## **Official Transcript of Proceedings**

## **NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION**

Title: Reactor Oversight Process Initial

Implementation Evaluation Panel

Fourth Meeting

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4	REACTOR OVERSIGHT PROCESS
5	INITIAL IMPLEMENTATION EVALUATION PANEL
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7	FOURTH MEETING
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9	MONDAY
10	FEBRUARY 26, 2001
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12	ROCKVILLE, MARYLAND
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15	The panel met in Room T2B3, Nuclear
16	Regulatory Commission, Two White Flint North, 11545
17	Rockville, Maryland, at 8:00 a.m., Loren Plisco,
18	Chairman, presiding.
19	PRESENT:
20	LOREN PLISCO, Chairman
21	RANDY BLOUGH
22	BILL BORCHARDT
23	KEN BROCKMAN
24	MARY FERDIG
25	STEVE FLOYD

	2
1	PRESENT (Continued):
2	DAVE GARCHOW
3	RICHARD HILL
4	ROD KRICH
5	ROBERT LAURIE
6	JIM MOORMAN
7	ED SCHERER
8	JIM SETSER
9	RAY SHADIS
10	JIM TRAPP
11	ALSO PRESENT:
12	TOM BOYCE, NRC, NRR
13	CHIP CAMERON, NRC, OGC
14	ROBERT HUSTON, Licensing Support Services
15	RICH JANATI, Pennsylvania Department of
16	Environmental Protection
17	JUDITH JOHNSRUD, Sierra Club
18	DAVE LOCHBAUM, Union of Concerned
19	Scientists
20	JOHN MONNINGER, NRC, NRR
21	SCOTT MORRIS, NRC
22	CHRIS NOLAN, NRC
23	DEANN RALEIGH, LIS, Scientech
24	SUSAN YIM, Winston & Strawn
25	

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1	P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S
2	(8:17 a.m.)
3	CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Good morning. Welcome to
4	the fourth meeting of our initial implementation
5	evaluation panel. This is a public meeting.
6	I'd like to ask everyone that's not a
7	panel member to sign the attendance sheet at the front
8	of the room.
9	The meeting will be transcribed. We'll
LO	schedule some time at the end of each session or the
L1	end of the day, whichever is most convenient to
L2	receive any public comments.
L3	As far as I know, we didn't receive any
L4	written comments before the meeting; is that right,
L5	John?
L6	MR. MONNINGER: No, we did not.
L7	CHAIRMAN PLISCO: First, I'd just like to
L8	summarize the agenda of what we're going to do the
L9	next two days. This morning we'll see if there's any
20	comments on the meeting minutes. They were sent out
21	electronically to the panel members last week.
22	This morning we'll spend some time
23	completing our initial prioritization of issues that
24	have been identified so far through panel input.
25	This afternoon we have some stakeholder

presentations. David Lochbaum from the Concerned Scientists Floyd will and Steve give presentation from the Nuclear Energy Institute perspective, and Rich Janati from Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection will also give a presentation.

Tomorrow morning we have some additional stakeholder presentations from the public affairs perspective that the panel asked for at our last meeting from the NRC Public Affairs Office, Victor Dricks; McGraw Hill's <u>Inside NRC</u>, Jenny Weil; and Scott Peterson from NEI, Public Affairs Office.

And then in the afternoon, depending on how much more we have to do and how much we've finished this morning, on initial prioritization we'll try to finish up or initial prioritization.

Also, if time allows, if we do finish the initial prioritization, I'd like to go back to what we categorize as our priority ones and start developing our consensus positions and recommendations to start determination of what we're going to put in our report to Sam Collins.

And then do some agenda planning for our next meeting. At our last meeting we had tentatively scheduled April 2nd and 3rd as our next meeting, and

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1	we'll talk about that as far as what topics we want to
2	have for that meeting.
3	Anything else agenda-wise we need to cover
4	or to add?
5	(No response.)
6	CHAIRMAN PLISCO: As far as the meeting
7	minutes from the last meeting, John E-mailed those
8	out. Does anyone have any questions or comments on
9	those?
10	MR. GARCHOW: John, just a minor detail,
11	a company change. We're PSEG Nuclear. We're not
12	affiliated at all with Public Service Electric and
13	Gas.
14	CHAIRMAN PLISCO: John, does that mean
15	that there are copies in the back if anyone needs a
16	hard copy of it?
17	MR. MONNINGER: There's copies with
18	Attachments, I believe, 1 through 6 or 1 through 7.
19	The only thing missing is the 600 page transcript. So
20	if you'd like a hard copy of that
21	(Laughter.)
22	CHAIRMAN PLISCO: But that will be up on
23	the Web page.
24	MR. MONNINGER: It is up on the Web page.
25	CHAIRMAN PLISCO: It's already up?
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1 Any other questions about the 2 meeting minutes? (No response.) 3 4 CHAIRMAN PLISCO: All right. I'd like to 5 move right into initial prioritization. quite a bit of time at our last meeting going through 6 7 two specific areas. We have a couple more areas to finish. 8 There are copies at the back of the room. 9 10 The summary of the issues; John has compiled the input 11 that we got during the month from panel members as far 12 as the recommended initial priority, and also in the back of the room there is a summary of what the issues 13 14 are and some of the individual comments related to 15 those issues. And as we did last time, we're going to 16 17 put these issues into two categories. We had a lot of discussion at our last meeting on the two categories. 18 19 The first priorities are an issue that 20 should receive high priority, and the second priority 21 are just issues for consideration. 22 MR. SCHERER: We have two copies, 23 different versions? 24 CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Yeah. I'm going to 25 explain to you. There's a thick packet that has a

summary of the initial priorities from the panel 1 2 members that also includes a summary of what all the 3 issues are, and that was right before John got two 4 other inputs. 5 There were three inputs still missing from the panel members, and he got two late yesterday, and 6 7 you'll have another sheet that has four pages, and that's the latest priorities. I think those are all, 8 with the exception of one, everyone's priorities. 9 So we'll use the one that's just a four-10 11 page handout. Just to save paper John didn't reprint 12 the whole 27 pages. So that's a new update. And the areas we need to get through today 13 14 are I, which is the inspection; P, which is the 15 performance indicators; and then O, the overall 16 category. 17 What I propose is to go through the inspection area first, then the performance indicator 18 19 area, and then save the overall categories for last. 20 Chip, did you have any comments you want 21 to make before we get started? 22 MR. CAMERON: Yeah, just a little bit in 23 format. terms of Loren always mentioned our 24 prioritization criteria, which we had quite

discussion of at the last meeting and,

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I think,

simplified. So we're going to be using those, and we're going to go through the remaining three areas that we didn't cover the last time, and that's inspection performance and then the overall category would be last.

And the idea is to get a sense of the committee in terms of what the priority of the various issues under inspection, performance, and overall are.

You're aided in the sense that from the homework assignments, the short handout that you have, if we look through, for example, the first inspection issue, increased level inspection in baseline program, you'll note that five people from the homework, five of the committee members said that this was a priority one, nine, gave it a priority two.

It means we probably have significant discussion perhaps to do on that issue. There may be some of these where 99 percent of you gave it a priority one, so that maybe we can move through that particular area fairly quickly.

So that's this morning's exercise, and then tomorrow I think what Loren would like to so is now that we have the priorities set pretty much for these particular issues, to go through and talk about what are the main points that need to be brought to

1 the commission's attention. What are the main points 2 that make that a priority one issue, for example? 3 Because you'll note that this larger 4 handout that we were working with the last time that 5 has all of these sub-bullets, some of these things may be in conflict with one another. Okay? And they came 6 7 not only from the panel's discussion of issues, but I think John drew these from presentations, various 8 9 different sources. So that sort of has to be made 10 integrated and coherent in terms of what you're going to be saying. 11 12 And then I guess the idea, Loren, would be that you would go off and start drafting that. 13 14 that correct? 15 Right. CHAIRMAN PLISCO: 16 MR. CAMERON: All right. CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Yeah, it's really to get 17 a sense for what the main message is in each of those 18 19 priority one categories that we want to get across. 20 This one handout has a lot of input, and 21 as Chip mentioned, there are some that are 180 degrees 22 out, the comments; that we need to resolve those and 23 read some consensus on those. 24 MR. CAMERON: And, in fact, you may in 25 deciding what the priorities are there, that may come

1 into play just in discussing those priorities. 2 We'll use that board over there for a 3 parking lot, anything we need to come back and 4 revisit, including anything that you might want to put 5 in the overarching category, the overall category. I think that happened in our discussion last time. 6 7 were going through specific areas, and you thought that, well, this should also be reflected in the 8 9 overall. 10 So before we get started and go 11 inspection issue one, are there any comments or 12 questions that any of you have on how we're going to proceed? 13 MR. BORCHARDT: At the risk of reopening 14 15 another lengthy discussion on priorities, I guess I'm asking if there's a common understanding regarding the 16 17 timing of any priority one action would take place. Does assigning something a priority one imply that it 18 will get addressed by any particular milestone or that 19 20 it is just the more important of however many the 21 total is? 22 Is this a short-term/long-MR. CAMERON: 23 term type of --24 MR. BORCHARDT: Well, no. What I'm just trying to make sure is that we have agreement on the 25

1 idea that because we had signed something Pri. 1 in my 2 mind does not necessarily mean that it needs to be resolved 3 necessarily completely by any given 4 milestone, but that it is just the more important of 5 whatever the total population of issues is. 6 MR. CAMERON: Okay. 7 MR. BORCHARDT: Because if somebody 8 thought that it was going to be fixed within three 9 months, you know, that if there was a very serious problem that impeded the adequate implementation of 10 11 the program, then that's a --12 CHAIRMAN PLISCO: I think it's the latter. I think based on our discussion before, you know, 13 14 given the fixed amount of resources that the staff 15 had, these are the things that we think they ought to 16 be spending their time on. 17 I mean, some of these issues that we've already talked about aren't going to be fixed in one 18 19 or two months. There are, you know, some significant 20 issues that need to get resolved. 21 Mary, you're shaking your MR. CAMERON: 22 head. 23 MS. FERDIG: Well, that question came up 24 for me as I went through those items independently,

and there were things that I thought were priority

1 one, but that were critical and I needed to be assured 2 that they would be attended to, and yet I knew that 3 they were probably not among those that needed to be 4 taken care of in the next three months or by a 5 particular milestone. So it was a subtle -- and so I went ahead 6 7 and labeled them one, but I knew that somewhere along the line there would have to be some discretionary 8 consideration. 9 10 MR. CAMERON: Steve. 11 MR. FLOYD: Yeah, I agree with that. 12 think the other thing we talked about a little bit was making sure the staff had enough time to do a 13 14 reasonable job of dealing with the issue and not put 15 an arbitrary time frame on it because then what often happens is you do something about the issue and then 16 say you've addressed it just to meet a clock, and 17 that's not the right thing to do. 18 I think it is just what Bill said. 19 20 a higher priority than a priority two item. 21 MR. CAMERON: And it's neutral in the 22 sense of when it has to be fixed. Does anybody have a different opinion or any questions on that issue? 23 24 MS. FERDIG: And it's not up to us to make

the determination of relative timing.

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Is that what

1 we're saying, in effect, or not? Do we want 2 specify those things that we think are timing-wise 3 needed to be fed into the --4 CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Well, I think we can 5 leave the door open. As we go through the discussion if there's something that -- you know, the panel 6 7 consensus that it does need to be addressed promptly because of some aspect of an issue, I think we can 8 9 communicate that. We'll do that on a case-by-case 10 basis as we go through. But, in general, I think, you know, what 11 12 Bill mentioned, the focus of our priority system was just on the importance and what the more important 13 14 issues are that need to be addressed and not 15 specifically the time frame today. And the related issue you 16 MR. CAMERON: 17 discussed the last time was in terms of if an issue was already being worked on, how did that influence 18 19 whether it was going to be a one or a two, and I think 20 that you decided that the fact that it was being 21 worked on by the staff or whatever would not take it 22 out of priority one, for example, category if it was 23 an important issue to the panel. 24 CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Right. MR. CAMERON: Good. Any other issues like 25

1 that that we need to revisit? 2 (No response.) The first 3 MR. CAMERON: All right. 4 inspection issue that you have is increased level of 5 inspection at baseline program. You had five people that gave this a high priority, and nine people put it 6 7 into the consideration category. 8 Loren, do you want to give a little 9 summary of this or --10 CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Yeah, let's just talk 11 about it to make sure we have a common understanding 12 of what these issues are. One had to do with the perception that there was an increased level of 13 14 inspection between the baseline program under the 15 reactor oversight process and the old core program, and that the higher resources were causing higher 16 17 charges to the licensees. There were some resource issues having to 18 do with the variation between the expenditures on the 19 20 same inspection procedure. 21 Another issue defining was more 22 specifically what the baseline inspection program was, 23 whether it was a de minimis program. 24 There was a specific comment about the 25 occupational exposure area resources being higher than needed to be.

And there was an issue having to do with the frequency of some specific inspections, whether they were the correct frequency or not.

MR. CAMERON: Okay. Maybe we should ask the just deserves consideration category came through with more people than the high priority category. Could we ask someone who thinks it should be a high priority to discuss why they think it should be?

MR. BORCHARDT: Well, before I get to that, let me throw another wrench in. Is it appropriate for us to discuss the wording of the issue? The way it's worded now implies that the program is either too high or too low, depending. I think that the --

CHAIRMAN PLISCO: That is appropriate.

MR. BORCHARDT: I think that the issue of the program continuously evaluating itself to insure that it has the appropriate amount of inspection effort is a good topic. I think we ought to steer away from indicating based on the limited review that we as individuals would be able to do of whether or not the current level of effort is too high or too low overall because, as the comments indicate, they may be too high in one area and too low in another.

1 And I think it would be dangerous for us 2 to make an overall statement. So I am one that voted 3 as a high priority on this issue, but not -- I 4 minimized the word "increased level," but focused more on the importance of this program, evaluating what the 5 appropriate level of inspection effort is. 6 7 It's, I think, largely an internal NRC matter, and I would guess almost if the voting went 8 9 somewhere along those lines, that the NRC would see this instinctively as a high priority issue than 10 11 perhaps the non-NRC members. MR. CAMERON: Can we follow Bill's thread 12 to highlight the word "appropriate" rather than either 13 14 increased or decreased? Does anybody have any 15 thoughts on that? I sort of agree with this 16 MR. GARCHOW: 17 you took the issue as being should there be an ongoing review as more data comes in, like in a self-18 19 assessment type arena that's formalized to keep 20 checking and adjusting. I mean I would say that is 21 probably reasonable to do, and then let that self-22 assessment, you know, change the program however the 23 results would indicate. 24 I agree with Bill that we don't have

enough data here to say this inspection is too large;

1 this one's too small. 2 MR. With this change of CAMERON: 3 appropriate, do those of you who made this a priority 4 two -- would you go to priority one? Would it make 5 any difference in what priority you would give it? MR. FLOYD: I'd still give it a two. 6 7 think this is an ongoing effort that should be done very year in the program to take a look at where the 8 9 inspection resources are being expended, what kind of results are being achieved, where weaknesses are 10 11 identified within the industry, and make adjustments 12 as necessary. It's an ongoing effort. MR. CAMERON: Rod, do you? 13 14 MR. KRICH: Yeah, I agree. I'm not sure 15 I agree necessarily with appropriate. The issue started as, at least the part that I understood, was 16 17 that, in fact, from the licensee perspective we are seeing an increased number of hours spent responding 18 19 to inspections. So there is that aspect of it, but I 20 agree that this is something that just -- that's why 21 I gave it a two. It's just going to have to be worked 22 I don't see it as a critical item. out over time. 23 MR. CAMERON: Ken? 24 BROCKMAN: But I think one point

that's essential if you look at this, there is a

number of licensees who are seeing an increased effort, typically those who used to be the historical self-one performers, and then there are others who are seeing a lot less effort, and that's the dichotomy that you get there. You have a much larger continuum that everybody gets put into, and the haves get some more and the have nots don't, and you come up with this new paradigm that you've got out of it.

So, I mean, increased is right for one group. Decreased is right for another group. That's why I'm a little bit and with Bill's thing on appropriate, but I think one of the points that Loren brought up is essential. What is baseline?

Your event response is in there. Everyone has to have an event. There's a lot, especially from the public's viewpoint and in budgeting aspects for others who have that concern. We've got to get a handle in it. This program needs to be very clear in what is meant by the baseline program and how that is communicated, and I think that's a very, very important part of this that can't wait. It has to be a high priority of that communication so that everyone understands exactly what it is.

The part I would agree with Steve is much more on an ongoing basis.

1 MR. CAMERON: Does your communications 2 issue -- does that fit logically within the overall 3 Should we put that in as parking lot issue? 4 MR. BROCKMAN: I personally would like 5 just still in the parking lot right now and see where it goes when we're done. It may not be here. There's 6 7 a lot of different places where we could put it. 8 MR. CAMERON: Okay. How about other 9 on either Bill's suggestion, make 10 appropriate, or on what the priority for this issue 11 should be? 12 Mary, where did you come out on this? Well, I agree with Bill's MS. FERDIG: 13 14 suggestion about appropriate. I would also like to 15 hear Bill say a bit more about why he sees it as a high priority because I'm hearing more and learning 16 17 more about the issue as I am experiencing this conversation. 18 19 I rate it as a two based on what I thought 20 I knew, but I need to hear why it should be a one. 21 MR. BLOUGH: Well, I think it's a one at 22 least initially because it is a different program than 23 was institute in previous years, you know, for the 24 previous ten years, and to the extent that it has, in

my view, raised concerns with the inspection staff of

1 the NRC and with the licensees, that it deserves some 2 higher priority now than it will in the long run. 3 I think once we get through the initial people 4 implementation stage and become more 5 comfortable with this new process, that it will get into a steady state, normal priority, annual review 6 7 kind of activity. But I think there's so much newness to it 8 now that it's worthwhile for it to receive some higher 9 focus, some higher attention, even if it were only for 10 11 the benefit of the NRC inspection staff, from my 12 perspective. MS. FERDIG: So right here, it's just 13 14 helping them to be comfortable with the transition of 15 determining when more inspection is appropriate versus when less inspection is appropriate, and in that 16 focus, this baseline that Ken's referring to would 17 become more clear. 18 Right, they would be more 19 MR. BLOUGH: comfortable with the resource allocation to 20 21 various parts of the program, for the new program. 22 And I think that, Steve, MR. CAMERON: 23 your category, too, was based on the fact that this is 24 a -- "routine" may be the wrong word -- but this

should be an ongoing activity, and Bill was saying

1 that that may be true later on, but right now your 2 argument for it being a one should be that at this 3 stage of the program it's very, very important. 4 MR. FLOYD: I wonder if this doesn't fall 5 more under, you know, an overall issue because I'll give you the industry's perspective. They don't see, 6 7 quite honestly, a lot of difference between the scope and breadth of the current inspection under the 8 9 baseline program than what they saw under the old core program. In fact, the hours are within 100, 200 hours 10 11 of being the same. 12 And the feedback we get from the licensee is it looks like the same type of inspection pretty 13 14 much conducted the same way, and they don't see a lot 15 of difference. I'm just wondering if we're seeing, 16 you know, resistance to change. The fact that it's given a new name, maybe it's broken down a little bit 17 different, but overall licensees really don't see much 18 19 of a change at all from their perspective. So it may 20 be an internal NRC change issue. 21 I'm just speculating because we don't see 22 it from industry's side. 23 MR. CAMERON: Other comments on this 24 issue? 25 (No response.)

1 MR. CAMERON: Jim, do you have any? 2 didn't know whether you had anything you wanted to 3 offer on this. 4 MR. TRAPP: I guess I rate it as a two, 5 and my reasoning was that I just hadn't heard a lot either way that those inspection sources were too high 6 7 I didn't hear a lot of discussion on or too low. 8 So I thought it was something that the normal processes would just handle as part of Bill Dean's 9 10 (phonetic) group. MR. MOORMAN: Yeah, I saw this as more of 11 12 a change of management issue because we're still -- we have a defined baseline program that the inspectors 13 14 are following, and the hours are going to vary 15 somewhat, and we're still trying to work within that, and I saw it more of, I guess, a billing issue. We're 16 17 putting more hours towards some things, less hours towards others. 18 19 Like Ken said, some are getting more; 20 others are getting less. So I gave this as two 21 because as we go on, I think we'll eventually work 22 this out, where we spend our resources, which are 23 going to be on the most safety significant issues. 24 Now, we have a baseline program that 25 better defines what's risk significant and more safety

1 related. So that's why I thought it was something 2 that would work as we go on. 3 MR. CAMERON: So the two people that we've 4 heard from that do put it into one category, I think, 5 Ken, if I understood you, your major concern there was the communication issue, okay, which may deal in 6 7 another context. And, Bill, this is a transition. From the 8 point of view of the NRC staff, it's an important 9 transition. 10 11 Does anybody --12 When MR. SCHERER: you say "communication," you're referring to communication or 13 14 Ken is referring to communication within the staff. 15 Is that a public of confidence indication that you were trying to give? 16 17 It's both. MR. BROCKMAN: It's communication of what the program is for the staff is 18 19 an issue right now. I think we discussed that from 20 the public's viewpoint with the reduction from N plus 21 one to N going on at the sites at the same time. 22 I've gotten numerous communications of 23 The program is being reduced. confusion. 24 isn't being reduced when you talk hours. 25 getting that clarified to the public. Exactly what is

1 this program in its overall context? What is meant by 2 baseline? What can you expect to see at every site? 3 What type of variances will you see? 4 I think that's an essential aspect for the 5 staff and for the public to understand. I'm not surprised. It should be invisible to the licensee. 6 7 MR. CAMERON: Okay. Does that clarify 8 your question, Ed? 9 MR. SCHERER: Yes. 10 MR. CAMERON: Okay. Does anybody want to 11 strongly define the one priority issue? Because it 12 seems like your issue may be able to be dealt with in another context. This internal NRC change issue that 13 14 Steve brought up, there's nothing inappropriate for 15 the -- and I guess this is a question for all of you -- is in your write-up on this level of instruction, 16 17 and you write it up as a two; is there anything inappropriate of noting that it may be important as a 18 transition issue for NRC staff, or does that mean that 19 20 it doesn't get the attention that it's going to need from Bill's point of view? 21 22 MR. SCHERER: Well, my opinion is that I 23 agree with Bill that the phrasing should be closer to 24 something like appropriate as opposed to increased.

I don't have a particular problem with that, but I

feel this is an internal issue within the NRC as to how in priority it gets resolved, and it'll be addressed within the NRC as to how perhaps with more effort in the short term, but I also think it has to be an ongoing effort within the NRC.

What is the appropriate? How have things changed? It may be different at different plants with different situations. So actually this is a continuous reevaluation of their inspection process, and I would be disappointed if they weren't continuously going back and looking at whether they're putting appropriate resources in appropriate areas.

What's appropriate in 2001 may not be approximately in 2005. If, in fact, licensees have changed their programs, then it's not worth those inspection hours then. I just don't know.

MR. CAMERON: Okay. Well, you're going to all get a shot, perhaps a couple of shots, but the first one being when this is written up, but for the sake of proceeding now, it seems like it's the -- I hate to use the word "consensus" -- but it's the feel of the panel that this should be a priority two issue, and that it would be better to use the word "appropriate" rather than increased and decreased, and when you come back to discuss the narrative on this,

1 I think you've already given a pretty big flavor to 2 what that narrative might look like, including taking care of Bill's concerns. 3 4 Bill, do you have anything else you want 5 to say on this before we move on? 6 MR. BORCHARDT: No. 7 MR. CAMERON: Anybody? 8 (No response.) 9 MR. CAMERON: Okay. The second inspection issue is current inspection report documentation 10 11 threshold sufficient. A similar case to the last one 12 where four of your made this a number one issue and ten of you made this a number two issue. 13 14 Any comments on this similar to the one 15 that Bill did in trying to sort of refine what the 16 concern was here? And, Loren, if you want to, if you think 17 you need to add anything of explanation, go ahead. 18 19 CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Yeah, I'll iust be 20 I think the majority of these comments, I brief. 21 think, same internally from the inspection staff as 22 far as some questions about whether the threshold is 23 right. 24 We have changed the threshold. inspection manual chapter 0610-star, and there is a 25

1 screening process and some questions that are asked of the inspector that they need to answer to determine 2 what goes in the report. 3 4 And because of those questions, the most 5 significant issues are getting documented in the report, and it does screen out some of the lower level 6 7 issues. Some misuse in the past may have been what we call minor violations that don't get documented in the 8 9 So the report does focus on the more report. 10 significant issues. 11 But as in the questions raised by the 12 inspectors, I think we heard some of it at our last meeting from the senior resident inspector panel about 13 14 some discomfort, about some lower level issues, which 15 in their mind may be indicators of a trend in the 16 specific area and some concerns about whether they can 17 document those or not in the report. That's where I think a lot of that 18 19 comment comes from, and whether that threshold is set 20 at the right place. 21 MR. CAMERON: Steve. 22 MR. FLOYD: Well, I thought it was a two. 23 Standing back looking at what's the big picture 24 purpose of the oversight process, it's really to have

a mechanism for the NRC to ask what resources beyond

1 he base line warrant the explanation. And the action 2 may determine who does that, but what derives the 3 action makers is getting greater than green findings. 4 But what we're really talking about here 5 on this item is items that are green or less than green and can I put them in the report; can I not put 6 7 them in the report? It might be an irritant both for the staff 8 and for the licensees, whether it is or isn't put in 9 the report, but in terms of the overall objectives of 10 11 the oversight process, it probably has very little to 12 do with the final outcome. That is why I kind of viewed it as a two. 13 14 MR. CAMERON: Does anybody want to make a 15 case for treating this as a number one? MR. BORCHARDT: Yeah, I think Steve hit on 16 17 a good point, which hadn't occurred to me until he just mentioned it, that really this issue being 18 19 specific to the purpose of this panel is not as big an issue as I view it to be on its own. I mean, I think 20 21 there's substantial public confidence, 22 responsibilities issue within this. What issues are 23 documented in inspection reports? 24 But as it relates to the reactor oversight 25 process and implementation of the action matrix, I

1 think maybe it's not as important in this specific 2 is regarding other aspects of it inspection program. 3 4 CHAIRMAN PLISCO: And I think there is an 5 aspect of the same issue that's in another area we're going to talk about, is the crosscutting issues and 6 7 how we handle crosscutting issues, and there is some 8 overlap because a lot of the concern the inspectors 9 have is in that specific area, the crosscutting issues, and I think we'll get into some of that in 10 11 that discussion. 12 MR. KRICH: agree, but I'm just Ι Ray Shadis is not here, I noticed, and I 13 14 want to make sure that we get his perspective or at 15 least that we give adequate consideration for his 16 perspective on it because think he had put out some as well. 17 MR. CAMERON: So should we put Ray in the 18 19 parking lot? 20 PARTICIPANTS: Yes. 21 MS. FERDIG: I was just asking myself that 22 same question from, you know, the public confidence important issue from the 23 Ιf it's an aspect. 24 perspective of public confidence, then to what extend 25 does that bring it into this arena, whether it would

1 seem to be directly related or not. MR. GARCHOW: Right. Hold that because we 2 3 have Dave Lochbaum and Rich Janati this afternoon. 4 I'm sure that Dave's going to get into the public 5 confidence piece. CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Yeah, we'll revisit this 6 7 one. 8 MS. FERDIG: Okay. MR. GARCHOW: 9 The other aspect with the 10 inspection report that the stakeholders around our 11 plant are confused with, and I know we covered it 12 somewhere is, is when we document these no color findings, it's very hard to explain to somebody what 13 14 that is, but I think we have another later piece of 15 this that talks about findings and colors of findings. 16 the extent that they're 17 inspection reports, that's caused some level confusion. 18 19 MR. CAMERON: Okay. 20 Well, I agree, and I MR. SCHERER: 21 certainly am comfortable and felt this was a two, but 22 I do think that the other issue that I want to make 23 sure gets highlighted is the issue of what is and is 24 not a minor violation. And it indicated uniformly defined because 25

that then becomes a public confidence issue, and it becomes an efficiency. It's several of the other categories, and it doesn't really require the licensee to do something terribly different than if it had, you know, something as a green finding or a minor violation.

We were told, for example, that the regulatory guidance on minor violations is no longer applicable. So in Region 4, at least, we don't know what the definition is for a minor violation. Somehow that has to be defined and worked out so that all licensees are aware of what's going on and the public is aware.

MR. BORCHARDT: Now, I think that's a good example of what I was trying to refer to a moment ago, that inspection reports are very important to both the industry, the public, and the NRC, and I think it's an issue that needs to be given high priority, but I'm not so sure that it relates specifically to the reactor oversight process.

Because the issues that you're referring to on whether or not there would be a minor violation or not are not going to impact the action matrix under any circumstances.

MR. SCHERER: I agree.

1	MR. BORCHARDT: So for that reason, if we
2	narrow our focus to the reactor oversight process, and
3	if that's what the purpose of this panel is, I think
4	inspection report thresholds and documentation is not
5	as important because there's no question about the
6	very significant issues are going to get discussed in
7	the report, and they will feed into the action matrix,
8	and then we're in this new process.
9	But, I mean, I think that there are
10	numerous important issues having to do with inspection
11	reports that ought to be very high priority within
12	NRR, but are separate from the activities of this
13	panel.
14	MR. SCHERER: I think we're in violent
15	agreement.
16	MR. CAMERON: Does that capture? When we
17	talk about checking back with Ray and in listening to
18	David and the state, were the concerns expressed there
19	basically going to this the essence of this what is a
20	minor violation or are they a different, broader
21	concern?
22	MR. KRICH: In my opinion, I think it's a
23	broader concern.
24	MR. CAMERON: Okay.
25	MR. KRICH: I think it's a concern of

1	public confidence. I mean I see this issue as one of
2	public confidence more than the issue of minor
3	violation.
4	MR. CAMERON: All right. I just wanted to
5	know how many things got pushed in the parking lot.
6	MS. FERDIG: I have a quick question that
7	could probably be answered in 20 words of less, but my
8	impression was that the inspection program, as a
9	supplement to the ROP, is, therefore, a part of what
10	the public would consider this revised framework to
11	include.
12	So how is it that you're seeing it as not
13	a part of the ROP?
14	MR. BORCHARDT: In my view, the inspection
15	process and the inspection reports feed into the
16	reactor oversight process.
17	MS. FERDIG: So it's a supplement to?
18	MR. BORCHARDT: A supplement? I'm not
19	sure I really understand that word. I mean it's
20	it's an important element of the reactor oversight
21	process because it provides data regarding the
22	performance of licensees into the assessment process.
23	But there are elements of how these issues
24	get documented and what the lower threshold of some of
25	those issues are that are not that data is not fed

1 into the oversight process, doesn't impact the action matrix, yet I believe could be very important from a 2 3 public confidence standpoint. 4 MR. BLOUGH: Well, the fact that 5 doesn't feed into the action matrix means it's not part of the assessment process, but it seems that if 6 7 it's a matter of, you know, what was inspected and 8 what was found and what we wrote about it, that at 9 least it's part of the overall oversight process that 10 includes, you know, inspection, assessment, 11 enforcement. 12 MR. GARCHOW: I sort of agree with Randy. I think we have to be careful we don't cut this too 13 14 fine because it's the whole picture, the 15 inspections, the action matrix, the reports, annual meeting. I mean it all sort of fits into this 16 17 mix that when you stir it up, it all has to work 18 together. 19 I think, you know, in thinking back, it 20 was all sort of an attempt was made to design those 21 elements from the whole, not in a series approach. It 22 was what does it look like in its entirety. 23 MS. FERDIG: And I guess I want to agree 24 with that. From a general, nontechnical, public 25 perspective, there's an assumption that there are

1 these interrelated activities that contribute to an 2 overall oversight process that we can feel confident, 3 and you know, that can be cut and diced in 100 4 different ways. 5 MR. GARCHOW: Now, saying that, relevant to the topic at hand, and I personally believe this is 6 7 a priority two type issue, but I mean, I don't think we can separate it from the whole mix, is sort of my 8 9 point. I think it's a two also 10 MR. BLOUGH: 11 basically from the standpoint that, you know, Bill's 12 argument that it's not going to affect the action matrix, and we know things that might affect the 13 14 action matrix and affect the overall assessment and 15 the overall approach to the plant. We know those we can get documented. 16 17 And there is an issue with consistency and with, you know, how much information the public gets, 18 19 but I don't think it's a priority one issue. 20 MR. CAMERON: The feeling seems to be 21 priority two, but maybe make it a preliminary two 22 until we revisit with Ray and David and others. 23 Anybody have any problems with that? 24 And we do have a couple of parking lot 25 issues. Okay.

1	MR. FLOYD: I don't disagree with that,
2	but I'd just like to make an observation, and I see
3	this in numerous forums as we try to risk inform our
4	approaches here. We seem to spend most of our time
5	and we seem to be most confused about what to do about
6	that which is least significant, and the same thing
7	holds true as we try to go through and risk inform the
8	regulations. We spend 99 percent of our time trying
9	to gnash over what do we do with the stuff that
10	everybody agrees is not very important and very little
11	time worrying about what's really important.
12	That's why I have a hard time seeing why
13	this could possibly be a one. That's just an
14	observation that I see in almost every meeting that I
15	attend where we have a process that's trying to be
16	moved to be made more risk informed.
17	MS. FERDIG: Good point.
18	MR. CAMERON: I think that other panel
19	members would probably appreciate it if when we
20	discuss other issues if you have that perspective to
21	put that on board.
22	MS. FERDIG: To keep in mind.
23	MR. CAMERON: But it may be it looks like
24	it will be a two, but we'll reserve judgment until we
25	hear from others on this.

1	MR. FLOYD: sure.
2	MR. CAMERON: How about does anybody have
3	any comments, I guess I should ask, on what Steve just
4	said generally, or do you want to wait to see if it
5	pops up again?
6	MR. LAURIE: it'll pop up for me on the
7	next issue, Chip.
8	MR. CAMERON: Okay.
9	MR. LAURIE: So I'll save it.
10	(Laughter.)
11	MR. CAMERON: Right, okay.
12	CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Ready to start?
13	(Laughter.)
14	MR. CAMERON: The third issue is improved
15	public access to inspection information, and, Loren,
16	do you want to give us a little summary? And then
17	we'll ask we'll turn to Bob.
18	CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Sure. What we tried to
19	capture in this, there were a number of suggestions to
20	improve access to different pieces of the oversight
21	process and make that information available to the
22	public having to do with what's on the Website and
23	access and the accuracy of that information.
24	And there were also a number of issues, I
25	think, from the inspector viewpoint, and this had to

1	do with specific inspection program information and
2	the timeliness of getting the most current information
3	up on the Web page that was available to them.
4	MR. CAMERON: Okay, and this is another
5	one following this trend. Five people gave it a
6	priority one. Ten gave it a priority two.
7	Bob, why don't you lead off for it?
8	MR. LAURIE: Well, first, you're reading
9	from a different paper than I am because my numbers
LO	are different than yours. I have the
L1	MR. CAMERON: Yeah, I should mention for
L2	those of you who the scores, the so-called scores
L3	are reflected on the smaller handout.
L4	MR. LAURIE: I think you mentioned that,
L5	and I missed it.
L6	I think this goes to a basic philosophical
L7	question of what do you do with the public, and I
L8	respect Steve's comment about attempting to
L9	concentrate on what's important, but I think the
20	question you have to ask is: important to whom?
21	And I think there's a scientific
22	perspective, and I believe there is a public
23	perspective. And I don't think one is any more
24	important then the other long term.
25	Now, short term, I think it's easy to say

that the public need not have access to less important information because it's simply, in the view of the professionals, less important. I honestly believe that longer term that view is inimical to the entirety of the industry.

