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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Title: Reactor Oversight Process

Initial Implementation Evaluation Panel

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1	UNTIED STATES OF AMERICA
2	NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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4	REACTOR OVERSIGHT PROCESS (ROP)
5	INITIAL IMPLEMENTATION EVALUATION PANEL (HEP)
6	+ + + +
7	MEETING
8	+ + + +
9	MONDAY,
10	APRIL 2, 2001
11	+ + + +
12	ROCKVILLE, MARYLAND
13	+ + + +
14	The panel met at 9:00 a.m., at the Nuclear
15	Regulatory Commission, Room 1F16, One White Flint
16	North, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland,
17	Loren R. Plisco, Chairman, presiding.
18	INITIAL IMPLEMENTATION EVALUATION
19	PANEL MEMBERS PRESENT:
20	LOREN R. PLISCO, Chairman
21	A. RANDOLPH BLOUGH
22	KENNETH E. BROCKMAN
23	MARY E. FERDIG
24	STEVE FLOYD
25	DAVID A. GARCHOW
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1	INITIAL IMPLEMENTATION EVALUATION
2	PANEL MEMBERS PRESENT (Continued):
3	RICHARD D. HILL
4	ROD M. KRICH
5	ROBERT A. LAURIE
6	JAMES H. MOORMAN, III
7	STEVEN A. REYNOLDS
8	A. EDWARD SCHERER
9	RAYMOND G. SHADIS
10	JAMES M. TRAPP
11	ALSO PRESENT:
12	CHIP CAMERON, NRC/OGC
13	DOUG COE, NRC
14	BILL DEAN, NRC/NRR
15	RONALD K. FRAHM, JR., NRC/NRR
16	TIM FRYE, NRC
17	ROGER HUSTON, Licensing Support Services
18	DON HICKMAN, NRC/NRR
19	JEFF JACOBSON, NRC/NRR
20	MIKE JOHNSON, NRC/NRR
21	STEVE KLEMENTOWICZ, NRC/NRR
22	PETER KOLTAY, NRC/NRR
23	SCOTT MORRIS, NRC/OEDO
24	CHRIS NOLAN, NRC/OE
25	VONNA ORDAZ, NRC/NRR

1	ALSO PRESENT (Continued):
2	ROGER PEDERSEN, NRC/NRR
3	DEANN RALEIGH, LIS, Scientech
4	WAYNE SCOTT, NRC/NRR
5	JOHN THOMPSON, NRC/NRR
6	SEE-MENG WONG, NRC/NRR
7	SUSAN YIM, Winston & Strawn

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1	P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S
2	(9:00 a.m.)
3	CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Let's go ahead and get
4	started.
5	Welcome to the fifth meeting of the
6	Initial Implementation and Evaluation Panel.
7	PARTICIPANT: It seems like the 23rd.
8	CHAIRMAN PLISCO: It is only the fifth.
9	It seems a lot more.
10	This is a public meeting. There is a
11	sign-up sheet by the door for those non-panel members.
12	The meeting is transcribed.
13	We'll provide some opportunities for any
14	public comments at the end of each session. We didn't
15	receive any written comments before the meeting to
16	hand out.
17	Let me go through the agenda for the next
18	two days. You can see what to expect. We'll just do
19	some administrative business this morning. At 9:30,
20	Bill Dean will be in from the Inspection Program
21	Branch at NRR to give us an update on the reactor
22	oversight process, to give us the status of where they
23	are in the self-assessment program, and to provide a
24	brief summary of the results from the lessons learned

workshop, the external lessons learned workshop which

was held last week, and a number of us were there.

We'll continue with that discussion in the afternoon to allow the opportunity for any of the panel members to provide their feedback on that lessons learned workshop also.

We did have some time blocked out this afternoon for some external invited stakeholders, but we didn't get any takers for that. So what we'll really do is move into the main objective for this month's meeting, is to go through the issues that we've developed. We did the initial prioritization the last two months, and John and I have gone through and tried to summarize what those issues are and put down what the priority was and what the impact on the program goals.

And you should have in your stack of handouts there in front of you a list of those issues. Actually that has all of the areas except for the SDP, and we're going to finish that tonight and get that to you tomorrow, but we'll go through those one by one and make sure we have captured the issue to help us put the final report together.

Tomorrow we'll continue that discussion and really have the whole day up until two o'clock allotted to go through those issues and make sure we

1 have captured the theme or any messages that we want to provide in our final report. 2 3 And then we'll do our last agenda planning 4 session and talk about where we go from here as far as 5 preparation for our final report. the last meeting, we had talked 6 7 tentatively about a meeting set up for April 25th, and we'll talk about that and what the objectives for that 8 meeting might be if we still want to have it. 9 Any questions on the agenda and the plan 10 11 for today and tomorrow? 12 (No response.) CHAIRMAN PLISCO: I did want to mention a 13 14 couple of administrative things. First, I don't know 15 if everyone knows. John Monninger and his wife, they had a baby daughter on Friday. 16 17 (Applause.) CHAIRMAN PLISCO: We had asked her to wait 18 19 until after this meeting, but she did not cooperate. 20 So because of that we had a contingency plan set up. 21 We have designated Ron Frahm here in the back from NRR 22 as our Designated Federal Official for this meeting, 23 to help us out and keep track of what we've discussed and take care of some of our administrative items as 24

we go through the meeting.

We're expecting Mary to be here -- I know her flight was getting late -- last night, and hopefully we'll see her soon. Jim Setser could not attend. He had personal issues, and he's not going to be able to come, but I'm going to go ahead and forward electronically the issue sheets to him to see if he has any comments, and I'll get those before we put that report together.

The last thing I wanted to mention was Bill Borchardt was involved in a reorganization within actually many of the offices of NRR, and he has moved over to the Associate Director of NRR, and he will have cognizance of the inspection program. That will be under his authority. Actually Bill Dean will work for him.

We had discussion last week and today. He thought probably the best avenue is to recuse himself from the panel, even though he was in OE, since he'll be in the line, and we had a long discussion I know in our first meeting about our independence and some sensitivity of the panel members in that line change for the organization that's in charge of the programs. So he thought it would be best to just go ahead and recuse himself.

MR. KRICH: That's a heck of a way to get

1 out of having to sit on the panel. 2 CHAIRMAN PLISCO: That's exactly what I 3 told him. 4 (Laughter.) 5 CHAIRMAN PLISCO: What people would do. Well, if we could, I guess 6 MR. KRICH: 7 what I'd like to suggest because I think Bill had a lot of good input to this, and I hate to lose that. 8 9 So is there maybe some way we can get him to provide us written input, you know, from his time on the 10 11 panel? 12 CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Yeah, I can talk to him about that, and he did have a couple of alternate 13 14 suggestions as far as, you know, he was really 15 representing the Office of Enforcement to provide that perspective. 16 Right. 17 MR. KRICH: CHAIRMAN PLISCO: And he and a number of 18 staff members in OE -- actually, Chris Nolan sat in on 19 our first meeting, and he was going to ask them to 20 21 come down when we have -- he's here. Hi, Chris. 22 So if we have any issues that come up or 23 questions and we're looking for some input from that 24 perspective, Chris will help us with that and provide 25 that.

1 MR. KRICH: I'd still like to get 2 something from Bill himself on --I can talk to 3 CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Okay. 4 Bill about that and provide his perspective, but 5 again, because of the sensitivity, and we did have about a three-hour discussion, I think, on our first 6 7 meeting about the sensitivity, the independence, and that's why he thought that was probably the best way 8 to handle that even though I just think he just 9 started the job last week. 10 11 MR. FLOYD: Well, considering the amount 12 of time he's been in the job and the fact that if he gave us comments in writing they'd be part of the 13 14 public record, I think that that would be 15 appropriate thing to do. 16 CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Okay. I'll do that. I'll talk to him about that. 17 Any other questions on that? 18 19 (No response.) 20 CHAIRMAN PLISCO: The meeting minutes in 21 your package in front of you, and there are copies out 22 from, is the summary of last month's meeting. John's 23 working now on getting the transcript on the Web page. 24 I don't think it's on. It's not no the Web page yet, 25 but it should be there soon, but this is the brief

1 summary, and a copy of some of the attachments that we 2 used. 3 Okay, and as I said earlier, as far as the 4 panel's wish list of external stakeholders, we had two 5 left. One was Jim Riccio. We approached him and asked him if he'd be interested in discussing his 6 7 issues with the panel this month, and he declined. with 8 Ι also worked our Office 9 Congressional Affairs to see if there was any interest 10 from the congressional staff to come over and provide 11 us any viewpoints, and because of their schedule and 12 other things that are going on in preparation for the spring recess, they declined also to come over at this 13 14 point and provide us any input. 15 So, Loren, will you note MR. GARCHOW: that somehow in the record just for the completeness 16 of seeing that we were reaching out --17 18 CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Yes. 19 MR. GARCHOW: -- to anybody and everybody 20 we could think of? Put that in the front of the 21 report. 22 And actually CHAIRMAN PLISCO: that 23 reminds me of one more thing. What I had hoped to do 24 is if we can get through the discussion of all these 25 issues today and tomorrow and at the end of tomorrow

try to capture any other thought as far as things we
want to make sure we include in the body of our report
that aren't necessarily hi captured, the
specific issues as far as general overall themes or
thoughts that we want to capture in the report. I'd
like to talk about those tomorrow near the end of the
day, you know, such as that so that when we put those
together we make sure we get those things captured.
MR. LAURIE: Loren, do you know what the
status is of David Lochbaum's petition on I don't
know the exact specifics of it. Do you know what I'm
talking about? It's called a petition.
CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Yeah, with petition to
require the performance indicators to be made.
MR. LAURIE: Yes.
CHAIRMAN PLISCO: The submittal to be made
part of the
MR. LAURIE: Yeah. Do you know what the
status is?
CHAIRMAN PLISCO: I do not, but when Bill
Dean is here this morning, maybe we can ask him
directly, and he can probably
MR. FLOYD: It's out for public comment,
comments due back towards the end of April, I believe
it is.

1 MR. LAURIE: And is that something that 2 the full Commission deals with? 3 MR. FLOYD: Yeah. 4 CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Yeah, when Bill's here 5 this morning, he's expected and we're going to start at 9:30. We can talk to him about that. 6 7 MR. KRICH: Loren, just out of curiosity, when you approached Jim Riccio, was he unable to do 8 this because of just schedule of problems or was he 9 just not interested in talking to the panel? 10 11 CHAIRMAN PLISCO: I don't know. I can 12 talk to John. John talked to them, and he's actually talked to them, I think, the previous meeting and for 13 14 this meeting, and I couldn't tell you. I don't recall 15 what it was as far as it was scheduled issues or 16 anything else, but I can get an answer to that. 17 I'd be interested. MR. KRICH: 18 CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Okay. And what you 19 should have in front of you for handouts are the 20 February meeting summary that I sent to Sam Collins with some of the attachments. 21 22 Well, the reason we do that is some of 23 them are large. We just include those electronically. 24 We didn't give you all of them. 25 There was an E-mail sent out by Ed --

1 where is Ed? -- on the Time magazine article. We have 2 copies of that out front. Our meeting agenda, you should have that, 3 4 and then you should have a package of the issues that 5 we've developed so far, and this includes all of them except for the SDP issues, and as I said, we'll finish 6 7 those tonight and get that out tomorrow. I didn't think we'd get through all of 8 9 these today. So I knew I would have the time to do 10 that tonight. 11 What I've done, and you can just look at 12 the first sheet as an example, is just provide a summary of the issue, what our initial priority was, 13 14 and what I call primary program goals. What John and 15 I did is go through the eight goals that we were going to measure success again, and the primary ones, the 16 ones that got essentially the most votes across the 17 panel, we included those. 18 19 Obviously many of these issues really 20 cross many, many of the goals, and we decided just for 21 brevity's sake to pick the ones that appeared to be 22 the primary ones. 23 And tried to provide brief 24 description of the issue. In cases where we had some

examples to better explain it, we included those, and

then what we're calling right now a panel recommendation.

Some we got from the discussion. Some were sort of inferred by the way that some of the write-ups were provided, and we'll talk about those as we go through those. I think there's one or two that I still have the panel recommendation blank because it wasn't clear once I went back to look at our notes to where we were headed as far as what our panel recommendation is, if any, and we'll talk about some of those, too.

Let's see. Any general questions about those?

MR. GARCHOW: Is it your anticipation, Loren, as we get through these this essentially becomes the report with some sort of opening description of what we did and then these attachments, just some just blend into the report?

CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Right. John and I are working right now on the format for the report and how we want to lay that out, and we could talk about that, too, as far as any suggestions people have how we are -- we'll provide, you know, like some kind of cover letter to present our results, and then a general overview as far as what the panel did, how we

conducted our business, you know, the external 1 2 stakeholders we talked to. 3 And I think right now our thinking is the details, as in this level of detail, will be 4 5 essentially an attachment to the report, and then we'll try to summarize some of the issues in the front 6 7 of the report, like in an executive summary type 8 discussion. And then there would be a 9 MR. KRICH: 10 section for minority opinions as we had agreed upon in 11 the --12 CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Right, right. And we can do that with in the body of the report or, you 13 14 know, on these individual sheets. 15 MR. KRICH: Right. CHAIRMAN PLISCO: I mean, this might be 16 the better place to do that, is on these individual 17 sheets. If there's other comments or minority views 18 19 that we want to add, we can just put them right on 20 these sheets. 21 And our intention is, as I said, to go 22 through each one of these during this meeting, gather 23 those comments, and John and I will pull the front 24 part of the report together, get that out to you 25 electronically, get some additional comments to

1 finalize that report, which we're shooting for the end 2 of the month, end of April. 3 And again, that's what I was going to talk 4 about, too, is that the need for that meeting on April 5 25th, where we see how far we get by tomorrow, whether we still need to do that or the other option is really 6 7 what they did in the PPEP panel, was once the report got to that point, just do it electronically, 8 9 know, send it out, gather comments electronically and go through several iterations of the report that way. 10 It is harder for me to do it that way, but 11 We can do it that way. 12 we can. MR. BROCKMAN: From one who was on the 13 14 initial, it's just as hard as a member to try to fit 15 that into your normal work schedule. You get captured 16 by other things. 17 CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Yeah. 18 MR. BROCKMAN: I'll So express 19 preference now. We'll do better coming together. 20 CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Yeah, and just have the one-day meeting and just finalized and see if there's 21 22 any other needed discussion on the issues. 23 I would support that also. MR. KRICH: 24 CHAIRMAN PLISCO: MR. GARCHOW: 25 If you could get that out

1 before that meeting, when we're just coming in then --2 CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Yeah. MR. BROCKMAN: Come in educated. 3 CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Yeah, and John and I, 4 5 before he ran off to pick his wife up from the hospital discussed that this morning, our time line to 6 7 making sure we can get the draft of the report pulled together and get it out to you in time before that 8 April 25th meeting so that you have time to go through 9 that before the meeting. It will make the meeting 10 11 more efficient, and that's what we intend to do. 12 But if there are any other suggestions, we're still laying out the report format as far as 13 14 what we need to include. We obviously went back and 15 looked at the PPEP report to see how that was laid We'll probably use some parts of that format. 16 17 But I think a lot of the issues in the previous panel were sort of general. There wasn't a 18 19 lot of experience. We do have a lot more detail and 20 You know, you can see it specifics. in these 21 individual sheets, and it's the experience gained this 22 year. 23 Is it your intention that MR. SHADIS: 24 this meeting on April 25th be the final meeting of 25 this panel?

CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Yes.

MR. SHADIS: I can see looking at my own schedule where I would have to do an awful lot of work, jam it in to make certain that the minority view, if you will, is captured.

The more we get into this method of picking out small bits and pieces of this program and critiquing each of those, sort of in education what we call an atomistic approach, if you can pardon that, the more I keep pulling back to take a high level view of this, and Bill Dean's recounting of the origins of the ROP at the workshop, you know, really triggered, you know, my concern that the Commission's intention to avoid situations like the Maine Yankee situation, where so much had slipped by and then was caught up in the independent safety assessment, that that not be repeated.

And right now I don't have the assurance, and maybe I'm missing things, but going over all of these really narrowly focused details on the reactor oversight process so far doesn't give me assurance that that goal is going to be met.

You know, the lack of complete design basis information, the lack of comparable PRAs for comparable plants, I mean, at this point we're very

uncertain about enforcement as to whether or not it 1 2 can be anticipated predictable. 3 So I don't see how this program will be 4 much better, if any better, at catching those problem 5 plants, and so anyway, it leaves me with, you know, working at these really big block, basic issues. 6 7 And so I have to say that between now and April 25th, given the work load that I have, I don't 8 know if I can get material in front of the panel for 9 consideration well in advance of the 25th and how that 10 11 would be then incorporated. 12 What. time MR. LAURIE: are t.he constraints, Loren? You have to submit the report by? 13 14 What's the end date? 15 CHAIRMAN PLISCO: The end of April was the 16 original target. The intent is to get our report out 17 just in time for the staff to have a chance to see it before they submit their report to the Commission, 18 19 their, you know, end of the year report to the 20 Commission. 21 MR. KRICH: Could I ask, Ray, how much 22 time you think you would need in order to do what you 23 want to do? 24 MR. SHADIS: I don't know. I'm iust --25 I'm firing cautionary flares up here because, you

1 know, it may well be that I could sum those issues in 2 short order and have them down here next week, but the -- or even in the matter of a few days. 3 4 But to build the documentation to support 5 or put away those concerns, one way or the other, you know, I don't see it happening much before the middle 6 7 of the next month, just, you know, looking at it at my 8 schedule. My schedule shouldn't be the driver, but 9 10 it's just the way it is. 11 MR. GARCHOW: I think there's room in the 12 I guess I would say if you had a minority opinion or something fit in a different view, I guess 13 14 I wouldn't say that the standard would be you would 15 have to assemble a large amount of supporting or refuting evidence. 16 17 I think what brought the panel together was for the sort of collective expertise and, you 18 19 know, professional backgrounds, and there is room in 20 the report for judgments and some examples in the 21 minority opinions without, I would think, a lot of 22 time and effort, needing, you know, to build a 23 justification package. 24 I certainly wouldn't need it to support a 25 minority opinion on something.

CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Yeah, and I think for the purposes of this panel that's why we're here, is to hear their individual views. I don't think you have to provide a lot of information to back up your -- I mean, if it's your view, it's your view, and that's why people were asked to be on the panel.

I don't think you have to, you know, develop a case study really to demonstrate that, and I think a lot of people here have, you know, seen parts of the program. I think as you raise your issues, I think they'll, you know, understand that.

MR. SHADIS: Over the next week or two, and I, you know, am committed to work on this, but over the next week or two, as I am looking for documentation, would NRC commit to helping to dig out those basic documents?

I have more or less some of the same problems that Mr. Lochbaum has with the ADAMS thing. In fact, we're rejecting the whole Garden of Eden thesis now because of ADAMS, but, yeah, in any case, I really would like to be able to examine some of the underlying language for developing the goals that were developed, and I'd like to see where the Commission was coming from because I do see this not only as a public, but the report to the а report to

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1 Commissioners, and now I'd like to know if we are 2 speaking the same language. specific 3 CHAIRMAN PLISCO: What 4 information are you talking about? I'm not sure I 5 caught what you're looking --MR. SHADIS: Well, I wasn't. All of the 6 7 insights, if you will, whatever I've been able to bring to this, have been largely based on specific 8 examples. How does it work in a specific example when 9 you have an inspection finding or whatever? 10 11 I think the first meeting I came in with 12 some inspection findings on similar issues where the findings were different, wanted to know how that 13 14 happened. 15 And given that, you know, Bill Dean essentially said that the genesis of this whole thing 16 17 was in the Millstone Maine Yankee cases, I really would like to reach back and try to relate the 18 19 response to the stimulus for the program for those 2.0 cases. 21 So if there's correspondence, if there are Commission directives, if there are Commission meeting 22 23 minutes that led to the development of the reactor 24 oversight process, I really would love to be able to

look through them to see if that's the direction we're

1	headed.
2	The objectives that we've laid out here,
3	whatever there are, eight of them and the goals just
4	don't do it for me.
5	CHAIRMAN PLISCO: The only documents that
6	I know that really lay out the foundation are the two
7	SECY papers.
8	MR. FLOYD: Well, besides SECY 99-007 and
9	007A.
LO	CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Oh, oh, seven A
L1	MR. FLOYD: I think what might help him
L2	would be to take a look and read the Arthur Andersen
L3	report, which specifically looked at some of the past
L4	watch list plants and the timing situation, you know,
L5	there, and the SRM from the Commissioners to the staff
L6	to develop a replacement oversight process, given some
L7	of the findings in the Arthur Andersen report.
L8	Those would probably be the ones who would
L9	have the bulk of the pre-SECY 99-007 literature.
20	MR. SHADIS: Steve, has the Arthur
21	Andersen report been filed as a public document?
22	MR. FLOYD: Oh, yes, yeah.
23	MS. FERDIG: I'm also thinking there
24	meeting transcripts of two Commissioner level
25	stakeholder meetings that were held early in the

1 process. I'm thinking there was one in July '98 and 2 another in November, and those are available. And there were also principles that were 3 4 spelled out. Are they in one of the SECY reports or 5 were they --Are you talking about the 6 MR. FLOYD: 7 principles of good regulation? Is that -- that's 8 probably what it was. 9 MS. FERDIG: Yes. As I talk to people who went back to the origin of this, they frequently 10 11 reference this set of principles that were agreed upon 12 that had, I think, a lot of the performance based, risk informed, regulatory perspective. 13 14 MR. FLOYD: Those are available. 15 MR. BLOUGH: In terms of getting, Ray, 16 information you need, I quess the other, 17 Inspection Program Branch is here, and they probably have most of that, and the PDR is right across the 18 19 hall, right? 20 It certainly is. MR. SHADIS: 21 MR. BLOUGH: And you could actually get 22 that help without -- they actually do use ADAMS for 23 you there. So if I understand it right, you know, you don't have to negotiate out if yourself -- if you 24

either use that directly or call in via the 800

1	number.
2	MR. SHADIS: Yeah.
3	MR. BLOUGH: So I wonder if maybe it's
4	useful that Ron is here as a substitute today because
5	it seems like he's our quickest
6	CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Yeah. Well, I don't
7	think the problem was getting the information. It was
8	really understanding what exactly it was that he
9	needed. That's what I was trying to understand.
10	MR. BLOUGH: Okay.
11	CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Yeah, I don't think it's
12	a problem of getting it. It's just knowing what it is
13	we want to get.
14	MR. BLOUGH: Okay. I'm just getting to
15	the "how" then. How would be best to help Ray?
16	MR. GARCHOW: We can ask Bill Dean. I'm
17	sure some of the documents he has in the notebook on
18	his desk, if he works like everybody else does. I'm
19	sure he doesn't go to ADAMS unless electronically, I
20	would guess.
21	MR. LAURIE: So what's the end date for
22	filing a minority report?
23	MR. BLOUGH: If I could interrupt, I
24	guess
25	MR. SCHERER: I quess I'm a little

1 concerned that we're sitting here figuring out how to 2 write minority reports when the charter of the panel was to try to reach consensus, and then if and when 3 4 that fails. 5 MR. LAURIE: Well, Ι respectfully disagree, and I think what Ray has to say, I think 6 7 under our earlier discussions and agreements, anybody has a right, including myself or yourself, to offer 8 9 any additional comment, whether you call it a minority report or otherwise. 10 11 And all I'm asking is what's the deadline 12 for being able to accomplish that, and I would not expect a challenge on any additional comment that I 13 14 sought to offer or anybody else sought to offer. 15 CHAIRMAN PLISCO: And I would say, looking at our schedule, it's the 25th. That's the last time 16 17 we'll be together to talk. Now, I mean, obviously anyone can caveat their comments and say, you know, 18 19 they can provide their comments any time to the staff 20 or the Commission individually, but for the purposes 21 of getting our report out and having the other panel 22 members have an opportunity to see it and comment on 23 it, it will be the 25th. 24 MR. BLOUGH: I don't think we're presuming

that all of these views would be minority views

either. I mean, part of what I heard Ray say is that he would like another shot at the panel after he's done more research, you know, perhaps in swaying, if his views differ from where we are at a certain point in time, perhaps in swaying us on some or all of what he's go.

So I guess I agree with that. We shouldn't be presuming that there will be minority views at this point, but I guess we shouldn't presume that anyone's view is going to be the majority or minority at this point.

MR. SHADIS: I appreciate, you know, what you just laid out because it isn't necessarily even that I disagree with any of the findings that, you know, have come out of the panel and have been summarized. Most of those look fine by me. It's just the question for me of whether -- you know, what are the real basic foundation kinds of information that the ROP needs to be built on.

And, you know, my own sense is that without having the design basis information complete, without having the PRAs to some degree lined up, the underpinnings aren't there, and I guess I also have concerns with what the baseline inspection program looks like.

1 It may be, you know, from our perspective 2 that we're building a house of cards, made out of all 3 these little pieces. The foundation doesn't seem to 4 be there. 5 So in any case, what I'm getting to is that initially we did have some free wheeling 6 7 discussion, and then we got down to the business of putting away all of these little 8 issues. Му 9 difference may be in the approach to the program and 10 what is going to be included in the report as much as 11 any real difference about what the conclusions might 12 be. But I can't see signing off at the end of 13 14 this without eight myself or the panel thoroughly 15 addressing those basic what I call foundation issues. MR. BLOUGH: It would be good that you ask 16 17 for the panel because just listening to what you've said in terms of, you know, avoiding situations like 18 Millstone and Maine Yankee and also in terms of the 19 20 inspection program, my view is that on both those 21 accounts the new program is better than what we had, 22 and substantially. 23 So I guess it would be good to kind of

research we want to do. I'm just wondering now how we

debate after we've all done whatever

have that

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1 get Ray the information he wants to look at. 2 MS. FERDIG: Loren, I have a thought, too, that I wanted to put out now so that we can have it in 3 4 the backs of our minds, not having read this document. 5 The first meeting that I attended, which was the second meeting of the panel in Atlanta, we 6 7 spent quite а bit of time talking about the 8 perspective we would take on this report and the need 9 to identify those things that we thought substantiated the value of the ROP and document some of the positive 10 11 points that exemplified its movement in the direction 12 that was intended as well. So I think it's a balance relative to what 13 14 Ray is saying, and I notice that our conversations, 15 just because we are analytical people, have tended to focus on what we see as the critical priority issues 16 17 of concern, and I don't know that we are prepared or have a similar amount of documentation to identify 18 19 examples of things that would suggest why it may be, 20 indeed, moving in the direction that was intended. So do we have that, do you think, or do we 21 22 need to also consider how that will be a part of the 23 report? 24 CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Well, I mentioned 25 earlier, I think, we need -- I mean, we're going to

have to provide some over arching views of the program
in this cover letter of this report. You know, we
have a lot of details and specific issues that we have
raised, but as we talked in our first couple of
meetings, there are, you know, some overall
conclusions or views we're going to have to provide in
that report about the program.
We talked about views about the program
and views about the staff self-assessment process. We
have to address that also.
MS. FERDIG: I would just like to see that
substantiated with a sufficient amount of detail that
helped it hold its balance with the total message in
the report, as well as what's in the cover letter.
MR. LAURIE: I think that it's going to be
hard to do, and I understand the point, but any time
you develop a panel with 15 analytical people plus one
Californian, you're going to get
(Laughter.)
MR. LAURIE: Referring to myself, sir.
MR. BROCKMAN: Two Californians. Let the
record show two Californians.
MR. LAURIE: you're going to get an
analytical report, but I understand the necessity of
having at least a portion of the report written in

English, and that's going to fall upon the authors of the report to either have it read or written or reviewed by somebody else for translation purposes.

And that's really hard to do because the total audience is not going to all be analytical. A

total audience is not going to all be analytical. A portion of the audience will not. So it's a challenge.

MR. SCHERER: I guess part of my reason for my earlier comment was I seem to recall we spent a good portion of the first meeting of the panel talking about goals and trying to reach consensus on those points where we could reach consensus even if it took a bit of effort and a bit of wordsmithing to do that.

And I go back and look at the charter and that's where I seem to find the scope and the effort at consensus. Just to remind myself, the IIEP will evaluate the ROP results against performance measures. The IIEP will provide a written report containing an overall evaluation of the ROP to the Director of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

This report will include the consensus views of the panel or the majority and minority views when a panel consensus cannot be achieved, and I seem to recall a lot of discussion at that first meeting

trying to find areas of consensus, even if it took us a bit of time.

And I, very frankly, up to now had been pretty pleased at the consensus we have reached when we've discussed the subjects at hand. I see no reason that process shouldn't continue as we work through the report and try to achieve those areas where we can reach consensus. When we can't, so be it.

MR. LAURIE: I certainly am not suggesting anything to the contrary, Ed. What are you making reference to? All of this seems to go back to Ray's stated intent. I mean, the report and my only comment was that I hope he's provided sufficient latitude to do that.

That does not take away my desire for full effort for consensus statements to the greatest degree possible.

MR. SHADIS: And, Robert, the only reason that I'm even suggesting doing that is because of the press of time, and you know, seeing how the material that we have for the basis for a report has developed in these small blocks of information, and I'm -- after attending the workshop on the ROP, I'm not focused on the idea of avoiding what Bill Dean -- and Bill Dean, I guess, will be here in a bit -- but avoiding what he

said the Commissioners' intent was in stimulating the beginnings of this, which was to avoid running into the kinds of surprises that came with Millstone and Maine Yankee.

And I have to say, too, that the tool that opened up all those issues, that was the diagnostic evaluation team or in the case of Maine Yankee what they called the independent safety assessment team, NRC has now done away with the diagnostic evaluation team program, and I don't see anything else there for a kind of diagnostic safety net to pick up on what may be missed, although granted it may well be an improvement, the new program, including the baseline inspection program.

I haven't, in listening to the presentations before the panel, I haven't heard a discussion of how that is, why that is, and whether or not it's a sufficient improvement to take the place of that safety net, that diagnostic evaluation team that would go, you know, through a plant thoroughly looking at both systems and management.

So I can't come to the conclusion that the new program is taking us where we want to go on all of these objectives. I mean all of them.

MR. KRICH: I guess I'd like to just add

1 one clarifying point to Ray. In addition to Millstone 2 and Maine Yankee, the revised reactor oversight 3 process was a recognition of the maturity that the 4 industry had achieved. 5 So there's a balance there that I think we need to keep in mind. 6 7 MR. SHADIS: I'm glad that you brought that up because that's part of the information, too. 8 9 I really don't have a handle on what the industry's 10 argument and correspondence were, you know, 11 industry people spoke to at the beginning of this 12 process. I know that in the case of Maine Yankee --13 14 here we fall back to the case of specific stuff all 15 the time -- in the case of Maine Yankee, the local 16 citizenry were first -- we were stunned to find out 17 how much was wrong with the plant. We were dismayed to have NRC basically say that even so, it was fit to 18 19 operate. 20 But what happened with the company was 21 that they brought in outside management, and it was 22 turmoil, and ultimately it was uneconomic to do all of 23 the repairs that needed to be done. 24 Our sense now is that it was not Maine

individual decision to

Yankee's

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new

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bring

management. We have the sense that there was a terrific amount of pressure from the industry because of the shock waves that went through when this plant tumbled, and that reverberated in the agency, and it affected the agency.

So, you know, the idea that the industry came in and said, "Yeah, but look, you know, we have all of these other indicators that say we're doing well, and we need to be recognized for it." And I'm pleased to hear you say that.

I just really would like to be able to get a handle on what the full game was and understand all of what went into it. That's the kind of thing we'll be looking to.

MR. FLOYD: I just want to add that you may be missing a piece of the new program if you think there's not a diagnostic evaluation. You're right there's no inspection called a DET like there was before, but if you look at the supplemental inspection procedures for a plant that is in the multiple degraded cornerstone category, which would typically have been the plants at a performance level that would have been getting a diagnostic, that supplemental procedure covers the elements that used to be included in a diagnostic examination.

1	So it's a similar procedure by a different
2	name, but that doesn't mean the same types of issues
3	aren't being evaluated and looked at.
4	MR. KRICH: Actually it's an advantage
5	having gone through that at Quad Cities. It focuses
6	the diagnostic evaluation in a specific area so that
7	you get a much deeper look than you do when you did it
8	the old DET where they went out across the entire
9	plant.
10	We found it to be quite effective. Much
11	as it was painful, it was still effective.
12	MR. REYNOLDS: Ray, just to be accurate,
13	the inspection at Quad Cities was not actually
14	there were three that Steve talked about. There were
15	two in production.
16	MR. FLOYD: There is a more comprehensive
17	one, which is the 95003, which does look across the
18	board in broad areas, not directly related.
19	MR. KRICH: I guess I see those as steps
20	in that overall process of doing an in-depth
21	MR. REYNOLDS: I believe 95003 inspection
22	at Indian Point-2 that was recently performed; is that
23	correct?
24	MR. BLOUGH: That's the only one that's
25	been done, and that report hasn't been issued yet.

1 It's due out this month. The public exit meeting 2 occurred in early March. The program staff is here. We could ask 3 4 them to compare and contrast the DET and the 95003. 5 I know they started, when they wrote 95003, they started with the DE -- the diagnostic evaluation 6 7 procedure that went there. Those special inspections, 8 MR. SHADIS: 9 what are we calling them? They're not augmented 10 inspection. 11 MR. BLOUGH: Supplemental. 12 MR. SHADIS: Supplemental inspections. So it's hard to keep up with the subtle language changes, 13 14 but you know, those are welcome, and I think they're 15 appropriate for the things that trigger them also. However -- and I think that we all know 16 that, as Rod said, they don't have the scope of the 17 diagnostic evaluation team inspections, and even the 18 19 diagnostic evaluation team inspections, although they 20 did find problems in some areas, the conclusions 21 weren't always -- from a public interest point of 22 view, the conclusions weren't always in line with the 23 findings. 24 You know, so it wasn't a perfect program, 25 I wouldn't begin to say let's go back and and

1 duplicate that program, but I do believe that, you 2 know, we may well not be capturing what was captured 3 in the two watershed events of Millstone and Maine 4 Yankee. 5 MR. KRICH: I didn't mean to imply that the scope -- didn't have the same scope, Ray. What I 6 7 was trying to say was actually it was approved, and 8 then I thought it was more focused. 9 Steve, did you have something? MR. FLOYD: Yeah, I was just going to say, 10 11 again, Rod was actually talking about the procedure 12 that they had at their plant, which was 95002, which was a focused inspection on the areas that were 13 14 identified that had problems. 15 If you go to the next cornerstone in the action matrix, the multiple degraded cornerstone, you 16 17 go into the 95003 which is a much broader looking, including in areas where there weren't any previously 18 19 identified problems under the assessment process to 20 see what the extent of condition might be in areas 21 that hadn't emerged yet. 22 it's much more analogous to а

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1 to be done under the diagnostic examination program 2 because there is. MR. KRICH: 3 Thanks. Steve. 4 MR. SHADIS: No, I understood that and 5 also the example now at Indian Point. You know, we're going to be looking forward to that. 6 7 My understanding of it is that even the Indian Point examination is not as extensive and not 8 9 as intensive as the diagnostic evaluation that was done at Millstone or the independent safety assessment 10 11 that was done at Maine Yankee, not the same number of 12 systems, not as wide a slice across the management end of things as was done there. 13 14 And so that's what I'm getting back to, 15 and I don't want to get into the point of, you know, debating it or arguing about it, but I'm really 16 looking for information. 17 In fact, if I could have it somehow, you 18 19 know, in the short amount of time we have, if I had 20 assurance from NRC staff that, you know, would show me 21 that these things did line up, that it had been 22 replaced with something that was as officious or even 23 more officious, even more effective, fine, you know. 24 That would take care of that issue.

But, you know, we don't see it at this

point.

MR. GARCHOW: I guess I'm a little I'll say confused, but there could be two ways the panel could go, and I thought we were heading one way. It doesn't mean either one was correct. We sort of had it as a de facto that we were implementing for a year, and that over that year there were objectives for the year and a diverse panel was going to be assembled to take some look at factual data and use experiences and backgrounds, along with what the staff provides us to assess whether those objectives over the last year were met or not, and that provides, I would say, some fences around the corral to make it even achievable to get a report out, right?

Now, given that great conversations, and I think we could probably have a lot of discussion around the framework of how we even got here, whether or not it goes back in history; those I'll say discussions and opportunities are always there, and there was a lot of dialogue and public comment period even before the first SECY paper came out to really do that compare and contrast.

And there were actually -- I think Steve can notice the documents actually -- they went back and looked at the problem plans and went back and sort

1 of transposed. If we were doing this process on those 2 plans, where would they have ended up in the action 3 matrix doing things like screening LERs and going back 4 into the public record? So fair amount of that was done. Whether 5 you had access to it or not, I don't know, but that 6 7 would be if the Committee was going to be going and, you know, John would say, "Okay. Is the basis still 8 sound to go forward?" which isn't really what I 9 thought that this Committee was doing. 10 11 It's going forward. There were some clear 12 objectives one year ago that were set out, and this panel was going to look at data to say did we meet 13 14 those objectives or did we not, as opposed to getting 15 into an in depth review of whether the framework was sound or not. 16 17 So I guess I am a little confused about what are we doing. 18 19 MR. SHADIS: Can I clarify or try to 20 clarify? 21 I think that you're right. I think the 22 panel has done an excellent job of going through the 23 data, you know, such as it's been presented, and 24 picking out whether or not it hits or misses and so 25 on.

And I would not even want to participate.

I probably would be absent from any meetings that got into going back and discussing the origins of this in any detail because I don't want to do that.

