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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
***
BRIEFING ON ALTERNATIVES FOR REGULATING
FUEL CYCLE FACILITIES
***
PUBLIC MEETING
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
One White Flint North
Rockville, Maryland
Tuesday, July 2, 1996
The Commission met in open session, pursuant to
notice, at 10:00 a.m., Shirley A. Jackson, Chairman,
presiding.
COMMISSIONERS PRESENT:
SHIRLEY A. JACKSON, Chairman of the Commission
KENNETH C. ROGERS, Member of the Commission
GRETA J. DICUS, Member of the Commission
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STAFF AND PRESENTERS SEATED AT THE COMMISSION TABLE:
JOHN C. HOYLE, Secretary of the Commision
KAREN D. CYR, General Counsel
JAMES TAYLOR, Executive Director for Operations
CARL PAPERIELLO, Ph.D., Director, Office of
Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards
ELIZABETH TENEYCK, Director, Fuel Cycle Safety and
Safeguards Division, NMSS, U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission
ROBERT WILLIS BISHOP, President, General Counsel,
Nuclear Energy Institute
JAMES A. FICI, Plant Manager, Westinghouse
Electric Corporation, Columbia, South Carolina
CHARLES VAUGHAN, Manager, Regulatory Compliance,
General Electric
ROBERT WOOKEY, Manager, Nuclear Regulatory
Affairs, Assurance and Policy, U.S. Enrichment
Corporation
HAROLD BURTON, Sr. Vice President, SCIENTECH, Inc.
DONALD VIETH, Sr. Technical Advisor, Tank Waste
Remediation System, Department of Energy,
Richland Operations
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P R O C E E D I N G S
[10:00 a.m.]
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Good morning, ladies and
gentlemen. Today, the Commission will be briefed by both
the NRC Staff and industry and other government
representatives on alternative approaches on regulating fuel
cycle facilities.
The Commission would like to welcome the industry
and other government representatives to the NRC. I use
"other" because the NRC Staff is obviously government.
We look forward to hearing from all of you this
morning. This is an important matter on the Commission's
agenda. The NRC has been examining various methods for
improving the regulatory program for fuel cycle facilities
for the past five years. During that time, the NRC has
focused on a number of different aspects of the program,
including quality assurance, maintenance management controls
and criticalities safety to name a few.
This effort by the NRC Staff has not been done in
isolation from the various affected parties. The NRC has
conducted workshops with major fuel cycle licensees and
other affected stakeholders on this issue and has solicited
the views of industry on preliminary draft rulemaking
packages.
In April, the NRC Staff submitted a paper to the
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Commission that identified six alternatives that were
developed to provide a range of options for upgrading and
more clearly defining NRC's regulatory base for fuel cycle
facilities and as part of its deliberations, the Commission
looks forward to hearing more about each of these
alternatives from the NRC Staff and later this morning
hearing the views of industry and other affected parties on
potential modifications to NRC's regulations governing fuel
cycle facilities.
Commissioner Rogers, Commissioner Dicus, do you
have anything that you would like to add at this time?
COMMISSIONER ROGERS: No, thank you.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: If not, Mr. Taylor, please
proceed.
MR. TAYLOR: Good morning. With me at the table
are Carl Paperiello and Liz Teneyck from the Office of
Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards.
The presentation this morning will be given by
Liz.
MS. TENEYCK: Thank you.
Well, good morning.
As you mentioned, today we will be discussing the
topic of upgrading 10 CFR Part 7(d) which contains the
regulations for the possession and use of special nuclear
material. We plan to provide a background of what raised
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concerns regarding the adequacy of our regulations and
specific weaknesses that have been identified with the rule,
as well as what activities we have had under way since 1993
to upgrade the rule through the rulemaking process.
As you mentioned, we have identified a number of
alternatives of proposed ways for the Commission to proceed
and we will discus those in greater detail today.
Next slide, please.
[Slide.]
MS. TENEYCK: To review or to familiarize you with
how we got to where we are today, we plan to look briefly at
some events that have happened at our fuel facilities, the
results of some self-assessments that we have made of our
regulatory program and the evolution of actions that the
Staff has taken to date in that vein.
Next slide, please.
[Slide.]
MS. TENEYCK: Looking back, the most significant
event that has happened at a materials facility occurred at
our Sequoyah Fuels facility in 1986 when an individual was
killed by a hazardous chemical that resulted from the
rupture of a UF-6 cylinder. Now, although Sequoyah Fuels is
a Part 40 licensee, the event did involve the heating of a
UF-6 cylinder which is similar to activities conducted at
many of our fuel facilities today.
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A resulting congressional committee report
criticized the NRC at that time for being too narrowly
focused on radiological safety and not addressing other
hazards such as chemicals.
In 1991, there was an event at GE Wilmington that
focused our attention in the criticality safety area.
Subsequent reviews identified weaknesses at the operations
at the facility as well as weaknesses in NRC's regulatory
program.
Next slide, please.
[Slide.]
MS. TENEYCK: After the GE event, a task force was
created to review the materials program and it identified a
number of weaknesses. Recommendations to correct these
weaknesses were published in NUREG-1324 entitled Proposed
Method for Regulating Major Material Licensees in February
of 1992.
Next slide, please.
[Slide.]
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: For the record, do you want to
mention what one or two of those weaknesses that were
identified are?
MS. TENEYCK: Okay. If -- let's see. We have a
background slide of -- Slide Number 4, we can move to that
quickly, if you would like, and just quickly go down some of
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them.
[Slide.]
MS. TENEYCK: They dealt with a requirement to
immediately decontaminate contaminated areas, to require the
reporting of potential criticalities or the loss of
criticality safety controls, to require a standard format
for the licensing application and to in effect move toward a
living license and also to perform a hazards analysis, which
was something that was missing in our regulatory program, to
develop a standardized approach for the submittal of license
applications and the review process and to prohibit
contamination in areas external with facilities. So it
dealt with a lot of risk type of activities from a hazards
analysis to focusing on contamination control to focusing
also on the licensing process.
COMMISSIONER ROGERS: I wonder if sometime during
your presentation you could indicate how serious the most
serious kind of an accident at one of these facilities might
be in terms of public health and safety consequences and
where that might fall in the general spectrum of industrial
facility accidents, in facilities of this general type or
chemical processing type?
In other words, I wonder if you would give us some
perspective of just what is a really serious event that
might take place at one of these materials processing
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facilities and where would we put that in the spectrum of
consequences which we really want to avoid, just what the
general range is.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: And as a follow-on to that, I
am interested in how the posited ISAs, the safety
assessments, would fall in terms of an ability to answer
questions about the potential for this most serious kind of
event to occur in one of these facilities.
[Slide.]
MS. TENEYCK: All right.
Continuing with slide five, the Staff addressed
one of the task force recommendations in 1991 when it
published Bulletin 91-01, to encourage licensees to
voluntarily notify the NRC when they lost controls such as
moderation or geometry that were in place to prevent
criticalities. Staff feels that our current regulations are
deficient in that it only requires actual criticalities
events to be reported to the NRC.
Staff also considers these 91-01 reports to be
important precursor information which we track and analyze.
We think it is important to know why and when these controls
are lost and also to be in a position to review the
licensees' root cause analysis and corrective actions to
identify any generic weaknesses with our regulatory program.
To date, 70 such events have occurred and many of
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them substantiate the weaknesses that were identified in
NUREG-1324.
Next slide, please.
[Slide.]
MS. TENEYCK: In 1992, Staff initially developed
an action plan to respond to the program weaknesses,
primarily focusing on upgrading guidance rather than
modifying the actual rule and by conducting team assessments
to identify facility weaknesses. And the goal at that time,
I think, was to actually try to inspect safety into the
facilities.
The Commission responded at that time with a
direction to the Staff that the highest priority should be
to sharpen and upgrade the regulatory base for determining
the adequacy of licensee performance. So, consequently,
Staff reorganized and developed a new action plan which
focused on, among other things, upgrading the regulatory
base, developing a new standard review plan for the first
time, revising the existing standard format and content
guide and developing implementing guidance.
Next viewgraph, please.
[Slide.]
MS. TENEYCK: We do not feel that fuel cycle
facilities are being operated in an unsafe manner. We do
think, however, we feel that we need to have increased
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confidence in the operating margin of safety and a better
understanding of the safety basis for conducting activities
at the facilities involving special nuclear material.
The present rule is not risk-informed and it does
not require a hazards analysis. Staff's position is that an
integrated safety analysis is needed which systematically
analyzes the potential risk from criticality, chemical
process safety and fire hazards so that potential accidents
or high risks can be identified so that items relied on for
safety can be implemented and measures to ensure the
continued availability and reliability of these measures are
in place.
Next slide, please.
[Slide.]
MS. TENEYCK: We feel that the greatest threats to
these facilities are from criticality and the hazards of
chemicals and fire. However, our current rule is
essentially silent on the latter two and requires
criticality alarms to be in place but doesn't currently
require licensees to prevent criticalities.