I look, for example, the -- what I'm spending most of my time of late at the Commission, and that's licensing power plants. The Energy Commission does outstanding work of holding public hearings and seeing public input, and I sit there hour after hour after hour after hour at one or two or three in the morning listening to the public saying to myself, "This is not important. I can't deal with these comments."

And at three o'clock in the morning, I've had a tendency to state that, which is not always the right thing to do.

But I also recognize that although I may not believe it's important, they believe it's important, and I'm firmly convinced after working for 25 years in the development industry that allowing and investing that time and those resources into coming close to maximizing public awareness and public input is the best possible thing you could do for the longevity of an industry and of a process.

So I concur that in many cases resources have to be allocated to what is deemed not necessarily the most important short term, but just wait until there is an incident and see how quickly Congress demands an increase in public access and see how quickly one might long for an opportunity to have opened the process in the first instance so you can argue that you've already had it maximized.

And I think that's the basic philosophy. I sit here, and I have the greatest respect to the nuclear professionals that are in this room, and I have to weigh that against my experiences with public processes both as representing government institutions and representing private development industry, and as frustrated as I have been over many years in my dealings with the public, I think at this age I find that it's a very good investment if you're going to be around for anything longer than the shortest terms.

So it's for that reason that I support public access to even the inspection records, and I get some sense of the fact that the inspection records are not the big deal, but then I would want to know why not. Why should we not do this, recognizing that every time you let out information, well, it's going to take resources that you have to make

1 available to explain that information, Ι and 2 understand that. industry 3 And Ι think for both 4 government that's part of the cost of doing business. You can take it too far. I know in some areas of the 5 country, in some instances there are concerns that 6 7 public involvement is too deep, and I don't know the 8 answer to that one. 9 I do, however, think that there is a 10 proper balance. 11 MR. CAMERON: Thank you, Bob. 12 Best I can do. MR. LAURIE: Right. Let's go to Steve. 13 MR. CAMERON: 14 MR. FLOYD: Yeah, I think those are 15 excellent points. I guess the issue that we've got to wrestle with is how much information do you put in an 16 inspection report and what characterization do you 17 give it so that you don't unintentionally mislead the 18 19 public. If you fill an inspection report up with 20 21 a lot of observations and even minor circumstances 22 that in any reasonable situation could never have any 23 negative impact on what's done, I think there's a 24 danger of confusing the public because they don't know

how a nuclear power plant works, by and large, and how

all the programs work together, and you can easily scare them into thinking there's a much more severe problem than what there otherwise is.

So maybe it's a matter of having better explanations of what is found in the inspection report.

MR. LAURIE: And that's a good point, Steve, and I understand that, and I don't suggest -- I'm thinking this is going to read poorly in the transcript, but I don't suggest that the process be -- that the technical process be dumbed down so that the lay public can understand it.

I think, however, that it has to be easily capable of being translated into English so that the public can understand.

MR. FLOYD: Yeah, the big thing in our view, the big thing the public wants to know, most of the public wants to know is should I be worried, and if you just fill up an inspection report with a lot of low significant items and don't really put a good characterization on the overall what it's telling you, they don't know whether they should be worried or not, whereas I guess the approach we're trying to take here is to minimize the number of nuisance type of discrepancies at the plant that really don't have an

1 impact and try to make the inspection report bump up 2 a little big of a notice so that when people read it 3 they know whether they ought to have a concern or not. 4 And that's the balance we're trying to get 5 here, I think. MR. MOORMAN: I think as the public tries 6 7 to answer that question, should I be worried or not, they could also look for some level of engagement by 8 9 a regulator, and at that point if there's no engagement at a low level, they can say, "Well, maybe 10 11 I should be worried because this guy doesn't appear to 12 be doing his job. So, you know, I get concerned if we can't 13 14 show that, you know, if there's just nothing but a big 15 blob of green there. Somebody may say, "Well, maybe you guys aren't doing anything." 16 17 So, you know, at the risk of trying to solve the problem, there is a way to do this. We can 18 19 just list them in the inspection reports of what we 20 see. 21 MR. CAMERON: There seems to be two issues 22 that you're talking about here, and Bob was very 23 articulate in talking about why the public should have 24 access to all the information that is produced. 25 A second issue is what's the quality of

1 the information that is available, what goes into 2 those inspection reports, and do you intend to deal 3 with both of those issues in this particular issue, or 4 are there other issues where you look at, from, again, 5 a public perspective, what information goes in the 6 report? 7 And I guess we sort of touched on that in the last issue, but do we need to talk a little bit 8 9 about both of these issues and where they're going to 10 be addressed? Ron, are you thinking about this, ready to 11 12 say something about it? I thought that the previous 13 MR. KRICH: 14 issue was the matter of content. It went more to 15 Jim's issue of how much gets into the inspection 16 report. 17 MR. CAMERON: Okay. 18 MR. KRICH: And that also then 19 addresses -- and that's why I raised the Rad Shadis 20 issue of what's the public seeing. This issue was, I 21 think, more a matter of what can the public get to. 22 You know, the bio-reactor oversight process has two 23 main elements. One is the performance indicators. 24 The second is the inspection report, and I think part

of the discussion that came up for this item was

1 people were looking at -- they get on the Web; they 2 look at the PIs and stop and say, "Well, that's not 3 meaningful because it's all green." 4 But you need to go down further to see the 5 inspection reports and then actually you can go from there into the actual text of the inspection report 6 7 and get more information there. And that's the major part of what's going 8 9 on, and I think one of the issues here, Steve, as I remember, is a lot of the people were missing that 10 11 part of it. 12 MR. FLOYD: Yeah, it -- oh, excuse me. ahead. 13 14 MR. TRAPP: Excuse me. It just seems to 15 me if you have a computer and you're on the Web, I mean, the accessibility of inspection information now 16 17 is bound better than it ever way. I don't know how you can improve it. You know, it seems like that 18 19 piece has been licked. 20 MR. FLOYD: You know, there is one comment 21 in here that I did want to highlight, and that is this 22 thought that it may enhance public confidence to 23 publicize how much time the regulator is inspecting 24 the plant, and I think that would go to, you know, one

of the concerns.

If you'd see a plant that's all green, is it because nobody is looking or is it because they've looked a lot and they haven't found anything significant? That's a very important message to get out.

I think it would be useful. Again, we're trying to solve a problem here, but I think it would be useful, as was suggested in the comment here, to put the hours if not on the Web site maybe in the inspection report itself after each major inspection or inspection area is done and say, "Hey, we spent 400 hours looking at this area, and we didn't find anything that has significance, but here's a couple of minor items."

I mean, that's a whole different characterization than here's a bunch of minor items without any perspective put on them. You don't know how long they looked. I think that would help public confidence personally.

MR. SCHERER: I agree with that. There is a perception that I think still continues to exist that somehow the PIs have replaced NRC inspection and that this is an industry self-monitoring process and there is no more NRC engagement on the issues. There is no NRC inspection, and that all we get are the PIs.

We've seen that in several of the comments and to this panel where we get shown the PI column and say this is the program. So to the extent that we need to revise the weight not only what we communicate to the public as a result of this process, but the way we do it, I would personally do away with that window that shows only PIs because PIs are only a part of the reactor oversight process.

But how we communicate and what we communicate is very important, and I continue to believe that there's a perception -- certainly it was true in our public meetings -- that there is only industry supplied PIs and no NRC engagement in terms of inspection.

MR. CAMERON: I've heard a lot of -- the comments that I've heard on this discussion all seem to agree on the importance of access to information, and I'm trying to figure out why most people, I think, put this in a category two, and it may be something that was said around the table, that we're already doing a pretty good job on it.

So it's not the fact that public access to information isn't an important consideration, but it's something that is not an important priority in terms of needing to be fixed. Is that -- Jim?

MR. SETSER: Now, I'm sitting here listening. I think that, first of all, the thing that's most important is that we have an attitude that there ought to be public access to information. That's what's important.

In general, most of the public doesn't want to know everything that we're doing, but at the same time there's still a small percentage of activist people that want you to prove everything that you do, even why you got up at a certain time of morning, and you're going to have to deal with that process as an outlier, as a separate situation than just under this process.

But the criticism we as regulators have gotten for the last 50 years is we're a closed shop and we don't want to share with the public. So the focus of the new oversight process is to develop an attitude that we do want to share and that there be processes available for every facet of the public if they want to know certain information.

That doesn't mean that we have to make everything proactively available on every piece of paper there is just so if somebody stumbles along and says, "Oh, I want to read this sometimes," it's available.

1 But you also have to understand that it's 2 normal to hear push-backs on these kind of things 3 because that's part of the organizational change 4 process. For instances, if I start talking about my 5 goal is compliance with environmental laws, somebody will automatically start pushing back and saying, "Oh, 6 7 you're going soft on enforcement now. You're not 8 going to enforce the laws anymore." 9 Because enforcement is what we're really So part of this comment 10 all about, not compliance. 11 that you're getting back is a normal bush-back process 12 because we're undergoing an organizational change. So we don't need to get too complicated. 13 14 We don't need to get so complex except to say, number 15 one, we do think it's time to say we owe everything to the public, and we're committed to giving it to them, 16 17 but then I think you are doing a pretty good job of making processes available whereby they can get it if 18 19 they want it. 20 MR. CAMERON: Let's explore that among the 21 rest of the people because I think that's the crux 22 here between the priority one and priority two. 23 going back to your criteria, what do you end up saying 24 about public availability of information?

MR. GARCHOW:

25

I guess I'm with Jim here.

Like what is broke? I mean three years ago we'd have been sitting here and say we have great public access to information for the last 15 years prior to three years ago because we allow and we'll let somebody go to a nearby library and dig through stacks of documents and make their own conclusion, and we would have stood here and defended that as readily available public information.

We're so much further ahead right now than we were just three years ago. I mean, I'm trying in the context of this panel wonder, you know, what is the priority of this, given that the growth will continue. Nobody is stopping refining the Web. Every time I go on the NRC Web page, it's better than the time that I went on it before.

Sounds like somebody is there constantly refining, and I'm thinking from my perspective this at best is a priority two, given the leaps and bounds that this process has caused public information to be available with the Website and how it linked to the oversight process.

MR. CAMERON: Let me check in with all of you in terms of what Dave just said. Is it the what is broken here that deserves consideration for one or two rather than the subject itself?

Loren.

I think Dave makes a good point. If you really go back, the original issues that we rolled up into this, they're very specific recommendations as far as specific information, accuracy, availability, and as Steve mentioned, the one issue on publicizing more, you know, inspection-wise of what resources we're expending in the program and making the findings themselves more visible on the Web page. They were pretty specific.

That being said, this whole discussion on public accessibility we're going to hit again. You know, I've got two roll-ups in the overall category that I'm saving until the end. This same discussion is going to occur. This was really just focused on the inspection program availability of information. There's another discussion we're going to have overall as far as public access and accuracy of information that we're going to get to looking at the overall process.

So I'd recommend that we hold that discussion later when we get this overall category and we look at the whole thing and maybe roll up some of these public access information discussions.

1	And for the purposes of this, and maybe
2	it's just something we can put in the parking lot, is
3	we'll just prioritize these specific recommendations,
4	and I'm hearing two in general, but the discussion
5	about accessibility information overall, if you look,
6	you know, where we ended up in some of these overall
7	categories, we have a lot of priority ones from that
8	perspective when we get to that, and maybe we can end
9	up just rolling this up into the overall category when
10	we get to that.
11	MR. CAMERON: Let me check back in with
12	Bob before we go on.
13	Bob, you heard
14	MR. LAURIE: Yeah, I don't have a problem
15	if we take I-3 and simply address the issues and look
15 16	if we take I-3 and simply address the issues and look at the questions posed and ask the question: is it
16	at the questions posed and ask the question: is it
16 17	at the questions posed and ask the question: is it broken? Do these particular projects need work?
16 17 18	at the questions posed and ask the question: is it broken? Do these particular projects need work?  You know, I don't have an answer to that.
16 17 18 19	at the questions posed and ask the question: is it broken? Do these particular projects need work?  You know, I don't have an answer to that.  I mean, my priority was dealing with the overall
16 17 18 19 20	at the questions posed and ask the question: is it broken? Do these particular projects need work?  You know, I don't have an answer to that.  I mean, my priority was dealing with the overall subject, not dealing with the particular question.
16 17 18 19 20 21	at the questions posed and ask the question: is it broken? Do these particular projects need work?  You know, I don't have an answer to that.  I mean, my priority was dealing with the overall subject, not dealing with the particular question.  MR. CAMERON: And I think we're going to
16 17 18 19 20 21 22	at the questions posed and ask the question: is it broken? Do these particular projects need work?  You know, I don't have an answer to that.  I mean, my priority was dealing with the overall subject, not dealing with the particular question.  MR. CAMERON: And I think we're going to get to that discussion. I guess this is, again,

1 perspective of what is broken here, what specific 2 things need to be fixed. 3 MS. FERDIG: I think we need to ask our 4 guests later during this meeting, as well, what their 5 perspectives are about access to information and becoming more --6 7 MR. CAMERON: And let's put that over here. We'll check back on not only inspection issue 8 9 two, the content, but on inspection issue three, which is the -- okay. 10 11 MR. BLOUGH: Yeah, I think on this issue 12 that if you ask the question what's broke, I mean the question is also how bad because there is a lot of 13 14 tweaking needed on, you know, how we make the 15 information available and what's on the Web site and how visible is the inspection effort relative to the 16 17 PIs. But I know the staff in headquarters is 18 working on all of that, and indeed, you do see changes 19 20 from time to time when you go on the Web site, and 21 there's others that I think are going to make it 22 easier for the public to look and actually get the 23 integrated view of inspection results. 24 So to me it's not that nothing's broken, 25 but there is a big improvement, and the things that

1 need tweaked, if you will, as far as I know, are all 2 being worked on. 3 MR. LAURIE: Does NRC have an agency-wide media officer or does the inspection program have its 4 5 own media? how does --CHAIRMAN PLISCO: We have a Public Affairs 6 7 Office, and actually we're going to hear from them 8 tomorrow, and we can even raise some of questions of them as far as what kind of feedback from 9 their perspective they're getting. 10 11 MR. SCHERER: That's my concern since when 12 I look at the agenda or the people we invited to come speak. I'd rather not close out this particular issue 13 14 until we hear their input. We've specifically 15 requested input in this area both today and tomorrow. 16 MR. CAMERON: Okay. That's a real good 17 point. It's our presentation both today and tomorrow. They have implications of these issues. 18 And from Bob's point of view, on his 19 question, is there is a headquarters office of Public 20 21 Affairs, and then there are public affairs officers in 22 each regional office, as I understand it, right? 23 So that could be explained. Hopefully 24 they'll explain that tomorrow. MR. LAURIE: 25 Good. thank you.

1 MR. CAMERON: about issue four, How 2 handling of crosscutting issues? This is inspection 3 issue four. 4 Now, on this one, we had a pretty large 5 majority who thought this was priority one rather than priority two, and you could save your discussion of 6 7 why for the narrative discussion tomorrow. We could ask those who do think it's a high priority to give us 8 reasons why they didn't think it was a high priority. 9 10 And, Loren, do you want to give us a 11 little context on what crosscutting issues means? 12 CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Yeah, I mentioned this a little bit earlier when talking about inspection 13 14 report documentation threshold. This is a bigger 15 question. How do we identify and document adverse 16 17 trends in the crosscutting areas? What are the criteria for thresholds? And there's also a question 18 of what is a threshold for NRC engagement in some of 19 these areas as far as crosscutting issues? 20 21 If you don't have the technical issue that 22 meets significance, you know, as far as white, yellow 23 and green, but if the staff believes there is a 24 programmatic issue or issue of crosscutting, how are 25 we going to communicate that, and what are the

1 thresholds for taking action? 2 That's what the question is. 3 MR. CAMERON: So crosscutting means or at 4 least it includes those types of issues that may not 5 rise to significance in and of themselves, but they may indicate a trend that may be --6 7 CHAIRMAN PLISCO: In the context of the 8 ROP, it's human performance issues, safety conscious work environment issues, and problem identification 9 and resolution issues, those three specific areas. 10 MR. CAMERON: Okay. Anybody want to 11 12 comment? Dave. MR. GARCHOW: Well, in the context of, you 13 14 know, having watched this thing develop from that 15 first workshop, we had a presumption that the PIs and the inspection finding significance would point to 16 deficiencies in the licensee's performance in these 17 areas well before there would be any kind of 18 19 significant impact to public health and safety. That was sort of like Steve used to call 20 21 it the rebuttable presumption of the program, and I'm 22 not sure anybody has brought forth data yet to show that a plant has had problems in these areas that have 23 24 not popped up in either white or yellow inspection

findings or PIs, but we continue the conversation, you

1 know, just continues to be a debate of this process. 2 So my purpose for putting it as a high 3 priority issue is either to determine whether the 4 original frame -- someone has got to conclude whether 5 the framework was sound that said that the PIs and the significance of the inspection findings would put out 6 7 these errors before anything significant happened or 8 not because the behind that scenes that's happening, 9 there's not universal agreement on that principle. So then the pressure continues to put those findings in 10 11 the crosscutting areas in inspection reports, to roll 12 them up in some sort of significance. We invented this no color finding. 13 14 that sort of popped into the landscape, all because we 15 haven't been able to get to the conclusion. Either it's sound with the PIs in the inspection grading of 16 findings or it's not, and if it's not, you know, maybe 17 we do need a human performance indicator or something. 18 19 But it just keeps churning because I think 20 it's a priority. So we address that once and for all, 21 and I think that's the issue. 22 MR. FLOYD: Yeah, I would agree with that, 23 I think it is a significant enough issue and 24 enough concern certainly within the inspectors in the

agency that it probably deserves a priority one to get

1 an answer to it as soon as possible and nail this 2 thing down. presentation 3 I've got, in my this 4 afternoon, I have some data which might shed some 5 light on the correlation between greater than green conditions either in PIs or inspection findings and PI 6 7 in our and human performance area specifically. Safety conscious work environment, there isn't much 8 9 data to look at, but the other two areas there is 10 some. 11 Any other perspectives on MR. CAMERON: 12 this as priority one? We heard from Dave and Steve, and this is 13 14 priority one for them because we need to have some 15 certainty. We need to answer this question about what are we really looking at here. 16 17 Ed? I gave it a priority two 18 MR. SCHERER: 19 because I hadn't seen and I hadn't heard of a plan to 20 do what is outlined there, or even a real recognition 21 that that's the issue. 22 In fact, I didn't have a great deal of 23 confidence that there was an ability to prove the 24 negative and say, "Okay. We are now satisfied that 25 these crosscutting issues are not, in fact, vulnerable

1 areas that need to be independently monitored because 2 we can't cover them with a PI or an inspection module. 3 So if I believed that the staff would, in 4 fact, undertake the task that you outlined there, then 5 I would have no problem agreeing that that would be a I just haven't seen any plan or any 6 priority one. 7 acknowledgement that that's the issue. In fact, I perceive that if I voted this 8 9 as a priority one, what I would be agreeing to, to continue the debate of how many minor findings and PI 10 11 NR program amount to a trend and what is a trend; how 12 many multiple findings add up to a green, how many multiple findings add up to a white, et cetera. 13 14 MR. CAMERON: So your priority, too, was 15 based on your assumption that it was going to be 16 business as usual, so to speak, okay, and what we have 17 over here is priority one. The assumption is that it's priority one because we need to really resolve 18 19 this issue. 20 SCHERER: I did it based on the MR. 21 comments that were in the table. 22 MR. CAMERON: Steve? 23 Yeah, I think it's such an MR. FLOYD: 24 important issue for the inspectors particularly that 25 it really does need to be addressed.

1	Going back to the first thing that we
2	talked about this morning on timing, it may not be
3	possible to do it very, very soon because I just think
4	it's going to take some time, take some data. You've
5	got to get enough findings across the industry to see
6	if there is a pattern so that you can either support
7	or refute the rebuttable presumption that underpins
8	the program.
9	So it's going to take some time, but it's
10	something that we feel strongly that the staff,
11	because of the concern within the agency, needs to put
12	a high priority on figuring out what is the answer.
13	MR. CAMERON: This is also a good example
14	of the timing issue, something that may be a long-term
15	thing, but it's still important, but we have
16	MR. FLOYD: It could take another year.
17	MR. CAMERON: Could we have an NRC
18	perspective on this particular cut at this issue?
19	CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Well, I think Jim may
20	want to talk about it.
21	MR. CAMERON: Jim.
22	CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Because we heard a lot
23	of this apprehension, I think, from the senior
24	residents, you know, the panel that we had at our last
25	meeting, and I think that was the center of their

1 concern, was how we handle this area and what we're 2 doing with it. 3 MR. CAMERON: Is the center of their 4 concern, if you can just expand on this, but do they 5 have the same concern that was expressed by Dave and Steve that there needs to be more certainty of what 6 7 we're doing in this area? MR. MOORMAN: Yeah, I think that will add 8 to the overall level of comfort because it looks 9 different to the person who is there every day and can 10 11 see the small problems, and they don't look that small 12 because you can see these things as they begin to in your mind line up. 13 14 You may or may not be right, but you need 15 more data, and you want to be in a position of being able to capture your thoughts so that you're not 16 standing there when something happens. 17 PARTICIPANT: In fact, there's no doubt 18 19 that there needs to be a more rigorous and structured 20 way of dealing with these kinds of issues. The 21 initial development of the program recognized that 22 these areas existed, but then didn't go any further, 23 and I think it's a high priority issue that we

continue the work to go to the next generation of

evaluation of these issues.

24

1 MR. BORCHARDT: It's a real void, I 2 think, in the SDP space because if Jim called me up 3 and said, "Gee, whiz, Jim. Every day I got into the 4 control and the operators are sound asleep, " he would 5 come to me and say, "You know, how do you evaluate Put a color on that." 6 7 And from an SDP point of view we couldn't 8 do that. You know, we just don't have the ability to 9 look at --10 MR. TRAPP: I think we'd all agree that's 11 probably an egregious finding. Yet what do we do with 12 it when we find it? So I think human performance is key, and it could be related to safety. So it needs 13 14 to be resolved. 15 MR. BLOUGH: Yeah, and the other point is that plants that have gotten into trouble in the past 16 17 under our old program, generally they had significant crosscutting issues, and they developed over a period 18 19 of years, and you had, you know, a pattern where you 20 saw them develop and evolve for some period of time, 21 generally something and then, you know, 22 significant happened, and you've got the utility, you 23 know, to really make changes to attack the issues they 24 had.

So at the heart of it is if you have

1	crosscutting issues, they're crosscutting because they
2	can affect several cornerstones, and does the
3	framework we have that will, you know, catch
4	individual issues across thresholds; is that going to
5	work well enough, you know, in all important cases?
6	So I think it's a very important question
7	just, you know, based on the history we've had, and it
8	could be that as Steve said, we're going to prove out
9	in a period of time that, yeah, the framework is fine
LO	with the thresholds we've got, but I think it's
L1	important not just for the inspectors. It's important
L2	for the framework and for safety.
L3	I would rate this very high on the
L4	maintain safety.
L5	MR. CAMERON: Okay, and just for the
L6	record, I feel compelled to introduce that if there
L7	were egregious problems like continuously operators
L8	sleeping in the control room, the NRC is not confined
L9	by the reactor oversight process to take whatever
20	action is compelled by the situation to address it.
21	MR. BORCHARDT: I'm just saying we're void
22	from the
23	MR. CAMERON: Right.
24	MR. BORCHARDT: We couldn't do a risk
25	analysis of it, but we could do a regulatory analysis.

1 MR. MOORMAN: And it would happen only 2 once. 3 MR. CAMERON: Okay. It seems this is 4 priority one, and it's a process issue. In other 5 words, although we've heard pros and cons, you're not arguing or not saying -- you're not trying to solve 6 7 the problem here, but you're saying that someone needs to deal with this issue. 8 9 All right. Are you ready for five? 10 CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Yes. 11 MR. CAMERON: This is handling of multiple 12 findings, pretty close. Eight rated it as a one. rated it a two. 13 And, Loren, context on this one? 14 15 This is a CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Yeah. specific question. That's why I just put it under a 16 17 separate heading, and I think you can even make the argument it may be better in the enforcement and 18 19 assessment section. 20 But it was really how we handle multiple 21 related findings as far as, you know, do we issue 22 separate findings. Are there some kind of grouping or 23 roll-up of those issues and how we handle them in the 24 process? 25 And I'm not sure whose comment this was.

1 I don't know if anyone wants to elaborate on that 2 more.. MR. CAMERON: This is an interesting one. 3 4 Steve? 5 MR. FLOYD: I'd just like to make an observation. Last week I read all 723 green findings 6 7 and 203 no color findings that are on the Web site, and it looks to me like there isn't a lot of confusion 8 9 out there. Maybe there's some individual inspection confusion, but as a general rule, it looks like the 10 11 agency is figuring out how to look for related 12 findings, establish a trend, and make a green finding out of it or, in one case, make a white finding and in 13 14 another case make a yellow finding out of it. 15 So it looks like this is happening. 16 MR. CAMERON: And so that's on the theory 17 of what's broken again --18 MR. FLOYD: Yeah. MR. CAMERON: -- this would be a two from 19 your perspective. 20 21 MR. FLOYD: Yeah, basically. 22 Does anyone know what the MR. GARCHOW: 23 example was? I mean, was there an issue with a 24 specific plant that there was a struggle with was the 25 issue just aggregated, and it's yellow on its own, or

was the issue, you know, this happened and this happened and this happened, and when you ran them all through the process, you end up with three greens, a yellow one, and white?

I mean, it would be helpful to me if I sort of knew where this came from.

MR. NOLAN: The hypothetical situation is this, that if you go in and do one inspection and you find, for example, five issues, you could view them individually on their own, in which case if three were green they would cut them off, or you could multiple them together. Well, they would drop off the regulatory conference.

Three of them, or you could lump them together and call it one issue and attribute all of them to the high significance and bring them all to a regulatory conference.

And the issue is right now there isn't any specific guidance to discuss those types of issues. That's the hypothetical. The one in practice is the EQ issue at Cooper, at which they have a significant number of degraded EQ treatments which represented a specific challenge to the SDP program because it was such a complicated technical issue to try and attribute risk to that the way they addressed it is

1 they went and picked out one or two or three of the 2 obvious technical issues and tried to characterize the 3 entire risk characterization of the entire issue based 4 on those because it was just a technical challenge to 5 the SDP. So that's the specific situation, but the 6 7 hypothetical is that based on how you group and categorize things, you can bring green issues to the 8 9 regulatory conference if you choose to discuss that or 10 not. MR. GARCHOW: Thank you. 11 That was very 12 helpful. Yes, that's helpful. 13 MR. FLOYD: 14 CHAIRMAN PLISCO: And I can give you more 15 examples that we had in Region II in the pile-up process. There was an issue at Sequoia, and there was 16 17 a white finding and a flooding issue, and during the course of the inspection there were some other issues 18 that were identified, other violations that were 19 20 identified that were really not contributing causes to 21 the event. They were kind of peripheral issues, and 22 that question came up. 23 Do they get included in the connotation of 24 this white issue, or should they be handled, you know,

separately since they really weren't contributing

1 causes? They were just saying they were found in the 2 course of the inspection. Even though it was related 3 to the equipment itself, you know, how do you handle 4 those? 5 But from my perspective this isn't really a new question for the RLP process either. 6 I mean, 7 this question has always come up, you know, in the previous enforcement program and how you roll up 8 9 issues. 10 You know, we've dealt with this question 11 many times. If you have a number of issues that have 12 a similar root cause, do you put them together into one enforcement package or not? 13 14 MR. GARCHOW: Is it fair to look at this 15 as enduring? You know, we're doing something new that you couldn't think of everything right out of the 16 front. So as the process goes along, we'll find these 17 kinds of things that happen occasionally. 18 19 The example at Cooper, that would happen 20 occasionally, I would think. So if the NRC has a 21 process on how to handle the exceptions, you know, we 22 can probably expect that there is going to be occasionally something come up that doesn't quite fit 23 24 all of the rules.

And I would say that if I had confidence

1	that there was a process within the NRC on working
2	through those kinds of things that come up
3	occasionally, I'd make this a two and just say that
4	just with any other kind of change you can't think of
5	everything up front, and something is going to happen,
6	and as long as you have a process to get the right
7	people in the room and figure it up, I think that's
8	true in almost everything anybody does.
9	MR. CAMERON: Does anybody want to argue
10	for a or try to make a case for a one on this, given
11	what you've heard from Steve and Dave and Loren and
12	the information on specific examples?
13	MR. SCHERER: Only in terms of its impact
14	on the enforcement process. We will get to the
15	matrix, and if you have more than one finding as a
16	result of a related event, are you in a multiple
17	degraded repeated degraded cornerstone?
18	So the consequence is really not severe
19	here in terms of inspection. The importance in my
20	mind is in the enforcement part.
21	MR. BORCHARDT: And in enforcement you're
22	not limiting yourself to a concern about notices of
23	violations, but rather then the effect it would have
24	on entry into the action matrix.
25	MR. SCHERER: Exactly.

MR. CAMERON: Steve.

MR. FLOYD: Just an observation. I mean these are really case specific. I think there's been some examples where this has worked well in the program so far. At one station there were some radiation protection findings that were decided that they were individual findings because each one in and of itself met the criteria. You know, even though they're all somewhat related, it showed an overall potential programmatic breakdown of the station's radiation protection program for workers.

But nonetheless, there was an opportunity to have caught and fixed each one at a certain stage even though they were somewhat related.

So it looks to me like the process has worked by exception, you know, where it needs to. I was just thinking on the Cooper case, that may be another good example of an exception where it's really not how many findings do you make it and roll it up. It sounded to me like what really needed to occur on the Cooper one was to do a Phase 3 SDP evaluation where you looked at what was the impact of having multiple deficiencies that affected multiple pieces of equipment and do a more integrated risk assessment rather than trying to figure out, well, okay,

1	individually they're all green, but if I really roll
2	them all up into, you know, a Phase 3 PRA type
3	evaluation, what would it tell me? Does it rise to
4	the level of being white or are they still all green,
5	you know, in the aggregate?
6	MR. TRAPP: That's what was done.
7	MR. FLOYD: That's what was done? Oh,
8	okay. Yeah.
9	MR. CAMERON: Bill.
10	MR. BORCHARDT: Well, I think also on the
11	EQ types of issues, sometimes there's so many pieces
12	of equipment it just gets to be overly burdensome to
13	analyze each individual piece of equipment, and so
14	what the attempt was to try to find the most
15	significant few as a way of saying, okay, this is the
16	most serious equipment impact, and this was whatever
17	significance it was assessed at, and then just roll
18	that not really roll up.
19	In a way, I'm very sensitive to
20	aggregation in the past
21	MR. FLOYD: Right.
22	MR. BORCHARDT: but not aggregating,
23	summing green findings to something higher, but rather
24	umbrella, putting other issues under the same umbrella
25	as the most significant.

1	MR. FLOYD: Yeah, and I think it's a lot
2	easier to do that on the items that affect the reactor
3	safety SDP cornerstone if it's equipment related.
4	Where this issue really comes to bear is if it's more
5	programmatic in nature, where it's really not
6	affecting any equipment directly today, but there's
7	the perception that it could in the future, and that's
8	where we really get into the gray area on this one.
9	MR. CAMERON: Okay. Well, with the caveat
10	that Ed offered about that this and I don't know if
11	I summarized it right from an enforcement
12	perspective, and I guess in a specific case, the
13	implications of this may be important, but this would
14	be a priority the feeling of the panel that this
15	would be a priority two?
16	All right. Okay. Well, the next one is
17	I-6. This is physical protection inspection, and
18	people seem to be torn on this one. There were six
19	that put in a high priority and eight who put it in
20	the number two category.
21	Loren, what is this physical protection
22	inspection?
23	(Laughter.)
24	CHAIRMAN PLISCO: How much time do we
25	have?

1	You know, there's only two simple bullets
2	on here, but there's been a lot of concerns from the
3	staff and the industry on the physical protection
4	inspection program and how it's going to be conducted,
5	what's going to be looked at, and then how a finding
6	could be handled in the SDP process
7	MR. SCHERER: Didn't the Commission just
8	speak to this issue?
9	MR. BORCHARDT: Yes, and I think this is
10	a case that the Commission has authorized the staff to
11	deviate from what was the original process. Given
12	that we have an existing deviation, in my mind it's a
13	high priority because you don't want to live with
14	existing deviations. I mean, now is the point where
15	there ought to be a high priority to fix the
16	situation.
17	However it ends up being fixed isn't our
18	decision, but
19	MR. GARCHOW: When you get about, you
20	know, 30 words on what the essence of the I didn't
21	get a chance to
22	MR. BORCHARDT: Well, there was a
23	significance determination process for security
24	findings, and that fed into the reactor significance
25	determination process so that what happened far more

1	often than not was that any significant security
2	finding would correlate to a red finding on reactor
3	safety because you could enough?
4	MR. GARCHOW: Yeah.
5	MR. KRICH: Basically you wound up at core
6	damage pretty much, entered the reactor safety.
7	Having been the poster child for this issue
8	(Laughter.)
9	MR. KRICH: I think, you know, given what
LO	came out from the NRC, I guess I still seen this as
L1	it's important to get to resolution on this. We have
L2	some new criteria to go by, but it's still an issue,
L3	I think, that needs attention.
L4	MR. GARCHOW: So the solution was to
L5	somehow revise another process of looking at security
L6	issues that didn't tie into the reactor?
L7	MR. BORCHARDT: Well, the short-term
L8	solution or the interim solution was to not make that
L9	transition to the reactor significance determination
20	process and have the finding based solely on the
21	security.
22	MR. GARCHOW: What they did was come out
23	with some screening criteria.
24	MR. FLOYD: Beginning in green, white,
25	yellow red.
	•

1	MR. GARCHOW: Yeah.
2	MR. BLOUGH: Well, we also have this issue
3	under SS-7, reevaluate the physical security SDP on
4	page 5, and it looks like we already called that we
5	already called the SDP aspects of this as one, and now
6	we're talking about the inspection element of it,
7	which is the actual inspection.
8	MR. CAMERON: And S is what we did. We
9	already discussed that and came to a conclusion; is
10	that correct?
11	CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Yeah.
12	MR. CAMERON: All right. Anybody
13	MR. LAURIE: Chip, I don't have a good
14	understanding of you know, I'm not going to ask
15	that a lot of time be taken for this, but I don't have
16	a good understanding as to what the NRC does as far as
17	security inspections.
18	Does NRC have contracts with your own
19	security forces or the military to test the systems?
20	How does that work?
21	MR. CAMERON: Can someone, I think,
22	because
23	MR. FLOYD: I can give you just a
24	snapshot.
25	MR. CAMERON: put the status stuff in

context? Can someone give Bob a --

MR. FLOYD: The security inspection really has two areas. One is more of a programmatic review of the overall effectiveness of the program covering areas like fitness for duty, access control, and things like that, and administering your program.