But what I'm seeing and what was evident, I think, at the workshop is that the reactor oversight process is still a work in progress. There are still in every category -- there are details that are also fundamental issues that are still being decided, and as such, you know -- and what I have to do in order to be able to pass judgment, if you will, is redefine it in terms that I'm familiar with, put it in my own language, and when I do that, and I put together an equation and it's got all of these factors, and then I see that there's, you know, one large blank in the middle of the equation that might have to do with design basis information or, you know, what's the confidence level in the PRAs, for example, as they inform the process, and I don't see these things there, then I become concerned.

MR. TRAPP: That's one of our main objectives though, is PRA quality, and that's one of our number one priorities. So maybe there's a lot more consensus than you think. Maybe we should just continue on and see how it works out.

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1	MR. SHADIS: Again, I don't disagree with
2	you. And I don't want the panel to stop doing
3	whatever it's doing, you know, because I have these
4	concerns, and I'm just automatically presuming and
5	a minority report, by the way, isn't necessarily a
6	contrary report. It may simply be a supplemental
7	report dealing with information that the panel itself
8	didn't have time to get into or didn't feel it needed
9	to get into.
10	And so what I was essentially asking for
11	there, given the short time frame we have, was some
12	help in getting to some of that basic information.
13	CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Yeah, and like I said,
14	I think if we can narrow it down, exactly what it is
15	you need, I think we can help.
16	And I think the other question is, you
17	know, I think for the panel to have a chance to talk
18	about it and see it, I mean, the 25th is our last
19	meeting.
20	MS. FERDIG: Exactly. I think that if
21	there are some foundational questions, that enough
22	though we are targeted and tasked to look at the one
23	year implementation, I certainly think that this is
24	the context for those questions to be asked.
25	MR. REYNOLDS: I was going to offer that

anything that the Inspection Program Branch cannot provide, I have an administrative staff that could go look for documents, and I'd be more than willing to make them available to Ray or Mary. You have to help us with the type of work, but we would go find those and get those to you, too, if you'd want. MR. SHADIS: I would appreciate that. MR. REYNOLDS: I'd make those available to If the Inspection Program Branch can't do that for whatever reason or they're busy with other tasks, I have administrative people that would be more than happy to chase down things, and they know how to use That is a plus for them. MR. SHADIS: I'd appreciate that. CHAIRMAN PLISCO: I would like to move on. Bill Dean is patiently waiting. Are you ready, Bill? MR. SHADIS: I didn't realize he was here, and here I've invoked his name in vain several times, we'll say. CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Are you ready to start, Bill? Copies of the slides are MR. FRAHM: available up front. I'll give them to panel members. MR. DEAN: Okay. Good morning, everybody. I appreciate the opportunity to come before you again

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and update you on status and answer your questions, and I guess we have the rest of the morning pretty much set aside towards sharing with you where we are with the oversight process.

Those of you that were here last week participated in the public lessons learned workshop.

I think that that was a very good workshop, and I think we got through a lot of issues.

I guess I would like to make just a couple of points before we get started maybe to help Ray out a little bit in terms of the diagnostic inspection. Some of the people here at the table appropriately characterize the fact that we model the supplemental inspection 95003 after the diagnostic inspection. I've heard some of the same comments regarding the scope and breadth, and the intent is to be able to focus that diagnostic inspection on the particular cornerstone or cornerstones that have been impacted.

But there is a lot of flexibility left to the region and the inspection team to take the past record and use that to characterize the scope and breadth of their inspection, but it is intended to be akin to the diagnostic inspections in the past, and I would say that Indian Point-2 would probably offer that they certainly received a lot of inspection

1 effort looking across a wide breadth of activity. 2 So I think that we've captured the spirit 3 of the diagnostic inspection team in the program. 4 The other comment I heard with respect to 5 implementation, and you did hear at the workshop there is a lot of work that's going on in a 6 7 lot of areas, but I would actually characterize some of that work as being whether or not we had a revised 8 9 reactor oversight process where we had the old process. I think some of the work that you would see 10 11 ongoing and discussed would be things that we would be 12 talking about. So I think a lot of the work that we have 13 14 in front of us is not so much work that's just related 15 to the fact that we have a revised reactor oversight 16 process, but the fact that we have an oversight 17 process at all. So I think, you know, there's a mix of 18 19 things that we're looking at. 20 MR. SHADIS: Bill, can I ask you just a 21 question with respect to the DET? 22 MR. DEAN: Yes. 23 Why was it that the DET MR. SHADIS: 24 wasn't killed right out there in public? Why was it that it was moved to a department that didn't have 25

funding for it and, therefore, is just sort 1 2 strangled? MR. DEAN: Yeah, I don't know all of the 3 4 background in terms of the decisions in terms of 5 budgeting. I think that the diagnostic inspection the last few opportunities we had to exercise that really 6 7 had migrated towards a process where we offered the licensees the opportunity to develop an independent 8 review group, and then we would oversee and follow 9 along behind that independent review group. 10 11 And I know that was exercised at some of 12 the last couple of plants in the last four or five I think we did that at Cooper. 13 14 MR. SHADIS: Cooper. 15 MR. DEAN: Cooper we did that, and it was a process that seemed to be fairly successful in terms 16 17 of obtaining insights. Okay? Now, our process that we have in the 18 19 oversight process is not like that per se. It doesn't 20 say you go out -- you know, we do our own independent 21 inspection. That's a key element of the new oversight 22 process, and so I think that it was felt that we 23 didn't need the administrative group that we had in 24 the old AEOD, I think, that supported the DETs. 25 Now, Alan Madison might be able to maybe

later if he pops in this morning; he might be able to provide you some more insights on that because he was part of that organization as they were transitioning. So Alan might be able to provide you perhaps some better insights than I can in terms of that organization's demise itself.

But I think the perception was that we had

But I think the perception was that we had captured the appropriate techniques and methodologies, and that we felt comfortable in going forward and integrating if there was a need to do that inspection, you know, utilizing the assembled staff in the body of work that we captured in the current oversight process to be able to support those types of inspections.

MR. SHADIS: Thank you.

MR. DEAN: Okay. First slide.

This is what I really want to talk with you all about this morning. We'll go over real briefly the feedback activities that we've utilized over the past year to collect feedback on the oversight process. I'll give you a short synopsis of what I believe the overall results of the first year have been.

I'll talk about some of the initial implementation issues, and then that will lead us into discussions of the external workshop and basically the

1 outcomes of each of the sessions we had there because 2 I know a lot of you didn't have the opportunity to participate in that. 3 So I think it would be 4 worthwhile sharing with you what we went in with in 5 terms of issues, what other issues emerged during the workshop, and then what were the outcomes of each of 6 7 those workshop sessions. And then we'll just spend a few minutes 8 9 talking about some major future milestones 10 activities, and so that's pretty much what we hope to 11 cover. 12 And, Loren, I'll look to you whenever you all want to take a break, you know, whatever is a good 13 14 time for you all. 15 Okay, and we'll be running -- is now a good time? 16 17 (Laughter.) MR. DEAN: Did Ken just get here again? 18 19 Okay. Next slide. 20 In terms of feedback activities, Okay. 21 just a -- some of this is kind of a reiteration, but 22 I think it's important to note that over this past 23 year and even before that, we've gone to great lengths 24 to communicate, solicit feedback, provide information

to a wide variety of stakeholders.

The first couple of bullets up there note some of the things that we've done in the public arena. After we began initial implementation each of the regions sent out managers to each reactor plant site, locality to meet with the public described in the oversight process, solicit feedback, comments, and discuss, you know, what we were doing, why were we doing the oversight process.

And so I think that was fairly successful in getting the word out fairly consistently and comprehensively to at least those public stakeholders in the area of the nuclear power plants.

We also had public workshops in each of the regions, both at the beginning of initial implementation and then also at about the mid-term point of the first year, and once again, the purpose of these meetings was to describe what did we think were the challenges that we had seen thus far, as well as the successes from the oversight process to date, and then to solicit feedback once again from both industry and public stakeholders that were in attendance at those meetings.

And we had those workshops in each of the regions in October and November and, I think, early December of last year.

So those were some of the things that we tried to do during the past year in terms of informing the public and getting public feedback.

With respect to interfacing with industry, we have pretty much on a three to four-week basis had meetings with the industry working group, ROP working group sponsored by NEI. We spent a lot of time at those meetings talking about performance indicators, but we also spend time talking about other issues that are of common interest between industry and the NRC regarding execution of the reactor oversight process, and so those have served to be very valuable forums for getting some common understanding of issues, and to make some progress on coming to resolution on some of those issues.

And we'll more than likely continue those over at least the near term. I'm not exactly sure what the ultimate frequency will be, but I think that it probably has been -- and, Steve, you can chime in -- but I think they've been pretty valuable opportunities.

We would hope that those would become less performance indicator oriented and more ROP overall oriented, which you know, we may be able to reduce the frequency some.

We sent out a <u>Federal Register</u> notice. You k now, there are certain ways that we can collect formal feedback for the purposes of analyzing that feedback and being able to consider it in a formal way, and we sent out a <u>Federal Register</u> notice late last year with two purposes in mind.

One was to solicit topics for feedback for the workshop we just had last week, and so we incorporated those public comments we did get into the fabric of the workshop last week.

But the second piece is in my mind the more important, and that's to solicit feedback on the first year of initial implementation of the ROP, and we listed a number of specific questions that we were particularly interested in getting feedback on, and that public comment period closes April 13th.

I think you all remember the first IIEP meeting. One of the suggestions that David Lochbaum had was to make sure that that <u>Federal Register</u> closure date occurred after the workshop so that those members of the public that haven't been able to follow the program on a day-by-day basis would be able to take the results of that workshop and be able to incorporate that into any feedback they might have.

And so we've done that, and so that date

1 closes the 13th of April. So that will be a good 2 opportunity for us to get some formal considered feedback from hopefully a variety of stakeholders. 3 4 Of course, we have the initial 5 implementation panel, and there's no need to expound upon that anymore. You all know what you are. 6 7 Internally we've had obviously a lot of We have weekly phone calls with our 8 activities. 9 counterparts in each of the regions. We've made many 10 visits to the regions. The regions have come to 11 headquarters for a variety of different level 12 management meetings. We have a fairly active internal Web page 13 14 communicating issues and guidance to our 15 stakeholders. We have a formal feed back process by which we take input from inspectors and incorporate 16 17 where appropriate that input into any guidance document changes or revisions. 18 We actually made site visits to all of the 19 20 regions and six sites in each region to meet with the 21 resident inspectors, region as well as based 22 We did that in the fall time frame. inspectors. 23 So we've gone through a lot of effort to 24 try and solicit at various levels a lot of feedback

from our inspectors and managers in the regions, and

so I think we've been fairly successful in fleshing out a lot of issues, and all of that has been considered as we go forward in terms of what are we doing in revising the oversight process.

And then lastly on this slide, about a month ago we executed an internal survey. We have the raw data available to us now. We're in the process of analyzing that data. My sense is that we're probably a couple of weeks away from coming up with some analysis of that, but that will be considered as well in terms of going forward with respect to any modifications or revisions to the oversight process.

So that's just a summary really of the things that we've done in the last year just in terms of communication and facilitating gathering feedback.

Okay. Next slide in terms of overall results. Based on all of this feedback that we've gotten, as well as obviously our daily observations of the process and frequent communications with our managers in the regions, I think that I would characterize the first year of the oversight process as being a successful period in terms of initial implementation.

You all are looking at the criteria or judging the process against the criteria much as we

are, the eight criteria, and I think that it's been pretty clear from all stakeholders -- and we heard this at the workshop both from NRC's perspective, as well as David Lochbaum's perspective -- that this oversight process is an improvement over what we had before when you judge it against those eight criteria.

That doesn't mean that we don't have more room for improvement, and I'll agree with Ray's earlier comment that we are, you know, still making changes and continuing to revise, but I think we're moving into a regime where we are in more of a self-improvement approach, you know, continuous self-improvement, as opposed to, you know, let's work out all the bugs and make major changes to the oversight process.

I don't think that we're going to make many major changes to the oversight process as a result of the first year. You know, there will be some modifications. There will be some refinements, but I think for the most part, we won't be in the process of making major, significant changes.

I think we're pretty happy with the framework. We think that the framework is playing out much like we thought it would be. Obviously there's still change management activities that have to take

place. I wouldn't say that we have 100 percent confidence of our inspectors and managers in the regions yet, but I think that that confidence level is building.

So I think that all in all, the first year which we've had a chance to substantially exercise the process, and I'll give you a little bit of data later on that shows, you know, where we've been able to exercise the process.

But that's been a major factor in, I guess, my consideration that I think that the first year has been successful, is that we've been able to see plants in each column of the action matrix and be able to exercise that part of the process that deals with those plants in those columns of the action matrix.

We've seen performance indicators almost across the board cross thresholds. We've seen inspection findings in almost every cornerstone, and been able to execute the significance determination processes.

So I think the fact that we've been able to exercise the oversight process, as we expected the first year of initial implementation would allow us to do, gives us some comfort in being able to move

forward and feel confident that we do have a pretty sound framework and a sound structure that we need to build on.

We did make several significant changes the first year. I think physical protection, SDP, was one that right out of the box we ascertained that that was not going to be an effective tool, and so we recently have issued the interim physical protection guidance, and we're working with our stakeholders to develop a permanent physical protection SDP. that's one place where we made a significant change.

The second place, I think, where we made a significant change was in tightening up our guidance with respect to inspection report findings. I think that we were finding over the first six months a lot of the types of issues and observations that we were intending to extricate from the process, those sort of subjective or low level issues that were finding their way into the oversight process, whether it was through the auspices of no color findings or whatever.

And so that was another, I think, significant change that we made to try and tighten up the criteria associated with what is a finding, how do we incorporate cross-cutting issues and cross-cutting findings into the inspection report regime. I think

1 those ar probably the two significant changes that we 2 made during the first year. 3 But for the most part, we tried to hold 4 the process stable for the expressed intent, purpose 5 of having a year of initial implementation to be able to exercise the process as it was developed coming out 6 7 of the pilot program and be able to gather information and insights about how that was going to work. 8 So we really assiduously tried to avoid 9 10 making very many changes during the first year for that purpose so that we would get a good, full test 11 12 after the first year, and I think we've done that. MR. LAURIE: Bill, may I interrupt for a 13 14 moment? 15 MR. DEAN: Sure. 16 MR. LAURIE: We've never met. My name is 17 Bob Laurie. I'm an Energy Commissioner in California. MR. DEAN: Yeah, you've been pretty busy 18 19 the last few months. 20 MR. LAURIE: If these guys would get their 21 stuff back on line, California's energy problems would 22 be solved. 23 (Laughter.) 24 MR. LAURIE: Take it easy. Lighten up. 25 What is your change process? That is, the

panel is going to go away, and we're going to make some recommendations. You're going to see issues arise. How do you identify those? How do you make those changes in response to that?

I don't know the bureaucratic formulas that you all have to go through. Can you take one minute and provide that for me?

MR. DEAN: Sure, sure. There's a couple of things that we've put in place in terms of how do we make process changes. The one that probably stands out the most clearly because that's the one that's most refined is making process changes associated with the performance indicators.

We have a manual chapter that we've developed called manual chapter 0608, which describes the performance indicator program, and incorporated in that -- I think a lot of you have had the chance to see this -- is a fairly substantive flow chart that describes that when an issue emerges regarding a performance indicator, it describes all of the paths that you would take in terms of considering that issue, and that takes you all the way from considering that issue in terms of making a clarification and just sending some feedback to the individual or group that had a common -- all the way to developing a new

performance indicator and going through a formal benchmarking process and going through a pilot program, and evaluating the results of that pilot program before we make a change.

So that one stands out the most in terms of being a clearly defined, fairly deliberative process in terms of making changes.

Now, with respect to other aspects of the process, let's take, for example internal inspection procedure guidance. I mentioned earlier the formal feedback process that we have that we solicit feedback from our inspectors, and a lot of the feedback that we get pertains to inspection procedures.

For example, certain steps or elements of an inspection procedure that don't seem to be appropriate or maybe a better methodology for how to conduct a certain inspection, and so what we'll typically do or what our process calls for in an inspection report revision process is to take that feedback, develop a proposed revised inspection procedure. We send that out to the regions. We give the regions 30 days to comment on that, and then we go through an analysis of the comments.

We indicate, you know, what changes we have made to the procedures based on what comments,

1 and then we issue it as a formally changed procedure. 2 So there, once again, while that is probably not a 3 process, that is as familiar or as of interest to say 4 a public stakeholders like the PIs -- they have a lot 5 of visibility -- that's an equally formalized process internally. 6 7 MR. LAURIE: These are not regulations. 8 MR. DEAN: No. 9 So you don't have to go MR. LAURIE: 10 through a regulatory process. 11 MR. DEAN: Correct. 12 MR. LAURIE: Okay, and there's an opportunity for external stakeholder input as well? 13 14 MR. DEAN: Not for something -- there's 15 opportunity for stakeholder input for us to consider things, and one of the things I mentioned at the 16 17 workshop last week based on -- and you'll hear it 18 again later when through the public we qo 19 communications sessions -- but one of the issues was 20 interacting with the public. How do we take public 21 feedback on the oversight process, consider it, and 22 then how do we get back to the public as to how do we 23 consider their feedback? 24 And so one of the things that we've incorporated into our formal feedback process is that 25

if we get some input from a public stakeholder, you know, making some suggestions about the program, then I give it to my appropriate task lead for that area and my branch. I ask them to develop a feedback form and serve that into our feedback process.

And then when we develop a preliminary response, provide that to the individual organization that made the suggestion. And then when we finally make a final, determined answer -- okay, which for some things like, for example, a procedure change; we change or procedures on -- right now we have a quarterly. We'll probably move to a semi-annual inspection procedure change process.

So you know, we may get some input early in that process, and if it's not something that we need to change because it's not a fatal flaw, being an enhancement of the procedure, we would incorporate that into that quarterly or will soon be a semi-annual change process. So you may not get any feedback until we've finally fixed your issue, you know, maybe six or seven months down the line, but you'll get an interim report that basically says, "Here's how we plan on considering your feedback. It'll be in this process, you know, maybe six months down the line before we actually change the procedure."

MR. BLOUGH: Any change that we make, it's incumbent on the staff to make sure in the process of developing and reviewing that change that it fits within the regulations and also that either it fits within the existing guidance we've been given by the Commission or, if we think it's outside the policy guidance we've been given by the Commission or marginal, then we should seek the Commission's advice or approval in those.

So those are part of the administrative requirements of making a change, but having said that, in the area of inspection and assessment there's probably the most room for staff to incrementally improve our processes compared to anything else. For example, licensing; your licensing processes are more constrained than the inspection processes, and probably enforcement would be kind of in between licensing and inspection in terms of, you know, the constraints, how much detail is prescribed either by the regulations or by the Commissioners' offices.

MR. LAURIE: Thank you, Randy, and that's helpful.

And I apologize for the diversion. I'd just add we've spoken a lot about unintended consequences, and the question in my mind is is the

bureaucracy -- and I'm not using that term in a negative sense -- flexible enough to respond in a rather immediate fashion when those unintended consequences are fully noted.

MR. DEAN: Yeah, I think that we've kind of coined a term in the first year in terms of, you know, where would we need to make an immediate change, and that would be where we detected what we think might be a fatal flaw, you know, in one of the guidance documents.

And we do have the capacity to do that. You know, we would prefer to be in a modus operandi where we're fairly stable and we take specific points in time where we make a considered effort to make changes.

For example, in the self-assessment process that we've developed, the intent is to basically on an annual basis take the input from the previous year, consider all of that in terms of what sort of changes or refinements should we consider in terms of the oversight process, and then that would be brought forward actually to our senior managers at our agency action review meeting and then describe in a Commission paper and to the Commission in an annual briefing.

1 Okay? So the intent is to have continuous self-improvement process and to have a 2 formalized self-assessment process, and we have a 3 4 couple of guidance documents that are actually being 5 finalized that describe what our self-assessment process is. 6 7 So once those are issued, it might be -that might be something that would be 8 you know, worthwhile sharing with you and it might help you out. 9 10 MR. LAURIE: Thank you very much. 11 MR. DEAN: Yeah, okay. 12 I'd like to move on to the next Okay. couple of slides real briefly. These are just some 13 14 slides that show some data, and I don't want to expend 15 too much time on them, but to kind of make the point in terms of were we able to exercise the program 16 17 substantially during the first year or not. This first one just shows the performance 18 indicator results for the first three quarters. 19 20 gets us through basically the end of calendar year 21 2000. 22 We have yet to get the input for the first 23 quarter of this calendar year, which we'll get by the 24 end of April, but this shows that for all of the

performance indicators, with the exception of public

radiation safety, that we have had some plants cross thresholds, in some cases even yellow thresholds. So that's given us basically the capacity to be able to at least understand that we are getting a spectrum of performance. We are seeing issues emerge and different cornerstones, and the performance indicators are picking up some of those issues.

The next slide talks about inspection results. Once again, this shows the inspection results, and it's very important. I think that I've recited this mantra a number of times, but that we have to look at the oversight process in terms of the complementary nature of both the PIs and the inspection program. They all fit together.

You know, they aren't intended to be separate. There is, I think, some duplication between the PIs and the inspection program, but you know, there's a very strong complementary nature to the two, and you have to look at the results of the oversight process, considering both.

And this basically shows that we've been able to exercise the significance determination processes in all of the major areas, and in some cases we've had some yellow and red findings. So we have had some findings of significance, and so I think this

demonstrates, you know, that we have, you know, once again been able to exercise a lot of the aspects of the oversight process. It's given us some insights into some areas where we might want to consider some improvements, and you'll hear about that a little bit later this morning when we go into some of the workshop session results.

And then the last one here is basically the action matrix results, and basically this shows the number of plants that have been in various columns of the action matrix. Thus far out of the 100-plus plants in the country, 73 units have stayed within the licensee response band. We've had 22 plants that have entered the regulatory response band, five integrated cornerstone and one in multiple repetitive degraded cornerstones.

So once again, this gives us some pretty good basis that we've exercised the program substantially. We've had plants that have been all corners of the action matrix -- columns of the action matrix. They've been there for different reasons, and so that gives us a good comfort that we are seeing a spectrum of plant performance out there. we are detecting it through the oversight process, and that we've been able to deal with those issues.

1 MR. KRICH: Bill, if I could, just gut 2 feel, and I don't know whether you did this when you 3 started off the process or not, but looking at this 4 kind of -- this is a good summary of how much or where 5 the plants are. Right. 6 MR. DEAN: 7 MR. KRICH: Does this match what your gut 8 feel is or is this a surprise or what? Did you do 9 a --10 MR. DEAN: Is it a surprise? No. 11 don't think so. I think it shows a good spectrum. 12 Obviously, you know, reflects the fact that most plants are operating at a level where the licensee 13 14 response band is probably an appropriate performance 15 level, but it is showing that there's a 16 percentage of plants that have issues emerge that 17 require greater NRC level of attention, and that there's require significant 18 few plants that 19 attention. MR. KRICH: 20 Right. So does this match 21 kind of your sense of, you know, normal, kind of the 22 way things you expected to run or --23 MR. DEAN: Yeah, I think so. I think so. 24 This is not a surprise. This spectrum of performance 25 is not a surprise to me. I think that some people

maybe would have thought that, you know, with all of the -- well, some of the verbiage, I think, early about the NRC program, you know, backing off and giving things over to the licensees, but I think that this shows that, you know, there are still issues emerging, that the NRC is finding issues through its inspection program. The performance indicators are serving a role of also detecting issues, and, you know, it shows that not everything is perfect out there, and that this process provides a good framework for being able to help identify in an objective fashion those plants that warrant additional NRC attention. MR. GARCHOW: I guess I'd ask a follow-up question to Randy and Ken. Do you think that -- and maybe Loren to some extent, too --MR. KRICH: And Steve. MR. GARCHOW: And Steve. MR. LAURIE: You haven't heard question. MR. GARCHOW: Region III, I apologize. So I don't exclude the NRC folks who are in the regions looking at the plants I direct this question to, all inclusive. Does this fit the data that -- I have two

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1 parts -- does this fit the data in what you actually 2 think by virtue of your experience of judging plants 3 for all the years you've been doing it, does that 4 You know, when the plants in your judgments 5 have issues and you're bubbling them up, does it sort of follow through the action matrix in a way so that 6 7 the plants that you believe are having issues are 8 being captured in the program? 9 And do you think you have the ability to 10 direct the resources towards those plants 11 accordance with the action matrix? 12 So it's like two questions. I mean, you see data coming in. Do you believe this process 13 14 allows you to direct the resources into the plants 15 that, based on the feedback of the information that you're getting from the inspectors, you know, are 16 17 plants that are having issues? 18 MR. DEAN: I've asked that question 19 particularly of my inspectors. We have yet to find an 20 issue that we think we should have inspected that we 21 have not been able to inspect. The program has the 22 flexibility to get you to any issue. 23 You have to learn the new program, and 24 because it's orchestrated a little differently, but

everything is still there, and that's just getting

familiar with the change in the bureaucratic process a little bit.

Any issues of significance that we're talking about here certainly we can still get to, and they can be captured. My resources are fully utilized. So this has helped me prioritize.

In the past there was a tendency, there was a temptation to spend time on issues that may have not had the safety significance because of either professional curiosity or external factors which may drive you there, and this helps you now maintain a focus on those areas there and not let your resources get distracted.

There's a Region IV viewpoint.

MR. BLOUGH: Well, first of all, I would say in part it's too soon to fully answer your question. So you can really, based on the amount of experience we have so far, you can just give an impression so far.

So far I believe, you know, the system is working well. It is bubbling up important issues. I would say if you look at the licensee and regulatory response columns and if you try to step back and say how are the plants doing and, you know, how would plants compare, you know, under a SALP system, you

can't really. Being in the licensee response column or the regulatory response column is really not differentiation of performance that is that large that if you use some other system that it would show up that way, but I think that's the way it's supposed to be designed.

So moving through the regulatory response column and back to the licensee response column, I think that's happening, and I think that indicates good issues, but it doesn't necessarily indicate a ranking of plants or anything of that sort of thing.

I would say that there are plants that we know of that have cross-cutting issues that they're dealing with, and yet they're in the licensee response column, and sometimes the licensee may have a lot of issues that they're dealing with and yet be in the licensee response column.

And so you wonder a little bit, but as I say, so far I think that this system is functioning well, and you know, there's none that I see right now where the assessment would be way off, you know, from what we would have done under a previous program.

And of course, the advantage of this program is with defined thresholds. The NRC starts -- adjusts its assessment and starts action basically

immediately, as soon as we've nailed down -admittedly some of these determinations have taken
longer than we'd like, but as soon as we've nailed
down the determination of significance on an issue
that should result in a change in assessment and
different NRC actions, we start right away now, which
I think is good.

MR. REYNOLDS: I'll give you my bottom line first. This inspection program and the previous one allowed us to make sure there was no major safety issues, and there are no major safety issues that we're aware of.

That being said, there are areas that in today's space might be categories as low safety significance to very low safety significance that the inspection program doesn't deal with as well as we might like, areas like design and cross-cutting issues, but those are being worked on.

But I think those are two areas that we find problems that we think need to be addressed, and the program isn't as flexible as we might like.

Another case is you may end up with an issue becoming white or yellow. We can look at it, and it may not be as significant as some people think, but I would say that's how the program is designed or

1 why it is just crossing the threshold for us to look 2 People tend to over react. 3 Sometimes we've looked at it and spent 4 time on it. The licensee has spend a lot more time on 5 that issue than maybe we thought necessary. The inspection program does allow us to 6 7 look into whatever areas we need to. As we learn it, 8 we've had to be somewhat I want to say "creative," but 9 maybe that's too strong of a word, but on inspectors, we used the old program, and now we're using the new 10 program, but we're still looking at the areas we think 11 12 are very important to safety. And I would just end by saying that some 13 14 of the issues we think PRA can be improved on. Cross-15 cutting issues, corrective actions and design are some areas that need to be improved on. 16 prevented us from saying the plants are safe or unsafe 17 and making sure those thing are fixed. 18 MR. SCHERER: 19 Steve, what do you mean by 20 design issues? 21 MR. REYNOLDS: Some examples might be 22 calculation errors, things that you find from doing 23 design inspection that don't yet render that system 24 inoperable. If allowed to accumulate over time or

modification on top of modification may

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1	eventually getting you there.
2	MR. SCHERER: Things I would refer to as
3	an engineering issue.
4	MR. REYNOLDS: If that's how you refer to
5	them, fine, sure.
6	MR. SCHERER: Thank you.
7	MR. DEAN: I don't have much more to add
8	CHAIRMAN PLISCO: That was helpful. I
9	mean, I sort of got the gist.
10	PARTICIPANT: One more spectrum from a
11	Region II.
12	CHAIRMAN PLISCO: And mine is pretty much
13	the same. I think what issues we get involved in,
14	when we get involved in them, and the level of our
15	involvement, I think our view has been appropriate so
16	far. You know, the issues that we've had have crossed
17	the thresholds and appear to be the right ones, and in
18	our level of involvement, especially the green-white
19	threshold appears to be working.
20	And really, I think the only area where we
21	had some angst at least in Region II I know that
22	Region IV had some similar issues that weren't handled
23	well in the beginning I think we've been working
24	through those. Our degraded conditions or issues

involving conditions where there's not really an event

1 that occurs, but what looks like a significant 2 condition. 3 I mean, an example is the Summer pipe rack 4 and how the program handles that. It's not -- those 5 kind of issues are not real conducive to risk analysis because it's not really known well, especially in the 6 7 beginning, what the impact of the condition is and how you factor that in to do a risk analysis, and some may 8 9 be so complicated, complex, you know. For example, the issue you had at Cooper with cable splices, you 10 11 It's a widespread issue, how you handle that. know. 12 there have been some issues like that that we've had to work through and make sure we understand 13 14 how the process handle is, and I think we've worked 15 through those, and I think we've made some changes to 16 the program to accommodate that, to make sure that those kind of things fit well, too. 17 But in general, we've been able to deal 18 19 with the right issues, I think. 20 MR. BROCKMAN: I'd like to let a comment 21 come from Jim thought down at the grass roots level, 22 how the inspector sees it as opposed to how the 23 manager sees it. 24 MR. MOORMAN: Well, I'll get to the bottom 25 line right away. It seems about right. We've gotten

much better guidance on how to deal with low level issues and how to differentiate between what's important and what's not important.

The Group 1, 2, and 3 questions have really helped the inspectors put the small issues down and decide what to really continue on in. So I see us as being able to use that guidance, be more consistent with it, and also get to the issues that we need to get to with respect to some design issues.

My experience with that has been that if we do have a low level design issue, such as bad calculations, that will go through the process and come out as a finding, and then once it does that, the reliance on the licensee corrective action program to take and process that and go forward and change their program for the better or those calculations, that capability exists.

So I see us going in the right direction there. With respect to resources, as Ken said, we are fully using our resources, and I would think that as we grow and change in the future, we'll get a lot more efficient with it and we'll be able to do the same with a little bit less.

MR. KRICH: Bill, if I could ask one more question, could you comment on how well the process

1	has been in terms of being able to predict declining
2	performance?
3	That's been kind of one of the overall
4	objectives, and it went into the development and the
5	design of the process to some degree. Steve, that's
6	my recollection of this.
7	MR. DEAN: The intent of the process is
8	not to be predictive per se. It's an indicative
9	process.
10	MR. KRICH: Right.
11	MR. DEAN: It's to look for indications of
12	plants and to find indications hopefully in advance of
13	a plan being in a status where they're like, you know,
14	a Millstone of the mid-'90s, late
15	MR. KRICH: Right. That's what I'm
16	talking about.
17	MR. DEAN: But that's sort of predictive.
18	MR. BLOUGH: Or early and timely
19	indication.
20	MR. DEAN: Right.
21	MR. KRICH: So could you comment on if you
22	have been able to
23	MR. DEAN: Well, that was after hearing
24	everybody talk, and I wanted to get back to a point
25	that Randy made, is that, you know, we're still early.

I mean there is some premises of this oversight process that I don't think are going to be fully proved out or disproved for a number of years. Okay? And that would be one of them.

Okay. How well does this plant predict a plant that may be entering unacceptable performance regime? Okay. We won't know that for several years. You know, for example, we'll take the Indian Point-2 experience. Well, a lot of what's transpired at Indian Point-2 goes back several years. It wasn't just like, boom, all of a sudden, you know, they show up on a radar screen as a problem plant.

They have been a plant that has had the interest of the NRC at a certain level of senior management for several years. Okay? They've had a series of issues and problems there. What the oversight process allowed us to do was basically categorize that plant giving the types of findings and the types of performance indicator results that they had and then be able to look at it in a more objective and predictive nature as to what should we do about that plant.

So I think in a lot of respects -- and, Randy, you can help me -- I think that it would help regional management crystallize how should they

approach Indian Point-2, you know. But would be one that if we could go back, and we did do a feasibility review of Indian Point-2 as part of looking at how would this process predict performance, but I think, you know, you would have to go back and overlay the last two or three or four years of Indian Point-2's performance to say, you know, would this process have predicted or made a difference two or three years ago if they had maybe one or two white issues or whatever.

I don't know. It's too early to tell.

You know, Mary, you've been trying to --

MS. FERDIG: Well, this is simply a philosophical question that I've asked myself, and you could probably answer it in a hurry.

I'm noticing as we look at this program now one of the ways that you're helping us to know that it's working is to show us the degree to which there are plants that fall in these various categories.

What if hypothetically, given the continuous improvement in the intentions of both the industry and the regulator to ultimately reach a level of optimum safety performance that may theoretically have plants operating in the green band; what then relative to how you might view this program and its

effectiveness?

MR. DEAN: If all of the plants from the licensee response band, would I be here staying that I think we've been able to fully exercise the program?

MS. FERDIG: Yeah.

MR. DEAN: I don't think I'd be able to because we wouldn't have had the opportunity to deal with the plants that had issues or problems that had some significance to them.

Now, you have to remember the process is set up. You know, the threshold concept is set up to assure that even plants that have red issues, that is still a whole, you know, degree of magnitude away from what the agency has set as its safety goals. Okay?

So the intent is for this process to be able to identify issues of safety import early enough to assure that both the licensee and the NRC are aware of those issues and before we get to the point that we're crossing safety goal space and really having been an impact on public health and safety.

So, you know, when we talk about protective public health and safety, we've tried to establish a process that makes sure that when issues that are significant in this process emerge that we have not crossed the threshold that we are or the

1 plant is at an unsafe level in terms of protection of 2 public health and safety. And that's sometimes is something that 3 4 gets lost in the looking at the green, whites, yellows 5 and reds and different columns of the action matrix, that there are still several degrees of safety 6 7 performance away from impacting safety goals. We're trying to make sure -- and that 8 9 maybe is the predictive nature of the process, is that we want to make sure we can interact and the licensee 10 11 can be aware early enough to prevent us from getting 12 in that regime. MS. FERDIG: But the program could still 13 14 be working --15 MR. DEAN: Sure. MS. FERDIG: -- as intended --16 17 MR. DEAN: Absolutely. MS. FERDIG: -- if they were all --18 19 MR. DEAN: Absolutely. 20 FERDIG: -- if every plant MS. 21 operating within the green band. 22 Absolutely. MR. DEAN: 23 MS. FERDIG: And it wouldn't necessarily 24 suggest that we would need to come back and look at 25 the thresholds and question whether they are set

correctly if we don't have a certain percentage of plants in the white and yellow and so forth.

MR. DEAN: Yeah, that's a good question, Mary. Let me give you one of the things that we're instituting internally, and this kind of gets back to the question over here from Mr. Laurie about looking at making changes and what process do we look at.

In terms of, for example, looking at our inspection procedures, you know, we have a spectrum. We have what we believe is a risk informed inspection program to make sure that we look at those areas of plant operation and design and engineering that are important from a safety perspective, but within that, there are some that I think are more risk important or safety important than others.

And so the question emerges, okay, after we look at this process for year, and one of the things we're looking at is what sort of findings have we gotten in each of the inspectable areas. Have we got a lot of findings? Have we got not very many? Have we gotten significant findings? Have we not gotten significant findings?

And we're going to use that information to help us determine should we make some adjustments to the inspection program, and I'm going to get into that

in a little bit in terms of inspection program flexibility and resource application because we want to make sure that we're spending our resources in the right areas where we have the potential to find those issues of significance.

Okay. So one of the things we have to

consider in making a determination, let's just say that we have an inspectable area, and let's just take the design inspection. We think the design inspection is a very important inspection, but let's say that we're not getting a whole lot of findings out of that inspection.

Well, that could mean one of two things. It could mean that licensees are doing a real good job in terms of, you know, design basis management, or it could mean that maybe the approach that we're using to look at that area maybe is not quite the right approach. Maybe there's a better way to look at it.

So one of the things that we have to look at, we have to look at, you know, what sort of findings are we getting. Are we getting findings of significance? What sort of level of effort are we expending?

You know, we're spending a lot of effort looking at design. It's an important area to look at,

and we think it's important to look at. So you know, we have to take all of those aspects and say, "Okay. Should we or do we need to make some adjustments either in the approach, or is the approach we're taking the right approach?"

And we have to do that for all of our inspectable areas. So, you know, for example, if we looked at every plant being in the licensee response band through inspections and PIs, you know, that might cause us to consider, well, where have we seen issues in the past. We're not seeing issues in the past in those areas anymore. Look at our inspection guidance.

And if we're happy with our inspection guidance, then that's, you know, an appropriate place to be. I think past history would suggest that given the complexity of these machine and the human-machine interface that, you know, you're going to have issues, you know.