Presently, as I mentioned earlier, only
criticality events are required to be reported to NRC. The
Staff feels that reporting requirements similar to those
contained in Bulletin 91-01 should be incorporated into the
regulatory base.
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Part 70 has also been modified so many times since
its initial issuance in the 1960s that we feel that it is
difficult to understand and administer. It often contains
redundant requirements presented in a very disjointed
fashion. It also is very prescriptive in some areas and, in
other important safety areas, essentially says operate
safely.
The requirements also address a wide range of SNM
uses, from subcritical quantities of material that are
contained in sealed sources all the way to large quantities
of highly enriched uranium. So the rules are required to be
applied to a large group of cats and dogs, as you might say.
Next slide, please.
[Slide.]
MS. TENEYCK: Staff had concurrently developed a
rulemaking package that contained a rewrite of Part 70, a
totally new standard review plan, a revised standard format
and content guide, a guidance document on implementing an
integrated safety analysis and a regulatory analysis that it
had proposed to provide to the Commission in June of 1995.
However, at a Commission meeting in March of 1995, the
Commission directed the Staff to provide the draft
rulemaking package to industry and other interested parties
to solicit their input on the proposed changes, without the
customary statement of considerations that would normally
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have gone along explaining the purpose of the rule and
without a planned two-month refinement period in which the
Staff had proposed to finalize the rule before it was
submitted to the Commission.
Two public workshops were subsequently held with
industry and other interested parties in March of 1995 and
November of 1995. Rather than trying to characterize
industry's perspective of the rule, as you mentioned, they
have been invited here today and we will hear their
presentation after ours.
Since members of the Commission have changed
substantially since our rulemaking effort began in 1993,
Staff has identified six alternative approaches for the
Commission's consideration on how Staff might proceed in
this area.
Next slide, please.
[Slide.]
MS. TENEYCK: Listed on the viewgraph are six
proposed alternatives. Let's begin with alternative two,
which is currently the status quo.
In the early 1990s, when weaknesses were
identified in the regulatory program, the licenses of seven
major fuel facilities were in timely renewal. The renewal
process had to proceed along with the rulemaking process so
Staff subsequently encouraged licensees to voluntarily
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commit to performing an integrated safety analysis and to
maintain that ISA for use in licensing activities.
In effect, what we were doing is we were trying to
implement generic changes to correct identified weaknesses
without the benefit of a rulemaking.
Next slide, please.
[Slide.]
MS. TENEYCK: Staff feels that there are
significant disadvantages of trying to license under the
current Part 70 particularly since it doesn't adequately
address the performance of an ISA, criticality prevention,
chemical process safety and fire protection. It is also
silent on the protection of external events such as a
seismic event, except at a plutonium facility.
Next slide, please.
[Slide.]
MS. TENEYCK: We have found that reliance on
voluntary commitments to perform an ISA is not an effective
and an efficient way to regulate because without formal
requirements and implementing guidance, interpretations of
what is an appropriate ISA can vary widely.
Staff feels that it is important to have a
requirement for an ISA to systematically analyze the hazards
from criticality, fire and chemical process safety and that
it be kept current through a good configuration management
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program, that it be thorough and that it be used to
determine the impact of process changes.
Next slide, please.
[Slide.]
MS. TENEYCK: Going back to the alternatives, I
would like now to discus alternative one, which basically
represents -- I'm sorry, back to slide nine.
[Slide.]
MS. TENEYCK: -- which basically represents
licensing under the constraints under the current Part 70,
without encouraging licensees to voluntarily commit to
performing an ISA. That, in our mind, is just moving
backwards, knowing the weaknesses that are with the current
rule.
Alternative three proposes to amend Part 70 to
require that an ISA be performed and maintained and
commitments be made to identify items relied on for safety
and to identify implementing measures to assure their
continued availability and reliability.
Staff has responded other industry's concerns
raised during our public meetings to establish -- their
concerns that we require -- that multiple programs be
established to provide this availability and reliability of
the items relied on for safety. At the time, we had no idea
of the connotation and the baggage that went along with the
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term "program" so we have modified our proposal to require
that they establish a safety program that requires -- that
includes, I'm sorry, all of the measures that we feel are
important like QA, maintenance, configuration management and
whatever, and that they be applied to the items relied on
for safety commensurate with the risk of the particular
problem.
Next page -- I'm sorry, you're all on that one.
I'm moving pages here.
Alternative four would amend the Part 70 similar
to the amendment for alternative three, although in addition
to requiring ISA, we would also require that the other
weaknesses that have been identified within Part 70 be
addressed such as reporting requirements. And, also, we
would want to require that the licensees submit their
application in a single, one-part format. Existing guidance
encourages licensees to provide their application in two
parts. The first part would require their commitments to us
that are enforceable. The second part was, in essence, a
discussion of their safety program which they were free to
modify without NRC review and that wasn't binding. As a
result of that, when we came to renewal time, the safety
program that was described in the original application did
not resemble in most cases their current program and it
required a much more onerous renewal process than we feel is
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necessary.
Alternative four would also include our
requirements like reporting of the 91-01 type of loss of
criticality controls and also would require the approval of
NRC for an ISA for any new processes or new construction.
Alternative five, which is similar to the original
Staff approach, would involve a rewrite of the Part 70 for
to reorganize and restructure the rule and also to delete
requirements that we feel are overly prescriptive and
redundant. A new proposed approach is also included where
we would separate the critical quantities of special nuclear
material from Part 70 into a new part, thus leaving the
existing Part 70 unchanged to address subcritical quantities
which are similar to those licensed by agreement states and
there we have a goal of comparable requirements so, in
essence, we would not be affecting the agreement state
program at all and we would have all of our subcritical
quantity licensing in one part.
Alternative six would also be a modification which
could include the alternative three, four or five but would
grandfather the operations at existing fuel facilities from
the requirement of having to perform an ISA because of their
operating history. However, if they made any major
modifications to their program, initiated any new processes
or new construction, then we feel that an ISA should be
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performed.
In summary, we have identified the weaknesses with
the current Part 70 and have proposed a new risk-informed
licensing approach to increase our confidence the margin of
safety at licensed fuel facilities.
As directed by the Commission, we have discussed
our proposed rulemaking activities with industry and have
made some modifications to our rulemaking package based on
that input.
Shortly you will hear their perspective on our
proposed changes.
We will be faced in the near future with licensing
new facilities, often using new technologies and we feel
that it's important that we have a strong regulatory base to
support our licensing efforts.
We also feel that it is important to have a good
standard review plan so that we will have a predictable
licensing process, so we have proposed six alternative
approaches for your consideration and we now look for your
direction as to which direction we should proceed.
That concludes my remarks.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Thank you.
MS. TENEYCK: If you think that I did not address
your comments, the questions you had earlier I'd be happy to
address them.
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COMMISSIONER ROGERS: Maybe I missed them -- no, I
don't think you did.
MS. TENEYCK: Okay.
COMMISSIONER ROGERS: I don't think you addressed
on any kind of a quantitative basis or risk as we normally
interpret risk as probability times consequences, or even
the consequences themselves -- I didn't hear that -- and it
seems to me that's -- we have to have something to put these
systems into the overall perspective of everything we
regulate -- reactors and all the way down to medical
programs.
I don't -- I think if you are not prepared to do
it right now, that's okay. I think that has to be done, but
it does seem to me that at the moment we don't have the
advantage of being able to put this in some kind of a risk
perspective.
Also, I am a little uncertain as to what you
really do mean when you are talking about ISAs. Are you
talking about doing a PRA as part of that or not? In your
list of alternatives, the word "risk" appears only in
Alternative 5. You mention ISAs and it is only in
Alternative 5 that you mention the word risk-informed. It's
not clear to me that ISAs are being contemplated on a
uniform basis involving a probabilistic risk assessment or
not.
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I know there was a great discussion a year or two,
a couple of years ago, on the subject of risk in these
facilities or hazards -- they used the word "hazards" that
were not in general the end result of a probabilistic risk
assessment. Many of them were qualitative assessments of
potential hazards.
In other words, what I am trying to see is what
are we talking about here when we are talking about an ISA.
Are we all talking about the same thing? How does an ISA
conceptually relate to an IPE for a nuclear power plant?
Are they totally different kinds of animals or do they bear
a certain kind of similarity to each other in terms of
methodology and that is what, you know, I would like to hear
something about.
MS. TENEYCK: Okay. I'll be happy to respond to
that.
The ISA concept is very similar to what is
conducted in the chemical industry. It's not a new process.
It's been around for a number of years and there's a number
of ways to accomplish that. A PRA is one technique and in
our guidance document that we developed, we identify a
number of techniques that can be used to perform an
Integrated Safety Analysis.
We recognize that the results from a fuel facility
are not similar to the consequences that could result from a
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nuclear power reactor but in our rule we do provide or plan
to provide consequence limits that will identify when the
licensees -- what they should be protecting against and any
risks that would exceed those levels, and they are not as
great as what would be at a power reactor -- we're currently
contemplating, say, 5 rem at the site boundary -- but the
events that could happen at a fuel facility are much more
focused on affecting worker safety.