And then the second major element that was part of it was a force on force evaluation. The guys in the black pajamas and the guns show up, see if they can break into the plant and get to areas that contain what are called target sets of equipment, which is equipment necessary to achieve and maintain safe shutdown at the plant. So it's an actual exercise.

MR. LAURIE: And what's the history of that?

MR. FLOYD: Well, it's been a bone of contention with the industry and the NRC because with each one of these evaluations, the team that comes in and conducts the exercise has better and better weapons of greater and greater caliber to the point now where at many stations in the country the guards at the station by state law are not allowed to carry the weapons that are necessary to get the force interdicted that is being assembled by the NRC to test their process.

So there's a lot of disconnects. So really I think where this issue really is, and I agree it's a high priority, it needs to be resolved, and the resolution appears to be going towards a revised rule that's going to clarify what is the threat that you're really trying to demonstrate against, and where does a reasonable threat response that the station has to deviate put up start to from what is the responsibility of the U.S. government to not allow that type of force to get into the country for a terrorist action.

I mean, there's a line that has to be drawn somewhere, and over time the line has crept more and more and more towards it's the responsibility of the station to basically take on the responsibilities of the U.S. government at least in some people's perception.

So there's a revised rule that's going to come out and try to define that and make a little bit better sense of it, and in the meantime, they've put in this interim significance determination process to more subjectively evaluate deficiencies that might be relevant for force on force evaluations, and then when the final rule comes out, get an SDP that actually works that's written to meet the final rule.

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That's the overall game plan.

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MR. GARCHOW: Now, to add to that, if you look at, you know, some other potential terrorist targets in the United States, you go to the owners of those industries and ask how are they protected, and they said, "The federal government protects me," you know, large chemical complexes, other things that would be reasonable potential targets for somebody that had that as one of their objectives.

And there's no requirement in those industries at all to have anything other than almost like watchmen for access.

MR. LAURIE: And this is something that the Commission itself is looking at at this point.

MR. SCHERER: Well, there has been progress made. I mean, the NRC has now issued adversarial characteristics document, for the first time in recent memory at least defines a stable platform in which the utilities can respond to that threat.

And the Commission has recently indicated its desire to bring more sense to this area and voted on, I guess, it was for Quad Cities five-nothing to take interim steps, and I think by definition, let's say, consistent with the fact that we put it as a

1	priority one before, the Commissioners have made it a
2	priority one issue. I think it's appropriate, and I
3	think it's going to be addressed probably not key to
4	the reactor oversight process, but it's going to be
5	addressed.
6	MR. LAURIE: I would just like to see each
7	resident inspector pull patrol every once in a while.
8	(Laughter.)
9	MR. GARCHOW: Be sure we get that in the
10	minutes.
11	MR. LAURIE: It's already there.
12	CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Is there any more on
13	this that you want to talk about?
14	MR. CAMERON: Yeah, priority one?
15	CHAIRMAN PLISCO: I was going to propose
16	we take a 15-minute break.
17	(Whereupon, the foregoing matter went off
18	the record at 10:00 a.m. and went back on
19	the record at 10:18 a.m.)
20	MR. CAMERON: Okay. We're going to move
21	right along to I-7, clarify event response guidance.
22	And just for, I guess, people's
23	information because you do have guests coming this
24	afternoon, are you going to plan to break at 12 and
25	resume at one or do you want to reserve the

1 flexibility until you see where we are later on in the 2 morning? 3 CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Let's break at 12. 4 MR. CAMERON: Okay. 5 CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Because we have continuation slot for this tomorrow. 6 7 MR. CAMERON: All right. 8 CHAIRMAN PLISCO: So we'll stop where we 9 are at 12. 10 (Simultaneous conversation.) 11 CHAIRMAN PLISCO: This issue, I-7, and I 12 think most of this came from NRC comments having to do with we were working with some draft guidance on 8.3 13 14 that was being essentially piloted through the initial 15 part of the process, and comments having to do with making sure that the guidance was clear and that the 16 17 thresholds were clear and that we could communicate those to the public, and that there was appropriate 18 19 structure in the process to make the decisions on what 20 the agency was going to do in an event response so 21 that everyone knew what to expect when certain types 22 of events happened. 23 And we had nine MR. CAMERON: Okay. people who selected this in category two and five in 24

category one.

1	Any of the category one people want to
2	make a case for category one?
3	(No response.)
4	MR. CAMERON: Or do any of the category
5	two people want to make a case for category two?
6	MR. BROCKMAN: Category one weren't so
7	very impassioned about their ratings.
8	(Laughter.)
9	MR. SCHERER: I guess between the last
LO	meeting and this one, we had inadvertently volunteered
L1	to test this process.
L2	(Laughter.)
L3	MR. SCHERER: And I thought, as it turns
L4	out, that the response was in accordance with the
L5	process. It was reasonable. It was dialogue, and the
L6	NRC response was appropriate. The process does seem
L7	to work.
L8	I agree there are issues that had to be
L9	resolved, and in fact the CCDP turned out to be
20	somewhat higher than the NRC expected, the one we
21	calculated, but the response was reasoned and seemed
22	to be well within the process.
23	So it seems to work, one data point at
24	least. It seems to work.
25	MR. CAMERON: This is an actual data

83 1 point. 2 MR. SCHERER: Yeah. I don't disagree that there are things that should be worked on, but it 3 4 doesn't seem to be something requiring immediate and 5 priority attention. Anybody on the -- david? 6 MR. CAMERON: 7 MR. GARCHOW: I think that when you read the guidance that they have, I'll sort of make a point 8 9 from the NRC's perspective. I think the process has to have some leeway for the regional administrator to 10 11 in his judgment experience a knowledge of the 12 particular plant, be able to always send the event response, you know, subject to some review, and I 13 14 think if they're doing that every other Thursday, that 15 might be questioned, but I think it's very important for this process to allow the judgment of the regional 16 administrator to call for an event related response. 17 So I would just caution against making 18 19 this box so well defined that there isn't leeway. 20 MR. SCHERER: If I wasn't clear, I think 21 the NRC did use judgment and did use the leeway they 22 I think they used it appropriately. had.

concerns internally that we had early on have really

CHAIRMAN PLISCO: And I think some of the

I'm sort of speaking for Ken.

been addressed.

23

24

I know one of the issues that both Region 4 and Region 2 had was the original procedure didn't, I think provide the flexibility that we thought it needed to handle conditions. That was really focused on something that actually -- an event that happened.

There were some issues, for example, on the cable splice issue that Ken was talking about, and we had some similar issues in region 2. An event did not occur, but it was a condition that we thought was significant that needed like a special inspection. We wanted to make sure the management directive had the guides in there to allow that kind of decision to be made.

And I think that has been changed, and I think, Ken, to your satisfaction that part of the program has been addressed to allow that.

MR. BROCKMAN: Yeah, I think that part has come across pretty well, but I'd also like to echo on Ed's comments. If you looked at what happened out in San Onofre and just a very literalist reading of the current guidance, the inspection effort would have been different from what was out there, and there was an allowance to bring in the experience and the operational savvy of the agency in defining what should be the appropriate response for that.

1 So I'm satisfied with where the guidance 2 is right now, and it's essential to keep it there , 3 and I'd probably go with Steve's comments on the first 4 issue this morning. I think this one has gotten to 5 the point where you put it as two. It's something that needs to be ongoing and continuing there. 6 7 There are two things the regions do: inspect and respond to events. To ignore it would be 8 9 totally inappropriate, but where it's at right now, probably two is the right spot to let it be dealt 10 11 with. 12 MR. HILL: Ken, did I misunderstand you? I thought you said that if you looked at the guidance, 13 14 the inspection would have been different than what 15 they did. If you took an extremely 16 MR. BROCKMAN: 17 literalist look at the risk portion of the guidance, it would have taken you into one path, but when you 18 19 brought in the deterministic aspects to make it a risk 20 informed decision as opposed to a risk based decision 21 -- and that's what I was reading into Ed's comments, 22 I think you got to the right position. 23 So you think the guidance is MR. HILL: 24 okay enough that you can get to where you want to go? 25 MR. BROCKMAN: Yes, yes.

MR. BLOUGH: Yes. I think that on
balance, you know, the guidance that tells you you
know, gives you guidance on what type of inspection
follow-up to kick out to once the event has been
stabilized, the event is actually over, you know, that
has a risk informed aspect to it, and it has
deterministic criteria, and it has allowance for
judgment, and it says the people in NRC management
should consult each other.
So it seems to me the San Onofre one was,
you know, weighing all of the guidance that was right
the way it should happen per the guidance.
MR. BROCKMAN: I think so.
MR. CAMERON: So any objections to
MR. CAMERON: So any objections to priority two?
priority two?
priority two?  (No response.)
priority two?  (No response.)  MR. CAMERON: Okay. So next we have
priority two?  (No response.)  MR. CAMERON: Okay. So next we have revised problem identification and resolution
priority two?  (No response.)  MR. CAMERON: Okay. So next we have revised problem identification and resolution inspection, and this one is pretty close. Six of you
priority two?  (No response.)  MR. CAMERON: Okay. So next we have revised problem identification and resolution inspection, and this one is pretty close. Six of you thought it was one, and eight of you thought it should
priority two?  (No response.)  MR. CAMERON: Okay. So next we have revised problem identification and resolution inspection, and this one is pretty close. Six of you thought it was one, and eight of you thought it should be a two.
priority two?  (No response.)  MR. CAMERON: Okay. So next we have revised problem identification and resolution inspection, and this one is pretty close. Six of you thought it was one, and eight of you thought it should be a two.  Loren, what's the story on this one?

1 identification resolution inspections, the resources 2 we're applying to that, whether that appropriate, whether we're looking at the right areas, 3 4 and what we are doing with the findings, whether that 5 was effective and efficient. This is in addition. There is internally 6 7 a working group working on these very issues to look 8 at what the results have been across all the regions, 9 and if there's a better approach that we can take on 10 that inspection. 11 MR. BORCHARDT: Would it be fair to say 12 that I-8 relates to I-4? MS. FERDIG: That was going to be my next 13 14 question. 15 CHAIRMAN PLISCO: There is a difference, and that's why I separated them on here. I think four 16 17 is really what you do with the results, how you handle issues that may be considered crosscutting issues and 18 19 any thresholds for action. IA was more narrow as far as how do we do 20 21 the inspection, what the right frequency of the 22 inspection is, how many resources should be applied. 23 It's really just the scope and breadth of the 24 inspections specifically and not what we do with the

results and how we handle the results of that.

1 MR. BORCHARDT: But PR&R is a crosscutting 2 issue. Right. 3 CHAIRMAN PLISCO: 4 MR. BORCHARDT: And for that reason I 5 think crosscutting issues is a significant issue overall, and then as you get more specific, it remains 6 7 just a significant through. I would argue that this ought to be a priority one as a piece of a much larger 8 9 issue, a crosscutting issue. MR. SCHERER: I quess I don't understand 10 11 why this needs to be a separate issue as opposed to 12 being subsumed not only in four, but in the way we've revised Item 1. 13 14 MR. TRAPP: The last bullet of Item one is 15 almost the same thing. It says, "Need to review frequency of inspections that require major asset 16 17 allocation, and they talk specifically to the PI&R. Yeah, and I don't see the 18 MR. SCHERER: 19 PI&R as different or raises some unique issue. 20 agree that there are some questions as to the amount 21 of resources, the amount of findings, the amount of 22 already identified findings that now get followed up. 23 But I think these are all issues that 24 could easily be subsumed both in four and in item one, 25 and unless I'm missing something, the PI&R just

1 doesn't deserve to have a separate category for the 2 resolution of the same set of issues. MR. BORCHARDT: 3 Well, I'll just play devil's advocate for a second. The strength of the 4 5 industry's problem identification and resolution processes, I think are one of the founding principles 6 7 of this new program. To the method that the NRC ought to use to periodically verify the health of that 8 problem, I'm assuming that's what the inspection 9 10 procedure and process would do. 11 Ι think that gives it special а 12 I mean that and in light of the fact consideration. that it's a crosscutting issue. 13 14 MR. SCHERER: Well, let me be the advocate 15 for the other side. What is not covered already under the fact that crosscutting issues -- PI&R is one of 16 17 the three crosscutting issues, and we're addressing that aspect in there, and the resource allocation 18 19 toward how many hours of inspection does a PI&R 20 require would be subsumed in Item 1. 21 What issue is left over for separate 22 identification and resolution? 23 MR. BORCHARDT: I don't know that any one 24 is left over. What I see as a danger, especially as 25 putting I-8 into I-1, that I-1 is a much bigger thing,

1 has a number of areas that in my mind do not rise to 2 the same priority of importance as PI&R, and that I'd rather not that one issue get lost in the much bigger 3 4 picture of I-1. 5 I could live more easily personally with folding it into I-4, as I-4 deals with how findings 6 7 are handled, and we would expand I-4 to also include how the findings are identified. I could live with 8 9 that as long as it keeps a high priority. There are two different 10 MR. CAMERON: 11 aspects here though. One is the, as Loren said, this 12 one was meant to be focused on the actual inspection although it obviously has import 13 14 crosscutting, and it's the possibility that you could 15 put the actual inspection process part, i.e., I guess, resource allocation into one, but make sure under the 16 crosscutting I-4 that you put this in there. 17 Would that satisfy you, Bill? We don't 18 19 want it to get lost basically. MR. BORCHARDT: Yeah, I think I'm at least 20 21 initially concerned with having the issue put into I-1 22 because I see that as a very big resource issue, and 23 it would get lost. 24 MR. SCHERER: I was suggesting putting it 25 in I-4 the way you discussed, but there's one aspect

1 of it that I think does belong in addition to I-4 in 2 I-1.MR. GARCHOW: 3 If we think I-4 is really 4 just handling of it, then handling of it would be how does it affect across all elements of the reactor 5 oversight process. So when they handle it, I imagine 6 7 they're going to revise the procedures. If we revise the procedure, it will take a different amount of 8 9 effort. I mean, I wouldn't presuppose which way it 10 would go. 11 But when I thought of handling, I thought 12 it was handling it in its entirety where every aspect of the programming dealing with crosscutting issues 13 14 would be revised in some way, you know, that whoever 15 is looking at it would determine a need be. 16 quess I was reading more 17 "handling" encompassing everything. 18 MR. CAMERON: Mary? 19 MS. FERDIG: Well, I'm just imagining the 20 final report, and I'm imagining a section crosscutting issues, which is clearly going to have 21 22 some language associated with the kinds of things 23 we've discussed, and I think in doing so there will 24 need to be a priority on this PI&R process. So I think it works. I think we can do it 25

1 this way, and it remains for me a priority one, given 2 that. 3 MR. GARCHOW: Bold under I-4. CHAIRMAN PLISCO: 4 And there is some symmetry there. That inspection procedure does look 5 at all three of those crosscutting issues. 6 7 MR. CAMERON: So is it the sense of the 8 group that we put PI&R under -- fold that into I-4, 9 eliminate this as a separate category, and also keep in mind that there may be resource allocation issues 10 11 related to this PI&R that you might have to address 12 under category one? CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Actually they're already 13 14 there. 15 Okay. All right. MR. CAMERON: 16 MR. BLOUGH: But if we merge them, then 17 we'll bring the text of I-8 up into I-4 because I think it --18 19 MR. CAMERON: Yes. 20 MR. BLOUGH: Yeah, the PIR inspection is 21 the only inspection focused, you know, directly on 22 crosscutting issues, and I think how you do the 23 inspection and how often and what's the interaction 24 between the periodic inspection and continuous 25 inspection, yeah, those are all very important

1 questions.

And the question is addressed even within an environment where there's some who don't think any periodic inspection is needed of this area because, again, using the theory that if no thresholds are cross, the agency doesn't need to be looking there.

So just given all of the divergence of use and the importance of the fundamental principle of the program, you know, I think this inspection, any issues associated with it are priority one.

MR. CAMERON: Okay, and that emphasizes also, just to reemphasize what Mary said, is that I-4 remains a priority one issue.

MR. SCHERER: I have no disagreement with it as far as we've gone. There's still one remaining part of this that I think gets subsumed in Item 1, and that is at least our experience on the PI&R inspections is it tends to spin off findings in other areas simply because they're in the PI&R process.

And it has, therefore, implications against the base program because as these get identified, they need to be closed out, whether they're a minor violation or a violation or a green finding or something else.

So that whenever the NRC comes in and

1	looks at the PI&R, there's a tendency to I don't
2	want to be pejorative but mine it in terms of
3	finding other issues because the licensee identified
4	it, put it in the PI&R program. The NRC then wants to
5	follow up and close it out.
6	So it does have an impact on the base
7	program, and I just wanted to make sure that that gets
8	identified.
9	MR. CAMERON: Can we put a bullet for
10	further discussion under the I-1 description that says
11	something about the so-called spinoffs from the PI and
12	our inspection? Would that capture it, identify it
13	enough so that we can speak to it?
14	MR. MOORMAN: Yeah, I think we need to
15	have something in there that identifies that because
16	my experience with the PI&R inspections are that we
17	find different issues.
18	An ancillary part of that is an assessment
19	of the PI&R program, but we do find other issues that
20	wind up going back into the assessment process, and
21	I'm not exactly sure that that's what we that we
22	want to make an assessment of how well the corrective
23	action program works, not finding all of the
24	violations that the residents did.

MR. CAMERON: And that's your -- the

95 1 spinoffs that you're talking about, Ed, are a spinoff 2 into the assessment part. 3 MR. SCHERER: Exactly. 4 MR. CAMERON: Okay. Let's look at as a 5 bullet under one, and so we eliminated eight, folded it into I-4 and a little bit into I-1. 6 7 Last inspection issue, I-9, of 8 licensees' self-assessments to meet inspection 9 requirements. Now, pretty overwhelmingly, 11 of you had a two for this issue, and three of you had a one 10 11 for it. 12 And, Loren, do you want to? CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Yeah. Well, there are 13 14 a number of specific comments, and this actually goes 15 back to the old inspection program that was a part of the old inspection program where we in certain cases 16 flexibility if the utility did 17 allowed the assessment or had a third party come in and do a 18 we would look at reducing 19 specific inspection, 20 inspection resources in that specific area, 21 essentially just look at what the self-assessment did 22 and what the findings were, and use that as part of 23 our program.

the gist of this comment is: is there avenue for that

That was in the old program, and I think

24

1	approach in the new program? And maybe to use self-
2	assessments in place of baseline inspection, I think,
3	is the question.
4	MR. CAMERON: And with that explanation,
5	does anybody want to reverse what they thought their
6	priorities were?
7	CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Well, I just want to add
8	one more thing. This has a link back to what we
9	talked about before when Ken was talking about what is
10	the baseline program. You know, is it a de minimis or
11	not?
12	And there is some linkage between this
13	question and what we talked about before, defining
14	what the baseline program is.
15	MR. CAMERON: Anybody have anything they
16	want to say about this one?
17	MR. GARCHOW: I think it's a natural
18	evolution, but I don't think it's a priority.
19	MR. FLOYD: Right. That's how I see it.
20	PARTICIPANT: I agree.
21	MR. CAMERON: Okay. Does anybody have an
22	objection to make it a priority two?
23	And this implications for defining the
24	baseline, Loren, that's going to be
25	CHAIRMAN PLISCO: We have that actually in

1 number one as a two also. Make sure that definition 2 is clear. So that's captured in I-1. 3 MR. CAMERON: 4 MS. FERDIG: Let me just ask real quickly. 5 I think I put a one down for that, and I think my question around that had to do with my lack of 6 7 understanding about the degree to which selfassessment was relied upon as a part of the inspection 8 9 process or if it could be, and if so, how that balance 10 occurred. 11 And if that's the case, then how do we 12 know how rigorous internal self-assessments are and what's the standard by which that is measured? 13 14 So I just want to make that statement. 15 CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Well, in the program 16 right now there is not any reliance on the self-17 assessment process, and this is a question that's come up because there was some case-by-case reliance in the 18 19 old program, and in some specific areas. 20 MS. FERDIG: Right. I mean I think it's 21 a great idea. 22 CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Most of it had to do 23 with big team inspections like design inspections. If 24 the utility did their own evaluation of an inspection. 25 and we looked There were cases,

licensee performance and what kind of confidence we had in that assessment, and it's not that we wouldn't do any inspection. We would reduce the inspection and first look at what they did and look at the results of that and make a decision whether we thought that was a good enough look and not do an inspection ourselves.

And that's what we did in the old program.

MR. SCHERER: I want to make sure the record is clear for those people who aren't familiar with it. At least I'm familiar with the process. Critical self-assessments are done with, for example, for the CE fleet we do it with a team of peers and with other plants and from other expert groups. So it's not just a couple of people within the utility that sit down and decide to do a self-directed self-assessment.

These are usually interdisciplinary teams that come and audit the processes rigorously, and we found our experience even in some cases with more rigor go through the process and do an evaluation, and in some cases we have suggested that the NRC consider those as potential inputs to their inspection process even to the point of inviting the NRC to participate in those teams.

You know, I'm a very strong advocate for

1	that process as adding a lot of value, especially as
2	our peers from other plans with a similar design come
3	in and review our processes, but I think this is just
4	one of these normal evolutions that over time we'll
5	look at and if it adds value, the NRC will make a
6	decision whether it does or does not add value to
7	their process.
8	MR. CAMERON: And is that clear, Mary,
9	now?
10	MS. FERDIG: Yeah, I think it is.
11	MR. CAMERON: What their role is?
12	MS. FERDIG: That's what excites me about
13	this, the potentiality of this item. I like seeing
14	the utility assume responsibility of its self-
15	assessment. I like the regulator acknowledging that
16	and using that as a part of its input.
17	And I think it's clearly a priority two.
18	MR. CAMERON: And now just to make sure
19	that we're clear on this and maybe make sure I'm clear
20	on this, but as of now, the self-assessment is not
21	CHAIRMAN PLISCO: It's not part of the
22	program.
23	MR. CAMERON: not part of the regular
24	program.
25	CHAIRMAN PLISCO: I'd like to comment on

1	that.
2	MR. CAMERON: Okay.
3	CHAIRMAN PLISCO: It's not part of the
4	baseline inspection.
5	MR. CAMERON: Right.
6	CHAIRMAN PLISCO: In other words, there's
7	no provision in the baseline inspection for a utility
8	to do their own self-assessment and, therefore,
9	obviate the need for baseline.
10	Not true in the supplemental program. The
11	design of the supplemental inspection for degraded
12	cornerstone plant or multiple degraded cornerstone was
13	done with the expectation right in the action matrix
14	that there would be a comprehensive licensee self-
15	assessment once they crossed thresholds to that
16	extent, and then the whole supplemental inspection,
17	you know assumes that that's happened.
18	So I think this is priority two as well.
19	I just wanted to make that clarification. It's not
20	part of the baseline, but it is, I think, part of the
21	supplemental.
22	MR. BLOUGH: It's an assumption of the
23	supplemental program.
24	CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Right, and I think the

base of this comment was really strictly to the

1	baseline program.
2	MR. CAMERON: And just for the record, the
3	self-assessment that you guys do is normal course of
4	business. It's not just a supplemental situation, and
5	I think Mary is advocating perhaps for somewhere down
6	the line that self-assessments should perhaps be
7	encouraged. Use of it could be encouraged perhaps by
8	some NRC recognition.
9	MS. FERDIG: Right, and, again, that
10	assumes a rigorous standard in how that would be
11	applied.
12	MR. CAMERON: All right.
13	MR. HILL: Let me just ask a question and
14	just make sure I'm understanding a baseline. If the
15	team inspections that you talked about have been
16	previously looked at of if you've done your own self-
17	assessment, would they be considered part of the
18	baseline or just supplemental?
19	MR. FLOYD: Only supplement as you're
20	getting up there and not part of the baseline.
21	MR. HILL: Other than, for instance,
22	what's an OSRE considered? Is that part of the
23	baseline or is that above baseline? Because that's
24	CHAIRMAN PLISCO: It's neither. It's not
25	part of the baseline.

1	MR. BROCKMAN: Currently, Attachment 3,
2	there's an Attachment 3 to the security procedure,
3	which is a baseline procedure.
4	CHAIRMAN PLISCO: But it's sort of an
5	interim, right. I mean the Commission is still making
6	a decision where we're going to go.
7	MR. BROCKMAN: There's a forced or
8	unforced component recognized within the baseline
9	procedure at the moment. How that will characterize
10	itself in the final throes remains to be seen.
11	MR. HILL: We have similar type things in
12	fire protection stuff. I'm not sure whether that's
13	considered baseline or not.
14	CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Yeah, that's baseline.
15	MR. HILL: Okay.
16	MR. CAMERON: Okay. Are we ready to move
17	into performance indicators?
18	Okay. The first issue there is need to
19	identify and evaluate unintended consequences for
20	performance indicators. I think one of the highest
21	number one ratings so far on this one, and, Loren, do
22	you want to give us some context?
23	CHAIRMAN PLISCO: There are quite a few
24	comments. I won't go through them all on your sheet.
25	It is on page 9 of the big package.

1	A lot of concerns and issues and
2	perceptions of unintended consequences of certain
3	performance indicators or performance indicators that
4	may drive actions, undesirable actions by a utility
5	because of the performance indicator, and those are
6	the concerns.
7	I think a number of these we've talked
8	about before in some of our previous meetings on some
9	of these unintended consequences for certain specific
10	performance indicators.
11	MR. CAMERON: Anybody I know Ed has
12	spoken to this a number of times. Maybe
13	CHAIRMAN PLISCO: I was expecting him to
14	speak first.
15	MR. CAMERON: I was going to say why don't
16	we go to Ed for a summary.
17	MR. SCHERER: I think I've spoken enough
18	on this. I think everybody knows where I come out.
19	I think this is an important issue that needs to not
20	only be worked in the short term, but we have to watch
21	it over the long term and have a robust process for
22	looking at it.
23	MR. BLOUGH: You've got 13 one votes on
24	this, which may be the highest ratio.
25	MR. SCHERER: Everything has been said.

1	Maybe not everybody has had a chance to say it.
2	MR. CAMERON: I guess we should ask the
3	people who at least initially rated it as a two. Do
4	they want to say anything about that?
5	Luckily we don't know who
6	(Laughter.)
7	CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Does anyone strongly
8	oppose it being a one? Let's put it that way.
9	(No response.)
LO	CHAIRMAN PLISCO: All right. It sounds
L1	like a one.
L2	MR. CAMERON: Okay. Next, P-2, initiating
L3	events, cornerstone, and this is the opposite from one
L4	in a sense. We had 11 who thought it was category one
L5	and four who thought it was category I'm sorry.
L6	Eleven thought it was category two. Four thought it
L7	was category one.
L8	Loren?
L9	CHAIRMAN PLISCO: This specifically had to
20	do with the unplanned power change performance
21	indicator to evaluate the effectiveness of that
22	performance indicator, and there's also a concern
23	about unintended consequences.
24	And as I read this the other day,I was
25	wondering whether we qualit to just roll this up into

	105
1	a P-1.
2	MR. FLOYD: That's really what it is.
3	CHAIRMAN PLISCO: It sounds like it's
4	really a sub-question of what we already have in P-1.
5	MR. FLOYD: I think so.
6	MR. CAMERON: Does everybody agree with
7	that?
8	MR. FLOYD: I would agree with that, yeah.
9	MR. CAMERON: That it is a subset?
10	PARTICIPANT: Sure.
11	CHAIRMAN PLISCO: It's just one example,
12	I think, of what we're talking about.
13	MR. FLOYD: Exactly right.
14	MR. CAMERON: Ed, you're ambivalent about
15	that or have no problem with that?
16	MR. SCHERER: I have no problem with it
17	being moved in. I don't think this is a major issue.
18	I mean, I was the one or one of the people that
19	believed on its own it would be a category two. By
20	moving it into P-1 I haven't changed my opinion as to
21	the importance of this particular issue, but letting
22	it be subsumed into P-1 is fine with me.
23	MR. HILL: I guess one comment I'd like to
24	make back on P-1, and that's the wording we have of
25	the title of it of unintended consequences. When we

1	have the NRC come here and talk about this, they made
2	a very clear point that unintended consequences had a
3	very specific meaning which was different from
4	increased regulatory burden, and I think though that
5	the comments here kind of cross both of those, you
6	know, in P-1 and P-2.
7	It really talks more about I think my
8	impression and a lot of people had the feeling of
9	really kind of discussing both of those. So I
10	MR. CAMERON: This just sounds like a good
11	point to clarify not only does the use of this term
12	is this a term of art in reactor oversight process
13	space that they imply something that the panel doesn't
14	mean to imply? And what is covered?
15	MR. HILL: I guess my understanding of
16	what that meant was much bigger than what I heard the
17	NRC say. "It only means this."
18	Up here is the first time I really heard
19	that distinction.
20	MR. CAMERON: Can you tell us again what
21	you think it means versus what the NRC staff said it
22	meant?
23	MR. HILL: Well, I think what I heard the
24	NRC staff say is it only had to do with those things
25	that a utility might or might not do relating to

1 safety, unclear safety; that if there was in the viewpoint of the utility extra burden or extra things 2 3 you had to do or extra, you know, like the fact that 4 you're white and how that's viewed from the outside, 5 that was not an unintended consequence. That might be increased regulatory burden, 6 7 but it didn't fit their definition when Alan Madison and them came and talked. It didn't fit in their 8 9 definition when they talked about unintended 10 consequences as far as the self-assessment and so on 11 that they did. I heard a big distinction between 12 unintended consequences meaning only relating 13 14 nuclear safety and that anything else that was just a 15 hassle or whatever fit into the other category of increased regulatory burden. 16 17 MR. CAMERON: I guess this is a good issue to think about given the NRC's statutory mission, but 18 19 again, looking at strategic plan, what do the rest of 20 the people on the panel think unintended consequences 21 covers? 22 Are we only looking at potential safety 23 issues? Are you also looking at additional resource 24 expenditures, administrative complications, et cetera,

et cetera?

1 MS. FERDIG: Absolutely. I mean, 2 unintended consequences in the grandest sense without 3 calling specifically what Alan said is whatever occurs 4 that wasn't a part of the intention of the action that 5 has some broader implication. I don't think Alan would 6 MR. BROCKMAN: 7 disagree with you in the broad context. I think he was just bringing it up to Bennett. When they talk 8 about the unintended consequences of a regulatory 9 burden issue, they will talk about it under the term 10 11 of regulatory burden. 12 When they're talking about unintended consequences within the program branch, they focus 13 14 themselves to talk in that way, not to say at all that 15 there aren't unintended consequences that go much broader than just the reactor safety area. It's just 16 the bin they put them in for internal discussions' 17 viewpoints. 18 19 So I mean, I that's how they're doing it, 2.0 but it doesn't mean how we have to do it. MR. CAMERON: Yeah, right. Side from the 21 22 fact of what the NRC staff means, it probably would be 23 good if the panel agreed on what they meant by this, 24 and using Richard's broader definition as the stocking

horse here, does anybody have any disagreements that

1	it should be looked at broadly?
2	MR. HILL: Well, I think the only point
3	though is we're supposed to be giving our report to
4	Sam Collins, who will be hearing self-assessment from
5	Alan Madison and them, and they will be talking that
6	terminology.
7	And so if we're going to use the same
8	words, we ought to at least redefine it or something.
9	MR. CAMERON: Be explicit.
10	MR. HILL: Or else we're going to get
11	into, you know, there will be a conflict there.
12	MR. BORCHARDT: I read P-1 and all of the
13	sub-bullets to be in shorthand managing to the
14	indicator issues, whereas the broader unintended
15	consequences, which is the point we were talking
16	about, I think is equally valid, but I don't read that
17	into what the current P-1 is.
18	We may have created a separate issue about
19	unintended consequences for the regulatory process for
20	using performance indicators, but I think P-1 has to
21	do with the impact on plant operations and conduct of
22	activities on site that are caused by a recognition of
23	its impact on performance indicators.
24	MR. CAMERON: Well, if this is true, I
25	guess the first thing you need to decide is do we want

1 to cover more than just focusing narrowly on the 2 performance indicator classical use of the term 3 perhaps "unintended consequence," and if you do want 4 to focus more broadly on that, what terminology? 5 Do you want to change the terminology on this one, unintended consequences and other whatever, 6 7 or do you just want to make that clear in the narrative on it that we're focusing on more than just 8 9 this narrower view? 10 Steve, any thoughts? 11 MR. FLOYD: We could still use the term 12 "unintended consequences." To me what it meant, and I agree with Bill. The way it's written here, it's 13 14 pretty much from the licenses who are managing it, but 15 I think it is a little broader than that. To me unintended consequences is if either 16 the licensee or the regulator changes their behavior 17 in a manner that they otherwise would not have done 18 19 without the construct of the program in place driving 20 To me that's what it is. 21 Because in some cases we think the NRC, 22 you know, has to per the program engage in a supplemental inspection if you trip a threshold, but 23 24 they already understand why you trip the threshold,

and it may be an artificial problem with the PI and

1 the way it's put together, and yet the program says I 2 have to go out and do an inspection. So there's an element of burden both for 3 4 the staff and for the licensees that really isn't 5 having to do with managing the PI. It's a flaw within 6 the PI perhaps. 7 MR. SCHERER: And maybe we need to create another or put that in the parking lot because I see 8 9 this -- I don't want to snatch defeat from the jaws of victory or confusion from where I think there's a 10 11 clear understanding of unintended consequences as Bill 12 This is managing to the indicators, and outlines. that's the way we discussed it at our previous 13 14 meetings. 15 I agree there's a broader issue, as Steve defines it, but that's not the issue as I understood 16 17 P-1, and if we start, let's at least reach agreement that there is an issue on managing to the indicators 18 19 and to the metrics, and this goes to -- I would say it's broader than just the performance indicators, but 20 21 it's a P-1 issue because you manage to the SDP. You 22 manage to a lot of the other indicators as well. 23 But here I think we understand the issue. 24 I think it has been discussed at at least two of the

previous meetings in some detail, and if we start

1 expanding it, then we're almost assured to create 2 confusion unintended as to what we mean by 3 consequences. 4 MR. CAMERON: So your proposal, Ed, would 5 be to keep this within the narrower definition of managing to the indicators and the matrix, however you 6 7 want to describe that, but to create another category under O or something like that that would take care of 8 Richard's concern and other people's concerns about 9 resource expenditures. 10 And Steve talked about NRC and licensee 11 12 behavior under unintended consequences, and I guess I to ask whether even under this narrower 13 14 definition are you only worried about changes in -- I 15 mean, how does this fit in with Steve's changes in NRC and licensee behavior? 16 17 But I guess I threw a lot on the table How about this other -- Richard, what do you 18 there. 19 think about this additional category, new category 20 that captures some of the resource and administrative 21 issues that you were concerned about? 22 Well, yeah, that's fine. MR. HILL: 23 think even the idea of managing to the indicator and 24 what Steve's saying about NRC behavior. I think that what I heard from Alan and 25

1 them was much more narrow. I think what he was 2 looking at is the utility is doing something that's 3 considered to be adverse to safety as a result of 4 I think that was the specific area they were 5 looking for. And so even if you're looking at, well, 6 7 the NRC's reacting when they don't have to or whatever, I think that would be outside of what they 8 9 would classify when they're doing their assessment, and that's really my only point. 10 11 I'm not really real strong about what we 12 put in here, but it's just that I think there is a very specific definition that I really wasn't aware of 13 14 until they came and presented it that I don't think 15 the industry as a whole is that familiar with. I know my boss would talk about unintended 16 consequences, and he's talking about things that don't 17 fit in the NRC's definition. 18 19 MR. BROCKMAN: But, once again, the issues 20 acknowledged. They're just are being in 21 different --22 Right, and I agree. MR. HILL: 23 MR. BROCKMAN: Okay. 24 MR. HILL: And that was really the part I 25 took back, was, you know, you start saying this is unintended consequences, and people will tend to disagree. They'll agree it's in another bin somewhere, but there is that distinction, and that's really all I was trying to bring up, is that there is a distinction.