And so I think it would be very unlikely that we would have all plants be in the licensee response band. But having said that --

MR. BLOUGH: I'd just like to comment that even though we have experience with one red finding, two yellow findings, and four yellow PIs and a couple of other cases where there were multiple white

findings in the same cornerstone in a plant, that's not a whole lot of experience out in the right end of the action matrix.

MR. DEAN: Right.

MR. BLOUGH: So in Region I we've done the one 95003 multiple degrade cornerstone inspection at Indian Point-2. We haven't issued a report yet. We have just exercised the 95002 inspection one time. So although, you know, I think they work well, it's not a whole lot of experience in the most risk important things.

The way the distribution works you get a lot of experience in less risk important things and less at the more risk important things.

MR. DEAN: Yeah, I guess that was one point I was going to make listening to this considered feedback, is that there's two things, I think; is that this process requires a certain amount of restraint on our inspectors, given the level of the issue, that they have to give the licensee the opportunity to work their way through an issue to get through the root cause evaluations and extended condition reviews before we start looking at them in any sort of supplemental inspection procedure space or follow-up inspection procedures.

And so I think that's been part of the change dynamic that I think our inspectors are still wrestling with a little bit, that they would like to delve into issues a lot sooner than maybe they did in the -- like they did in the past, but that this program, you know, requires them to have some restraint at those lower levels.

And so I think that's still part of the change dynamic, and the other one is to reemphasize

And so I think that's still part of the change dynamic, and the other one is to reemphasize what Randy said. While we've exercised the process on the right side, that that's probably where we'll gain the most, you know, lessons learned.

We're going to take the Indian Point-2 experience and Region I's experience and use that to help refine our inspection procedures, you know, the DET-like inspection, Ray. You know, we'll use experiences that some of the other regions are having.

We're going through one now in Region II dealing with Cooper, which has been a fairly -- Region IV at Cooper -- that's been a fairly complex and, you know, more of a programmatic breakdown type issue as opposed to an issue that's easily translated through the significance determination process.

So, you know, that will help us refine our guidance and develop that. So we will obviously

1 continue to learn lessons, but I think we're going to 2 find more of them more on the right side of the band 3 than the left side. 4 Having said that, I'm at the point now to 5 start going through the implementation issues that came out of our internal and external workshops. 6 7 might be a good time for a break. CHAIRMAN PLISCO: 8 Yes, yes. Fifteen 9 minutes. 10 MR. DEAN: Okay, and then we'll parade up a series of people up here and give you that. 11 12 (Whereupon, the foregoing matter went off the record at 10:47 a.m. and went back on 13 14 the record at 11:07 a.m.) 15 MR. DEAN: Let me just touch on Okay. 16 what you have here on this slide. It says initial 17 implementation issues are basically the issues that came out of our -- considering all of the feedback 18 19 that we received over the first year, what we thought 20 were the key issues to look at in terms of considering 21 both internally and also externally. 22 And the first issue there, inspection 23 flexibility and resources, and let me just briefly 24 summarize what the issue is there, and that is in

developing the oversight process,

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some

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put

particular constraints in terms of sample sizes for certain inspection procedures. We developed what we felt were the appropriate frequencies for certain inspectable area procedures and asked the regions to live by that and to live by the requirements in the inspection procedures and to make sure that they executed the inspection procedures to meet all of the requirements.

So there was a lot of constraints there, and that was quite a change from our previous core inspection program which basically left it up really to the inspector to ascertain whether they had completed the intent of the procedure.

So this process was quite a transition, quite a paradigm shift for our inspectors in terms of what constitutes inspection program completion.

And in doing that and having those constraints, and they were, you know, tighter, I think, that really what we envisioned, but we felt for the first initial implementation we wanted to try and achieve as consistently as we could an execution of the inspection procedures so that we would have a good sense as to what does it take to complete those so that we can make some reasoned decisions about how to allocate our resources in a going forward manner.

One of the big issues internally is that recognition that we probably need to accommodate some degree of flexibility so that the regions can better utilize their resources and deploy their resources and still execute the inspection program as it's intended.

And so that's one of the things that we're looking at internally. I mentioned earlier the process that we're looking at in terms of considering individual inspection procedures, looking at the number of hours expended, the number of findings that we had, and helping us -- helping that information -- help us judge how to approach whether we should look at the sample size for any particular procedures.

And so we'll be seeing some changes that are really going to be more internal in nature in terms of hopefully giving our inspection force a flexibility little bit more and the regional management a little more flexibility so that we can complete the program intended while still as appropriately utilize our resources.

So that's a big issue internally. We've got a meeting here on the 23rd and 24th of April with the Division Directors from each of the regions where we hope to basically finalize the input and make whatever sort of appropriate adjustments to give the

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needed flexibility there without you know, obviously we don't want to go back to the days of old where we had regional initiative in different regions for implementing different inspection procedures, you know, based on whatever rationale went into management's decision. We still want to have a consistently applied and implemented inspection program.

But we do recognize that there is some room for flexibility there to accommodate things like plant design differences, to accommodate the fact that certain plants operate at different levels with different performance issues, and we need to make sure that we have the capacity to be able to within the baseline inspection program accommodate those differences, you know, without being too restrictive, overly restrictive on our inspection force.

So that's really the major internal issue.

That was not an issue we brought forward for external consideration. That's basically an internal effectiveness and efficiency issue.

The remaining issues there, the eight issues there, issues for external feedback, that basically is the outline for the remainder of our discussion with you here this morning, and what we

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1 intend to do is have the pertinent task leads for each 2 of these areas within the Inspection Program Branch, actually within the division, because some of these 3 4 are outside the Inspection Program Branch, but within 5 our Division of Inspection Program Management. I'll walk you through the issues that were 6 7 set aside for discussion at the workshop, additional 8 issues that might have emerged, and then what the 9 outcomes are, and we're going to jump around a little bit because we do have some of our staff members that 10 11 have other commitments today. 12 And so first I'd like to start with Don Hickman, and he will go through the PIs, but then the 13 14 next two after that will be maintenance effectiveness 15 and the physical protection. So we'll have to jump around a little bit. 16 17 For this first one, it starts on page 9, external lessons learned, workshop outcomes on reactor 18 19 safety performance indicators. I'll ask Don to step 20 up. 21 MR. SCHERER: Before you do that --22 MR. DEAN: Yeah. 23 MR. SCHERER: -- Bill, where did this list 24 of issues that you have on seven and eight come from?

Is this, in fact, a de facto list of the things you're

1 working on or is this the result of feedback you 2 received or --3 MR. DEAN: Yeah, the list was developed 4 based on really the accumulated feedback over the 5 course of the first year of initial implementation, feedback that we received from various stakeholders, 6 7 both internal and external. It also incorporated some I mentioned the <u>Federal</u> Register 8 of the feedback. 9 We got feedback from several parties. sent us some feedback, a couple of licensees, David 10 11 Lochbaum from UCS, and we incorporated all of those 12 into developing the agenda for the external workshop. But I would say that 95 percent or maybe 13 14 90 percent of the issues that we used to develop for 15 discussion at the external workshop for basically the accumulation of all the input we received over the 16 17 past year. 18 MR. SCHERER: Okay. I'm trying 19 For example, ALARA is not on here. understand. 20 MR. DEAN: Yes, it is. It's under 21 radiation safety issues. 22 So it is here? MR. SCHERER: Okay. 23 MR. DEAN: As you get to the Yes. 24 individual letters, you'll see the actual issues that 25 we discuss. There's four or five issues under each of

1 these topic areas in most cases. 2 MR. SCHERER: Thank you. KRICH: 3 MR. And, Bill, just a quick 4 question. I'm sorry. On the meeting that you're 5 going to have, I think you said, at the end of this month. 6 7 MR. DEAN: Yes. Where you talked about the 8 MR. KRICH: 9 flexibility, where you're going to talk about how to add some more flexibility, after you get through with 10 11 that, will that thing go through the process that 12 we've gone through pretty much from the beginning where you get with NEI and the industry to kind of 13 14 work through that? 15 Well, we would describe, you MR. DEAN: know, if there were any changes in terms of, you know, 16 17 let's say, for example, one of the things we're looking at is the PI&R inspection, the annual 18 inspection, whether that should be annual or biennial. 19 20 MR. KRICH: Okay. 21 MR. DEAN: That's one of the things. 22 We'll make the decision. We've gotten all of the 23 feedback. That was the purpose of this workshop, was 24 to get the feedback from the external stakeholders

about some of these things that we're considering, the

bigger ones.

And we'll take that, and we'll make our determination. You know, with respect to some of the smaller or the other inspection procedures, you know, my sense is that probably you'll see some changes in some of them in terms of the range of samples that we expect to get on an annual basis, and that's probably how we'll deal with the flexibility issue for the most part.

But it isn't something that we're going to offer to external stakeholders in terms of, you know, we're going to spend, you know, 40 hours on this inspectable area and 24 here and 80 here. I mean those are the decisions that we're going to make based on our accumulated feedback over the course of the first year.

We consider that to be an internal, you know, effectiveness and efficiency issue in terms of the program. Now, if we had an issue that says, you know, we're not sure whether this is an area we ought to be looking at anymore, you know, certainly that would be something that --

MR. KRICH: That's what I had in mind.

MR. DEAN: Yeah, yeah, if we had something of that magnitude.

1 MR. KRICH: Okay. 2 Any other questions? MR. DEAN: Okay. 3 Otherwise I'll ask Don to step up to the plate. 4 MR. HICKMAN: Good morning. I'm Don 5 Hickman, task lead for performance indicators in the 6 ROP. 7 In the reactor safety performance indicator session, we presented the status of three of 8 9 the important performance indicator issues during initial implementation and sought stakeholder feedback 10 11 on the proposed resolution to those issues, and the 12 three are the safety system unavailability indicator, and that's the one that has generated a significant 13 14 number of frequently asked questions or infrequently 15 asked questions and concerns. The unplanned power change indicator is one that is a proposed replacement 16 17 for and a plan to do a pilot program for that replacement in the near future. 18 And then the unplanned SCRAM indicator, 19 20 and there's a pilot program ongoing right now due to end at the end of this month with the data reported in 21 22 April. 23 The pilot program for the unplanned SCRAM indicator 24 replacement included both the SCRAM 25 indicator and the SCRAM with loss of normal heat

removal indicator, and what was done there was to replace the word "SCRAM" with reactor shutdowns, and the concern here was the perceived negative impact of counting manual SCRAMs.

One of the changes that we made, along with the name and the definition of the indicator, was to take the opportunity since we were going to pilot a replacement for the SCRAM with loss of normal heat removal indicator to clarify the guidance, and the guidance that's currently in NEI 99-02, Rev. 0, was not clear that SCRAMs caused by loss of all feedwater or decreasing condenser vacuum.

And so we have taken that opportunity to clarify that guidance, and as a result, we expect that we will probably see some differences, and in fact, to date we have seen a few differences between what licensees are reporting to the current ROP, the data by which they're being measured, and what they're reporting to the pilot program.

With regard to the proposed replacement for the unplanned power change indicator, what we've done there was to use very much the same definition that's contained in the monthly operating report requirements and licensee tech specs, and initially we had called -- that section of the monthly operating

report is called unit shutdowns and power reductions, and one of the comments we got from the workshop was that perhaps we didn't need the word "shutdown," and that turned out to be correct. We decided to delete the word "shutdown." So now it's called unit power reductions. And that is measured for 7,000 critical hours.

Another thing that came out of the workshop was another proposal to perhaps pilot a second replacement indicator at the same time, that there might be a dual pilot, and the proposal there was to count power reductions required as a result of equipment malfunctions or operator errors.

There was a fair amount of discussion as well about counting power reductions that are required as a part of normal operation, and the proposed replacement unit power reductions would count all power reductions of greater than 20 percent in average daily power level.

include And that would such power reductions or such reasons as broad pattern adjustments, MSIV testing, turbine valve testing, those types of things if they exceed greater than 20 percent in average daily power level change.

That's a concern to the industry, and

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hence the proposed dual pilot to count only those caused by equipment malfunctions or operator errors.

CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Don, I just wanted to mention that I happened to be a sponsor for the session, and one of the -- I don't know. Maybe it wasn't a revelation to everyone, but it was a revelation to me -- was that a number of the problems we're having in performance indicators are in the areas where the measure includes things that are not necessarily bad things by themselves, and that's where a lot of, I think, the rubs are occurring in the program.

You know, there are situations like the power reductions. You know, we have surveillance requirements, you know, plants required to come down, and they have to count that or in situations like the one we currently have, if the plant has an equipment condition, the prudent thing to do is to come down now and repair that.

With the 72-hour restriction, human nature being what it is, that comes into play, and it should. And we had a lot of discussion about that in that group about, you know, the ideal is to get indicators where we aren't picking up these things that are the prudent action, and so that question doesn't come up

1 in someone's mind. I mean, that came into play, too, 2 in the manual SCRAM. You know, that's where that came into play also, where you know the right action is 3 4 going to show up on the indicator and where someone 5 might think about it. That gets into our whole 6 MR. GARCHOW: 7 discussion on how we handle moving from green to white because you took all of that out of it. If you had a 8 9 number of those occurrences that were done prudently or for all of the right reasons and you just happen to 10 11 determine -- I mean, the original constructed a system 12 of somebody had come in and looked, and then you'd have an exit and say, you know, just an artifact of 13 14 the system, doesn't really point us to anything. 15 You happen to come down, you know, four times to clean your water boxes because there's grass 16 17 in the Delaware River like there is every year, and you know, it doesn't point to anything. 18 19 MR. HILL: But if you know that's going to 20 happen though, why waste everybody's effort to do it? 21 Why not just plan that out of it? 22 If you could come up with MR. GARCHOW: 23 perfect indicator, that would do the it, 24 supporting it either way, but saying in some respects

we're in this conversation because we overemphasized

1	what it meant to go away. That was my only point.
2	CHAIRMAN PLISCO: But I think the staff
3	I mean, logically from the NRC perspective, you know,
4	our view is that if you pick the right threshold and
5	factor that in, it was fine, but it still causes
6	problems.
7	MR. SCHERER: That's a key element in the
8	ongoing discussion on unavailability because a
9	component of unavailability is a good thing.
10	CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Right.
11	MR. SCHERER: Preventive maintenance.
12	CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Yeah.
13	MR. SCHERER: A component of
14	unavailability is problems with component, something
15	you're trying to measure, which is reliability of the
16	component. So how do you adjust the number to allow
17	good things to continue to happen and measure the
18	thing you're trying to measure?
19	It's an ongoing discussion, one that I
20	think we have to recognize, especially for this
21	purpose, in its unintended consequence.
22	CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Right, and as a public
23	confidence issue, too, because, you know, when you
24	cross a threshold, and it turns out a lot of what
25	contributed to that were prudent actions, then it gets

difficult to explain. You know, the NRC is taking action, and we're getting into this regulatory response band.

But then, you know, in the public arena it looks like, at least from our view, we're trying to explain it away, and there's a public confidence issue here.

MR. KRICH: You're negotiating.

MR. DEAN: I was just going to share, and Dave kind of hit the nail on the head, these are called performance indicators, not performance measures, and it's an indicator. And if we go in there and look and say, "You guys, we're acting prudently," it should be described in the inspection report, and we move on. But that's been a difficult hurdle to get over.

MR. FLOYD: Yeah, and I think if it were just between the licensee and the regulator, that wouldn't be a problem at all. It's when you bring in the public and the financial community and they look at these and draw different conclusions or at least perceptions of performance. They don't bother to read the full report. They just see that, gee, this plant tripped some white indicators, and it doesn't look like anybody is doing anything about it, and that's

1	where the problem comes in.
2	I mean, it's good we make this public, but
3	then it creates another set of problems that are
4	really outside of the construction of the original
5	program.
6	MR. REYNOLDS: We got the public and the
7	financial community to be better off. Is that what
8	you're saying?
9	MR. FLOYD: Well, maybe that's a good
LO	suggestion.
L1	(Laughter.)
L2	MR. TRAPP: Don, do you have a lot of
L3	cases where the PIs that were tripped to white were,
L4	in fact, things that the licensee was doing prudently
L5	or, I mean, have you made that cut and do you have any
L6	data for it?
L7	MR. HICKMAN: With this particular
L8	indicator or
L9	MR. TRAPP: No, any, just in general.
20	MR. HICKMAN: In general?
21	MR. TRAPP: Yeah.
22	MR. HICKMAN: Not that I'm aware of.
23	Generally speaking what we've done let me back up
24	just a little bit. What this turns out to be is a
25	tradeoff between a simpler PT and a more complicated

1 PI that excludes the prudent things, and what we have 2 been doing to date has been making these 3 complicated. 4 So we have gotten lots of questions. 5 We've had to -- we have to start looking at all of these issues and deciding one by one whether this 6 7 counts or not. It has greatly complicated the 8 process. 9 I think to date I'm not aware of any where people doing imprudent things have crossed the 10 11 threshold. Maybe Steve is, but --12 Yeah, I'm aware of at least MR. FLOYD: On unavailability, for example, they did 13 14 a projection ahead, and they plugged in the amount of 15 planned maintenance that they intended to perform on the systems in accordance with their maintenance rule 16 17 to balance availability and reliability, and they say that they will be tripping all of the thresholds if 18 19 they stay where they are on all of the safety system unavailability thresholds. 20 21 MR. HICKMAN: There have been examples 22 like that where people have looked ahead and been 23 concerned about doing the maintenance that they had 24 planned to do, but --Ray, did you have a comment? 25 MR. KRICH:

1 MR. SHADIS: Well, yeah. I was just 2 wondering if some of these are not only a product of 3 the way that you're looking at them, but they're also 4 a product of the rush for ever shorter outages. I mean, isn't there any -- you want to 5 give credit for doing things prudently at power, 6 7 reducing power if you're going to do certain 8 maintenance of items and so on, and not penalize the 9 industry. But at the same time, the frequency of 10 11 these things happening seems from the public 12 perspective, my perspective, to be a result of pushing for shorter refueling outages, and that ought to go 13 14 into the equation for prudence also. 15 If you're stacking up a bunch of these occurrences while your plant is at power, maybe the 16 17 last time you were down here refueling you should have been thinking about doing some of this stuff. 18 19 MR. FLOYD: Well, no, the example that I 20 gave was really people doing planned maintenance, not 21 having to do unplanned maintenance at power because 22 they didn't do proper maintenance in shutdown. 23 Well, but it's a choice MR. SHADIS: 24 though to do it. If you're looking at it in the long

range, you might plan to do it while you were down, or

you might plan to do it while you were up and going, and you might plan to do that in order to shorten your outage, yes?

MR. FLOYD: Yes. I think the big rub though is what we're seeing is we're seeing a head on collision between the deterministic way that we've run our plant to date versus the risk informed way of running the plant.

of this maintenance on line, they've had to present, and it's in our indicator they have to have presented and gotten approval from the staff on a quantitative analysis that shows that there is no significant impact on risk, essentially a risk neutral impact from doing the maintenance at power as opposed to doing it while the plant is shut down. Otherwise they have to take the unavailability.

And the ones that we're talking about tripping the threshold don't fall into that category. It's the ones where you have to take the unavailability to do their planned maintenance to meet their rule balancing maintenance between the reliability and the availability goals the maintenance rule.

So we're seeing a dichotomy here, I think.

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1 As we try to become more risk informed, we still have 2 of requirements that are based upon deterministic analyses. 3 4 MR. SHADIS: Well, or becoming risk determined also. I mean, risk informed is one thing. 5 To pile everything into the column of we can show you 6 7 calculations that says we can go ahead and do this procedure which takes away redundancy, takes away 8 9 defense in depth and, therefore, it's okay to do is 10 another thing. 11 there is an alternative and 12 alternative is to spend a few more dollars and stay shut down a few more days for refueling. 13 14 MR. FLOYD: Yeah, that sounds easy, but I 15 think the reality is that in some cases the shutdown configuration that you're in is actually riskier than 16 doing it at power. So from a public health and safety 17 perspective issue, it's the wrong thing to do to take 18 19 the longer outage in some cases and do the work while 20 you're shut down rather than doing it at power. 21 So it's a somewhat complicated issue. 22 It's not black and white. 23 But just to add something, MR. KRICH: 24 Ray, I think I understand your point. Just something 25 you may not be aware of is when we do that on line

1	maintenance, in all cases we also look at what
2	compensatory measures we have to take or what actions
3	or other activities we will not take while we're in
4	that particular situation so as to minimize the risk,
5	and that's why it's judged to be risk neutral, because
6	you're not doing all of the normal type of activities
7	that you would do when you're in that condition.
8	MR. SHADIS: No, I understand.
9	MR. KRICH: Okay.
10	MR. SHADIS: I understand. It's just it
11	is a matter though of at least with some of these
12	indicators of making the decision that puts you in
13	that place somewhere well in advance of getting there.
14	MR. KRICH: Yes, yes.
15	MR. HICKMAN: Well, we were talking a lot
16	here. As you can see, the discussion quickly came
17	focused on safety system unavailability and because
18	that's the issue. I mean, that's the one that's the
19	issue.
20	As far as trying to avoid counting
21	imprudent actions, as I say, it's a tradeoff between
22	a simpler indicator and one that in essence would
23	count most everything and the threshold set
24	appropriately.
25	What we've gotten to with the safety

system unavailability indicator is one that's quite complicated, and we're continually addressing issues and making decisions as to what counts and what doesn't count.

The issue of thresholds becomes very important then. We established the thresholds based upon the best data we had available at the start of the initial implementation, which was the historical data that licensees provided to us from their WANO reporting.

And we have since found out that the WANO reporting is not to the accuracy that the NRC is looking for. It was not counting everything. So the question of the threshold is a big one, and this is what Steve was referring to when he talked about the licensee who may exceed that threshold by doing the things that he wants to do.

We can't adjust the thresholds unless we have data, and so it's going to be a tough process, I guess, getting to the point where we have thresholds that we have confidence in.

One of the proposals that was made was to link the thresholds to the plant specific maintenance rule criteria for those systems, and then there was discussion about whether the threshold ought to be set

1 equal to the criteria or the threshold maybe ought to 2 be above the criteria to give licensees an opportunity 3 -- if they were to exceed the criteria and go 4 (a)(1) to fix it. That is a proposal that I'm sure 5 will see further discussion. And then the last issue there, the common 6 7 definitions there for unavailability. This is an issue concerning the burden on licensees to collect 8 9 different data for WANO, the ROP, the maintenance rule, and the PRA applications. Everybody seems to 10 want something a little bit different. 11 12 And I think clearly we would all like to have one set of data that licensees could report and 13 14 let various programs use that data however they want 15 to do it. A common definition is a starting point, 16 but it's not the answer because the devil is in the 17 details. 18 Those are the issues that we talked about. 19 20 The outcomes, as I mentioned earlier, the replacement 21 SCRAM indicator has been in the pilot program now this 22 is the sixth month, and it will end at the end of this 23 month. 24 We got no disagreement with that indicator

expressed by the stakeholders that were present.

1 We've had 21 plants reporting that data. At the completion of the program, we'll evaluate the data 2 3 according to the criteria that we listed in regulatory 4 issue summary, and we'll make a determination as to 5 what to do. There was a comment made, a good comment, 6 7 that the staff should develop success criteria for the pilot program for the unplanned power reduction 8 9 replacement, which is the unit power reduction 10 indicator, and if we do a dual pilot, it would be for 11 the other indicator as well to count equipment 12 malfunctions and operator errors. This we will do. That's the process. 13 14 We'll issue a regulatory issue summary. That will 15 list the criteria that will be used to evaluate those indicators. 16 17 final And the outcome, to monitor equipment performance properly, we really need to have 18 19 a nonavailability indicator, as well as a reliability 20 indicator. We only have unavailability now, which 21 means we can do a portion of it, but we can't do it 22 all. 23 We are looking to get some help from the

Office of Research in this regard. They are working

on the risk based performance indicators, which would

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1 certainly help us in the future. In the meantime, we need to do something with what we've got to try to 2 simplify the 3 indicator to ease the burden 4 licensees, as well as the staff. 5 That's the end of my presentation. I was just going to 6 CHAIRMAN PLISCO: 7 highlight one more thing on this, the second bullet. It was interesting. There was a lot of discussion on 8 9 unplanned power reductions, similar to our meetings here, is what sounded like a good idea. 10 11 throw it out to a group of people, I think the 12 proposed indicator -- we spent quite a bit of time with people shooting holes at the proposed indicator, 13 14 and at the end there was a lot of questions raised 15 about, well, maybe the old one wasn't so bad after all as far as the indicator itself. 16 17 And this has to do with what we talked a lot about here, is unintended consequences, and that's 18 19 what we were trying to address in this proposal. 20 MR. LAURIE: Question. 21 CHAIRMAN PLISCO: And some of those 22 concerns with more unintended consequences. 23 MR. LAURIE: How far in advance when it 24 comes to planned unavailability? For example, when,

Ed, you're going to do planned maintenance, how far in

1 advance do you inform ISO of that intent? Is it 2 months? MR. SCHERER: 3 Right now we don't have a 4 requirement. You mean one which requires us to reduce 5 power? 6 MR. LAURIE: Yes. 7 MR. SCHERER: Right now there is no 8 requirement for us. 9 MR. LAURIE: Okay. 10 MR. SCHERER: The governor has asked us to 11 start doing that. 12 MR. LAURIE: Because it would be a goal of ISO to be able -- we have planned and we have 13 14 unplanned, and the problem in California has been --15 and I was teasing Ed a little bit -- California has had 13,000 megawatts down, only a tiny fraction being 16 17 But most of that has been forced outages, Edison. 18 unplanned. 19 You want planned because the system 20 operator can then go out and buy in advance, not have 21 to pay spot market prices. So the question is I'm not 22 familiar with what the rules are regarding 23 notification of system operators to notify of planned 24 outages. There's no rule because obviously they know regarding planned outages. 25

1	The question is: how far in advance is
2	that planned for? No rule?
3	MR. GARCHOW: It's different in each ISO.
4	I mean I can't quote you chapter and verse, but
5	there's advantages to, you know, providing the planned
6	outages.
7	MR. KRICH: It's a problem because
8	MR. GARCHOW: It's very problematic.
9	MR. KRICH: Something we can take
10	advantage of.
11	MR. GARCHOW: Sine the ISOs typically are
12	formed you know, they were all formed by the
13	utilities, the ones that manage the transmission
14	system.
15	MR. LAURIE: Is the information given to
16	ISO confidentially, but there's no good sense of trust
17	in that?
18	I didn't mean to take up you guys, but
19	it's an issue because forced outages are a lot more
20	expensive to make up the megawatts for than unforced
21	outages.
22	MR. DEAN: Okay. Without any further
23	questions for Don on performance indicators, I'd like
24	to jump ahead to maintenance effectiveness, which is
25	on page 41. This should be a fairly short issue, and

1	then we'll get into some of the more lengthy ones.
2	Thank you, Don.
3	PARTICIPANT: What page did you say?
4	MR. SCOTT: Page 41, page 41. That's
5	because we've got short people presenting it.
6	My name is Wayne Scott. I'm with the
7	Equipment, Quality, and Performance Branch of NRR, and
8	my technical right arm here, Dr. See-Meng Wong from
9	the PRA Branch, giving this presentation on.
LO	We're delighted to see that you're running
L1	your schedule on Eastern Standard Time this morning.
L2	(Laughter.)
L3	MR. SCOTT: The objective of our session
L4	was to discuss the challenges associated with this
L5	(a)(4) related findings and the SDP and to talk about
L6	how we might go about enhancing the SDP in order to
L7	handle maintenance Rule (a)(4) violations more
L8	effectively "findings" I guess I should say and,
L9	of course, to get feedback from our stakeholders.
20	The problem comes when we have a finding
21	and we try to fit maintenance rule finding through the
22	SDP. It often doesn't go, and in the case of (a)(4),
23	essentially it can't go. We maintain a maintenance
24	rule enforcement review panel. We've had that in
2.5	place since 1996, and usually there's a lot of

1 resources. We kind of like to get the whole process 2 structured so we could get out of the one at a time 3 assessment business. 4 And every time we have an enforcement 5 issue and maintenance rule, typically it's a struggle. Other issues, page 41. Other issues that 6 7 were raised during the discussion include the first 8 one there, the first bullet. One concern, a concerned 9 licensee suggested that if they were to find an error in their PRA or their tool for assessing the risk or 10 even maybe even worse yet, if they were to enhance 11 12 their tool and found that there was some difference in the numbers that they were coming up with, the revised 13 14 version, would the NRC do some hindsight and say, "Oh, 15 here's a case where we thought you were okay, but you really weren't," that kind of stuff. 16 17 And I think without making any serious policy, we told them that we wouldn't be doing that 18 kind of stuff. 19 Another issue raised was is there a need 20 21 for the SDP in the old part of the maintenance rule 22 (a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(3) stuff. There's enough of 23 anguish that goes on during these review panels that 24 a lot of folks would like to see that, but I think

what we have come to is that we find if there's a

performance issue associated with it, we're able to get it through the current reactor safety SDP. If there's no performance issue, then it's basically a programmatic issue, and under the current approach to things anyway, it just ends up no color and goes on about its business.

Another concerned citizen wondered if a licensee totally misses doing an assessment of risk, then will they get a second violation for failing to manage that risk that they didn't know they had. I think that's not a major concern either. We typically don't cascade violations and give double jeopardy, although sometimes you'd kind of like to, right?

And the last issue there on that page related to whether getting into this new SDP process would have the consequence of making -- specifically focusing on managing the risk issues, whether licensees would make their own programs vague so that we wouldn't be able to come in and say, "You said you were going to do one, two, three, four, five, and you only did one, two, three. Therefore, we violate you for not doing four and five, and if they made a mushy -- some of us talk with our hands -- if they made a mushy program, then we couldn't violate them for not following their own program.

And we certainly hope that licensees are -- what was the term we heard a little bit earlier, people saying, "Well, you know, human nature being what it is"? I'm from the old school, I guess, not the old school of enforcement and whatnot, but the old school of doing things. My attitude is do it right and you won't have to have a problem with all this kind of stuff.

The licensee we hope will not vague up their own programs just to avoid some issues with us.

Okay. On the next page, we've got a little issue with our slides here in this handout. Please just pass through page 43 and jump on to page 44.

Similarly, licensees with bigger and better PRAs feel concerned that their ability to fine tune -- when we come into a situation looking at risk numbers and they've got a tool that fine tunes those numbers, then they're concerned that we'll be able to come in with a little razor sharp edge and say, "You're on the wrong side of the edge of this razor sharp issue. So that's a violation," where somebody else who maybe doesn't even have an appropriate tool, that has a very vague approach to the process can get away with a lot of things because we can't hold them

1 to their own -- keep their own feet in their own fire. 2 Again, that's one of the problems that inspect 3 having, trying to and enforce 4 maintenance rule issues in the (a)(4) area. We really 5 encourage licensees to have bigger and better tools so that they can handle analysis of more sophisticated 6 7 configurations. I've always taken the position that the 8 licensee really shouldn't try to enter a configuration 9 that is more complex than the sophistication of his 10 11 tool is able to assess, and so we just really hope 12 that licensees who are doing more and more on-line stuff and have bigger and better tools don't cut back 13 14 on their ability to analyze their own risk due to some 15 potential concern about NRC's coming in there and looking over their shoulder. 16 17 MR. REYNOLDS: Wayne, so in your opinion, if there was a standard or similar PRA for each 18 19 licensee, this issue would go away? 20 MR. SCOTT: Well, basically I don't think 21 licensee go away, but, yeah, issues ever that 22 certainly would be --23 I mean the issue about MR. REYNOLDS: 24 being penalized if you have a simple -major 25 MR. SCOTT: Ιt would be

improvement certainly.

MR. REYNOLDS: Okay. Thank you.

MR. SCOTT: And the last issue arose, proposed additional burden to a licensee out of a discussion where we said if a licensee does an assessment of the configuration that he thinks he had and we find that there are more SSEs out of service than he included in -- he, it -- included in their assessment, then we would rely on the licensee to do a revised assessment, and some people felt that was going back to the licensee and have them do an additional assessment after they'd already done one would be an additional burden.

I guess in a way it would, but especially when licensees have these on-line risk tools. I don't think it really is a significant burden, especially if it's going to show that they really weren't too far off out of line.

So the other slide that's not here is our outcomes slide. The outcomes are probably fairly predictable. The first outcome of our discussion was that we intend to continue to work toward enhancing the present SDP so that we're able to address licensee performance deficiencies with respect to compliance with (a)(4) of the maintenance rule.

1 And the second outcome is that we 2 certainly want to and we're encouraged to continue working closely with stakeholders in the development 3 of this augmentation of the SDP. 4 5 That ends my presentation. Anybody have any other questions? 6 7 MR. SCHERER: Yes. In terms of defining success ahead of time as you work your way through the 8 9 process, what is it that you feel that you're trying to cover in the maintenance rule SDP that's not 10 11 already covered in the after safety SDP? 12 Well, the biggest problem is MR. SCOTT: that there's no way even if we can get into the SDP, 13 14 and typically we can't, in the (a)(4) area, and when 15 we have had opportunities to discuss it and come to 16 some consensus, we're really never able to find 17 anything other than a green outcome. And we believe that there is a potential 18 19 for outcome beyond green, but there just isn't the way 20 to get there working through the screens and questions 21 and whatnot. 22 MR. SCHERER: I'm not sure I got an answer 23 to my question. What areas are you trying to identify 24 in terms of risk significance that aren't already

covered under the reactor safety SDP?

1 MR. SCOTT: I guess I don't understand 2 your question. 3 DR. WONG: Can I offer a response? 4 MR. SCHERER: Yes. 5 DR. WONG: Can I offer a response? Okay. The current reactor safety SDP does 6 7 a level of detail of completeness that we see that does not cover what we're trying to address licensee 8 performance deficiencies in noncompliance with (a)(4). 9 One example that I can give technically is that the 10 11 (a)(4) regulation requires the licensee to assess and 12 manage planned maintenance configurations, and in some specific cases, external conditions, for example, 13 14 inclement weather or electric grid stability problems 15 that may affect the maintenance activities out in the switch yard. 16 17 In the current SDP, although we are doing -- spending a lot of effort trying to develop the best 18 19 models that we have, those details are not there, and 20 that's the reason why we propose the (a)(4) SDP in the 21 approaches that we presented at the workshop. 22 Thank you. 23 To follow on, one of the MR. GARCHOW: 24 assumptions, I quess going in, even the maintenance of 25 (a)(4), was that the technical specification specified

1 configurations that assure public safety, and that we are moving on with the development of our tools to 2 3 say, you know, where we can be more prudent, and 4 understand risks, to put contingencies in place and 5 really understand activities before we embark on them, that's the right thing to do, and we'll go do it, and 6 7 the maintenance rule, (a)(4), specifies you do that. But relative to this process in trying to 8 9 use some sort of risk assessment on different levels of prudence or ability to accomplish (a)(4) by the 10 licensee, I sort of agree with Ed that it's hard to 11 12 see where that would get you into any kind of risk significance to point for further NRC engagement. 13 14 To me it seems very, very isolated in its 15 scope, and I fall back to the tech specs prohibit the licensee from getting into configurations that clearly 16 are risk significant by definition. 17 We've been operating the plants that way 18 19 for 20 years. 20 MR. DEAN: Yeah, let me jump in and help 21 See-Meng here out. I think that actually some of the 22 things that are done in terms of configuration, control configuration management during times that 23 24 vou're taking particularly multiple pieces

do maintenance actually

equipment

out

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themselves to a risk assessment where you can actually develop a change in core damage frequency for a given point in time and be able to apply the thresholds that we have to ascertain for that period of time what was the level of significance when there is -- if we find something where you didn't appropriately manage or take into consideration something that you should have.

I think that's what the intent of this modification to the SDP is intended to be. Isn't that right, See-Meng?

DR. WONG: Yes.

MR. GARCHOW: Yeah, I understand, but I'm just trying to tell you when you find that, what is truly the impact to the real ability to say that you were, you know, white or yellow. I mean, what's that pointing to, given the fact that either you're in compliance with your tech specs or you're not, and you've done some sort of review to put compensatory measures in place to increase like we're going to be successful in the transient.

I still don't see where for the regulatory oversight process it adds value in trying to point you towards some increased interaction with the licensee as opposed to like Ed was saying, that clearly as a

result of your maintenance activities you've had excessive unavailability and you trip the threshold or your maintenance rule inspection says that you have some issues with your, you know, repetitive maintenance program. You have a chance to get into the oversight process in that manner different than running through the SDP specifically to (a)(4).

That's why I don't fully understand, but it's not a requirement that I do. I just offer that as a comment.

MR. KRICH: I guess, Bill, I would just add that I think that it should manifest itself in the existing either inspections or PIs, it seems to me. And I'm with Dave. I may not fully understand, but it seems to me this is a solution in search of a problem, but I'll be interested to see how it --

MR. DEAN: Well, we'll see how it develops. I think one of the things that we think might come out of this though is perhaps a different approach into how we look at licensees in terms of maintenance effectiveness practices, and that perhaps, you know, my thoughts are that -- and this is a little bit visionary -- but my thoughts are that this might help us actually ascertain in terms of when I talked earlier about inspection program flexibility, when

should we devote more attention to a licensee in terms of configuration control and things like that.

Are they putting themselves in maintenance profiles that are at an elevated risk, in which case we probably need to pay more attention to what's going on in the plant in terms of, you know, configuration management and execution of the risk management plan, and so on and so forth, as opposed to if a licensee is keeping themselves very low in terms of risk profile.

You know, that might be some of the insights we get from looking at this.

MR. SCHERER: I just want you to consider that when you look at that, it may be that as opposed to looking for the insidious combination of maintenance activities, which I encourage you to do, and I support the effort to go look at it, but it may be that your comment that you can only have green findings may only be proving the robustness of the current tech specs and how much they obviously would be allowable alterations to the plant.

