commissioner with us this morning, Commissioner
Diaz, who I am sure some of you may have met.
The Commission will first hear from the industry
and then the NRC staff.
The NRC has issued final design approval for two
standard reactor designs, the General Electric advanced
boiling water reactor, and the ABB Combustion Engineering
System 80 Plus and is in the final stages of certifying
these designs by rulemaking. We expect that the
certification of the two standard reactor designs for which
we are currently assessing comments will be completed within
the next several months, few months.
Copies of the presentation slides are available at
the entrance to the meeting.
Do any of my fellow commissioners have any opening
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comments?
COMMISSIONER ROGERS: No.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Mr. Colvin, you may proceed.
MR. COLVIN: Good morning.
Chairman Jackson, Commissioner Rogers,
Commissioner Dicus and Commissioner Diaz, good morning. I
am Joe Colvin with the Nuclear Energy Institute and with me
today is Ralph Beedle, our chief nuclear office, Dave Rehn
of Duke Power, who chairs the Advanced Light Water Reactor
Radiation Working Group for the industry, Regis Matzie who
heads up the Nuclear Systems Engineering for ABB Combustion
Engineering and Steve Hucik, who is responsible for nuclear
power plant projects at General Electric.
We thank the Commission and appreciate the
opportunity that you have given us by making public the
draft final rule language and the staff paper that
summarizes the remaining policy issues associated with
certification of the evoluntionary plant designs and we
appreciate the invitation to discus the industry's views as
well as concerns with the potential impact of these policy
issues on future licensees who will reference these
certifications.
These certifications are a key part of the
improved regulatory framework that is essential to maintain
the viability of nuclear energy in our country's energy mix
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and that is one of the enabling conditions in the U.S.
Nuclear Energy Industry Strategic Plan for building new
nuclear power plants.
[Slide.]
MR. COLVIN: We share the Commission's objectives
as shown on this slide, enhanced safety and reliability,
standardization of designs, the early resolution of key
safety issues and finally but certainly not last a stable
and predictable licensing process.
As we emphasized in our comments in the proposed
rule, the comprehensive NRC safety rules -- safety reviews,
I should say, have clearly demonstrated the successful
achievement of the first objective. The designs and
operational commitments embodied in the design control
documents or DCDs offer us the chance to achieve and
maintain a remarkable degree of standardization. However,
the process deficiencies that we continue to see in the
rules concern us because they have the potential to lessen
the degree of standardization, to leave unresolved many of
the issues that were reviewed and approved by the NRC in the
course of that rulemaking and, most importantly, to fail to
achieve the stability of the licensing process that the NRC
and the industry set as a goal when we began this effort.
Today, we would like to discus four of these key
issues that, in our view, remain unresolved. Four issues
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that have the significance and the impact on the finality of
issue resolution achieved by these certifications and on the
stability of these certifications to bring Part 52 licensing
process to reality.
Before we get into these detailed discussions, I
would like to ask each of the vendors who have their
certifications, both Steve Hucik and Regis Matzie, to add
their perspectives as the design certification influence on
the process made to date and the objectives of Part 52.
I would encourage you to ask questions. I am sure
that as we go or --
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: You're just telling us to do
our job.
MR. COLVIN: Yes, ma'am. I am sure that won't be
a problem, but we would encourage your questions at the time
of the discussion or certainly at the end, as you might
prefer.
MR. HUCIK: Good morning. I am steven A. Hucik,
General Manager of Nuclear Plant Projects for GE's Nuclear
Energy. I have responsibility for all of GE Nuclear
Energy's advanced designs including the U.S. ABWR design
which is the subject of these Part 52 certification
rulemaking and the ABWR nuclear power plant projects
currently in Japan and in Taiwan.
Although this morning's briefing focuses on
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resolving remaining certification process issues, I believe
it important to acknowledge at the outset what NRC's Part 52
design approval and certification program has already
accomplished through the sustained and interacting efforts
of industry participants, the NRC staff and the Commission
itself.
From GE's standpoint, the final design approval or
FDA issued by the NRC in July of 1994 was a landmark
achievement, one which built upon a decade-long
developmental effort and which followed exhaustive safety
reviews by the NRC staff. The FDA gave staff approval to a
design of substantially enhanced safety and economy of
construction and operation, a design which holds enormous
promise for contributing to our country's energy future.
That promise, I would note, is already being
realized in Japan where the first of two ABWR units is now
in full power operation and completion and commencement of
startup testing for the second unit is scheduled for later
this year.
The ABWR, I am pleased to add, has also been
accepted by Taiwan Power Company for a two-unit project at
its Lo Min site.
Certification rulemaking is the first step in the
design approval phase of Part 52. What we seek from this
step is a certification rule that will be hospitable to
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future use of this advanced design by the U.S. utilities.
This requires design stability and licensing predictability,
two of the primary objectives of Part 52 and of the 1992
Energy Policy Act.
We welcome today's opportunity to express our
views on the process provisions in the certification rules
where there is industry-staff disagreement. While today's
briefing necessarily centers on disagreements to be
resolved, I want to state GE's appreciation for the work
done by the senior review group. The public dialogue with
the group on July 15 was highly constructive and many of the
concerns expressed in prior industry comments would be
resolved through adoption of the recommendations in the
group's option paper of August 13, 1996.
There remain, however, significant process issues
where disagreement persists. Our position on those issues
is set forth in the comments submitted by the Nuclear Energy
Institute and will be discussed further by the speakers this
morning. I would only underscore at this point the concerns
GE has in three major areas.
First, applicable regulations. The inclusion in
the certification rule of a group of additional applicable
regulations remains a strongly disputed matter. While the
proposed deletion from Section 4 of applicable regulations
covering operational requirements is an improvement, our
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basic concerns persist as to the remaining array of design-
related applicable regulations in Section 5. There is no
safety or other need for these added regulations.
Uncertainties are inherent in their deliberately broad
formulation and they introduce a design instability which is
a deterrent of future utility use.
Secondly, technical specifications. We continue
to believe that the technical specifications in the DCD
should be accorded finality, a position supported by
standardization considerations, by the Part 52 objective of
early issue resolution and by the substantial effort
expended in their preparation and the thorough staff review
leading to their FDA approval.
Finally, de novo or wholly new review for design
certification renewal. We categorically reject the
proposition that design certification renewal requires a de
novo or wholly new review of the originally certified
design. As a practical matter, it is very unlikely that a
vendor such as GE or ABB is going to finance the cost of a
de novo review for a renewal. Moreover, we believe that
appropriate issue finality is compatible with Part 52
certification objectives and with the requirements for
renewal contained in Sections 52.57 and 52.59.
Conclusion. It has been nine years since GE filed
its pioneering design approval application for the U.S.
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ABWR. In Olympic terms, this has been a marathon process of
GE-NRC interaction. Much has been accomplished as we reach
the closure stage on remaining process issues. What is
needed now is a rule worthy of the enormous time, resources
and effort expended to bring us to this point, a rule which
is faithful to the design stability and licensing
predictability objectives of Part 52 and of the Energy
Policy Act, a rule that will enable this advanced design of
demonstrated safety and economic value to make its
contribution to our own country's energy future.
Thank you very much.
COMMISSIONER ROGERS: I wonder if you could --
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Why don't we let Mr. Matzie
make his comments and then we will jump right in.
COMMISSIONER ROGERS: Okay.
DR. MATZIE: Good morning, Chairman Jackson,
Commissioner Rogers, Commissioner Dicus and Commissioner
Diaz. My name is Regis Matzie. I am ABB Combustion
Engineering's vice president of Nuclear System's Engineering
and I have overall responsibility for the design,
development and licensing of the System 80 Plus standard
plant design.
First, I would like to also express my
appreciation for the Commission appointing the senior review
group. Their involvement has helped move the process along
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to where there are now a manageable number of policy issues
for final resolution.
We envision all of the issues before the
Commission today to be just that, policy issues related to
process, whose resolution does not impact the safety of the
design but certainly will impact the commercial viability of
the design.
As you have already stated, the System 80 Plus
design was granted final design approval over two years ago.
It incorporates many new safety features that comply with
the Commission's severe accident policy. These new or
improved features provide substantial additional margin
against core damage accidents and a wider range of
mitigation capacity in the highly unlikely event that core
damage does occur.
The System 80 Plus standard plant thus achieves
functions and performance levels that exceed current
regulatory requirements. In fact, the NRC approved
probabilistic risk assessment for System 80 Plus shows that
it is approximately two orders of magnitude safer than
today's currently operating plants.
ABB Combustion Engineering and the nuclear
industry are therefore greatly troubled by the NRC's
proposed design certification rules, create additional
applicable regulations to capture the extensive effort and
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accomplishments that I have mentioned.
We have provided, in accordance with the NRC's own
policy for future reactors, a design that is much safer than
present plants. It is unreasonable to consequently saddle
these safer designs with additional regulations.
Furthermore, since these new regulations are not needed for
adequate protection of the public, adding them to this rule
runs counter to the clear guidance of both the
Administration and the Congress to avoid unnecessary
regulatory burdens.
The principal result of these increased regulatory
standards means more surveillance, more operational
expenses, more enforcement activity and thus a less
attractive nuclear option despite the fact that we have
produced a much safer plant.
Beyond additional applicable regulations, there
remain a few other matters of disagreement with staff
positions that are also very important to us. Two of these,
namely the finality of technical specifications and the
status of operational requirements in the design control
document are especially troubling. In these, the staff has
proposed adverse changes in the finality status of extensive
portions of the design control document long after these
issues were reviewed and approved and, indeed, very late in
the rulemaking proceedings.
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ABB Combustion Engineering has expended
substantial resources to achieve design finality and these
proposed staff actions would undermine finality and
licensing predictability to an unacceptable degree.
Regarding the renewal of design certification, the
design should have the legal benefit of the doubt that it
complies with the rules and regulations in effect at the
time that it was originally certified. It has that benefit
right up to the time its term expires and there is no reason
beyond the additional relevant experience and new
information to be considered under 52.59 to conclude that it
does not continue to comply. A de novo review would be a
major waste of both industry and NRC resources.
We trust that all of the remaining topics
documented in the extensive comments submitted in July and
last week will receive your serious consideration, even
though we only have time to address a few this morning. It
is ABB Combustion Engineering's strongly held position that
this rulemaking is an essential element to the future of
nuclear power in the United States. It will provide the
definitive statement of the U.S. regulatory regime that will
be awaiting investors when favorable market conditions
return in this country.
In conclusion, I would observe that the Commission
should take considerable satisfaction that they have
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approved advanced designs that provide substantially
increased safety. However, from the industry's perspective,
it is imperative that the Commission now provide rules that
minimize perceived investment risks associated with
licensing.
Thank you.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Thank you.