Individuals can be killed from criticalities.
They can also be killed from hazardous chemicals that could
result and fires could cause a significant dispersal of the
nuclear material around and could cause health and safety
problems.
But your concern from a PRA perspective, that is
just one technique. Industry has indicated in their
experience in conducting such things that a PRA is not
always necessary, that it is more important that it be
conducted by a team of individuals that are familiar with
the facility and the process that as they go through the
process they look at potential problems that could cause
criticalities.
They look at chemicals that are used in a process
and to identify any risks that they could pose to the
process, and it has been determined that a very effective,
Integrated Safety Analysis could be done without the use of
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PRA.
We also find that PRA is a useful technique in
power reactors when a lot of their systems are very similar
and there's a lot of history on failures of equipment, but
in our fuel facilities we find that they almost all are very
unique, do not always use the same type of equipment, and so
it does not lend itself to the performance of a PRA as well
as a power reactor would.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Do you have any comments, Carl?
MR. PAPERIELLO: I would characterize -- you asked
about the risk -- the risk in a fuel facility as mentioned
is twofold.
The first is the chemical risk, the largest
probably being characteristic of the rupture of a large UF-
6 cylinder as occurred at Sequoyah Fuels with the
accompanying consequences.
The other is an inadvertent criticality. If you
look historically at the criticalities that have occurred,
you are talking about killing nearby employees. Generally
the lethal radius is in the order of tens of feet and
offsite radioactive consequences are relatively small. They
are far less than a reactor and probably bounded by more
traditional chemical type accidents, but that is --
obviously, it's not a reactor. You are not going to get
devastation of large portions of the countryside that could
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happen in a reactor.
It's within the range of comparable petrochemical
accidents -- you know, refinery accidents and the like.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Given what you just said, two
questions come to mind.
One is where would the alternatives -- how do they
play? Have you done that kind of a juxtaposition of the
alternatives that you have laid out to comparable regulatory
requirements in the industrial chemical facility space
because what you just said suggests that that is the
comparison that is more apt.
So the question is where do these proposed
alternatives lie with respect to regulatory requirements for
those kinds of facilities?
MS. TENEYCK: Maybe I can address that.
The hazards analysis that we are proposing is not
that different than what OSHA and EPA have proposed. In
fact, some of our licensees are interested in conducting the
ISA in such a way that it satisfies the requirements of NRC,
EPA and OSHA.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: And have you done any order of
magnitude or cost/benefit estimation of the alternatives
that you presented?
MS. TENEYCK: We had a regulatory analysis done of
our original proposed draft. The alternatives that are
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proposed to date we do not have cost/benefit analysis done
on because we wanted to get direction from the Commission
before we proceeded in doing any of them.
There is an upfront cost. We all recognize that
it is going to be an expense and it can vary from site to
site, but we have in discussions with licensees had
indications that the results of the ISA have been useful and
have identified potential problems that could have shut them
down and that having a better understanding of the safety
basis will in most cases allow them to operate and by being
up and operational it will save them money in the future, so
that is about as close from, you know, a detailed analysis
that we have done although we did have some other cost
analysis done but it wasn't a final product and it still
needs to be refined.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Commissioner Dicus?
COMMISSIONER DICUS: No questions.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Let me ask you one last
question.
You talked about reg guides, standard review plan,
and implementing guidance. Presumably this is what was
presented to the earlier Commission as a way to address some
of the issues and concerns with the existing Part 70 or its
implementation, is that correct?
MS. TENEYCK: Yes, the Commission was satisfied
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with the approach that we were taking to address the
weaknesses.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: And so the alternatives that
you are presenting now are meant to be ones that would
supersede doing those things, is that correct, or these
things would be done with reference to whichever alternative
is the --
MS. TENEYCK: No. We would not propose to do
anything other than to -- whatever way we modify the rule we
feel it's very important that we have a standard review
plan.
We feel that is an important document to be used
to standardize the review process. In the past it was done
on a more ad hoc basis. There were branch technical
positions, various documents, but we think that a good
standard review plan is imperative not only for use of the
licensing staff in reviewing the applications but also for
the use of the Applicant to know what acceptance criteria
that the NRC will be using when they prepare their
application and so that is a very important thing.
The standard format and content guide we feel is
important because that gives guidance to the licensees on
how they could prepare an acceptable application so we feel
that those two are very important and we also feel that
guidance such as that which we were developing to identify
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techniques on performing an ISA are very important, so we
don't propose that the rulemaking package be any different
than how we have proposed it before. It's just a question
as to how we proceed in modifying the current rule.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: What happens in your
development of a standard review plan, et cetera, what
happens to things like the branch technical positions and so
forth.
MS. TENEYCK: They were incorporated into the
standard review plan. Now let me tell you that we don't
have a general consensus on what should be acceptable
criteria at the time we started the development of this SRP.
We basically had a lot of individual staff doing the best
job that they could do with the lack of guidance but putting
their own twist on what they felt was an acceptable system,
so that there was a lot of meetings that brought together
the Staff to come to a consensus on what was acceptable
criteria.
Branch technical positions that had been used in
the past certainly influenced these decisions but the
perspective of basing it on the risk areas and addressing
those things was a new perspective, because before the
approach was to provide an across-the-board maintenance
program or, you know -- we didn't have a maintenance
program.
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Let me give another example -- a radiological
safety program. It was just layers of programs that were
applied rather than taking the approach of looking at the
high risk areas and applying the measures to those.
The entire approach that we proposed based on the
ISA would be to not only focus the licensing on the high-
risk areas, but to restructure our inspection program so
that they inspect and focus on the high risk areas to ensure
that the measures that are there to provide protection are
indeed available and reliable, so we are changing our whole
focus and that is to take, you know, an effort to turn to
the Staff and bring them together in a consensus position
and I think that we have that now but it wasn't there two
years ago and we have been working on it all along, so I
think that is something that this would give us that would
be very useful for the process.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: And your intent would be to
remove overly prescriptive requirements in both -- either a
new or an amended rule as well as any implementing guidance?
MS. TENEYCK: Well, the way that the alternatives
are laid out, the real alternative we would have to remove
those prescriptive requirements would be on Alternative 5,
where we would rewrite it.
In fact, it makes it a little difficult to even
patch in the ISA approach into the current rule because of
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all these existing prescriptive programs. It would be even
probably more confusing to a new Applicant trying to
understand the process then if we were able to rewrite the
entire rule and strip out of it all of these prescriptive
programs that are in there.
We feel our approach gives the licensees a lot
more flexibility in defining their programs because they are
going to identify the areas that are high risk and they will
determine the important things, whether it be maintenance or
QA or training that is necessary to assure the availability
and reliability of those measures.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: And it's not going to take you
another five years?
MS. TENEYCK: No, ma'am. We are very, very close.
As I say, we have the draft rule. We have already been
thinking in these terms.
I think it would probably be harder to go back and
try to patch something into the existing rule than to come
up with a new rewrite.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Mr. Rogers? Do you have
anything to add?
COMMISSIONER ROGERS: Well, just one little
question of detail.
In Attachment 2 to the SECY 96-079, there was a
reference to a Westinghouse submittal that pointed out the
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remarkable agreement between a submittal -- I guess to us --
and OSHA, an OSHA requirements submittal or conformance and
something that might meet EPA requirements as well, and the
comment was, I just have to paraphrase it because I can't
remember the exact word, but essentially that it was
remarkable agreement between those three documents that they
were preparing.
My question is did they include an ISA and was
that a quantitative ISA? In other words did it involve a
PRA?
MS. TENEYCK: I think that you could best ask that
question to the Westinghouse representative that is here
today.
COMMISSIONER ROGERS: I see, okay.
MS. TENEYCK: Similar approaches can be used to
satisfy all of our requirements and so I think that we
certainly are supportive of an approach that would not be
contrary to meeting the requirements of OSHA or EPA.
COMMISSIONER ROGERS: Thank you.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: I note that both NRC Staff and
industry talk about removing over-prescriptiveness and
performance-based approaches.
Is there concurrence as to what "performance-
based" means?
MS. TENEYCK: No. I can say that very
. 29
emphatically. We have -- our position on performance-based
rules are not prescriptively telling the licensee what they
have to do, but allowing them the flexibility of telling
them what we feel the requirement should accomplish and
letting them have the flexibility of proposing to us how
they would plan to meet that.
We have heard many other definitions of
performance-oriented rules and I would suggest maybe you
might ask industry what their definition is of performance-
oriented.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Okay. Any other questions?
Commissioner Dicus?
COMMISSIONER DICUS: I have none.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Well, thank you very much. I
think we'll hear from the industry and other
representatives. Thank you very much.
Mr. Bishop, you are leading the group?
MR. BISHOP: Yes, ma'am, I am.
Chairman Jackson, Commissioner Rogers,
Commissioner Dicus, for the record my name is Bob Bishop. I
am Vice President and General Counsel of the Nuclear Energy
Institute. Mr. Colvin sends his regrets that he was not
able to appear here today. He asked me to appear in his
stead because I have some experience in these matters as
well.