And I kind of tend to wonder if maybe saying something along the lines of this is managing the indicator instead of using the words "unintended consequences" might be better.

MS. FERDIG: Yeah. Call it what it is.

MR. SCHERER: Well, "unintended consequences," I believe, is a good and legitimate title for this because these are all indicators that have been picked because they appear to be the right thing to do, and there are unintended consequences of almost everything you pick, and you have to manage them.

An easy example, and we talked about several at other meetings, but one that has come up recently, is everybody can say a LARUT (phonetic) is an important thing to do and we want to reduce occupational dose, but we don't want to do it at the expense of not inspecting a component that needs inspection. Putting off an inspection of a steam generator or something else because you're trying to

1 reduce dose is a choice that you don't want to just 2 drive based on a performance indicator. You want to 3 make the right decision based on the risk and the 4 balance in terms of overall safety. 5 So recognizing that we're talking about performance indicators, in selecting them and in 6 7 changing them and in addressing them, we need to recognize every time you pick a performance indicator 8 9 with the best of intentions, you always have to unintended 10 continue look aggressively for 11 consequences. 12 Would you describe it as MR. CAMERON: unintended consequences of managing the performance 13 14 indicators? 15 MR. BROCKMAN: Could I offer a suggestion? I think what would scratch everyone's itch, it would 16 17 probably be in our presentation to just have a 18 paragraph in there that says there are numerous 19 unintended consequences that address certain areas. 20 Those that address the effectiveness and efficiency of 21 the NRC are being dealt with under effective and 22 efficiency. 23 Those that are dealing with regulatory

this section we are dealing with this, which would be

burden are dealt with under regulatory burden.

24

right there, a little introductory paragraph.
Everybody knows where to go to get whatever they want,
and we can move on to P-3.
MS. FERDIG: Exactly.
CHAIRMAN PLISCO: John and I will take the
burden to try to
MR. MONNINGER: He's on his own.
CHAIRMAN PLISCO: clarify exactly what
we mean by this term in the context of what we're
talking about.
MR. GARCHOW: Can you say that again for
John?
(Laughter.)
MR. BROCKMAN: It is captured for
posterity.
MR. CAMERON: Well, given what Ken said,
which alluded to the fact that these other unintended
consequences will, again, be captured somewhere else,
is that true or do we really need another category
somewhere that tries to capture them? And these would
be, you know, the resource issues, administrative
difficulties, which could be, I suppose
MR. SCHERER: Couldn't we put it in the
parking lot and we would see
H

1	MR. SCHERER: at the end if we need to
2	come back and address it?
3	MR. CAMERON: Okay. So I'll just say need
4	for additional unintended consequences category just
5	for shorthand now.
6	MR. HILL: Just as a comment, it sure
7	would be good if you used black ink or black or
8	whatever it is instead of red.
9	MR. CAMERON: What's that?
10	MR. HILL: A darker color would be able to
11	be seen easier.
12	MR. CAMERON: That's one of the unintended
13	consequences
14	(Laughter.)
15	MR. CAMERON: of using red is that you
16	can't see this?
17	MS. FERDIG: That's right.
18	MR. CAMERON: Okay. I promise after
19	lunch, we'll have a visible parking lot.
20	PARTICIPANT: Perhaps that was an intended
21	consequence.
22	MR. CAMERON: All right.
23	CHAIRMAN PLISCO: P-3?
24	MR. CAMERON: All righty. New performance
25	indicators.

1	MR. TRAPP: You know, one of the risk
2	based performance indicators is looking at steam
3	generator tube integrity, and it seems like that's a
4	pretty specific subset maybe of a risk based
5	performance indicator, P-5.
6	CHAIRMAN PLISCO: P-5?
7	MR. FLOYD: Yeah, I agree. I was going to
8	suggest on this one why don't we just change it to be
9	a general wording and just say, you know, identify and
10	evaluate potential new programs in accordance with the
11	program. I mean new indicators in accordance with the
12	program.
13	The NRC has actually developed a process
14	for doing just that.
15	MR. TRAPP: And we do capture that thought
16	in P-5.
17	MR. FLOYD: Yeah.
18	MR. TRAPP: Depending on nearly unanimous.
19	CHAIRMAN PLISCO: So combine P-3 and P-5
20	and just call that "identify and evaluate new
21	performance indicators."
22	MR. CAMERON: Are we keeping P-4 or
23	merging it?
24	CHAIRMAN PLISCO: P-3 and P-5 we're
25	merging.

1	MR. CAMERON: Oh, okay. So P-3 is going
2	into P-5. All right.
3	CHAIRMAN PLISCO: We're combining them.
4	PARTICIPANT: We're on a roll here.
5	CHAIRMAN PLISCO: And what is it?
6	MR. CAMERON: Need for risk informed
7	performance indicators is P-5.
8	MR. GARCHOW: It looks like continue
9	evaluating performance indicators, which I think the
10	program allows for now.
11	CHAIRMAN PLISCO: We had 14 twos for P-3
12	and 13 twos for P-5.
13	MR. FLOYD: Pretty unanimous.
14	CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Does anyone want to
15	speak to making it a one?
16	MR. FLOYD: No.
17	CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Are we ready for P-4?
18	Do you want to talk about P-4?
19	MR. CAMERON: Okay. Again, a split, eight
20	for one, six for two. And this is that difference in
21	perception regarding green and white.
22	How about the Loren, do you want to say
23	anything about this one?
24	CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Yeah, there's a lot in
25	this one. This has to do with some of the

communication issues and perception issues regarding the green-white threshold. This specifically is talking about the PIs, but there is an overarching issue in the same area that we get to, I think, in one of the O -- I don't know if it's O-5. That may be where that is.

Because of the difference in development of these thresholds, the PI indicator isn't necessarily -- that threshold is not necessarily a risk significant threshold where it is in the inspection findings.

And the confusion in communicating that information and entry point of the action matrix, and there are some concerns in here about the perception difference between the NRC and the licensees regarding this threshold.

We talked about this several times before in some of our previous meetings, that, you know, from the NRC's perspective it's really the entry point to the NRC response, and it's sort of a low level of significance.

But based on some of the unintended consequences discussion and licensee responses, they view it as, you know, much more significant than what the staff views it as.

1 And then the third aspect obviously is the public communication and what their perception of that 2 3 threshold is and the importance of that. 4 MR. SCHERER: This is clearly one issue 5 that I feel strongly about, but one of the things that we're going to get over the next today and tomorrow is 6 7 some stakeholder input, is the perception. We've heard a lot about this area in my mind in the past, people 8 coming in with all of the performance indicators, 9 they 10 green are, state and 11 stakeholders that perceive the program to be the 12 performance indicators, and if they're all green, it's somehow unacceptable. 13 14 I would like -- we could discuss this, and 15 we could spend a lot of time discussing this, but I'm not sure that I would want to come to resolution till 16 I've heard from the other stakeholders. 17 So my suggestion is that rather than go 18 19 through this now and then listen this afternoon and 20 tomorrow, perhaps we could delay this and have this 21 discussion later when we have gotten the additional 22 input from the other stockholders, or we could discuss 23 it twice. 24 MR. CAMERON: Anybody disagree with that 25 or have anything to offer before we table it?

1	MR. GARCHOW: I agree with that. The
2	stakeholder issue is the issue. I mean, those that
3	understand it understand it, but that's not the issue.
4	MS. FERDIG: When you use the word
5	"stakeholder," are you referring primarily to non-
6	regulator, non-licensee stakeholder?
7	MR. GARCHOW: That would be correct.
8	MS. FERDIG: So that it is, in your view,
9	then less an issue of the difference in perception,
10	green and white, as perceived by you guys?
11	MR. GARCHOW: I wouldn't want to speak to
12	that.
13	MR. BROCKMAN: Yeah, I wouldn't agree with
14	that.
15	MS. FERDIG: Because initially I was going
16	to say, well, do we need to add it to the public
17	information question in P-2, and then I thought, no,
18	because this question relates also to internal
19	understandings between regulators.
20	MR. BROCKMAN: I've definitely got a
21	concern. If all greens are okay, then by definition
22	any white becomes significant.
23	MS. FERDIG: From whose point of view?
24	MR. BROCKMAN: From the utility's point of
25	view. That's what we're seeing out there occurring.

1	There are so few whites in findings or in PIs out
2	there that the significance that is being attached to
3	a white finding has grown way beyond what was the
4	basis for premising that.
5	MR. GARCHOW: I agree with that.
6	MR. BROCKMAN: Or it rolls right back into
7	unintended consequences
8	MR. SCHERER: We're talking about
9	MR. BROCKMAN: and it's causing
LO	behavior modifications.
l1	MR. SCHERER: We're talking about not
L2	findings. We're talking about performance indicators.
L3	MR. BROCKMAN: I'm talking both.
L4	MR. SCHERER: Okay, but this is
L5	MR. BROCKMAN: Findings, we didn't have a
L6	number associated with it. Findings come out where
L7	findings come out, and I've got no problems, but
L8	really in PIs, that's what's driving it in PIs. There
L9	are so few that you're getting into that arena.
20	That's right. Keep me on PIs, not on
21	findings. Thank you.
22	And there are changes occurring. I think
23	definitely we need to hear the public's perception of
24	that, but I wouldn't role it uniquely under the public
25	confidence him because of those reasons

MR. BORCHARDT: Yeah, I don't know if I keep this issue separated to performance indicators because at some point this process inevitably, people will want to compare green performance indicators and green inspection findings, and the fact is they're not the same.

And we know that, but I think there is an understanding that's required, sophisticated understanding required to understand that subtle difference that bears some importance.

MR. SCHERER: I agree, and in fact, to comment whether there's agreement between the NRC and the regulated industry, I think there clearly isn't agreement. We had a long, protracted debate in the Region IV workshop on just this point when the Deputy Executive Director for Operations came out and said, "Well, wait a minute. Green is not good if it's a finding," and I agree with that, that that's why we're separating findings from performance indicators, and performance indicators are defined differently with a 95-5 as opposed to risk based at the green to white threshold.

I think that's exactly the issue that we're trying to address here, and perception is an important part of it. That's why I think we asked for

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1 the presentations, at least part of the reason we've 2 asked for the presentations this afternoon 3 tomorrow for the performance indicator part. 4 I agree findings have their own issue and 5 are linked invariably because in the public's mind it's easy to link green to green and white to white 6 7 and yellow to yellow. MR. HILL: But I think the same thing has 8 9 been said of performance indicators, too, that just 10 because it's green doesn't necessarily mean that all 11 green is good. You do have some in performance 12 indicators as well. It just means that you are able to control 13 14 it yourself without NRC intervention. 15 MR. CAMERON: So if that is true, I mean, 16 there's a separate issue of what does green mean. 17 MR. SCHERER: Well, I'm not sure I agree I think the green to white threshold 18 with that. 19 doesn't mean in my mind -- I can't think of a 20 performance indicator that isn't in the acceptable 21 range when it's green. What we're debating is if it's 22 white it may also be acceptable because if you're in 23 the 95-5 and just because you're in the bottom five 24 percent doesn't mean you're unacceptable or not in the

perfectly acceptable band.

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It just means you're in

1	the bottom five percent.
2	Unless you're in Lake Wobegone and
3	everybody is above average, somebody has got to be in
4	the lower five percent.
5	MR. HILL: I wouldn't use the word
6	acceptable or unacceptable. I think that the issue is
7	just because you're in the green band doesn't mean you
8	don't have to take some action.
9	MR. SCHERER: Oh, sure. Absolutely.
10	MR. HILL: It's just you do it yourself,
11	not necessarily with NRC involvement.
12	MR. SCHERER: Yes.
13	MR. HILL: But the fact that you have to
14	take some action doesn't mean that it's just good and
15	I don't have to do anything.
16	MR. SCHERER: I agree.
17	MR. HILL: And, you know, there are people
18	that, you know, have kind of said if it's green, it's
19	good and I don't have to do anything.
20	MR. CAMERON: Are there two different
21	issues here though? I mean, there's maybe a lot of
22	different issues. Is there uncertainty about what
23	green and white means in everyone's mind is one issue,
24	and then there's the perception of green and white.
25	MR. SCHERER: For performance.

1	MR. CAMERON: For performance indicators,
2	and you have another thing in terms of inspection
3	findings, and I'm not even sure I want to go to the
4	fact that creating finding does not mean good, I
5	guess, but
6	MR. SCHERER: Because it's still a
7	finding.
8	MR. CAMERON: All right. And Mary's
9	point, too, is that we started off and Ed said let's
10	table P-4 until after the presentations, and Mary said
11	are we talking about non-licensee stakeholders only in
12	terms of tabling or, I guess, in terms of the issue
13	generally, and the discussion seemed to indicate that,
14	no, we weren't just talking about non-licensee
15	stakeholders.
16	So, Ed, in your mind, you wanted to table
17	this until after we got there. Are you talking about
18	tabling only the perception in the minds of the
19	public, the non-licensee stakeholders or are you
20	talking about let's table the whole thing and then
21	come back and revisit it?
22	And we've seen there are various
23	components here.
24	MS. FERDIG: And I'm okay with tabling.
25	I just wanted to ask that question.

## (Laughter.)

MS. FERDIG: Right. I'm not taking issue with that, and it may be that the industry's point of view is impacted by what the public stakeholders say this afternoon, which will then feed into that process.

MR. CAMERON: David.

MR. GARCHOW: I think it would be helpful like how we got here with these PI green-white thresholds, having lived through this for two years. Originally at NRC the attempt was let's risk inform it, and let's know that for like initiating events, which gets all the discussion, let's risk inform it.

So we went and got all of the data the NRC did and we looked and said, yes, for a representative like Westinghouse plant, to get a core melt increase of  $1^{e-5}$ , you needed some absurd number of reactor trips in a short frequency of time to have it even be risk significant.

And the same is true for unplanned power reductions. You needed just an absurd number, 30, 40. There was one number of reactor trips, I think, that was 26, that if you were going to set the green-white threshold to make it look just like a finding, you'd need 26 reactor trips in a year.

1 Well, then, you know, people having 2 reasonable discussion with reasonable men said, you know, would anybody in the community wonder like on 3 4 the 25th reactor trip what the NRC response might be 5 on the 25th trip in a year, and the answer was yes. So then a discussion was held, and it 6 7 said, hey, if we want to use this process, like Ken 8 said, as a pointer and when the NRC should get 9 engaged, let's use the outlier approach and it came under this 95-5, and at that point, when that decision 10 11 was made, the deviation occurred between what a green 12 inspection finding is and what a green PI finding is, and it introduced that confusion. 13 14 So for the people who weren't involved in 15 how like we got to here, that was sort of how we got here because if we stayed true to risk informed, you 16 would never probably ever get anybody to be white in 17 the initiating events cornerstone ever. 18 19 That probably just confused it, but that's 20 how we got here. Well, I think it probably 21 MR. CAMERON: 22 best to table it, but I think that the committee needs 23 to do some work on what the discrete issues are in 24 this particular category because it seems like there

is a number of them, and they also may be easily

1 confused. 2 Anybody want to say anything more before 3 we table? Ray, do you want to use this opportunity 4 to --5 MR. SHADIS: To introduce myself? (Laughter.) 6 7 CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Welcome. MR. SHADIS: You can be suspicious if they 8 9 get all of the passengers off the plane and have you help them roll it out of the barn and strap skis to 10 11 it. 12 (Laughter.) MR. SHADIS: That's all I have to say 13 14 about that. USAir, the farm team. 15 One thing that would help me on this a great deal is if we were talking using a background of 16 17 concrete examples, you know, and there's a difference between risk informed and risk determined, if that's 18 19 a word. 20 I'm looking again at an inspection report 21 -- thank you, Randy -- looking at an inspection report 22 from Millstone on their feedwater pump issues, and it 23 turns out that the feedwater pump was put out of 24 commission in part because when they were sticking

circuit cards in, they didn't have a wiring diagram

1 that showed all of the interconnections between the 2 circuit modules that also provided information 3 regarding their function and operation. And, you know, from a non-technical, 4 5 public point of view, there's something wrong with There's something wrong with a system 6 that plant. 7 that permits them to operate equipment without having a full wiring diagram with all of the interconnections 8 9 on it. And to at the end of the day come to a 10 11 green finding because this conditions didn't exist 12 very long is a puzzle to me, and this is just one example that came across my desk, but I'm sure that 13 14 all of the people out there in the field that have had 15 field experience have other examples of how this 16 works. 17 You know, for me, one example it doesn't work: the State of New Jersey was in here. I think, 18 19 what was their figure? Ninety-eight, point, two 20 percent in the green, something like that. 21 MR. MONNINGER: A little higher than that. 22 MR. SHADIS: Yeah. 23 Ninety-eight, point, MR. MONNINGER: 24 eight. MR. SCHERER: Again, that's just looking 25

1 at performance indicators though. 2 GARCHOW: And you were doing 3 inspection finding. 4 MR. SHADIS: Yeah. 5 MR. GARCHOW: I mean that's a valid comment, but there's a little difference between the 6 7 two. MR. CAMERON: And one of your issues, Ray, 8 maybe the main issue, a couple of issues about what 9 does the language communicate. 10 There was 11 discussion on that this morning, and an agreement to 12 make sure that we go back to those types of issues, but I know you have an additional issue here. 13 14 Maybe what we could do is, unless you guys 15 want to keep on this, is table it until you hear this afternoon and tomorrow morning's descriptions, and 16 17 then come back. We discuss it tomorrow afternoon, but I think that it might be worthwhile if John -- and 18 19 I'll volunteer John and perhaps Loren -- if you could 20 try to parse out what is included under 21 particular issue and then see if everybody agrees with 22 that, and then we can have a discussion of each of 23 those three issues. 24 Does anybody have any objection to that? 25 Should we table it and move on?

1	(No response.)
2	MR. CAMERON: Okay.
3	MR. GARCHOW: I'm not sure it's going to
4	get any easier.
5	(Laughter.)
6	MR. CAMERON: I was hoping it would, but
7	it would be roughly right.
8	MR. GARCHOW: This goes at the very
9	construct of the program that didn't quite play out
10	the way that we thought it was going to play out. So
11	it was a learning. That doesn't mean that that's good
12	or bad or that it isn't acceptable the way it is, but
13	it didn't really play out exactly the way that some of
14	the people at the NRC that, you know, put it together
15	thought it was going to.
16	Actually in ONEI, you folks that got a
17	chance to review some of this thought it was going to
18	work out. It did end up in an intended consequence
19	that people are avoiding or believe it's bad and then
20	avoiding white at all cost, which you know is not
21	where the program is thought to be thought of.
22	MR. CAMERON: Well, John, given what David
23	said, can you guys before tomorrow maybe think about
24	what are the basic components of this finding?
25	Because we've heard there's a performance

1	indicator's element. There may be an inspection
2	finding element. There is the what it means to
3	licensees and the NRC, what the perception of it is.
4	In the public there's a bunch of different
5	subtopics it seems.
6	MR. SCHERER: I'm comfortable addressing
7	the performance indicator under P-whatever, four, and
8	recognizing that the others will be handled
9	separately, but I want to make sure we come back at
LO	some point maybe it's a parking lot issue to
L1	recognize somehow that there's a public understanding
L2	issue of green. Green is green and white is white,
L3	and so there's a public perception issue that we have
L4	to make sure we pick up before we're finished.
L5	MR. HILL: Yeah, and I would assume
L6	that
L7	MR. SCHERER: It's the thing Ken and I
L8	started a discussion, that there is an
L9	interrelationship, but when we try to address it under
20	P-4, however we resolve it, there is still an
21	interaction with the inspection findings and other
22	findings, a tendency to equate green equals green.
23	MR. CAMERON: Okay.
24	MR. GARCHOW: For somebody pulling up the
25	Web page, that gives them an illogical thing to do.

1	MR. SCHERER: Yeah, I understand.
2	MR. CAMERON: And, John and Loren, maybe
3	even if that let's put that into the subtopics even
4	if we want to take it out later and put it somewhere
5	else, just so that we know all the issues that have
6	been raised under this particular topic. Okay?
7	MR. LAURIE: And I'm not sure it's any
8	more complicated than the psychology of the color
9	green. My guess is that if psychologists, and they do
LO	this, people say green is good and anything less than
L1	green is not because that's what we've been taught,
L2	and so maybe you have to use different colors.
L3	And it may be no more complex than that
L4	from a public perspective.
L5	MR. CAMERON: and if you're using those
L6	different colors differently in a different context,
L7	it even exacerbates that particular problem.
L8	MR. LAURIE: That's right.
L9	CHAIRMAN PLISCO: But from the NRC-
20	licensee interaction it's not going to matter what the
21	color is. Anything outside of whatever that bottom
22	color is is going to cause that rub.
23	MR. FLOYD: And I'd just like to point out
24	that blue is taken because the no color findings are
2.5	colored blue.

1	(Laughter.)
2	MR. CAMERON: A no color finding is blue?
3	Well, that makes sense.
4	MR. GARCHOW: So if we make the color
5	findings invisible, then it all sort of works.
6	MR. MONNINGER: That's only because of the
7	background of the NRC Web page is white.
8	CHAIRMAN PLISCO: So after 40 minutes,
9	have we tabled this?
10	(Laughter.)
11	MR. CAMERON: Now, we're going to look
12	forward to this though tomorrow.
13	Now, we're going to P-5 and the need for
14	risk based performance indicators and we did that.
15	PARTICIPANTS: We did that.
16	MR. CAMERON: Oh, we moved P-5 into P-3.
17	MR. BROCKMAN: No, we combined them.
18	MR. CAMERON: But you don't need to
19	discuss them now.
20	MR. CAMERON: P-5.
21	MR. BROCKMAN: You did good on that one,
22	Chip.
23	MR. CAMERON: Thank you, Ken. One of my
24	most enthusiastic supporters.
25	P-6, safety system unavailability

1 performance indicator needs revision, eight for one, 2 seven for two. 3 Loren, do you want to give us context on 4 this? 5 CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Yeah. You can probably tell by the length of the detailed comments on page 11 6 7 of the big package that there's lots of issues having unavailability of 8 with the performance 9 indicators, handling of fault exposure hours, the definition of unavailability, what should be counted 10 11 and what shouldn't be counted, some conflicts between 12 different metrics that the licensees have to deal with depending on what program they're looking at and how 13 14 the unavailability is defined, which causes some 15 bookkeeping issues. Something more in here. A concern about 16 if you look at the guidance in 9902, a lot of FAQs had 17 to do with exceptions, you know, what things were 18 19 counted and what not counted, and the concern about 20 the credibility of the indicator over a long period of 21 time as those exceptions increase. 22 Did I get them all? I think that's the 23 gist of most of the comments. 24 MR. CAMERON: Comments on this one? 25 Steve.

MR. FLOYD: Well, I made it a one. We've got 18 performance indicators in the program. Four of them are in this area, and yet they account for fully two-thirds of the frequently asked questions that we're dealing with under the oversight process.

This one also has the elements that we've been talking about all along here, and that's unintended consequences, potential impact on safety for people being inclined not to do enough maintenance on a system to not trip the indicator, and where the problem really comes in here is many licensees can trip the indicator from green to white on this indicator and yet be fully in accordance with their allowed outage times and their technical specifications and not have tripped the performance criteria under the maintenance rule.

And yet the response if you trip the performance criteria under the maintenance rule is identical to the response that the agency has if you trip the green-white threshold on a PI, and that's that it gets elevated attention. The licensee does a root cause. They establish an improvement or corrective action element for it, and then monitor it to see that its performance gets restored and the NRC oversees that.

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1 That's exactly the same thing that happens 2 if you trip a green-white threshold. So we have a great deal of inconsistency with other requirements 3 4 that the NRC has on this particular indicator, and it 5 also has been the one, as I mentioned, that has 6 subsumed most of the frequently asked question 7 resources and probably caused the most amount of discussion between the NRC and the licensees. 8 9 The response is a little bit MR. TRAPP: 10 different between going maintenance Rule A-1 11 going white on availability, right? Because the NRC 12 wouldn't be engaged in one case and we would be engaged with follow-up in another case. 13 14 MR. FLOYD: Well, except that the program 15 says that if you feel your performance criteria goes 16 to the A-1 category, what happens in the A-1 category is whether -- it's not formally in the program, but 17 what we know happens is that the residence certainly 18 19 is aware when the licensee puts an item in the A-1 20 The action that the licensee takes is category. 21 identical. Okay? 22 Right, but we don't do a MR. TRAPP: 23 I mean we don't do a 95-001. follow-up. 24 MR. FLOYD: No, you don't do a 95-001, but 25 the resident certainly does take a look at the program

that the licensee has put together whether it's in the
ROP program or not. They basically carry out
something analogous to a 95-001 procedure. They check
and see if you've they think your action is going
to restore compliance or not compliance, but restore
the performance target that was set. So it's very,
very similar.
MR. CAMERON: So two separate an
inconsistency grounds and most of the FAQs are on this
based on the inconsistency or based on other issues?
MR. FLOYD: Based on other confusing
factors associated with it.
MR. CAMERON: But in your opinion, it's
confusing and has to be straightened out.
MR. FLOYD: And it has unintended
consequences also, right.
MR. SCHERER: Steve made that point, and
I don't want it to get lost because part of the reason
you get all of those FAQs and all of that debate is
attempts to avoid the unintended consequences, and the
inconsistency is caused by the fact that
unavailability is really a surrogate for reliability,
and unavailability is impacted by doing preventive
maintenance. Everybody can pretty much agree that

preventive maintenance is a good thing to do, but it

drives the unavailability up, therefore, drives you towards a green to white threshold, and that's the debate that's constantly going on.

In fact, the example I think we cited in one of the earlier discussions is we did a risk informed amendment which showed that doing on line diesel generator maintenance was a good thing. It was safer to do it at power. Simply doing the safer operation would have in and of itself driven us into the white or even into the yellow PI in accordance with our tech spec.

The NRC approved the tech spec change, went to 14 days, and that would have driven us into the white if the NRC hadn't made an exception as part of an FAQ.

So any process that requires FAQ exceptions and redefinitions needs to be reworked.

MR. FLOYD: Yeah, I might just add on this item that it is being worked. The NRC has a forum they call it now, I guess, that's been pulled together to take a look at this unavailability definition. The industry has a task force working on it. In fact, we had our first meeting between the NRC's forum or at least a subset of the forum and a subset of the industry task force to start taking a look at what do

1 we need to do to address the unavailability problems 2 and the unintended consequences of it. 3 And we think it's solvable. And, in fact, 4 we don't think it's going to take all that long to 5 solve it. But it's still a high 6 MR. CAMERON: 7 priority. It's a high priority, yeah. 8 MR. FLOYD: I'd give my vote to priority 9 MR. KRICH: 10 Also, I think that there's an issue here of 11 Not handling this properly can mask a masking. 12 negative trend or mask a positive trend in terms of plant performance. 13 14 In fact, at the first meeting, I had 15 brought up an issue that got misrepresented in Dave Lochbaum's letter, and the issue was that we were 16 17 getting a white finding, which was really masking what another issue with the system because 18 the was 19 unavailability was not being looked at properly. 20 definition wasn't tight enough to keep it within 21 bounds. 22 So from that aspect I think it's also very 23 important. 24 MR. CAMERON: Okay. Luckily David is here 25 with if to respond in his us. So he wants

1	presentation, he can do that.
2	MR. KRICH: He's more than welcome to.
3	CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Does anyone have a
4	problem with a one?
5	MS. FERDIG: No.
6	MR. GARCHOW: Given the discussion.
7	MS. FERDIG: Given the discussion, I move.
8	MR. CAMERON: And we didn't hear from any
9	of the NRC folks specifically on this.
10	CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Yeah, I think all of the
11	comments sort of supported what I was going to say,
12	which is just as the FAQ on large number or
13	unavailability, a lot of the questions we get from
14	inspectors are in this area. As far as performance
15	indicator space, almost all of the questions had to do
16	with unavailability as far as what's count and what's
17	not.
18	MR. CAMERON: Okay. I guess I have
19	already one.
20	MR. SCHERER: I guess I'm in agreement.
21	I voted in my notes, in my homework for one, but I
22	just want to give anybody that felt it was a priority
23	two a chance to comment because I was surprised, very
24	frankly, when I saw the spread.
25	MR. CAMERON: In light of the discussion,

1	the people who might have chosen it for a priority
2	two, in light of the discussion this morning, does
3	anybody want to offer anything from the priority two
4	perspective?
5	MS. FERDIG: I was a priority two, and it
6	was because I did not understand the significance,
7	which I do now as a result of this conversation.
8	MR. CAMERON: All right.
9	MR. GARCHOW: Ed's compelling oration that
LO	swayed me to a one.
L1	(Laughter.)
L2	MR. SCHERER: I'm overwhelmed.
L3	MR. CAMERON: Okay. P-7, need for
L4	frequently asked questions. Now, the majority, ten of
L5	you, selected two. Five of you selected one. Again,
L6	discussion may influence how this comes out.
L7	Loren, do you want to give us the
L8	CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Yeah, the title might
L9	not be worded well. You know, I think we've talked in
20	the past about at least in the context of performance
21	indicators we get a lot of positive feedback from
22	stakeholders that there are questions and answers and
23	interpretations to help understand.
24	These comments were specifically about,
25	one, there's too many because it's causes confusion,

1 and I think a lot of this is focused on unavailability 2 again; that there was a concern about really FAQs may 3 be a misnomer because they're really not FAQs. 4 They're really site specific, you know, very narrowly 5 focused questions. MR. GARCHOW: So you're saying they may 6 7 only be asked once? CHAIRMAN PLISCO: In a lot of cases they 8 9 were only asked once. Actually in most cases they 10 were only asked once, and it was, I think, 11 recommendation from some stakeholders in order then to 12 be more usable to of the plants, they ought -- a more generic answer ought to be given, and that really 13 14 relates to this next comment, which was a specific 15 comment about -- and I think this came from the NRC inspectors -- is that they've seen cases where there 16 17 was a site specific question in the response, and the licensee took that answer out of context and applied 18 19 it to their case when it didn't apply to their case, 20 but they picked the right phrases and words to make it 21 apply, and there was some concerns with how that was 22 being done. 23 MR. CAMERON: Steve? Sorry. I was just going to say that

regardless of what priority we give this one, whether

MR. FLOYD:

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1 it's a one or a two, it is being worked aggressively, 2 I think, right now. 3 There's a Rev. 1 to the NEI 99-02 document 4 that's out for comment both within the public and the 5 agency that really has taken the 235 odd FAQs to date and tried to incorporate them into the text of the 6 7 manual, generalized them, and make it very, very clear what the intent of the question was by providing 8 amplified guidance in the document. 9 So the clock has been kind of re-zeroed. 10 11 We still have the frequently asked process, and 12 they're still rolling in, but they're rolling in at a much reduced rate over what they were rolling in 13 14 during the first part of the year of the program, 15 which is what you would expect with a new program being rolled out. 16 17 So we think it's going to be manageable from this point on, but it really doesn't matter what 18 19 priority it gets. I think it's being worked about as 20 aggressively as it can be. 21 MR. CAMERON: You testified that sort of 22 the working criterion in the panel --23 MR. FLOYD: We weren't going to be 24 constrained by that, right. MR. CAMERON: -- doesn't mean it shouldn't 25

be identified.

MR. SCHERER: I guess maybe I was confused by the title. If the subject is improving frequently asked questions, then I certainly have no problem with it being a two because I think it is improving and, in fact, one would expect frequently asked questions would drop off.

Part of the reasons for the frequently asked questions is it avoided the individual inspection findings coming back being different from region to region, being different within the region, and tried to provide some sort of forum for addressing issues, and you would expect it to drop off.

I misunderstood perhaps P-7 is to questioning the need for FAQs to continue. I believe that FAQs need to continue, and if that is the subject, then I would think it's important to me that FAQs continue.

If it's a need to reform the FAQ process, then that's clearly a category two in my mind.

MR. CAMERON: So one way to look at this is improving or need to improve the FAQ process. The other way to look at this is need for FAQs, and I guess from what I heard now is FAQs, even the right terminology to use -- I don't know -- but --

1	CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Too late.
2	MR. CAMERON: Rod, from your perspective,
3	this was improving the FAQ process. That's the way
4	you read this.
5	MR. KRICH: Yes.
6	MR. CAMERON: This is the alternative. Is
7	there a need for FAQs?
8	Rod.
9	MR. KRICH: I took this item as that we
10	need a process. It happens to be the FAQ process now,
11	but we have to have a process whereby we can get
12	dialogue with the NRC on interpretations because
13	and it's declining over time. I understand that, but
14	we still need that as we go through this.
15	I took it, I think, the same way Ed did,
16	which is
17	CHAIRMAN PLISCO: That was an unintended
18	consequence of my poor selection of words because most
19	of the comments on having a FAQ were positive.
20	MR. BROCKMAN: Something along the lines
21	of "need to improve FAQ process," and it's a priority
22	two?
23	MR. FLOYD: Yeah, I would agree with that.
24	MR. BROCKMAN: I'll agree if that's the
25	issue.