MR. DEAN: Yeah, there is some movement afoot internally with respect to tech specs in terms of risk informing the tech specs to basically get rid of things like allowed outage times, and in which case a process like this becomes even, you know -- right

1 now we do have the tech spec AOTs to kind of fall back 2 on, but you know, if things transition to the point 3 that perhaps they may be heading -- you know, this 4 type of approach becomes more important. 5 MR. COE: I'd like to dispel one thing. 6 CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Pardon? 7 MR. COE: I'm Doug Coe with the Inspection 8 Program Branch. The comment that was made earlier about 9 10 that you can only get green findings is specifically 11 with reference to the Phase 1 process, in which you 12 have to remember that initially findings that are put trough Phase 1 and Phase 2 of the reactor safety SDP, 13 14 there was not -- it was not anticipated that there 15 would already be a quantitative answer for what the risk impact of the finding was. 16 17 So the Phase 1 and Phase 2 were intended to help the inspector make some early decisions about 18 19 whether to pursue something further. 20 In the case of maintenance rule (a)(4)21 evaluations, the licensee in many cases, if they've 22 used a quantitative tool, already have a quantitative answer, and there is a logical problem with Phase 1. 23 24 The questions you go through don't specifically

acknowledge that you may already have a quantitative

1 answer. 2 So what the comment was that you end up 3 green is you strictly follow the Phase 1 questions; 4 you can't get into a further analysis. 5 Now, we've already built something into the SDP that says for inspectors, you know, if you 6 7 don't feel that, you know, you're getting a correct answer out of the Phase 1, go ahead and go on into 8 Phase 2 and Phase 3, but notwithstanding that, we do 9 want to fix the problem with the Phase 1 work sheets. 10 11 But I just want to point out that the 12 earlier that maintenance comment was not configurations will always be green if you have a 13 14 finding where the licensee missed something. That is 15 not correct. MR. DEAN: Okay. Anything else for this 16 17 topic area? (No response.) 18 19 MR. DEAN: Okay. I think I saw Vonna walk 20 in. Vonna Ordaz, who is currently the Acting Section Chief in the safeguards area, will spend some time 21 22 talking about workshop activities associated with 23 physical protection, and then after that we'll move

I think this is on page 37 of yours.

into radiation safety.

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1 MS. ORDAZ: Okay. For the physical 2 protection issues, our session objective was 3 introduce several issues that NRC is currently working 4 on and answer questions about these issues. 5 There were four items. One was the Group 2 questions that's in the 0610* procedure. 6 7 whether or not the Group 2 question that currently existed was usable, and it turns out it was unusable 8 9 and open to interpretation. So we did revise the Group 2 questions. 10 11 The second issue had to do with the 12 physical protection SDP. As you may know, we have an interim SDP because the original physical protection 13 14 SDP was unusable in several cases that we had during 15 initial implementation. The SDP results were inconsistent with the 16 17 actual risk significance, and also we introduced a draft physical protection SDP for consideration, one 18 that would follow the interim PPSDP. 19 20 The third item was inspection procedures. 21 Of all the baseline inspection procedures we have, 22 we've been making some revisions to those procedures, 23 and we were showing some insights on how we're going 24 about doing that.

And the fourth item had to do with

1 performance indicators to determine if they clearly 2 accomplish their stated purpose. 3 Next slide, please. 4 The other issues raised in the workshop 5 included, as a result of all those discussions, should licensee identified findings that are entered in their 6 7 corrective action program be run through the physical protection SDP. That was the first question that came 8 9 up, and is it a threshold question? It's one of the items that we will be 10 considering in the next step to figure out how to 11 12 address it. The second item is insuring the SPA pilot 13 14 program follows the current program in Revision 2, 10 15 CFR 7355. The third item is --16 17 CHAIRMAN PLISCO: You may want to explain what SPA is. 18 19 MS. ORDAZ: Oh. 20 CHAIRMAN PLISCO: I'm not sure everyone 21 here knows what that is. 22 ORDAZ: far MS. Okay. As as the 23 safeguards performance assessment that the industry is 24 proposing, and it's their version of how to perform 25 the OSRE, which is what NRC currently inspects to.

1	MR. REYNOLDS: The force-on-force drills.
2	MS. ORDAZ: For the force-on-force
3	exercises. Thanks, Steve.
4	MR. KRICH: If I could, I'm not sure I
5	understand. How can the SPA then follow revision to
6	7355 if that's not finalized yet?
7	MR. REYNOLDS: The point was when it
8	becomes final.
9	MR. KRICH: So in other words, make the
10	adjustment to the SPA.
11	MR. REYNOLDS: Sure.
12	MR. KRICH: Okay.
13	MR. REYNOLDS: The point of the workshop
14	was not to make the current program with revisions
15	follow SPA, but to make SPA follow the regulations and
16	the rules.
17	MR. KRICH: Okay.
18	MR. REYNOLDS: And if the rules changed,
19	to make sure that it complied.
20	MR. KRICH: Yeah.
21	MR. REYNOLDS: That was the point.
22	MS. ORDAZ: Right, and some of the
23	concepts in the SPA pilot program will be are being
24	factored into the rulemaking activities associated
25	with 7355.

1 item includes physical security 2 performance indicators should be reevaluated in light 3 of the performance requirements of the revision to 4 7355. 5 Next slide, please. The fitness for duty performance indicator 6 7 was discussed, and it was recognized that it should be reevaluated in light of the requirements of the new 8 fitness for duty rule and also the security equipment 9 performance index PI has an inconsistent performance 10 11 threshold and should be changed. 12 That was one that had the, from what I understand, a lengthy discussion on, and we'll have 13 14 some continuing discussions on that later this week. 15 Next slide. Okay. As far as outcomes from the workshop, we 16 17 clarified the recent revision to the Group 2 questions that were issued 2/27/01. It says in this slide no 18 19 further actions needed, but we're always welcome to 20 any comments from the public or the industry. 21 I know there was some discussion on those 22 questions at the workshop, but the latest revision, 23 the ones where we fixed the unusable term is now in 24 the 2/27 inspection procedure -- pardon me -- the 2/27

25

0610* procedure.

1 The second item, inspection procedures 2 being revised were discussed and questions answered. 3 It says no further action is needed. However, we're 4 still finalizing those inspection procedures, and this includes making efficiencies in the procedures and 5 consolidating the force-on-force procedures, and the 6 7 OSRE rules of engagement that you may be familiar with that was issued November of 2000 into one draft 8 procedure for all force-on-force exercises. 9 10 And the third item there, the interim SDP, 11 which was issued 2/27 into 0609 was discussed and 12 Staff should address questions were answered. efficacy of the SDP as it is applied. 13 14 On the interim PPSDP, that was issued in 15 COMSECY-36 from the Commission back on January 25th, and that is our interim, and as we mentioned in the 16 17 workshop, we have a proposed final, if you will, PPSDP, but we're in the very beginning stages of it. 18 We have a lot of discussions to have yet in an open 19 20 and public forum and a ways to go before we have it considered a final PPSDP. 21 22 MR. KRICH: How could it be a final and 23 still have a long ways to go, I guess? 24 MS. ORDAZ: Pardon? 25 MR. KRICH: I'm confused.

1	PARTICIPANT: Proposed final.
2	MS. ORDAZ: Proposed. I even told them to
3	strike the word "final" from our discussion.
4	MR. KRICH: So what I'm interested in
5	MS. ORDAZ: Is draft. You know, whatever
6	comes after interim, the last leg, the
7	MR. KRICH: Yeah, I don't care what you
8	call it. What I'm interested in is making sure that
9	whatever comes out of this is as a result of going
10	through the process that we have established for
11	MS. ORDAZ: Absolutely.
12	MR. REYNOLDS: And that's exactly what
13	this last sentence means or was intended to mean, is
14	that any lessons learned from implementing the interim
15	SDP will be put forth when we develop the next SDP,
16	whether it's the final or whatever. Hopefully it's
17	the final, but the next wave.
18	MR. KRICH: Right.
19	MR. REYNOLDS: We'll take lessons learned.
20	We took lessons learned to develop the interim SDP.
21	Take lessons learned from apply interim SDP. So we
22	developed the next one. So we don't do that cold.
23	MR. KRICH: Right.
24	MR. REYNOLDS: That's your point.
25	MR. KRICH: As well as getting input from

1	the stakeholders is what I
2	MR. REYNOLDS: Sure.
3	MS. ORDAZ: Right. We actually considered
4	it a draft.
5	MR. KRICH: But when you issue something
6	as a final, we get, you know, kind of
7	MS. ORDAZ: Right. We called it a draft
8	proposal for consideration, I believe, at the workshop
9	just to make sure you didn't think it was final.
10	PARTICIPANT: It will have to be final at
11	some point though.
12	MS. ORDAZ: But to let you know we are at
13	the beginning stages of that. Okay?
14	MR. SHADIS: Yeah, could you give us in a
15	narrative way the basic difference between the SPA and
16	the program it's intended to replace?
17	MS. ORDAZ: You mean the SPA as it
18	currently exists?
19	MR. SHADIS: OSRE versus SPA.
20	MS. ORDAZ: Well, in general is that we
21	inspect the for the OSREs, we do the inspections
22	for the SPAs. It will be the utilities that will be
23	doing what the NRC would have done in the past, but we
24	will be overseeing their implementation of oversight
25	of the force-on-force exercises.

1	MR. SHADIS: But the exercises will be
2	carried out, will be a physical test. It won't be an
3	analysis.
4	MS. ORDAZ: No, it's still considered
5	the NEI document as written still includes the
6	tabletops and the force-on-force exercises, which is
7	similar to the OSRE.
8	MR. SHADIS: What is the rationale that
9	NRC is applying to this one?
10	MS. ORDAZ: In terms of?
11	MR. SHADIS: Entertaining it at all.
12	What's their rationale for changing it of thinking
13	about changing it?
14	MS. ORDAZ: Well, the SPA program has
15	actually been discussed in a number of public meetings
16	in the past, the NEI document, over the past year or
17	so before I started working here, and through the
18	interactions we've discussed and weighed all of the
19	options, and we have a Commission paper going forward
20	currently that lays out the program and the
21	implementation issues associated with it.
22	As a matter of fact, that's up with the
23	EDO's office right now. So the rationale, which is
24	what you're asking me, for going to the SPA versus
l	

what the OSRE is is that we were open to piloting this

1 SPA program. It is a pilot, and we'll take it up for 2 the full course of the year if agreed to by the Commission, and then at the end of the year, we'll 3 4 have a period of lessons learned evaluation to 5 determine if that's a program that we'd like to go with, and see if there's any insights we can factor 6 7 into our rulemaking process. MR. REYNOLDS: Ray, also any time we have 8 9 a change in the inspection program or a case like that when industry takes on more of a cost and more of a 10 11 burden to do these activities, we are sure ourselves 12 that there's an equivalent level of assurance that the safeguard program will be implemented effectively. 13 14 So even though they may do more of the 15 drills, more of the assessments, we're still going to be involved doing inspections and assessing to make 16 sure that they are in compliance and that they're 17 safe. 18 19 So any time we let our licensee take on 20 this sort of activity, we're assuming that it's an 21 equivalent level of safety. 22 Well, MR. SHADIS: sure. I 23 anticipate you'd want to do that, but let's try a fill 24 in the blank. This is better because, blank. Can we

do that?

1	MR. BROCKMAN: It is more effective and
2	efficient, period.
3	MR. SHADIS: Because?
4	MR. BROCKMAN: The licensee knows their
5	particular site better and can better investigate it,
6	and it is more efficient because it requires less NRC
7	resources to effectively oversee that, as opposed to
8	independently administer the evaluation themselves.
9	MR. SHADIS: All right. I'm just
10	checking. So it has nothing to do with all of those
11	failures of exercises that have taken place in the
12	last couple of years?
13	MR. BROCKMAN: Absolutely not.
14	MR. SHADIS: Oh, okay.
15	MR. BROCKMAN: In fact, the new program,
16	one of the things you would have to do is assure that
17	those types of deficiencies would be caught by this
18	one to the same degree that they ere by the other one.
19	If they didn't, then you couldn't pursue down the
20	path.
21	MR. REYNOLDS: I do have to temper what
22	Ken said. We hope it's more efficient and effect.
23	MR. BROCKMAN: To be determined.
24	MR. REYNOLDS: It's not clear. That's why
25	we're doing a pilot. If you talk to some industry

1 folks, some of them think it will be more costly for them, but in the long run it may be more efficient and 2 effective for the whole, if you add both pieces 3 4 together. 5 We haven't yet determined if our inspection resources will be less or more or the same. 6 7 That's still to be determined. MR. BROCKMAN: But that is the premise by 8 which we're pursuing the pilot. 9 10 MR. REYNOLDS: Right. 11 MS. ORDAZ: So we'll know more at the end 12 of the pilot program once we do our lessons learned. And we do have a public meeting on the 5th of this 13 14 week to talk about some of the implementation details. 15 MR. DEAN: Yeah, let me just offer I think the approach that's being promoted is one that is 16 17 analogous to what we do in emergency preparedness space where the licensee conducts exercises we 18 19 We watch them critique because the burden 20 is, after all, on the licensee in terms of making sure 21 their staff is trained and capable of executing in 22 this case their security plan. 23 And so I think there's an analogy there in 24 terms of what we do in EP space. 25 MS. ORDAZ: Thanks.

1	MR. DEAN: Anything else for Vonna?
2	MR. FLOYD: Yeah, I was just going to add
3	I think one of the things that the licensees are
4	looking for from the SPA program is more timely
5	identification of perhaps deficiencies the way the
6	program is set up. Right now our plant gets in OSRE
7	what is it, about every eight years roughly? And
8	under this program it's actually a three-year program
9	that has sub-elements being evaluated periodically
10	through the three years, and then every three years a
11	force-on-force exercise.
12	So you get much more of a more timely
13	heads up if you have any weaknesses in your program to
14	correct them.
15	MS. ORDAZ: In the OSRE program
16	MR. SHADIS: Thank you.
17	I had to rate them all. I liked your
18	explanation.
19	MS. ORDAZ: The OSRE program does continue
20	throughout the SPA pilot.
21	MR. DEAN: Okay, good. Anything else for
22	Vonna?
23	(No response.)
24	MR. DEAN: What I'd like to do before
25	lunch is to have our people who represent the

1	radiation safety arena, Steve Klementowicz and Roger
2	Pedersen, come up and talk about the issues associated
3	with those particular cornerstones, and I think then
4	would probably be a good time to break for lunch.
5	PARTICIPANT: What page is that on?
6	MR. DEAN: Yeah, this is on page 19, I
7	believe. Page 19.
8	MR. KLEMENTOWICZ: I'm Steve Klementowicz,
9	and I'm the public radiation safety cornerstone lead.
10	And I have three issues. We changed one
11	of the blocks in the transportation SDP.
12	The second issue was on the radioactive
13	material control portion of the SDP, the NRC
14	inspectors have asked for additional guidance.
15	And the third issue, again, the NRC
16	inspectors have asked for additional clarification and
17	guidance about a time frame to be used for counting
18	occurrences against a licensee's program.
19	Now, let me go into the first issue, the
20	transportation change. It was not in your handout,
21	but we can have copies made. You'll have to get the
22	copies to go through it properly.
23	But let me explain it. In the
24	transportation area, this issue addresses that a
25	licensee has to quantify and classify radioactive

material that they ship off sit either to another licensee or to a burial site. So the NRC regulations, as I say, to classify and quantify the radioactive material.

The original SDP -- and that's low level burial ground. That's the SDP we're talking about. On the right-hand side, the lower right-hand two decision diamonds are new. Prior to that what we had was a very simplistic significance determination process which stated that any time a licensee shipped radioactive material off site, if they did not correctly classify it, if they under classified it, that would be an automatic white finding.

And right out of the gate in April, as soon as the program started, we encountered a situation where a licensee shipped some material, Type B. There's three classes, A, B, and C, C being the more risk significant type of waste. The licensee classified the waste as A waste when, in fact, it was B waste. So they got an automatic white finding.

Based on an investigation of what actually occurred, industry came back to us and said, "This SDP needs to be expanded because what really happened was, yes, the licensee did under classify the waste. It was B waste and it was called A waste in all of the

shipping papers. However, there was very minimal risk because the licensee met all of the NRC regulations pertaining to the waste."

So all of the regulations were met. The material was packaged as if it was Type B waste. It was sent to the Barnwell disposal site and correctly disposed of as Type B waste. The error was they called it A waste.

We had several public stakeholder meetings to discuss the proposal to expand the SDP to reflect that if the licensee did meet the regulations, but still under classified it -- and here we refined it to only consider Type A and B waste. So if the situation happened again where the licensee met all of the regulations, packaged it properly, but through some administrative oversight called it A instead of B, there would be no risk to the public or to the workers or at the disposal site. So we would call that a low risk situation and classify it as a green finding.

However, for those situations with Class C waste, everyone agreed that that is a risky situation. There is more risk there, and so that would be an automatic white finding.

So what we brokered over the course of last year through public stakeholder meetings,

1	including the regional inspectors, was an expansion of
2	the SDP to further refine the risk for transportation
3	of radioactive material, and so that will be coming
4	out in the new NRC inspection manual, 0609, Appendix
5	D.
б	Any questions on that? Yes.
7	MR. LAURIE: Can you clarify for me the
8	jurisdictional lines on transportation and storage
9	issue between NRC and DOE? In all of my efforts in
10	regards to transportation, I've always dealt with DOE.
11	Is that confusing?
12	MR. KLEMENTOWICZ: Well, the NRC, we along
13	with the Department of Transportation, regulate the
14	shipment of radioactive material to the other sites.
15	DOE is not part of our process.
16	MR. KRICH: Do you mean DOT, Bob?
17	MR. LAURIE: I'm sorry?
18	MR. KRICH: Do you mean DOT, not DOE?
19	MR. LAURIE: No, no.
20	MR. KLEMENTOWICZ: All of the power
21	reactor waste is under NRC regulation. We incorporate
22	the Department of Transportation, but DOE is not part
23	of our
24	PARTICIPANT: What comes in from other
25	places and is in a port and then goes up to Hanford,
-	

1	it gets
2	MR. LAURIE: Well, okay. So DOE handles
3	foreign spent fuel.
4	MR. KLEMENTOWICZ: Yeah, and we're not
5	talking about that here. We're talking about Part 50
6	power reactors.
7	MR. LAURIE: Okay.
8	PARTICIPANT: So a different strain of
9	radioactive materials are handled differently.
10	MR. LAURIE: Okay. Thank you.
11	MR. KLEMENTOWICZ: Yes?
12	MR. SHADIS: My understanding is that
13	Class A waste doesn't require any kind of warning
14	placard on a ship. Is that a requirement of Class B
15	waste?
16	MR. KLEMENTOWICZ: Yes. I mean, I can't
17	cite you chapter and verse, but there are specific
18	requirements for the shipments of all radioactive
19	material. It just doesn't go out, except for exempt
20	quantities and some very, very exclusive use shipments
21	that hospitals and universities typically use.
22	MR. SHADIS: It strikes me there's a risk
23	impact in no labeling this material correctly, and the
24	only instance I can cite to you is that it's probably

not even contaminated, but designated to be

1	contaminated rubble was sent from the Maine Yankee
2	site. The containers it was in were labeled using
3	wide cellophane tape and magic marker as Class A
4	waste, but there was no indication that it was
5	radioactive waste or where it came from on the
6	containers, and it was parked on a rail siding in a
7	town of about 40,000 people within 100 yards of a
8	housing development and left there for a period of
9	about five to six weeks, and you know, the metal
10	containers well sealed and so on.
11	So I would anticipate not a heck of a lot
12	of risk there, although if I was a kid growing up in
13	that neighborhood, I would have been in those
14	containers to find out what it was.
15	However, if that were Class B waste and it
16	was labeled as Class A, I would say there was a safety
17	difference at least, a risk difference.
18	MR. KLEMENTOWICZ: And we agree.
19	MR. SHADIS: And I was wondering if you
20	would agree.
21	MR. KLEMENTOWICZ: The green risk, say if
22	it was B waste, the situation that occurred, shipped;
23	it was B waste called A waste. However, what I'm
24	pointing out, the risk it was a finding. It's

contrary to the procedures and the requirements. So

1 it's a finding. 2 But when you look at the risk, it met the 3 NRC regulations as far as packaging and security and 4 dose rates external to the surface of the package. 5 So the licensee correctly handled the waste as B waste. The only situation was the paper 6 7 work the driver was carrying says this is Class A waste. All the other radiation levels at the surface 8 of the material, the packaging for the material was as 9 B waste as it should have been. 10 11 So if it was called B waste, there would 12 have been absolutely no issue, but they misclassified it. 13 14 MR. BROCKMAN: To take your example, Ray, 15 if --16 MR. KLEMENTOWICZ: Wait one second. 17 please. In other parts of the transportation SDP, 18 have risk categories if the material for a 19 20 situation like you present, if the container is not 21 adequate, if there is a breach of the container, if 22 the radiation levels exceed what they're supposed to 23 while being out in the public. 24 We have other flow charts that relate to. 25 So if someone did breach the package, that would

1	escalate the severity based on the dose to the member
2	of the public.
3	MR. SHADIS: All right.
4	MR. KLEMENTOWICZ: So we address those
5	issues.
6	MR. SHADIS: Fine.
7	MR. KLEMENTOWICZ: This one is specific to
8	this.
9	MR. SHADIS: I'm sorry to interrupt.
10	MR. KLEMENTOWICZ: This one has about four
11	separate flow charts to address risk from
12	MR. REYNOLDS: I think if we just answer
13	a couple of simple questions, my issues that Ray
14	asked, the issue that you talked about, the container
15	was labeled as Class B.
16	MR. KLEMENTOWICZ: As A.
17	MR. REYNOLDS: As A, and the truck that
18	transported was not labeled as carrying B because it
19	thought it was carrying A or it was labeled
20	appropriately?
21	MR. KLEMENTOWICZ: I believe, well, it was
22	placarded as a radioactive material shipment, but the
23	paper work
24	MR. REYNOLDS: As B or for A?
25	MR. KLEMENTOWICZ: the paper work that

the truck driver carried called it Type A waste.

MR. BROCKMAN: The issue you're talking about is if everything had been done as if it was B, except for the piece of paper, everything in fact was done. In other words, take your example, Ray. If you could put B on a rail siding for six weeks and the only difference on it was the kids would see a B instead of an A, which they would know no difference on, but everything else was okay, there is no difference.

It's how it was done. There is certainly a risk associated with it when you're looking at it from in front, but if it was handled totally as if it was B in every way, shape or form, and the only difference is it's a piece of paper, then they say there's no difference, and you can come up with the finding still being a finding, but it's green.

MR. SHADIS: Yeah, I guess I'm using this as an example because the problem I have is that you're driving back from the outcome. You're saying, well, at the end no one got into these containers. At the end they were delivered safely, whatever it may be.

But the fact is that in this process, you hand over improperly labeled materials, and thereby,

1 you open it. You put it in harm's way. You open it 2 to the prospect that it is going to be handled based on the confidence that people have in that labeling as 3 4 it goes down the track and it gets out of the 5 licensee's control and it gets out of your control. And to my way of thinking, that has an 6 7 impact on risk. 8 MR. KLEMENTOWICZ: And we agree. It's not 9 a minor issue, and this is a green finding that's documented and that must be corrected by the licensee. 10 So we agree, but in a situation if they meet the NRC 11 12 regulations, albeit that they really didn't know that they met -- if the situation -- okay. 13 14 through that flow chart again. 15 If they did not meet the NRC regulations, 16 if they thought it was Type A waste and they packaged it as A waste and we find out that it's B waste, and 17 again, the receiving site, Barnwell, does inspections, 18 19 specific inspections on all waste material; so if it 20 was found to be B waste called A waste and packaged as 21 A waste, that would go to a white finding. The severity increases because the risk potential is 22 increased. 23 24 But the situation we encountered was they

met the Type B NRC requirements. So it really was an

administrative error.

Now, to point out -- I won't go into any detail, but the flow chart that is up there, if someone gets into the package, if there's a breach, we look at the dose rates and the contamination levels to assess severity. So even for A waste, A, B, and C waste, if there is a breach and a member of the public receives some exposure from it, we've quantified the risk here.

The next issue is clarification, clarification of radioactive material control, and this by itself doesn't help you very much. So you should take a look at the overall cornerstone.

And this is part of the overall program, but that is the public radiation safety cornerstone. On the left-hand side it talks about the radioactive material control, if we could focus in on that. Magic zoom here.

Okay. What the inspectors requested additional clarification on is the part of the flow chart that goes down rad material control, public exposure and over to the right, greater than five occurrences.

And we have situations where licensees have radioactive material on their sites, but yet it's

still under their control. They may have released a contaminated tool or wrench on their property, and it's still under their control, and we want to give credit for that, that it can't reach a member of the public.

But there are other situations where we maintain that the licensee has -- that the tool could just walk off site, and what we've provided is additional guidance to the inspectors as to when the licensee still in our opinion has control, and basically that means does this material, this wrench or this contaminated soil or concrete blocks -- is there a final radiation survey point that this material would have to pass through, and would that radiation detector be able to detect the material that could go into the public domain?

If it can, if it can be surveyed and detected, then we maintain the licensee still has control, and it is not a finding. If we find there is no survey point, then the licensee has lost control, and that would be a green finding, and we would assess over a two-year period whether or not they've done this greater than five times because there is some dose associated with each release of material, and we look at the integrated dose from that material

1 potentially getting it off site. 2 essentially what was provided was 3 additional guidance that's going into the SDP to give 4 the inspector guidance. When has the licensee lost 5 control, and when can we assess credit? And we'll leave that up because the third 6 7 issue, the inspectors were also asking for additional guidance on the greater than five occurrences relates 8 to over a two-year inspection cycle, and realizing 9 10 that the regions do not conduct their inspections on 11 same month every two years, there is some 12 movement. So the request, the feedback comment to 13 14 the region was: can we lock this in, something like 15 that's done with the PI reporting? Take a two-year window and either do rolling quarters or assign it a 16 two-year calendar year fixed window, and that's what's 17 currently out for discussion with stakeholders, with 18 19 the regions, and the industry. So that we're still working, but we'll 20 21 lock into some two-year period and then be able to 22 assess whether or not the five occurrences were met 23 within that two-year period. 24 Any questions? 25 (No response.)

1	MR. KLEMENTOWICZ: Thank you.
2	MR. GARCHOW: Loren, I guess there is a
3	question.
4	So where are we talking about the ALARA
5	and the
6	MR. KLEMENTOWICZ: The next gentleman.
7	CHAIRMAN PLISCO: I know we're due for
8	lunch, but these guys have been waiting all morning.
9	I know you guys wanted to get back to work.
10	MR. DEAN: I was just going to say we're
11	flexible, but when you said that
12	CHAIRMAN PLISCO: I'd like to get through
13	the radiation safety.
14	MR. SHADIS: Can I ask one quick question?
15	And it may go back to the previous speaker. In that
16	one diamond up there, that one box, there was half an
17	mr dose level. Where did that come from?
18	PARTICIPANT: Point, oh, oh, five.
19	MR. SHADIS: Yeah, .005 rem.
20	PARTICIPANT: Two mr. I mean that's
21	MR. SHADIS: No, it's .005, isn't it?
22	MR. KLEMENTOWICZ: Right, .005 rem.
23	MR. SHADIS: You've got public exposure
24	and five millirem.
25	MR. KLEMENTOWICZ: That was part of the

1 reactor oversight program working with stakeholders as 2 to what is the appropriate risk to go greater than green. It essentially came from the effluent release 3 4 program. 5 In Appendix I, Part 50, we define for radioactive effluents what is ALARA, and that is three 6 7 to five millirem. We equated risk, what we considered ALARA to the Appendix I to Part 50 for effluents, and 8 9 carried it over to be consistent. 10 MR. SHADIS: Thank you. MR. BLOUGH: And is that an actual 11 12 exposure in this case or is it a hypothetical? MR. KLEMENTOWICZ: In this case, this 13 14 would be an actual exposure. The material was 15 released, the licensee has the responsibility to calculate the dose to whoever could have -- who was 16 17 exposed to it. Thanks. 18 MR. BLOUGH: Okay. 19 MR. PEDERSEN: I'm Roger Pedersen. I'm 20 the technical lead for the occupational radiation 21 safety cornerstone. 22 Steve didn't mention it, but our session 23 was broken into two sub-sessions. The first session 24 was an information exchange. Those issues that we thought we had a fairly good handle on what the 25

resolution -- what the problem was and what a viable resolution was.

The three issues that Steve just covered were in that first session, and the first of my issues, which starts on page 21, was in that session as well, which has to do with the way that our current STP characterizes the Commission's policy on enforcement discretion from skin exposure and over exposures from hot particles.

A recent issue at one of the plants pointed out that the way it is, the wording in there can be read that it excludes all exposures from any type of exposure from a hot particle, which wasn't the intent. So we agreed to revise the words to more accurately characterize the actual Commission policy, which is an over exposure to the skin, a shallow dose exposure from a hot particle.

That was easy. Now, moving on to the harder part, ALARA.

The next two of my issues at the bottom of page 21 and the top of page 22 are related to the way we do performance assessment in the ALARA area. The objective to our cornerstone as we identified in the Pook's Hill public workshop back in October, September-October of '98, is that the objective of the

1 cornerstone is to insure that licensees maintain doses within the limits in Part 20, and this is the way the 2 3 Commission paper characterizes it, which turns into an 4 issue, and that those doses are ALARA. 5 So we have two objectives here. We 6 actually have two pages of our SDP, but they're a 7 single SDP. There's two halves of it to cover those 8 two objectives. 9 The ALARA SDP, there's been a number of 10 issues that have surfaced recently. There's a couple 11 of issues that have been outstanding issues from day 12 one, from the first day that we created the SDP, and they're wrapped into these issues. 13 14 Before we started the second session on 15 ALARA, which by the way its objective was to first clearly articulate what the bases and background was 16 for the SDP we had, and then to have a facilitated 17 discussion type workshop to either arrive at consensus 18 19 that what we have was adequate, with possibly some 20 modifications that the staff proposed, or to at least 21 come to some alignment as to an alternative course of 22 action. 23 So before we started that discussion, I 24 opportunity to review the basis

background of what we have, and that started with

agency goals, ROP program objectives and structure, a brief history of the regulatory and enforcement history of ALARA, and then I covered some constraints that the staff felt that they were under when they developed the current SDP, and a number of assumptions that we made when we put the current SDP together. didn't intend to go through whole -- it took me two hours last week. So I didn't want to do that today. The important ones I'll bring up as we go along. These first three issues on 21 and 22 are the issues that the staff identified in our internal focus group shops, our meetings, and then we allowed the industry obviously or the participants -- it wasn't just the industry -- to raise issues. Because this was a facilitated discussion, we wanted to get all of the issues up on the table, categorize which issues we needed to attack first, and work from there. MR. KRICH: Roger, I would just propose that the industry did have some input into Issue 3. MR. PEDERSEN: Actually not as much as you think. MR. KRICH: Well, I think a lot. MR. PEDERSEN: No. I'll go through them. The second issue on page 21 of whether the

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1 current SDP is too lenient for, quote, good performers 2 and too harsh for poor performers breaks into two aspects. The way the SDP was structured, and I don't 3 4 have this slide either, but it was one that we handed 5 So it might be helpful if we look at the SDP itself. 6 7 Can you focus in on the top half of that 8 and zoom it up? When we, the staff, were attempting to 9 create this SDP on how you do performance assessment 10 11 in ALARA, it's a challenging task. The purpose of ROP 12 stated objective is to have an objective measure of performance that is scrutable or understandable and 13 14 reproducible. 15 ALARA performance is admittedly subjective process. I say admittedly because that's 16 17 a direct quote out of the statement of considerations that we published in '92, when we published the '92 18 rule that made ALARA a requirement, a "shall" instead 19 20 of a "should." So what we, the staff, came up with was a 21 22 comparison of the intended outcome in terms 23 collective dose for work activities or jobs and 24 compare that to the intended outcome or the planned

the estimated or projected dose

outcome,

licensees' ALARA programs developed in their work planning, and we put a criteria that if that exceeded by more than 50 percent, then possibly we have a finding here or an issue.

This flow chart right here actually was part of the SDP when we first put it together a year ago, the lessons learned from the pilot program. It was pointed out that this was actually screening criteria. So we took it out of the SDP and put it into 0610* as the first question in the Group 2 questions in our area, in our cornerstone.

As it appears in 0610*, it's just a paragraph, but this is the flow diagram, the logic diagram that's in that paragraph. This logic diagram does not show up in 0610*.

Anyhow, once you get past that first question or half part of a question, then that second diamond there compares the particular licensee performance to a median value of performance in terms of a rolling three-year average. The concept was if a licensee is doing at least as well as the median value in terms of performance, in terms of low collective dose, they must be doing something right, and so we probably don't want to interfere with that process. That was the logic that went behind that.

1 they're not doing as well as the 2 median, and of course, the basis for that median value was the agency's first strategic goal is to maintain 3 4 the current level of safety. The staff assumption built into that -- I guess I just talk with one hand 5 here. I'll try to -- the staff assumption built into 6 7 that logic was that the current industry performance in ALARA is acceptable, in general. 8 Some licensees are actually doing much 9 better than that, and their performance is world 10 11 class, is comparable to any country out there, which 12 wasn't necessarily true ten or 15 years ago. Anyhow, once you get through those two, 13 14 then there's a five person-rem screen there also, 15 which is to establish some low level of significance in the work activity we're talking about. 16 17 That screening criteria develops what it is, the bases, you know, what constitutes the bases 18 19 for judging this performance, this ALARA performance. 20 You pass those you have a finding that goes into the 21 SDP, which is on the bottom. 22 You want to move the slide up there, Tim? 23 The actual SDP takes that finding, and 24 then it uses the magnitude of the collective dose at

25 person-rem, the frequency of occurrence, which is

the diamond over to the right and/or, again, the rolling three-year average to come to significance levels of green, white or yellow.

We determined early on that we didn't feel that it was appropriate to get to a red outcome from ALARA issues. At the time we were developing this, our understanding of red was that you'd shut the plant down. I know that's not the current complete definition of a red finding, but still, we still don't feel that it's appropriate to get into a red finding just from ALARA issues alone.

So with that background, flipping back up to the top, that rolling three-year average in the screening criteria, that second diamond there, of course, if you're on the good side of that, if you're below in terms of collective dose or above it in terms of performance, you have no finding. There is no finding there at all.

A number of our stakeholders, particularly our regional inspectors, objected to that unintended outcome that they could not even document a problem at a plant if they're on that particular side of that screening criteria.

So that's the genesis of it's too lenient to the, quote, good plants. The flip side to that

1 coin is that if you're not on that side, then you're 2 subject to possible multiple significant findings, 3 multiple white findings or maybe even multiple yellow 4 findings, although that's hard to grasp. So that's what we looked at. That was the 5 issue that we brought forward. 6 7 We had a solution. I won't bore you with it because it has been kind of taken over by events. 8 The third issue, if you will, the second 9 ALARA issue which we spoke of earlier was, again, 10 11 towards that bases. When we developed -- no, leave 12 that there, if you will. When we developed this SDP, and again, 13 14 those screening criteria are part of the SDP at the 15 time that we originally constructed it, we realized right away. We had a lot of interaction with NEI and 16 17 our stakeholders. We had several public meetings in which we discussed this. This was not our first 18 19 This was at least the three that we finally 20 put into place. 21 But we recognize right away it's based on 22 doing a dose estimate on jobs. It's job specific, and 23 it's based on the licensee's dose estimate. It was 24 pointed out from day one that there is no standard

definition of a job. Licensees slice and dice their

outage and major work activities in various ways to control the dose and control the work activities.

In addition to that, there's no hard requirement that a licensee even do a dose estimate, much less an accurate dose estimate. That's why I said even though those issues have resurfaced very visibly recently with at least one fairly visible enforcement activity, and those issues were identified from day one. That's been an outstanding IOU from the conception of this SDP, and the agreement that we had or that we came to at least in our public workshops or public meetings was that we would use this first year of implementation to inform us as to whether that needs to be changed, what kind of additional guidance that needed to have.

One of the big concerns which is articulated in Issue 3 was that the licensee could manipulate those numbers or manipulate the outcome of the SDP just by doing those things which were within their power, which was slice and dice, if you will, jobs into much, much finer increments so that they would never pass the 25 person-rem in the SDP or maybe never even pass the five person-rem in the screening criteria, and then you know, have the possibility of having some creative definitions of a job that would

1 bias the outcome of this SDP. 2 So that was a recognized potential from 3 the day one. 4 Yes? 5 MR. GARCHOW: And as someone who tries to make these decisions, you know, there are ALARA 6 7 committees trying to actually parcel the activities into the smallest possible segment of the job and 8 differentiate so that the different parts of the job 9 planning can be done with those groups that can 10 11 influence the dose. 12 So it actually drives you toward parsing the job into smaller and smaller increments. 13 14 MR. PEDERSEN: Well, we didn't intend to 15 drive the ALARA programs any way with this program. We were trying to establish a basis for assessing the 16 17 performance of the programs that are out there. Again, anyone who has any history with 18 19 ALARA in the U.S. industry knows that over the last 20 20 years it is significantly improved, dramatically 21 improved. 22 There's another consequence. MR. KRICH: 23 You probably know about it, but just for purposes of 24 completeness, since one of the screening criteria is

150 percent over the estimate, the original estimate,

1 then certainly it would tend to make people 2 overestimate jobs so as to --3 MR. PEDERSEN: Yeah, that was another 4 potential as far as biasing the outcome of the SDP. 5 MR. KRICH: And clearly, that's against ALARA principles. You want to estimate the job as 6 7 tightly as possible to create a challenge or a --MR. PEDERSEN: Yeah, it's not an unknown 8 9 issue between the inspection program and licensees The regulatory history in ALARA is somewhat 10 11 complex in that ALARA was a "should" in the old Part 12 20 or the pre-'92 Part 20. ALARA performance was noted to not be what it should be back in the '80s. 13 14 The NRC put a lot of emphasis on ALARA. We had a lot 15 of interactions between our inspectors and our regions and licensees. Performance dramatically improved by 16 17 the time we put the regulation in place. The regulation lagged the licensee performance. 18 19 When we put the regulation in '92 into 20 place, were very cautious about negatively we 21 impacting that good trend, and we're trying to do that 22 same thing here. We're trying to be cautious about 23 having a negative unintended outcome. 24 So anyhow, there was potential for that 25 negative unintended outcome. We recognize that, and we decided to watch and see how it played out and see what we needed to do now.