. 30
I am here on behalf of the nuclear energy industry
which has focused its activities with respect to the
regulation of facilities licensed under Part 70 through an
NEI committee called the Facility Operations Committee. You
may hear us refer to the FOC. That is what that focus is.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Excuse me, Mr. Bishop. Just
for the record, would you introduce the other gentlemen at
the table?
MR. BISHOP: Yes, ma'am. On my right is Mr. Fici,
manager of Westinghouse's Columbia, South Carolina, fuel
fabrication plant. On my left, Charlie Vaughan, responsible
for regulatory and environmental health and safety matters
at General Electric's Wilmington, North Carolina, fuel
fabrication plant.
I should mention in the audience today are also a
number of other individuals with similar direct
responsibilities for fuel fabrication facilities licensed
under Part 70 that also represent that important sector of
the industry. Specifically here today are plant managers or
senior staff members representing Westinghouse and General
Electric. At the table, ABB Combustion Engineering, Babcock
and Wilcox, Framatome Nuclear Fuel Services and Siemens, the
major fuel fabrication facilities, and representatives of
other Part 70 licensees as well. I think that is an
important sign of the importance that the industry feels
. 31
about this issue.
I will begin our presentation today with a broad
overview of the situation from our perspective and what we
believe is critically important. That is developing a
regulatory framework that makes sense.
Messrs. Fici and Vaughan will then provide the
industry's recommendations in more detailed fashion based on
their direct licensing and operating experience and, of
course, at any time we would be willing to answer any
questions you might have.
First and foremost throughout our discussion
today, I believe it is important to recognize that neither
the regulated licensees nor the NRC have concluded that
additional or different regulation of Part 70 fuel
fabrication facilities is necessary to ensure adequate
protection of public health and safety or the safety of the
many employees and contractors who work at our facilities.
Yes, mistakes have been made at individual
facilities, errors have occurred. And, yes, events have
occurred that we all wish have not occurred. But we have
learned from those experiences and we will continue to work
to make sure that they will not happen again.
We have taken actions in response to that, to
those events and errors, that included the modification of
safety programs, emphasizing to our people the need to do
. 32
the right thing as well as modifying our operating
practices, systems and components to be more effective.
There can be no question that the plants now have even
improved margins of safety because of those voluntary
efforts on the part of licensees.
An independent assessment conducted for the NRC
Staff now two years ago by Science and Engineering
Associates goes precisely to that point. The NRC Staff's
consultant concluded that:
"Part 70 licensed facilities are not unsafe, as
currently operated and regulated. This is attested to by
the fact that there have been relatively few accidents
involving SNM, special nuclear material, at Part 70 license
sites, and no member of the public has been injured due to
such accidents. In addition, there have been no criticality
events at Part 70 license sites since the NRC was created in
1974 and assigned oversight responsibility for SNM
activities."
The obvious conclusion, the defense in depth
approach to plant design and operation has proven to be
valid at Part 70 facilities.
The consultant's report went on to observe:
However, events have occurred at these facilities,
particularly at fuel cycle facilities, that could possibly
lead to more serious events or accidents.
. 33
The NRC Staff's principal articulation to us as
well as in this briefing today of why a dramatically
different regulatory system should be imposed has been based
on the NRC Staff's concerns about their lack of confidence
in the margin of safety that now exists. Phrased earlier, a
so-called record of upsets that has occurred and that the
current regulatory system is "haphazard", a confused way of
licensing. Let me address those briefly in turn.
We have analyzed the record of upsets in a
document labeled Additional Discussion of Part 70 Operating
Experience. We have made copies available in the meeting
room, to commissioners and to Staff. We ask that that
analysis be included with the transcript of this briefing
and the record of this proceeding.
This analysis demonstrates that, in the events
analyzed by the NRC Staff, there always remain substantial
margins of safety and conservatisms that continue to ensure
public health and safety.
As to the second point that the current regulatory
system is haphazard, the current system may not be elegant,
I believe was the word the Staff used in the Commission
briefing last year, but I think it is clear it has also
worked. The major reason for the so-called haphazard system
is that the current system was designed to work to
accommodate a wide variation of types of facilities licensed
. 34
under Part 70. That is not a flaw in the current system;
that is a virtue of the current system.
The industry has been concerned during the last
five years that the NRC Staff has been considering a variety
of changes to the regulatory system that the potential
impact on licensees of those changes has not been carefully
evaluated. First, many of the changes being considered and
that are among the alternatives before the Commission today
would not achieve benefits that are in any way commensurate
with the cost of implementing those changes. Second, many
of the changes under consideration could have unintended
consequences that could, if only through a diversion of
resources, in fact end up being adverse to the public
interest.
Because of these concerns, we were heightened when
the Commission directed the Staff last year to discus these
matters with the major fuel cycle licensees. Today's
presentations reflect the benefit of the significant
interactions that have taken place over that past year
between your Staff and the industry.
As Messrs Fici and Vaughan will describe, both the
NRC and the industry have benefitted significantly from
those discussions. We think the stage is now set for
developing a process that will address the heart of the NRC
Staff's concerns yet provide real value to Part 70
. 35
licensees.
Let me turn first to Mr. Fici to provide an
overview of the industry's perspective on this important
matter and then turn to Mr. Vaughan to provide a more in-
depth review.
MR. FICI: Good morning, Chairman Jackson,
Commissioner Rogers, Commissioner Dicus. I am Jim Fici of
Westinghouse and I am pleased to be here today to not only
represent Westinghouse but all of the fuel cycle companies
that operate facilities licensed under Part 70. All of the
major Part 70 licensees are here today as authors of this
presentation and I have spoken with all my counterparts and
we are of a like mind.
Over the last several years, the Staff and the
industry have discussed and debated Part 70 at some length
in meetings, workshops and other forums. By and large, the
industry has been opposed to major revisions to the rule.
This is primarily because we are convinced that Part 70 fuel
facilities are being operated safely under the existing
regulations. The recently completed NRC plant performance
reviews of three of our facilities bear out our conviction.
Furthermore, the Staff has concurred with that assessment,
but still apparently desires increased confidence in the
safety of our operations.
After our last workshop with the Staff in November
. 36
of 1995 and after careful review of SECY 96-079, we have
come to the unanimous conclusion that our mutual goal, to
maintain and improve the margin of safety of our facilities,
would best be served if some carefully designed regulatory
changes were implemented. Therefore, the main focus of our
presentation today is on those areas where we feel we can
move forward on a cooperative basis.
I want to stress that these recommendations have
been unanimously endorsed by all represented companies
operating fuel cycle facilities licensed under Part 70.
I would like to briefly summarize the major
elements of our recommendations. First, while we opposed
major changes to Part 70 in the past, we proposed that a
focused and performance-based addition to the existing rule
could potentially be beneficial. We are willing to work
with the Staff to achieve that change. Second, and more
particularly, we could embrace a specific change to the
existing Part 70 that would require licensees to address
plant safety hazards using an integrated approach.
Licensees could either perform a reasonable scope
integrated safety assessment, ISA, as we expect most will
do, or use an acceptable alternative approach determined to
be acceptable by the industry and the NRC. The change would
explicitly provide for both options.
The change should also include: One, specific
. 37
measurable safety program performance objectives; two,
reference to acceptable industry practices for performance
of the ISA; and, three, the principle that individual
licensees will determine what, if any, changes in existing
facilities, equipment or controls are needed using a graded
approach based upon the results of the ISA or alternative.
Many of the Part 70 licensees have efforts under way or
planned which they believe could satisfy such a rule change.
Third, until the ISAs or an acceptable alternative
are completed and the results available for review, it is
premature to decide what, if any, changes may be required in
existing fuel, facilities or existing programs. Indeed, we
feel the necessary safety programs are already in place at
our facilities.
While the ISAs may help us adjust the
implementation of those programs commensurate with risk, we
would not expect the ISAs to disclose the need for
significant new programs. Thus, at this stage, we believe
that NRC and industry resources could be saved by suspending
work on the draft rule, standard review plan and standard
format and content guide. These draft documents contain
significant new programmatic criteria in areas such as
quality assurance, maintenance, chemical safety, fire
protection, training and human factors. The need for such
changes should be driven by the ISA results on an individual
. 38
plant basis.
Completion of these guidelines and documents in
their current form will create pressure to implement costly
changes before the need for those changes is demonstrated.
Indeed, this is already occurring. The Staff has
acknowledged that it is encouraging licensees to follow the
draft standard review plan and the draft standard format and
content guide in their license renewal applications and is
granting a more limited term license renewal that is five
years rather than 10 years where licensees have not followed
the draft guidance. We are very concerned that the Staff
appears to be requiring licensees to follow draft guidance
as a condition of receiving 10-year license renewals.
We are equally concerned that the draft guidance
might become de facto inspection guidelines or acceptance
criteria. Our recommendations would produce a more
consistent application of requirements among the Part 70
licensees.