Commissioner Rogers?
COMMISSIONER ROGERS: Do we want to talk about
anything more broadly in the whole process here? I mean, is
this now a general, opening for discussion?
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Are there other presentations
that you plan to make?
MR. COLVIN: Chairman Jackson, we had planned to
have Dave Rehn and the other participants go in and talk
about each of these four issues in more detail. Perhaps
that might be the best time to subject those specific
issues.
COMMISSIONER ROGERS: that's fine.
MR. COLVIN: And if there are more general
questions --
COMMISSIONER ROGERS: Well, then I have two
specific questions to the presentations.
I wonder, Mr. Hucik, if you could elaborate a
little bit on -- give me a couple examples of how the
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applicable regulations introduce design instability?
MR. HUCIK: The review that was done with the NRC
focused on design features and design issues related to the
particular designs, the ABWR and the System 80 Plus. Those
designs and the bases for those designs were the bases for
the Commission and the NRC issuing the final design
approval. Applicable regulations present new regulations
that potentially open up those issues and do not provide the
finality that the FDA does with the designs as given in our
documentation.
COMMISSIONER ROGERS: How?
I know you have said it but precisely how would
that -- what scenario do you see that would in fact produce
that result?
MR. COLVIN: Maybe if I might try, just to get
into the discussion a little bit, if you take a look at the
applicable regulations as they apply specifically to a
design, I think the major concern is that it involves a
significant degree of potential interpretation by the reader
and by the regulator. I mean, if I pick out of context the
rule on shutdown risk and it has four elements, it says the
design must include assessments of four issues, the third
issue is features that mitigate vulnerabilities resulting
from other design features.
I think that is abstract enough and of enough
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breadth that we could talk about what assessments ought to
be conducted of what features for as long as we wanted to
talk about those. As a result, I don't think the rules
provide the certainty that that design is fixed in time.
That's part of the issue and, in fact, that is provided
within the FDA in great, great detail that those features
have, in fact, been met and the assessments have been
conducted. So I think that's the issue.
Raising new interpretations --
COMMISSIONER ROGERS: Let me see if I understand
what you are saying here.
Is your concern that if these applicable
regulations are put in place before the design is certified,
as a rule, that then they would interfere with the
certification, the acceptance of that certified design? In
other words, that would lead to a re-review of issues that
have already been considered in staff approving the design
which is now up for certification? Is that the concern?
MR. COLVIN: Sir, we are at a state today where
we -- and the Commission is going to move forward and
certify these designs through rulemaking. It will be
several years, hopefully not too distant but several years,
probably the turn of the century at which time when we, the
customers, will be looking at these designs as a viable
source of meeting our energy needs.
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When we start looking at those designs today and
look at the potential risk and uncertainty that's involved
in now going back and verifying that design now, today, five
years later, meets this applicable regulation that is not
well defined, is vague, will cause me, the customer, to
question whether or not I've gotten enough certainty and
finality in this process to justify the financial community,
the investment community and me as a customer moving forward
to purchase that design. That's the issue.
COMMISSIONER ROGERS: I think we have to pursue
that because I think that's, you know, a scenario that would
be fully outside of, I think, the intent of this process.
But how realistic is it?
We are talking about, now, a design which will be
certified through a rulemaking process and finalized through
that process. Now, are you saying that when a COL applicant
comes along and wants to adopt this design, that then the
applicable regulations could be used to challenge the
design? Is that what you're suggesting?
MR. COLVIN: I think there are a number of
scenarios that one could posit in this situation. I think
what we are trying to do is ensure back with the basic
principle that we do not add detail in regulations that is,
one, unnecessary and, two, provides uncertainty in the
future. I think if you go through the --
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COMMISSIONER ROGERS: I understand that.
MR. COLVIN: If you go through these
regulations --
COMMISSIONER ROGERS: I'm trying to focus here on
how the applicable regulations relate to instability in the
design itself. That is what I am focusing on. Now, there
are lots of other issues. I am not saying they aren't
there. But I am trying to understand how that could come
about. And I have trouble seeing that.
MR. COLVIN: If you go to the current Part 52,
52.63, which provides the finality that, notwithstanding any
other action in the future, the Commission cannot make a
change to the design and a petitioner cannot change in that
design unless that is either -- two factors are met, one,
that that change is necessary to assure adequate protection
or, two, that that change is necessary to ensure compliance
with the applicable regulations, the regulations that were
in effect at the time of the design certification. I think
that is the issue.
If, in fact, this applicable regulation, the
excerpt that I read, is in effect at the time of the design
certification, then there is -- there is a threshold which
has now been at issue with the Commission or the staff
deciding that a new change is made to that design three
years, five years or ten years in the future based upon not
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meeting the current interpretation of what it takes to
achieve compliance with that. So it adds not only to
instability in the design certification process but into the
follow-on process.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: My understanding is that 52.63
has a fairly stringent backfit standard for the
applicability of these additional applicable rates and so
that the Commission cannot impose a compliance backfit
unless actually three criteria are met, the failure to
comply results in a substantial reduction in the protection
of public health and safety or the common defense and
security, that the new requirements provide a compensating
increase in protection not exceeding the level of protection
originally embodied in the additional applicable regulations
and, third, that the direct and the indirect costs of
implementation are justified in view of this compensating
increase in protection.
You are saying that that is not enough?
MR. COLVIN: No, I am saying that that is not
enough. I think what we have done is achieve a higher
degree of backfit protection but in an area that is yet
untested. That is a new -- a new --
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: The very fact that you say it's
untested, you're saying that the Commission, because it is
untested, should not at any point in the future have any
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ability under however stringent a set of circumstances to
understand, in fact, whether what it thought it was
certifying in these designs in fact, you know, is in these
designs? Is that what you are telling us? That we should
remove that ability?
MR. COLVIN: I think there is a basic -- no I
don't. I would not say that you ought to remove that
ability.
I think that the Part 52 requirements, though, set
in place the tests that ought to be preserved and those
tests were very stringent and they were decidedly stringent
and developed through the public policy process and that was
the principle on which we all went forward with Part 52 and
implementation of design certification. That test was that
it either had to be compliance with the regulations as they
existed today or that it had to meet the adequate protection
standard. What we are talking about here is now a different
level of new information or new information which changes
not either one of those two standards but which adds a third
tier category.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: But the new information, which
I guess you mean these new applicable regulations, were the
reference -- were the references with respect to which these
designs, in fact, were done. Is that not correct? I mean,
are you telling me -- that is my understanding of the way
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this has evolved. Are you saying that is incorrect?
MR. COLVIN: No I think that is correct and --
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Let me finish then. So if that
is the case, and one has stringent backfit requirements,
those stringent backfit requirements are always referenced
to some base line standard or requirement. And so what are
you suggesting that the Commission use? If, in fact, you
are satisfied that the backfit elements are reasonable, what
then should be the reference on which they are made?
MR. COLVIN: First of all, I am not sure that I
agree that the backfit standards were acceptable.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: So you think that they --
MR. COLVIN: I would like to take the discussion
back, again, to the other point. Let me answer your
question, I think, first on this issue.
If, in fact, we said that the applicable
regulations certified the design features of these two
designs at the time of issuance of design certification
rulemaking and that is the test against which all backfit or
all potential changes are made, then I think we are
essentially in agreement.
The dilemma is that by adding words into a new
regulation that leaves open the interpretation of what is
compliance and what it takes to achieve that is left open to
interpretation between the staff, the Commission and the
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industry that is sitting at the time that is reopened, that
is the issue. And that the backfit tests that are
applied --
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: What is it -- I guess I'm
confused. What is it that's being left open to
interpretation? Can you be more explicit?
MR. COLVIN: As I say, if you take the example,
the shutdown risk says, assessments of features that
minimize shutdown risk. The staff has certified that those
assessments were done for each of these designs and the
staff is satisfied that those have been completed.
Now, is there a new assessment that should be
completed to minimize assessment risk three years from now?
If, in fact, there is, then that test, that's new
information which obviates 52.63. It takes away the
standardization that we applied because new information --
the designs were safe and they continue to be safe to meet
the adequate protection standard.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Well, it is safe as of the
understanding today; is that correct?
MR. COLVIN: That's right. And if I kept it
narrow to those features that were embodied within the
design --
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: As far as one understands that
those features, in fact, give the level of safety that one
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thinks one is certifying today.
MR. COLVIN: And if they don't then the Commission
has provisions to reinforce those to the adequate
protection --
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Well, if we don't, 52.63 is in
fact a more stringent backfit situation with respect to
that.
MR. COLVIN: I think we are talking about these
issues in the sense of adding a third tier of types of
regulation. We have regulations that the NRC issues for
adequate protection. We have regulations which the NRC
issues based --
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: No, I understand what you are
saying.
MR. COLVIN: -- upon 51.09. Now we are adding a
third tier which adds new regulations for new advanced
plants which are intended to be more safe --
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Right.
MR. COLVIN: -- more predictable, a more stable
process but we're adding a more onerous process because --
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: No, it is not more onerous
because presumably the designs reference these additional
regulations. What you are really -- are you really --
MR. COLVIN: If the design references those, then
there is no need for the applicable regulations.
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CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Well, yes there is because
there are those who come back to us and talk about whether
things that are design documents or safety documents in fact
have the weight of regulation and perhaps they should be
challenged. And so we have had these discussions.
So if one wants overall stability, we want
stability for you and we want stability for the Commission.
MR. COLVIN: I agree.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: And so I guess, again, I am
back to Commissioner Rogers's question where I guess I am
not sure that I have seen the total picture as to how the
application of these applicable regulations which you agree
are the referenced ones for these designs that the
Commission has given final design -- the staff has given
final design approval to, how then, using those as the base
line requirement at some future date compromises the design
that they are referenced to in the first place.
MR. COLVIN: Let me try an example one more time.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Okay.
MR. COLVIN: And let me see if I can try this.
Everybody else can weigh in if they desire but as
we look at the process, we went through the process of
evaluating the designs through the staff-industry-vendor
interaction. We set, first of all, we set a very high
standard of what the customer desired in the utility
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requirements documents and that's where the decision was
made, in fact, to increase the safety level of these plants.
Back over 10 years ago, through the EPRI utility
requirements documents, the industry got together and
established the safety criteria that we intended to meet in
our designs. That's the principle. We then moved forward
and through the interactions with the staff and the vendors
and the industry reviewed the designs and made the
determination that led to the issuance of the final design
approval.
In order to meet those and then move forward in
the design certification, we then evaluated all these design
features and the staff said these design features are
adequate and they meet the intent of the rules in all these
areas, the applicable regulations, the regulations that were
in effect at the time, at the time you issued that.