1 MS. FERDIG: But I think what I've heard 2 is that it's more than an FAO process, and I just --3 it's a two. I'm with it, but I think that we're 4 looking at the fundamental premise of this program. 5 I talked with someone recently who said something to the effect of -- and knowing there have been those who 6 7 have been working on this thing for years -- "I can't wait until it's set in concrete, " quote, unquote, as 8 if there will be a final point. 9 And for me the unique characteristic of 10 11 this entire framework is that it invites continued 12 exploration and clarification dialoque and understanding and implications and interpretations of 13 14 one plant application versus another, and so on. 15 So whether you call it an FAQ or whatever, I think that we want to at least check out with each 16 17 other whether we assume that the philosophy of this program is to invite that kind of --18 19 MR. CAMERON: And you may hear some more 20 of this during the presentations. Is there a need to 21 -- is everybody clear on what the implications of the 22 FAQs are for a specific plant or licensees generally? 23 MR. GARCHOW: They're very well used by 24 our licensees. 25 MR. SCHERER: And I made a recommendation

1	before that we extend the FAQ process to the other
2	parts of the reactor oversight process. So I
3	certainly misunderstood, and I withdraw my one and
4	certainly agree with a two.
5	MR. CAMERON: Okay. Priority two, with
6	the understanding that this issue is all about the
7	need to improve the FAQ process.
8	MR. KRICH: So let me ask a question
9	though. Is there someplace that we can capture the
10	need to continue some process that allows this
11	dialogue to go on?
12	MR. FLOYD: I'd be willing to stipulate it
13	that if you need to improve it that means you're going
14	to keep it.
15	MR. CAMERON: Yeah, the assumption I heard
16	is that the FAQ process will continue. It's whether
17	the need to improve the process is a high priority or
18	just an issue for consideration.
19	MR. SCHERER: I would also state that if,
20	in fact, there are infrequently asked questions, that
21	may be considered a success if we address a question
22	once and it goes away as opposed to have each
23	individual plant discover the right answer.
24	MR. KRICH: Let me go back. So I
25	understand that if you're improving a process that

1	it's going to be around for a while.
2	MR. SCHERER: Right.
3	MR. KRICH: What I was getting to was
4	Mary's point about is this thing looked at possibly as
5	there's an endpoint, and what I'm suggesting is that
6	it be looked at as a process that we put in place as
7	part of another element of the ROP whereby there's a
8	mechanism that's permanently in place for this
9	dialogue to occur.
LO	MS. FERDIG: Bingo. That's what I'm
l1	talking about.
L2	MR. CAMERON: Does anybody have any
L3	disagreement with the way Ron
L4	MR. KRICH: So just saying by working on
L5	it means it will stay in place doesn't I don't
L6	think that necessarily follows.
L7	MR. BROCKMAN: Introductory paragraph and
L8	write-up.
L9	MR. KRICH: Whatever, just so long as it's
20	recognized.
21	MS. FERDIG: Language does matter, and if
22	what we're characterizing is not an FAQ process, then
23	maybe what we're talking about is something else that
24	it evolves into, and I just don't want that to get
25	lost.

MR. CAMERON: No, good point.
CHAIRMAN PLISCO: I think we're going to
come back to this when we get to the overall
categories. There's one section on avenues for
feedback and, you know, accumulation of the lessons
learned, and some kind of infrastructure to answer
questions.
MR. CAMERON: The key is the word
"dialogue," continuing dialogue, opportunity for
dialogue.
MS. FERDIG: That's it.
MR. CAMERON: All right. Priority two on
that one.
P-8 is the need to clarify public
communication of PI information, and six people gave
this a one. Nine people gave this a two.
Loren, context on this one?
CHAIRMAN PLISCO: There is some overlap
with this one and P-4. P-4 specifically dealt with
the green-white PI threshold. This is a little
broader as far as public communication of what the
definitions of white, yellow and red performance
indicators are.
There are a number of issues in here which
we really already talked about, is the focus of the

1	Web site appear to be on performance indicators, and
2	there are some public confidence issues on what these
3	performance indicators mean, and the words that are
4	used to describe them.
5	MR. CAMERON: Okay. The issue is need to
6	improve the process or whatever of the communication
7	of PI information to the public.
8	MR. SCHERER: What struck me as
9	significant on this one is if you look at the table,
10	all of the votes went to both public confidence and
11	understandable. All of the votes went that way.
12	MR. CAMERON: Now, what is that point
13	again, Ed, when you look at the table?
14	MR. SCHERER: It did not appear that
15	anybody felt
16	MR. CAMERON: Oh, I see.
17	MR. SCHERER: it was maintain safety or
18	effectiveness and efficiency or unnecessary regulatory
19	burden. Everybody put it into one or both of those
20	columns, and I think that puts it in significant
21	context in my mind as to how that's part of the
22	reason I believe this is appropriate that we address
23	it as a separate issue. It's a communication issue.
24	CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Now, I propose just as
25	we do with P-4 we table it until we hear some of the

1	other stakeholder inputs.
2	MR. FLOYD: I agree.
3	CHAIRMAN PLISCO: And like I said, there
4	is some overlap of these same issues in P-4, or do we
5	want to discuss it anymore now?
6	MR. CAMERON: And for everybody that's a
7	good observation to make, and I guess we'll have some
8	discussion on that. No one put it into the maintain
9	safety category.
10	CHAIRMAN PLISCO: So do we need any more
11	discussion as far as understanding the issue? I think
12	we've talked about this one quite a bit.
13	MR. GARCHOW: It does sort of tie into the
14	other one.
15	MR. CAMERON: I guess that's the one issue
16	you need to figure out, too, is how you want to parse
17	those out. I'll put this in the parking lot and move
18	on to nine.
19	CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Right.
20	MR. GARCHOW: We could leave this for the
21	ongoing implementation evaluation that they'll have to
22	deal with next year.
23	(Laughter.)
24	MR. CAMERON: So you know something we
25	don't know then?

1	MR. GARCHOW: That'll be Ken chairing that
2	one.
3	MR. FLOYD: I'd like to propose that we
4	subsume P-9 into P-6. Credit for operator actions is
5	really all related to safety system unavailability.
6	So it should be a subset of the issues that need to be
7	resolved under that item.
8	MR. GARCHOW: That is all related.
9	MR. FLOYD: Yes.
10	MR. CAMERON: Does anybody disagree with
11	that?
12	(No response.)
13	MR. CAMERON: Okay. No disagreement.
14	Do you need to say anything about it, too?
15	I mean, we're putting it into P-6. Does anybody want
16	to
17	MR. BROCKMAN: The thing that's
18	interesting is we came up with a number one priority
19	for P-6, and this one was an overwhelming priority
20	two.
21	MR. CAMERON: Yeah.
22	MR. BROCKMAN: It makes it very much a
23	small fish in this pond.
24	MR. FLOYD: Yeah, and I guess my
25	interpretation of that, and the way I looked at it was

1	I gave it a two also. If it's by itself, it's a two.
2	Okay? But most of the issues under the unavailability
3	definition, all of the nuances if you took them
4	individually would probably be a two, but when you
5	roll them all up, it's a big issue that needs to be
6	addressed overall.
7	MR. SCHERER: Not endorsing the theory of
8	aggregation.
9	(Laughter.)
10	MR. SCHERER: We did that earlier on the
11	P-2 that we subsumed into P-1, the same way.
12	MR. CAMERON: Yeah, there's a precedent
13	for doing that. Okay.
14	CHAIRMAN PLISCO: P-10.
15	MR. CAMERON: P-10 is public radiation
16	safety cornerstone, overwhelmingly a two, and this one
17	probably deserves some explanation, public radiation
18	
	cornerstone.
19	cornerstone.  CHAIRMAN PLISCO: I'm trying to figure out
19	CHAIRMAN PLISCO: I'm trying to figure out
19 20	CHAIRMAN PLISCO: I'm trying to figure out how to explain it because I'm not that familiar with
19 20 21	CHAIRMAN PLISCO: I'm trying to figure out how to explain it because I'm not that familiar with the concern. I'm not sure whose issue this was. I
19 20 21 22	CHAIRMAN PLISCO: I'm trying to figure out how to explain it because I'm not that familiar with the concern. I'm not sure whose issue this was. I think it was a fairly specific issue about looking at

1	MR. CAMERON: This is off site?
2	MR. FLOYD: Yeah. As I recall this one,
3	and I thought it was that this was a PI that probably
4	would not have been tripped by any plant in the
5	country over the last ten years. Okay? So the
6	question really, I think, goes to do we need this as
7	a PI in that it's really not providing any
8	information. It's perceived at least by some as not
9	adding value to the program.
10	MR. TRAPP: Well, if it was a 95-5 though,
11	then you'd expect five plants to have tripped it over
12	the last year.
13	MR. FLOYD: But it's not a 95-5 because
14	when you have all zeros, it's tough to get a 95-5.
15	MR. TRAPP: This isn't just wouldn't
16	this just be your liquid rad releases and your gas
17	releases?
18	MR. FLOYD: It's got. There's a table in
19	your RETs or for those who have moved the RETs into
20	their FSAR or licensing controlled program, it's
21	basically the same point, but nobody has tripped the
22	thresholds.
23	MR. TRAPP: But I would guess the intent
24	here was that, you know, to monitor plants for the
25	liquid discharges and, you know, their gas discharges.

1	MR. SCHERER: But this one is like reactor
2	coolant system, leak rate, and fuel failures. There's
3	just not a lot of data that plants have gotten to the
4	point where they've released material.
5	MR. TRAPP: Everybody releases material,
6	right?
7	MR. FLOYD: Right. It's not that they
8	don't release material. It's that they haven't
9	released any material that's maybe it's a threshold
10	issue because the threshold is did you exceed your
11	tech spec allowable values.
12	MR. TRAPP: That could be the threshold or
13	the threshold could be, well, gee, if I'm a plant that
14	releases more liquid curies than this other plant,
15	maybe that would be the threshold. I mean, I didn't
16	write this, but I know the idea of it, but you can
17	certainly set up a PI with that.
18	MR. FLOYD: Yeah, the PI as it current
19	exists is did you trip any of the tech spec reporting
20	thresholds that you have for this item.
21	MR. CAMERON: But you don't think it needs
22	your your statement about do we need it
23	MR. FLOYD: I was reflecting where the
24	question came from. I wasn't taking a position on
25	whether we needed it or not

1 MR. LAURIE: To go back to the framing, 2 right, this is actually a PI, but because it was based on the tech spec, the tech spec actually has some 3 4 basis in risk. Right. 5 MR. FLOYD: Because I remember when we 6 MR. LAURIE: 7 were putting this together an NRC researcher came in and told us some studies that were done, and this is 8 9 actually based on health risk. So this was actually That particular tech spec with the 10 risk informed. 11 ODCM was probably risk informed from at least a 12 personal health basis more than the other tech specs were because they had to stay there. 13 MR. SCHERER: But now we're getting into 14 15 solving the problem, and I don't have a problem with 16 this thing on the list as a category two. It clearly 17 is not a pressing issue. In my mind, you know, any plant that trips this particular PI has a serious 18 19 issue. MR. CAMERON: Okay. Any objection? Maybe 20 21 we can finish this, the performance indicators, but 22 priority two? Any objection to priority two on this 23 one, on the theory that it's not broken? 24 MR. GARCHOW: Who had this concern? 25 mean this is one that almost, even though we said

1	categories, is this really an issue? Maybe we can
2	cover this later. I mean, I'm not even sure what the
3	issue is.
4	MR. FLOYD: The question is whether it
5	should be deleted from the matrix.
6	MR. SCHERER: I think it was more in an
7	efficiency effectiveness. Is it worth collecting the
8	information and publishing it if it's not saying
9	anything?
10	MR. CAMERON: Why don't we when we come
11	back to do the narrative on all of these, maybe we
12	should focus on whether this should be deleted or not.
13	MR. SCHERER: Well, deleted as in an item
14	for our report or deleted as a PI?
15	MR. CAMERON: As an item for the report.
16	MR. SCHERER: Oh. I don't have a problem
17	with that, but
18	MR. CAMERON: No, not going back to PIs.
19	MR. SCHERER: It needs to stay as a PI.
20	I clearly believe that because it's part of the NRC's
21	mission, and it needs to be addressed.
22	MR. CAMERON: All right.
23	MR. SCHERER: And it has its own
24	cornerstone.
25	MR. CAMERON: I'll put that in the parking

1 lot also, that our discussion of this one will be 2 whether we continue to need it in the report. 3 The last one, physical protection 4 cornerstone, P-11. Does this relate to previous 5 discussions of physical protection that we had? MR. FLOYD: No, it actually relates more 6 7 to P-10. Again, it goes to the issue of what are we really measuring and is it important for the program. 8 I think to me the philosophical difference 9 that's being asked in P-10 and P-11 is is the 10 11 performance indicator there just to provide 12 indication of where the NRC needs to go look further perhaps for an issue or is there a broader purpose for 13 14 having some of the PIs, and that is to communicate to 15 the public how the licensee is doing in areas that have been identified as important by the regulator. 16 17 that's really kind And  $\circ f$ the philosophical edge that's put on P-10 and P-11. 18 19 you look at it very narrowly, in my mind you could 20 easily question a lot of the individual elements of 21 the program as to whether it's really telling you 22 something, but if you stand back and take a look at 23 them collectively as a whole, then there's a broader 24 picture that it gives you. You also have to look at 25 MR. BROCKMAN:

1	the program has two things, and that's to identify
2	those things that aren't going well and those things
3	that are.
4	MR. FLOYD: Right, yeah.
5	MR. CAMERON: Any further comment on P-11?
6	And most people, I think, have this as a two. Some
7	have it as a one.
8	Does anybody want to speak to this
9	particular issue as a priority one? And does
10	everybody understand what the issue is? Does Loren
11	need to go into some background on that?
12	MR. SHADIS: On physical protection?
13	MR. CAMERON: Yes.
14	MR. SHADIS: Yeah, I don't know. It's not
15	an issue. It's a subject, topic heading. I don't
16	know what the issue is.
17	CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Well, I think the
18	question is: is it worth the time and effort to
19	collect this data and publish it? Is it, you know,
20	useful information for anyone?
21	That's a really simple way to put the
22	question.
23	MR. SCHERER: This is the three PIs, not
24	the question of OSREs which we discussed earlier.
25	CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Right. Just the

1	performance indicators themselves, the three security
2	PIs.
3	MR. CAMERON: The three security PIs.
4	Does that sum it up to everybody? Is this useful
5	information that should be gathered?
6	CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Well, it's the same
7	question as the one before it, and I guess you could
8	actually probably roll them together and say there's
9	a number of PIs that there are questions of whether
10	they're useful or not, that they provide any insights
11	or useful information.
12	MR. SHADIS: Does their usefulness
13	you're saying their usefulness fails because the
14	findings are uniformly the same?
15	CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Well, this is strictly
16	the performance indicators, and I'm not sure who asked
17	the question. It wasn't my question, but there are a
18	number of people that have asked is it worth the time
19	and effort to collect the information and publish it
20	on the Web site. It isn't going to tell anyone
21	anything, and I think there's someone that perceives
22	that it's
23	MR. SHADIS: It's going to tell people
24	that ostensibly you're looking at these things.
25	CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Right, yeah.

1	MR. CAMERON: If you look at it from the
2	converse, what message would it send unintentionally
3	perhaps if you eliminated off-site radiation doses and
4	performance indicators?
5	MR. FLOYD: What are you trying to hide?
6	MR. CAMERON: Yes.
7	CHAIRMAN PLISCO: There aren't many hits.
8	Isn't that really the gist of the question? There
9	aren't many hits on this PIs. So if there
10	MR. FLOYD: Yeah, there is on the first
11	one in the security area, but not on the latter two.
12	The first one on the equipment performance index,
13	there's been a number of hits.
14	CHAIRMAN PLISCO: And is it good for
15	public communication and confidence even though there
16	aren't a lot of issues to show that there aren't a lot
17	of issues, or is it worth the time, you know, the
18	efficiency and effectiveness, to collect the
19	information and publish it?
20	That's, I guess, the balance. Is there a
21	balance?
22	MR. SCHERER: Yeah, and the issue in my
23	mind is we do have a screening program. We do have a
24	fitness for duty program. We do have an IDS system in
25	our plants and whether there's a lot of hits or not

1 I think it's important to understand and publish the 2 fact that if we do have a program and if it's working 3 effectively, that's a finding, and if it's not working 4 effectively then that's a different finding. 5 But we still need to publish it. I think we can improve it. We can address it, but certainly 6 7 I don't think this is a category one. I think this is 8 clearly a category two. 9 Priority two. MR. CAMERON: Anybody 10 disagree with priority two? 11 CHAIRMAN PLISCO: But the prelim. 12 perspective, isn't this a subset of the question about if per chance all of the PIs were green is that okay? 13 14 I mean, isn't that sort of a subset of that question? 15 MR. FLOYD: You could philosophically make 16 that leap, yeah. 17 Well, in this case there's also the one that you're not mentioning. There's a mismatch in my 18 19 mind between the PI and the inspection. We measure 20 then to a great detail the availability of the 21 intrusion detection system. Then when we have an 22 OSRE, we take zero credit for an intrusion detection system. So we have a mismatch between what we measure 23 24 in PI and report quarterly, and the way the NRC

measures the security system robustness.

1 But this is not in a place we need to 2 address that here. I'd just make sure it's on the list somewhere to be addressed. 3 4 MR. CAMERON: Okay. Priority two? 5 MR. FLOYD: Had to get that in. MR. CAMERON: Okay. Well, good. We have 6 7 gotten through two of these topics, and I think it's appropriate the one topic we didn't discuss, the 8 overall, is going to come after presentations, and 9 since some of our presenters were here for this 10 11 discussion, I think that will be useful when they come 12 to talk to us this afternoon and tomorrow morning. 13 And, Loren, what time do you want to 14 resume? 15 CHAIRMAN PLISCO: One o'clock. MR. CAMERON: One o'clock. All right. 16 17 (Whereupon, at 12:05 p.m., the meeting was recessed for lunch, to reconvene at 1:00 p.m., the 18 19 same day.) 20 21 22 23 24 25

1	A-F-T-E-R-N-O-O-N S-E-S-S-I-O-N
2	(1:02 p.m.)
3	CHAIRMAN PLISCO: All right. This
4	afternoon we've got presentations from three
5	stakeholders. First we have Dave Lochbaum from the
6	Union of Concerned Scientists.
7	MR. LOCHBAUM: Why, thank you.
8	The last couple times I've been here it's
9	been before the ACRS. This is like the ACRS'
10	grandkids. Presenting to you today is a little bit
11	different from if you have any troubles with that,
12	please let me know.
13	MR. FLOYD: We'll take that as a
14	compliment.
15	MR. LOCHBAUM: Just don't let it get back
16	to the ACRS. They might not.
17	MR. GARCHOW: I'll try to be George. I
18	think this is where he sits.
19	MR. LOCHBAUM: No, he sits over here.
20	Anyway, I think you all have handouts of
21	the slides I'll be using to talk from.
22	The first thing THAT we set out to do was
23	similar to what you've done, is try to figure out what
24	yardstick to use in order to evaluate the program
25	against. And that turned out to be harder than I

1 thought it was going to be. I thought that was going 2 to be the easy part. 3 We first started using the NRC's four 4 objectives: maintain safety, increase efficiency and 5 effectiveness, and so on. And a dilemma that posed was that there are plenty of examples where we could 6 7 find one or two things where it didn't increase efficiency and effectiveness or didn't increase public 8 confidence. 9 So you could, depending on what your 10 11 preconceived notion of the program was, you could 12 justify any answer you wanted. So I figured that wasn't necessarily going to do us any good. 13 14 gave up on that pretty quickly. 15 And our second attempt was to use your objectives, which are basically the same plus a few 16 others. And it gave us the same dilemma, basically. 17 We could answer those questions with examples to say 18 19 no for just about any one of them, or all of them, and 20 say that the program is not effective then. 21 But I don't think that's accurate or that 22 would be meaningful for anybody's use. So we gave up 23 on that one as well. 24 So then we tried to use the NRC staff's 25 metrics, as used in the October 12th, 2000 document.

1 And although it was better, it was a lot of work. 2 don't have the same staff size, 3 collectively. Individually we might. But -- so we 4 gave up on that one as well, though it didn't give us 5 the dilemma; it just gave us more work than I wanted to do. So I banded it. 6 7 Then I tried to use the -- right now there's a public comment period out on the inspection 8 9 program, or the oversight program more broadly. And it asked a number of questions that are pretty much 10 11 biased towards giving you an answer that the program's 12 For example it says, "Is the SDP not very good. process usable and does it provide consistent and 13 14 accurate results?" 15 Well, the answer to that question's going 16 to be no. 17 Does the ROP assessment program provide timely, consistent, and relevant -- I assume it means 18 19 all of them, not just any one of those. 20 question there's going to be no. 21 But again, is that useful information to 22 people to really evaluate this program? 23 We didn't think it was meaningful so we --24 we're not going to answer those questions in that way. 25 So what we did was come up with our own

metrics. At least it would be easy. I don't know if it's useful, but at least it's going to be easy, which was my major criterion.

And what we did was to look at the three elements of the oversight program: inspection, assessment, and enforcement, and to try to determine if that's better than what was used before, and that's still subjective, but it was easier to evaluate them rather than the absolute of whether the new program meets all these objectives, the objectives I stated earlier.

So basically we went through the data from the first year or partial year against these criteria of whether it's better than what we had in the past.

And so that's the yardstick we used, and evaluated these, the data we collected against.

And just going through them in no particular order, I looked at the inspection program first and broke each of the elements down into two phases, what we liked and what we didn't like about the program elements.

Some of the things we liked about the inspection program was that the inspection findings are posted on the Web with links to the inspection reports. And you can get that information outside of

ADAMS, which is a great thing.

Second is the inspection finding summaries on the Web and not in ADAMS which is a great thing, and the inspection reports indicate that the NRC is spending more time in risk significant areas than the prior program did, which also is a good thing.

And then if you look at some of the inspection findings and why things are colored the way they are, there are some real good examples. We cited one from a FitzPatrick inspection report. I'm not going to read the whole thing there, but it's pretty evident that the NRC looked at the staff, the condition that existed in the plant, showed that that condition didn't prevent the safety function from being preformed. So, therefore, even though it is a finding and needs to be corrected, its safety significance if relatively low. It was plain and simple.

Although the footnote here explains it wasn't in the inspection report -- it was in the inspection report. It wasn't in the finding as summarized on the Web. So an additional step was required, but you get to the -- you get to the information that answers the question of why it was green.

1 And there's another example. These aren't 2 the only examples. I just find a few examples to They're not all of the 3 illustrate the point there. 4 examples, either good or bad, that we have collected. 5 There was a Grand Gulf inspection report that looked at a ventilation condition at Grand Gulf. 6 7 Again, they showed that even though the equipment was impaired, the safety function would have been 8 preformed despite the impairment, and therefore, it 9 clearly justifies why the finding was green. 10 11 You know, it makes perfect -- this was 12 actually in the summary on the Website and also in the inspection report. 13 14 And to balance that, we have some things 15 we don't like about the inspection program. One of the things we don't like is ADAMS, and that's going to 16 be everything we will ever say is we don't like ADAMS, 17 no matter what the topic is. 18 My barber was a little understood --19 20 didn't understand why I said I didn't like ADAMS, but 21 any opportunity I get to criticize ADAMS we're taking 22 it. 23 MR. LAURIE: I'm sorry, David. I don't 24 know what that is. 25 MR. LOCHBAUM: ADAMS is a system that

1	doesn't work very good. It's supposed to be
2	(Laughter.)
3	THE PARTICIPANT: That could be any system
4	in the world.
5	MR. LOCHBAUM: Not in this case. It's
6	ADAMS is the agency-wide document access management
7	system. It's the
8	MR. LAURIE: That's the NRC's system?
9	MR. LOCHBAUM: Yes.
10	MR. LAURIE: Yeah, okay.
11	MR. LOCHBAUM: They spent roughly \$24
12	million on this system that the public was supposed to
13	use after the local public document rooms were closed.
14	We've called it the equivalent of electronic keep away
15	because it doesn't work very good.
16	And, in fact, the NRC's abandoning it
17	sometime here in the near future.
18	MR. LAURIE: Okay. Thank you.
19	MR. LOCHBAUM: Some of the other things we
20	find is that there are some inspection reports where
21	there's there's really not a good explanation as to
22	why the green crayons were being used.
23	In Beaver Valley, there was one that said
24	that the risk associated with the failure of the
25	refueling water storage tank level transmitters has

1 been determined to be low because we did a Phase 3 2 analysis, and that was it. I mean, there was no other explanation as 3 4 to what the Phase 3 analysis considered, didn't 5 consider. You know, we went through this process and it's green because the process told it was green. And 6 7 I'm not saying that it wasn't green. I'm just saying that there wasn't enough information provided to agree 8 9 or disagree. You could write down on every finding, no 10 11 matter what the color was. I mean, that's -- you just 12 describe the process; you didn't describe why it was 13 that way. 14 And at Calvert Cliffs, it basically 15 explained what was found. It doesn't explain why that was green or why it wasn't yellow, red, or any other 16 Again it just explained what was found, not 17 color. necessarily why it was determined to be green. 18 19 Browns Ferry, a similar example. 20 know, this is different than the Grand Gulf Example. It had a ventilation system that explained why it was 21 22 green because the safety function was still fulfilled. 23 This one basically says the safety system 24 function will not be fulfilled, but the only people 25 who are going to die are going to be the operators. So

1 therefore, nobody off site is affected. So that's 2 okay. You know, operators do have a pretty 3 4 important function during many accidents and to just 5 say that those consequences are limited to control room operators may be true, but that isn't necessarily 6 7 enough reason to make it green. Again, there might be a reason why it's 8 9 It's just that this doesn't seem to be the right reason for making it a green. 10 11 Another example it at the Harris plant. 12 More than anything else it just describes what was found, not necessarily why it was determined to be the 13 14 safety significance of green. 15 I haven't run the numbers to tell you how high a percentage this is, but it's more than half the 16 17 ones I looked at were this way. But again, I haven't looked at all of them. I started alphabetically with 18 19 the As and I got down through the Hs and some of the 20 So I got about half way through the plants, and Gs. 21 it seemed to be occurring quite frequently. 22 And that was discussed this morning about 23 the quality of information versus the threshold. One 24 of the ways to improve the quality is not to put this

information into the inspection reports at all.

1 Therefore, you don't have to worry about why you use 2 whatever crayon was used. But if you're going to put the stuff in 3 4 the report, you need to at least explain why it was 5 what you said it was. I think that goes to the quality issue that Chip asked, the related question. 6 7 And one thing we don't understand, and 8 this is somewhat related to the significance 9 determination process, is that some of the inspection findings are said to be of low significance because 10 11 they didn't effect something else or they occurred 12 during a test and not during an actual emergency. Since that's part -- I thought was part of 13 14 the reason for doing the test was to find out if 15 things are working or not, just because it comes up to be a failure shouldn't in and of itself be the reason 16 17 for it to be a green finding. That would seem to imply that there's only 18 19 two colors, red or green. Either you kill people or 20 And there's got to be some gradation you don't. between those two. You know, this can't be the right 21 22 reason for coloring things. 23 Some of these inspection findings are in 24 the initiating events' cornerstone, and it's said to

be like the first one at Beaver Valley was said to be

1 of low safety significance because mitigating 2 equipment was not affected by the initiating event. 3 Well, that seems to prove the fact that 4 seven cornerstones provide back-up and redundancy and 5 all that other stuff. That doesn't address the question of whether that equipment that affects an 6 7 initiating even worked right or not. Ι 8 that's -- again, that seems to be the wrong reason for making something a low significance. 9 It should be evaluated on its own merits, 10 not whether the back-ups to it in another cornerstone 11 12 were in place or not. That just doesn't seem to make much sense. 13 14 And I think this was one that sometimes 15 inspection findings are cast against certain cornerstones, but it's not clear why it was in that 16 cornerstone and not one of the other cornerstones. 17 This is a Sequoyah event where the finding 18 19 was put in the mitigating systems cornerstone or under 20 the mitigating systems cornerstone, and it looks like 21 it should have been under the initiating events 22 cornerstone. 23 In this case it was a reactor trip caused 24 by a spurious equipment failure basically, due to some 25 procedure change or design control change issues.

It seemed to increase the initiating event frequency. It did challenge the mitigating systems, but it really seems to be the hit should have been against initiating events and not against mitigating systems.

I guess it could have been worse to put in

I guess it could have been worse to put in one of the other cornerstones, but it looks like this was the wrong label for this finding, not the color.

I just mean where it -- which bin it ended up into seemed to be the wrong one.

That pretty much sums up what we've found on the inspection program. Going to the assessment program, what we do like is green findings, and on the color screen that would be green, but it's light grey on this one.

We do like the PI summary and the PI thresholds, with the exception of the alert and notification system, PI summery scope, and the fact that there's not a performance indicator for containment integrity or containment system performance, not necessarily containment integrity.

One of the things we do think is good about the new assessment program is both the plant owner and the NRC response time is improved. Neither one of them has to wait until there's SALP roll-up

1 period or a mid-cycle performance review to know about 2 a problem, whether it's a PI or an inspection finding, and to react to it. 3 4 You know, I knew they were arguments in 5 the past that that was also under true under SALP. The NRC and the licensee didn't have to wait until 6 7 SALPs came out, but this seems to be much quicker or 8 faster response that the old process. So it's not 9 perfect but it's a step or several steps in the right direction. 10 11 The action matrix we really do like. 12 fact, we like it so much we wish the NRC would use it. So far, the few times that they've gone into it, it 13 14 seems like it's been abandoned with more frequency 15 than it's been followed. 16 MR. GARCHOW: What are some examples of that? 17 The Quad Cities security 18 MR. LOCHBAUM: 19 issue, the Indian Point 2 red finding. Both seem to 20 be -- and I'll get into this a little bit further 21 because we talk about those -- but those both seems 22 where you enter the action matrix, and the staff 23 decided they didn't want to do what the action matrix 24 called for, so they didn't. 25 MR. KRICH: Are you going to get into that

1	later, Dave?
2	MR. LOCHBAUM: Yes.
3	MR. KRICH: Because that's not quite
4	accurate.
5	MR. LOCHBAUM: We think it is.
6	MR. KRICH: Okay. We don't think it is,
7	but we can talk about it.
8	MR. LOCHBAUM: I would have bet that you
9	wouldn't have thought that was so, but I'd also bet
10	that Indian Point 2 doesn't agree with me either, but
11	we'll see.
12	We do like the fact that senior management
13	meetings are replaced by regional mid-cycle
14	performance reviews. We think any effort that the NRC
15	does that takes control away from Whit Flint and moves
16	it closer to the plant will improve the objectivity of
17	the process.
18	To put it another way, the more you rely
19	on White Flint to make decisions, the more likely they
20	are to be political and subjective rather than based
21	on actual performance.
22	And the last thing we liked about the
23	assessment program or on the fly did we like about the
24	assessment program is that finally a line has been

drawn between acceptable and unacceptable performance.

1 There never really existed such a thing in the past. 2 There were times when the agency reached 3 a determination about unacceptable performance, but it 4 was more ad hoc, and it was against ill-defined 5 criteria. Again, some of the things we like about 6 7 the assessment program is the PI trending. There was some discussion this morning about green-to-white 8 thresholds and information like that. 9 I quess our view is we don't care if there are any colors on there 10 or not. 11 12 You know, you've got the data trends. You can see where the things are getting better or getting 13 14 worse. And the plant owners and the NRC are looking 15 at these things every three months. So if the NRC and 16 the plant owner realize that things are getting better 17 every quarter, that seems to be worthwhile information. 18 19 these parties see that things are 20 getting worse, I don't care if it's above red, below 21 red, or whatever, at least that seems to be worthwhile 22 information that everybody should then act upon, and 23 it's the indications we've had. 24 We like the fact that in general in the

95-5 concept for green to white threshold, we think

that's a good concept. We know it doesn't apply in every single case, but where it does, I think it's a good idea, recognizing that it doesn't mean that you're in bad space if you're in the white band and have moved out of the green band.

Although I don't understand some of the concepts of the discussion this morning about the unintended consequences with the diesel generator example at San Onofre, where the consequence had it not been for the fix would have put the plant into the white band with the acknowledgement that the white band is an unacceptable form. You're just in the bottom five percent of the acceptable band.

So it looks like if people recognize that or understood why it got there, that wouldn't necessarily be a bad thing. Apparently it was perceived to be a bad thing enough that there was some negotiation underway to make sure that the plant would stay in the green band.

MR. GARCHOW: The issue there, Dave, that we talked about the last meeting that you weren't at is that for the period of time that it's there, whatever the issue, it's setting yourself up to be closer to a degraded cornerstone. And then following the action matrix, I mean, if you don't provide the

1 leeway like it sounds like you're suggesting they're not, you're sort of stuck with the white that maybe 2 3 shouldn't have been a white to begin with. 4 Now, another white that should have been 5 you're into a degraded cornerstone, all of which then when you unline from that and the public sounds like, 6 7 you know, it's not done. It doesn't sound like -- it sounds like you're inventing new rules when you're in 8 9 the middle of the game, right? So that if you shouldn't have been white 10 to begin with, that's the incentive not to be white. 11 12 MR. LOCHBAUM: So the solution to that was to use a FAQ to get around the coloration. 13 14 just looks like you've shifted when a negotiation 15 phase comes in. You haven't gotten around the problem in the first place. 16 17 So from the public standpoint, whether you negotiate now or negotiate later in the process, I'm 18 19 not sure there's a huge difference. MR. SCHERER: Well, it sounds like you do 20 21 think there's a big difference because you said the 22 NRC shouldn't deviate from the response matrix. 23 But they do. MR. LOCHBAUM: I mean, if 24 they didn't, there would be no second negotiation, but So there's negotiation, whether you do it 25 they do.

1 when you enter the action matrix and the people don't 2 want to take the steps that are specified in the 3 action matrix, or you do it in the front end to 4 artificially lift yourself out of a band that you'd be 5 in otherwise. It's still negotiation, you know. 6 7 the plant owner coming to the NRC saying, "I don't want to be here for this reason." The NRC accepts or 8 9 rejects that argument, excluded the "or rejects" from And then the thing is not put into the band 10 that it should be in. 11 12 MR. SCHERER: Well, you said it should be in, but if you remember my comment, the NRC and the 13 14 licensee both agreed that it was safer to do it at 15 So if you -- if the NRC had rejected it, we would do the less safe thing, which is something you 16 17 don't want to see happen, right? Well, it's predicated on 18 MR. LOCHBAUM: 19 that I agree with that, and I don't. And if that were 20 indeed the case, then other plants in the country are 21 doing less safe things. Because that's the way most 22 of the other folks are doing it. 23 MR. SCHERER: Well, more people are moving 24 to doing it on -- at power for that reason, where the

-- where the circumstances justify. It's case by case

1 evaluation. But for the -- for the sake of discussion 2 let's just stipulate that it is safer to do it one way 3 versus another. 4 Wouldn't you want to see the plant do the 5 safer thing, assuming for the purpose of discussion that it's safer to do it on line? Or would 6 7 you rather follow the matrix and drive the plant to do 8 the less safe thing? MR. LOCHBAUM: Obviously we'd rather do 9 10 the safer thing. But I'm not sure that by doing the 11 safer thing and taking a white PI that that means 12 you're in -- that's necessarily bad. That's perceived as bad because you went to great pains to avoid that 13 14 white label. And I guess I don't understand why --15 Well, I'm linking that to MR. SCHERER: your comment that the NRC shouldn't deviate from the 16 action matrix, and if, in fact, it's okay to take a 17 white, which you're saying, now you're in the action 18 19 The next one is a repeated or if you have a 20 different one --21 MR. LOCHBAUM: Right. 22 -- then it's a multiple MR. SCHERER: 23 degraded. Now you're saying don't deviate from that, 24 even though it was a safer action that caused you to 25 get there in the first place.