Third, we believe that the Staff and industry
should focus their resources on working out the details
related to ISA methodology, scope and content and on the
definition of acceptable alternatives. The NRC's draft
guidance on performing an ISA, draft NUREG-1513 and the
American Institute of Chemical Engineers' recommendations on
which it is largely based are an appropriate starting point.
. 39
We would like to meet with the Staff to begin this process.
Finally, our proposal to establish a requirement
for the performance of an ISA or an acceptable alternative
approach does not mean that the ISA documentation or results
should be incorporated into the safety basis of our
facilities or formally submitted to the NRC. To do so, in
our view, necessitates significant changes in the format and
content of our license applications and represents a
fundamental change in the way our facilities are regulated.
ISA documentation and results would, however, be available
for Staff review at each licensee's facility.
Now, in summary, we recommend that our mutual
efforts be refocused on, one, Staff and industry discussions
to work out the ISA methodology, scope and content and the
parameters of alternative approaches and, two, a limited
addition to the existing rule that would require licensees
to continue to address safety hazards using an integrated
approach through an ISA or an acceptable alternative. The
change would define the quantitative safety performance
objectives to be achieved.
We urge the Commission, however, not to finalize a
change to the existing rule until there is a clear
understanding and consensus on the details of the ISA or
alternatives.
I would now like to ask Mr. Vaughan to elaborate
. 40
on the points I have just highlighted.
MR. VAUGHAN: Good morning, Chairman Jackson,
Commissioner Rogers, Commissioner Dicus. The purpose of my
discussion here is to provide some additional detail on the
unanimous recommendations of the Part 70 fuel operators and
I would like to begin by discussing some of our suggestions.
As a beginning point, it is essential that the
regulation contain well-defined safety performance
objectives that would be used to evaluate the potential
facility specific hazards and safety consequences that
should be of concern to the NRC and industry. As directed
by the Commission and based on our history of interacting
with the Staff, we stand ready to work with the Staff to
develop performance objectives appropriate for our
operations. These criteria would define the underlying
objectives of any facility's safety program.
COMMISSIONER ROGERS: Could you give us any
examples of such objectives?
MR. VAUGHAN: That is some of my next statement to
discus those and where we have some common understanding, I
think.
The Staff has suggested certain criteria or
consequences of concern that may be reasonable for inclusion
in a proposed rule and are worthy of further consideration.
Those criteria include compliance with Part 20 limits in
. 41
non-accident conditions, avoidance of criticality,
thresholds for doses to members of the public, intake of
soluble uranium and exposure to hydrogen fluoride.
In NUREG-1513, the Staff has stated that, and I
quote, "Appropriate controls must be in place to provide
reasonable assurance that any accidents identified in the
ISA having these consequences will not occur."
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Repeat that?
MR. VAUGHAN: Repeat it?
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Please.
MR. VAUGHAN: "Appropriate controls must be in
place to provide reasonable assurance that any accidents
identified in the ISA having these consequences will not
occur."
We agree and we feel that it is essential that the
rule itself contain measurable safety performance
objectives.
Next slide.
[Slide.]
MR. VAUGHAN: With safety performance objectives
clearly defined, and the ISAs complete, the results should
enable licensees to determine whether adequate controls are
in place to prevent or mitigate credible events and
accidents that, based on a realistic evaluation, could
produce any of the consequences described above. If
. 42
credible event or accident sequences are examined and
determined not to be reasonably capable of producing such
consequences, no further consideration would be required.
Of course, for these events or accidents of lesser
significance, would continue to be prevented and mitigated
through the existing customary safety programs.
Where an accident or event could produce
consequences exceeding those specified in the rule, however,
the licensee would evaluate and document the controls relied
on to prevent or mitigate the incident and take additional
measures if necessary. Licensees would be permitted to take
into account the anticipated likelihood of an event or an
accident as well as the potential impacts in the process of
grading its safety program.
Using these criteria, one approach to grading
would be to classify structures, systems and components
based on safety significance and to apply controls along
with assurance measures commensurate with that
classification.
Next slide.
[Slide.]
MR. VAUGHAN: The regulation should reference
industry practices that may be used in the performance of an
ISA. The 1992 American Institute of Chemical Engineers'
Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation Procedures, Section Edition
. 43
with Work Examples, is frequently referenced in NUREG-1513
and provides reasonable approaches to performing ISAs.
Other methods may also be acceptable.
The regulation should also acknowledge that
licensees are performing hazards analysis under other
applicable requirements such as the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration's Health and Safety Management
Regulations and the Environmental Protection Agency's Risk
Management Program Regulations. These efforts should be
acceptable means of meeting ISA requirements for hazards
within NRC's jurisdiction, namely hazards associated with
radioactive materials, nuclear criticality and those
chemical hazards that could affect nuclear safety.
Draft NUREG-1513 states that NRC's ISA guidance is
intended to be consistent with the requirements of OSHA and
EPA, so long as the ISA addresses radiological nuclear
criticality and certain chemical hazards, for example UF6
releases, not covered under other regulations. In this
regard, we agree with the Staff.
There are various efforts under way at some fuel
facilities to re-evaluate and/or redocument the current
safety basis for their operations. Some of these ongoing
efforts may fulfill the requirement of an ISA. In other
cases a licensee may feel that it has an alternative
approach or program for assuring itself of and demonstrating
. 44
to the NRC the safety of its operations.
The rule should provide flexibility for licensees
to offer alternative approaches for the NRC's consideration.
Such approaches might not constitute a hazards
analysis but could still provide the NRC with increased
confidence in safety.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Can you give examples of such
an alternative approach and how it would then tie in with
the prior recommendations where you talked about the
integrated approaches having to do with consequences of
concern and how you would migrate from such an example of an
alternative to that that would be different than what would
be in the ISA?
MR. VAUGHAN: I believe that the guidance in the
AICHE Handbook is probably the most currently used. Some of
the facilities that are with our committee have indicated
that there may be some other options and they might want to
comment on that maybe when we finish our presentation, but I
think generally we go along that line. It's just that we
would like to reserve the right to be able to use some
different techniques if those are appropriate and are
acceptable to both parties.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Okay --
MR. BISHOP: We haven't identified them now. We
think that may come out of the process.
. 45
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Commissioner Rogers.
COMMISSIONER ROGERS: Yes. I didn't want to let
you go either.
I think the really important aspect of ISA is the
"I" -- the "integrated" and if one is looking at
alternatives, do those alternatives scrap the integration,
total system view of the safety analysis or do they differ
in detail but not spirit from an integrated safety analysis
that might be acceptable under the OSHA and AICHE
approaches?
In other words, are you saying that you think the
alternatives -- I mean just to put it very bluntly, do you
think an acceptable alternative is one which does not do an
integrated analysis of the facility?
MR. VAUGHAN: I believe that the "integrated" word
or the integrated aspect is present in all of the options
that we have talked about. It's one more in the mechanics
of how you do that and the mechanics of how you record
results and maintain those results.
COMMISSIONER ROGERS: All right.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Do all of the alternatives
allow the graded approach to implementation that the ISA as
presumably you and the Staff understand allows?
MR. VAUGHAN: I believe so.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Because it strikes me that if
. 46
(a) the focus does not remain on an integrated safety look,
as Commissioner Rogers has pointed out, and (b) does not
allow for consistent understanding and approach in terms of
a graded implementation if that were what were adopted, then
what you are really positing is to leave things at the
status quo, it strikes me.
MR. BISHOP: I believe we think those two
principles, those two elements of the ISA, would be critical
to any approach that is considered.
Part of our concern is that we know we don't know
everything we need to know and that is what we would intend
to work with the Staff to develop these thoughts further and
we may come up with something that we don't now envision.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Okay, so these are new things
that the Staff has not heard about yet? Is that what you
are telling us?
MR. BISHOP: Our recommendation today? Yes,
ma'am.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: I see. What have you guys been
discussing for five years?
[Laughter.]
MR. BISHOP: We may need to extend the time for
the briefing.
MR. VAUGHAN: Let's see if we could have the next
slide.
. 47
[Slide.]
MR. VAUGHAN: The rule should specify that upon
completion of the ISA or acceptable alternative each
licensee will determine what if any changes in existing
controls are needed to provide reasonable assurance that the
numerical safety performance objectives are not exceeded and
will implement such changes in a timely manner.
It should also specify --
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Does that mean with all
deliberate speed?
MR. BISHOP: Yes, ma'am.
MR. VAUGHAN: Yes. It should also specify that
the ISA results indicate that relaxation of some controls or
reallocation of resources is justified, that the licensee
may do so in accordance with any applicable license
amendment or commitment change procedures.
The Staff has indicated that safety program
changes should be based on the results of an ISA. However,
the preliminary draft provisions to Part 70 and the draft
SRP and SF and CG prematurely include detailed new safety
program criteria.
Among these new criteria are criteria for
implementation of very rigorous QA programs following the
guidance of NQA1, which is not justified by the potential
source term and risk associated with Part 70 facilities.