So now that review has been done and the scope of
what has been looked at has been defined and, to the best of
the staff's knowledge and the industry's knowledge, we have
assured the safety of those plants to even higher levels
than was required by the Commission's safety goals.
Now what we are doing is adding a new layer of
regulations that is written very broadly and is open to
interpretation, so it is not -- if, in fact, we certified
the design certification rulemaking and the final design
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approval to the features that exist there, then there is no
instability.
But if, in fact, we add no regulation that is left
open to interpretation that is generally vague by the staff,
the Commission or the industry, then we open up the
potential at some point in the future for some new idea,
information or some other threshold event to question
whether that design certification was adequately performed.
DR. MATZIE: Could I take a try at using another
example?
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Sure.
DR. MATZIE: There is an applicable regulation
relating to conditional failure probability of the
containment and the numerical number used in that applicable
regulation is .1. We build the first plant in the United
States and we get the as-built detailed design and as-built
equipment and put that in there and we run the conditional
failure probability calculations as part of the living PRA
and it comes out to be .105. Now, what do we all do? Who
decides whether that meets it or doesn't meet it?
That is an example of the uncertainty that an
applicable regulation in this phase that we are talking
about can raise at a very critical point in the process.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: But if one has an applicable
regulation, and I agree the conditional containment failure
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probability is an interesting one. You picked a good one.
But let's talk about that in two ways.
One is, let's imagine that, in fact, you did a
calculation and, as you say, it was .105 instead of .1 and
you would be concerned as a licensee or as a vendor that,
ah-hah, the NRC is going to jump all over you because it is
not exactly .1, try to force some change.
I guess the question then I have is if you look at
the criteria that are laid out in 52.63, this what I call
more stringent but that has these more stringent backfit
elements and not only do they address, you know, margin of
safety, they talk about the both direct and indirect costs,
are you suggesting it would be impossible to accommodate
that small a degree of change such that you would not have
comfort that the staff would come along and impose some
requirement on you because of that degree of change, given
those three stringent requirements?
DR. MATZIE: I don't have confidence that the
staff or a potential intervenor would not raise this issue
to a fairly high level of pain in the stage where we might
discover this when we've got as-built equipment information
that is cranked into the PRA.
I think it becomes an issue of the stage at which
it is found out and what the both intervention and staff,
how they look at it and recognize the point we're talking
28
about if we sign the contract today is downstream seven
years or so. If the plant's delay -- I mean, the first
plant comes to contract eight years from now, we're talking
about 15 years from now we might be addressing this issue.
Who knows what the environment is within either
the staff or the public in terms of addressing this type of
issue. And I believe there is an uncertainty. I agree that
some of the backfit positions attempt to address that but I
don't know what the environment will be in that time frame
and that's why I believe that brings uncertainty into the
process.
COMMISSIONER ROGERS: That's clearly an
uncertainty you have expressed there. It is a little
different from the example that was talked about earlier,
namely challenge to the design itself. I mean, here you are
citing an example, the plant, the design has been accepted,
the plant has been built, you're all ready to go and then
somebody steps in or at some point, you know, it's yet
another kind of uncertainty but a little different from
direct -- introducing a direct challenge to the design
itself kind of uncertainty.
Well, I think these are very important things for
us to understand. If I could just digress for a moment, I
think that there are various ways we can look at this
situation but my mental image of what has happened is not
29
that we started out with a set of regulations and design to
them. That isn't what happened. What we started out with
was an exhortation to the industry from within and from the
Commission itself to come up with designs that are
substantially safer than those that we have.
We believe that the current designs are safe or we
wouldn't be allowing them to operate. However, we all felt
that the next generation could be demonstrably safer and
therefore ought to be. However, there were no guiding
regulations to design to, that would lead to that.
So, in effect, what I think is happening here is,
in a sense, we are reverse engineering the regulations
backwards from the design to what a regulation might be that
would lead to that design and that is where I see the
problem.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: That's where we are.
COMMISSIONER ROGERS: And if we knew how to set
those regulations ten years ago or so when we embarked on
the design process, then we should have done it but we
didn't know how to do that at that time.
So we embarked on a process here that said, go out
and do the best that you can and the industry tried to do
that and I think successfully did it.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Right.
COMMISSIONER ROGERS: And now we are at that point
30
and it is, you know, it's very, very clear that we could get
there because we got there and now we would like to take --
some people would like to take another step and say, well,
why don't we codify this in some way in regulatory space
beyond the rule that certifies the design itself. It seems
to me that that is the issue that is on the table and what
are the problems of doing that and I am interested in the
assertion that doing that will introduce instability in the
design and I am having a little trouble with that itself,
just seeing exactly how that might happen.
I also wanted to -- well, it's really, I guess --
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: I think we want to give the
other commissioners an opportunity.
COMMISSIONER ROGERS: Yes.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: You were going to make a
comment?
MR. REHN: Yes. Dave Rehn with Duke.
Commissioner Rogers, I believe your
characterization of how we got to where we are today is,
indeed, correct in keeping with how we view that as well.
Also, on the industry side, as an operator and a
constructor of these plants, we have always strived to have
sufficient margin between that which is regulatorily
required and that which where we try to operate. We do not
like to operate right at the margin and, on some of these
31
applicable regulations, what we have are designs that we all
agree go far beyond those minimum standards of safety.
However, if we now try to overlay regulations that bump up
close to the numbers that we have established, whether
derived through PRA techniques or other approaches, those
then allow changes in interpretation.
I mean, PRA is not an exact science, per se.
Things can change in some assumptions and we can derive
slightly different numbers. If there is at least a margin
built in between that which we are trying to achieve and
that where we are, we minimize the risks to possible design
changes.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: I understand your point,
Mr. Rehn, but I think in a way we are on the horns of a
dilemma here because the issue is what is that margin and is
the Commission being asked to certify what we think is a
Cadillac with air bags and ABS and then comes out at the
other end and finds out that it's a '57 Chevy? And while
people certainly drive '57 Chevies around all the time and
no one forces them to trade them in, the issue is what was
the Commission's intent when it started out and was it a
1996 Cadillac or a 1996 Pontiac, is that the margin? Or is
it a '57 Chevy?
MR. REHN: We fully appreciate your position but
we also, I think, must remember that those, to use your
32
example, those air bags and other safety features are
described and contained in tier one and, by definition, they
are significant challenges to us if we were to even
contemplate a change to those features.
They are there, they have been reviewed and we are
very much supportive of those being in the plant when it is
constructed and when it is operated. So we believe by
having those in the tier one, that certainty is provided.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Is there a clear distinction
between the design and operational aspects in tier one and
tier two?
MR. REHN: Between design and operation, I think
there is some combination of both, both in tier one and tier
two. That is part of what we were going to discus later.
As you go through any design, there is always an
interest in how is it going to be operated, what are the
requirements that might be associated, whether tech spec or
other operational characteristics? One, sometimes,
influences the other.
In this certified design to date, both of those
aspects in several areas have been addressed when it was
necessary for the reviewer or the designer to stipulate what
was the design and, indeed, how would it be used in
operation. And it is those hand-in-glove relationships that
I think assure not only is the feature there but there is an
33
understanding and indeed a definition of how it will be used
or maintained during the operation of the plant.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Last question for you. Suppose
one thought that, as you say, in the tier one part, that one
were really certifying the car with all the new safety
features but, in fact, found out that some new information
indicated that that was not the case, what then do you think
is a reasonable position?
MR. REHN: Well, we can postulate I think lots of
ranges of new information on where we are.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: No, I agree with that but this
is at the high level, at the high level here.
MR. REHN: I guess my deep-seated suspicion is
that any new information is unlikely to challenge the
overall safety of these to the extent that it would take it
down to such distance that we are now impinging upon the
original safety margins that are as defined. Clearly, we
strive to be many orders of magnitude safer than existing
designs and, indeed, those are the reasons for these
features to be added.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: But there should not be a
process that gives us comfort that in fact the safety
features are what we think the safety features are today?
MR. REHN: Well, to the extent that the best minds
on both sides of this have strived to define them and
34
articulate them in tier one, I think we have done an awful
lot to ensure that level of certainty. It is the
introduction of what might be characterized as an
instability by trying to go further and assign absolute
numbers to these, I mean, if there was indeed a standard
that was predefined for a probability of core melt frequency
or off-site exposures that indeed we would say we needed to
exceed, that may have yielded slightly different approaches
to this.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Commissioner Dicus, did you
have some comments?
COMMISSIONER DICUS: No questions.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Commissioner Diaz?
COMMISSIONER DIAZ: I think I can add very little
to this discussion. I just come in just at the moment in
which there is so much information of which I am really not
appraised. But, in principle, I think there is an issue
that is clear to everybody, that the process was started to
diminish uncertainty, both in the design and operation of
nuclear power plants and in the regulation of nuclear power
plants and I think we are all probably trying to get to that
same point.
I cannot really, at this moment, see where the
clear differences are. It seems like we are talking the
same thing but I like to see a little more regarding how 10
35
CFR Part 50, Appendix A and B and all the appendixes match
into this discussion and then I might be able to be a little
more clear in what my comment are.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Why don't we go on. Do you
have further presentations?
MR. COLVIN: Yes, let me turn it back over to Dave
Rehn since he's had it anyway and we will continue.
MR. REHN: Thanks, Joe.
Again, we very much appreciate the public release
of the NRC staff analysis of the nuclear industry's comments
on the draft design certification rules. Also, along with
the recommendations that they have submitted for the
Commission consideration.
Overall, we have been very encouraged by the
willingness of the NRC staff to hold both public meetings on
these important issues and we have found in the public
meetings, including our July 15 interaction with the senior
management, to be very productive and very useful, not only
in clarifying our positions but also in helping us
understand the staff's positions as well. I think that has
led to a great deal of commonality in terms of what we are
both striving to do.
On our overhead, we show a background paper
summary. In preparation for this briefing, we reviewed the
recommendations that are contained in the August 13 NRC
36
staff paper. Overall, there seems to be a convergence
between the NRC staff and the industry positions on 11 of
the 20 issues. Obviously, subject to the clarity of the
final rule language.
We see a potential for a convergence in three
other areas, provided there is some further clarification.
However, we still find there is roughly six areas where the
staff and the industry, if we don't diverge, at least we
have not yet found that commonality or that middle ground.
Today, what we would like to do very briefly is to
cover four of those areas. Our fundamental question, our
fundamental thrust in these areas is the question of both
finality and stability as it relates to the Part 52 process.
The four issues that we would like to talk about
are the finality associated with standardized tech specs,
the extent of issue finality that is contained in
certification renewal proceedings, the finality associated
with operational issues that are reviewed and approved
during -- that were reviewed and approved during the
certification process and ultimately, once again, to
hopefully have a brief discussion on applicable regs,
focusing on the finality and stability associated with that.