1 MR. LOCHBAUM: But the safer action, the 2 conclusion of the stipulation about the safer action 3 was predicated on the assumption that you didn't have 4 any other degraded cornerstones. And now your plant conditions have now shown that that conclusion was 5 flawed, and perhaps the NRC shouldn't have been so 6 7 generous in granting -- reaching that conclusion. MR. SCHERER: You're making a link I don't 8 think exists between one PI and another PI. 9 not all linked. 10 Well, the plants are 11 MR. LOCHBAUM: 12 designed for a single failure criterion. So if you start having multiple things that aren't working 13 14 right, you're challenging the underlying basis for 15 operation, and you could clearly increase the safety such that doing the maintenance on-line with the other 16 17 cornerstone, which ever it was, in a degraded mode reduces the safety, does not increase the safety as 18 19 you'd initially assumed. 20 So we would say, yes, that is a bad thing to do and shouldn't be allowed, or I don't mean 21 22 shouldn't be allowed; shouldn't be green under the 23 current band. 24 The other thing we liked about the data 25 trending is that it shows you how close you are,

although I just said we don't care what color things are. It does show whether you're slightly white, very white, slightly yellow, very yellow, and so on.

Things about the assessment program we

don't like are ADAMS. We don't like the fact that the NRC issued a red finding to Indian Point 2 for the steam generator problem, but allowed the plant to restart before the plant provided a response to the finding because, quote, the company's, quote, current engagement in unit restart and power ascension activities was the basis for the extension request, end quote.

In other words, the even though it had happened months and months before, the plant's staff was so focused on restarting the plant that it couldn't answer the safety findings from the red violation.

So our contention was that the NRC's response wasn't as dictated by the action matrix, where it focuses more and more attention on safety issues.

Here the focus, both the NRC and the licensee, were on restarting the plant before the underlying safety questions were answered. There was plenty of time. The thing took about ten months from

1 the time the event happened until the NRC issued the 2 red finding. 3 that time the company didn't 4 apparently didn't have enough time to answer why it 5 was or was not a safety problem. And the NRC accepted that. 6 7 So we don't think that the intent, the spirit, or any aspect of the action matrix was abided 8 9 by by the NRC staff at Indian Point 2. And this isn't sour grapes after the fact. I've called Hub Miller 10 11 before this was done, shortly after the October or the 12 letter was issued last fall and expressed dismay with it at that time. 13 MR. TRAPP: Dave, one clarifier there that 14 15 may be missing is it was a steam generator tube integrity issue, and they did install four new steam 16 17 generators before they restarted. So the root cause of that steam generator two issue was really gone 18 19 before restart. That might have weighed into the 20 decision. 21 MR. LOCHBAUM: That wasn't the information 22 I got from Mr. Miller. 23 MR. FLOYD: Just a point of clarification The red finding was that they did an 24 additional.

inadequate job of finding defects in the existing

1	steam generators prior to restart and, therefore,
2	increased the initiating event frequency for steam
3	generator tube rupture with the other conditions at
4	the station resulting in a red finding, so
5	MR. LOCHBAUM: But the reason
6	MR. FLOYD: Fixing generators by replacing
7	them eliminates the deficiency.
8	MR. LOCHBAUM: For the short term, not for
9	the long term because they still then have to inspect
10	the new steam generators.
11	MR. FLOYD: Sure.
12	MR. LOCHBAUM: Because they're not
13	invulnerable to the problem.
14	What we pointed out was that all along the
15	plant owner had objected to any claim that it did
16	anything wrong, there was any deficiencies at all and
17	its inspection program. It said it did nothing wrong.
18	So our concern was if the company doesn't think it did
19	anything wrong, and it did something so wrong that it
20	garnered a red violation, if the plant owner doesn't
21	know the difference between right and wrong, why
22	you're allowing it to restart?
23	Because if it doesn't know the difference
24	between right and wrong in this case, how do you know
25	that it knows the difference between right and wrong

1 in any other case? 2 And there's only two reasons that the NRC allows a plant to start up, and additional licensing 3 4 is the plant meets all regulatory requirements and 5 there's reasonable assurance that the plant will continue to be operated in compliance with all 6 7 regulatory requirements. 8 Here you have an owner saying, "I have no 9 clue what the regulatory requirements are. agree with you that I violated them, " but the NRC 10 11 allowed it to restart. 12 So the two underlying principles that it got its license were both undermined and the NRC 13 14 allowed it to restart before that answer was resolved. 15 I agree there was some margin because there were brand new steam generators. That's why our petition asked 16 17 for them to put those new ones in. 18 But it wasn't a moot point. 19 determines when it comes back into play on those 20 specific components. So --21 MR. HILL: Can I ask a question about your slide? 22 23 I don't understand. It says up there what 24 we don't like about and then you've got this little 25 gamma or something there, red with a one.

1	MR. LOCHBAUM: Yeah. That's that's the
2	yellow finding and a red flag finding, if this was
3	color coated.
4	MR. HILL: You don't like yellow or red
5	findings; is that what you're saying?
6	MR. LOCHBAUM: Yeah, if we have a
7	preference we like the green findings. And we gave
8	although you can't see it, we gave ADAMS a red
9	finding.
10	(Laughter.)
11	MR. LOCHBAUM: Actually it earned a red
12	finding.
13	The second thing we didn't like about the
14	action matrix thing this goes to Rod's question
15	the NRC opted not to issue any finding on its Quad
16	City security failure.
17	Rather than to deviate from the action
18	matrix, it just chose not to even play the game, not
19	issue a finding of any color. That's another way to
20	get around the action matrix, is to take your ball and
21	go home.
22	MR. KRICH: That would be true if it
23	was that's not quite the case where you have a
24	white finding was issued. So I don't know what you're
25	referring to, Dave, but if you could view the

1 inspection report we got a white finding for that. So 2 the NRC didn't do -- take their ball and go home. 3 MR. LOCHBAUM: They basically negotiated 4 a red finding down to a white finding, and then 5 issued-don't 6 MR. KRICH: I know who thev 7 negotiated with. They didn't negotiated with us. 8 MR. LOCHBAUM: Okay. I could comment a little bit 9 MR. FLOYD: 10 What really happened in that whole security 11 SDP area was there was a late minute proposal, which evaluated thoroughly, to 12 link didn't get deficiencies that were found during a force-on-force 13 14 evaluation to the reactor safety SDP. 15 MR. LOCHBAUM: That wasn't our proposal. 16 MR. FLOYD: Oh, no. It wasn't your 17 proposal, no, no. It was actually --Whose proposal was it? 18 MR. LOCHBAUM: 19 MR. FLOYD: It was actually the industry's 20 proposal as a way of making linkage between them 21 because when we were doing that the understanding that 22 we had with the security folks at the NRC was that you 23 had these things called target sets, which contained, 24 you know, elements of safe shutdown equipment. And if 25 the intruder got in and damaged a target set, but you

had other equipment available, that when you fed it into the action matrix it showed that you could still achieve and maintain safe shutdown, then you ought to get credit for that.

Well, what happened is when they went to apply the SDP actually in practice and started doing the OSREs, the NRC instead took the approach that, no, you can't take any credit for any equipment that's not in a target set because the objective of our OSRE is to fail the equipment in the target set.

And therefore, any equipment that you think is necessary to achieve and maintain shutdown should be in a target set, and we're going to fail all that equipment so you can't get credit for any other equipment.

So the whole basis for the SDP and the approach was flawed because it wasn't thoroughly evaluated, and it was sort of a knee jerk, last minute change to the program to try to come up with an SDP that made some sense, and it failed miserably.

And I think both the industry and the NRC recognize that the SDP did not work because the fundamental basis for it was not accepted by the security people conducting the OSREs once the program got implemented.

1	And that's really why they chose to ignore
2	the security SDP findings, because it would always
3	result in a red finding if you can never take credit
4	for any equipment that's not in a target set.
5	MR. LOCHBAUM: Unless you
6	MR. FLOYD: Regardless of how much there
7	was.
8	MR. LOCHBAUM: Unless your security's able
9	to protect the target set.
LO	MR. FLOYD: All the target sets, every
l1	single one for every possible scenario. And their
L2	argument was if it's not in a target set, you can't
L3	take credit for it. And that was never the intent of
L4	the original SDP. It was to take credit for what
L5	other capabilities the plant had to be able to achieve
L6	and maintain safe shutdown after an intruder was able
L7	to come in and damage some equipment in a target set,
L8	not every single piece of equipment at the plant
L9	simultaneously.
20	MR. LOCHBAUM: Okay.
21	MR. FLOYD: But they wouldn't allow that
22	to be part of the evaluation. So that's why it was
23	flawed.
24	And I think everybody recognized it just
2.5	wasn't going to work.

1	MR. LOCHBAUM: Not everybody recognized
2	it.
3	MR. FLOYD: Well, maybe not everybody, but
4	the people that were close enough to it discussing it
5	were.
6	MR. KRICH: The point is that, in fact,
7	Quad Cities was issued a white finding. There were no
8	negotiations going on, and that the Quad Cities OSRE
9	inspection got used as a I called it a poster child
10	for addressing the issue of the SDP concern, and what
11	came out was the white finding with a new set of I
12	guess I call them screening criteria for security
13	issues.
14	MR. LOCHBAUM: I guess I that's not my
15	understanding of the history, is that there was
16	initially an opportunity for a pre-decisional
17	enforcement conference. The company decided it didn't
18	want to do that.
19	MR. KRICH: That's not true.
20	MR. LOCHBAUM: It heard that the NRC had
21	come out with a red finding in SDP space. The company
22	then asked for a pre-decisional enforcement conference
23	that was not open to the public.
24	Subsequent to those negotiations, there
25	was a commission vote and it came out the way it is.

1	MR. KRICH: Dave, there was no pre-
2	decisional enforcement conference. There was never a
3	pre-decisional enforcement conference.
4	MR. LOCHBAUM: I'm sorry. I used exit
5	meeting. You had a chance for an exit meeting.
6	MR. KRICH: It was an exit meeting.
7	MR. LOCHBAUM: You turned it down, and
8	then after the
9	MR. KRICH: No, we didn't
10	MR. LOCHBAUM: red finding
11	MR. KRICH: We didn't turn it down, no.
12	MR. LOCHBAUM: That's what I'm hearing.
13	MR. KRICH: No. You're wrong. It's
14	everything is out in the public. We had an exit
15	meeting. Then the NRC asked us to come in and had
16	another management meeting with them, which we did
17	hold, which I believe was closed because it dealt with
18	security issues. And that was the end of it.
19	The next thing we knew is we only got the
20	letter about two weeks ago. So your facts are not
21	quite right.
22	MR. LOCHBAUM: Somebody's facts are not
23	quite right. We'll see.
24	MR. KRICH: Well, it's not my facts.
25	MR. LOCHBAUM: Okay. It's not my facts.

1	So
2	MR. KRICH: But you're the one who's
3	citing these things that aren't accurate. There was
4	no pre-decisional enforcement conference.
5	MR. LOCHBAUM: I corrected that to say
6	exit meeting.
7	MR. KRICH: And there was an exit meeting
8	held.
9	MR. LOCHBAUM: The first one
10	MR. KRICH: And then there was a
11	management meeting held at the request of the NRC.
12	MR. LOCHBAUM: The I mispoke earlier.
13	What I was told by the NRC was that the company
14	decided it didn't want an exit meeting; when it heard
15	the red finding was being floated, asked for an exit
16	meeting so, therefore, to explain that there was
17	equipment available at the plant that could be used to
18	protect the core for the targets at damage.
19	After that exit meeting was conducted in
20	Region 3 that was a closed meeting
21	MR. KRICH: That was not an exit meeting.
22	MR. LOCHBAUM: It's what I was told it
23	was.
24	MR. KRICH: There was a there was an

exit meeting conducted at the end of the inspection.

1 MR. LOCHBAUM: I'm just --2 MR. KRICH: Well, let me finish. And then there was a subsequent meeting that was requested in 3 4 order to provide additional information that the NRC 5 asked us to provide them. Now, I think the NRC may have categorized 6 7 that as a subsequent exit meeting in order to make it fit within their procedures. 8 But it was a meeting that was requested in 9 order to provide additional information. That was the 10 11 end of discussions with the NRC. The next thing that 12 happened was they issued their letter on February 13th, I think. 13 14 MR. LOCHBAUM: The staff told me it was an 15 exit meeting. If you're saying it wasn't an exit 16 meeting, then that's -- that's what the meeting notice 17 said. MR. KRICH: But there -- my point is that 18 19 didn't turn down an exit meeting and 20 subsequently ask for it after we heard about a red 21 finding. We had an exit meeting with the NRC, as --22 as we normally do at the end of an inspection. 23 that the NRC asked us to give them more information 24 during a meeting that was held in the region.

meeting was called, I think, another exit meeting in

1 order to make it fit within the process. But the meeting basically was we provided them additional 2 3 information that they did not have. 4 MR. LOCHBAUM: Okay. 5 MR. KRICH: And having been involved in every step of the way, I think I know what happened. 6 7 MR. BLOUGH: Aren't we -- we're here to hear Dave's perceptions about what happened and his --8 9 you know, how he -- what his assessment of the program I just -- yeah, I don't know that we're here to 10 try to change Dave's opinion on this matter. 11 12 MR. KRICH: No, I'm not trying to change anybody's opinion. What I'm trying to do is make sure 13 14 that the information that's given to this panel is 15 accurate at least from the point of view of the things that I know about. And what's on this slide is, in 16 17 fact, not accurate. MR. FLOYD: Yeah, I think what I'm getting 18 19 of value out of this is that if Dave has these types 20 of perceptions with the way the program is being 21 executed and run and is not -- does not have these 22 explanations reasonably available to him, then that is a public perception problem. 23 24 MR. LOCHBAUM: Then something is not 25 working, right.

1 MR. FLOYD: And it does create problems 2 with members of the public trying to understand the process if they can't do that. 3 4 MR. LOCHBAUM: I think regardless of 5 whether you think the Indian Point 2 or Quad Cities findings were red, green, or the safest thing that 6 7 ever occurred in the history of the world, I think if you look at the timeliness from the event to the NRC 8 9 finding, in both cases they were many, many months. It takes the NRC relatively no time to 10 11 issue a green or no color finding, and an extremely 12 long -- because the negotiations take longer for nongreen findings. And the more significant the issue 13 14 might be, the longer it takes, and if you're actually 15 doing risk informed regulation, that's exactly 16 backwards. 17 You ought to be able to come to the conclusion faster on the important stuff. 18 If a 19 theater owner was told that his theater may be on 20 fire, and he reaches determination it's not, you know, 21 it takes him several weeks to figure out whether it's 22 on fire or not; I don't think he'd be doing a real 23 good job. 24 So for the NRC to take months to figure 25 out -- regardless of whether you thought the endpoint

1	was right or wrong, the timeliness of both of these is
2	just unacceptable, although I do concede it's better
3	than what the old process was. It was unacceptable in
4	the old process as well.
5	MR. GARCHOW: Dave.
6	MR. LOCHBAUM: Yes?
7	MR. GARCHOW: When you use the word
8	"negotiation" and we really, really cover this because
9	you've brought this up before, when we had the NRC
10	folks in here at the last meeting or one of the days
11	last meeting. They made a truth is always
12	somewhere, right?
13	But, I mean, to the extent that you're
14	using the word "negotiation," they were using the
15	opposite of negotiation about getting the information
16	necessary to work through the significance
17	determination process correctly.
18	And I'm just I guess I'm I mean
19	you're making a point just like ADAMS is bad. I mean,
20	you keep using "negotiation." Do you actually believe
21	it's negotiation and what's that
22	MR. LOCHBAUM: Yes.
23	MR. GARCHOW: what's that founded on?
24	MR. LOCHBAUM: It's founded on discussions
25	with NRC staff members. As far as the Quad City

1 security, we were told by many NRC staff members that there was utility executive after utility executive 2 3 who came in to meet with the Commissioners to lobby 4 for no finding being issued. 5 I don't know if it was people from ConEd or Exelon or whatever they're called, but we kept 6 7 hearing that there was utility executive after utility -- and the staffers wanted me to come in and counter-8 9 lobby or point-counterpoint that. And we don't do 10 that. 11 We hope the Commission reaches a right 12 In this case they didn't, but we -- we kept decision. hearing that from a number of staffers, that utility 13 14 executives -- it might not have been the sole purpose 15 of them coming in here, but it was clearly brought up during the course of their discussions with the 16 Commissioners. 17 So, you know, that's why I think -- and 18 19 this whole bit, although from what I was told, this 20 bit about the exit meetings and the coloration, I was 21 told that by NRC staff. I didn't gin that story up by 22 I'm not that creative. myself. 23 So, you know, from what I'm hearing from 24 the NRC staff, that's how it look -- how it came down.

Well, then that's good.

MR. KRICH:

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Ι

1	mean, that's good information because that means then
2	that there are communications issues not only with the
3	public, but also within the NRC staff that need to be
4	addressed.
5	Because what you just described didn't
6	happen in reality.
7	MR. LOCHBAUM: We'll see. I you know,
8	I don't I'm not calling you a liar by any means.
9	Because I know and respect you.
10	MR. KRICH: I'm not calling you a liar,
11	but, you know, I was there so I know what happened and
12	what didn't happen.
13	MR. LOCHBAUM: All I know is I was told by
14	people I trust as well something that doesn't agree
15	with that. So I got two different fact sets and
16	MR. KRICH: I understand.
17	MR. LOCHBAUM: until I understand what
18	the difference is, I've got to go with the one I
19	MR. KRICH: But I'd like to get back to
20	Dave's question about negotiation also because you
21	continue to use that word, and as far as I'm aware of
22	there were no negotiations that went on.
23	MR. LOCHBAUM: There were negotiation
24	in my context is if there were no negotiations, the
25	NRC staff and the plant owner could look at an event.

1 use a significance determination process, you know, 2 spin the wheel, whatever they used, and come up with 3 a coloration without having to go back and forth and 4 talk about individual plant data and all this other 5 stuff. Those are negotiations. You're providing data. They're assessing 6 7 whether it's right, wrong, or indifferent. Those are 8 negotiations. They are not necessarily the bad 9 connotation connotation associated with 10 negotiations. But they are negotiations. 11 You're deciding whether something is or is 12 not significant. And in ConEd case, which I know a little bit more about -- I thought I did -- ConEd came 13 14 in and explained why they thought the issue was not a 15 red finding. And they presented their numbers and their results. 16 And the NRC staff issued the results from 17 their calculations and their ciphering and showed that 18 19 it was a red finding. 20 So you have two parties using the same 21 process coming up with completely different things and 22 then --23 So you would refer to a pre-MR. KRICH: 24 decisional enforcement conference as a negotiation

because that's exactly what goes on at those -- at

1	those meetings.
2	No. I'm talking about an enforcement
3	meeting. I mean that's exactly what the purpose of an
4	enforcement conference is is for
5	MR. LOCHBAUM: Right.
6	MR. KRICH: the licensee to provide
7	information so that the NRC can reach a conclusion.
8	So that you could consider, under the definition you
9	just gave, that's a negotiation?
10	MR. LOCHBAUM: That's correct.
11	MR. KRICH: Okay. All right.
12	MR. LOCHBAUM: And I don't mean to imply
13	that all negotiations are bad either. I mean, just in
14	this case when negotiations drag out a determination
15	on a safety issue, we think it's a bad thing.
16	So in these two cases we think the
17	endpoint was wrong. We also think the delay was
18	wrong. So it was in this case two wrongs definitely
19	don't make a right.
20	MR. FLOYD: Dave, I've got one question
21	for you. Our observation, I just wanted to see if you
22	had any basis for differing from this observation.
23	Our observation i though I totally agree with you
24	it has taken in some cases longer than what's

appropriate to resolve some of these issues, hopefully

1 that'll get remedied when the plant specific work 2 sheets come out and a few other enhancements are made 3 to the program. 4 But I'm not aware of any case where the 5 action to resolve the deficiency waited until after the determination of what the significance of it was. 6 7 So the delay in characterizing it was there, but actually taking action to take care of the condition 8 9 and resolving it and getting it in the corrective action program and proceeding to address it did not 10 11 wait for the determination. 12 MR. KRICH: Let me --MR. FLOYD: It's almost an after-the-fact 13 14 determination. 15 MR. KRICH: Let me give a concrete example So once we had the exit meeting, right after 16 the Quad Cities OSRE, we identified corrective actions 17 that we were taking or had taken or were going to take 18 19 in the short term, and then we docketed that 20 information. 21 So we didn't wait almost a year to take 22 corrective actions for the issues that were identified as a result of the OSRE. It was done within probably 23 24 a month and a half. 25 Okay. For the counter MR. LOCHBAUM:

1	example, in the Indian Point 2 case that I'll go back
2	to, the company still doesn't think it did anything
3	wrong. It would be hard for me to believe that a
4	company doesn't believe it did anything wrong with its
5	inspection program could have implemented the fixes to
6	fix the program.
7	It doesn't think it did anything wrong.
8	What's it going to go out there and fix?
9	MR. FLOYD: Sorry. I just can't comment
10	on that one. I don't know all the facts there.
11	MR. LOCHBAUM: So there's a red finding
12	that was issued. I can't agree that I can't think
13	anybody could argue that the corrective actions have
14	been done since the company still, or at least the
15	last time I checked, still refused to claim they did
16	anything wrong.
17	So there's no way it could have fixed that
18	effort. So even though the steam generators were
19	replaced and the actual source of the problem, the
20	steps to ensure that that doesn't happen again, it
21	doesn't look like they've been taken.
22	So I would argue that that's not
23	necessarily always the case.
24	MR. BLOUGH: At IP-2, the company
25	described the changes they had made to the oversight

of steam generator inspections and contractor oversight and such in correspondence. But I guess your point is you would question whether their heart was in those things they described to us, if they continue to maintain, you know, all along that, you know, they hadn't done anything wrong to begin with.

MR. LOCHBAUM: Well, basically it's kind of like if I'm given a multiple choice question exam, and D is the wrong answer and there's three, A, B, and C. I could go then A and then -- eventually I'm going to get the right answer with that process.

But if they don't know the difference between right and wrong and what they did wrong, there's no way to ensure that the next time that comes up that they're going to do the right thing. So even though they've ultimately got the right answer on that exam, that doesn't guarantee future performance. In fact, it argues very strongly the other way, that they're going to make the same mistake again.

Getting back to the slides, another thing we didn't like about the assessment program was the fact the PI data was submitted voluntarily. So to try to address that problem we submitted a petition for rulemaking last year that would have made the submission of data mandatory, and it seemed to correct

that problem, if it ever goes through.

The thing we don't like about the significance determination process is it's based exclusively on core damage frequency. Findings, for example, on spent fuel storage, criticality in the spent fuel pool or radway system integrity are illogically forced to be green or no color.

The exception being is if you do have a problem in one of those areas that leads to somebody being over exposed, you could get a non-green finding through that other pathway.

Another thing we don't like about the assessment program is that the Alert and Notification System PI is based on test failures and unjustly excludes all other failures. We've gone through the daily event reports as we did on the pilot program and pointed out a number of failures lasting many days that somehow don't count in the Alert Notification System PI.

It's only the ones that failed during the test. That seems a very easy way to compile the data. It just doesn't seem to be as meaningful as one that looks at the availability of the sirens themselves.

Attached to our comments we found from the Harris, Sharon Harris, case an Atomic Safety and

210 1 Licensing Board panel ruling that applied a 95 percent 2 criterion to the Alert and Notification System's 3 function. 4 And this was in a July 10th, 1986, letter 5 from Paris & Shon of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board panel to then Commissioner Lando Zech, and his 6 7 fellow Commissioners. If you look at the threshold for the white 8 or the green to white, that's below the criterion that 9 the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board panel applied in 10 11 the Sharon Harris case to evaluate whether this system 12 was functional or not. And the white to yellow threshold is even lower, which would seem suggest it's 13 14 way below. 15 I do need to point out that the 95 percent criterion that was applied by the Atomic Safety and 16 Licensing Board is on notification. 17 Ninety-five percent of the population when the sirens go off will 18 19 hear them. 20 I'm not sure they even have to know what 21

I'm not sure they even have to know what to do, just the fact they heard the sirens. And the fact that you don't have 94 percent of your sirens is not a one for one correlation. But it's close enough that I think it shows that there might be a problem in this area.

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1 We thought it was a problem before that. That just further reinforced our concern. 2 In fact, we've thought that -- I think 3 4 every forum I've ever had I've made that register that 5 concern. I've never ever, ever heard from the NRC staff why that was a good or bad thing. 6 7 So there was some discussion this morning about frequently asked questions. I said at the panel 8 9 last year that that went on to the NRC's list of never answered questions. 10 11 We provide the forum written. We provide 12 I've done everything but pass building a it orally. note and never ever get an answer back. 13 14 So I can make it again and apparently it's 15 falling on deaf ears. I don't know what the deal is. But in terms of interfacing with the public, when the 16 public keeps raising questions and never ever hears 17 whether it's good, bad, or indifferent, I think it's 18 19 just testing my stamina. Actually it's just making it easier for me 20 21 because I just go back to my last set of comments and 22 bring them forward. I don't have to do any new, 23 original thinking. 24 One of the things we don't like about the 25 action matrix, and this was discussed this morning

about what information goes out to the public. We think the action matrix itself is good and the summary that's on the Website is good.

But in its current format it's very difficult to use. Basically it's a one line entry for every plant in the country with a little box that says what column or what response category the plant is in. And this thing for 103 plants turns out to be about 10 feet long if you could scroll through it.

What we thought would be a little bit easier to use would be a matrix like this where you had the five columns and you indicated what column the plant was in so it would be a shorter more concise summary of information.

We also think this should be or something like this should be the starting point for the NRC Website, not the PI indicators. If you go to see a doctor, generally he tells you what your bottom line is, whether your healthy or not and then provides details to either indicate why you are or are not healthy, depending on whether it's cholesterol level or whatever.

He doesn't give you all the, you know, the blood count data and all the little bitty stuff and then at the end come out with a conclusion that you've

1	only got a week to live or something.
2	MR. FLOYD: Dave, I'd like to explore that
3	a little bit. So your suggestion is that if you want
4	to see where a plant stands you click on the name of
5	the plant and it would go to the action matrix and
6	highlight that plant and show you where that plant is
7	in the action matrix, and then you'd click on the box
8	under the column that they're in, and then you'd go to
9	the PI's and the inspection finding summaries if you
10	wanted to delve into more depth as to why they're in
11	that column of the action matrix. Is that the concept
12	or
13	MR. LOCHBAUM: Similar to that. I guess
14	we were envisioning that when you first called up
15	plant assessment results, you'd get this report card
16	or this
17	MR. FLOYD: Right.
18	MR. LOCHBAUM: summary. And then if
19	you wanted the PI data or you wanted the inspection
20	finding data
21	MR. FLOYD: Okay.
22	MR. LOCHBAUM: you could get to that,
23	but you'd start here rather than the other way around.
24	MR. SCHERER: David, how is that different
25	than what's on the Web right now?

1	MR. LOCHBAUM: Right now you have to go
2	through a lot of things. In this you get to kind of
3	at the end. You have to go through a lot of other
4	places to get here.
5	MR. SCHERER: I went on the Website on
6	13th of February and found exactly what you're
7	suggesting.
8	MR. LOCHBAUM: But was that where you
9	started or was that after you've clicked through a
10	number of these places to get there?
11	MR. SCHERER: Just went and found a matrix
12	that's got every plant and whether it's in a licensee
13	response column, the
14	MR. FLOYD: That's a new addition they've
15	just put on.
16	MR. LOCHBAUM: Right. But again, when you
17	start out, you start at the PI summary and then you
18	can get to that table, that listing, but you don't
19	start there. It's kind of like several steps down the
20	road today. And I think that this should be a
21	starting point, and you could get to the PI summary if
22	you want to, but you shouldn't start there.
23	MR. BLOUGH: Is it a sore subject to ask
24	if the NRR staff has that comment and has told you
25	anything yet?

1 MR. LOCHBAUM: No, because I just -- this 2 was just recently added. Right, yeah. 3 MR. BLOUGH: 4 MR. LOCHBAUM: Within the last few weeks. 5 MR. BLOUGH: Yeah. And I hadn't made that 6 MR. LOCHBAUM: 7 We are compiling comments for the public comment. 8 comment period that's coming up on the -- in the 9 workshop in late March. So I haven't provided any interim comments. 10 11 MR. BLOUGH: Okay. Thanks. 12 MR. LOCHBAUM: Some of these comments came up this morning in the discussion. One of the things 13 14 we don't like is that the casual observer is saturated 15 with information on the Website. In our comments we provided a brief quarterly report -- I'm sorry. 16 concluded a monthly report that's prepared by Ontario 17 Power Corporation on each of their plants. 18 19 And I'm not saying that should be the 20 information that the NRC provides, but it's a very 21 simple process for people who live around the plants 22 to understand how their plant's doing. It's available 23 on the Website. You can also download it, but I think 24 it's a much better interface for the casual public

then the information that's on the Website right now.

1 Right now you pretty much have to compile 2 that data yourself to come up to that conclusion. For 3 example, this panel will be providing a report to Sam 4 Collins on whatever it concludes. You know, you have 5 a couple options. You could just provide him the meeting 6 7 minutes, the transcripts from all these meetings. Collins has above average intelligence and plenty of 8 So he could read through all that and come to 9 his conclusions on what you guys think. 10 11 But you're not going to do that. You're 12 going to write him a nice, fairly brief report on what you've looked at and what your conclusions are to make 13 14 it easier for him to understand what you've done. 15 You really haven't done that with the You make the public do the data collection 16 17 and compilation. So we were suggesting that a report somewhat like the Ontario Power Corporation report 18 19 might be a better way to communicate to the public on how you feel about a plant's performance. 20 21 This is related to the Alert Notification 22 There's a frequently asked question, number System. 23 174, and specifically the response to that question. 24 The question asked if it was okay -- whether missed

tests should count in the denominator for the -- for

1 this PI. And the answer was no, even if the tests 2 were intentionally skipped. 3 So if you know a siren is bad and you 4 don't test it, it doesn't count in the denominator and 5 you can artificially inflate the response. Something doesn't seem exactly right about that. 6 7 But again, we don't like this indicator, the way it's currently done, so we obviously have a 8 9 bias and we're very critical of this indicator in just 10 about every aspect. And we also don't like the Phase 3 11 12 evaluations that are done on plant specific risk assessments that are not publicly available. 13 14 Any of these discussions or negotiations 15 are secret because the public doesn't have access to the information that's being discussed, and therefore, 16 they don't seem very fair. Part of this process was 17 to be transparent, scrutable, and consistent. 18 And we don't think the current SDP process 19 20 achieves any of those processes. I think it's prima 21 facie evidence that it doesn't in that every time --22 I don't know that there's ever been a case where the 23 industry agreed with the assessment done by the 24 industry or by the NRC.

So if both parties sitting down looking at

1 the same event using their similar risk information 2 come up with different answers, I don't know why the public should believe the ultimate number whatever it 3 4 ends up being, whether the NRC wins the negotiations 5 or the licensee does. The fact that every single case -- it's a 6 7 non-green. The two parties disagree and debate and negotiate about it. I think you're undermining public 8 9 confidence every single time. It makes my job easier, 10 but I don't think that's what you want to do. When I was on a pilot evaluation program, 11 12 Mr. --MR. LAURIE: Dave, can you go back to that 13 14 last slide? 15 MR. LOCHBAUM: Sure. Everybody understands what 16 MR. LAURIE: 17 you meant except me. Under the -- under your last bullet, when you talk about secret negotiations, can 18 19 you define that for me? Are you talking about private 20 discussions or are you talking about outcomes that are 21 not made public? 22 Can you just take one minute and explain 23 that to me? 24 MR. LOCHBAUM: Yeah, what I was referring 25 there was that the information that's being

1 discussed, the NRC will go through its process and try determine how significant a finding 2 3 condition was. The licensee will then provide 4 information from plant specific risk assessments that 5 generally -- that history has been to say that this isn't as significant as the NRC first evaluated. 6 7 Well, those plant specific risk 8 assessments are not on the docket. They're not in 9 publicly available. So any member of the public cannot look at the reason the licensee said that this 10 should be lower, less significant than what the NRC 11 12 determined. Now, I'm not saying -- I'm not saying that 13 14 the basis for that, the licensee's argument is flawed. 15 It's just there's no way to check to agree or It's just not publicly available. 16 disagree. 17 For that reason those negotiations, which have some significance because they tend to determine 18 19 safety significance --20 MR. LAURIE: What's the outcome of those 21 negotiations? 22 MR. LOCHBAUM: It depends. In the recent case done in the South at the summer plant a finding 23 was changed from yellow to -- yellow to white or 24 25 something like that based on the information received

1 these non-public, publicly available from risk 2 documents. 3 MR. LAURIE: Is the outcome always public? 4 MR. LOCHBAUM: The coloration is. 5 MR. LAURIE: Okay. And then --As far as the numbers to 6 MR. LOCHBAUM: 7 determine whether -- what the NRC looked at, sometimes it is; sometimes it isn't. That's why I started out 8 9 with where sometimes there's a really good, well documented justification, what we looked at and why it 10 11 is or is not significant. And sometimes it's just 12 this is green because the Phase 3 evaluation says it's 13 green. 14 MR. LAURIE: If -- if the public were 15 aware of the outcome based upon the color, and the public wanted to make inquiry as to the basis of the 16 outcome, would then that information somehow be 17 available? That is, the rationale? 18 19 MR. LOCHBAUM: Not to my knowledge. 20 would answer the question, but from my understanding 21 that is that information is not available. 22 MR. FLOYD: Dave, if the -- if you saw in 23 the inspection report where a plant provided some of 24 their outcome results from their PRA and then saw an 25 NRC assessment of that in the inspection report saying

1 we looked at this and we agreed with the licensee 2 number because, et cetera, et cetera, would that fix the problem for you? 3 4 No. Just the fact that the information's 5 not available is what drives it? MR. LOCHBAUM: Yeah, because you don't 6 7 know --MR. FLOYD: But we have that same problem 8 9 though in deterministic regulation. don't -- we don't have our complete analysis, deck of 10 11 local analysis on, you know, in the public docket and 12 all that. It's just a tremendous amount of analysis, deterministic analysis, that is not in the public 13 14 domain. 15 But there's less of it. MR. LOCHBAUM: Because right now you have the 16 It's unavailable. You have all the Q and A that surrounded the 17 FSAR. FSAR originally. You have all the updated FSAR 18 19 submittals. You have a lot of technical specification 20 because changes there's very few technical 21 specification sections out there that haven't been 22 changed at one time or another over the time. 23 So if you go back and look through all 24 that information, if you have that much time, you can

generally understand what the parameters established

for that system or that function were by the licensee.