. 48
New criteria for much more formal maintenance
programs, criteria for reactor style training programs using
formal systems approach to training methodology,
prescriptive new criteria on criticality safety, fire
protection, and human factors programs and criteria for
expanded reporting requirements.
We do not believe that the NRC should presuppose
the need for programmatic changes before completion of the
ISAs or acceptable alternatives.
The inclusion of these changes in the preliminary
draft rule and in the draft SRP and SF and CG are based upon
the Staff's assessment of prior industry events, some at
Part 70 facilities and some at other types of facilities.
That assessment does not take into account the
current status of the industry's operations as shown by the
results of the recent NRC-conducted plant performance
reviews at three Part 70 facilities, each of which noted a
good level of safety performance.
The Staff's analysis of prior industry experience
is discussed in Attachment 3 to their paper entitled,
"Improving the Regulation of Fuel Cycle Facilities." That
is dated November the 7th, 1995.
We have reviewed the Staff's analysis and we are
providing an attachment to this presentation which discusses
the results of our review and, as asked earlier, we have
. 49
asked that that be included in the transcript of the
meeting.
Our basic conclusions are that the events
evaluated by the Staff hightlighted the need for
improvements in our operations. For those events discussed
by the Staff which we have specifically analyzed there were
existing substantial margins of safety and conservatisms
that continued to assure public safety.
Though instances of the loss or degradation of a
single control criticality safety parameter have occurred,
the double contingency principle and conservative
assumptions built into the criticality safety analysis have
served effectively to prevent accidental criticality events.
Finally, lessons learned as a result of such
events as well as continuing efforts to make cost effective
improvements in our program have provided the industry with
an even larger margin of safety than existed several years
ago.
These improvements it seems have gone
unrecognized.
SECY 96-079 suggests that to address the
industry's concern with the programmatic aspects of the
draft rule it could be revised to require a "single safety
program" and to refer to the various individual safety
programs, for example, chemical safety, training, and human
. 50
factors, as "measures" rather than individual programs.
It is important to make clear that whether such
programmatic changes are included in a rule, in guidance
documents, implemented through inspection activities, or as
the Staff suggested, redefined as measures to be included in
a single safety program, they are premature and not
justified at this juncture.
They do not provide clear, cost effective and
measurable safety improvements.
Next slide.
[Slide.]
MR. VAUGHAN: The rule change we propose would
require that the ISA results be documented and available for
review by the Staff.
This would include a discussion of the controls
relied on to assure that the consequences of concern are not
exceeded and the basis for concluding such controls are
adequate. A formal submittal to the NRC of an ISA report
would not be required.
More importantly, the ISA should not become part
of the license which may only be changed through a codified
change process.
In accordance with our configuration control
programs when significant plant changes occur or are
planned, licensees would be required to review and update
. 51
the ISA and to implement any new controls that may be
necessitated as a review of that re-review and updating of
the safety basis.
Incorporation of the ISA itself into the license
would necessitate significant changes in the current license
application format, dramatically expanding the description
of the plant site, facilities, equipment, processes, and
controls which would form the basis of license.
In this regard we note for example that the
certification applications recently submitted by the United
States Enrichment Corporation under 10 CFR Part 76 criteria,
which is very, very similar to those in the drafts of Part
70, including the Standard Review Plan and Standard Format
and Content Guide included over 1000 pages per plant
dedicated to site, facility and process descriptions and
safety or accident analysis.
This is a very significant administrative burden
which would produce no measurable improvement in the safety
of Part 70 facilities.
Next slide. Well, that is the correct one up
there now.
Finally, to assure that future modifications to
fuel facilities operations caused by regulatory change are
based on strong health and safety considerations and are
appropriately cost justified, we repeat our strong request
. 52
for the inclusion of a backfit provision in the revised Part
70.
Modifications resulting from new or different NRC
requirements or Staff positions must be subjected to an
appropriate backfit analysis before implementation. This
provision would be consistent with NRC regulations governing
the gaseous diffusion plants and commercial reactors.
Thank you for your consideration and deliberation
on this very important point this morning and I'll give the
microphone back to Mr. Bishop.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Before you do, there was I am
told a near-criticality event at GE-Wilmington some years
ago and the question I had was was there a double
contingency built in in that particular case?
MR. VAUGHAN: There was. The double contingency
program or that approach was in place in that particular
situation.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: And what does near-criticality
mean then in that particular situation?
MR. VAUGHAN: Near-criticality as best I can tell
in that case simply says that one of the contingencies was
lost and so we were in a position that we had then a single
contingency.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Okay. Commissioner Rogers.
COMMISSIONER ROGERS: Well, a couple of questions
. 53
then of general observation.
How would an ISA help you to decide on what
training programs should be in place to keep people over the
years alert to criticality questions and how to avoid them?
It does seem to me that in various parts of our
industry, not only in your applications but others, that
criticality training and awareness is in danger of
disappearing -- let's put it that way -- and that as time
goes on, while it may be certainly possible to train up new
people to carry out routine operations in the plant, the
basic understanding of how something might lead to a
criticality could get lost if your training programs don't
address that, and it seems to me that's a common feature to
all of these facilities and I don't know why something like
that has to come out of an ISA.
MR. FICI: Let me see if I can respond to that
question.
First of all, Commissioner, I think the inherent
characteristics of the processes in our facilities do
protect against criticality events, but an integrated safety
assessment I think would point out where appropriate
engineered controls could provide even greater margin to
safety or, if that wasn't practical, where administrative
controls are also appropriate, and that is where in the
application of administrative controls you would focus a lot
. 54
of your training.
But in many of our facilities we conduct
periodic -- I believe in our facility it is every two
years -- criticality safety training with all of our
employees so I don't agree with your statement that that
kind of training is disappearing.
COMMISSIONER ROGERS: Well, it may or may not, but
I am just telling you that throughout the industry the
background that people come into the industry is changing
and an understanding of criticality events and what
criticality is is disappearing.
We have seen a number of instances in other
situations where people who have been moving things around
for example just didn't understand the potential for
criticality in some fuel storage situations.
I don't agree with you that this is not an issue.
I think it is an issue and what we are talking about is a
general issue for the whole industry. You may have ongoing
training programs at your particular site, but we are
talking about a rule now that involves everyone and I don't
think that should be based on what may or may not be
happening at one licensee's facility.
MR. VAUGHAN: I would like to add a little to that
because I think there is a lot of benefit from the ISA and
your observations are correct. The number of professionals
. 55
that are entering the industry today that are trained in
criticality safety are on the way down, so they are a
resource that is very difficult to come by and that is of
concern to us and we are working at it, as I am sure you
are.
But if we get to the ISA, I think one of the
beauties of the ISA is, number one, it does give you an
integrated look so that you look at all of the components of
safety and you also have an opportunity to rank those so you
know what is important.
One of the things that happens to us today is the
rules are the requirements are the rules are the
requirements and they all generally have equal weight, so
you are faced with trying to train, for example, if you are
looking at training, you are faced with trying to train
everybody to everything to the same degree of detail and
that is a very difficult challenge.
Under the concept of the ISA, we would be looking
at it in an integrated fashion. We would come out with the
ranking so we would know where the most serious risks are,
where the highest probabilities are for things to happen,
and so we would get a hierarchy of things that we should be
addressing and that way if it is training or whatever the
programmatic element is that we need to have that assurance,
then we can add those things --
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COMMISSIONER ROGERS: Oh, yes.
MR. VAUGHAN: -- in an graded, weighted approach
and I think we can do a better job of implementing those
things under those kinds of conditions than we can today so
I think the ISA actually will help in that regard.
COMMISSIONER ROGERS: Oh, I would agree with that,
but it seems to me we are talking about a floor here now of
training that I think, a commonality that might be
appropriate for everybody and then in addition to that the
local application of these considerations is of course
vitally important so I would agree with you there.
Well, the general observation is that it does seem
to me -- I hadn't seen your set of slides here before I came
in -- and the last word that I understood was that you folks
were basically opposed to a rule and it seems to me that now
that is not the case, that you have begun to come to a
conclusion that there might be some virtue to a rule provide
that -- and then some conditions have to be met.
So I do think that in response to the Chairman's
question of what have you been talking about for five years,
a lot of that has been don't have a rule and I think now you
have come to a recognition that maybe this is the time to
consider a rule and consider it seriously and get on with
the job of doing something constructive and I wonder why,
for example, now that you have come to a conclusion that a
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rule might be in your best interest, why don't you file a
petition for rule-making that states what it is you want to
see in a rule instead of trying to tinker with something
that the Staff has put together that you are not very happy
with?
MR. BISHOP: Absolutely, and I should have
apologized earlier for springing these slides, this
information, this approach on you with no notice.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: You should.
MR. BISHOP: Yes, ma'am.
[Laughter.]
MR. BISHOP: Let me just say in my own modest
defense, that's because we were hammering it out as late as
yesterday --
COMMISSIONER ROGERS: This morning.
[Laughter.]