So to do that, I am now going to turn it over to
Regis who will provide a summary on the first issue, tech
specs.
37
DR. MATZIE: Next slide, please.
[Slide.]
DR. MATZIE: The industry is adamantly opposed to
depriving the System 80 Plus and ABWR technical
specifications of the finality which they deserve. The
reasons we are opposed to the staff's proposal as provided
in their memorandum to you dated August 13, 1996, are, one,
the design certification applicants were required to submit
technical specifications for review as per 52.47. The
technical specifications have been carefully reviewed and
approved by the NRC staff as documented in the final safety
evaluation reports.
Point two, the Commission's own policy guidance
contained in their February '94 SRM for SECY-93-77 calls for
issue finality for all information provided in the
application that is reviewed and approved in the design
certification. The technical specifications were included
as tier two material in the design control documents
referenced in the April 4, 1995, notices of proposed
rulemaking. There were no comments received that would
suggest that the technical specifications not be provided
the same finality as any other portion of the design control
document. Thus, the staff's proposal runs directly counter
to the Commission's standing guidance.
Point three, the NRC staff has erred in attempting
38
to separate design and operational matters. For the
purposes of their proposal on technical specification and
treatment of other operational matters, the staff has
characterized design features as relating to hardware. The
design is not confined to hardware. The design also
consists of bases, assumptions and analyses, all of which
are very much interrelated to plant -- to the operation of
the plant.
The operational matters in the design control
document are there because they are design oriented. Where
the matters relate to the administrative aspects of
operation, the design control documents generally defer the
information requirements to the COL application.
The so-called operational items that are in the
design control document often bear directly on the safety of
the design; they are not separable from other design aspects
and cannot be categorically excluded from having finality or
from being requirements. They have been reviewed, approved
by virtue of the entire design process.
Point four, the technical specifications which
comprise over two volumes of material in the System 80 Plus
design control document and similarly in the ABWR cost
nearly $2 million per design to generate, gain NRC approval
and print in the precise format that was required by the
staff. And, in fact, for the System 80 Plus design, it was
39
a second printing to get that precisely as required by the
staff. Without finality, this investment is squandered
because finality is what the design certification is all
about.
Point five, the entire effort would be subject to
being redone at the COL application stage as there is no
finality for the technical specification as proposed, not
even the backfit protection standard of Part 50.109 during
the COL application is afforded in the staff's proposal.
Point six, the industry's proposal would answer
the staff's concern about two sets of technical
specifications and change procedures. The industry proposes
that after the COL is issued, the design certification
technical specifications would not have further status and
the plant would have one set of technical specification with
one change process, subject to the 50.109 backfit standard.
Furthermore, the staff's proposal is not necessary
for safety because even with issue finality under 52.63, the
staff can seek to backfit on the basis of adequate
protection or compliance with the regulations applicable at
the time of design certification.
In accordance with the standing Commission
guidance, we ask that the Commission direct that the System
80 Plus and ABWR standard technical specifications be
provided finality under 52.63 for plants referencing these
40
design certification rules up to the time of COL issue.
Thank you.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Thank you.
Commissioner Rogers?
COMMISSIONER ROGERS: No, I have no comment.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Commissioner Dicus?
COMMISSIONER DICUS: No questions.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Commissioner Diaz?
COMMISSIONER DIAZ: No questions.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Dr. Matzie, for my edification,
because there is this issue of what's operational and what's
design, can you give me or give the Commission an example of
an operational requirement in the design control document
that you feel is inextricably connected to the design
features themselves?
DR. MATZIE: Well, I think that I have a number
here and maybe I will start with one that I feel is
straightforward. There are many others.
First, the one I would like to start with and
hopefully the example you are looking for, is on the
containment leak rate. The leak rate test says that the
containment leak rate for System 80 Plus containment must be
proven lower than .5 volume percent per day, basically an
operational requirement.
That number is used throughout the safety analysis
41
for the PRA, the site boundary dose, it is used in
determining some of the design attributes of the design
itself in terms of tightness of the containment, et cetera.
So I think that it is a good example of how something that
is operational is fundamental to the design.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Do you have another example?
DR. MATZIE: We could turn to one on the reactor
coolant operating limits. There are a set of operating
limits which, as an example, have pH conductivity hydrozene,
et cetera. Those were all characteristics used to select
the materials, to predict the performance of the reactor
coolant system and they are also operational limits which
the operating staff must adhere to in operating this plant.
It is a whole table of those, with footnotes, et cetera.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Okay.
MR. COLVIN: Thank you, Regis.
Steve will now address the next issue.
MR. HUCIK: Thank you.
Next slide, please.
[Slide.]
MR. HUCIK: We will introduce the topic of
finality at certification renewal and then discus a few
relevant points related to this.
The issue before the Commission is the scope and
nature of NRC review of the originally certified design at
42
certification renewal. Industry strongly opposes any
requirement for de novo or wholly new review of the
originally certified design. Duplicate review of that
design is not required by Section 52.59 and it allows no
role for issue finality.
As a practical matter, it is highly unlikely that
vendors will commit to the enormous cost entailed in a new
complete design review and a review of that type would
impose needless resource burdens on the NRC staff as well.
Renewal review needs a proper focus and industry
proposed such a focus in its July 23 comments. We
recognized in those comments that updated information in the
renewal application should cover relevant experience between
the time of certification and renewal. This burden of
information submittal and explanation is properly shouldered
by the applicant. That burden does not, however, cede
control of the scope of renewal review to the applicant, as
the staff contends. NRC will prescribe the scope of updated
information to be submitted, evaluate the sufficiency of the
submittal and make its own determination as to the need for
design modifications based on the adequate protection and
compliance requirements as set forth in Section 52.59.
In short, contrary to the staff's concern about
our proposal, NRC would not be precluded from considering
postcertification information which could have altered its
43
earlier adequate protection and compliance findings if that
information had been known at the time of original
certification. If industry's proposed rule language is not
sufficiently clear in that regard, we are open to clarifying
the rule language.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Would you repeat the statement
you just made?
MR. HUCIK: In short, contrary to the staff's
concern about our proposal, NRC would not be precluded from
considering postcertification information which could have
altered its earlier adequate protection and compliance
findings if that information had been known at the time of
original certification. If industry's proposed rule
language that we have provided is not sufficiently clear in
that regard, we are open to clarifying that rule language.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: If what information had been
known at the time of certification?
MR. HUCIK: Information that had been found after
certification that was shown to be not known at the time.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: I see. If it's found after
certification but if it had been known at the time it would
have affected the original certification. Is that your
point?
COMMISSIONER ROGERS: Well, the language though
was adequate protection, right?
44
MR. HUCIK: Right.
COMMISSIONER ROGERS: So the planned benefit of
the design in providing a substantially greater protection
than adequate protection, because adequate protection is
what we have now, if that disappeared because of operational
experience, what would your position be?
Not that the design is inadequate to provide
adequate protection but the substantial increased safety
margin was proven not to be there through operational
experience? Same conditions that you just talked about but
not degraded to below adequate protection standard but
substantially below what we all thought was to be achieved
by the new design?
MR. HUCIK: That would still be within the
adequate protection level.
COMMISSIONER ROGERS: Why would it? Why would it?
I don't see it. I mean, the adequate protection
could still be manifest but the substantial improvement over
that turned out to be illusory. I am just suggesting that.
What would your position on that be?
It is not that it's unsafe. It is just that it's
no safer than everything we have right now.
MR. COLVIN: Let me clarify. I just want to make
sure we clarify it. I think our position is clear that the
articulation of the review requirements that is in Part 52
45
currently, Part 52.59, a criteria for removal, takes on two
conditions. One is the applicable regulations that were in
effect at the time of the certification and, secondly, new
requirements that the Commission might levy -- and if I can
find the words quickly, that the -- that may wish to impose
after determination that there is substantial increase in
overall protection of the public health and safety or common
defense and security that the direct and indirect costs of
the implementation are justified in view of this increased
protection.
So, in answer to your question, if in fact at the
time of the renewal one had looked and then found
differences between what had been expected at the time of
the certification, the Commission under this requirement
would have the ability to, in fact, require for renewal a
new level of requirement in its renewal process.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: But subject to a backfit
requirement that is referenced to adequate protection as
opposed to the enhanced level.
COMMISSIONER ROGERS: Right. That is not the
issue as I see it.
MR. COLVIN: No, it's not -- it's not -- it's not
referenced to adequate protection, according to the rule.
That's not referenced to adequate protection.
At time of certification, you have certified the
46
design and ensured that you either have to meet the adequate
protection standard or the compliance requirements of 52.63
from the time the design certification rulemaking is issued
up until the time of renewal.
When you go to renew the design, the Commission,
by your own regulations, can then apply a new threshold of
standard which is embodied in 52.59 and we are in agreement
with that level of standard requirement.
The issue on the table is whether or not
everything that had been reviewed as part of the initial
review was set aside and the review started anew, the wholly
new issue. I think that is really the issue.
MR. HUCIK: That's the real issue.
MR. COLVIN: That's the issue, whether or not we
can rely on the work that had been done before except for
the new questions and changes. That's the issue that is on
the table if I am -- unless I --
COMMISSIONER ROGERS: Well, I mean that is an
issue. I frankly don't think that is a very realistic
possibility that at license -- at certification renewal time
that the whole process would be started all over again with
everything we have done so far.
However, I do think this matter of a -- at
certification renewal time it becomes apparent that some
features of one of these designs in fact don't deliver this
47
very much improved margin of safety, although it is
perfectly safe. So there is no adequate protection
standard.
Now, what is the basis on which the staff could
then say, well, wait a minute, in certifying renewal here,
we thought this thing was going to do much better? It isn't
and we think you ought to go back and do something to fix
that up to get that margin back up again.
Now, I wonder if Mr. Malsch could comment on what
he thinks the rule says on the proposed certification
rule --
MR. COLVIN: Commissioner Rogers, let me say that
we agree with your statement.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Let's let Mr. Malsch answer the
question.
MR. MALSCH: There are two findings -- well, one
finding made at renewal stage, which is that the design
complies with adequate protection and the regulations in
effect at the time of the original certification. In
addition, though, there is a provision built into the rules
in Part 52 which say that, at renewal time, the staff may
impose backfits to design based upon what is essentially a
standard 51.09 backfit protection standard.
So we could, at renewal stage, based upon new
information under Part 52 add a design feature if it would
48
provide substantial additional protection and be cost
justified. So Mr. Colvin is essentially correct.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: What is the reference? What is
the reference standard?
MR. MALSCH: Well, I think -- for the purposes of
the backfit rule?
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Yes.
MR. MALSCH: You would operate -- you would be
asking yourself whether there is substantial additional
protection provided above a base line with the base line
defined as adequate protection plus regulations in effect at
the time of the original design certification.