And then you can look at that information and look at the justification that was provided, albeit in deterministic space, and see if it seems to be reasonable or not.

You are missing some detailed calculations that aren't available, aren't on the docket.

MR. FLOYD: A lot of them.

MR. LOCHBAUM: But there is -- there's a smaller gap of information that's available. When you look today at the PSA results and you just get a number, you don't know how that was determined. You don't -- there's a much larger gap between what you can try to define and where the number came out to be.

So it -- it just makes that effort --

MR. FLOYD: I think, personally, I think I'm hearing a little bit of misperception about how the Phase 3 SDP works. I don't -- to my knowledge, the NRC just doesn't take the number from the NRC's Phase 3 evaluation and run with it. What they do is they'll take the number, but they'll understand -- try to understand what the basis for the number is, pass some judgement on whether or not the licensee's model is better than their SPAR model upon which their analysis might be based, and then make adjustments to

1 their SPAR model, give them credit for equipment that 2 maybe their model didn't have in it. 3 And I'm just wondering if they documented 4 that rationale for that additional basis, the fact 5 that we got this result of a yellow because we didn't know you had this system and, in fact, you do have 6 7 this system, and when we consider the credit that that 8 system adds, then we agree it's a white. 9 I mean, if they had that in the inspection 10 report would they -- is that the type of information, 11 I guess I'm wondering, that would help you get more 12 comfortable with what's going on? The fact that they're not just letting the 13 14 licensee run a number and say, "Oh, okay. You got a 15 different number. We'll go with that." 16 MR. LOCHBAUM: That would help. 17 MR. LAURIE: Okay. Right now all we see, we 18 MR. LOCHBAUM: see the fact that there's a conflict between what the 19 20 licensee thinks and what the NRC thinks. 21 MR. LAURIE: Okay. 22 LOCHBAUM: We see that there's a MR. 23 meeting of whatever label wants to be thrown on it and 24 at the end there's a -- there's a color that comes 25 And you only read the inspection report or the

1	finding; it's very difficult to figure out how that
2	went from what it was to what it ended up being.
3	Any means that would enable that to be
4	transparent that it's billed to be would sure help,
5	because right now, you know, we don't the process
6	is like I said secret. I mean, that's why we pretty
7	much say it's secret. There's no information coming
8	out that allows anybody outside the negotiations to
9	understand what it came
10	MR. LAURIE: Sure.
11	MR. LOCHBAUM: out to be.
12	MR. LAURIE: Okay.
13	MR. LOCHBAUM: And I don't I don't want
14	to be a party to all those negotiations.
15	MR. LAURIE: Right.
16	MR. LOCHBAUM: That's not what I'm bucking
17	for.
18	MR. LAURIE: I understand.
19	MR. LOCHBAUM: So
20	MR. SHADIS: I'd like to make a comment on
21	that reference to public confidence.
22	And by the way, you look very good in that
23	chair, first of all.
24	MR. LOCHBAUM: Who is that, by the way?
25	MR. SHADIS: The other person that was

occupying that chair.

I brought up the issue of the summer plant finding, contrasted it to Millstone, similar situation, and, you know, there was this -- the sequence of events was that I believe the summer plant first finding, preliminary finding came out. There was then the Millstone finding came out. Then the summer plant finding was adjusted and brought into line with the Millstone finding.

And the significance was laid down. And from the -- just from the public perspective this is a little unnerving. This makes it seem as if the agency is uncertain.

When we asked about it in our lab meeting, we were told that yes, and there were calls from region to region to find out how and why they were handling it the way they were handling it.

You know, this undermines the whole notion of consistency and predictability, and it really doesn't do anything for public confidence. If exit meetings and enforcement conferences are not accurately recorded and if there wasn't a full disclosure of the conversation that took place in those meetings, then the public can only, you know, see them from the results.

1 And if the licensee and the NRC 2 together and the result of it is pretty consistent that the licensee walks away with a lesser finding, a 3 4 less safety significant finding, then the public can 5 predict with some confidence that that's the way those meetings are going to go and that's what the purpose 6 7 of them is. I don't know of any instances in the New 8 9 England plants where there was one of these exit meetings or enforcement conferences or whatever that 10 11 resulted in the NRC coming down with heavier findings 12 or more safety significant findings. It's always gone as far as I know, in the other direction. 13 14 MR. MOORMAN: Ray, in New England --15 MR. SHADIS: Yeah. MR. MOORMAN: -- just to correct, I don't 16 17 think we've ever decreased the significance color of a finding for Region 1 after a rad conference. 18 19 not aware of it if we have. 20 MR. FLOYD: I think the -- and again, this 21 probably beas better public understanding 22 communication, but the Phase 2 SDP work sheets, which 23 preliminary color, intentionally is the are 24 conservative so that you don't have false negatives

being slipped through the program.

1	So the whole idea behind having a Phase 3
2	was the expectation that there would be some
3	sharpening and recharacterization of the risk when you
4	go from a simplified model to a more detailed model of
5	a plant that has more information and is more
6	complete.
7	It doesn't always change the answer, but
8	it might. But the whole idea was, in fact, one of the
9	tests I believe in the matrix is that in the Phase 3
10	the colors don't go the other way. If they go the
11	other way, we don't have the SDP right at the Phase 2
12	level because we don't want false negatives at the
13	at the Phase 2 level.
14	But that means we have a certain
15	percentage of false positives, which the Phase 3 is
16	then designed to put in proper perspective.
17	So, I mean, it's the way the program was
18	constructed. Now, if the public doesn't understand
19	that, and they're seeing that as, oh, a deal being cut
20	in the back room, then that's a clear that is a
21	public perception problem.
22	It doesn't mean the process is flawed. It
23	means it hasn't been properly communicated and
24	articulated.
25	MR. SHADIS: I think I think then it

1	really needs to be.
2	MR. FLOYD: Yeah.
3	MR. SHADIS: That this the intent of this
4	process is for the industry to have another cut at
5	explaining it and, you know, clarifying the issues.
6	MR. FLOYD: Yeah.
7	MR. SHADIS: And lightening the findings.
8	MR. FLOYD: Right. Like Dave's comment,
9	that he needs more explanation in the inspection
10	report as to why it was changed, and a better
11	understanding of it.
12	MR. LOCHBAUM: I was aware of that
13	conservatism or the way that was structured, and I
14	used that to evaluate the difference between those
15	that got downgraded and those that didn't were how
16	successful the negotiations went for which party.
17	MR. FLOYD: I don't think that's it.
18	MR. LOCHBAUM: That's the way it's
19	perceived.
20	MR. FLOYD: Yeah. That's
21	MR. LOCHBAUM: That's the way I measured
22	it.
23	MR. LAURIE: When you use when you use
24	the term "negotiation" is that is that a term of
25	art or is that your perception of reality?

1 Is it a negotiation or is it a factual interchange or exchange with the commission then 2 coming back and making a decision. 3 MR. LOCHBAUM: As I use the term, it's the 4 5 process between the licensee, the plant owner, and the The Commission very seldom gets engaged. 6 NRC staff. 7 MR. LAURIE: Okay. MR. LOCHBAUM: It did in the Quad Cities 8 9 case. 10 NRC staff. MR. LAURIE: 11 MR. LOCHBAUM: And it's that process of, 12 you know, paper, rock, scissor to figure out what color, you know, a finding should be. That's what I'm 13 14 referring to, is that negotiation process. 15 MR. LAURIE: Right. MR. GARCHOW: But, Dave, in answering this 16 17 question, I mean, have some -- the process and how it's perceived 100 percent it's perceived how you see 18 19 it perceived. I mean, that's your perception. 20 I mean, in fairness that this question is 21 exactly the process. Something happens; 22 information given. It isn't like two people sitting 23 across a table saying, "Well, can this end if it's 24 Okay. It's white." We all walk away. 25 white.

That's not what happens. Information is exchanged and then at a later point, through some discussion internal to the NRC. which the licensee typically is not privileged to, a determination is made. And that's communicated in a public way back to the licensee.

MR. LAURIE: And --

MR. GARCHOW: That is the processed way that it occurs. How that lands on the public or you, I mean, that's a good discussion. We're here to get your input on that, but having been involved in a couple of these myself, it's a -- they send us mail. We say, "Hey, there's more information that might be beneficial here."

The mail on the bottom says, hey, if I want to get some information, there's a process to do it. A meeting is scheduled. We provide the information in the meeting. We go away from the meeting. And at another point in time, much like Rod said, another piece of mail comes up and says it's white; it's green; it's yellow; it's blue; it's gone away. And that is the way the process --

MR. LAURIE: And that goes to -- that does go to my question of who the decision maker is, and the decision maker is the NRC staff.

1	MR. GARCHOW: That's correct.
2	MR. LAURIE: And I I distinguish in the
3	in my own work that I do between information
4	gathering and exchange and decision making.
5	MR. GARCHOW: Right.
6	MR. LAURIE: And, in fact, I'm faced with
7	the same question that you are in licensing cases.
8	And I try and differentiate or I try and determine
9	where the decision is being made, and then does the
10	decision maker have the capability of providing an
11	explanation.
12	And then it's a question of whether
13	parties are free to exchange information under
14	informal circumstances, as opposed to public forums,
15	for example.
16	And is that the issue that we're faced
17	with here? Is that there's a public distrust of that
18	exchange of information?
19	MR. LOCHBAUM: It's broader than just that
20	exchange of information. The public distrust of this
21	agency is incredible. I mean, the reason that the
22	public in general doesn't like the voluntary
23	submission of PI data is that people don't trust this
24	agency.
25	You know, if there was trust in this

1 agency, I'd be out of a job, because the agency does 2 a pretty good job, in general. I mean, it is a very 3 good regulator. But the average people living around 4 the plant don't trust this agency. Whether that's 5 valid or invalid or for the right reasons or for the wrong reasons, that's the case. 6 7 MR. LAURIE: I understand the issue. 8 Thank you. 9 During the pilot program MR. LOCHBAUM: 10 Mr. Lieberman was pretty much by himself 11 maintaining that crosscutting issues weren't being 12 handled properly. I disagreed with him then, and still not fully agree with him yet, but I'm moving 13 14 towards his conclusions. 15 And looking at the data from some of the inspection reports it seems to suggest that he might 16 17 The River Bend inspection report issued be right. some time last fall, the finding coloration was no 18 The finding itself was that there was a 19 20 declining human performance trend with approximately 21 27 findings over the previous 12 months having a 22 direct or credible impact on safety, and warranted no finding, no color finding. 23 24 That clearly was human performance is

clearly a crosscutting issue. Our own reports on

1 River Bend have shown that back in the '97 through '98 2 period, it was the worst plant in the country that we 3 looked at in this area. And this suggests that it 4 hasn't gotten any better. 5 The way the system currently works, and that was the construct that Dave Garchow mentioned 6 7 this morning, is that you it's currently assuming -- the reactor oversight process assumes that 8 that will manifest itself at some point in a finding 9 or a PI changing threshold. 10 11 At this point, and the mistakes have been 12 incredibly high, much higher than they should be, much higher than any other plant that we've seen. 13 14 company seems completely unable to fix that, over a 15 period of multiple years. Are we waiting for somebody to die before 16 17 we step in there and try to correct that? You know, their performance is clearly not 18 19 It's been not good for a number of years. 20 know, 27 findings in 12 months may not be the right 21 number, but at what point do you step in and you do 22 something? 23 Do you wait? Do you wait for the accident 24 and try to prevent the second accident? Or do you

look at this trend and say this is not good and we

1 need to -- we need to do something sooner? I think Mr. Lieberman might be right. 2 think we may need to step in a little bit sooner and 3 4 address some of these crosscutting areas. 5 The problem we see is that the reactor oversight process lacks the criteria to determine when 6 7 human performance problems build up to the point where some action is required. 8 And you could -- you could say whether 9 that's a problem of identification resolution. 10 Ιt 11 could be training. You know, there's a number of 12 issues that fall into this category that we may need to go back and take a look at. 13 14 And lastly the containment itself is a 15 barrier that mitigates accidents, but it's not covered under the Barrier Integrity or Mitigating Systems 16 17 performance indicator. There was an attempt in the initial phase to have a containment barrier PI, but 18 19 that was not one that was very good. 20 And the solution was just to get rid of it 21 altogether. I understand it's being looked at under 22 the risk-based performance indicator program, but that 23 -- you know, we think that needs to be expedited, 24 because there really needs to be one.

We don't think the one they had was a good

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1	one.
2	MR. BROCKMAN: Could I hold you just for
3	one second? I want to make sure on your your
4	problem, your human performance issue, that I
5	understand it correctly, and the concern I hear you
6	expressing is that there doesn't seem to be a way to
7	get to this declining trend before you actually get
8	what I call an event of white, yellow, red
9	significance.
10	You see it coming, a predictiveness as
11	opposed to an indication aspect if you wish.
12	MR. LOCHBAUM: Right. You know, it's
13	you know
14	MR. BROCKMAN: I understand.
15	MR. LOCHBAUM: The inspector could have
16	gone out there and logged or documented 1,000
17	requirements. As long as none ever cross that
18	threshold, his hands are pretty much tied.
19	MR. BROCKMAN: I understand your comment.
20	Very good. Thank you.
21	MR. FLOYD: But I thought on this side of

restatement without any of the justification.

Dave, your concern was going to be that as it was on

some of the other items that you don't see the basis

You just see the conclusory

for the conclusion.

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23

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1 How did the -- how did the inspector 2 conclude that 27 findings over a 12 month period had 3 a direct or credible impact on safety? 4 There's no basis provided for that. 5 thought that was going to be your comment. Well, on this one the 6 MR. LOCHBAUM: 7 inspection report did actually provide some additional details. I just left them out for the -- for brevity. 8 9 But they did explain for -- I'm not going to say for 10 all 27, but for the more salient of the examples, they explained what, at least in the inspector's mind, what 11 12 that tie was. So the information was there whether you 13 14 agree or disagree with that, but at least that was in 15 the inspection report on this one. 16 MR. FLOYD: Okay. 17 MR. LOCHBAUM: I've got more on the assessment program we don't like. 18 There was a paper 19 that was issued last February, just about a year ago, 20 on human performance that looked at human performance. 21 And it looked at the accident sequence precursor 22 program events that were reported from 1992 to 1997. 23 There were -- they looked at 48 of them. I don't know 24 if they looked at all of them, but it looked at 48 of

these accident sequence precursor program events and

1 concluded that 38 of the 48 items, or 79 percent, 2 involved human performance issues. I also noted that few of the items 3 4 involved errors by control room personnel, which I 5 assume means the rest of them were caused by personnel outside the control room, not licensed operators. 6 7 What we think this report shows, that the 8 NRC needs better assessment of human performance 9 trends in individual plants, with some predefined 10 thresholds for response. 11 We also think that that needs to look at 12 broader -- the entire worker population, not just the control room operators. Although the control room 13 14 operation performance is very important, it's not 15 limited to their performance. CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Dave, I don't think got 16 17 that page in this package, if we can get a copy of that. 18 19 MR. LOCHBAUM: Okay. That's true. That was slide 28. Slide 21. 20 21 What we don't like is the distraction 22 imposed by the SDP Phase 2 and Phase 3 exercises. 23 I said earlier, the stated intent of the reactor 24 oversight process is to focus NRC and industry

attention on risk significant items.

238 1 And the protracted delay this as 2 information exchange goes back and forth seems to work 3 counter towards getting to what the significance of an 4 item is and reacting to it appropriately. 5 Related to that, the significance determination process for non-green findings is just 6 7 to slow. The NRC response time is inversely proportional to the risk significance, 8 and also 9 inversely proportional to common sense. The more important something is the longer it takes you to 10 11 reach that determination. 12 That just seems wrong. We think the SDP process is fundamentally 13 14 flawed and should not be used at all. Our example 15 that the ConEd, Indian Point-2 aqain is steam ConEd thought it was 16 generator two rupture event. 17 either white or yellow. The NRC determined and steadfastly maintained that the event was red. 18 If these two parties months after the fact 19 20 can't look at an item and come to a fairly close 21 agreement, then I don't know how the NRC and the 22 industry should expect the public to have greater

what we like is that the page on the NRC Website is

Now turning to the enforcement program,

confidence than it itself has.

23

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pretty good and, in fact, we like anything that allows you to get information without going to ADAMS.

There have been protracted debates over security levels and associated civil penalty amounts in the future that are avoided now or that are eliminated now, and replaced by discussions on resolutions. We think that's a good thing, with some of the caveats I mentioned earlier.

What we don't like is ADAMS. We don't like ADAMS. We don't like the D.C. Cook plant for getting a green finding for intentionally and illegally suspending its maintenance rule monitoring efforts during the time the plant was shut down. An NRC inspector discovered this omission after D.C. Cook Unit 2 restarted, and the monitoring was not reinstituted.

And it got a green finding because the mistake had been made when the plant was shut down, which maybe, in fact, was true. But it doesn't get the plant off the hook for restarting a plant without reinstituting the program.

So it looks like it should be greater than green for that failure. Plus there were at least two indications of safety related or important to safety equipment that was rendered less than fully functional

1 due to this specific maintenance rule violation. 2 And in a report that we're about to issue, 3 probably within the next month or so, we looked at the 4 enforcement actions taken against, or not taken 5 against, individuals over the last two years by the NRC staff. And we found that the actions, enforcement 6 7 actions are not in any way corresponding to the underlying risk significance. 8 The example, the classic example is Ms. 9 Gail C. VanCleave, who was banned from the industry 10 11 for three years by the NRC because she used her dead 12 mothers Social Security number to get a job as a clerk at the D.C. Cook plant. 13 14 And D.C. Cook, when it found out about it, 15 they fired her immediately. The NRC piled on and banned her from the industry for three years. 16 17 In that same two-year period, the NRC found cases of licensed operators admitting to using 18 19 cocaine in the control room, while they were serving 20 in the control room, not necessarily in the control 21 room itself. 22 They found licensed operators who failed 23 fitness for duty tests for THC and other illegal 24 substances, who got a warning letter from the NRC 25 asking them not to do it again.

1 Ms. Gail C. VanCleave was banned for three 2 years. 3 They also found cases of -- seven, eight 4 cases -- eight cases of managers or supervisors who 5 discriminated against employees for raising safety concerns in what the NRC determined was deliberate 6 7 misconduct. In none of those cases the responsible 8 9 managers and supervisors got anything worse than a 10 warning letter. In one case there was no action taken 11 whatsoever against the individual for breaking the law 12 and discriminating against a worker for raising safety issues. 13 14 In that same case, which is involved the 15 D.C. Cook plant, the plant owner got a non-cited, noncolor violation for that fact. You know, we don't 16 17 like the SDP process, but we think the enforcement actions against individuals are the worst single 18 19 aspect of the new oversight process. I'm not familiar with this 20 MR. HTT.T.: 21 example. Why did she use somebody else's Social 22 Security number? Was there something with her that 23 you're not citing? 24 MR. LOCHBAUM: Yes. She -- that's a good 25 I'm glad you asked that because the report point.

does point out what she was trying -- why she did that.

In her past she had been convicted of a misdemeanor theft charge at a previous employer. And she was worried that that misdemeanor theft conviction would keep her from getting a job as a clerk at D.C. Cook. So she used her dead mother's Social Security number so that the background check wouldn't reveal that fact.

At the same time there was a case at Millstone, where a current worker was arrested. that worker did not report that fact to management. There was no action taken against that -- the individual did get a warning letter from the NRC asking them not to do it again. Next time you're arrested for a felony or something, could you tell us about it? That worker continues to work at Millstone.

What really happened in Gail C. VanCleave's case was she told the NRC inspectors that she'd do it again, and therefore, the NRC banned her from the industry because they didn't like her honesty about her dishonesty.

In the other cases, the people refused to admit any blame like in the D.C. Cook case. We start -- we had no idea that rule was applicable to us. So

1 that ignorance of the law got them off the hook. 2 because she said she'd do it again. 3 Indian Point 2 cases, they don't know the 4 difference between right and wrong, and they can 5 restart the plant, without knowing the difference between right and wrong. 6 7 Ms. Gail VanCleave knows the difference from right and wrong and says she'd do it again to get 8 9 a job as a clerk at a plant in Michigan. 10 reason she's banned from the -- that's just totally -if you look at the NRC's enforcement policy and the 11 12 criteria they use for determining what actions you take or not, there's four of them. 13 14 There's the risk significance of the item. 15 There's the seniority level of the employee doing the work. There's the actual or real consequences of the 16 And there's whether it was willful or not. 17 event. In those 23 cases we looked at, Ms. Gail 18 19 C. VanCleave was the lowest level employee. 20 action had the absolute lowest risk to the public. 21 She was as wilful as anybody else. Yet she received 22 the most severe penalty. I mean, that --23 MR. SCHERER: Dave, I don't know anything 24 about the facts that you're citing, but did I hear you

say that you were opposed to individuals being held

1 responsible under this process? 2 MR. LOCHBAUM: No, just the opposite. 3 think -- the reason we did the report that we're going 4 to issue soon is that we think that managers and 5 supervisors who violate the law and discriminate against workers who raise safety issues should be held 6 7 accountable for those actions. 8 What the report shows is they are not being held accountable for their actions. 9 The only people being held accountable for their actions are 10 11 low level workers. Those people are getting the book 12 thrown at them. The higher you are up in the management 13 14 chain, the less likely it is that you're going to 15 severe -- receive any kind of enforcement action from 16 this agency. 17 And we think the result of that, the NRC is basically essentially an accomplice in the illegal 18 19 action --20 So you want to see -- I'm MR. SCHERER: 21 just trying to understand. You want to see more Ms. 22 VanCleaves, not less? 23 MR. LOCHBAUM: What we would like to see 24 is the NRC to implement its enforcement policy as it's 25 written. As it's written the NRC is not doing that.

The NRC has criteria in the enforcement policy that spell out when it does and doesn't take action. It's simply not following that guidance. It's doing something else.

So either change the criteria to match what you're doing or change what you're doing to match the criteria, one or the other, whichever, your choice. But don't tell us one thing and do something completely different.

And that's what's happening now. We think in terms of safety I'm not trying to condone what Ms. Gail C. VanCleave did, I mean, but more importantly, until the NRC takes people who -- retaliation against whistle blowers seriously, it's not going to stop.

And the data, if you look at the last report that came out from the Office of Investigations, OI report, it shows that. The number of alleged discrimination cases is going up, and the number of alleged using your dead mother's Social Security number cases is going down because the NRC takes severe action against the workers who do that, not against the managers who do the discrimination cases.

So the risk-reward is totally out of whack, and that needs to be fixed.

1 MR. SCHERER: Well, as I understand it, you filed a petition for rulemaking in this area 2 3 asking for that. I was just trying to -- well, when 4 I heard you the first time, I thought you were arguing that the NRC should have fewer cases of Ms. VanCleave. 5 Again, I don't know the facts of the case. 6 7 MR. LOCHBAUM: Sure. 8 MR. SCHERER: But now I'm hearing that you 9 want to see more of them. I'm just trying to 10 understand your position. 11 MR. LOCHBAUM: It's not that we want to 12 see more people banned from the industry. What we want to see is if the NRC is going to take enforcement 13 sanctions against individuals, they need to be 14 15 consistent with the enforcement policy, and they're 16 not right now. they were consistent 17 Ιf with their enforcement policy, if they're going to ban Ms. Gail 18 19 VanCleave for the action that she did, there's 20 managers and supervisors at power plants today that 21 shouldn't be working in industry because their actions 22 had a much greater threat to the public health and 23 safety than anything Ms. Gail VanCleave did or didn't 24 do. 25 So all we're asking is that the NRC

1 implement its enforcement program consistently and 2 hold people accountable for violating federal safety 3 regulations. 4 The reason we think that's important is 5 that one of the crosscutting areas is safety culture. If the NRC is going to turn its back on managers and 6 7 supervisors who discriminate against whistle blowers, you're basically condoning a less than adequate safety 8 9 culture of plants, and that has got to stop. And we did this report to show the problem 10 11 that exists in the enforcement program, and this 12 shouldn't be a great surprise to bill because we sat down with Bill a couple of weeks ago, and I recognize 13 14 that Bill doesn't fully agree, doesn't agree with the 15 report or its conclusions, but I think he understands what we went through to do it. 16 17 As far as about the oversight program itself, what we like are the quarterly performance 18 19 results for all plants are available on the NRC Web 20 site, and you don't have to get into ADAMS to do it. 21 What we don't like, again, is ADAMS, just 22 in case there's any misunderstanding about that. 23 The other thing we don't like about the 24 program is we can't understand why D.C. Cook restarted

under the manual chapter 0350 process, but Indian

1 Point restarted under the reactor oversight 2 We think that the reactor manual Chapter 3 0350 should have been used in both cases or should 4 have been used in neither case, not the way it was 5 done. We've raised this point in various public 6 7 forums before and still have not got an answer from the NRC staff as to why it was different. 8 9 The closest I got was I talked to Mr. Miller at Region I about why he didn't institute the 10 11 0350 process, and the answer I got basically was 12 they're doing everything 0350 required, and it just would have been additional paper work to implement a 13 14 process that they were doing already, and that might 15 be the right answer, but you know, just to safe some paper work doesn't seem like exactly the right answer. 16 17 Within the context of the MR. GARCHOW: program, is it your belief, David, the program isn't 18 19 clear to how a plant should exit? 20 Let's say we work through the action 21 matrix in some hypothetical plant, and you end up red. 22 NRC chooses to use a confirmatory action letter on 23 whatever issue. I mean, I'm ignorant of the program 24 to that level of detail.

Is there some discretion whether we would

1 use 0350 or not, and is that the issue that you're 2 bringing up, that there's discretion now and it's not It's not clear which way or is it clear and 3 4 we're not doing it? 5 I mean, you know, there's a phoney in here somewhere. 6 7 MR. LOCHBAUM: Right, or some kind of interim. 8 9 As I looked at the 0350 process, the revised manual Chapter 0350 process that was written 10 11 for the reactor oversight process, not the old one, 12 it's pretty clear from our reading of the entry conditions that Indian Point 3 was into 0350 space. 13 14 I mean it almost looked like it was written --15 Indian Point 3? MR. GARCHOW: MR. LOCHBAUM: Indian Point 2. I'm sorry. 16 17 That Indian Point 2 was -- it almost looked like the manual chapter was written for Indian 18 19 Point 2, and yet --20 So what you're saying is MR. GARCHOW: 21 that the new program does account for it. There's a 22 criteria, and then we could have the debate whether we 23 met it or didn't. That's a different discussion. The 24 program sounds like it was written to accommodate it, 25 not conveyed in this one case whether it was followed

1 or not, but I see that as a different discussion. 2 There isn't a big -- you're not saying 3 there's a big hole in the program relative to whether 4 you should or shouldn't use 0350? 5 MR. LOCHBAUM: No. 6 MR. GARCHOW: Okay. 7 MR. LOCHBAUM: It looks like 0350 is very clearly invoked by the procedure. It just wasn't 8 followed. 9 10 MR. GARCHOW: Okay. 11 MR. LOCHBAUM: Another thing -- some 12 like about the overall reactor things we don't oversight process is it's really not user friendly. 13 For example, on the Web site, the cornerstone 14 15 description for the RHR system PI is described as -and I'm not going to read that long thing, but that's 16 17 -- if you were to assign an eye glaze factor to that thing, it would be way, way up there. 18 I'm not sure 19 there's too many people out in the general public that 20 would understand what is trying to be conveyed there. 21 I don't have a suggestion for better 22 words, but the guidance that UCS gave to me the first 23 week I was there was if you can't explain it to your grandmother, you ought to just shut up, and my 24

grandmother is not a nuclear engineer, and I tried

1	this one on her. She didn't do too good. She didn't
2	understand what it meant.
3	So I just think some more communication
4	effort needs to be expended on explaining what some of
5	these things are. If the audience of the Web site is
6	the general public, this doesn't work. I mean this
7	might be great for internally between the licensees
8	and the NRC staff, but for communicating to the public
9	this is a little bit on the weak side.
10	MS. FERDIG: Dave.
11	MR. LOCHBAUM: Yes.
12	MS. FERDIG: Would this go back to your
13	suggestion earlier that there might be some kind of
14	summary format like Ontario
15	MR. LOCHBAUM: Sure.
16	MS. FERDIG: that for one who wanted
17	to, we also it's a summary
18	MR. LOCHBAUM: Right.
19	MS. FERDIG: but still more information
20	than you get now that allows more transparency and
21	scrutability for what goes into decision making.
22	MR. LOCHBAUM: One of the things I do like
23	about the NRC's process is that it is tiered. So you
24	can start out at a high level issue. If you just live
25	next to a plant and you want to check once a year how

it's doing, you should be able to do that, or if you're somebody who wants to follow up on every single finding and every section, it does allow you to do that.

It's just that it's really aimed at the person who's really heavily involved and less aimed at the person who just wants to know whether I need to move or not, and I think there's some more work needs to be done on the high level over views, but I think that would answer or would address it.

I notice going through there's a lot of information available on the NRC Web site, but nowhere on there does it indicate that the public comment period is currently open. The only place you find that is in the <u>Federal Register</u> itself and in the meeting minute notice.

It looked to me like if you really were seeking public input that you'd somewhere on that eight or ten Web pages, you might mention that the public comment period is open and here's how you submit comments. It seems like an easy thing to do.

MR. BOYCE: Question. There is a -- Tom Boyce from NRR -- there is an E-mail link where you can mail in comments. Is that what you're referring to?

1	MR. LOCHBAUM: No.
2	MR. BOYCE: I mean, it's the bottom of the
3	oversight process home page. Do you want something
4	more than that?
5	MR. LOCHBAUM: No, I've seen that, but the
6	public who goes to look at those Web site pages now
7	doesn't know that there's a public comment period with
8	the questions and doesn't know that the NRC staff is
9	actively soliciting comments on certain areas.
10	MR. BOYCE: Okay. Over and above the
11	external workshop link that we have up there saying,
12	you know, we're having an external workshop. Here's
13	the location, and we're looking for input.
14	MR. LOCHBAUM: Yes.
15	MR. BOYCE: Over and above those?
16	MR. LOCHBAUM: When I prepared those
17	comments, I didn't see that external Web site thing.
18	MR. BOYCE: Okay.
19	MR. LOCHBAUM: Having gone through that
20	exercise, the next step for me was to evaluate using
21	the yardstick that I had developed to determine
22	whether I like or don't like the new process. So the
23	question I asked myself this goes to Ray's question

oversight process better than the inspection  $\operatorname{program}$ 

under SALP?

We think it is despite the flaws that were noted. We think the revised inspection program redirects more attention to risk significant areas, and we think equally important, the revised assessment program insures more timely and objective inspections above baselines.

So we think the new program is better than what was being used in the past.

Asked the same process for the assessment program: is the new assessment program better than what was had before? And we also think the question to that is yes, even though that the SALP is fundamentally flawed.

The revised process raises more timely and objective warnings than what we had in the past. The green to white thresholds identify problems, enable them to be fixed while these negotiations are going on, the point that Steve raised earlier yesterday.

MR. GARCHOW: So I think I've listened to this enough that the fundamentally flawed is the process and interchange communication between the NRC, what you're calling negotiation; are you suggesting that the fundamental flaws are trying to use risk in sites and setting targets on core melt frequency? Is

1 that fundamentally flawed or is the whole thing 2 fundamentally flawed? Because you weren't really talking like 3 4 that when you were into that section of your 5 presentation. flaws with this 6 MR. LOCHBAUM: The 7 significant termination process are using plant 8 specific risk assessments when the NRC 9 identified criteria for what is or is not a good risk 10 assessment. 11 MR. GARCHOW: Okay. 12 And hasn't evaluated the MR. LOCHBAUM: risk assessments against those standards and doesn't 13 14 make the risk assessments publicly available. 15 are things that would change that process. 16 MR. BLOUGH: But, Dave, I also had a question on that. Your earlier slide said that the 17 use of the SDP should be stopped, I thought, because 18 19 of the problems with it, and yet the SDP is an 20 integral part of the assessment process. 21 If we actually stopped using the SDP, what 22 would we do to still achieve -- get a more objective threshold based, you know, ongoing type of assessment? 23 24 MR. LOCHBAUM: With the SDP process, with 25 the Phase 1, you basically learn whether it's not a

1 color, green, or something other than green. 2 just truncated the SDP at that process and forgot all about this Phase 2 and Phase 3 stuff, that would be 3 4 enough. 5 That would be a whole lot better than going through the Phase 2 and Phase 3 process because 6 7 at that point you'd know that there's a problem in a specific area, and the NRC would be required and the 8 plant owner to do some follow-up work to make sure 9 that it gets fixed. 10 11 I would end the debate over whether it's 12 yellow or red or whatever and just focus on getting the thing fixed. 13 14 MS. FERDIG: I want to ask an ignorant 15 public question. Does this relate to what Steve was 16 saying earlier where there's a more whatever, 17 conservative initial look; then there's this exchange of information where people try to get smarter by 18 learning more from each other and then develop a more 19 20 refined assessment about what is reality? 21 And so you're suggesting to not take that 22 first until that information step has been 23 exchanged --24 MR. LOCHBAUM: 25 MS. FERDIG: -- and then come to a

1 conclusion and don't change it? Don't go from a Phase 2 2 to a Phase 3 to get to a good answer. 3 MR. LOCHBAUM: No, not exactly. It was 4 just the opposite. I would eliminate all of that 5 information exchange and go with the initial cut. The initial cut just gets you past at 6 7 worst, but gets you past the green to white threshold. It wouldn't assign a color any greater than the fact 8 9 that it's not green. It's something other than green. That would invoke all of the response of 10 11 both the licensee and NRC staff tracking up on it as 12 both Rod -- excuse me -- and Dave and Steve have mentioned earlier where, you know, the corrective 13 14 actions are already in place. The resolution is 15 already in place. Why the negotiations are going on and the information exchange and all of the figuring 16 out what color it should be, that seems like a waste 17 of effort on both the licensee's part and the staff's 18 19 All you need to know is that it's not green 20 anymore, and it needs to be fixed and just stop the 21 game at that point. 22 MS. FERDIG: Sir, I just want to get real 23 clear on what I think I continue to hear about your

connotation of the word "negotiation." It's as if it

that continuing clarification

implies

24

25

exchanges

1	information to make sure we got it right is somehow
2	compromising
3	MR. LOCHBAUM: It's not
4	MS. FERDIG: somehow discrediting what
5	might be an initial first impression based on the best
6	data we have in this moment.
7	MR. LOCHBAUM: It's not so much that it's
8	compromising it. It is that process is getting to
9	a more complete understanding of the issue, but it's
10	not changing what's being done about it. You know, no
11	matter what that color came out at Quad Cities, that
12	didn't change what you would have done. The change in
13	Indian Point 2 wouldn't have changed at all what
14	anybody did.
15	So why does both the NRC staff and the
16	licensee expend the resources and the effort and the
17	postage to send this information back and forth to
18	understand an issue that doesn't affect what they do
19	down the line?
20	MR. FLOYD: Well, I think the answer to
21	that is that it doesn't affect, you're right, the
22	corrective action that's taken, but it certainly does
23	affect what the agency's response is, whether it's a
24	white, a yellow or red.
25	A single yellow is a degraded cornerstone,

1 whereas two whites make a degraded cornerstone. 2 Multiple yellow starts getting you into multiple degraded cornerstone, and you know, the action and 3 4 response is quit a bit different from the agency, and 5 the public perception of the performance of the plant is quite a bit different. 6 7 So that's the element that I think you ignore if you just stop at the Phase 2 determination. 8 9 MR. LOCHBAUM: You'd have to make some First of all, you aren't 10 significant adjustment. 11 going to determine yellow or red. You'd have to make 12 a significant adjustment to the action matrix if you did that. I mean but you could. 13 14 MR. KRICH: I agree with you. I think 15 that the key point is that if something's wrong, make sure it gets fixed, and I think that's happening. 16 17 The other part of the process as I have always understood it though is to know where the plant 18 is in safety space, and the point of going through the 19 final determination of what the color is is to know 20 21 where the plant is relative to reactor safety. So as 22 things add up, you can see if it's degrading and take 23 further action to stop it from degrading. 24 So I think the only reason -- and believe 25 me, we don't want to go through this process either,

1 So on that aspect we're in violent agreement. Dave. 2 MR. LOCHBAUM: Right. But the key part is to know 3 MR. KRICH: 4 where do we then need to focus attention so that we 5 don't degrade any further. MR. SCHERER: I guess next me take that 6 7 If I understand your suggestion, it is that there would be green and other than green, black and 8 9 white. Either it's green or it's not green, and you 10 would only have SDP Phase 1 as this green. 11 My concern with that is that would seem to 12 me philosophically to move away from risk informing the regulation and go back to a compliance based 13 14 regulation because it's either green or it's something 15 else. But there's no steps. It's either black 16 17 or white, and that moves us back to the SALP process of either it's in compliance or it's in violation, and 18 19 its safety significance doesn't matter. 20 MR. LOCHBAUM: I would agree with you, and 21 I also agree with Rod's assessment, is that the real 22 reason for finding out what the color is is to figure out what the overall plan is, not the specific thing 23 24 that garnered that finding, but what are the overall

plans.