MR. BISHOP: -- but we did finish it yesterday
evening but we do think there is merit in going forward.
We do think, however, it is important to make sure
that we agree first, before we establish what the rule
should say and require, what is the heart of it, what is the
principles that we are trying to achieve, what is the scope,
format, content of the ISA. How would it be used? How
would it be developed? Are there acceptable alternatives
and what would the parameters of them be?
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We think it is much more important to ensure that
we understand what we are trying to accomplish through that
rulemaking than begin the process of rulemaking before that
stabilized.
COMMISSIONER ROGERS: Well, that's what I am
suggesting that you do.
MR. BISHOP: Certainly.
COMMISSIONER ROGERS: Put that down and come to
submit a petition for rulemaking that says what it is you
think it ought to be and why.
Then that starts a process. It's a public process
that everybody can observe. It's not in secret.
MR. BISHOP: Yes, sir.
COMMISSIONER ROGERS: And come to grips with the
problems. Right now we seem to be not making an awful lot
of progress when the Staff presents to us six different
alternatives than perhaps none of which are the best and I
would encourage you to get on with the job and -- having
come to the conclusion that a rule is probably the best
thing to do.
MR. BISHOP: Our approach -- we do know how to
prepare petitions for rulemaking. Our approach however is
to begin, with your concurrence to work immediately with the
Staff to develop the concept of the ISA and make it real.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: I think you need to get the
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petition in if you do it, because, you know, you have been
talking for five years and my point of view is that you
can't just keep going on and on and decide you are going to
get into the morass of, you know, we have to agree on all
the details of what an ISA has to be before you get on with
the fundamentals of what it is supposed to accomplish and so
I would disagree with that, but if you would like to see a
rulemaking that has certain baseline principles involved, I
agree with Commissioner Rogers that you need to go ahead and
submit the petition.
I do not think it is acceptable to get into a
long-winded, let's negotiate again, so Commissioner Rogers
will be long gone, Commissioner Dicus might be long gone, I
might be long gone, and then you are starting it over and
over again, and that it a piece in terms of regulatory
process that I think is unacceptable, and so, you know, if
we want to make a move we make the move and it is not
something that should take five years to come to closure.
MR. BISHOP: Agreed.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: And that you don't get into the
morass of we're going to negotiate every little piece before
we come forward because if you don't do that, then we're
going to more forward anyway, considering the alternatives
or something that the Commission itself might decide that it
wants to do.
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So Commissioner Rogers has also opened a window
that I agree with but I am saying to you that it's not one
that is going to be based on we're going to get agreement on
all of these details before we move forward because we are
not going to wait that long.
MR. BISHOP: Yes, ma'am. I understand.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Commissioner Dicus, did you
have comments?
COMMISSIONER DICUS: No, they have been asked.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: So thank you --
MR. BISHOP: Yes, ma'am. We thank you.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: -- for coming. It's been very
informative and stimulating and I think that I have already
delivered the message to you and it has been an interesting
and excellent presentation. Thanks -- we are adjourned.
I'm told the meeting is not adjourned. I didn't
realize that the representatives from DOE were planning to
make comments. If that is true, I ask you to come forward
and make what comments you would like to make at this time.
Identify yourselves as you do that.
MR. VIETH: Good morning, Madam Chairman,
Commissioner Rogers, Commissioner Dicus. My name is Don
Vieth and I am with the U.S. Department of Energy's Richmond
Operations Office. My position is the Senior Technical
Advisor for the Tank Waste Remediation System Program
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Office. The mission of the Office is to establish the
system necessary to retrieve, process and convert to a
stable solid suitable for disposal the 240,000 metric tons
of process chemicals mixed with about 250 megacuries of
radionuclides contained in 177 tanks at Hanford.
Since August of 1994, one of my responsibilities
has been to examine and outline the means by which the
remediation of the tanks can be achieved through privatized
operations. The Department has determined that it is
possible to make this fundamental change. It has
established a two-phased approach and it has issued a
request for proposal. Phase I will be initiated in August
of 1996, that is just next month, with the signing of the
contracts for services for the demonstration scale
facilities. Phase II is planned to be initiated in 2004 for
the procurement of services for the full production scale
facilities.
The privatization of the TWRS will result in the
purchase of a service on a fixed-price basis from a
contractor-owned, contractor-operated facility. DOE will
provide highly radioactive feedstock and receive vitrified
waste suitable for disposal in return.
For the TWRS privatization, our principal tenet
from the outset has been the intention of transitioning to
external -- that is, non-DOE -- regulation of the
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privatization contractors. Environmental regulatory
oversight will be by state agencies. The occupational
safety -- for occupational safety, the Department is looking
to the Occupational Safety and Health Administration for
regulation.
DOE has sought external radiological nuclear
safety regulation by NRC but both agencies have concluded
that the NRC currently does not have the capability to
execute their role in a demonstration phase of the TWRS
privatization consistent with the schedule of the consent
order for remediation of defense waste. The radiological,
nuclear and process safety management of the contractors for
the demonstration phase will be directly regulated by DOE in
a manner defined by the terms and conditions of the
contract. In anticipation that NRC may regulate the
production phase that is beginning in 2004, DOE intends to
regulate in a manner consistent with NRC principles and
concepts.
The TWRS privatization program has chosen to base
its regulatory program on an integrated safety management
approach. This approach extends the compliance basis for
demonstration of safety by DOE contractors to a clear
responsibility by the contractors for safety on a continuing
basis across the span of contractor activities.
Consistent with applicable laws and within the
. 63
context of a thorough hazard analysis, the contract, subject
to a DOE sanctioned process, identifies a set of standards
or safety requirements and standards tailored to the
contractor's activity. The contractor certifies that when
approved by DOE and implemented by the contractors, the set
of safety standards covering the contractor facility will
provide adequate safety, complies with applicable
regulations and conforms to the DOE's sanctioned top-level
safety principles. Among the top-level safety principles
are the IAEA, basis for safety principles for nuclear power
plants that is 75 NSEG 3. The principles also appear
generally in the NRC's proposed method for regulating major
material, that is NUREG-1324.
Along with the concept for the proposed amendment
to 10 CFR 70, the TWS regulatory program is based on an
integrated safety management. The benefits to be realized
from the integrated safety management include an integrated
approach to safety across the full set of hazards,
radiological, nuclear and chemical process safety and plant
safety, incident to the contractor's activities. It
provides an integrated evaluation basis for balanced control
of hazards, emphasizes the contractor's responsibility and
ownership for integrated, continuous safety of the
contractor's activities, not just compliance with a set of
requirements imposed by law or by the DOE. It provides
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improved certainty for regulation of DOE, the Tank Waste
Remediation privatization contractor and provides in
combination with privatization incentives for effectiveness
and efficiency.
During DOE regulation of the TWRS privatization
demonstration phase, NRC modification of its rules with
knowledge of lessons learned from the DOE regulatory
experience from TWRS to emphasize integrated safety
management is expected to enhance both DOE's and NRC's
ability for the seamless transfer -- that is, if it
occurs -- to the regulation of the TWRS privatization
contractor. That is, going from DOE to NRC.
In addition to efficiencies that could be achieved
by the two agencies, the continuing stable integrated safety
management regulatory bases are expected to enhance
contractors' efficiencies and effectiveness. The TWRS
regulatory program for privatization contractors supports
the principles of integrated safety analysis, planning and
management in NRC's 10 CFR 70.
Thank you.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Thank you.
MR. BURTON: I think Mr. Wooley was supposed to
speak first in the order of things but, if he isn't here,
I'll go ahead.
Good morning, Chairman Jackson, and Commissioners
. 65
Rogers and Dicus. I thank you for the opportunity to be at
this meeting. My name is Harold Burton. I am Senior Vice
President at SCIETECH, Incorporated. We are a technical
services company specializing in nuclear safety.
I participated as an invitee to the November 1995
workshop and my discussions are a matter of record in that
discussion. My reasons for speaking today are two-fold.
From 1987 to 1990, I led the design, construction and
licensing of the new AGU fuel fabrication facility and
Category I storage facility for UNC Naval Products. The
licensing was performed to, I would call it, again newly-
revised Part 70 regulations because they were under
continuous revision. While this was a license for a new
facility at an existing site, it was treated as a license
amendment but a new SAR was prepared for the facility so we
were doing it in a somewhat unusual fashion.
We received a prompt review from the NRC and also
the amendment to the license to the NRC. We did that by use
of very skilled staff and in the form and also carefully
following the guidance that we received from the NRC in
order to meet our schedule requirements. Much of that
guidance was in the form of discussions and the requirements
of the regulations were sometimes confusing and somewhat
difficult to follow. This increased our concern over the
timely approval of our application and our schedule was very
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tight.
Had we had a standard review plan and a standard
format and content guide and clear guidances to the safety
analysis requirements and meeting necessary and sufficient
conditions for the application of standards to the facility
design, I would have felt much more confident in having a
degree of control over our amendment application and
response to the questions.
As it was, we worked closely with the Staff and
achieved the objective but in a fashion which was subject to
more individual interpretations than I would have preferred.