If you'll flip over to page -- well, excuse me. We probably should go through the other issues that the participants of the workshop brought up. These are kind of in reverse order in terms of significance of the comment and how much it impacted the discussion and proposed resolutions that we talked about in a while.

But as you can see, there were a number of them. There was a lively discussion. Many issues came out. The first one that the cornerstone objectives conflict with Part 20 is what I referred to a minute ago, and that's just a choice of terminology and wording that's in the SECY paper, 99-007 and 7A.

There was a question that the choice of words could be read that there was an intended subtle change between the NRC's expectation and what's actually a regulatory requirement in Part 20. The answer to that was that there was no intended subtle change. There is no intended change between our expectation and what's in Part 20.

And as you'll see on the later pages, we agreed to go back and look at that and see if we could revise the words to more accurately reflect the

regulatory requirement.

There was a lot of discussion on what the basis for the criteria of the SDP. As I told you, I went through our bases, and we talked about a number of issues that might be an adequate basis for a performance assessment in this area.

The use of a performance indicator was brought up. I didn't mention it earlier. We have one performance indicator in this cornerstone that deals solely with individual exposure control. During that Pook's Hill '98 workshop in which we scoped this process, there was a consensus that we didn't have an identified performance indicator in the ALARA area.

There was strong consensus that a rolling three-year average wasn't it, and we couldn't put anything else into place. So not having a performance indicator in this area, of course, means that the performance assessment is done solely by the baseline inspection. It's an inspectable area, and it's done solely by the baseline inspection.

So this idea of a performance indicator in ALARA has been alternately brought up and withdrawn and brought up and withdrawn over the last couple of years, most recently last week, and you'll see when we get a couple of pages. It was discussed possibly a

1 performance indicator could resolve some of the issues 2 that the NRC brought to the table, as well as some of the issues that the licensee brought to the table. 3 4 There was an issue about this whole 5 process having the unintended consequence lengthening outages and causing more dose rather than 6 7 less dose, interfering with the licensee's programs. We talked about those. 8 should be 9 SDP criteria related to 10 identified program weaknesses or failures. That was 11 a fairly important concept that I thought was already 12 built into our SDP, but it was evidence from the discussion that people didn't realize that, and we 13 14 discussed that at length. 15 On page 24, the three-year rolling average collective dose missing from that should be more 16 17 contemporaneous. There was an issue that currently that rolling three-year average is published in a 18 19 NUREG that sometimes takes up to a year, year and a 20 half to get on the street, and so this issue actually 21 gets subsumed in a further issue. 22 There was an issue about the thresholds built into the logic, and the logic itself. These, of 23 24 course, are just a list of the issues that were raised

by the stakeholders at the meeting.

An issue about the inspection level not decreasing in response so that it improved industry performance. That was discussed and somewhat tabled. We couldn't solve that problem by talking about the SDP basis.

There is an issue about frequency and

There is an issue about frequency and scope of inspections that we're doing on another track, and we refer to that in terms of what the right number of inspections, the right number of hours are, particularly in ALARA.

The last three, the bottom bullet on the bottom of page 24 and the next two, were probably the three most significant in terms of impact on our discussion, and that was that the STP is overly focused on projected doses; that a number of the stakeholders were concerned that there was even numerical criteria in the SDP, the five person-rem, the 25 person-rem, the 135 person-rem for PWRs, those numbers.

There was a concern that that would lead to unintended consequences by possibly implying a de facto definition of ALARA which was not intended by this process.

And then something that surprised me was the use of the rolling three-year average collective

1 I explained to you our rationale for having it 2 built into the SDP or the assessment process. actually both in the SDP and in the screening 3 4 criteria. It's more than a majority. It was a 5 unanimous by vote. Non-NRC participants in the workshop indicated that they didn't think it was 6 7 appropriate to even use a rolling three-year average in the SDP, period. 8 After much discussion, that was brought up 9 to a vote to see where people stood, and when the 10 11 question was asked should a rolling three-year average 12 screening criteria and/or part of the significance criteria built into the SDP, a show of 13 14 hands indicated that the only people that thought it 15 was were the NRC folks. At that point I changed my vote. 16 have come -- well, I'm getting to the conclusions. 17 If you turn over now to page 27, it's got 18 19 the outcome of our session. On page 27 it clearly 20 identifies that we're going to change the SDP in terms 21 of the enforcement policy in SDPs. 22 Twenty-eight starts the ALARA issues. 23 Again, I've already covered the first one, and that's 24 make sure that the stated objective is consistent with

the regulation.

The next two bullets actually go towards an alternative to the current SDP. After the vote that the stakeholders clearly objected to using a rolling three-year average in the SDP, we agreed; we, the NRC, agreed to explore the possibility of using that solely for adjusting baseline hours. It's not currently in the program, but there is discussion. We have gone through some discussion about having a flexible number of hours in the baseline program.

The baseline program was initially the minimum amount of inspection, but I think one of the lessons learned from this year of implementation is that some licensees are easier to inspect than other licensees, and so it may be a single number isn't the right thing to do, that there should be a range depending on how easy a licensee is to inspect.

And so it was generally -- the feeling was that it would be more appropriate to use that rolling three-year average in terms of a high level, overall performance indication, if you will, into adjusting those baseline hours and not necessarily using that as a screening criteria and/or a decision gate in terms of significance within the SDP.

So if you take that out of the SDP, there's two issues there. The first is since it's

using the screening criteria, you have to figure out how you're going to get into the SDP. What is it that your inspection finding is based on now? What is it that's an occurrence that has to pass some screening criteria that gets you into the SDP?

And that's what that third bullet is. It was noted in the meeting that the second Group 2 question in our cornerstone, which currently speaks just to individual exposure controls, could be expanded to cover ALARA as well, possibly, and that is to expand this concept of unplanned, unintended dose to more than just an individual unplanned, unintended dose, but also to a collective unplanned, unintended dose.

So we're exploring defining what unplanned unintended dose would be in the ALARA sense, in collective dose, and use that as a basis for getting into or a basis for this performance assessment in ALARA.

I hate to do this, but if you'll jump over to page 29, the third bullet down, since we're covering the consequences of taking a rolling three-year average out of the SDP, that is another consequent.

Currently to get to a yellow finding from

1 a single event -- Tim, you want to put the SDP back up 2 on the bottom half of that and zoom in on it? 3 The large diamond at the bottom defines 4 the significance of a single event that would take you 5 to yellow, and that's a fairly high threshold. we were just putting in a rock catcher, if you will. 6 7 We're talking -- well, it was based on the median value, but I can't -- we're talking outliers. 8 9 talking two, three standard deviations from that median value that the original criteria was based on. 10 If you take rolling three-year averages, 11 12 and of course, it's based on rolling three-year average, if you take it out of the equation here, then 13 14 the issue is, well, how do you get to a yellow? 15 do you get to a degraded cornerstone from a single 16 issue? 17 And that instigated quite a bit discussion, and the general consensus is that probably 18 19 you shouldn't be able to get to yellow. You shouldn't 20 get to a degraded cornerstone from a single ALARA 21 issue. 22 So that's what that third bullet is on 29. We came to a consensus that yellow outcome probably 23 24 isn't, from a single event, probably isn't appropriate 25 in ALARA, as well as the red outcome that we talked

about earlier isn't appropriate.

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Now, you still can get to a degraded cornerstone, and that's the current high visible enforcement action that we've got going on, got to a degraded cornerstone not from a single yellow outcome, but form multiple white outcomes, and there was a consensus, which is the last bullet on page 29, that it is appropriate to get to a degraded cornerstone from ALARA alone, without having an overexposure or some significant individual exposure as long as that path to a degraded cornerstone was for multiple whites. So that's that last bullet.

Now, jumping back to page 28, there was also agreement that the magnitude of the unintended dose adequate basis for determining an was significance level. One of the assumptions built into this process is that dose is a direct measure of risk, and that's a fairly well established assumption, if you will, that based on ICRP, International Commission on Radiation Protection, recommendations, the risk factors of four times ten to the minus four death per rem; that that risk factor is defined for an exposure rate and exposure range in which that risk additive, and therefore, those risks are additive until you get to high dose, high dose rates, where you

start talking about getting out of the stochastic region, the statistical outcomes and get into non-stochastic outcomes that, in fact, those risks are additive.

So the magnitude of dose should be built into the SDP. Obviously changing the bases for our performance outcome is going to change not only the screen criteria, but it will probably change the SDP, the way it looks, somewhat, although things that we agree to that are adequate measures are gates in this logic flow path, are currently built into the SDP. There were a few other ones that were bloating around which may or may not be added to or modify the ones we have, but the three principles built into the current SDP in terms of magnitude of dose, frequency of occurrence, and getting to a degraded cornerstone from the possibility of having multiple white outcomes is all built into the current SDP.

Going back to 29, page 29 now, that first one we've already talked about. The use of the rolling three-year average collected dose is more for inspection planning rather than for significance determination.

And we've already covered the second bullet there as well.

So on page 30, we list some of the areas of alignment here. The first one was that even though the performance indicator idea was raised yet again, it was tabled pending the outcome of this road towards success or road towards resolution that we've identified, if you will.

There was also one parking lot issue that was raised, which was the findings of no color. At least one individual in the room had recently gotten a finding of no color in the ALARA area and wanted to debate at length the purpose of a finding of no color, and we had to defer that to another session, which was dedicated to findings of no color, not just ALARA, but in general, the whole process and where that fits in.

So we parked that issue, pending the other

so we parked that issue, pending the other session.

On page 31, the process that we've identified that we're going down, which is to first remove the current Group 2 screening criteria for ALARA and include those either in inspection planning or inspection guidance in terms of how small a job should the inspector be looking at and should be interested in and that rolling three-year average be, of course, used as that inspection planning tool in terms of frequency of inspections or frequency or

length of inspections, hours of inspections.

To try to develop this concept that was floated at the public workshop of using this unplanned or unintended dose as the entry level or the entry stuff into the SDP, that our inspection finding would be based around that rather than comparing the planned dose to the actual dose, and I can't be any more clear than that because we haven't gone through that process.

And of course, once that fundamental basis changes, that will most like change some aspects of the current ALARA SDP and possibly revise inspection guidance in addition to the inspection guidance I just referred to. We might have to provide some additional guidance to the inspectors by what we mean once we've defined if, in fact, we do get to a clear definition of unplanned or unintended dosing, go that way. We'll have to provide additional guidance to our inspectors so that they understand what that is and are focused at the right things to be able to make that determination.

Now, obviously this is all with the caveat that we have processes in place to make these changes. We have an SDP process change. We have inspection program process changes, and a significant change to

1 this SDP, I understand, is going to also require us to 2 benchmark, to go back and look at experience to date, 3 and whatever SDP we come up with, run those cases to 4 see if the outcomes are consistent with what we think 5 the proper outcomes were when we went through them. And then I believe there's also a pilot 6 7 phase in which if we do come to a -- well, we will come to an understanding of what the SDP should look 8 9 When we do that, then after the pilot of that new SDP, then there will be an implementation in which 10 we gather lessons learned, and I guess there'll be 11 12 more opportunities. I'm that familiar with 13 not these 14 processes, although I'm sure I'll be intimately 15 familiar with them in the next year or two. 16 That's where we came to. That's what we 17 did last week. Any questions? Yeah, I've got one, Roger. 18 MR. FLOYD: 19 You said the ALARA regulation was first promulgated in 20 Do you know about how many violations to ALARA '92. 21 have been issued over the years? Just ballpark. 22 MR. PEDERSEN: You're throwing me a hand 23 grenade here. Actually, because of public comments we 24 got during the '92 rulemaking, we, the staff, put a

fairly high threshold as to what we considered a

violation of Part 20. Okay?

And that's something I had to draw a distinction between. The SDP is not trying to determine if you violated Part 20. The SDP is looking at performance assessment in the ALARA area because the requirement in Part 20 is that you have a program to assure doses are ALARA, not that doses are ALARA, which kind of spins off that first issue.

So it's a programmatic requirement. So we put a fairly high threshold as to when we determine that program is broken to the extent that we can draw the conclusion that you're not complying with Part 20.

I believe, although I can't quote you, I believe early on there was one violation cited in Region I that didn't meet that staff criteria, which is why we did that after that experience. Since then, up until recently, there hasn't been a cited violation in ALARA. There hasn't been a violation cited against the requirement in Part 22, implement engineering controls, programs and procedures to assure that the doses are ALARA, until recently, until the current case that we have ongoing.

MR. REYNOLDS: Which is a violation of having an ineffective program.

MR. PEDERSEN: Yes.

1 MR. REYNOLDS: Not so much doses. MR. PEDERSEN: Cited against Part 20, yes. 2 3 We've had many issues about --4 MR. REYNOLDS: A big distinction. 5 MR. PEDERSEN: -- about licensees not conforming to their own procedural requirements that 6 7 they put on themselves in implementing that program. We've had lots of citations of failure to implement 8 9 your procedures as required by Part 20. We've had a number of issues of whether your program is getting 10 11 the kind of management attention it should be getting. 12 There's been lots of that dialogue over the years. But in terms of actual citations against 13 14 Part 20, since actually '94 is when licensees were 15 required to implement. The '92 was the statement of considerations, and if you remember, from '92 to '94, 16 17 we had two sets of Part 20. We had the old Part 20 and the new Part 20. So there was a crossover 18 19 implementation period. 20 But by '94, all licensees were required to implement that new revision, which had changed from 21 22 the license should have an ALARA program to the 23 licensee shall have an ALARA program. So sine '94 now 24 we've had very little enforcement history there. 25 MR. FLOYD: Okay. Thanks.

1	MR. NOLAN: I'd just like to supplement
2	that information. Within the past year there's been
3	on the material side of the house a severity Level 1
4	violation in which ALARA was from the '94
5	MR. PEDERSEN: Yeah, I was talking just
6	from a Part 50 perspective.
7	MR. NOLAN: The '94 that he was referring
8	to was an NCB in Region 1, and it was a failure to
9	follow procedures based on the administrative controls
10	in the tech specs. There have been other procedural
11	violations, but you were specifically asking for
12	MR. FLOYD: Right. Thanks.
13	CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Lunch time?
14	MR. DEAN: Thanks, Roger.
15	CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Are we ready for lunch?
16	Be back at 1:50.
17	(Whereupon, at 1:16 p.m., the meeting was
18	recessed for lunch, to reconvene at 1:50 p.m., the
19	same day.)
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	184
1	A-F-T-E-R-N-O-O-N S-E-S-S-I-O-N
2	(2:10 p.m.)
3	CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Are we ready to get
4	started again?
5	What's the next topic?
6	MR. DEAN: We have four more topics to
7	walk you through here this afternoon. Hopefully we'll
8	make some good progress. What we'd like to start off
9	with, I think, is one that might be fairly short and
10	sweet, and that's fire protection issues.
11	MR. REYNOLDS: Short and sweet. Didn't
12	you say it with all of them, short and sweet?
13	MR. DEAN: I can always rely on Peter to
14	be short and sweet. At least short.
15	After that we'll jump ahead to assessment
16	and enforcement issues because Mike has somewhere that
17	he's moved a meeting to three o'clock. So we want
18	to make sure we get him in.
19	And then we'll do cross-cutting problem
20	identification and communication issues.
21	PARTICIPANT: That will take us to
22	midnight.
23	MR. DEAN: That will take us to 3:30.
24	MR. SCHERER: You really know how to
25	celebrate the first anniversary of the program.

1	MR. DEAN: Yes, we do.
2	MR. BROCKMAN: He's throwing a party.
3	What do you want?
4	MR. DEAN: Nothing better than being with
5	my closest friends in industry.
6	(Laughter.)
7	MR. DEAN: Okay, Peter.
8	MR. KOLTAY: Okay. Fire protection.
9	MR. DEAN: This starts on page 13, lucky
10	number.
11	MR. KOLTAY: Fire protection. I was one
12	of the test leads on the fire protection task force,
13	and we initially addressed two issues. One is
14	improvements to be made to the SDP, which has been
15	around since we issued that SDP, making it more
16	effective, more efficient, and more user friendly.
17	And the other issue had to do with the
18	licensing basis and changes and how to control changes
19	to the licensing basis in the fire protection area
20	only, generally dealing with the Appendix R
21	requirements and how does the licensee go about
22	changing those requirements, which at this point are
23	outside the 5059 change requirements.
24	And of course, during our meetings and
25	during the external workshop additional issues were

1	brought forth. One was concerning the use of licensee
2	self-assessment, and this only addressed fire drills
3	and fire brigade training and anything associated with
4	the fire brigade and how we assess the fire brigade.
5	This one keeps showing up over the past
6	year: too much emphasis on safe shutdown and not on
7	defense in depth.
8	The next one was passed a resolution of
9	issues for public confidence. Fire protection due to
10	the complexity of the SDP has been more bogged down in
11	bringing forth and finalizing issues and putting them
12	out in the public domain through the inspection
13	reports. Probably some are slower than the other
14	areas that have SDPs.
15	MR. KRICH: Could you go back just a
16	second and explain
17	MR. KOLTAY: Sure.
18	MR. KRICH: a little bit more what you
19	meant by the second bullet there?
20	MR. KOLTAY: To much emphasis on safe
21	shutdown and not defense in depth.
22	MR. KRICH: Yeah. What defense in depth
23	are you talking about?
24	MR. KOLTAY: The way the inspection is
25	broken down in the fire protection, one is alternate

shutdown capability is safe shutdown. Defense in depth is actually inspecting for the individual fire protection installations that protect the plant that include fixed or manual protection and detection, fire brigade, fire barriers and so on.

MR. KRICH: Okay.

MR. KOLTAY: Resources, inspection preparation support.

On the outcomes, actually fire protection technical people are concentrating quite a bit on improving the SDP. I'm not sure it's going to be that much user friendly. That's one of the issues, but most important is to give the inspectors a better tool. Right now their tool is somewhat cumbersome, and they rely on equitous (phonetic) people quite a bit or probably more than we expected them to. So we're trying to develop a process that will give them better tools to assess the fire scenario and the fire development.

And this is a simplistic or relatively simple tool relying on existing information and data available to fire protection engineering handbook on calculating -- evaluating the size of the -- estimating the size of the fire, the amount of combustibles, and then calculating temperatures at the

1	ceiling level, and giving the tool to the inspector to
2	determine based on those temperatures how will the
3	fire development and what will it affect.
4	This is going to be ready for trial use
5	some time this summer.
6	MR. KRICH: Is that all that you're doing
7	or does it include also looking for taking or
8	availability or credit for other pieces of equipment
9	that may be available?
10	MR. KOLTAY: Do you mean fire protection
11	equipment?
12	MR. KRICH: No, just other safe shutdown
13	equipment that would be available.
14	MR. KOLTAY: Basically
15	MR. KRICH: In other words, is that the
16	only thing that's being done for that first bullet
17	then, is just calculating fire damage?
18	MR. KOLTAY: Exactly. To borrow the
19	drawbacks of the SDP, that it doesn't you know, the
20	appendix, going back to the Appendix R, fire
21	protection was usually based on a very simplistic
22	assessment or assumption that you enter a room that
23	could have a fire and just assume that it's destroyed.
24	MR. KRICH: That's correct.
25	MR. KOLTAY: And that's become

1 MR. KRICH: And you didn't have to be an 2 Appendix R plant to assume. 3 MR. KOLTAY: Right. It's too conservative 4 and we're trying to make it more realistic, and giving 5 the tool to the inspectors and ourselves to reduce that size and put some boundaries on it. 6 7 very difficult to put boundaries on a fire because it's not like a piece of equipment that just fails. 8 9 Then you know what your failure actually is. 10 And we're trying to keep it conservative 11 still. 12 MR. KRICH: So if you now are able to have more realistic fires, then you're able to take credit 13 14 for other equipment that may --15 MR. KOLTAY: Exactly. 16 MR. KRICH: Okay. 17 MR. KOLTAY: Is that what you were getting 18 at? 19 MR. KRICH: All right. 20 MR. KOLTAY: The other important aspect of 21 the SDP is, of course, fire frequency. Right now we 22 use generic -lot of plants use generic а 23 frequencies, and the data dates is available up to 24 1994-'95 time frame, and we're trying to bring that up 25 to date using a contractor and various other means.

1 The next bullet also relates to the 2 frequencies. Insure that plant specific data is factored in and actual plant performance deviates from 3 4 industry averages, and there what we're suggesting is 5 make sure that we use plant specific data when it's available. 6 7 Improve the validity and objectivity of the evaluation, the fire brigade drill performance. 8 Assessing the fire brigade drill performance has been 9 an issue for us, has been an issue for the licensee. 10 11 There were many different suggestions that were made, 12 and we'll be looking at all of them. 13 The next one says need 14 additional quidance to the inspectors the on 15 evaluation of the fire brigade. That's already being done, and we issued additional quidance just in the 16 17 past couple of weeks. Someone suggested to consider developing 18 a PI for assessing fire brigade performance, and that 19 really hasn't been looked at at this point. 20 21 Fire brigade performance should not be 22 addressed -- apparently there was a lot of concern on 23 how we evaluate the fire brigade. So fire brigade 24 performance should not be judged on the basis of only

one drill.

1 agreed with that, and it 2 currently I don't believe it is being judged based on 3 one drill, but I think --4 MR. TRAPP: My program only calls for one 5 drill observation at present. 6 MR. KOLTAY: Right. 7 MR. DEAN: Yeah, that's what we've been basing it on. 8 9 MR. KOLTAY: So I'm sure they may be observing parts of other drills. I don't know, but by 10 11 requirement, they're only looking at one, and they're 12 going to try to make some improvements in there. Develop a process for evaluating human 13 14 performance and provide a quantitative basis for the 15 significance determination. This is a more complex area that the risk analyst who's dealing with fire 16 17 protection is working on, as to how to give credit for human performance during fire or fire scenarios. 18 And this is not the fire brigade, but the 19 20 The reactor safety SDP already addresses operators. 21 this issue, but there's a concern that if there's a 22 fire at the same time that they need to shut down the 23 reactor or change plant conditions, there may be an 24 added stress and an added requirement on the reactor's

end, and we need to look at that and see how to

address that, in fact, on the operators.

The next two issues deal with the baseline. We didn't explore the changes to a baseline very much. So we didn't have a lot of input. However, we need to look at how to control changes to a fire protection program.

It's no longer in the 5059 process, and other processes that address changes to fire protection, which is like, I think, 5048. I don't really give you a lot of detail or a lot of guidance, us or the licensees. So that's an area that needs to be addressed.

And the last one I just spoke to. The licensees are making changes. It follows sort of the one before this. Licensees are making changes to the Appendix R mostly replacing automatic or fixed protection systems with manual actions, and we don't have a methodology currently to measure that, and it could be of concern because even though we can accept individual replacement of a fixed or automatic action by a manual action individually, but then you compile them and we go from three specified manual actions, let's say, for example, from the Appendix R that's currently in there to ten to accomplish the same thing. You really haven't evaluated how that would

Impact the plant.
Any?
MR. DEAN: So I think the bottom line
there is that we're looking to improve the fire
protection SDP. We annotated a few areas there. I
think that we're continuing to look at the licensing
basis, I guess, to make it clear to our inspectors and
licensees how we're incorporating the license basis
type issues in the process, but I think, you know,
these fire protection issues, you know, for example,
the latter one, a licensing basis, has been an ongoing
issue. That's not anything that's new with this
oversight process. That's been a challenge for some
time.
MR. HILL: On that last one where you talk
about automatic actions or passive devices, are you
talking about barriers or anything?
MR. KOLTAY: Exactly. One of the areas
that first showed up in there is the removal of the
thermal leg and being replaced by manual actions. The
functions of the equipment that was protected by the
thermal leg.
MR. SHADIS: I attended that breakout
session.
MR. KOLTAY: Right.

1 MR. SHADIS: And workshop, and I noticed 2 that the conversation really wrapped itself around 3 fires in spaces, and that the primary concern seemed 4 to be the vulnerability of the cables. 5 MR. KOLTAY: Right. And I'm wondering if fires 6 MR. SHADIS: like fire at the resin filters or fire in a low level 7 waste storage container or building or fire related to 8 the diesel generator, for example, why those were not 9 discussed, and if they are included in this process 10 11 you're working on. 12 MR. KOLTAY: Some of the examples maybe I can use to tell you why they are running. Like diesel 13 14 generators are generally pretty well protected. 15 They're isolated. They've got three-hour fire 16 protection around them. They've got automatic 17 protection, automatic detection. So chances -- you that's pretty well contained, 18 know, and compartmentalize so that redundant equipment wouldn't 19 be affected. 2.0 21 The filters on some of those areas, it 22 varies from site to site. Typically those rooms are 23 isolated, and there are no other combustibles in the 24 area, and no credible ignition source that perhaps is

self-igniting, let's say.

1	So it would come up if a specific site has
2	a problem in that area, but generally those areas are
3	pretty much devoid of combustibles, except the filter
4	itself and ignition sources.
5	MR. SHADIS: When I talked about low level
6	waste containers with one licensee, I asked if they
7	segregated out rags that had been used in radiation
8	areas that had become coated with grease for one
9	reason or another, and that wasn't part of their
10	program.
11	MR. KOLTAY: Probably not. You're talking
12	about self-starting, self-igniting situations.
13	MR. SHADIS: Yeah. I'm just saying that
14	I saw the possibility.
15	MR. KOLTAY: Yeah, and these issues are
16	examined, and the reason they wouldn't be brought out
17	is because they probably haven't been identified as a
18	problem, and that doesn't mean that they are a
19	problem. Chances are they can address.
20	Thanks.
21	MR. DEAN: Thanks.
22	I'd next like to have Mr. Johnson step up
23	and cover assessment enforcement issues. I believe
24	those start on page 45 of the handout.
25	MR. JOHNSON: Yeah, that's right, 45.

The assessment of enforcement section really had two groupings of issues. The first issues are on page 45, and they were really intended, I think, to be primarily informational, although as you see we actually had some discussion on a couple of the issues.

The first issue is 50.9, enforcement PI reporting. You'll remember a year ago we had some significant concerns about inaccurate reporting and how we would handle them under the new oversight process.

We've had some experience with that, and so we wanted to talk about that just a bit, and in addition, to provide some information on where we see ourselves going with enforcement discretion in the future.

The second issue on enforcement, consistency in the ROP. It really deals with application of enforcement consistency or application of enforcement. We had a concern that was raised by Dave Lochbaum regarding a couple of enforcement actions that we took, and he perceived that we handled one more significantly, with more significant enforcement than we should have and one with less significant enforcement than we should have,

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and so we wanted to talk about that issue a little bit.

The third issue deals with no color findings. No color findings are findings that are greater than minor, that is, when you look at the Group 1 questions, you would pass through those. However, when you go to Group 2, you would see that there's no SDP that applies to those. If you go to Group 3, then you look for extenuating circumstances, and it turns out that the extenuating circumstances in Group 3 actually allow a fair number of issues to pass through, and those issues are no color findings.

And so we talked about the perceived concern of inconsistency with respect to how those issues are treated. We talked about the fact that the ROP is colorized, and so what do you make of the significance of a no color finding, nd we talked about that a little bit.

The last was the role of the regulatory conference and the action matrix. You'll see reference to a regulatory performance meeting. That is typically confused, has been confused with the regulatory conference. We wanted to clarify that, and in addition, we wanted to talk about how we conduct that regulatory conference to make sure that there was

a good understanding about regulatory conferences and what we expected and, in fact, what we're going to do to kind of clear that up.

So we talked about those four issues on the first afternoon or the afternoon session, and in fact, if you look at the next slide -- well, I'm sorry. Before I get to the next slide, we talked about the fact that with respect to information on 50.9, that we have, in fact, not had the problems that we felt we were going to have with 50.9; that there is room for discretion in the current policy; and that if we add new PIs, we'll once again look at discretion and see whether discretion was appropriate for new PIs because to some extent that is warranted.

We answered the questions with respect to the consistency of application of the enforcement, and I don't think there was a lot of discussion in response or a lot of input or other issues that were raised as a result of that.

Now let's go to the on color finding slide.

Recent guidance really has indicated -- I mean, we revised the recent guidance, and that recent guidance revision, we think has resulted in really a decline in the number of no color findings, we

believe. We intend to continue to watch it.

When we ended the workshop, we had the perspective that we wanted to revise the guidance in 0610 to eliminate no color findings, and we got some feedback that said that we really ought to treat it -- I guess there were differing views on how we should treat it.

One said that we ought to keep the no color findings and try to resolve this perception problem about sort of the absence of significance of no color findings or how those no color findings really play out in terms of their significance.

And the second approach really was that we should try to minimize no color findings and drive for fewer bins of findings, and so we left that action on this issue to go forward and continue to try to work on no color findings.

Next slide.

With respect to regulatory conferences and regulatory performance meetings, we discussed with the group the fact that we really do want to change the focus of the regulatory conference. It really is a discussion primarily or first and foremost on the significance of the issues, and we wanted to place that first in the conference.

1 Secondarily, it's discussion of 2 compliance, and last but not least, I think going into 3 the workshop we would have said that corrective 4 actions really weren't a key feature of 5 regulatory conference, although it was pointed out in the workshop and we think it makes sense that 6 7 considering the public forum, it's not a good place for licensees to leave those, to in that meeting for 8 us to talk about problems and not to have in that 9 forum some discussion of corrective action. 10 So we've allowed that. We're going to be 11 12 modifying the guidance to allow that in the regulatory conference. 13 14 We discussed some other possible changes, 15 such as someone else besides the Regional Enforcement Coordinators opening the meeting, again to make the 16 shift on significance of the issues and to conduct 17 this SERC, if you will, with the appropriate levels of 18 19 management commensurate with the action matrix. It doesn't make sense for an issue that is 20 21 a regulatory conference to deal with a white issue, to 22 have the Regional Administrator out talking about it. 23 MR. KRICH: Mike, just a minor point, but 24 some regulatory conferences are not dealing with

noncompliances, but rather findings that are not

necessarily in noncompliance.

MR. JOHNSON: Absolutely, absolutely. I didn't mean to imply that they were, in fact. In the case that there are noncompliances, we want to make sure that they are handled in the proper sequence in the conference.

evaluation bases and assumptions prior to the -- in fact, Bill is going to in communications talk about an issue that we have with respect to openness of the SDP process and so you'll hear more about that issue, but we want to make sure that the information that is, in fact, the basis -- provides the basis for the decisions, in fact, is shared early. In fact, we make it publicly available.

Next slide.

Then we went onto a couple of other issues, and this is really where we spent the brunt of the discussion, if you would, and we tried to really have the group arrive at some sort of an alignment on some approaches to address these issues.

The first issue really is a treatment of a situation in which you've had a performance issue which resulted in a cross-threshold, and when we go out and do our supplemental inspection, the licensee

has not either taken -- has had significant weaknesses in the way they look at the root cause or the extent of condition or even when we look at the corrective actions. They don't seem to match or they're not extensive enough and so on and so forth.

And what do we do with those issues? We had always intended in the program that we would keep those issues open until the licensee had, in fact, dealt with them, that is, the root causes and those kinds of things.

And there's a way to do that. In fact, there were specific words in the enforcement chapter that talked about doing it for inspection findings, but if you think about it for performance indicators where the performance indicator is based on the calculation and that calculation once the PI has tripped the threshold can return back to the green band, we hadn't really written the implementation guidance about how you would keep that performance issue open.

And so we talked about that in this particular session. There was a good degree of alignment. In fact, I by a show of hands asked for folks who agreed with the fact that we need to keep this issue open, the performance issue open until it's

resolved, and everyone raised their hands in that session. They thought it was important that we keep that issue open.

We talked about how you would do that, and there was good alignment in the group that the way to do that would be to open for that finding in the event that the NRC had gone out and done some supplemental inspection and found that there were significant weaknesses in the licensee's root cause and those kinds of thing.

We would open a finding. That finding would have the same color as the original finding, and again, there was good agreement on that particular approach for addressing that issue.

The point was made that we need some criteria for opening that finding, some criteria, that is, for deciding that we have had enough problems with the licensee's performance and addressing this performance issue, that we want to keep it open, and we already have some, in fact.

If you look in 95001, it talks about the words a lot like what I just used in terms of trying to characterize the issue for you, but there also was a point made that there needs to be a strong causal link between what we find in terms of the weaknesses

or just inadequate corrective action, if you will, or root cause and the actual performance issue that emerges.

And there was some thought at least on some parts, some people who participated, that there ought to be some indication that this is not an isolated situation, but some sort of a programmatic problem that we're trying to address that has resulted in this performance issue that cross thresholds.

We talked about the opportunity for the licensee to provide input. You know, we have long wrestled with this notion of due process, whatever due process means. It was important. The group decided that we do, in fact, provide licensees an opportunity to provide input before we do open that finding that carries this issue forward.

We talked about whether that should happen at the SERC or whether it would happen at the exit meeting, and there was a large degree of consensus that it really ought to happen at the exit meeting. That's the logical time to do it. It doesn't draw out the process. It still provides the opportunity for licensee management to raise concerns and those kinds of things. So, again, a good amount of consensus on that issue.

1 And we decided that the findings or the 2 group decided that the findings should be closed when 3 the appropriate corrective action had been taken and 4 we had satisfied ourselves with an inspection, and 5 contrast that with the way we handled the normal finding, which is that we keep that finding resident 6 on the books in the action matrix for four quarters. 7 So what we're saying is if you've extended 8 this performance issue because the licensee didn't fix 9 it, as soon as they fix it and as soon as we satisfy 10 11 themselves that they've fixed it, that issue will go 12 away. What happens when you talk 13 MR. HILL: 14 about the opportunity for licensee input at the exit 15 meeting? What happens if at the exit meeting it isn't resolved? 16 17 I mean a lot of times at least in the past, we've had to go back and have regional input to 18 19 determine what the finding is going to turn out to be. 20 MR. JOHNSON: Yeah, that's 21 It actually goes beyond where we were able 22 to get and the discussion. I mean, I think the answer 23 is that we would handle it like we do a SERC. 24 would take the information back. We would make a 25 decision, and then we would have a -- get back to the

1 licensee with respect to a final determination. 2 That's my off-the-cuff answer, but we didn't actually talk about that in the issue. 3 4 MR. HILL: But my question is when does 5 the licensee have a chance to have input then if it turns out, you know, that they don't know it's going 6 7 to be finding and it isn't resolved at the time. MR. REYNOLDS: Well, usually the way we 8 9 handle that, if we leave in an exit meeting and there's not a finding and we wait around two minutes 10 at finding, we re-exit, and at that exit you had your 11 12 chance. That's how we handle when we have a finding. MR. JOHNSON: Yeah, yeah. You'd want to 13 14 do it at the exit or at a re-exit. That's exactly 15 right. MR. SCHERER: Before you leave this slide, 16 17 I had two quick questions. On the first bullet, if the original issue was white and you open a PI&R 18 19 finding of the same color, does that mean you're in 20 multiple degraded? 21 MR. JOHNSON: No, no. We use the word in 22 the session that it was a place holder, and there was some objection with the notion of it being a place 23 24 holder, but in essence, it really is. It's preserving 25 that performance issue open at its significance until

1 it's resolved. That's all. 2 It's not double counted. SCHERER: 3 And then what if 4 whatever reason the NRC delays inspection because it 5 wants to put it off for the next regularly scheduled inspection of that area? Does that mean even though 6 7 the licensee has closed the action it remains open? 8 MR. JOHNSON: yes. Yeah, I mean we 9 -- go ahead and jump in, Ken wouldn't -- I was waiting for Ken. I thought you were 10 11 nodding your head and you were going to say something, 12 but you were probably just falling asleep. No, sorry. (Laughter.) 13 14 MR. JOHNSON: No, we really are going to 15 try to inspect that issue as soon as we possibly can, but we've got a performance issue that has been 16 17 We allowed some licensee to correct it. opened. did some initial supplemental inspection, and that 18 19 that supplemental inspection found that there were 20 weaknesses. 21 And the licensee has had now an 22 opportunity to fix it, and we need to go back out and 23 And we're going to factor that in in our see it. 24 planning and get to it as quickly as we possibly can.

And, Ken, I thought I had heard you talk

about --

CHAIRMAN PLISCO: I was going to say, I think it would be akin to how we handle the supplemental inspections now, is the way those inspections are supposed to be done is we wait till you finish; you know, for 9501, wait until you finish your root cause analysis, and usually there's a conversation between the regional manager and the licensee that we say, "Okay. When are you going to be ready for us to come," and once you give us that date, then we'll arrange a schedule for the inspection, and I would assume it would be similar in this case.

You would tell us when you think your corrective action could be done and ready for us to come look, and then we'll work our schedule to come do that.

MR. SCHERER: Okay. My question was it's clear from your response that you're not planning to wait for the next triennial inspection in that area.