But you could add this incremental protection at
that stage.
COMMISSIONER ROGERS: Under the ordinary backfit
rule?
MR. MALSCH: Right.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: But again, it is referenced to
whatever applications are in effect at the time of the
original certification?
MR. MALSCH: That's right. In a sense, that goes
back to the applicable regulations question because that
then contributes to the base line from which you're applying
the backfit standard under 51.09.
But, regardless of how you come out on applicable
49
regulations, there is still the opportunity in theory, at
the certification renewal stage, to add safety increments
above whatever applicable regulations would otherwise
require.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: But it is a question of what
the floor is from where you're starting?
MR. MALSCH: That's correct.
MR. COLVIN: The issue, Chairman Jackson, as you
indicated, is whether or not the information that has been
afforded finality in the original review is, in fact,
afforded finality in a renewal process. That is the
question and that is the concern that we tried to
articulate.
We are in agreement with the change process of the
requirements at the renewal stage.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Okay, Mr. Rehn?
MR. REHN: Yes. I'd like to now briefly cover the
last two issues, first starting with the status of operation
or operational related requirements. This is very analogous
to the tech spec discussions that we had.
We appreciate that the staff clarified in their
August 13 paper that all design changes, including those
that would result from operational requirements would be
restricted by 52.63. But we are concerned the staff is now
proposing a significant change in position and that is that
50
there is a distinction in finality accorded to design versus
operational related requirements, DCD.
We are concerned that this is not an easy or
straightforward concept, particularly when it comes to
implementation. Let me elaborate.
We agree with the staff that total facility
operational definition is beyond the scope of design
certification. But I think as we have already said, when we
and the staff were going through the design we found that,
in many cases, there was a need to define operational
related requirements to establish the overall safety reviews
of the particular designs.
These requirements are related to some of which
Regis has already touched on, such as periodic testing or
inspections, operational constraints, actions to minimize
shutdown risk, startup testing or other considerations name
but a few. Many other discrete requirements integral to the
staff's safety determinations were also included in the
DCDs.
Obviously, the intent was not to resolve all
operational issues in the DCDs. We fully agree. Issues
like training or security or other site-specific issues have
purposely been left out of the certification and are not
included in the DCDs. But we believe where the staff needed
to understand the discrete aspects of how a system would
51
operate or be maintained, that aspect should become part of
the overall design review and an appropriate requirement be
included in the DCD.
These requirements then, like other aspects of
DCD, since they were reviewed and approved, public hearings
and comments have been obtained as a part of the
certification rulemaking, we believe then that they should
be accorded an element of finality. And, indeed, going back
to the '91 Commission guidance suggesting that issue
finality for all information provided in the application
that is reviewed and approved should become part of the
certification rulemaking.
In light of this guidance and because the DCD
requirements that go beyond the bare design of the plant
were reviewed and approved and are now a part of the design
certification, we believe that these operational related
requirements should be treated as final and as final as any
other aspects of the material review for the DCD.
So I think, in summary, consistent with earlier
policy and guidance as well as the goals for earlier issue
resolution and standardization, we are simply asking the
Commission provide finality to all that information that is
contained in the DCD, that has been reviewed and approved as
part of the overall design certification rulemaking.
COMMISSIONER ROGERS: Well, it seems to me -- I
52
haven't heard what you really mean by finality. In other
words, are you talking about completeness as well as
finality? You're talking about operational related
requirements in the DCD. There would be other -- there
could be other operational requirements.
MR. REHN: Absolutely.
MR. COLVIN: Absolutely.
COMMISSIONER ROGERS: Outside of that that could
be imposed separately and presumably without limitation,
provided they can be demonstrated as necessary for adequate
protection. Is that correct?
MR. REHN: Yes, we agree.
COMMISSIONER ROGERS: So your position is that
what relates to operational -- what there is in the way of
operational related requirements in the DCD should be
finalized as part of the design certification rulemaking and
that -- and not change, and those particular requirements
not changed without some adequate protection standard
failing to be met; is that a fair statement?
MR. REHN: Yes.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Commissioner Dicus,
Commissioner Diaz, questions?
Okay.
MR. REHN: The last issue I wished to address was
in the area of applicable regulations. Lots has been said,
53
I think, on both sides of this. I think the arguments both
parties have made definitely have merit.
Since 1993, the industry has been opposed to the
concept of applicable regulations and we would like to take
just a moment to summarize a few of our points.
I think we need to view this in the overall
context of what we believe were the four main objectives
that Joe has already addressed in implementing these new
designs under Part 52. Clearly, enhanced safety and
reliability, we believe, have been achieved in these
designs. I think there is no disagreement relative to that.
Likewise, standardization and early resolution of
safety issues have also been a part of this process and I
think have been satisfactorily addressed.
Our concerns go to the heart of the fourth issue
which is the overall finality and stability and
predictability of our licensing process and it is within
that context I would like to raise a few issues.
First we fully agree that it may sound reasonable
to propose regulations that kind of lock in the level of
design embodied in design certifications. After all,
requirements are already in the DCDs. But, is it necessary
to do so and at what cost? Is this the right thing to do?
This is the key question I think that we have
because it attaches a suite of untested, potentially
54
untested new regulations to these certifications as proposed
by the NR staff and we believe that would add an element of
uncertainty and instability to the process that we had hoped
would be more predictable and stable. This is essentially
so, considering the proposed applicable regulations differ
in nearly every way from other existing NRC regulations and
attempt for the first time to address regulatory matters
that are far beyond the existing regulatory envelope.
We believe that the enhanced level of design is
locked in by the very nature that the design certification
rule themselves including Section 8 talk about these design
features in tier one and that there are necessary provisions
associated with changing tier one to ensure that these
enhanced safety features will, indeed, be there and be
effective.
Even if new information later indicates that these
new features do not provide all the additional safety
margins currently envisioned, it is beyond dispute that the
Commission can be assured that these features will provide
substantial margins of safety over the current generation of
safe plants consistent with expectations and policies. So
our belief is the answer is, no, applicable regulations are
not necessary to lock in these enhanced design features.
It would also seem like the industry concerns
regarding uncertainty and stability are adequately addressed
55
by the backfit protections included in the draft rules. The
staff clearly believes so. But do the proposed backfit
protections really help in this regard?
Proposed backfit protections are subjective and
untested in our view. They rely on interpretations by
future parties which could constitute a substantial
reduction in protection and a compensating increase in not
exceeding the original level of protection. Clearly, words
that can be interpreted in many different ways.
In addition to the backfit protections that are
subjective and untested, the wording of the applicable
regulations is problematic in certain areas. In the base
line level of protection achieved and intended to be
preserved was not initially defined, it is more a derived
standard as we have completed the designs.
Because of the practical implementation of the
staff's proposal, it depends on elements that are both
subjective and programmatic and undefined in some cases, we
can come to no other conclusion than this proposal itself
would lead to the uncertainty and instability I think that
we have already had a chance to talk about some today.
So perhaps more to the point, we can't envision an
already skeptical financial community providing support when
we have, indeed, introduced this increased level of
instability.
56
Last point. We note in the staff's own
determination or own decision in their August 13 paper that
only procedural changes are expected. They are likely to
meet the specific backfit standards for applicable
regulations. It is not likely that new information would
result in design changes.
If, indeed, this is correct, then the small
likelihood is judged by the staff that a proposed applicable
regulation would lead to significant procedural changes or
changes in the design we believe does not justify the
introduction of substantial uncertainty and instability into
what is, I think, already a complicated process.
So, accordingly, we would urge you to not use
these applicable regulations in the certifications.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: That's it?
MR. COLVIN: Chairman Jackson, at the end of any
questions, I would just like to make a few closing comments.
I would try to keep them briefs.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Commissioner Rogers, do you
have any additional questions?
COMMISSIONER ROGERS: No. No, I don't.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Commissioner Dicus,
Commissioner Diaz?
COMMISSIONER DIAZ: Just a comment.
I believe I am trying to understand this and if
57
you will pardon me for being so slow but, you know, when we
are talking about these applicable regulations and how they
go beyond Part 50 and the design certification rule, I am
not sure I have seen the question clearly answered as far as
I am concerned from the staff's side. The change control
processes in Section 8 of the rule, are they sufficient to
ensure that the designs will continue to provide an enhanced
level of safety over current designs without the need to
codify the applicable requirements?
And that, to me, seems to be an issue and I would
like to maybe hear an answer maybe not here but at some
time.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Well, the staff is coming up in
about two minutes, so you will have the chance to pose that
question to them, in fact.
COMMISSIONER DIAZ: All right.
MR. COLVIN: Chairman Jackson, now that I am at a
minute and 50 seconds, I will proceed quickly.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: All right.
MR. COLVIN: I'd just like to make a few brief
closing comments and thank the Commission for the time you
have given us and maybe take a step back for just a moment.
If you go back over ten years ago, we set on a
path and set on a path as a matter of public policy to put
in place an advanced reactor design that can meet our future
58
needs as energy suppliers within our country.
The Commission, in the issuance of Part 52, really
took a bold step in the face of a lot of comments and
adversity and pressures from many people, including the
industry, to put in place a policy that would lead to safer
plants, to standardized designs, to stability in the
process, to plants where the design was essentially complete
prior to any commencement of construction. And the
processes that would approve the processing and licensing of
these plants and involve the public at the earliest
opportunity and also involve the resolution of safety issues
at the earliest opportunity.
We have really made significant progress in those
areas. I think there are few things in life that are
certain and probably less certain when we are talking about
regulation and licensing than others, but I think there are
a lot of things that are certain about this process.
You know, it is certain that we have achieved
higher levels of safety in these plants. It is certain that
the Commission will ensure the public health and safety in
these designs. It is certain that we have established
procedures and processes and principles for these
standardized designs. It is certain that we have expended
tremendous resources, thousands and thousands of man hours
of Commission, staff, industry, vendor time and millions of
59
dollars at stake, including a considerable contribution of
public monies into this process.
I think it is certain that we have a process that
was so essential to the future of this industry that
Congress felt it necessary in 1992 through overlaying
federal legislation to add another degree of certainty to
the financial community and assurance to the investment
community and to us as customers that there would be a
stability and predictability in this process.
It is certain that the issues that we have been
discussing are issues of process details and not really the
protection of public health and safety and that we are
trying to finalize those processes today to cover all
possible solutions in the future when, perhaps, we don't
really have all the information that we need to do that in
the way that would make -- would be the most efficient and
effective process.