Currently, my company, SCIETECH, Incorporated, provides
licensing services to applicants including individuals from
the Department of Energy for materials licenses. We are
involved in a number of projects which, I believe, need
clear guidance and the best guidance is succinct, clear
regulations.
Many of these projects have a great deal of
uncertainty because of the question, who will regulate them
and to what regulation. One of the reasons for this
uncertainty is the uncertainty of the Part 70 regulation
changes. It is in our interest and that of our clients to
have a single set of regulations for facilities,
particularly for new facilities, regardless of whether they
are built on DOE property or on private property.
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Based upon these stated reasons and the statements
that I made in November, I am in favor of a comprehensive
change to the Part 70 regulations. I believe the draft is
good. It can be improved with explicitly defining safety
performance criteria and it contains a number of safety
performance criteria and some can be added.
I would like the NRC, DOE and current licensees to
work together to finalize the draft regulation. The
requirements of applicants with sufficient quantity of
materials to have a criticality should be significantly
different from those applicants with very small quantities
of nuclear materials.
The scope of the integrated safety analysis should
be defined as a part of finalizing the regulation. Also,
the regulation must have a standard format and content guide
and a standard review plan for applicants. Therefore, I
would urge the Commission to pursue alternative five as
outlined by the Staff. However, I also believe that the
current fuel cycle licensees will benefit little from the
new regulations. They have a significant evidence of safety
from their current operations.
Therefore, I would urge the Commission to allow a
phase-in period for the current licensees, something like
five to seven years, for them to adhere to the new
regulations. In that manner, I believe they could use their
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existing staff to prepare their ISA and minimize the cost
impact of the regulatory change.
Thank you for the opportunity to speak.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Thank you very much. I see
people appearing at all times.
Let me just ask this question. Are you
Mr. Wooley?
MR. WOOLEY: I am Mr. Wooley.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: All right, Mr. Burton, you have
spoken. Mr. Vieth, you have spoken. Is there a Mr. Earl
Carnes here?
MR. WOOLEY: No.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Okay, so, once we hear from
you, there are no other people appearing from the woodwork;
is that correct?
MR. WOOLEY: Not that I know of.
Good morning, Chairman Jackson, Commissioners
Rogers and Dicus. On behalf of the United States Enrichment
Corporation, I thank you for the opportunity to participate
in this meeting. USEC's chief executive officer, Nick
Timbers, has asked me to give you his regards.
My name is Rob Wooley and I am the manager of
nuclear regulatory assurance and policy. My reasons for
wanting to speak to you today are two-fold. First, USEC is
in the process of applying for a certification for gaseous
. 69
diffusion plants in accordance with 10 CFR Part 76. Our
experience with this process to date has provided some
valuable lessons learned relevant to the Commission's
deliberations on Part 70.
Second, passage of the USEC Privatization Act in
April established our proposed AVLIS plant as a Part 70
facility. We intend to apply for a license for AVLIS for
next year. As a result, it is in our interest to
participate in any efforts to improve the Part 70 licensing
process.
Our recommendations for the Commission are focused
in these areas: Clarity and defining of the requirements
and detail to be provided in applications filed by new
licensees, adoption of clear performance criteria and
application of new requirements based on cost/benefit
considerations.
At a Commission meeting held last March, Dr. Carl
Paperiello made an important point about USEC's application
for certification of its gaseous diffusion plants. He said
that, and I quote, "Had we to do it all over again, I," that
is Dr. Paperiello, "would have provided written expectations
to the U.S. Enrichment Corporation."
As reflected in Dr. Paperiello's statement, both
the NRC and the applicant recognized the importance of
establishing clear, unambiguous requirements. Although Part
. 70
76 was specifically developed for certification of the
operating Paducah and Portsmouth gaseous diffusion plants,
its implementation proved unpredictable.
Our original certification application involved
over six months of intense effort and was based on our
understanding of the requirements of 10 CFR 76 supplemented
by established guidance documents used throughout the fuel
cycle industry. After it was rejected, we spent another
four months meeting with the NRC Staff and revising the
application based on those meetings.
We have now submitted three revisions and have
answered more than 2,000 questions. Our experience
highlights the lack of predictability in the process. While
certification is unique to the GDPs, our experience is an
example of what could be expected were the draft Part 70
guidance applied to existing licensees. From our
experience, we offer three recommendations for improvement
that should be made in the Part 70 licensing process.
One, predictability. New facilities or those
coming under NRC regulation for the first time will enjoy a
more predictable process if NRC first defines what must be
addressed in an application and to what detail. Our first
application was rejected in part because it lacked
sufficient detail.
For the process to be predictable, both the
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applicant and the NRC Staff must work toward a common set of
requirements to a necessary level of detail. Precise
definitions of requirements in a rule coupled with clear
guidance on the level of detail and acceptable methods for
satisfying those requirements will greatly enhance the
predictability of the process. We hope to work with the NRC
to improve the predictability of the AVLIS licensing
process.
Two, justify changes. During the certification
process, many of the draft Part 70 requirements were applied
to the GDPs. We are making hardware and software changes at
the two gaseous diffusion plants amounting to approximately
$150 million. While these changes will unquestionably
improve the margin of safety at the plants, there has been
no systematic examination of the risk reduction associated
with the changes, let alone a determination that these
changes are the most beneficial changes. Both the NRC and
the applicant would be best served by adoption of a
requirement that proposed changes be justified on a risk
reduction basis before imposition.
And, third, performance criteria. Evaluation of
changes as well as predictability of the process will be
greatly enhanced by adoption of clear, explicitly defined
safety performance criteria against which the plant is
tested. Such criteria are available for reactors in 10 CFR
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100. Performance criteria are needed as a basis for
determining whether plant changes are warranted and for the
application of quality assurance measures. Criteria are
needed to better define what constitute an adequate level of
protection of plant employees and the public.
We support the industry's recommendation that the
NRC require either a reasonably scoped integrated safety
assessment or an acceptable alternative approach. The
integrated safety assessment proposed by the industry could
serve as the basis for examining the safety benefit of
proposed changes. We would like to be involved in any NRC
discussions to define the methodology, scope and content of
such ISAs as well as the parameters of any alternative
approaches.
We are now in the process of performing an ISA
using the draft NUREG-1513 guidance as an integral part of
the current design process for our proposed AVLIS plant.
NRC Staff has expressed an interest in meeting with us to
discus our approach toward this ISA and we look forward to
cooperating with them in this area.
In summary, we encourage the NRC and the industry
to learn from the GDP certification experience and to strive
toward a more predictable process for applying NRC
regulation to new facilities and those coming under NRC
regulation for the first time. In addition, we encourage
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the NRC to adopt clear safety performance criteria and to
consciously weigh the costs and safety benefits on applying
new requirements to existing facilities.
Thank you.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Thank you.
COMMISSIONER ROGERS: Just a question for
Mr. Vieth. In your integrated safety management program, do
you do quantitative safety analysis or are these some kind
of a mixed collection? In other words, how quantitative are
your safety assessments?
MR. VIETH: We haven't started this yet. We will
be adopting, for the most part, the concept used by the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration with regard to
the preliminary hazards analysis but there will be
quantitative estimations of the risk to the public and to
the workers from exposures and so on. I expect both
deterministic and probabilistic.
COMMISSIONER ROGERS: Thank you.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Thank you.
I think what we are coming out of this with is
clearly an integrated safety approach is the key that
undergirds whatever is done. I think that removing -- and I
think the Commission would agree, that this is the
undergirding -- and removing an overly prescriptive approach
is important. Stability and predictability of regulation is
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important. Recognition of the differences between existing
facilities and new ones in either regulations themselves or
how they are implemented is important. The quantities of
special nuclear materials are important, that performance
criteria really need to be laid out and cost/benefit
justifications have to exist and that as part of all of this
that a risk-informed approach is very important.
So I think I will end as I ended before, which is
the following:
First, I think we are moving along the line and we
invite and await any petition that any group would like to
submit that moving along the line of either changes to Part
70 or a new Part 70 is not something that can be unduly
dragged out again. As such, then, it cannot hinge on
detailed negotiations with respect to what an integrated
safety approach is. That is something that has to be worked
out along the way and particularly with respect to
implementation.
The final comment is that I would not like to
disabuse the NRC Staff and therefore the industry that would
be subject to this from clarification and of existing
guidance. I think it is important that any clarification
and solidification and consolidation of existing guidance
that can be done should be done but without de facto adding
new regulatory requirements in the process of doing that.
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I think, Mr. Wooley, your comments speaking from a
comment of Dr. Paperiello's that had there been more
standard guidance in place as to what was required, et
cetera, perhaps in the form of a standard review plan, would
have been helpful, but I think USEC has been the learning
vehicle relative to applying requirements to existing
facilities and I think all of us have come out of that with
a better appreciation for what could be done differently.
So, having said that, unless there are other
people in the woodwork, generically described, the meeting
is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:56 a.m., the briefing was
concluded.]
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