MR. JOHNSON: No, no, no, no, no, no, no.

MR. HILL: I thought up till now though sometimes you would look at an issue and say based on what you say you're going to do it looks okay, and so when the time period comes out, if we've done our corrective action we can remove it.

1 Now what I hear you saying is we can't 2 remove it. You've got to come reinspect and find out did we actually do what we said we were going to do. 3 4 MR. JOHNSON: No, no. I didn't mean to 5 imply that the corrective -- all of othe corrective actions had to be completed. Because that's not what 6 7 the supplemental inspection is looking for. looking for -- it's our look at the three things I 8 9 mentioned really: the extent of condition, root 10 cause, and corrective action. 11 And with respect to corrective actions, 12 for example, do the corrective actions that have been identified some of which may have been implemented and 13 14 some of which will be implemented, do those match up 15 with the root causes and the extent of condition? Are they appropriate? You know, does a licensee have a 16 17 plan to make sense and that kind of stuff? MR. HILL: Let me see if I understand this 18 19 I may be understanding it wrong. 20 opening of the PI&R finding of same color as original, 21 is that only if you come in and you find a problem, or 22 I sort of heard you -- I thought I understood you to 23 say once we have one, it's going to stay open until 24 you inspect it to your satisfaction.

MR. JOHNSON: Let me try again because I

1 did talk kind of fast through that. 2 An issue crosses a threshold. We allow 3 some time for you to, you know, take a look at the 4 issue and figure out what the root cause is and those 5 kinds of things. We do a supplemental inspection. 6 7 result of that supplemental inspection, we decided that there are significant weaknesses in what you've 8 9 done to address a performance issue. It's at that point that we'll open this finding that stays open 10 11 until you've addressed those weaknesses and we've been 12 able to go out and look and satisfy ourselves with 13 respect to our concerns. 14 MR. But at the supplemental HILL: 15 inspection, may not have actually done the we corrective action. We may just identified --16 17 MR. JOHNSON: That's correct. MR. HILL: -- what we were going to do. 18 19 MR. JOHNSON: That's right. That's right. 20 MR. HILL: So at what point in time. 21 you're acceptable at that time, when -- do we have to 22 have any more action from the NRC before it can be 23 closed out? 24 MR. JOHNSON: Yeah, now, I think that's a situation where we wouldn't even be opening this 25

1	finding.
2	MR. BLOUGH: Right, if we do the
3	supplemental inspection and the extent of condition
4	that looks appropriate, root cause is reasonable, and
5	corrective actions are reasonable. And the schedule,
6	even if it might go out into the future for quite some
7	time, if that's reasonable, the supplemental
8	inspection is satisfactory and that's it.
9	MR. JOHNSON: Yeah. That's right.
LO	MR. BLOUGH: And it may be that your PI
L1	changes back to green before your corrective actions
L2	are all implemented, but so be it.
L3	MR. JOHNSON: Anymore on that?
L4	(No response.)
L5	MR. JOHNSON: Okay. Last issue. We
L6	talked about a historical issues a little bit. The
L7	concern was that and this grew out of a real
L8	situation that we had during the first year of
L9	implementation it was that it's possible that the
20	licensee will have found an issue. Maybe let's say
21	it's an old design issue, and will have done a good
22	look to find it, taking corrective action, and so on
23	and so forth.
24	When we go out and take a look at that

issue and document it in our inspection report. You

can run it through the SDP and get an SDP result that is great, that crosses the threshold. How do you treat those issues, those historical issues like old design issues? In the assessment process, how do we decide what actions we're going to take? How do we need with balance that the to not provide disincentives, if you will, for licensees to take the action to go out and find those issues and try to resolve them?

So we talked about the treatment of historical issues in the assessment process. And we had probably a couple of hours of good discussion on this issue.

The group actually arrived at alignment on the determination of significance and how it's portrayed, and that alignment was that an issue with current risk significance, that is, an issue that you can run through the SDP and get a color on, is a performance issue regardless of whether, you know, it was sort of an issue that was the result of a licensee action that is in the recent assessment window or whether it was something that was done 15 years ago that the licensee just discovered.

And issue is an issue is an issue, and there was a good degree of alignment on that.

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Now, once we've decided what the significance of the issue is, then that alignment really broke down, and we really had two camps of thought, if you will, on how you treat those issues.

There was sort of one school of thought, and I posed four options for folks, and I had them try to decide where they stood out, and I'm going to tell you about the two that seemed to carry the most thinking in terms of where people were.

The first was with respect to how you treat the issue in the action matrix. There was a school of thought that said we ought to treat these issue that you can run through the SDP and get a color just like you treat any other issue in the action matrix. That is, you put it in the PIM. You put it in the action matrix would say you take whatever action the action matrix would say you take on those issues, just like any other issue. That was one school of thinking.

The other was that they're not just like any other issues. Yeah, we ought to call them what the SDP says that they are, and we ought to put them in the PIM, but when it goes to deciding what actions that we ought to take, we ought to either take a deviation from the action matrix or we ought to have

some defined class in which those kinds of issues would fall, and we would provide discretion for those kinds of issues so we wouldn't end up taking actions. So that was another school of thinking.

The NRC folks tended to think, almost unanimously tended to think that an issue is an issue is an issue. The licensees tended to think that we really ought to be trying to apply some discretion.

Now, I guess I ought to just take a second to tell you the two approaches that really didn't have anybody that supported them, and one was let's run it through the SDP, call it a white, put it in the PIM as a white, but then ignore it, not put it in the framework. You know, so even though it's a white issue in the PIM, let's not do anything with it. Let's just put it in the PIM and leave it there.

No one in the room voted for that one.

The other approach was an issue is an issue is an issue is an issue. You run it through the SDP. You assign a color. You put it in the action matrix, and you take whatever action you're going to take based on the action matrix, but then should additional issues come in in the next quarter, then is when we would allow discretion.

Then we wouldn't say take that issue and

put it with another issue and call it a degraded cornerstone. No one in the room favored that approach either, or very few people in the room favored that approach.

So people really did say either treat it like an issue, treat it like any other issue, or put it in the action matrix, but then have discretion for the actions that you're going to take at that time for that particular issue. That's where we came out with respect to that.

The last thing that we talked about was when do you remove these issues from the assessment window. Remember I talked about the fact that issues continue for four quarters. Normal inspection issues continue for four quarters, and we talked about what's the correct approach.

Again, we had two schools of camp. I'll let you decide who decided to do what. I can tell you we were split. One school of thought said, you know, an issue is an issue is an issue. We ought to keep it for four quarters just like we would any other issue.

The other school of through said, "Hey, it's not like any other issue. Let's remove it when it's corrected." So you would have, again, this class of issues that we wouldn't carry for four quarters,

1 the thinking being, again, we want to try to avoid 2 creating a disincentive, if you will, for licensees to 3 find these issues as we go forward in the future. 4 So, those last two areas are areas that we know we need to work on, that we know we are sort of 5 in different areas with respect to how we proceed, but 6 7 in general, I think we made good progress in the 8 session. CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Just for clarification 9 10 because one of these issues happened in Region II, 11 what we're doing now is treat it like any other issue 12 and keep it for four quarters. But then if something else 13 MR. DEAN: 14 comes up, then consider it discretionary. 15 CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Yeah, if something comes 16 That hasn't happened yet. up. MR. JOHNSON: That's right. That's right. 17 MR. TRAPP: An interesting example would 18 19 be like RHR's sump valves where I know if you believe 20 the ASP program, it's a ten to the minus three. 21 you have some sort of generic industry issue, like 22 pressure locking of valves that all of a sudden start 23 popping up red findings at each unit that that applied 24 It seems in that case you might want some weasel 25 room.

2 Any other questions? MR. GARCHOW: Mike, I wasn't at that 3 4 workshop, but if you go back it seems like on a simple 5 look at it, which is what are we trying to accomplish with the oversight process and do we need to assign 6 7 more resources to this particular utility based on, you know, some graded approach of the assessment of 8 9 the types of issues they are having; so that must have been in the camp that would say that you would have to 10 11 define that discretion because it really doesn't --12 the fact that maybe on a good engineering review somebody comes up with a 15 year old CALC issue that 13 14 they fixed, I mean, that may not be indicative of 15 anything at all with the configuration change process, which would be the typical one. 16 17 Was that sort of the basis for --18 MR. JOHNSON: Yeah. 19 MR. GARCHOW: -- the one camp? 2.0 Yeah, I think it was. MR. JOHNSON: 21 MR. GARCHOW: And what was the basis for 22 the other camp then if the oversight process was to 23 dispatch resources to plants that are having current 24 performance issues? What was the basis of an issue is 25 an issue is an issue and just comply with the action

MR. JOHNSON:

Right, right.

matrix independent of that assumption?

MR. JOHNSON: It really sort of turned on people's perception of what performance was. You know, we probably spent -- I don't know -- 15 minutes or a half hour talking about what is a performance issue, and we talked about the fact that is the performance issue the performance of the plant, that is, what you get when you run an issue through the SDP, or is it a performance of the licensee, the folks who were at the plant? And is there a difference?

And I think the folks who would say an issue is an issue is an issue would say, "Hey, if you run something through the SDP and you get a color result, the public doesn't really care if, you know, the folks who made the error are at the plant today or if it's inside the assessment window or if they were at the plant 20 years ago, when you look at your plant and you look at what's on the framework, that ought to reflect that SDP result.

So it was that kind of thinking that I think shaped where people came out with respect to or at least how people approached the answers about how we ought to treat issues in the assessment matrix and how long we ought to keep them resident and that kind of stuff.

MR. DEAN: Okay. Thanks, Mike.

Next we'd like to have Jeff Jacobson talk to you about cross-cutting issues and problem identification and resolution. I believe that's on page 32 of the handout.

The session on MR. JACOBSON: Okay. cross-cutting issues was combined with problem identification and resolution, which in fact is one of the three cross-cutting issues that we've called out. The three cross-cutting issues that we've been talking about are problem identification and resolution, safety human performance, and conscious work Those are essentially the three that environment. we're predetermined that we're going to focus on, and that's primarily what our session focused on.

The objectives of our session were really to inform stakeholders of some of the initial results of the oversight process with regard to cross-cutting issues. This is an issue that's kind of carried over from the framework and was discussed in our earlier workshops. It really boils down to whether or not people felt comfortable about our framework and our cornerstones appropriately addressed cross-cutting issues and whether the process would deal with those performance concerns appropriately when they're

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And essentially the framework looked at these cross-cutting issues, and one of the basic assumptions made in the revised oversight process is that cross-cutting issues, such as human performance, should they occur, will show up either in the performance indicators that have been established or in one of the baseline inspections that are being done.

That's kind of the premise, and the gold was to try to prove that premise through the data that we're going to acquire as we go along. So we've presented some of our initial results with regard to that.

We also discussed some proposed changes that we're going to be looking at making to the annual problem identification and resolution team inspection that we do. We're thinking about moving that to a biannual inspection. I'll touch on that more in a minute.

Next slide, please.

We really had four -- we broke that down into four specific topics to discuss. The first one is: does the ROP provide sufficient information on those three cross-cutting issues? Do our inspections

1 and our PIs appropriately cover the three cross-2 cutting issues of problem identification and 3 resolution safety conscious work in the environment 4 and human performance? 5 The next focus area was are there other cross-cutting issues other than those three I just 6 7 mentioned that the ROP should be calling out and treating separately. 8 The third focus area was once the ROP does 9 identify a concern in one of the cross-cutting areas, 10 11 does the structure of the ROP and our assessment 12 process appropriately treat those cross-cutting issues when they're identified? 13 14 And lastly, the fourth issue, like I said, 15 has to do with the frequency of our PI&R team inspection. 16 17 During the workshop we really presented our preliminary findings with regard to the first 18 three issues, not a lot of discussion or dissention, 19 20 I guess, on what our preliminary results were. There 21 were some questions regarding the second focus area, 22 which is: do we have all of the cross-cutting issues 23 covered? 24 Some individual expressed concerns like 25 should we be looking at common cause as a crosscutting issue and should we deal with that separately?

And our answer to that was, well, that's really part of the problem identification and

really part of the problem identification and resolution piece, and in fact, our inspection procedures tell the inspectors when they're looking at problem identification and resolution to make sure that common cause has been appropriately addressed.

We would also look at that in any supplemental inspection we did. Where we're looking at the root cause, one of the questions that is asked is: what is the extent and condition and generic nature of the issue? And is there a common cause associated with the issue?

A few individuals I think mainly from the state regulatory side of the house raised a concern that if we reduced the frequency of the annual PI&R inspection, they thought that might have a negative impact on public confidence. It was really two individuals, I think, and they were both from the state regulatory agencies.

I'll briefly go over the preliminary outcomes with regard to each focus area. Like I said, the first issue had to do with dose the ROP appropriately cover the three crosscutting issues that I mentioned.

Our preliminary answer to that is, yes, it does. Primarily we think it does because when we look at plants that I know have concerns in the crosscutting areas, specifically plants that we have identified have either weak or problematic PI&R programs, we notice that those plants have also moved out of the licensee response band for one reason or another, and we identified four facilities where we think that's true.

We didn't identify any facilities where we thought there was a broad, cross-cutting concern. Yet that facility was still within the licensee response band.

So we think preliminarily at least the data seems to support the original assumption made during the development of the framework, which would be that problems in these cross-cutting areas will show you either in the PIs or in the baseline inspections.

MR. KRICH: Jeff, did you look at the reverse, just out of curiosity, where you do a PI&R inspection, have some findings, but go back and look to see that, in fact, in general the licensee is doing corrective actions properly and these were kind of aberrations?

1	MR. JACOBSON: We didn't do an exhaustive
2	review of these things, but what we did is we looked
3	at the plants that we thought had the worst outcome in
4	the annual PI&R inspection and then looked to see
5	where those plants are in the action matrix, and the
6	four ones that we had the most concern about in our
7	annual inspection have moved outside the action
8	matrix.
9	We didn't look at ones that had maybe one
10	green finding in PI&R to try to make a more general
11	conclusion.
12	MR. GARCHOW: Jeff, before you move on, I
13	just noticed on Slide 34 there's an issue about some
14	discussion apparently at the workshop talking about
15	human performance. I'd just like for you to comment
16	on that.
17	I don't know if you inadvertently skipped
18	that.
19	MR. JACOBSON: Oh, well, I mistakenly
20	skipped it. One individual, I think, actually a few
21	individuals raised the issue of maybe we ought to get
22	rid of human performance as a cross-cutting issue
23	because it's so subjective, and we had some
24	discussions about how in the past we may have

inappropriately linked unrelated issues together just

1 because a human was involved and tried to make a point 2 that so-and-so has a human performance concern when, 3 in fact, these were three or four issues that were 4 really totally unrelated other than the fact that a 5 human was involved. And when you look at it, just about 6 7 everything at the facility has a human involvement at 8 some point or another. 9 Ι think there's somewhat 10 agreement that this is an area that has to be watched. 11 I don't think we're ready to say that we're going to 12 eliminate it as a cross-cutting issue yet, certainly we don't want to be in the position where 13 14 we're linking unrelated events together and trying to 15 make something out of them just because a human was involved in the process. 16 That doesn't really serve 17 anybody any good to do that. CHAIRMAN PLISCO: And it wasn't really the 18 19 subjectivity of the individual issue being human 20 performance. It's really subjectivity in development 21 of the trend. 22 Right. MR. JACOBSON: 23 And what meets --CHAIRMAN PLISCO: 24 MR. JACOBSON: Yeah, there's no 25 question --

1 CHAIRMAN PLISCO: -- a number of unrelated 2 What does that mean? issues. 3 MR. GARCHOW: I can conclude positively 4 that 100 percent of my performance issues are done by 5 my workers. So, I mean --6 (Laughter.) 7 MR. JACOBSON: Right. MR. GARCHOW: -- how do you differentiate? 8 Who else is going to make the mistakes? 9 10 MR. JACOBSON: Okay. Like I said, we 11 didn't really identify any new cross-cutting issues 12 with respect to our second focus area. We talked about human performance and common cause and explained 13 14 how each of those are handled in the current program. 15 I think most of the people were fairly satisfied with that. 16 17 With regard to the third focus area, we talked about some of the changes that we've made 18 19 recently with regard to our guidance to how we treat 20 cross-cutting issues, and just а synopsis is 21 originally I think we were somewhat lax in our 22 guidance as to when we would allow an inspector to 23 document that a cross-cutting issue exists, and then 24 we got into this thing with no color findings, and it

got very confusing even for me to understand where we

were.

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So I think we've made some improvements where now we're not going to document cross-cutting issues unless we can tie multiple events to green -- first, it has to be a green finding. That's number one.

And then you have to have several of those green findings in a certain area, and they have to be causally linked. The example I spoke of before would not work where it was just because it was a human, but let's say you had four errors made in a short time by one operating crew in a certain area. That might be something more of a specific cross-cutting issue that we would be concerned with.

So we've tightened up the guidance with regard to our documentation. We do not engage in inspection space anyway on cross-cutting issues. All issues have to be run through the SDP, and they go into the action matrix, and the action matrix governs what type of supplemental inspections we would do.

We would not do supplemental inspections solely for a cross-cutting issue, but we do deal with cross-cutting issues in our documentation and in the inspection reports and in our assessment process and some of the letters that we would send out to the

1 licensees. If we felt it was a significant crosscutting issue we would highlight that. 2 3 We would probably also use that if the 4 licensee moved out of the licensee response band. 5 That would be a factor. That would be taken into account when we plan our supplemental response. 6 7 So, for instance, if we thought that there was a weakness in the licensee's corrective action 8 9 program, we would maybe allocate more resources into looking at the root cause of a performance issue than 10 11 we would at a licensee where we had determined they do 12 real good root causes and have a good corrective action program. 13 14 But even within that there's a range of 15 resource allocations that we work from. Lastly, we discussed the basis for a possible reduction in the 16 17 frequency of the annual PI&R inspection. We think probably an inspection once every two years is more 18 19 appropriate at most plants. 20 However, we feel that at some plants we 21 want to continue an annual inspection, and the debate 22 is what is the threshold for which plants get it every 23 two years and which plants get it every one year. 24 And there's some proposals that have been

put forward, such as if the licensee is in the

licensee response band, they would get it every two years, and if they move to one of the other columns in the action matrix, they would get it every year, and the question is: is that going to be tied to the degraded cornerstone column or the second column in the action matrix? Or specifically how we work out the details, we haven't definitively defined where

So we haven't definitively defined where the threshold is going to be, but pretty much everyone is in alignment that there ought to be some that's every two years and some that's every one year.

We also talked about preserving the ability to follow up on issues throughout the year as part of our overall approach to looking at PI&R, but right now our inspection program allocates about ten percent of each inspection procedure to looking at PI&R.

We don't specifically account for it, but it's supposed to be part of that process, and that's been a challenge due to the fact that we don't specifically allocate for it, and we haven't been real good about documenting when we do that.

So one of the changes we're proposing is that we may add a PI&R section to every inspection report so it would make it more visible and it would

help account for it.

Also, if we go from an annual to a biennial inspection, that's going to save about 100 hours a year in the PI&R area, and there's a discussion of using some of those hours to establish somewhat of a pool approach where you could follow up on some selected issues throughout the course of the year.

The question is: how much of those hours do we allocate and how much do we save and how much do we spend? And we're still working on that. Hopefully within the next month or so we'll come up with an approach to that issue.

That's essentially all I have.

CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Jeff, I just wanted to mention, and maybe Jim can provide some input on this. The information I get from the inspectors, even though the procedure does say ten percent from PI&R, in reality they're actually spending much more than that typically, especially the residents. I think they're on a day-to-day basis because they spend a lot of time looking at individual corrective actions as they come through the system every day, and I think in actual experience they're spending more than that ten percent even though we don't account for it in our own

1 accounting system. So we don't have any actual 2 numbers. 3 But, Jim, what's your perspective? 4 MR. MOORMAN: Yeah, a lot of that review 5 gets charged to plant status. We review -- if they do what I do, is they review every condition report that 6 7 gets written in the plant, and then we follow up on selective ones, and then the ones that rise to the 8 9 level go through the questions, and then subsequently get followed up. There's either findings or non-cited 10 11 violations. 12 So to a certain degree we are following the problem identification and resolution issues. 13 14 Having done some of the inspections, I personally 15 believe that we may be a little bit more effective doing it on a day-to-day basis than we would just 16 17 coming in to do it on a one-shot inspection. But that's how we're doing that. 18 19 MR. JACOBSON: Yeah, I think one of the 20 challenges is in the documentation, and like you said, 21 you're doing it as part of plant status. What exactly constitutes PI&R versus -- I mean, 22 it's almost 23 intertwined in many of the activities that we looked 24 at.

To stop and say, "Well, now I'm really

looking at PI&R," it's not always apparent. The challenge is to be able to document it in a way that when they do the team inspection that they can integrate those results and come away with a meaningful assessment of PI&R that would include both the samples that were reviewed throughout the year, as well as what was looked at during the team inspection. But that's the goal, and that's where we've had some challenge in integrating those results due to the way that we've been documenting things. MR. MOORMAN: Well, we always ask the questions about the condition reports that we review. Do they understand the problem? Have the corrective actions been assigned appropriately? And are they following through with those corrective actions? And 95 percent or more of the time the answer to those questions is, yes, they're doing just fine, but there are on occasions where we find some instances where they don't. I guess what I would be curious in knowing is what percentage of findings in the PIR reports relate to problem identification and resolution and not just issues that were identified by reviewing the list of condition reports. I don't know if the staff

has that data or not.

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1	MR. GARCHOW: Say that again.
2	MR. JACOBSON: I don't understand the
3	question.
4	MR. MOORMAN: Well, what my question is:
5	what number of findings in a problem identification
6	and resolution inspection report are findings related
7	to the program itself as opposed to findings that were
8	discovered by the team that the residents missed?
9	That's kind of what it comes out to be.
10	MR. JACOBSON: I don't
11	MR. GARCHOW: Not making findings that,
12	hey, here was an issue that maybe you had an
13	inadequate root cause and came back because your
14	corrective actions weren't timely rather than just
15	here's an issue?
16	MR. MOORMAN: Exactly.
17	MR. JACOBSON: You mean okay.
18	MR. DEAN: How many different issues were
19	found by the inspection team that weren't found
20	through the routine inspection process? Is that
21	MR. MOORMAN: Yeah.
22	MR. JACOBSON: You mean like hardware
23	deficiencies in the field?
24	MR. MOORMAN: Right, right. You know,
25	when the team comes in, they get a list of condition

1	reports and go through it to pick out the ones, you
2	know, sort of a smart sample of condition reports that
3	may have issues with them.
4	Sometimes they'll see condition reports
5	and decide, well, yeah, this is an issue. It has
6	nothing to do with the corrective action program, but
7	yet it goes in that particular inspection report.
8	MR. JACOBSON: Well, I would say that in
9	most cases if we and the team inspection find an issue
10	that the licensee was unaware of or had
11	inappropriately characterized
12	MR. MOORMAN: Well, they got it from the
13	list of condition reports.
14	MR. JACOBSON: Yeah. Well, they may have
15	gotten it, but it may have been it may have been
16	inappropriately characterized, let's say.
17	MR. MOORMAN: Well, then that would be a
18	problem identification and resolution issue if it's
19	not characterized properly whether it's adverse or
20	significance or however they categorize the plan.
21	MR. JACOBSON: Right.
22	MR. MOORMAN: But the issue just typically
23	doesn't change. The issue, the facts of the issue
24	don't change; the corrective action doesn't change.
25	The issue then becomes a regulatory issue, and it goes

in the inspection report.

CHAIRMAN PLISCO: But I can't give you a full answer. I've been going to most of the PI&R exit meetings in Region II for this first year, and most of the findings I would say are issues with the program that the team had developed, but as you well know, some of those issues they developed they got hints from the resident inspector of areas that they ought to peek at, you know, things that have come up during the year.

So they didn't start, you know, to just look at this whole program. They had some intelligence from the resident inspector of areas that they had seen signs and maybe some problems that they thought needed development, and the PI&R team when they came in did that.

So I mean, I think sometimes maybe there are issues there that maybe the residents aren't aware of, but in most of the cases the residents actually pointed them in the direction.

MR. JACOBSON: Well, why is that not a success in either case? I mean from a program perspective, I don't care if it's the resident or the team. The fact that the NRC identified something that was -- I mean, that's the way I'd look at it.

1 We're not trying to play the residents 2 versus the team or whatever. CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Yeah. 3 That's what I'm I think there are success stories where I 4 saying. 5 think the residents did see signs of some potential issues and then the team, you know, has a lot more 6 7 latitude and time to develop the issue, and they did. MR. JACOBSON: Okay. Any other questions? 8 9 (No response.) 10 MR. JACOBSON: Thank you. 11 MR. DEAN: Okay. Thanks, Jeff. 12 The last point starts on page 52. This is communication issues. Randy was actually the sponsor 13 14 for that session. So he may be able to chime in in 15 appropriate moments. Basically the five issues we came forward 16 with were the ones listed here. The first one was and 17 is a notable internal issue in terms of the change in 18 19 threshold and inspection report documentation and the 20 fact there's still body of that а insights, 21 observations, feedback that the inspectors can provide 22 licensees and which for the most part most licensees are desirous of receiving. 23 24 And some of the discomfort that some 25 inspectors feel in sharing information that doesn't

make its way into the inspection report and concerns about public confidence and, you know, in a lot of respect concerns about covering themselves if something were to emerge at a future date that may have been related to a low level issue that they had informed the licensee of in the past and did not get documented.

So there's a lot of internal issues associated with that first one.

The second item was really more an attempt to get some insights regarding the role of the annual assessment meeting and how we can make that productive and beneficial both for the NRC, the licensees and our public stakeholders.

The third item there, the Web page was just an opportunity to try and solicit feedback on ways that we can improve the Web. The fourth issue there was one that would have been alluded to earlier regarding public communication regarding the significance determination process and the perception that discussions or negotiations or whatever were being done not in the public way, and so we talked about that issue, and some ways we can improve in that area.

And then the last item there was ways that

we could improve the way that we, the NRC, solicit and consider and integrate public feedback, including assuring that those individuals, organizations have a good understanding of how their feedback was considered.

We had some other issues that were raised in the course of all of these discussions. A lot of discussion took place regarding the concept of not documenting minor violations, which is an organizational philosophy that's been in place for several years. It's not a reactor oversight process issue. That was an issue that came with improvements or refinements in the enforcement process.

But we had a lot of discussion regarding documentation of minor violations and minor issues, and some parties felt it was important to do that for a completeness factor, but we've opted thus far not to document those for an efficiency and effectiveness factor and be able to assure that what's in the inspection reports are those things that we want the licensees most to focus upon.

Some discussion regarding that compliance is not commensurate with significance. That's obviously something that's been illuminated by this process, and the focus on significance at times are

compliance issues that aren't significant necessarily in terms of plant safety, but they are significant in terms of assuring that licensees are in compliance with the regulations, which still is a basic underlying premise of our oversight process.

So we had some discussion about that issue.

The third bullet there in terms of being able to describe in our write-ups of findings in the SDP how the SDP was utilized, how do we answer the questions, how do we get to where we were with respect to a finding, that that was an area that was noted by all stakeholders as an area that we can improve in both internally as well as externally.

There was a suggestion that we should consider a Web site for decommissioned plants that provides as much information and insight about the status of decommissioning plants, as well as operating plants, and that's something that we committed to get back to our staff here that handled decommissioning plants.

In terms of establishing a feedback process for licensees on the ROP, we do have the frequently asked question process for performance indicators, but some licensees expressed a desire that

we consider establishing a formalized feedback process that is broader, and so that's something that we took back with us.

And then we did not -- this is kind of jumping ahead to outcomes -- but there was no consensus on the annual assessment meetings for all green plants, whether we ought to have them or not. So that was something that engendered a lot of discussions.

CHAIRMAN PLISCO: But we are doing them this first --

MR. DEAN: We are doing them this first year, absolutely, absolutely.

We received a lot of comments to consider in all of those areas. I kind of highlighted a few. With respect to the Web page, I think one good set of feedback that we're going to consider in terms of revising the way the Web page works at least in terms of how it displays performance assessment is instead of starting from basically a level where you have the details and working up to the overall, to start with a first page as you enter the Web page with kind of an overall picture of where is a particular plant relative to the action matrix, and then allow you to migrate down and get to actually individual issues and

PI trends and things like that.

That was a good suggestion. Also some suggestions in terms of what can we do to make it easier to navigate; that perhaps we should consider when we describe certain aspects of the process like what does a certain PI mean. You know, right now we use the specific language that's associated with the 99-02 guidance, which is fairly --

MR. GARCHOW: Obtuse.

MR. DEAN: -- obtuse. Thank you. I was looking for the right word. That's a good one.

We can put that perhaps in a more accessible language for the public stakeholders, and that was a good suggestion as well.

So we got a lot of good feedback, and those were all things that we'll consider, and you'll start seeing some improvements with respect to the Web page. In fact, a lot of the suggestions we got were things that we were already working on, and as a matter of fact, Ron Frahm over here is my key staff member responsible for that, and you'll start seeing some of the improvements that were suggested at this meeting already taking place, and you'll see those in the next roll-out at the end of this month.

In terms of we got a number of suggestions

on how we could better respond to the public comments on the oversight process. One suggestion, as a matter of fact, that Ray made was something that he had seen successful in other arenas, which is establishing some sort of matrix set-up that shows, you know, public feedback in what area and how was it considered.

And so that might be something depending on the volume that we get in terms of public feedback, might be something that's worth considering, and I think that probably would be a good suggestion for us to look at in terms of the feedback we get in the Federal Register notice. I think that might be a real valuable approach to display that. So we're going to look at that as a possible suggestion for the next month or two when we collect all of that feedback.

And then in terms of considering ideas for public interaction in conjunction with the annual assessment meeting, like I said, there wasn't a consensus in terms of how valuable that meeting is.

I think one of the important thoughts that was brought out, particularly for plants that are in the licensing response band where you don't have a lot of notable issues that emerged during the year to discuss, to make that a valuable meeting, the licensees ought to bring to the table those types of

1 issues that they have, things that they've come out 2 with out of their own self-assessment, and share those 3 insights with the NRC. 4 And I think that would make probably for 5 a more valuable meeting in terms of giving feedback to also presenting to 6 NRC, but the 7 stakeholders, you know, a view and opportunity to see what is it that a licensee is doing in terms of trying 8 9 to develop their own aggressive self-assessment 10 program. So that was one of the thoughts that came 11 12 up. That's a good point. 13 MR. KRICH: 14 kind of like the mid-cycle meetings that some of us 15 used to hold, where we'd go in and tell the NRC where we thought our performance was to see if there was a 16 17 match-up. 18 MR. DEAN: Right. 19 MR. KRICH: So are you going to try to do 20 this for this first round of assessment meetings? 21 Well, the first round of the MR. DEAN: 22 assessment, I mean, the guidance is what it 23 Basically we go out there, have an annual public 24 meeting. It's a graded approach. If you're a plant 25 that's in the licensee response band, you can expect

to see the branch chief, you know, come out and meet with you.

We want to use that also as an opportunity to interface better with the public. For example, one of the things that Region II does for these annual meetings is they actually send letters to various key public stakeholders, and they have a meeting with those public stakeholders after the assessment meeting, and that's been very beneficial, I think, in terms of Region II being able to interface with those other public stakeholders and to get their feedback and to let them know what we're working on and receive comments.

So, you know, that's not something that we've mandated for all of the regions. All we really have told the regions is that you should use this as an opportunity to interact with your public.

We haven't mandated a way to do that. I think that some regions can provide some good lessons that I think other regions should consider. I know Region IV has developed some valuable insights from their public meetings.

You know, this all fits within the agency's four performance goals of, you know, public confidence, with efficiency and effectiveness, and you

1	know, on the surface you can say, "Oh, green plant.
2	Gee, we don't even need an annual meeting," but there
3	are some other things that can be done, I think, of
4	value for some of these other performance goals that
5	an annual meeting really you know, I myself am a
6	strong supporter of having an annual meeting. We just
7	need to make sure that we utilize it in a way that
8	best satisfies our needs, the licensee needs, and the
9	public needs in the area.
10	And obviously depending on where you live
11	in the country, those needs are different.
12	MR. BLOUGH: The guidance for this first
13	time through says, in part, that the staff should give
14	the licensee an opportunity at that meeting to present
15	any information they want about existing or new
16	programs designed to maintain or enhance performance.
17	So it requires the staff to give the
18	licensee an opportunity, but of course, it can't
19	require the licensee to make any of that presentation.
20	So that's where it ends up.
21	If a plant has got all green findings and
22	indicators and they don't want to present any of that
23	information that the staff is required to give them an
24	opportunity for, you can have a fairly bland meeting.
25	MR. BROCKMAN: There is one significant

1	difference from the previous program, and that's for
2	those plants that are in that licensee control band,
3	the senior person there is the branch chief.
4	MR. DEAN: Right.
5	MR. BROCKMAN: Which has historically not
6	been satisfying to most licensees for that
7	presentation. They're looking to get a higher level
8	audience.
9	MR. DEAN: Higher profile, yeah.
LO	I don't know. Randy or Ray, you were an
L1	active participant in that session. I don't know if
L2	you have anything to add or
L3	MR. BLOUGH: No, it was really almost a
L4	brainstorming session where the staff was trying to
L5	get ideas in several areas on how to improve things.
L6	There wasn't a lot of consensus from the participants
L7	except on very high level principles. The details,
L8	there was a wide range.
L9	It certainly met the objective of getting
20	a lot of ideas how we might do things better.
21	MS. FERDIG: Were there any public
22	stakeholders in that conversation?
23	MS. BLOUGH: Just a few, but you know,
24	David Lochbaum was there, but he had another
25	commitment, and so he presented some slides and

1 participated for about half of the time, and Ray was 2 there and participated very actively, and then three states, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Illinois, were 3 4 there, and they were all fairly outspoken and provided 5 a lot of ideas and a lot of insight. 6 MR. DEAN: So we had good, active 7 participation from those public stakeholders that were 8 there. No question. 9 Okay. With that, I've just got two more slides really to talk about. That's future milestones 10 11 and activities, the last two slides. Page 55 talks 12 about really some near term stuff. The first item is one I've already talked 13 14 about, getting the input on the Federal Register 15 notice and evaluating that, and that will pretty much 16 complete the picture in terms of all the feedback 17 processes that we've tried to implement this first 18 year. 19 We will have had the internal survey 20 hopefully analysis results. complete by then. 21 Obviously the results of this workshop. We've got a 22 meeting tomorrow, and as a matter of fact, to kind of 23 do a post mortem on the workshop and where do we go

from here with those results, as well as all of the

feedback that we've collected over the past year in

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terms of, you know, helping formulate the Commission meeting paper on the first year of initial implementation.

We had the first agency action review meeting in June, June 26th through 28th. That's the replacement for the senior management meeting, and it really takes on a whole different flavor. It's not necessarily a decision making meeting, as opposed to really a validation of the approach that we've taken for those plants that are in the multiple, repetitive degraded cornerstone column or above, as well as consideration of industry trends, consideration of ROP self-assessment results.

The Commission paper is due on initial implementation about the same time, late June, and our briefing for the Commission on initial implementation results is July 20th of this year.

So those are some of the near term milestones in terms of specific to the reactor oversight process and, you know, looking at what this panel was formed to do.

I want to spend an opportunity just to talk about a couple of kind of broader activities that are taking place. One is the risk-based performance indicators, and you all have had some information

provided to you over the course of your time together on what we're doing in terms of risk based performance indicators.

There currently is а white paper describing the phase one process of the risk based PI program that is out for public comment, and there's a meeting April 24th, I believe, a public meeting, and then after that point the public comment period will close, and the research staff that has developed that program will basically consider all of the public feedback they receive, make a recommendation to us here at NRR, and then we'll make some decisions about where to move forward, you know, what performance indicators or what family of performance indicators do we want to consider moving forward on.

What are the ones that we don't think there's any benefit in moving forward on? And start working on how will we integrate the results of that program and what needs to be done further to improve the reactor oversight process.

I will say that my own personal observations are there's a couple of areas that I think that they can help us improve on. One is within the realm of safety system unavailability and reliability. They're developing a process that

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incorporates plant specific thresholds so that the performance indicators are basically tailored towards individual plants and their design, and we think that that will be beneficial. It will also help separate some of these issues we have with fault exposure time by having a reliability indicator. So we think that that's one

The other area that I feel strongly that will give us some insights is some of the data that they're looking at, things like initiating event trends, common cause failures, will give us some benefit perhaps not on an individual plant performance assessment arena, but within our industry trends program and trying to develop some trends that will help us support the belief that the reactor oversight

place that is certainly worthy of further development.

Those are the two areas that I think that we'll get the most benefit out of the risk-based performance indicators, but that's just my personal observations.

process is, indeed, maintaining safety.

The industry trending program, we hope to have a Commission paper by late this month or early next month that will describe what we're doing in terms of industry trending. The industry trend

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program will borrow from some of the processes that we already have in place. For example, the accident sequence precursor program that the Office of Research currently runs in terms of looking at events, conditions, and providing after all the information in, providing a risk characterization of that event or condition and the trends that we see in there in terms of significance in number of issues that fall within the ASP program.

There's other things that research does that provides us insights about industry-wide performance initiating that frequency, data, reliability studies that they do on a periodic basis. Those are all things that we will continue to incorporate into our industry trends program.