I guess it is certain that future commissioners,
staffs and hopefully other members from the industry, but it
is certain that they will be sitting here discussing these
interpretations and these regulations at points in the
future, inasmuch as we may think we have resolved these
issues and sorted them out, that we will not have achieved
the detail and finality that we've got and if we're not
careful, I think we're going to undermine the fundamental
60
principles that we sought and that Congress sought in the
achievement of the standardized designs for the future.
So it is in this context that we really encourage
the Commission to go back and look at the fundamental
principles that were embodied in Part 52, the difficulty of
those decisions that were made through the public process
previously and ensure that those fundamental principles
aren't eroded as we move forward.
As Dave Rehn said, we have achieved, I think,
satisfaction on the first three issues. The issue that we
are really talking about is the issue of regulatory
stability and finality in these designs so that they can be
a viable design that we can purchase for the future. So we
thank you for your consideration.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Thank you very much. I thank
each of you. You have clearly put a lot of thought and
effort into what you have presented to us as well as with
working with the senior review group and we will be taking
and weighing very carefully what you've had to say.
So now I would like to call the NRC staff to come
forward and make its presentation.
Mr. Taylor?
MR. TAYLOR: Good morning.
With me at the table from the Office of Nuclear
Reactor Regulation are Bill Russell, Jerry Wilson and Ted
61
Quay.
These design certification rules are the most
extensive design approvals that the NRC has ever considered
and we certainly have taken the whole thing very seriously.
I think that one aspect of that just to mention is the fact
that, based upon the publication of the proposed final rules
in April and the ensuing comments, public and industry, I
set up a special senior review group to weigh through these
and I am pleased that in numbers of cases we have been able
to reconcile those comments.
Today, based upon what has already been presented,
the staff will give just a few key points, again, as it
analyzes these comments on the major issues and Jerry Wilson
will start.
MR. RUSSELL: In order to conduct a more efficient
meeting, what I thought we would do is focus on the areas
where there is disagreement. So what I would like to do is,
instead of going through the staff presentation as it is
laid out, we will start with slide 9, applicable
regulations. Jerry will cover some background.
Then we will take on tech specs and operational
matters together and then the last one will be the issue
associated with renewal because that does tie back to
applicable regulations and then other issues that the
Commission may wish to address.
62
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: May I suggest that you do
something because of the fact that you have a new
Commission, relatively new Commission, and I note that you
had some backup slides on the various issues. I think the
way we should structure this is that you go through each of
the areas that you would like to discuss and that you use
the backup slides as appropriate to further edify your
discussion given that.
MR. RUSSELL: Particularly as it relates to
applicable regulations.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Well, we were not all here from
the beginning.
MR. RUSSELL: Correct.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: And what we will then do is to
stop after each subject and have questions from the
Commission and then proceed. So rather than going through
all of the subjects we will do them one at a time.
MR. RUSSELL: Good. So we will do applicable
regulations, then cover the backup slides with applicable
regulations and then take questions on that and then go on
to tech specs and operational matters.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Right.
MR. RUSSELL: Jerry.
MR. WILSON: Thank you. I am Jerry Wilson of NRR.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: You have to speak up. We can't
63
hear you.
MR. WILSON: On the issue of applicable
regulations, the staff has been developing these regulations
that are applicable to the specific design since 1988. The
staff set forth a discussion of the history of applicable
regulations in Attachment 9 to our SECY paper 96-077 and at
that point -- hold that thought and I will get to the backup
slide.
What we did in 96-077 is set forth the regulatory
framework that was used to review these designs and would
constitute the regulations that are applicable and in effect
at the time the design is certified as has been discussed
earlier. So in Section 5 of the rule, that designates those
regulations and in particular it is in three areas.
Section 5(a) goes through the existing regulations
that apply to the specific designs; Section 5(b) identifies
the exemptions to existing regulations for these particular
designs; and, finally, Section 5(c) identifies the
additional applicable regulations that have been the subject
of the controversy.
Now, in addition, we have also provided a Section
8 which provides a special compliance backfit standard that
the Chairman proposed last spring and this standard is there
to mitigate the concern that the industry has raised about
the stability associated with these new applicable
64
regulations. Now the issue initially was raised with regard
to the severe accident issues but the special compliance
backfit standard applies to all of the new applicable
regulations and is in Section 5(c).
Finally, there were some requirements that were
also part of the design review that were put in Section 4
because they applied to applicants or licensees who
referenced these roles and those were Sections 4(a) and (b).
Now, could I have backup slide one?
[Slide.]
MR. WILSON: To go back for a moment and help
review the history here, I have identified some of the
Commission papers that are covered in the history of
applicable regulations that was in SECY-96-077 and that
points out that we began this process in 1988. Initially,
we were considering generic rulemaking but it was decided,
because of concerns over the schedules, impacts it may have
on design certification and also concerns that these actual
requirements would be design specific, it would be better to
proceed on a design-specific rulemaking basis.
That decision was made in the '89 time period.
Then at that point the staff started to develop the design
standards that would be used for these reviews and those
were proposed in SECY-90-16 and 93-87. The Commission
approved certain of those requirements to apply to these
65
designs.
The staff reviewed the designs against those
standards. Our safety evaluation report gives the
evaluation of the designs against these standards. Those
were the basis upon which the safety evaluation report said
these designs were acceptable and those final safety
evaluation reports are the basis for the approval on this
design certification process.
Now, in 1991, this issue of design-specific versus
generic rulemaking came up again and the Commission
reaffirmed that we were to go through design-specific
rulemaking for these designs. And so these applicable
regulations were recommended in the remaining SECY papers
here that have the proposed rules and final rules.
Now, the position the Commission finds itself in
is, in effect, a result of those earlier decisions in 1989.
That decision to go to design-specific rulemaking meant that
the final approval of these requirements comes down to the
Commission at this final stage.
[Slide.]
MR. WILSON: Returning back to slide nine, after a
review of the additional comments by the industry, the
senior review group recommended that the additional
applicable regulations in Section 5(c) be retained and the
staff believes that these regulations are necessary to
66
ensure the level of safety that is expected by the
Commission will be preserved for the life of a plant that
references these design certification rules.
MR. RUSSELL: I would like to add just a little
bit of additional background, having been involved with the
technical review of this for the last six years.
In each case, where the staff went beyond existing
regulations during the course of the review, the Commission
directed that those matters come to the Commission as a
policy issue such that the staff would not be creating new
policy in the course of the review but, in fact, would
identify those issues, seek Commission guidance on them and
then after receipt of that guidance implement that in the
review process.
There were in the series of SECY papers particular
positions which we underlined which were the early versions
of the applicable regulations along with a lot of background
discussion about why this should be provided.
In most cases, these underlying portions were
deterministic design features or capabilities, such as going
to alternate AC under the station blackout rule rather than
having a coping capability without an additional on-site AC
source. The current regulations allow either coping or
alternate AC. We said, for new plants, we only want
alternate AC.
67
Now, it is true that the tier one design
descriptions for both the ABWR and the System 80 Plus very
explicitly, at the level of a rule, now, in tier one, have a
requirement that you have an alternate AC source and it
identifies how it gets hooked up to provide power to the
emergency buses. But it is true that we did not use the
option under the current regulation for station blackout to
allow either coping or alternate AC. Sot r was a case we
came on a policy issue and that does not have as much
uncertainty associated with it because it is clear that that
was the requirement at the time and it is also clear that
that is in the design and it is captured in tier one.
There are some applicable regulations which have
some uncertainty associated with them, particularly those
associated with severe accidents. Typically, the severe
accident issues and the containment performance issues,
where you are doing analysis, you are making judgments, you
are looking at the total design and how the result comes out
from that analysis, that's the case where we said if there
is new information that comes up during the period of the
design certification that would raise a question about the
capability to perform, to meet that overall performance
standard, whether it is a performance standard or it is
spreading cooling and keeping corium away from structural
members such that the containment function is preserved,
68
those types of new information would be reviewed and the
issue would be a compliance backfit standard because that
was, in fact, intended at the time of the review, with a
requirement to show that the modifications are cost-
justified.
I could illustrate with a specific example for the
ABWR. During the course of the review, we looked at the
design of features to keep a core melt out of the sump area
of the ABWR containment substructure. A doghouse type
arrangement that had drilled holes in it such that the
material, when it went through, would quench and it would
not proceed into the sump so that you would not have
potential for either loss of coolable geometry or other
conditions.
And we believed, based upon whatever information
we had at the time, that the design was appropriate and it
was captured and there is a requirement to have this
protection for the sump. If it turns out later that that
won't work, there is some new information, we would propose
to look at that in the context of both the applicable
regulation, that is spread the material, ensure its ability
to be cooled and if becomes confined in the sump there
becomes a question about the ability to cool that material.
That could create a question if that function is called into
question.
69
Based upon everything we know today, we believe it
will work and that it can be designed and engineered and we
have appropriate requirements to keep molten material out of
the sump area. But we can't preclude that there is going to
be some new information. But we have proposed that there be
an enhanced standard and that that new information be looked
at and show that there is a cost beneficial aspect
associated with it. This would be a relatively small change
in an area of the facility. We would obviously not be
looking at proposing a larger containment or a larger area.
You would have to justify -- the costs associated with that
would essentially be rebuilding the plant and that is not
envisioned.
So those types of issues are the issues that we
were talking about and I think the two areas of uncertainty
are in the conditional containment performance area and in
the severe accident area.
COMMISSIONER ROGERS: But with your example that,
again, the concern the industry has expressed here on this
final example, you said, of course, we wouldn't do such-
and-such but there isn't anything in the applicable
regulation that you are proposing or would propose that
would say that, would it?
MR. RUSSELL: If it's required for adequate
protection, it could be backfit. Or you could conclude that
70
the plant is no longer safe and would have to shut down.
I don't see that --
COMMISSIONER ROGERS: But we are back to the
example of the superior feature of the design not being met,
not necessarily the adequate protection.
MR. RUSSELL: That's correct, but if that could
result in early containment failure or the loss of a
coolable geometry because of the corium progressing to the
sump and not being able to be cooled because you have not
been able to spread it, those are severe accident issues
which the intent of the Commission was to resolve severe
accident issues in the course of this design certification.
And so the issue that we have is whether that
objective was achieved or not, not necessarily whether it is
an adequate protection issue. Adequate protection issues
can be backfit. The issue is, how does one address a
compliance backfit against rules that were in effect at the
time, even though the decision was deferred with respect to
codifying those rules where the staff went beyond current
regulations in the course of the design review.
COMMISSIONER ROGERS: Well, I think there is an
issue and we can't debate it here really but I think there
is an issue that you are absolutely right that the
Commission wanted the staff to come forward and put on a
policy basis and get a rendition of Commission approval on
71
each of these issues that you have discussed on a policy
basis with the expectation, and I am adding this, that
the -- we were -- we would ultimately be in a rulemaking
process which involved the certification of the design, not
necessarily of an auxiliary set of rules that codified those
policy statements individually one by one as they developed,
as they were ultimately developed.
I think that is really kind of the problem that we
are dealing with here. That, yes, the Commission was very
clear on wanting to see certain things such as to avoid the
coping option, for example. I can remember that very
distinctly. But I don't think we said -- ever explicitly
said go and write a rule to do this, now, make sure it is in
the certified design, which you did do and which the vendors
have done.
MR. RUSSELL: And that can be done, I think,
fairly straightforwardly for features where the -- for
example, the other one is electric power system with the
alternate AC and the access to be able to provide power to
maintain condenser vacuum. Both of those were areas where
we went beyond current requirements. They are very
deterministic and it is very easy to see that those have, in
fact, been codified in the design.
The two that are more difficult are where you are
into analysis based upon your understanding of severe
72
accidents or your understanding of containment performance,
conditional containment failure probabilities. That's where
I believe the uncertainty is.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: So are you saying there is, in
fact, then, in this listing of what you would call new
applicable regulations, that there in fact is a bifurcation
where there are some that are, as you would call it,
strictly in the deterministic regime? There are others,
particularly those relating to severe accidents that really
have to do with more analysis and probabilistic treatments?
MR. RUSSELL: That's correct.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: And that in fact those that
have the more deterministic base are -- you have a high
degree of comfort that in certifying the designs that, in
fact, they would then be included?
MR. RUSSELL: Yes, I think that they are less
susceptible to new information coming in that would say the
applicable regulation has not been met and by virtue of
saying it has to be alternate AC, they put a gas turbine on
site, the gas turbine's required in tier one of the
regulation that we are proposing to certify, so the need to
have an applicable regulation that says, you can only be an
alternate AC site under the station blackout rule, they
would have that in the design.
There does become an issue, though, at the time of
73
design certification renewal as to what were the
regulations; i.e., the policies that were in effect at the
time of the original design certification and how that
carries forward or whether that could be proposed to be
removed at the time of a design certification renewal and
what would be the staff position at that time? Could they
go back to coping or would they have to remain on alternate
AC? I don't think it's likely that they would propose to
change it but there would be nothing that would preclude
that. It gets back to the issue of what are -- what is the
base line that was reviewed against where you specify
additional requirements beyond the current Part 50
requirements in the course of that review.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: So, in effect, there are two
issues, are there not? I mean, it strikes me that one issue
is are we getting what we think we are sort of buying and if
there is new information that suggests that we're not, you
know, what do we have to hold things to this enhanced safety
level that, presumably, the Commission wanted designed into
these new plants?
The other issue is one of if there ever is a
proposed change, perhaps at the renewal stage or at some
other point, what is the reference? What are the reference
set of regulatory requirements that that -- that that
proposed change is with respect to? Do I have that right?
74
MR. RUSSELL: That's correct.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Okay.
COMMISSIONER ROGERS: Well, if I could just ask a
question on this?
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Sure.
COMMISSIONER ROGERS: Because I think it seems to
me one of the questions is what is the regulatory status of
the FSAR that was developed? Can -- does that provide
essentially that documentation of what the -- what the
standards were that were applied to the analysis of these
designs? Why is it necessary to add to that a new rule?
Isn't the -- if you've certified the design by rulemaking
and it's based on the -- on a very extensive FSAR which has
documentation to support it, why do you gain anything by
adding an additional rule to state that that is what we
expected when we reviewed the design?
In other words, if there is an issue at some later
time of what really was the standard that was used by the
staff in reviewing the design and certifying it, doesn't the
FSAR and the documentation that goes along with that provide
the basis for answering that question?
MR. WILSON: Well, the FSAR or what we refer to as
the design control document has the design description. It
is no different than any other regulation.
If the design description could function as a
75
regulation, one could argue that you wouldn't need any of
our regulations and I am sure no one is arguing that. These
regulations function the same as any other regulation and a
design --
COMMISSIONER ROGERS: Excuse me, that's not -- I
don't think that's the issue. I think the issue is what
documentation provides the standard that establishes what
the basis of the staff decision was in approving the
certified design and in a detailed way?
MR. RUSSELL: The answer to that is the
combination of the safety analysis report submitted by the
applicant and the staff's safety evaluation report which
documents all of the SECY decisions and the staff
requirements memorandums. The legislative history, so to
speak, is well documented. The issue that was raised
earlier, for example, on the point one conditional
containment failure probability that was raised by
Dr. Matzie, that issue we actually have an analysis that
shows a .11 conditional containment failure probably as well
as a .03 under a different set of assessments and we
concluded that that was adequate and met the guidance of .1.
We didn't take it out to two or three significant figures
because of the uncertainty associated with doing those
analyses. That's well documented, that's in the safety
evaluation report.
76
So we are not talking about issues out to three
significant figures. What we are really talking about is
whether the existing history of how the review was conducted
is sufficient or whether it also needs to be codified with
applicable regulations and I believe that's a policy issue
that the Commission needs to decide.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Commissioner Dicus?
Commissioner Diaz?
COMMISSIONER DIAZ: No, thank you.
MR. RUSSELL: Okay, we would like to go now to the
technical specifications and I would characterize that this
is a subset but the most important subset of operational
requirements. That is, the Commission in the recent
rulemaking associated with 50.36 identified certain things
which are more important operationally that be controlled by
facility technical specifications. So we are going to talk
both operational requirements and tech specs but tech specs
are the more important set of those operational
requirements.
MR. WILSON: Can I have slide six?
[Slide.]
MR. WILSON: We have two slides on this issue.
Both slides six and slide seven, but I will speak from slide
six.
Basically, industry is requesting that the special
77
backfit protection in 52.63 be applied to operational
requirements and staff's problem in this regard is that
operational matters were not finalized in the design
certification review.
We agree in certain instances that we have
addressed operational requirements but in many instances we
have not and there may be cases where a particular design
feature would have some operational restrictions defined and
others not yet defined.
Now, we can't complete our review at the combined
license stage of these operational requirements if we are
constrained by backfit restrictions. And, therefore, the
rule provided a Section 4(c) that provides the ability to
complete these operational requirements without being
restricted by the backfit restriction.
And that general statement also applies to our
situation in technical specifications. Our review of the
technical specifications has not been completed and
therefore the final rules in 96-077 do not provide finality
for those partial technical specifications so that we could
complete them at the combined license stage.
It also allows a single change process and we
retained them in the design control document but did not
make them either tier one or tier two.
Now, as a result of the comments, the senior
78
review group recommended treating the partial technical
specifications as a special category of information. They
would have the finality associated with other matters that
are revealed under rulemaking in Section 2.758, which means
they couldn't be changed except for special circumstances.
And then after the combined license is issued, we would say
that the partial technical specifications have no further
effect as to that license consistent with the proposal made
by NEI.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Commissioner Rogers?
COMMISSIONER ROGERS: I just wanted --
I just want to make sure I understand what was
said here.
Go ahead, Bill.
MR. RUSSELL: I want to cover a couple of
additional points.
First, the regulations require even for a classic
construction permit operating license review that at the
time of an application for a construction permit, the
proposed technical specifications be submitted. So it is
not possible to conduct a review without having an
understanding of what are the important parameters to be
controlled at the level of technical specifications and
that's been for every facility that had a construction
permit application filed since January 16, '69.
79
So the fact that we needed to review tech specs as
a part of this review is not different from what we would do
under the normal Part 50 process with a tech spec review.
The second point is that the bulk of the review,
and I will show an example from the combustion standard tech
specs, for combustion engineering plants, the bulk of the
review was against the industry-developed standard technical
specification which was an activity that went back and forth
between the staff and the industry for close to some ten
years before it was finalized.
So the formatting, the other information that was
described earlier, was to be consistent with the standard
technical specification format that was developed by the
industry both for the ABWR, which was based upon the BWR 6
standard tech specs and CE's System 80 Plus which was based
upon the CE standard.
There are some areas where there was operational
relief provided based upon additional design features,
particularly as it relates to allowed outage times for
important safety-related equipment. In the case of the ABWR
after the extensive review of the PRA, there were identified
on the order of 12 areas of relief where there was
substantial increases in allowed outage times for equipment
during the operation for which they could take corrective
action or conduct online maintenance.
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In the case of the CE 80 Plus, there was one case
associated with the emergency diesel allowed outage times
where they got the same relief. That was because they did
not submit the information to justify changes and they
adopted the then standards CE standard tech specs.
The other thing that is important is that the
staff has developed a process with industry and this is one
that we believe is working quite well, as it relates to
changes to the generic standards. There are owners groups
that interact with each of the standards through NEI and
there is a process by which we look at changes to the
standard based upon proposed changes either by the staff or
by the industry such that it is used uniformly unless there
is a designed reason for the tech spec to be different for
those elements which meet the definitions in 50.36 to be
controlled by tech specs.
So we have a process that is working quite well
and it was that process that was used with the comparison to
the standards. There were some reliefs and we feel it is
appropriate to provide some degree of protection and by
handling these as matters resolved in rulemaking, those
matters become obligations on the staff as well as
intervenors to raise new issues up until the time of
issuance of a combined operating license. From that point
on, the staff and the industry are in agreement. From
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issuance of a combined operating license when you have a
licensee, from that point forward, it would be the same
process for all facilities in the U.S. so it would be the
standard 50.90 amendment process and there would not be a
difference in position. The only difference is what is its
status prior to that point in time and is it a part of the
rule, tier two, or is it a matter which is given finality
through rulemaking as was proposed by the review group.
I would like to illustrate with an example out of
a page so that you can see what's been done and what's not
been done to get a feel for how much is left to be done in
standard tech specs.
So what I have is Jerry is handing out pages and
these are from the CE 80 Plus. If I could have backup slide
3.3-10?
[Slide.]
MR. RUSSELL: This is the standard technical
specification format and I realize it's small but what it
does is it identifies surveillance requirements which relate
back to another page and that page has bracketed information
on it. But the information in brackets are numbers which
are best estimates from the design at this point in time but
they are not based upon as-builts.
So you must build the plant, conduct the
preoperational testing, determine what the appropriate
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flows, pressures are to achieve the functions consistent
with the safety analysis and then those actual values are
substituted. So in each case where you see brackets, that
information is not within the material that has been
accepted and reviewed by the staff. That is information
which we would expect to change as a result of completion of
construction, preoperational testing.
Next one is 3.4-22. This is similar. This is a
table which would be typical for a system. This is a
pressurizer. It identifies if you are not able to maintain
pressurized your water level within certain ranges, you have
to be in hot shutdown within six hours; you've got a leak
going on. So this is essentially the vehicle that gets you
into shutdown.
These time frames are consistent with the current
standard technical specifications for all CE designed plants
that are on standard technical specifications. So there are
not differences. We would propose to do them the same way.