But we also will look at developing industry-wide performance indicators that will be based on both the current what we refer to as the AEOD performance indicators, but those performance indicators that that office collected for quite a period of time, there's a lot of history with those, a lot of good trend data, and then as we get more information associated with our current performance indicators to the point that we can feel that we have enough information to call it a trend, then we'll

migrate away from those AEOD performance indicators that aren't needed that are duplicative of what we have in our reactor oversight process, but basically trend that data on an industry-wide basis and look for, you know, any potential trends in industry that might show a decline in overall performance that may not be reflected in individual plant performance results.

And then we're also looking at other aspects of the oversight process, you know, for example, inspection program results and things like that, action matrix. You know, where do plants find themselves in the action matrix over time? And utilize all of that to develop trend data, which is, you know, things to look at over three and four-year periods of time, not on a quarter-by-quarter basis like the ROP does.

So you should see something hopefully, like I said, by the end of this month that describes where we think we're going in that area.

And then the last area is the oversight process self-assessment. I've described earlier our philosophy that we want to have a continuous self-improvement aspect to the oversight process, and we've defined an annual self-assessment process that

1 includes, you know, consideration of feedback that we 2 received throughout the year. We'll probably utilize some form of 3 4 soliciting stakeholder feedback on results that will 5 incorporate looking at any significant issues or events that occur during the year and taking that 6 7 feedback and basically rolling that all up into some, you know, global self-assessment of the oversight 8 9 process and where it is that we can make improvements, refinements. You know, where does it appear to be 10 11 doing its job? Where does it perhaps appear to be 12 missing the mark? And use that as a means of continuous self-improvement. 13 14 And in my mind those are, you know, three 15 of the biggest activities that are going on that have 16 the potential to influence the ROP on a long-term basis. 17 Bill, maybe I'm missing 18 MR. KRICH: 19 something here, but we had gone through with you 20 before the current self- assessment that you're going 21 through, went through all of the --22 MR. DEAN: All the metric --23 MR. KRICH: -- metric schools, all of the 24 metrics that you're using. 25 MR. DEAN: Correct.

1	MR. KRICH: In fact, you showed us some
2	preliminary results that were not terribly meaningful
3	because you just didn't have enough data.
4	MR. DEAN: Correct.
5	MR. KRICH: Is that going into the report
6	that you're sending to the Commission and then
7	MR. DEAN: Right. Yeah, we will take the
8	aspects of that that are we're debating right now
9	whether to develop a separate report that takes the
LO	results from the metrics and provide some analysis to
L1	that and make that an attachment to the Commission
L2	paper or whether to send that up under separate cover.
L3	I think what we'll see in the future is
L4	something like that would go up. We'd probably see
L5	three pieces go to the Commission on an annual basis.
L6	One would be the results of our self-assessment, which
L7	will include those, plus all this other stuff that I
L8	described.
L9	A second would be the industry trends;
20	And then the third would be, you know, the
21	annual role of a plant performance and maybe a three-
22	prong.
23	MR. KRICH: So that would go into that
24	third bullet
25	MR. DEAN: Correct.

1 MR. KRICH: -- basically on a continuing 2 basis. MR. DEAN: Correct, correct. 3 4 MR. KRICH: Okay. 5 MR. DEAN: So we're still refining that, you know. As we collect data and look at it, we find, 6 7 you know, much like you all find in your own, you 8 know, metric programs that you set up for plant 9 performance; you know, you find some that aren't worthwhile and you come up with ideas. 10 11 we're still doing that. 12 MR. KRICH: So just out of curiosity, is there any value in looking at the results that you've 13 14 gotten so far or is there much more information to 15 look at from --Well, basically we have an 16 MR. DEAN: 17 additional quarter's worth of data from what we had last time. 18 19 PARTICIPANT: That's not even in yet. 20 MR. DEAN: Yeah, still not -- I don't 21 think Ι would feel comfortable in of terms 22 demonstrating any trends beyond things that we're 23 already reacting to based on, you know, the anecdotal 24 feedback that we've gotten from either licensees or 25 internally.

1 And we're struggling a little bit with the 2 display. I don't know if Mike looked at it. 3 know, I gave Mike some feedback. 4 We had a third quarter data set about two 5 or three weeks ago, and I gave Mike a lot of feedback on ways that we can improve it, and you know, 6 7 obviously we haven't had much time to work on it with 8 the workshop. 9 So, you know, we hope to in the next 10 couple of weeks clean that up and at least get the 11 third quarter data out. The fourth quarter data is 12 due at the end of this month, you know. So that will 13 probably follow close on the heels. 14 So our goal is to have by the end of the 15 fourth quarter, i.e., the data we're going to collect here in the next three or four weeks, to have a 16 17 complete set that has analysis in each of the areas, but we don't have it now. 18 MR. SCHERER: So I understand, the answer 19 20 to Rod's question is that you really don't have 21 anything significant that changed from the first 22 briefing you gave us and your October 16th, 2000 --MR. DEAN: 23 No. 24 MR. SCHERER: -- memo? MR. DEAN: No, not beyond the things that 25

1	we described here.
2	MR. BLOUGH: On October 16th, they
3	outlined the program.
4	MR. DEAN: Right.
5	MR. BLOUGH: And then a couple of meetings
6	later, they came in and they gave us data and charts,
7	primitive charts.
8	MR. DEAN: Primitive, yes.
9	MR. BLOUGH: That had two quarters' worth
10	of actual data on them.
11	MR. DEAN: Right.
12	MR. BLOUGH: I forget which meeting that
13	was.
14	MR. DEAN: That was the one down in the
15	hotel down in Bethesda.
16	MR. BLOUGH: January, and now you probably
17	have three quarters' worth of data.
18	MR. DEAN: Right, and we're in the
19	process, you know, based on our own assessment of the
20	quality of the last product, we're trying to improve
21	it, make it more, you know, reader friendly. But
22	there isn't much, you know, in terms of another
23	quarter's worth of data that gives us anything that we
24	feel comfortable in making any sort of analysis on
25	just based on that metric data.

1 MS. FERDIG: What kind of response have 2 you been getting from the Federal Register notice, or is that still open and therefore --3 4 MR. DEAN: Right. It's still open, and I 5 don't think that we've gotten anything. We haven't even checked. You know, we've been checking just for, 6 7 you know --8 MS. FERDIG: To see if you're getting 9 anything. Right, right. 10 MR. DEAN: 11 MR. GARCHOW: So, Bill, maybe you have 12 It's just not well advertised, but is there one place where you could go where you have like sort of 13 14 a project manager, where you have on a couple of 15 sheets of paper like what it is we're trying to do in the short term to improve the inspection program? 16 17 Do you have like an integrated action plan that describes all of the different facets? Because 18 I see you've taken a lot of input in. So it's like a 19 20 blender, but in the end that has to be used to 21 influence, you know, some sort of short and midterm 22 action plan. 23 And I have yet to see from NEI or the NRC 24 any, you know, where you could pick up a document and 25 say, "Yep, here's the major thrust in the next 90

1 days, 180 days, or next year for inspection, PIs, 2 SDPs." I mean, so it's sort of hard to just grab 3 4 that all in one spot. MR. DEAN: Yeah, I would offer a couple of 5 things in response to that. You know, as I mentioned 6 7 earlier, one of the things that we tried to do for the initial implementation period was to hold the program 8 I identified some of those 9 as stable as we could. things where we've made mid-course corrections or 10 11 changes because we felt we needed to, but for the most 12 part, our changes have been along the lines of refinements. Okay? We haven't made any significant 13 14 changes. 15 I think the workshop that we had last week was, in addition to the feedback we're going to get, 16 17 you know, at the end of this month we're going to the Federal Register notice, and the analysis of the 18 19 inspector survey will provide pretty much kind of an 20 over arching cap over what it is we think we need to 21 work on. 22 Like I said, we're going to have a post 23 mortem meeting tomorrow. We were going to have it 24 this afternoon, but you guys -- I talk too long.

But the intent of that is to start then

1 planning out, okay, what is it that we need to work on 2 What is it we need to work on long term? near term. I will say that our major near term goal 3 4 right now is associated with the inspection 5 flexibility and resources issue, the internal issue that I identified earlier today; to develop for the 6 7 regions to use when they go into their planning for the end of cycle meetings in early May that they have 8 an outline of what the inspection program should look 9 10 like for the next year. 11 MR. GARCHOW: I'd just offer a suggestion 12 that if you had some sort of living project planned where you could see what you are trying to work on or 13 14 enhance over a period of time. I think that would 15 help everybody, the inspectors, the public, NEI, the 16 utility. 17 Because I spent a lot of my licensing manager's time trying to figure out exactly what's 18 19 going on in each of these separate areas because 20 they're typically done by separate people. 21 Right, no. MR. DEAN: 22 MR. GARCHOW: And the staff, and it's hard 23 to get one picture of what's going on. 24 MR. DEAN: We do have a project management 25 It's about 15 pages long, and it does pretty plan.

1 much what you talk about. It identifies what are the 2 major issues; what are the key milestones; what dates 3 do they need to be accomplished by; who's responsible 4 for them, and we've been using that to get us up to 5 this date. It includes things like developing the 6 7 Commission paper. It includes, for example, our 8 internal process to revamp our inspector training 9 program and the manual chapter that goes with that. So we have a product like that. What we 10 11 need to do is take the results of this workshop and 12 integrate that into that plan, but we do have a tool that does that, but it's, you know, a tad broader than 13 14 the oversight process. 15 One other quick question I MR. KRICH: had, Bill, and it came to mind earlier. 16 a -- I forget -- a GAO; I think it was GAO who did a 17 survey early on internal to the NRC. The results were 18 19 not unexpected. 20 Then you talked about doing this second 21 internal survey. Is that to show, you know, here's 22 where we were; here's where we are, or has there been 23 anything in between? 24 MR. DEAN: Yeah, the purpose of about a 25 year or so ago GAO did a survey probably about 18, 19

months ago that looked at basically the staff's readiness to accept risk informed philosophy. It also incorporated questions that were pertinent to the oversight process.

About the time that those results were being made public, we had already commissioned an internal survey ourselves, and we were in a bit of a quandary because we didn't want to be seen as, you know, here's our survey to combat your survey, and I think for the most part we effectively deflected that comparison, for the most part.

But the intent of the survey we're doing now is, in part, to do that. It's in part to say, okay, there were some issues that were of concern: usability, SDP, the predictability of future poor performance of a licensee in this oversight process.

And so part of the intent of the survey that we sent out last month was to look and see where do we stand with some of those issues that were, you know, low ranked issues last time, issues of concern with our inspectors.

But it was also intended to be much broader in getting insights on the oversight process to facilitate some of the metrics that we had established for our self-assessment process. A lot of

1 those rely on internal stakeholder feedback. 2 So it was to fulfill that feedback need, 3 to see how are we doing against some of the criteria 4 for the oversight process, and so it's kind of 5 twofold. It's basically to help figure out where are we in the trend in terms of changed management --6 7 MR. KRICH: As well as fit the metrics. 8 MR. DEAN: Correct. 9 MR. KRICH: Okay. 10 MS. FERDIG: Is there any reason to assume 11 GAO will administer another survey in the near future? 12 I don't know. I don't know. MR. DEAN: It's a good question. I imagine they might if 13 14 somebody expressed an interest in Congress that wants 15 them to go look at it. Anything else I can help you with? We'll 16 be here tomorrow, Loren, if you need us for anything. 17 CHAIRMAN PLISCO: There was one question 18 19 this morning. I think we were waiting for Bill Gray 20 earlier, looking for some background information on 21 the basis and genesis of the program, and off the top 22 of our head we talked about two SECY papers, 99-007 Is there anything else if he wanted to go 23 and 07A. 24 back and look at the genesis of the program and what 25 some of the underlying --

1 MR. DEAN: Yeah, I mean, you can actually 2 go all of the way back to 1996-'97 time frame and 3 start looking at some of the SRMs at the Commission. 4 A lot of this, you know, a lot of this 5 started in the aftermath of Maine Yankee, Ray, as a matter of fact, the concern that here was a plant that 6 7 had heretofore been fairly well rated in terms of the 8 SALP process, and the next thing you know, they're on 9 the problem plant list, and then several months later they're shutting down. You know, how did that happen? 10 11 You know, and how come the NRC wasn't on top of that 12 issue? And so the Commission challenged the staff 13 14 back then to look at the SALP process and was that an 15 effective means of performance assessment, and so out 16 that emanated our what we called our 17 integrated review of assessment --18 Assessment programs. PARTICIPANT: 19 MR. DEAN: Yeah, and that emanated out of 20 that, and then you get to 1998 and, you know, we had 21 made pretty good progress with IRAP, and then we had 22 the defining moment with Senator Dominici, and you 23 know, we were going to cut the staff by 50 percent, et 24 cetera, et cetera.

And so that spurred us to work even

1	harder, and that basically provided the impetus that,
2	gee, maybe we'd better start engaging our
3	stakeholders, and so that's where we had the meeting
4	in late '98, the Pook's Hill Marriott, that helped
5	really germinate the structure and the framework for
6	the oversight process as it exists now.
7	So, I mean, you can go back and look at
8	that old information, and then that leads up to, you
9	know, basically you'll find the description in SECY
10	99-007 and 007 alpha that kind of described how did we
11	get from those days to the oversight process that we
12	used to implement in the pilot program.
13	So if you need any help finding any of
14	that information, I'm sure we can help.
15	CHAIRMAN PLISCO: We were asking for help
16	this morning, but we weren't sure where the best place
17	was to look.
18	MR. SHADIS: You know, you start by
19	looking at the first piece of paper, and sometimes
20	that lets you know where else you want to go. I'm
21	glad, you know, for the offer of help to dig some of
22	this out.
23	MR. DEAN: Five letters, ADAMS.
24	(Laughter.)
25	CHAIRMAN PLISCO: That's why he asked for

266 1 help. 2 MR. BROCKMAN: That was a precursor of his 3 statement. 4 MR. DEAN: I'm just kidding. 5 MR. SHADIS: I think some of this is cultural and imbedded in conversations other than 6 7 those that take place in the formal forums also. had a member of the ISAT team tell me that I was all 8 9 wet about Maine Yankee falling off a cliff, that 10 basically the plant was not in that bad a condition, 11 and that going on the watch list was politically 12 motivate, and the owners really wanted to get rid of it, and you know, it took on a momentum of its own, 13 14 but that basically there were very few problems that 15 couldn't have been readily resolved there, and said so, you know, in no uncertain terms. 16 17 interested SO I'm to know if the Commission's original intent in putting this in motion 18 19 hasn't been adjusted as the program has grown so that 20 we're not there anymore. 21 MR. DEAN: I don't think so. I think, you 22

MR. DEAN: I don't think so. I think, you know, you go back to the four criteria that we've applied to this process relative to the objectives of developing an oversight process, and those go back to the early, you know, feedback we got from the

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Commission. They wanted to see something that was more risk informed, more predictable, more understandable, and more risk informed.

And those have been with us, you know, since day one. We continue to apply those as criteria by which to evaluate the program. I think as long as we stay true to those initial criteria, that the Commission challenges the process that was better in those respects, you know, I think that we're on fairly solid ground in terms of evaluating how well are we doing against those.

MR. SHADIS: I'd like to make one comment just in case you're going to bolt out of here soon, which I suspect. In terms of polling, internal polls are risky because your own view drives the way the questions are structured, and you know, if it's all possible, it's really valuable to get a pool that's put together by someone else, not necessarily GAO, but essentially hiring it done.

MR. DEAN: Yeah. We talked a lot about how do we best solicit stakeholder feedback without delving in to the realm of surveys because, you know, that would probably just be too difficult a task in the end.

What we tried to do was make sure that --

1 we did a massive mailing of the Federal Register 2 We did a detailed mailing to interested --3 people who had expressed interest in meetings in the 4 past and key stakeholders in each of the vicinities of 5 the plants to, you know, send them the Federal Register notice, and if they had an interest, to send 6 7 it in, send in a response. So that's the way that we thought, you 8 9 know, probably achieved the best balance of at least 10 getting it out there that we were interested in 11 feedback in this area from the public, but not tying 12 ourselves to a survey because --MR. SHADIS: Yeah, I was referring to your 13 14 internal survey. 15 Oh, okay. MR. DEAN: MR. SHADIS: That, you know, where if you 16 17 all are going to put together the questions based on what you perceive to be the major questions that came 18 19 up, and you didn't have a full round of communication 20 on what were minor questions, some of those may really 21 loom larger in the end, and sometimes an outside point 22 of view, even if it's not thoroughly grounded in this 23 whole, big process, sometimes that can get you a more 24 accurate view of where you are.

MR. DEAN: Yeah. I think our survey, you

know, in trying to do two things, I can see -- you know, I appreciate your point. If we're just looking for feedback on the processes and how they're working, certainly. But if you're looking for feedback from a more global sense or a reflection on the process and the appropriateness of the process, you're right. I mean, our questions could probably be tailored that maybe would result in maybe not the most accurate response.

And that's something we had to be careful of, and I know that when we developed the survey, we sent it out to a number of internal staff members that didn't have a role in the oversight process to try and eliminate some of those biases, and I don't think that we were 100 percent successful, but we tried to make an effort to do that.

But I appreciate your point. IG offered, as a matter of fact, to help us with a survey. So that might be something to consider in the future.

CHAIRMAN PLISCO: I think what gave me some confidence -- I had some of the same concerns -- is I talked to Augie Spector. He got, I guess, a lot of narrative come, and they weren't answers to specific questions. I think there were many places on the form where inspectors are given opportunity just

1 to provide written comments that didn't necessarily go 2 with the question, and apparently he was surprised at 3 the volume of what he got in those sections. 4 And I think that's part of the reason it's 5 taken him a while to go through all of that, because So that gave me a little more 6 he got so much. 7 confidence that they didn't just focus on those specific questions, but that if they had any burning 8 9 issues, they provided it with those narrative 10 sections. MR. GARCHOW: We've done a lot of internal 11 12 surveys in our place. I'll tell you: read those We found that it's going through those 13 14 comments on the bottom of the survey forms that 15 actually give you much, much great insight to what's really, you know, bothering people or what the issues 16 are than somebody assigning a one to five score on a 17 question that always comes out to be about average, a 18 19 three, depending on you how write up the survey. 20 MR. BLOUGH: So would you recommend that 21 Bill gets those narrative comments in the hands of 22 regional managers. 23 MR. GARCHOW: No, I'm just saying --24 MR. BLOUGH: Just kidding. 25 MR. GARCHOW: -- my review of those is

1 probably very insightful. I mean that's what we found 2 at our sites. CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Is he trying to tell you 3 4 something? 5 MR. DEAN: Yeah, he is. Well, you know, for the 6 SHADIS: 7 public that are activists that are engaged in sort of 8 oversight oversight, those are the kinds of things 9 that jump out when there's a differing professional opinion or, you know, you get a random comment, and it 10 11 very often has that what we call the "whoa" factor. 12 You go, "Whoa, what's this about?" And sometimes there are good insights to 13 14 be gained then. 15 Absolutely. MR. DEAN: I had a question on a 16 MR. BLOUGH: 17 different topic. A lot of the issues here, it was really evident from these slides the acronym SDP came 18 19 up again and again and again in many of these 20 different areas, and I just wondered if from your view 21 how much of a hindrance it is right now to be having 22 so many SDP type issues that we're working on. 23 MR. DEAN: A hindrance? I think that's 24 just a natural. You know, the SDP is a new tool, and 25 it's a tool that's intended to help our inspectors

view the significance of an issue in a consistent manner to be able to divorce a certain level of subjectivity that maybe has existed in the past.

In doing that, in going through the logic that is defined in each of the individual SDPs, obviously in developing those we didn't think of every circumstance or happenstance or, you know, twist or turn that maybe needed to be considered.

And you heard from some of the presenters today some of the areas that we've identified that we've fixed because, you know, the way we had it tailored in the original SDP perhaps wasn't quite right.

We have some of the SDPs that are by their very nature fairly complex and, you know, the fire protection SDP in particular, and that in and of itself applies a certain amount of judgment that needs to be applied to execute that SDP, and so our inspections, in trying to do that, struggle sometimes in making their deliberations.

And so, you know, I think we've found some places where it was needed to give either additional guidance or clarify the guidance or whatever, but I would consider for a tool that's only been in place for a year -- you know, I'm still of the opinion that

the significance determination process was perhaps the most important feature in the oversight process in trying to achieve those objectives of being risk informed and objective and predictable.

You know, we may not have been necessarily effective and efficient in some of them. Some of them have taken longer, but I think that's just a natural growth process of implementing a new tool that is at the very core of our decision making.

So I'm not bothered by it. I think it's to be expected that we'd see enhancements and, you know, I think out of the seven or eight SDPs that we have, you know, the physical protection one was one that kind of fell apart pretty early, but all the other ones have proven to be successful tools in being able to ascertain what was significant, focus on the significance, and get the discussions between the licensees and the NRC to focus on what we thought was important about that issue.

And in my mind that's the very value of having that process. It lays out your thought process and allows people to discuss in an intelligent fashion, you know, what are the issues, what are the assumptions, and make some judgments about the import of those.

1	MR. KRICH: Well, I was just going to
2	editorialize just a bit here. I see this process as
3	a living, ongoing process. It's going to be a work in
4	progress basically. Even as we go forward, it's like
5	people who think that when you write a procedure it
6	should be perfect. Procedures are never perfect.
7	They're continually being improved upon.
8	So this has been I know it's been
9	tough. It's been a cake walk for you, right, for the
LO	last two years?
L1	MR. DEAN: Yeah.
L2	MR. KRICH: People haven't complained.
L3	You haven't gotten a lot of feedback.
L4	MR. DEAN: No, all of the stakeholders
L5	have seen things the same way.
L6	MR. KRICH: The stakeholders are just
L7	happy people.
L8	So I want to tell you that I appreciate
L9	how this has gone over the last because I've been
20	involved since the pilot process, and I know it's been
21	difficult, but I think it's worth all of the effort
22	that all of us have put into it.
23	MR. DEAN: Oh, absolutely. I appreciate
24	the comment. I think that, you know, there's various
25	stages of work in progress, and I think we started off

1	with, you know, a lump of clay and then maybe we had
2	a profile. So now we're getting, you know, eyebrows
3	and ear lobes and things like that in there.
4	So I think, you know, we'll continue to
5	refine and improve, but I think, you know, we've gone
6	from, you know, 60-40 to maybe 80-20, 85-15. So we're
7	getting there.
8	Anything else?
9	(No response.)
10	MR. DEAN: Okay. Anything comes up
11	tomorrow, you know, send for us and we'll have someone
12	come down and help you out.
13	Ray, if there's any, you know, help that
14	you need
15	MR. SHADIS: Thank you.
16	MR. DEAN: to get some documents, let
17	us know.
18	MR. SHADIS: Thank you. I appreciate it.
19	MR. DEAN: Okay. Thanks everybody.
20	CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Want to take a break?
21	(Whereupon, the foregoing matter went off
22	the record at 3:56 p.m. and went back on
23	the record at 4:20 p.m.)
24	CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Are you ready to get
25	started?

1	So we're done with presentations and we're
2	ready to work.
3	MR. GARCHOW: This is where we assign
4	Loren a very daunting task, and we'll be back in the
5	morning when you think about it.
6	CHAIRMAN PLISCO: No, actually we're up to
7	three o'clock.
8	MR. FLOYD: He updated all of this while
9	we were going through all those presentations.
10	MR. GARCHOW: That would be no.
11	CHAIRMAN PLISCO: I had originally
12	intended to have a slide on here. If there's any
13	other comments of the panel members that did
14	participate in the workshop, if there's any other
15	views that they want to talk about, I think a lot of
16	it just added them as we went along.
17	I know that's what I tried to do. I don't
18	know if anyone else
19	MR. FLOYD: I can make a three-hour
20	presentation.
21	MS. FERDIG: No. No, you can't.
22	I have a question. How many of us did
23	attend?
24	CHAIRMAN PLISCO: I was going to cover
25	that.

1	MS. FERDIG: Okay.
2	CHAIRMAN PLISCO: I was there. I know
3	Randy was there. Of course, these are the people that
4	I saw. So maybe I didn't get everyone. Steve
5	Reynolds was there. Actually he had he's not going
6	to be here tomorrow. He had to go back. Ray Shadis
7	was there. I sat next to him for one session. I know
8	he was there. And Steve Floyd was there.
9	Those are the ones that I saw.
10	MR. LAURIE: Brockman brought the beer.
11	MR. SCHERER: You must share.
12	CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Was that it? Was there
13	anyone else that I missed?
13 14	anyone else that I missed? MR. KRICH: I had a representative.
14	MR. KRICH: I had a representative.
14 15	MR. KRICH: I had a representative. MS. FERDIG: So my next question is then:
14 15 16	MR. KRICH: I had a representative. MS. FERDIG: So my next question is then: of those of you who were there and kind of had the
14 15 16 17	MR. KRICH: I had a representative. MS. FERDIG: So my next question is then: of those of you who were there and kind of had the experience of what we heard the overview of today,
14 15 16 17	MR. KRICH: I had a representative. MS. FERDIG: So my next question is then: of those of you who were there and kind of had the experience of what we heard the overview of today, were there any revelations? Were there any surprises?
14 15 16 17 18	MR. KRICH: I had a representative. MS. FERDIG: So my next question is then: of those of you who were there and kind of had the experience of what we heard the overview of today, were there any revelations? Were there any surprises? Were there any things that you could highlight for us
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14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	MR. KRICH: I had a representative. MS. FERDIG: So my next question is then: of those of you who were there and kind of had the experience of what we heard the overview of today, were there any revelations? Were there any surprises? Were there any things that you could highlight for us based on what we've heard that we need to pay particular attention to? CHAIRMAN PLISCO: I was going to say, big

didn't hear anything new that I hadn't heard before.

The one thing that did surprise me in one particular area, which I found interesting, is in the PI&R discussion, how strongly the two state representatives were opposed to moving the inspection, the team part of that inspection, the frequency from two years instead of one year, but the perception that it was a pull-back, which I found very interesting because knowing the genesis of how we got the one year, there was no scientific basis. program was a one-year program, and the two choices were it's a one year or two year inspection.

So we picked one year for the first year, but the perception now, and now that we picked one year, to go to two years, it looks like we're backing off even though there was no basis at all, but one year.

MR. SHADIS: But one year is useful for bureaucrats, and it's also useful for activists to, you know, set their calendar by and go find out what they can find out, and you know, a state bureaucrat can then write up their annual report rather quickly to the legislature, whatever they do.

CHAIRMAN PLISCO: But as far as what struck me, I was struck by how strongly they were

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1	opposed to that.
2	MS. FERDIG: And who's "they"?
3	CHAIRMAN PLISCO: This was the State of
4	Pennsylvania, wasn't it?
5	MR. SHADIS: Rick Janati and
6	CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Yeah, Pennsylvania and
7	Illinois, right? Weren't those the two states?
8	MR. BLOUGH: Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, New
9	Jersey, and Illinois were all there. I think they all
10	spoke. They still want the overall inspection
11	reduced.
12	CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Yeah, that was a
13	surprise to me, how strongly they were opposed to
14	that. It's like I said. Knowing that the original
15	one year was based on no really technical basis at
16	all.
17	MS. FERDIG: It was just the fear?
18	CHAIRMAN PLISCO: It was just the
19	convenience, especially since it was the first year.
20	I think the staff's view was it's the first year and
21	we need a baseline of this inspection process, and
22	we'll do it once per year this first year, I think was
23	the view. But the corollary inspection in the old
24	program was done between 18 and 24 months, you know,

the old what we called the 4500 inspection, the

1	corrective action inspection.
2	MR. SHADIS: California?
3	(Laughter.)
4	CHAIRMAN PLISCO: People were concerned
5	about the brightness of the light.
6	MR. SHADIS: That's better. Thank you.
7	I didn't know you could do that or I would have been
8	yelling about it a long time ago.
9	CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Is that better?
10	But to answer your question, that was the
11	one thing. What about you, Ray?
12	MS. FERDIG: How about others that were
13	there? Were there any surprises for you? You
14	mentioned at the beginning of our conversation.
15	MR. SHADIS: Well, you know, in the areas
16	like in fire protection and in maintenance, in those
17	arenas, there's still a lot that it seems that they're
18	getting together.
19	CHAIRMAN PLISCO: And I think part of the
20	maintenance was it's a new rule. I didn't see that as
21	an ROP issue. It's sort of taking the new rule and
22	now to see how it fits into the ROP which we didn't
23	have in the beginning.
24	MR. SHADIS: Yeah.
25	CHAIRMAN PLISCO: I mean the (a)(4)

portion.
MR. FLOYD: It does sort of beg the
question. Do you do an SDP for every regulation.
MR. SCHERER: Yes, correct question.
MR. FLOYD: Yeah.
MR. SHADIS: And I'm not sure what else,
you know, NRC could do to get additional public
involvement in the workshop, but there were times, and
we had some of the larger sessions, and there were
maybe, you know, 100 people there, and they were
saying, "Well, I'm talking about the public." And it
was amusing because there was no public to be had.
CHAIRMAN PLISCO: But I was a witness.
You held your own.
MR. SHADIS: Well, we got into it a little
bit.
One of the things, and this is a minor
point, but it gets to the language thing. It's on
point, but it gets to the language thing. It's on this no color findings, you know, and I understand,
this no color findings, you know, and I understand,
this no color findings, you know, and I understand, you know, that a lot of these things are going to be
this no color findings, you know, and I understand, you know, that a lot of these things are going to be put away or have the potential to be reduced in number

of the rest of the colors look silly. I mean it does.

1 It puts a certain air of I don't know what, frivolity 2 or something about designating by color. And if these are, you know, non-SDP issues 3 4 or I don't know. I came up with a bunch of --5 scratched down some things here, you know, like nongraded findings or -- I don't know -- isolated, stand 6 7 Call them something, but --8 MS. FERDIG: Rather than no color. 9 Yeah. It just --MR. SHADIS: 10 MR. HILL: How about clear? Just clear, crystal clear, 11 MR. SHADIS: 12 yeah. Translucent. 13 MR. BROCKMAN: 14 PARTICIPANT: Other than the fact that 15 you've got to put them on the Web page. MR. SHADIS: You know, yeah. Well, that's 16 17 one of the things that happens sometimes when you start building a system, is you get wedded to, you 18 19 know, categories and languages and symbols, and then 20 you can't get away from it, and I just would offer 21 that that's one that just come up with a reasonable 22 term that covers what those kinds of things are that don't fit in all the rest of it and call it that. 23 24 CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Are you having trouble 25 here?

1	MR. SHADIS: I'm sorry. Anyway, yean,
2	call it whatever term it may be, and even at it was
3	typical, I think, at the workshop that lots of time
4	was spent talking about trivial issues, just like that
5	one, and less time as it increased in safety
6	significance. You know, we were ready to talk about
7	minor stuff.
8	MS. FERDIG: What does that mean, do you
9	think? Does that mean there are fewer major
LO	philosophical issues and, therefore, the minutiae is
L1	worthy of talking about?
L2	MR. SHADIS: I don't know. I come from
L3	Maine where we have town meetings, pure democracy, and
L4	we always spend huge amounts of time arguing about a
L5	new coat of paint for the fire engine and then buying
L6	a new firehouse is nothing. That goes through in a
L7	flash.
L8	MS. FERDIG: It's not necessarily an
L9	indication of
20	MR. SHADIS: No, I don't think so.
21	MS. FERDIG: big things sorted out.
22	MR. SHADIS: Let me see what else I had
23	down here.
24	I guess I observed that some of the
25	industry guys were doing their job. They were

1 caucusing and strategizing for what they wanted to get 2 expressed in those breakout sessions, and that's value 3 I think that's what they're supposed to be 4 doing. 5 I wish, you know, that there had been a few more activists there. Sort of Lochbaum and I were 6 7 kind of back to back making our way from one meeting 8 to another. 9 MR. GARCHOW: So your caucus was very 10 efficient. 11 MR. SHADIS: Exactly. And I was surprised 12 to hear Dave Lochbaum say that this program, the ROP, was the public's best protection, any single source 13 14 protection with respect to a nuclear accident. This 15 ROP was it, and anyone that had to criticize, but I thought that was a heck of an opening statement. 16 17 I don't know. The people who spoke earlier pretty much covered the ground. 18 19 CHAIRMAN PLISCO: And during the break, I 20 was asked really what the purpose of having Bill Dean 21 go through all of those, and the real purpose is, you 22 know, we've developed our issues internally, you know, 23 from our own experience or the groups we represent, 24 and before we got into, you know, going back through

what I think the issues have been and going through

1 the issues we've gone through the last few months to 2 really hear if there was anything else that came up, 3 any other feedback or maybe a different perspective 4 that we really had before we got into that, and that 5 was really the purpose, to see if anything else came up because that did get a lot of feedback, you know, 6 7 internal feedback and external feedback on 8 process, and to see if there were any new revelations 9 or, like I said, maybe a different perspective on some of the same issues, you know, before we got into our 10 11 discussion. That was really the purpose. 12 And I myself, I did hear some different perspectives on some of the issues that I hadn't heard 13 14 before or at least got a better understanding of what 15 that perspective was than what I had before. So that was useful for me, especially as an implementer here 16 17 and some of the concerns and the perspective of that 18 concern. 19 Randy? 20 MR. BLOUGH: I really don't have anything 21 I think I really don't have anything to add. 22 CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Steve. 23 MR. FLOYD: I don't think I heard any --24 certainly no new significant issues were raised that

hadn't already identified, I think, as a panel back

1 last fall when we started settling the issues list. 2 Like you, I think I heard some different 3 nuances on it. I think I have a little bit better 4 appreciation as you said for why somebody has an 5 opposing position, but no, nothing of significance. All down in the noise level range. 6 7 CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Yeah, exactly what Ray There was a lot of I don't want to call it 8 said. 9 trivial, but there was some low level discussions on a number of issues, but --10 11 MR. SHADIS: But that was another language 12 thing that we got into when someone from NRC -- this was in assessment and enforcement, I think -- insisted 13 14 on saying that if it was minor, if it was a minor 15 issue, it did not get into the inspection report, and then repeated that over and over again. 16 17 And the only thing I could think is that's part of a dichotomy. The other part is major, you 18 19 so how do you characterize what's in the 20 inspection report? Well, kids, it's not minor. 21 know that. 22 And yet so many times when NRC staff are 23 called upon to characterize what is in the inspection 24 report in public, they have to say, you know, there's

no big risk here. It's not very safety significant,

1 and I think I actually have heard them say, "Well, 2 these are minor issues." 3 So, you know, this is just lessons in 4 language that came through. 5 CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Anything else for input or questions? 6 7 MR. BLOUGH: I guess one thing that did surprise me a bit was I had heard from external 8 9 stakeholders, you know, that the issue of, quote, negotiations in the SDP and lack of scrutability in 10 11 the SDP process, but I was surprised also. A lot of 12 licensees were claiming that the process was not that transparent for them as well. At least they seemed to 13 14 say that. 15 I didn't have time to pursue, you know, on an individual basis how much experience they had with 16 17 it, the ones who were making that comment, but that did surprise me. 18 But I do believe that all of the SDP 19 20 issues are being worked on, and it was the most new 21 and novel tool associated with the ROP, and it was the 22 most incomplete one when we started. So it's not 23 unexpected that there would be a lot of work. 24 just surprised to hear the licensees, at least a few

people, say that it's kind of a mystery to them as

1	well.
2	MR. SHADIS: Did you take "negotiated" to
3	be a, you know, pejorative term? Did you feel that
4	was a negative characterization of
5	MR. BLOUGH: The staff typically takes it
6	in a pejorative way.
7	MS. FERDIG: I get that sense that that's
8	how Dave Lochbaum was characterizing it, as
9	questionable.
10	MR. KRICH: I can tell you that I took it
11	as a pejorative. We don't negotiate anything with the
12	NRC.
13	MR. SHADIS: Well, you propose and then
14	they dispose. Is that what it is?
15	MR. KRICH: I don't know if I'd
16	characterize it that way, but
17	MR. SHADIS: Well, I guess, you know, what
18	licensees were saying is that they come in with their
19	preliminary findings, and then there may be issues
20	that are plant specific or conditions that are plant
21	specific that NRC is not aware of or they may have a
22	separate analysis and they take that to NRC and ask.
23	There's a conversation that takes place,
24	a dialogue.
25	MR. KRICH: Right. There's an exchange of

1	information, and it's like any other meetings that we
2	have with the NRC in this arena, and we provide them
3	with our information. They take that in, go through
4	their process, and come to a conclusion,
5	MR. GARCHOW: It's actually no different
6	than the previous process. They send us mail; we send
7	them mail.
8	MR. SHADIS: Well, yeah, but I wonder if
9	the NRC guys here would agree that there's no sense of
10	pressure for them to adjust their findings.
11	MR. TRAPP: Sure, there's a sense of
12	pressure, but that's part of the whole game. You
13	know, they have their position; we have our position;
14	and we come together, and we reach hopefully the right
15	conclusion. But
16	MS. FERDIG: It seems to me that that
17	exchange of information is an effort of everyone
18	involved to get smarter by learning more about a
19	broader perspective. So I'm commenting about the use
20	of the word "negotiation" and the connotation I think
21	people have when they use that word.
22	But the act of exchanging information to
23	broaden perspective and come to wiser decisions, I
24	think, is a characteristic of this program.
25	MR. GARCHOW: But there's nothing in the

1 program that says I have to agree. So in the end they hear the information, right, and I think they'd tell 2 me what the answer is. 3 Where the public wants a 4 MR. SHADIS: 5 strong regulator and the end result of these conversations that take place are it's either 6 7 neutral and nothing changes or the significance of the 8 findings goes down. I mean, that's what we see. It's 9 either -- you know, it drops from a yellow to a white or to a green or whatever, or it stays the same. 10 So really the end result of these 11 12 conversations, dialogues, exchanges of getting smarter is all in one direction. 13 14 FLOYD: But I think you have to 15 recognize there's a good reason for that, and the reason for that is that they're intentionally meant to 16 be conservative at the initial screening that goes on. 17 So it's intentional that you are likely to get a color 18 19 that is more severe than what it is if you did a more 20 complete analysis. That's the way the program was set 21 up. 22 probably Now, that hasn't been 23 communicated to the public very well in a way that's 24 understandable, and that's probably what the issue is. 25 But that's why you generally see the movement only in

the one direction, because they are intentionally 1 2 conservative on the front end. MS. FERDIG: What I would hate to see 3 4 would be for the NRC to not take action that made 5 sense to them because they feared that the public would presume they were in some negotiating. 6 I think that I need to be able to know 7 that the best decisions are being made on the best 8 kind of information available without that political. 9 MR. SHADIS: Then I spoke to NRC personnel 10 11 this morning on another issue altogether, and they 12 were engaged with the licensee in sending out RAIs on a license amendment, and the licensee was going all 13 14 the way up to Commission level to accuse them of, you 15 know, playing it too hard ball, and so the pressure was there, and I think that's real. 16 I think it's a 17 fact of life in any, you know governmental agency. And so, you know, I think you have to 18 19 understand how the public can come to see a change in 20 a finding and one that goes to a more lenient finding, 21 if you will as suspicious. 22 MR. FLOYD: Well, Ray, would you suggest that they maybe don't come out with a preliminary 23 24 finding then and make sure they do the full thorough

evaluation such that it's a final finding?

1 MR. SHADIS: Yeah, well, that would help. 2 I don't know if that would help in safety. 3 know if that would improve or maintain safety, but I 4 think it would help the NRC's public image for sure to come out with a finding, and the sooner the better. 5 MR. BROCKMAN: But it can't go that way. 6 7 The APA won't let me go that way because of due process, and you have to present the new --8 9 MR. SHADIS: Administrative Procedures 10 Act. 11 BROCKMAN: I have to present due 12 to, you know, present what the initial presentation is, and then you go into that. 13 14 the entire law by which we operate can't do it, and 15 myself as a regional manager, I mean, I never want to get into a position and find out during a conference 16 17 that the situation is worse than I thought it was. My inspection is broken if every time I don't come about 18 19 it and say, "This is the worst possible thing it could 2.0 be." 21 And we'll move on from there, but you're 22 It's a public relations nightmare, and I 23 don't know of a solution to it. But if I'm the 24 public, I'm much more upset about that than if I,

"Now, wait a second. You low balled this thing? You

had no idea how significant this thing was?"

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And the licensee in a public meeting wound up saying, "No, you all really under played this thing. It's really we had -- this is terrible."

That's far more incriminating on the agency's technical capabilities to oversee and assure reactor safety.

MR. SHADIS: Well, it's part of the criminal code, but people don't like plea bargaining either. You know, you can just see all of the analogies and where they fall. So I guess I'm suggesting that if that's your case, that it needs to be stated more clearly, and it has to go in the front of the pamphlet about reactor oversight process.

MR. BLOUGH: And see what's going to happen -- I'm sorry -- when we get the what's called the Phase 2 work sheets done, we'll be using those for the initial determinations, and those will be designed to be conservative. We would be able to get them out a lot quicker. The initial answer would come out helps, but they'll faster, and that be conservative. So there will still be this and perhaps even more of this reevaluation using Phase 3 with actually more of the burden on the licensee to take what we have with Phase 2 and show us why there's

1	something wrong with it.
2	It could be actually perhaps even more.
3	I don't know. What do you think?
4	MR. TRAPP: Oh, yeah. It's just going to
5	be quicker.
6	MR. SHADIS: Could some of it be avoided
7	if the licensees had all of their information in their
8	own basis for their performance indicators and so on?
9	MR. TRAPP: The only thing we color is
LO	findings with the Phase 1, 2, and 3.
L1	MR. SCHERER: We may be talking past. I
L2	think Ray is raising a very valid point, and where
L3	responding to the difficulty in coming to the final
L4	conclusion, which I agree with everything that has
L5	been said, but my concern is I think Ray is raising an
L6	extremely valuable point, one of communication, and I
L7	don't think we are as clear as we could be.
L8	If, for example, instead of saying our
L9	preliminary finding is it's a yellow finding, and then
20	after months and more meetings the NRC comes out and
21	says, "Sorry. It's green," that appears that
22	something went on behind the scenes, sort of the old
23	"Saturday Night Live" skit. Never mind.
24	My view is perhaps we ought to find a way
25	to communicate and clear terms that the NRC doesn't

know the ultimate disposition. Conservatively it could be up to a yellow finding, and the NRC is going to start a process by which it will get more information and make a final determination.

Being up front and explaining the process and not say it's a preliminary yellow, which we all sitting around this table may be able to understand, but the people who are interested may not. State our own uncertainty. State the process that we're going to use to resolve the issue, and then come out with a final finding so that at the end of the process, you say, "Yes, we thought it could be conservatively a yellow finding, but we've looked. We've now gotten the following information from the licensee. The NRC has made its determination, and it finds it is either a white finding, a yellow finding, or a green finding," whatever it is it has determined.

But instead of just saying the word "preliminary" and think we've addressed the public concern, I think it's fooling ourselves.

MR. LAURIE: Is there any way to have a preliminary assessment be anything other than a color? Because I share the view that there's gross mistrust of government at all levels. Federal is by far the worst as far as public trustworthiness goes, not

because of specific actions. It's just the nature of the beast.

And so there will be the sense that a deal was cut behind doors. So is there any way to have a preliminary standard be anything other than a color and only the final determination to be the color if you choose to stay with color? Can you do that? Is it workable?

MR. FLOYD: Yeah, I think you could. In the inspection report if you had a finding that when you ran it through the Phase 2 didn't come out to be green, but it was greater than green, you could just put in the inspection report that we've identified a finding that has more than a negligible impact on safety, and it's under further evaluation. I mean, you could do that and not assign a preliminary color.

MR. GARCHOW: Most of these events over time, the initial corrective actions have stabilized the situation. I mean, they are long past that part of the process. So the communications to the public, all you'd have to do is say that the initial actions are taken and, you know, stabilize the situation. It's under further review or something. That's an excellent solution.

MR. TRAPP: The other positive part about

1	that is I've gotten feedback from licensees that once
2	we go out with our preliminary red, that's what hits
3	the front page of the paper. The NRC identifies a red
4	finding. If it backs down to a green, that wouldn't
5	even make the back page.
6	MR. FLOYD: The nuances are not relevant.
7	MR. KRICH: So, in fact, there's an old
8	process in place where the NRC in an inspection report
9	will identify what's called an unresolved issue, which
10	is we found something that we think is a concern, but
11	we haven't finished evaluating it yet, and either the
12	licensee has to do something or the NRC has to do
13	something.
14	Until that happens, it will remain as
15	it will be carried as an item. So you could use that
16	in place, but you know
17	MR. SHADIS: Entered in the risk
18	significance determination program.
19	MR. KRICH: Process, right.
20	MR. SHADIS: And that's where it's going,
21	folks, and results will be out after carefully
22	examining
23	MR. KRICH: Exactly.
24	MR. SHADIS: what the licensee has to
25	offer and what we

1	MR. KRICH: I was going to add, not to
2	spend any time, but what Ed said. I understood, I
3	think, now what your concern is, the fact that we meet
4	and then things change. Even though there's no
5	negotiation going on, the perception may be that
6	there's something going on.
7	MS. FERDIG: My notes from this
8	conversation last time, too, I had reflected on before
9	I came in here, suggested, and I don't know if I have
10	this correct, is there an opportunity to provide more
11	information than is currently provided to help the
12	public understand how the ultimate finding was
13	determined, if it did vary from the initial finding,
14	or does that defy the efficiency goal by having to
15	worry about
16	CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Well, I think we are
17	striving to add more. I mean, we've made some changes
18	in the process to add more detail, and Jim can
19	probably add more to me to this, but I think it's not
20	going to get I think at some level in the public,
21	they're just going to see it went from yellow to
22	white, and they're not going to study the four pages
23	in the back to explain why. They're just going to see
24	I mean, is that right, Ray?

MR. SHADIS: Yeah, but --

1 CHAIRMAN PLISCO: You know, that -- at 2 some level some people are only going to see that it went -- you know, the press release goes out. 3 4 yellow, and then --5 MR. BROCKMAN: But it's an interesting If you've got no color with it, it's just an 6 7 issues being resolved and at the end you come out with what is a final issue, and then if you want to go 8 9 there, you go into the formal appeal process and what 10 have you. 11 There's something appealing to that. To 12 answer your question, Mary, personal thoughts are you're without a doubt -- efficiency is fighting this 13 14 because one of the things you would do is say, "Okay. 15 Every time we have a regulatory conference it's going to be in the town hall, you know, right outside the 16 city at seven o'clock in the evening," where the 17 public meetings are forced into the local public 18 19 venue. That would help. I don't know if it would 20 fix it, but it would help, but it defies efficiency up 21 22 one side and down the other. 23 MR. SHADIS: Very few people would show up 24 if there was a yellow, white, and green. CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Yeah, but it's all in 25

the record, and --

MR. BROCKMAN: It's all on the record anyway. I mean, all of this is already on the record. They're announced. Meeting minutes are put out, and all of these types of things. I mean it's --

MR. SHADIS: Dave Lochbaum brought this issue up at the workshop and also at the -- and basically what he was saying is that the process is really not real clear, and you may have -- you may have a meeting summary for your meeting with the licensee, but it isn't always apparent what the line of reasoning was that took you where you, you know, finally wound up.

CHAIRMAN PLISCO: And the timeliness factor comes into play, too.

MR. FLOYD: I think you're absolutely right, Ray, and I think the original program, at least when we talked about it in our public meetings with the staff, the original intent was in the inspection report, the inspector would lay out the logic that walked through the matrix. It's in this initiating event frequency because it's this type of event. The duration of the condition was X, and here's what else was available, and as a result of that, when you ran it through, it came out they have a, you know,

1 mitigation factor of four, and that puts it in the 2 white or the green or whatever. I mean, that was the logic that was 3 4 supposed to be in the reports. 5 MR. SHADIS: If no one would debate green findings, and I don't want to be too tedious about 6 7 this, but if you weren't debating green findings, a report could say that issues significant enough to be 8 entered into our determination process found or, you 9 know, this was an issue that's significant enough to 10 11 be entered into the determination process, and here it 12 goes. MS. FERDIG: And that's identifying it 13 14 without a color. 15 MR. SHADIS: That's right. So there's one piece of it. 16 MS. FERDIG: 17 MR. SHADIS: So then when you, you know, went through your process and the licensee got the 18 19 chance to plug in their information, I think it would 20 satisfy the APA also, and then you would at the end of 21 it come back with a color determination and put it in 22 your --23 Yeah, and I don't think MR. FLOYD: 24 anything would necessarily be missed because the item doesn't enter into the action matrix for further 25

1	agency action until the final determination is made.
2	MR. SCHERER: Yep.
3	MR. FLOYD: So maybe the intermediate
4	color is just causing public confusion and could be
5	remedied real easily.
6	MS. FERDIG: But I'm hearing two levels
7	here. I'm hearing the general public that would
8	misunderstand the change of color, that really
9	wouldn't understand the technical logic.
10	And I'm also hearing Dave Lochbaum and
11	perhaps Ray and others who do understand the technical
12	logic and aren't getting enough information to know
13	why that
14	MR. TRAPP: That's simply an
15	implementation problem.
16	MS. FERDIG: So that becomes part of the
17	write-up.
18	MR. TRAPP: It's not a process problem
19	because if we do our job right, that should be it.
20	MS. FERDIG: Okay.
21	MR. BLOUGH: We should stipulate that that
22	is the problem in terms of the level of detail and the
23	way the logic is explained in the inspection report,
24	but I think is well understood.
25	MR. SCHERER: If I recall

1 MR. BLOUGH: It's well understood, 2 it's being worked on, and that was -- Doug Coe and 3 others conveyed that at the conference. 4 MR. SCHERER: Τf Т recall Dave's 5 presentation though, he gave us several examples where he believed that there was inadequate justification 6 7 for the finding. He also gave us some examples where he thought a good job was done, and I think that's an 8 implementation issue. I think it's worthy of note, and 9 10 it ought to be transparent. 11 I think we discussed it last time that as 12 you drill down through the process, you want to be able to find a justification for the color of the 13 14 finding, whether it's green, white, yellow or red. 15 You do want to be able to find a clear justification. If I recall correctly, that seemed to be 16 the point he was making and gave us some examples of 17 what he considered on both sides of that issue. 18 19 FLOYD: This approach would also 20 probably solve what Randy was hearing from licensees, 21 too, about the lack of transparency in the process. 22 I think the complaint that we've picked up from the 23 industry on this is that it's not clear when does the 24 initial flow of information start and stop. You know, 25 is the inspector able to share the preliminary results

with the licensee, and if so, when? And when does the cone of silence drop and say, "Well, no, we're kind of pre-decisional now and we're not accepting anymore information"?

And there seems to be a difference across regions and even across inspectors within regions as to how that's handled, and this solution, I think, of not putting the preliminary color in the inspection report would also help with that because it's just an ongoing evaluation until you get to the final answer, which of course then is still subject to the appeal process, as Ken points out.

CHAIRMAN PLISCO: I think there is one practical issue. I mean, I think that may help in this public confidence issue, but the flip side is one of the things we're doing now is putting more detail of how we reached our preliminary conclusion in the body of the letter.

So we may say this -- that will say it appears to be more than a, you know, green finding, and then there will be four pages where if someone with, you know, some sophistication with the process will be able to figure out that that's a green issue or, I mean, a red issue or a yellow issue, it will be in there because -- and part of this, you know,

1 attempt at due process will provide in writing on the 2 public record what the basis of our preliminary 3 decision is and what assumptions were made so that 4 it's clear to everyone. 5 So we may say that in the first paragraph, but if you go to the, you know, second half of the 6 7 letter, you'll be able to figure out what it is. 8 MR. GARCHOW: Why would that be bad 9 necessarily? CHAIRMAN PLISCO: No, I'm just saying in 10 11 practical terms we'll be saying what color it is, you 12 know, without saying what color it is. MR. BLOUGH: Right, and what we're, I 13 14 think, worried about is this perception 15 negotiations and the NRC says it's yellow, and then there's whatever happens happens, and a long period of 16 17 time goes by. There may have been a meeting down in King of Prussia, maybe not. Who knows? And then we 18 19 come out with the white. 20 So we have said we thought it was yellow and then it turns out white. You know, it always goes 21 22 in that direction or stays. 23 If we change them and we don't put the 24 preliminary color in the inspection report, what 25 happens though is at the time we issue the report,

1 we'll still think it's yellow based on the information we have, and then we get more information from the 2 3 licensee, and we go through a process, and then we may 4 come out to white, and the only difference is that when we issued the report, even though we thought it 5 was yellow, we didn't say we thought it was yellow. 6 7 I'm just wondering about that. Is that the right thing to do? 8 9 I would have to argue that MR. LAURIE: that is the right the thing to do because I'm not 10 11 satisfied that sufficient thought was given to the 12 psychological repercussions of choosing colors. Everybody, the whole world demands green regardless of 13 14 what it means, and anything less than green, any 15 negotiation among colors will be perceived something untrustworthy. So words in this case, I 16 think, is much more valuable than an ultimate color. 17 Maybe you want to end up with an ultimate 18 19 color, and that was a decision that was made some time 20 I'd question that, but we're beyond that. 21 colors are dangerous because people have been living 22 with them since they were two years old. 23 So I think colors are problematic, and 24 words as substitutes, I think, in many cases would be

helpful.

1	MS. FERDIG: It helps to avoid early
2	generalizations that may not be accurate and
3	substantiated.
4	MR. LAURIE: No, I agree with them.
5	CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Of course, we spent the
6	last half hour doing what we said we would never do,
7	is figure out the solutions to the problem rather than
8	define the problem.
9	And not only that. This is an issue I
10	don't have on the agenda until tomorrow.
11	(Laughter.)
12	MR. BROCKMAN: Then tomorrow's meeting
13	will be a little more efficient, but as opposed to
14	some, maybe we've just focused on what one of our
15	recommendations is going to be.
16	MS. FERDIG: I was just going to say that.
17	CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Yeah, the SDP I had for
18	tomorrow.
19	MR. BROCKMAN: You're going to be 30
20	minutes more efficient.
21	CHAIRMAN PLISCO: That's right, tomorrow.
22	Any other feedback or issues about the
23	workshop and things that came up in response to Mary's
24	original question?
25	MS. FERDIG: Good answers. I feel like I

know more.
CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Well, we've got
according to our schedule an hour.
MR. SCHERER: It's not necessary to use
it.
MR. GARCHOW: Maybe, Loren, take what you
think the path between here and the end tomorrow looks
like, since you put a document together that we didn't
have a chance to read. Potentially we might be able
to get some efficiency by reading the packet in our
hotels tonight.
CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Yes.
MR. GARCHOW: And be very efficient
tomorrow.
CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Yeah, in fact, I
would
MR. SCHERER: But we could put a
preliminary color on it tonight.
MR. FLOYD: I would almost recommend that
we do that rather than trying to even start on this
tonight and read through these items, not having had
a chance to digest them; kind of read through the
whole package, let people make their comments and
mark-ups, and then come in and be a lot more efficient
tomorrow.

CHAIRMAN PLISCO: And I'll explain what you've got. What you have is a summary of the issues that came out of our prioritization activities and collecting comments. If you go back and remember the table that John had put together with all of the individuals sub-elements that we rolled up into specific issues, and we went through our prioritization and rolled some issues together.

What you've got is what we have pulled together, John and I. First is the performance indicator issues. And what I tried to do for each one of these is put a short summary of what the issue is related to, what the initial priority was, what the primary program goals. I mentioned that this morning. Went through and looked at how people voted, even though we said we weren't going to vote, but how those numbers fell out and the categories, are they goals that appeared to be the primary ones is what I've put here. I didn't try to capture every one.

Actually in most cases, there's at least one goal checked or one person checked each one of the eight goals, amenities, but I tried to stick with the primary so that it's easier just to communicate what we think the big issues are.

A summary of the description of the issue.

1 I tried to capture a narrative. That's really what 2 I'd ask you to focus on as you're reading through these, if I've really captured the issue that we 3 4 wanted to talk about, explain what the problem is, and 5 in some cases we had specific examples that were raised or in our discussions or that were provided in 6 7 the individual comments, and I tried to capture some of those to try to get the point across more clearly. 8 9 And then panel recommendation, and on some 10 of these I've just tried to capture what I thought were coming out of the discussions, and we can go 11 through those tomorrow. 12 What I've tried to do is not provide the 13 14 You'll see how I've worded carefully the answer. 15 recommendation to evaluate an issue, to clarify a quidance and not say what that specific clarification 16 should be, except like our last half hour, if there's 17 something specific that we want to recommend. 18 Then 19 that's what we need to add in here. 20 But in general, if you look through, I've 21 tried to use those type of words as far as evaluating 22 and making any necessary changes to try to address the 23 concern that we've expressed. 24 And then let me walk through just to make

sure everyone has got all the pages. There should be

1 P-1, which is the unintended consequences for the 2 performance indicators. 3 P-2 is the new performance indicators, and 4 that was a roll-up of several things that we had 5 having to do with risk-based performance indicators and new performance indicators. Safety system 6 7 unavailability we've had a lot of discussion about, and frequently asked questions. And that's it for the 8 9 performance indicators. 10 For the inspection program, we've got the appropriate level of baseline inspections. 11 Number two is the documentation threshold. 12 We've talked about that. 13 14 Number three is the physical protection 15 inspections. 16 Number four is the event response. licensee 17 Five is the use of self-18 assessments. 19 MR. FLOYD: Didn't we -- I'll go back and 20 look at my notes. I thought we rolled up several into 21 the physical protection. Maybe that's -- I'll go back 22 and look at my notes. 23 CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Yeah, several 24 these -- actually I don't have it written on here --25 have been rolled up, and there are also several that

1	were rolled up into the overall, and I'll get to that.
2	They're on the back here.
3	MR. FLOYD: Oh, okay.
4	CHAIRMAN PLISCO: There were a number in
5	certain specific areas that we rolled up in the
6	overall category.
7	Okay. Where was it?
8	Assessment first had to do with how long
9	an inspection finding should be included in the action
10	matrix. That's one issue.
11	The second is the regulatory conference.
12	The third is the no color inspection
13	findings.
14	The fourth is how do you handle multiple
15	inspection findings that are related to the same
16	issue. And that was one that I think was in the
17	inspection area before, but it's really an
18	assessment/enforcement issue, and we moved it into
19	there.
20	Overall we have process improvements and
21	stakeholder feedback and building an infrastructure to
22	handle those.
23	The second overall is public access to
24	timely and clear reactor oversight information, and
25	there were a number of issues in several different

1 categories that were rolled up into that one. 2 The third overall is long-term program effectiveness and testing the program against the 3 4 original program assumptions to make sure they are 5 still true or they are true. The fourth is cross-cutting issues, and 6 7 that also was a number of issues in specific areas that were rolled up into this one. 8 And the fifth overall is one we've had a 9 lot of discussion about, is this green to white 10 11 threshold and the differences between how it's handled 12 in performance indicators and the inspection findings and that is creating problems 13 how some and 14 communications issues in the program. 15 And that's one we had a lot of discussion As I went through all of my notes, I'm not 16 17 sure what our recommendation is in that. So think specifically and what 18 about kind of that one 19 recommendation we want to make in that specific area. 20 The one you're missing is the SDP. 21 going to finish that one up tonight. 22 MR. GARCHOW: We did have one accusation 23 under the green to white, I think, about maybe moving 24 the May action matrix line over one column because

early on in the framing of that, some of the earlier

1 discussions in the development of this, the actual thought was that one white finding would still be in 2 3 the regulatory response band, and somehow along the 4 way in a way that I haven't been able to exactly 5 determine when, that thought got dropped. Early on we were saying one white and just 6 7 fill in the green licensee response thing, 8 somewhere along the line --9 MR. FLOYD: That died pretty early on the vine in internal review. 10 11 MR. GARCHOW: And that caused some 12 unintended consequence by having one white finding get you into the other column of the action matrix. 13 14 that might be one you might have a suggestion on. 15 MR. CAMERON: When you read these over tonight, you also might want to give some thoughts to 16 17 what type of methodology you want to use when you review it to make it work as efficient as possible. 18 I think Loren indicated this morning that he and John 19 20 are going to rewrite these based on your conversation, tomorrow send them out again. So you'll get a chance 21 22 to do the type of wordsmithing you want to do. 23 So you may be able to concentrate tomorrow 24 this write-up characterize the

Are there things in there that shouldn't

correctly.

1 be in there? Are there things that should be in 2 there? And I know Ray raised this point this 3 4 morning about the, quote, minority report, but I think 5 anybody can be in the minority. It's not just going 6 to be --7 MR. SHADIS: The minority. 8 MR. CAMERON: Right. It's not going to 9 just be the minority. Well said, Ray, but you may be able to start fleshing out, going to Ed's point also 10 11 this morning about how you all agreed that first 12 meeting is let's try to make this a consensus, is that you may see items that are coming out here that may 13 14 form a possible minority opinion, but you may be able 15 to do something to make that part of the consensus, too, by accommodating that somehow. 16 17 MR. GARCHOW: That's exactly what happened during the pilot plant process when we got to just 18 19 this point, because half of the last day we determined 20 that 12 people could not individually word-whack 100 21 paragraphs and ever get done. I mean, you can't just 22 do that. So --23 Ι think the favorite MR. FLOYD: 24 expression of the day boiled down to, "Okay.

would have worded it differently, but can you live

1	with the way that it's worded here?"
2	MS. FERDIG: That's exactly consensus.
3	MR. FLOYD: And that's what consensus is,
4	exactly.
5	MR. GARCHOW: Right, or we'll never get
6	out of here.
7	MR. HILL: Where do we handle things like
8	I think Ray brought it up once upon a time, that right
9	now the NRC is doing its own self-assessment, and what
10	about the idea of somebody else looking at that?
11	Where do we fit that in? Is that some other part, a
12	narrative?
13	Have we made a recommendation about
14	anything like that?
15	CHAIRMAN PLISCO: That was not exactly an
16	issue.
17	MR. FLOYD: You would wish this process on
18	another body?
19	MR. HILL: I'm trying to add to the
20	process. I'm not saying that's my recommendation, but
21	it is something addressed.
22	MR. SCHERER: I thought Dave Garchow was
23	going to be part of a continuing
24	MR. GARCHOW: I was just making a joke I
25	thought.

1	CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Yeah, I think if we're
2	going to talk about that, the best way to handle it,
3	I mean, we can
4	MR. HILL: Anything that we have, such as
5	there was another comment earlier, but any
6	recommendations that's not exactly an issue, when are
7	we going to talk about it or how do we fit it in?
8	And I'm sure he's got a number of topics
9	from the previous parking lots and other issues that
10	might be
11	MR. BROCKMAN: If we've got things that
12	are open, we probably need to identify the issue that
13	it's related to, which I think this one is probably
14	the one you just mentioned is probably related to 03.
15	MR. BLOUGH: That would be a good way to
16	do it, I guess. I guess that's a good point though
17	when we're looking at what's here we ought to be
18	thinking about
19	MS. FERDIG: What's not here.
20	MS. BLOUGH: what's not here. We've
21	gone through a process to get to this point, and we
22	ought to be thinking about what's not
23	MR. HILL: Well, is that something you can
24	look at and see if from all of our table stuff and
25	everything is there something we should be re-talking

1	about in here that we haven't covered?
2	MR. CAMERON: Did John keep a he was
3	going to keep a running tally of all the flip charts.
4	CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Yeah, and I've been
5	going through this. A lot of them we have come back
6	to, and what we need to do is go back and cross-check,
7	see if there's any others that we haven't come back
8	to.
9	MR. CAMERON: Because we started that at
10	the first. There were a whole lot of parking lot
11	items that first meeting, and I think that we have
12	covered a lot of them as we've gone back, but that's
13	a good suggestion. See if we've done all of that at
14	this point, yeah.
15	MS. FERDIG: Do I also hear you asking
16	about the other kinds of assessment activities that
17	are going on simultaneously with ours, internal self-
18	assessment, for example?
19	MR. HILL: No, no. I'm just the
20	question came up is: should we recommend some kind of
21	group outside of the NRC be looking at that? That was
22	one example of recommendation. I'm just trying to use
23	that as how do we fit that type of recommendation in.
24	MS. FERDIG: I just want to make one
25	comment again that I alluded to this morning, and just

call it to our attention. As I'm reading the purpose here, we are asked to monitor and evaluate the results of the first year initial implementation of the ROP and provide advice and recommendations to the Director of the NRR.

I think because of the nature of the way these groups work and the ways that we think, we tend to do diagnostic and identify the things that are wrong and call them issues and make that the content of the report.

I'm just challenging that assumption and asking what does that mean in terms of the overall meta-message, and are there evaluative positions that we can take that may reflect something other than the problems that we've identified on these pages? And if so, how should they be characterized and can they be substantiated to the same degree of credible accounting that we are on these issues, and do we care?

It's just a question.

MR. FLOYD: I think Mary makes a good point. I mean, this report, although it goes to the Director of NRR, it obviously has a much wider audience, and I think we do need to be sensitive to the way that we write this up so as not to mislead the

1 people that may not have a complete picture of this. 2 I mean, just take the first one as an 3 example. I mean, if you read that first one, you 4 would think that licensees are out there doing all 5 sorts of unsafe actions potentially because they're trying to manage an indicator, and I don't think 6 7 there's any evidence of that. In fact, the staff says they don't have 8 any evidence of when somebody's actually taking an 9 They have some indications of where 10 unsafe action. 11 they might have managed the indicator, but it wasn't 12 done in an unsafe manner. if 13 And you don't put that 14 characterization on it, I think you're missing 15 something. Also, while this focuses on unintended 16 also 17 consequences, there are some intended consequences that were positive for the way some of 18 19 the PIs were put together, and I think that's maybe 20 some of the flavor you're talking about. 21 MS. FERDIG: Yeah. I mean, I've heard 22 those things intermingled into our conversations, but 23 I don't know that we have recorded them, documented 24 them. MR. CAMERON: And you've raised this. You 25

1 raised this first in Atlanta. It is sort of a parking 2 lot item, but it's more than that in the sense that I 3 think that the panel thought that there was some value 4 to making some more general, positive statements, not 5 just in the example you gave, Steve, by you're giving a false impression perhaps by the way the language is, 6 7 which you always need to look at. But I thought that you were thinking about 8 something like, well, what are the positive results 9 10 from this program. Is that correct? MS. FERDIG: Well, right. And I just 11 12 raise the question again so we can be conscious of the choices we're making about that, and it may be that 13 14 the cover letter, the reference to that is sufficient, 15 but it does create a powerful message when the content, the substance is, you know, dealing with the 16 problematic issues, when in fact that may not be the 17 18 strongest message. 19 MR. GARCHOW: Now, I would agree. I mean, 20 we in our management of the place -- I mean, I can get 21 groups of employees together and ask them what's wrong 22 with the place, and we can have a good three-hour discussion, and I can generate walls full. 23 24 But you can have the same conversation,

going right, and can generate the

what's

1 conversation. So you almost influence the reality by 2 how you choose to go after it. 3 So, I mean, I do appreciate the fact that 4 there probably is some intended consequences like 5 Steve said. You know, the EP performance indicator, I believe, has driven the industry to a better EP 6 7 program by nature of the performance indicator and looking at something that probably wasn't looked at in 8 9 that manner prior to this new process. 10 Security equipment is another 11 example. I mean I think that we ought to when we read 12 this tonight be looking for some positive examples as well to, you know, make sure we get the right balance 13 14 in, that it's not all a problem. 15 And a number of the CHAIRMAN PLISCO: individual inputs did provide that. We had to compile 16 all of that. 17 MR. KRICH: Right. Early on we had talked 18 19 about, and I think it came from Ed, was what were some 20 positives that came out, and I know I provided you a 21 list of positives in addition to the issues, and I 22 think other people did as well. 23 So the items are out there. I don't know 24 if we ever did anything with it. 25 CHAIRMAN PLISCO: No, we haven't compiled

1 it. I have it. 2 MR. KRICH: Okay. 3 CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Everyone didn't do it that way, but we have some like that. 4 5 MR. KRICH: And then I have one other question, and Rich kind of joggled my memory, but I 6 7 remember that back early on here I thought that one of the things -- I was just checking the charter, but 8 9 it's not explicit in there -- but I thought we had agreed early on, and I might not be remembering this 10 11 right, that part of our work was to evaluate the NRC's 12 assessment or evaluation, what we just talked about with Bill. 13 14 CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Yes. Yeah, we have to 15 say something about that, and I think the way the timing is worked out, you know, I think we'll 16 17 obviously have to pass some caveat since we didn't see the final results. 18 MR. KRICH: Right, right. I think what we 19 can pass judgment on is at least the framework and not 20 21 necessarily whether it's given good results or not. 22 CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Right, and I don't want 23 to tell the panel what the final answer is going to 24 be. We need to talk about that, but I gained some

confidence, you know, in these workshops. You know,

1 many of those issues that were in the workshop are the 2 same issues that we have. 3 You know, like I say, we may have a 4 different, slightly different take on the issue as far 5 as the different components of it, but I think most of the issues that we have talked about in these five 6 7 meetings, you know, were talked about in that workshop or in the internal workshop that the staff had as far 8 as things that still need to be addressed in the 9 10 program. 11 Let me just make sure I'm MR. KRICH: 12 I agree with you. clear here. I think from my knowledge of what the issues were in the industry that 13 14 they match pretty well with what we've talked about 15 here. What I was talking about is the big, thick 16 evaluation process that --17 CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Yeah, yeah. We do have 18 to --19 MR. KRICH: We've got to pass on that or 20 at least give some feedback to --21 CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Yes. 22 MR. KRICH: Okay. 23 MR. BLOUGH: Well, I didn't read it that 24 way, that that packet we got on October 16th was what 25 we had to pass judgment on.

1	CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Right, not just that.
2	MS. BLOUGH: I thought it was more
3	holistically the self-assessment, meaning everything
4	was being done through self-assessment.
5	MR. KRICH: I didn't mean to limit it to
6	just that. You're right, Randy, but it was
7	specifically included in that.
8	MR. HILL: And, by the way, I think I said
9	Ray brought up the idea of the process. I think it
10	was really Jim from Georgia who is not here now who
11	brought up the idea that you need an outside type
12	review of that self-assessment.
13	MR. SCHERER: He linked it to the Quality
14	Council concept. I recall that was on my list.
15	MR. SHADIS: That was running through my
16	mind over and over again to make this come out like
17	something I had said, and it didn't.
18	CHAIRMAN PLISCO: But, again, you know,
19	what you have left of this evening after you go
20	through these issues is, you know, what other higher
21	level, you know, messages do we want to include in
22	this report or things do we want to say.
23	But that's one question we do need to
24	answer. We need to say something about
25	MR. FLOYD: Maybe what we're really

1 talking about is what do we think the introductory 2 part of this report --CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Yeah, that's what I'm 3 4 talking about. 5 MR. FLOYD: Like an overall summary, and just for an example, could, I could see a 6 7 subparagraph under the overall that addresses each of 8 these areas that we've got comments in. Like 9 indicators, I could see performance an overall 10 statement that says something like performance 11 indicators were shown to be capable of being reported 12 in a timely and accurate manner, and they did point to some performance issues which resulted in additional 13 14 supplemental inspection. Some of them promoted, you 15 the right behavior and had the intended know, 16 consequence. 17 However, there's a number of issues that identified below 18 we've that have we some 19 recommendations on for further improvement, and there 20 may be a section in the main body of the report that 21 reads like that for performance indicators, inspection 22 area, SDP, right on down through the line. 23 MR. HILL: Aren't you glad that was 24 recorded? MR. FLOYD: Something like that. I think 25

that's what we're talking about.
MR. GARCHOW: For each topic.
MR. FLOYD: For each topic, yeah.
MR. GARCHOW: Every group that came in,
the resident inspectors, the risk analysis, I mean,
they all had positives as well as issues when they
talked before the Board. The state, I mean, everybody
was
MS. FERDIG: Had some substantive
examples, something other than just black.
MR. BLOUGH: I agree as long as it goes
through the same assessment. I mean consensus
process.
MS. FERDIG: Oh, absolutely, which is why
I'm bringing it up now as opposed to when we're
writing the report and it's too late to know that.
MR. HILL: And what was that quote from
David Lochbaum that you thought ought to be put in the
beginning? This was the hope of the
MR. SHADIS: No, I didn't say it should be
put in the beginning. I said he
MS. FERDIG: Do you think we need to
report that?
MR. SHADIS: Here, wait a minute. Let's
see. I have his comments actually that he submitted

for the at the <u>Federal Register</u> invitation that he
wrote on March 29th, and he said, "As stated at both
the opening session and the public communications
session at the recent ROP workshop, the Union of
Concerned Scientists believes the ROP is much better
than its predecessor at monitoring plant safety levels
and communicating to various stakeholders about safety
levels."
And then from there it goes negative, but
ten pages.
MR. GARCHOW: We could do it like movie
reviews.
CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Anything else?
MR. SHADIS: The format I think is just
MR. LAURIE: So you've assigned homework.
CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Yeah, we have homework.
Read through these. I don't have the SDP ones. So
MR. SHADIS: Loren, I'm going to be
disappointed if this group cranks out something on
schedule and the agency doesn't get its stuff done on
schedule. Do you know what I'm saying?
You know, is it a drop dead issue that the
Commission can't be told to wait another month while
we have time to like read through and think about
this, not time for another meeting, but just time to

1	contemplate all of what we've absorbed?
2	CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Well, like I said, our
3	goal in the beginning was to make sure before the
4	staff goes back to the Commission that they have our
5	thoughts before they do that and they had time to
6	absorb our input, and that was really the goal.
7	That's why we were looking at the end of April, early
8	May, because they've got to go to the Commission in
9	June.
10	So they need time to see what we have.
11	MR. SHADIS: But they probably won't show
12	up until November.
13	CHAIRMAN PLISCO: They have a meeting
14	scheduled that's on the calendar.
15	MR. GARCHOW: I don't know if history is
16	future performance like your stock market, right, but
17	having been involved in this process before, when we
18	took the PPEP letter and then it went in, I mean, it
19	wasn't a matter of just a couple weeks and several of
20	us got invited to be at the NRC Commission meeting
21	where that was presented to the Commissioners, and
22	they were on a pretty aggressive time line, and those
23	meetings were scheduled and executed.
24	So if we delayed the PPEP report, we'd
25	have gort of like migged the train

1	MR. BROCKMAN: I believe right now it's on
2	the schedule for the Commission meeting, is on
3	schedule for the 20th of July.
4	PARTICIPANT: We have SECY up on June in
5	advance of that.
6	MR. GARCHOW: All I am saying is they
7	followed their schedule last time because we had the
8	same conversation at the end.
9	MR. SHADIS: Oh, okay. We benefit from
10	your previous experience.
11	MR. BROCKMAN: We've been talking before.
12	CHAIRMAN PLISCO: And, again, if we're not
13	ready to make a conclusion in a specific area or we
14	want to caveat our conclusion, as we said, we probably
15	will as far as the metric part of that self-assessment
16	since we haven't seen the results. I don't think
17	you know, we're not going to be able to say a lot.
18	We will have the internal survey results,
19	which is another piece of that.
20	Enough for today? Thank you.
21	(Whereupon, at 5:26 p.m., the meeting was
22	adjourned, to reconvene at 8:00 a.m., Tuesday, April
23	3, 2001.)
24	
2.5	