The reason I chose to use CE is because, as the
Commission is aware, we have a pilot program ongoing with
the use of risk insights to develop improvements to the
standard technical specifications, particularly as it
relates to allowed outage times. And there is a major
interactivity underway with the CE owners group to justify,
based upon risk insights and other information, relaxations
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in some of these time frames.
To the extent that that activity is successful, we
would expect that the allowed outage times for a number of
items contained in this standard would be relaxed. That
could go the other way. There may be some equipment which
is identified as being important where you may impose a
shorter allowed outage time.
These are issues which don't affect the design.
It affects availability of the equipment to meet safety
finalities on an acute basis, how long can you have a piece
of equipment out. Those are the types of issues that we are
dealing with in tech specs, much of which has not been done,
some of which has been done.
The difficult issue that we have is drawing a line
as to what's been reviewed and approved uniquely such that
you could apply finality, what has not. It is not possible
to just rely on one document. You would have to go to the
legislative history; that is, what was submitted, what was
the review, the give and take back and forth.
And let me shift now from tech specs to an example
as it relates to an operational matter for surveillance
testing under the ASME code, pump and valve testing.
The regulations require that a plan be submitted
each ten years to identify how you will do pump and valve
testing. We wanted to do a review to ensure that we would
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not be needing exemptions from regulatory requirements, that
we had confidence that the current required pump and valve
testing could be performed, that is, you could conduct the
flow tests, you could do the testing of valves, you could
perform the in-service inspections that are needed if you
are doing ultrasonic or other types of examinations.
So we looked at it in the context of can they be
performed today? We have also said, to the extent there are
changes in those requirements in the future, we would apply
the enhanced standard of protection to not modify the design
in order to be able to do a future inspection or a future
examination. So if some new examination technique is
developed that would require a design modification, let's
say it's a pump or valve testing going to require
installation of a test tape in order to do that test, we've
said we would not require that.
On the other hand, if it is a nondestructive
examination and the regulation changes in the future, we
would expect that at the time of the application for a COL,
that applicant needs to meet the rules and regulations as it
relates to operational matters at that time, including the
code, if there is a revised technique for doing a
nondestructive examination or a frequency of examination
that has been justified through rulemaking we would expect
that to be done.
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So we are having a difficult time separating
what's been reviewed operationally from the design and it is
that gray area that we believe is being questioned. Some
matters have been reviewed. We see applying an adequate
protection standard to those matters as one which is a
higher standard than is being done for operational matters
under tech specs or under our rules today. We do agree that
we should not be modifying the hardware; that's where the
major costs are that are sunk. So that is basically where
we are with the operational matters.
COMMISSIONER ROGERS: How do you define partial
tech specs? I mean, what is your --
MR. RUSSELL: Where we have this bracketed
information, all the information has not been reviewed,
that's what we mean by partial.
MR. WILSON: In addition, the tech specs only
apply to the scope of the design being certified. There are
other design features outside like the ultimate heat sink
that aren't covered either.
MR. RUSSELL: That would come in in a COL
application when they design the ultimate heat sink and then
the tech specs associated with the ultimate heat sink and so
we would have that proposed at the time of the COL review.
So we are missing the site-specific design features for the
ultimate heat sink and we are missing all of the information
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that is in the brackets in this set of tech specs.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Commissioner Dicus?
Commissioner Diaz?
MR. RUSSELL: Again, the issue in dispute is not
what happens after issuance of a COL. The industry and the
staff have agreed with that. The issue is, how do you
provide some degree of finality to that information through
the issuance of a COL and a potential COL proceeding. Rules
are just as binding on the staff as they are on others who
wish to intervene in a proceeding. There was some confusion
in that in some of the written comments that came in.
The last matter is the broad issue of what needs
to be done for renewal.
MR. WILSON: Can I have slide number five?
[Slide.]
MR. WILSON: Now, the industry has pointed out
that they want to extend this finality matter and, by that,
I mean the special backfit protection provision in 52.63
beyond the expiration of the design certification role.
Now, in the final rules in 96-077, that is not done and that
is consistent with Part 52. There are two fundamental
problems with the industry's proposals.
One, the extension of finality beyond the
expiration of design certification will have the effect of
extending the duration of the certification itself and,
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second of all, their proposal seeks to limit the scope of
what the staff can review. And that shouldn't be the case
either.
There was a lot of mention of this issue of de
novo which really is a term that was raised by the industry
in an earlier public meeting and then complained about by
the industry. The staff isn't proposing that at all. But
the important part is that once the design expires that new
information that may come up during that 15-year period that
has been collected should be able to be examined by the
staff without restriction and if they determine on the basis
of examining that information that there is new requirements
that should be applied to design, then we would check those
requirements against the standard in 52.59 that Mr. Malsch
mentioned earlier and only if they met that special backfit
standard for renewal would they be applied to the design.
It is important to remember that there is
information that may be collected that the staff cannot
apply during the duration of the design certification that
they would need to look at and determine if it should be
applied after the certification is expired and a renewal is
sought and that is the important point here and that's why
the senior review group recommended no finality for after
the design certification has expired.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Commissioner Rogers, you have
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any comments or questions?
COMMISSIONER ROGERS: No.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Commissioner Dicus --
MR. RUSSELL: I would like to add one point on
this, an important one?
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Excuse me.
COMMISSIONER DICUS: No.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Commissioner Diaz?
COMMISSIONER DIAZ: No.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Okay.
MR. RUSSELL: It relates to the finality issue and
that is we don't have the equivalent of a standard review
plan and we have not engaged in a process as to what
information should be reviewed. Is it just the operating
experience that has accrued over the 15 years? Is it just
new information that may raise issues about the adequacy of
the design? There has not been a dialogue technically as to
what should or should not be reviewed or what is within
scope and we felt that that was premature since we have not
finished the first stage of the design certification. So we
believe that this is an area where there does need to be a
dialogue.
We don't believe it is a review from scratch,
obviously. It would be a review from an experience base
with whatever new information has been developed but we
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think that that work needs to be done and so we believe it
is premature to address this issue at this time in a
rulemaking that is intended to certify two designs and that
this is really something that relates to guidance as it
relates to Part 52 itself.
Whether it is something that would be done through
a regulatory guide, standard review plan or some other
approach, that work just hasn't been done yet so it is not
ripe at this point in time to say what should be or should
not be the scope of the review beyond what is already in the
regulation.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Let me ask you this question.
If the Commission were to defer consideration of the design
certification renewal procedures to following approval of
the actual rulemaking, you had these alternatives two and
three that you laid out in your August 13 memo. Could you
elaborate a little bit? I know you have, in a sense, spoken
to them.
MR. WILSON: The difference is, and I think it is
the point I was trying to make, is that I believe the
Commission needs to speak to this point of the industry's
request to extend the special backfit provision beyond the
expiration of design certification. If the Commission
doesn't speak to that and just defers it, then we will be
back with the same argument and that is a fundamental point.
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I believe that the Part 52 has already spoken to
that point, made that decision and the Commission should
reaffirm that point along with deferring the remainder of
the determination and review procedures, as Mr. Russell has
outlined and that is why the senior review group recommended
alternative three.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Let me ask one other question.
This actually goes back to applicable regulations.
How would the staff perform a review of a
licensee-initiated proposed change or departures from the
design features, you know, in a way that would address the
criteria in the additional applicable regulations?
Well, I guess what I am really asking is what base
line requirement would a reviewer reference to determine the
acceptability of any proposed change?
MR. WILSON: That was one of the fundamental
purposes of Section 5 of the rule is to set forth the
regulatory framework. All of the decisions about future
changes, as people referred to, it is stated in 52.63 but it
applies to all of the change process as they are evaluated
in the context of the regulations that are applicable and in
effect. And that is the purpose of Section 5, to say what
were those design standards that we used to approve this
design so that when questions happen 10, 15 years from now,
we will be able to go back and see what they are and make
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the decisions in that context.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: But what Commissioner Rogers
raised relative to what's documented in the DCD is not
enough?
MR. WILSON: Well, what's in there is a design
description. If you are changing from the design
description, all you know is that you are doing something
different; the evaluation of the acceptability has
traditionally been made in the context of the underlying
regulation.
MR. MALSCH: Chairman Jackson, an illustration of
the difficulty would be let us suppose that an applicant
were to request that in a particular case it be allowed to
have coping as opposed to an alternate AC source. If such
an exemption request were made in a context of a CPOL
application, the staff would, without the applicable
regulations, be forced to evaluate that as against the
existing regulations which allow coping. So presumably the
exemption would be granted.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Even if it's -- okay.
MR. RUSSELL: Yes. There were other issues that
were brought forward with respect to what level of
protection should be achieved as relates to core damage
frequency, et cetera. The expectation was that they would
be significantly safer but we did not put a number on that.
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I would also point out that the bulk of the safety
improvement that has been achieved has been in the
prevention area; that is, improving the reliability of
operation. You see that when you get to conditional
containment failure probabilities and some of the mitigating
features.
The bulk of the safety enhancements have come from
additional margin in the design of the facility and
additional reliability associated with systems, additional
redundancies, et cetera. So the area of mitigation, which
is why I selected the two examples, severe accident, which
is essentially in mitigation space, and the containment
performance are the areas which are uncertain which do
raise, I think, some issues. But they would be very
difficult to deal with in the context of exemption requests
and in the context of the base line associated with renewal
from the standpoint of what were the regulations in effect
at the time.
It is not regulations and policy statements, or
regulations and policy, even though they are well
documented. It is essentially regulations in effect at the
time of the design certification. That is the issue that we
have.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Commissioner Rogers?
COMMISSIONER ROGERS: No, nothing.
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CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Commissioner Dicus?
COMMISSIONER DICUS: No, thank you.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Commissioner Diaz?
COMMISSIONER DIAZ: No, I just want to underscore
the fact that I come at a time that I think is very
appropriate for me to get involved in this. For years I
tried to believe that I understood the issues related to
advanced certification and now I am finding that I am at a
real loss and I intend to tax your capabilities on this
area.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Well, we've had a fairly
exhaustive discussion here this morning and so I would like
to thank the representatives of the nuclear industry as well
as the NRC staff for a very informative and thoughtful
briefing. It is clear that all involved have put a lot of
thought and effort into this and the information we have
heard today provides a lot of perspective on the issues and
what has to be addressed to resolve them.
And I agree, Mr. Russell, with a comment you made
in a course of your remarks that in the end a couple of them
will just come down to fundamental policy decisions that the
Commission will have to make. But what has been presented
will be useful to the Commission in our consideration of
these rules before the Commission.
And, unless my fellow commissioners have any
94
additional comments, we're adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:47 a.m., the briefing was
concluded.]
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