1 If I had any confidence that the action 2 matrix would be acted upon, then that process would be 3 useful because it's important to know what the overall 4 plant performance is. I have no confidence whatsoever 5 that the NRC is ever going to do what that action So why spin everybody through that 6 matrix says. 7 process for no gain down the line? So I would agree with you if you wanted to 8 9 risk inform a process, you'd do that, but you'd also follow it up by doing what the action matrix says, and 10 11 I wouldn't even bet a dollar that that's going to 12 happen. So I'd just punt. When I see something 13 14 that looks like it's going to be a waste of effort 15 forever, just cut it off and go with what will 16 actually work. 17 So it seems to be a somewhat pessimistic view, but I don't see any reason for optimism at this 18 19 point. 20 Is the enforcement program under Okay. 21 the ROP better than the enforcement program under 22 And yes, with the exception of enforcement SALP? 23 actions taken against individuals, and it's the same 24 as it was before. What we like about it and the reason we --25

the justification for the yes is that the debates for the severity levels have been replaced by discussions over corrective actions. While there are still negotiations and debates over the coloration of issues, the old debates and discussions over the severity level and the associated civil penalties were much, much more protracted and much, much less productive for safety. So that significant gains have been made in that arena.

So the last slide was overall reactor oversight program has both benefits and shortcomings. Despite all of its flaws, we think the reactor oversight process is much better than its predecessor.

Having said that, we think an effective oversight program is the public's best protection against any safety issue whether it's plant aging or management changes or economic pressure, cost cutting pressures. Whatever the safety concern is, an effective oversight program is the best protection against it.

So we think that it's important to the NRC staff just doesn't stop at being better, but continually tries to improve the program, and we think from what we've seen the NRC staff is doing it. They have metrics to evaluate the process and to make

1 corrections as necessary down the road to make it more 2 effective. 3 So we're pleased to see the staff isn't 4 content at just being better. The staff wants to 5 constantly try to improve the program, and I don't mean ratchet up the thresholds, but constantly improve 6 7 the effectiveness of the program. And we're also pleased by the fact that 8 9 the reactor oversight program as it is is better than 10 what we had before. Thank you. 11 12 May I ask a question? MR. HILL: MR. LOCHBAUM: 13 Sure. 14 MR. HILL: You kind of summarized what you 15 like, what you don't like, and you've kind of said that overall it's better than the previous. Is there 16 something that you would particularly like this 17 committee to see out of this? Is there something that 18 19 you're recommending that we would have in our report 20 or not have in our report? 21 I mean, just saying what you like and you 22 don't like doesn't necessarily tell me what you're trying to tell us that we should present. 23 24 MR. LOCHBAUM: I quess I deliberately 25 didn't try to make any recommendations on what the

1 panel should do. You know, I think it's input that 2 the panel, having heard from other folks, other stakeholders as well. 3 4 I mean you have -- the discussions I heard 5 this morning are you're debating the issues and determining what your consensus opinion will be or 6 7 what your views will be. I think you understand where 8 we -- what we like and don't like about the process. 9 You know, we're going to make specific recommendations in this public comment period, and so 10 11 I didn't do it here because you have that charter and 12 you'll come up with those answers. danced around 13 that Ι 14 understand that. 15 (Laughter.) MR. HILL: Except you don't like ADAMS. 16 17 MS. FERDIG: Yeah, how do you feel about ADAMS? 18 MR. LOCHBAUM: We don't like ADAMS at all. 19 20 If they kept the box, I would recommend putting ADAMS 21 back in the box and sending it back. 22 Dave, if I could ask on the MR. KRICH: 23 last item there, I think that's a good point, and let 24 me just ask you to expand that a little bit or at least make sure I understand it. 25

1	So what you like is that the NRC is
2	looking to constantly improve their oversight of
3	licensees. Does that also include raising the bar for
4	licensees?
5	MR. LOCHBAUM: No. We don't think that's
6	a necessary requirement that you constantly improve,
7	raise the bar. I know we disagree with the State of
8	New Jersey and Jill Lipoti who thinks that that should
9	be a constant thing.
10	MR. KRICH: That's what I was trying to
11	get at.
12	MR. LOCHBAUM: You know, I saw the
13	question on the list this morning about is the NRC
14	willing to accept all green. I don't know if the NRC
15	is, but we would. You know, if that were the
16	condition, we wouldn't then turn around and say,
17	"Well, you need to bump the thresholds up.
18	MR. KRICH: Okay.
19	MR. LOCHBAUM: So that's not the criteria
20	we're using.
21	MR. KRICH: All right.
22	MR. MOORMAN: David.
23	MR. LOCHBAUM: Yes.
24	MR. MOORMAN: The Ontario power generation
25	nuclear report card that you that you've included, is
	•

1 included as an example for presentation or 2 content? MR. LOCHBAUM: Pretty much. Not so much 3 4 the actual information in there, but just if somebody 5 were living near a plant and just wanted to get a feel for how the plant nearby was performing, we think that 6 7 approach is pretty good because it kind of explains what they looked at and what the results were. 8 9 It didn't go into a lot of detail about why it looked at that versus other detail, but I think 10 11 if you were living near the plant and didn't study 12 this on a weekly basis, you would get the information you needed to know. 13 14 MR. MOORMAN: I'm just trying to 15 understand. It's got one nuclear performance index. It looks like it deals with safety and everything 16 17 else. MR. 18 LOCHBAUM: And also, Ι don't 19 particularly like the indicators they use. 20 the NRC has better indicators than that, just in terms 21 of format, the amount of information, how much 22 background information you have to know before you can read the information. 23 24 I think that's pretty good as a starting 25 Again, I wouldn't say that those are the point.

1 indicators the industry should use. That's not what 2 I'm trying to advocate. 3 MR. MOORMAN: Okay. Thank you. 4 MS. FERDIG: Dave, I have a question about 5 how you view the program today relative to how you thought you were feeling about it a year ago or even 6 7 earlier in the initial development stages. 8 you think? I think it's better than 9 MR. LOCHBAUM: 10 what their expectations were. Again, there are some 11 things we don't like about it. We never liked the 12 So it wasn't that that view changed. SDP. I don't think there's been any huge 13 surprises one way or the other. I've never had any 14 15 confidence going in that the action matrix would be followed. I mean, we made that comment at the March 16 17 Commission briefing, and the Commission put out some quidance in it they should document any deviations 18 from the action matrix, but in every case it's been in 19 there it has not been followed. 20 21 So a lot of what we felt was going to be 22 good and bad about the program was pretty much brought 23 I think the one thing that's been better than we 24 thought, I think the -- I think it's been accepted by

the industry and NRC stakeholders more.

1 I'm disappointed that there's no public 2 stakeholders I work with that thinks -- that agrees 3 with UCS that this is a good program. They all have 4 different reasons for not liking the program, but I 5 kind of still am alone in thinking this is a good thing, and I'm disappointed by that. 6 7 Of course, going around criticizing it might be one of the reasons why we haven't. It might 8 9 be a self-fulfilling prophesy in there somehow, but I think that it is much better than the old process, and 10 11 I'm disappointed more people don't recognize that. 12 You'd have to change your MR. GARCHOW: name to the Union of Non-concerned Scientists. 13 14 (Laughter.) 15 MR. GARCHOW: That would be a problem 16 right out at the start. 17 MR. LOCHBAUM: We looked at changing our name, and that didn't work. That wasn't the name we 18 19 were going to go to. 20 Yeah, that's probably the biggest area, 21 and we thought going in that more people would like 22 the program, but that hasn't been what the record 23 shows. 24 But I still think despite all of the falls 25 and the warts on the program, I think it's much better

than the old process.

MR. TRAPP: Are there any of those stakeholders that don't like the new program that could be of benefit to this Committee? Do you know of anybody?

## MR. TRAPP:

MR. LOCHBAUM: Well, Jim Riccio, who has made presentations in the past, he wasn't overly anxious to come in for a repeat, but he would be the one I would suggest.

Well, you knew I was on the panel earlier and failed, but I was glad to see both Ray Shadis and Mary, who I've known both of these individuals for over a year, and I think it was good that the NRC added these people to the panel. Either one of them would have been more than a capable replacement for me. I was glad to see that we got two, two replacements, and that was good.

And also I need to apologize to both of them because it would have been much easier for them if I'd have stayed on the panel, and they wouldn't have had to make all of these trips, but I personally appreciate them coming out and serving that role.

So I think to answer your question, I think the public side is more than adequately

1	represented on the panel by Ray and Mary.
2	MR. SHADIS: Dave, do you think that the
3	other initiatives that NRC has undertaken in
4	regulatory reform have colored public advocates' view
5	of this reactor oversight process?
6	MR. LOCHBAUM: I think in some cases. I
7	wouldn't say it has in every case. In trying to get
8	at least one other person to agree with me on this
9	thing, I've come across a bunch of different reasons
10	why people don't like it.
11	Some people just don't trust NRC, and
12	there's nothing that can be done. Some people don't
13	like the voluntary submission of data. So I tries to
14	fix that problem
15	I tried to get one other person to agree
16	with me, but I haven't found any general thread going
17	through there.
18	MS. FERDIG: Of course, you can't speak on
19	their behalf, but would you say that some of those who
20	are generally opposed to this program were less so of
21	the previous program, less in other words, is it
22	the new program they don't like or they just don't
23	like anything to do with nuclear?
24	MR. LOCHBAUM: The amazing thing is many
25	of the people I deal with thought the old program is

1 better and this is worse, and that's the problem I'm 2 having trouble with because I can't imagine any aspect 3 where this is worse than the old process, but a lot of 4 people I deal with thought that the SALP process --5 for example, the bi-annual watch list meetings they thought were great because it was a good chance to go 6 7 in there and beat up the industry, or at least the 8 people that are on the watch list. In this new process you kind of lose --9 10 that's diluted, and you don't have those forums to 11 beat up the industry anymore, and there are certain 12 people that think that's a bad thing. There are certain people who thought the 13 14 SALP process would get you to a bad score and give 15 Wall Street cause to pause, which would get the plant owners' attention and force some things, but you know, 16 this is a much better process. 17 I think this process would avoid serious 18 19 safety problems that led to some of the shutdowns of 20 some of the old plants. So we may not have the extent 21 of plant shutdowns, but I don't think that means that 22 the new program is not working. I think it's just the 23 opposite. It's showing that it is. 24 I haven't been able to find even -- I'm

I can't even get like the states.

amazed.

25

Jill

1	Lipoti, the State of Illinois; I haven't heard the
2	State of Pennsylvania, but I'm sure we'll find out
3	what the views are there. Bill Sherman at the State
4	of Vermont, he would like me to become more critical
5	of the program, if that's possible.
6	MS. FERDIG: State of Illinois.
7	MR. KRICH: Yeah, I guess I'm surprised.
8	The State of Illinois came in and said that they were
9	pretty much happy with it.
10	MR. LOCHBAUM: I talked to Neil Howey last
11	week about what he liked and didn't like, and what he
12	was telling me is that he didn't like aspects of it.
13	MR. KRICH: Let me give you the name of
14	the person to talk to.
15	MR. LOCHBAUM: Okay.
16	(Laughter.)
17	MR. GARCHOW: They're actually on the
18	record in here.
19	MR. KRICH: Yeah, the guy who came in and
20	presented here.
21	MR. LOCHBAUM: Okay. That would be great.
22	Yeah, I was going to make up a name if I had to.
23	(Laughter.)
24	CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Any other questions for
25	Dave?

	2,5
1	(No response.)
2	CHAIRMAN PLISCO: We appreciate your
3	taking your time to come talk to us again.
4	MR. LOCHBAUM: Appreciate it. Thank you.
5	CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Thank you.
6	Let's take ten minutes.
7	(Whereupon, the foregoing matter went off
8	the record at 2:59 p.m. and went back on
9	the record at 3:15 p.m.)
10	CHAIRMAN PLISCO: We're going to go ahead
11	and get started.
12	MR. FLOYD: I'm going to get started.
13	I'm here representing NEI today, not a
14	panel member obviously. What we've done is we've
15	taken a look at the results as they're portrayed on
16	the Web site through the end of 2000. So it's the
17	first three quarters of the program, and thought it
18	would be useful just to take a look at what some of
19	the trends look like, what some of the finding results
20	look like.
21	We've also taken a look at the
22	crosscutting area to see there's any information yet
23	in the program that would give us any indication about
24	how effective an area that is, and is the presumption

that's in the program correct, and then we have a few

summary observations.

The first thing I need to point out to in your packages, after the title page the first and second page are out of order. There's a significant personnel error there.

What we've done on the performance indicators, rather than showing you what the threshold value is, we've expressed where the industry is in terms of an average with respect to percent of using up the green zone band, if you will.

So what you see on these charts is just an understanding of where is the average plant in the country relative to the green-white threshold on the performance indicators, and the point that we did this for, and we did it for our executives also, was to show them that if you're tripping the threshold, then in most of the cases you are anywhere between about three to five times the occurrence rate of the average plant in the industry, just to give them some comfort level, that you probably are somewhat of an outlier if you're tripping the thresholds the way the thresholds have been established.

MR. GARCHOW: So 100 percent, Steve, would be the white?

MR. FLOYD: Yeah, that would be the

1 beginning of the white band. Okay? So you can see on this indicator that we're running at about 25 to 30 2 3 percent through the green band as an industry average. 4 So on this particular one, you have to have a SCRAM 5 rate three to four times what the typical plant in the industry has in order to trip the threshold. 6 7 Unplanned power changes, this one shows a slight positive trend. Of course, the unanswered 8 9 question here is are people managing the indicator and is that why the trend is going up or is performance 10 11 actually getting better in the industry? 12 I think it's probably a little bit of both, quite honestly. I think the NRC claims they 13 14 have some evidence of managing the indicator and 15 people changing their behavior as to how they run their plant, but we also know that the plants have, in 16 17 the last couple of years, have been achieving record capacity factors. Those have been going up, and the 18 19 forced outage rate has gone down considerably. 20 So we know that there are actually fewer 21 unplanned shutdowns going on out there in the 22 industry. 23 MR. LAURIE: Steve. 24 MR. FLOYD: Yeah. MR. LAURIE: Why is the non-nuclear force 25

1	shutdown in California, for example, so exceedingly
2	high in relationship to the data that you just put up?
3	MR. FLOYD: The non-nuclear?
4	MR. LAURIE: Yeah.
5	MR. FLOYD: I don't know. I don't know
6	about the non-nuclear one.
7	MR. GARCHOW: Somebody chose the wrong
8	fuel type.
9	MR. FLOYD: Yeah, that might be it.
10	MR. BROCKMAN: It might be biased.
11	MR. FLOYD: That's obvious.
12	MR. BROCKMAN: It would count as one. I
13	mean that's not a function of duration of perception.
14	A power change of greater than 20 percent is a hit of
15	one.
16	MR. FLOYD: Yeah, this is not a rate,
17	yeah.
18	MR. LAURIE: No, I understand.
19	MR. FLOYD: Okay. We see a little bit
20	different picture when we get into safety system
21	unavailability. On this indicator the industry
22	average seems to be pretty much mid-band in the green
23	zone. So there's less margin on this one to the
24	green-white threshold than there are for the other
25	performance indicators.

1	This one happens to be on emergency AC
2	power. I think the ground rules for this one have
3	been pretty well understood throughout the industry,
4	and it's a relatively easy system to read the
5	guideline manual for and come to the right
6	interpretation, and you're seeing a fairly level and
7	flat performance.
8	MR. KRICH: Do you know how much of that
9	is on-line maintenance?
10	MR. FLOYD: No, I don't. No, sure don't.
11	MR. SCHERER: Overhauls are not included
12	in that number.
13	MR. FLOYD: Yeah, if you have an overhaul
14	exception because you have a risk informed AOT
15	extension, that wouldn't be included in it.
16	MR. KRICH: That's not included. Okay.
17	That's what I wanted to know.
18	MR. FLOYD: Yeah, but of course, other
19	elements are.
20	On some of these others, like high
21	pressure injection and you'll see in a few of the
22	others, you're seeing what appears to be a slight
23	downward trend, and what we think is really going on
24	here, just to give you a perspective, is that we know
25	that, for example, fault exposure hours were not being

universally reported in the historical data, which is what you're seeing at more of the leading edge of the graph, and as people have tightened up as a result of this program being put under regulatory oversight, they're tightening up the reporting of the definitions.

And we're actually seeing what appears to be an increase in unavailability, but we think it's actually more accurate reporting of the unavailability data, and we've gotten that from a number of utilities that have gone back and taken a look at their historical performance data and said, "Well, gee, if we had to report the historical data for today's rules, which we don't have to go back and correct, if we had to, we would have to add considerably more hours than what we had today."

So we think that's why we're seeing a slight downward trend because, again, the actual system performance in service doesn't look like it's any different than what it has been.

MR. HILL: Why is that one system different though than like the emergency power or the one you're fixing to talk about? In other words -
MR. FLOYD: Well, I think this particular

one, high pressure injection, this was one that people

1	told us that they really weren't reporting fault
2	exposure on; whereas the diesel one people told us
3	that they were pretty much following the ground rules
4	on that one.
5	Whether that's true or not, I don't know.
6	MR. SCHERER: They were reporting for
7	exposure, but on a limited subset, essentially the
8	primary components.
9	MR. FLOYD: Okay.
LO	MR. SCHERER: Currently we're broadening
L1	the definition of where we report fault exposure to
L2	supporting equipment and being more rigorous in that
L3	approach, and to some extent I think as an industry
L4	we're seeing a trend come down as a more conservative
L5	and a broader NRC definition than that which had
L6	previously been done when it was a WANO PI.
L7	MR. HILL: Well, I can understand that,
L8	but I don't see why that would be different than RHR
L9	or something else. In other words, taking that logic,
20	then it would seem like it would be fairly well
21	consistent across unavailability.
22	MR. SCHERER: It was just more supporting
23	equipment in terms of HPSI that got affected at least
24	for the data that I
25	MR. FLOYD: What you see in every one of

1 these, I mean, even to go back to emergency power, 2 it's not as dramatic, but there still is a slight 3 downward trend on emergency power. There's a little 4 bit bigger one on high pressure injection. 5 You go to heat removal, and this is aux. 6 feedwater and HPSI -- excuse me -- RCIC, aux. 7 feedwater and RCIC. You see reasonably flat, maybe 8 slightly downward trend. The one that's really been a problem, RHR, 9 with interpretations on it, does show again a slight 10 11 downward trend, and again, think this is we 12 predominantly as a result of reporting improvements in quality and the accuracy of 13 the reporting 14 information. 15 So without pinning it into MR. GARCHOW: the wall, right? I mean I didn't really hear that we 16 17 had a really good answer on what separated -- it was maybe reporting, and we don't know what else is doing 18 19 it. 20 MR. FLOYD: Yeah. 21 MR. GARCHOW: I mean, it does look 22 different, I think Richard's point. 23 The one looks a little MR. FLOYD: 24 different, yes. Yeah, but they all, every one of them 25 does show at least a slight negative trend, which we

think is consistent with putting it under a program that has tightened up the interpretations of the data using the WANO guidance.

Safety system functional failures. We actually show a positive trend on this one overall in the industry. Again, I think this is consistent with improving capacity factors and availability of the units. If your safety systems are failing, you're having to take the plant off line, entering action statements in the tech specs, and that has occurred less and less over the last several years. I think you're seeing it in the trend.

The next three I kind of lumped all together and these are the emergency preparedness performance indicators. ERO participation, this is one that really has the exact desired outcome that the NRC staff was after when they wanted this indicator put in the program, and this was the issue where the NRC felt that there were a number of plants in the country that when it came time to have a graded exercise or a plant drill were pretty much just drilling the A team, and you had the other shifts that were not getting their experience, and yet obviously an event could happen regardless of what crew happens to be on shift.

And as you can see, we've gone as industry from about 70 percent through the green band to probably about what's that? About 15 percent through the green band. So there's been a very dramatic improvement, which is exactly -- and here's a case of an intended consequence that a performance indicator can have, an area where you performance to improve. So you establish indicator, and sure enough, it did improve.

The other shows slight upward trends, drill exercise performance, and Alert Notification System performance, notwithstanding Dave's comments earlier about that one.

The other one that I've got to show you is the protected area security equipment performance index. This is another one where the NRC wanted some improvement out there. This one, as you recall, measures the compensatory hours that have to be put in place when an IDS or camera system goes down and you have to comp. for it. It's not really a safety indicator, but it is an indicator in the NRC's view of how well you're implementing your program in the way that you've said you were going to run your program, and that was rely upon perimeter intrusion detection equipment to detect possible intruders.

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1 And, again, with the emphasis that's been 2 put on this one, there's been about a factor of two improvement in this indicator since the onset of the 3 4 program going back to first quarter '99 data. 5 Just a snapshot of non-green PI results. This is what they look like by region, and the total 6 7 in the program since the -- and this is for the first 8 three quarters of the current assessment year. So 9 it's second, third, and fourth quarter of 2000. There have been 30 PI thresholds crossed as an industry. 10 11 Okay? CHAIRMAN PLISCO: How did you count this? 12 Once they went over the threshold they're counted as 13 14 one. 15 MR. FLOYD: They're counted as one, right. 16 CHAIRMAN PLISCO: They stayed for the 17 second quarter? MR. FLOYD: They stayed there because the 18 19 data, you know, it takes a while to work off. didn't recount it. 20 21 CHAIRMAN PLISCO: It's still counted as 22 one? 23 Yeah, I didn't give it a MR. FLOYD: 24 second count, nor did I count one if it jumped down to 25 be a yellow, and then because of hours coming off or

whatever, it then transgressed to a white. I didn't change -- I didn't count that as another hit, as a color change. So it's the first occurrence of a threshold being exceeded unless there was another reason to have it go down again.

So that's pretty much what the spread looks like. I think we do ourselves a little bit of a disservice when we look at just the green PI summary table that's on the Web site and do a calculation of the 1,800 outcomes and say, "Oh, gosh, the industry is 98.2 or 98.8 green," because what this really tells you is that the thresholds have been exceeded 30 times across the industry.

And when we set the program up, we thought that, again, this was based upon 1995 to 1997 data, was the baseline for the thresholds. The expectation was that in the course of a year about five percent of the PIs would be tripped, and there's 1,800 possible So you expect somewhere around 90 times outcomes. based 195-197 during an assessment year on That's about the number of exceedences of at least green-white thresholds that you'd have.

And three quarters of the way through the program we've got about 30, which says if we keep it this rate for another quarter, we'll have about 40

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1 exceedences against an expected 90. So it's running 2 about half. But then performance in the industry has 3 4 improved quite significantly since '95-'97 time frame. 5 When you start looking at '99 and 2000 performance, you can -- it really does show up in just about any 6 7 metric that you want to look at. So I don't think this is inconsistent at 8 9 all with the program. 10 CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Steve, can you tell me 11 how many different facilities this includes? Because 12 I know some plants had more than one. MR. FLOYD: Some plants have more than 13 14 one. Well, the overall action matrix results, I 15 think, gave you a pretty good clue if you throw in the inspection findings, too, and this is another reason 16 why it's inappropriate to just look at the PI results. 17 If you look at the action matrix, there 18 19 are 79 units that are in the licensee response column, 20 16 in the regulator response column, five in the 21 degraded cornerstone column, and one in the multiple 22 degraded cornerstone column, which really means as 23 opposed to the statistic that's thrown out there, oh, 24 the industry is 98.8 percent green -- it's not true. There's 22 percent of the units in the 25

country that are not in the green band or the licensee response band. They're in a higher level of band and getting increased attention from the regulator at least at some level.

The conclusion that we had in this area is that despite some earlier concerns I think that the industry had about being able to meet the 21-day deadline following the end of the quarter, the experience to date has been that it can be reported timely and accurately.

There were some very minor instances identified in the early part of the program of inaccuracies in data reporting while people learned what the indicators really meant and how they were to be reported. That rate has dropped off almost to a nonexistent level in the last couple of quarters here.

And as you'll see in a minute when I go through some more data here, we do see an apparent correlation with some of the crosscutting issues, the PI&R program, and I'll show you that.

And we think that some of the performance indicators have resulted in definite performance improvements, and there were intended consequences for selecting some of the PIs, and for those, if we could have that be all the set that we could always get

1 after, we could probably drive performance to them. 2 But certainly some of these here have the 3 intended consequences. 4 I wanted to shift now to findings per 5 unit, and this is what these charts start to look like, and there's several of them to go through here. 6 7 There's all different ways that you can slice and dice 8 this data, and I've given you several snapshots of this. 9 This is what we see for green findings per 10 11 unit. You can see that the industry average is a 12 little bit over seven findings, green findings per unit in the first three months of the program. Region 13 14 2 is running at about 4.3 I think is the number that's 15 So they're the lowest, and Region 3 is on there. running a little bit over nine, but they're not 16 significantly different from Region 4 and Region 1. 17 Region 2 is quite a bit below the rest of 18 the industry in terms of number of findings per unit. 19 MR. GARCHOW: So this is the total number 20 21 in the first three quarters as an average per? 22 MR. FLOYD: What we did is we took each plant in the region, identified the number of green 23 24 findings that they had, and then divided by the number 25 of plants in that region to give you what the regional

1 per unit hit is, okay, on green findings. 2 MR. SCHERER: For what time? 3 MR. FLOYD: This is for second, third, and 4 fourth quarter of 2000. Yeah, all of my data here is 5 for the first three quarters of the program during the first year. 6 7 Another way to look at this is how are they stacking up and explain this chart. It deserves 8 a little explanation. I couldn't figure out exactly 9 how to put it on the slide. 10 11 What this tells you is if you look at the 12 number of plants that had between zero and five green findings, you find that there are 52 units in the 13 14 country that had between -- or 51, 51, 51 or 52 of the 15 units had been zero and five; about 26 units had between five and ten; about 12 units had ten to 15. 16 17 I think that's four units had 15 to 20, and there were five units in the country that had greater than 20 18 19 green findings. And that becomes important because I'll go 20 21 back and use these numbers to correlate to some other 22 things that we looked at, particularly in 23 crosscutting issues area. 24 Significant inspection findings, the non-Most of them have fallen in the -- or not 25 greens.

1	most of them, but the highest percentage has fallen
2	in the Region 1 area, and again just as in the case of
3	green findings, Region 2 for some reason has the
4	lowest number of significant inspection findings.
5	Region 3 and 4 are reasonably close to each other.
6	The total to date though across the
7	industry is about 20, 21 non-green or greater than
8	green inspection findings.
9	MR. HILL: Did you look to see if there's
LO	any correlation between the non-green PIs and non-
L1	green findings?
L2	MR. FLOYD: Yeah, that's coming up, yeah.
L3	MR. KRICH: So this is all greater than
L4	green?
L5	MR. FLOYD: This is all greater than
L6	green, right.
L7	I probably shouldn't have colored them
L8	green, should I?
L9	(Laughter.)
20	MR. BROCKMAN: Blue would have been nice.
21	MR. FLOYD: Blue?
22	MR. BROCKMAN: Are these final?
23	MR. FLOYD: These are final. These are
24	ones that have been posted to the Web site.
25	CHAIRMAN PLISCO: And so that's through

December?

MR. FLOYD: Through December. This is for the first three quarters of the program. There are 21 finalized greater than green findings on the Web site, and there's your distribution.

This next chart is pretty interesting to take a look at. This is a summary by action matrix outcomes, and what I've got here is the percentage of units that are in each of the columns, the four columns that have activity in the action matrix right now, the percent green findings, the percent greater than green findings, and percent greater than green indicators.

As I mentioned, there's 79 units that are in the licensee response column, and they account for about 60 -- what's that? -- about 66, 67 percent of the green findings. So that you can see that there's a lower number of green findings associated with the licensee response column than in the population of plants in the column. Okay?

Now, that starts to change as you move across the action matrix, which is about what you'd expect if finding green findings and a greater number of green findings has any relationship, particularly with some of the green findings being the crosscutting

area, a relationship to performance.

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For example, if you move to the licensee response column, you can see you've got about 16 percent of the plants -- excuse me -- in the regulatory response column, and they have a slightly higher percentage of green findings across the industry than what their population of plants are.

They have a little bit even greater percentage of -- quite a bit greater percentage of green findings and greater than green PIs. Obviously during the licensee response column you don't have any greater than green PIs or findings.

the When you qo over to cornerstone, you can see that the ratio between the percentage of the units and the percent findings, they have about double the number of the percentage of the green findings in the industry compared to the population, and they have quite a bit more greater than green findings and greater than green PIs given where they are in terms of the distribution in the plants, and then when you get to the multiple degraded cornerstone, there's even a difference percentage-wise between the greater percentage of plants in the column and the number of greater than greens and green findings that you have,

1 which is about what you'd expect. If there are more problems at a plant that 2 3 are being discovered, you'd expect to see a greater 4 percentage of findings and PIs being identified for 5 plants. Switch just for a second taking a look at 6 7 no color findings per unit. Here's the distribution that we see. We find that Region 4 writes the least 8 number of no color findings, followed by Region 2. 9 Region 3 writes the most number of no color findings 10 11 per unit, followed reasonably closely by Region 1. 12 MR. GARCHOW: Steve. MR. FLOYD: 13 Yeah. 14 MR. GARCHOW: Just since you're using data 15 and I don't know this off the top of my head, the distribution of number of plants per region, is there 16 a wide variety of distribution or is it approximately 17 the same number? 18 19 MR. FLOYD: There's roughly -- it varies 20 a little bit. There's like 28 in one. There might be 21 23 in another, but it's roughly -- but these are all 22 on a per unit basis. 23 Oh, per unit. MR. GARCHOW: 24 MR. FLOYD: Okay? So that equalized out 25 It's not the number of no color findings per

1	region. It's the number per unit per region.
2	Now, crosscutting green findings. What we
3	did was and I don't recommend you well, I
4	recommend you do do this if you really want to get
5	some insights. As I mentioned there's about 700
6	and I think the number is 727 green findings on the
7	Web site right now and 203 no color findings or
8	miscellaneous findings.
9	Tom Houghton and I read every single one
10	of those last week together, and we bend them as to
11	whether or not they were in the human performance
12	procedures or corrective action area, okay, just to
13	get a sense for what it was telling us.
14	MR. GARCHOW: Are these per unit or is
15	this total?
16	MR. FLOYD: These are total numbers per
17	region. Okay? These are not per unit.
18	MR. GARCHOW: Okay.
19	MR. FLOYD: Okay. Is that right? Yes.
20	Yeah.
21	MR. BROCKMAN: Did you read the executive
22	summary or did you read the detailed write-up?
23	MR. FLOYD: No, I read what's posted on
24	the Web site, the summary of it, yeah. That's how we
25	got it.

What we found is that you can see that there's a fairly level distribution in terms of procedure problems across the four regions. Region 1 is a little bit higher, but the rest are all relatively even, and what we really saw in the inspection reports anyway was a fairly even rate of human performance or -- excuse me -- procedure related issue.

When we get to corrective action, we saw a much greater percentage in Region 1, in Region 4, and somewhat less in Regions 2 and 3.

Human performance. This one was a tough one. As you'll see later on, I combined human performance and procedure compliance together as a human performance element. This one tried to break it out to see if it told you much different. What it would really tell you if you added human performance onto procedures on this, it would make Region 1 really stand out in terms of the total number of human performance related findings that they have been writing up and documenting compared to the other regions because the human performance rating in Regions 2, 3, and 4 are not rate, but numbers is fairly low.

Now, this next one shows you crosscutting

no color findings, again, by region, looking at human performance procedures and corrective action, and again, you can see that Region 1 writes the most number of no color findings in the corrective action area.

Region 2 has a fairly high number, but if you noticed on the previous charts, Region 2 had the least number of overall no color findings that they wrote, and what that really tells me here is that -- let's see. What was it? Hang on. Go back.

MR. GARCHOW: Do you have any feeling what drives the inconsistency?

MR. FLOYD: I'm going to get to that. Yeah, I did find a couple, yeah.

My overall observation on this was that there does appear to be a difference between the regions in the thresholds for documenting no color findings and green findings, and what my general observations are are that when you take a look at what Region 2 writes up, they have a very, very low rate of no color findings, but they write a reasonable number of green findings, and not a very high percentage, but the ones that they do write up appear to be at a level that's higher than what some of the other regions have as a threshold for writing the green findings, and

Region 2 it looks like doesn't avail themselves that much of the no color finding technique or tool that's out there.

Region 3 writes a fair number of no color findings overall, and their threshold seems to be lower for what is a no color and a green finding than what I saw in some of the other regions.

Region 4, my observation there, looking at the data, is giving the choice between writing a no color finding and a green finding, Region 4 tends to lean more towards writing a green finding, and is a much greater percentage of green findings in Region 4 than no color findings, and yet when you look at the nature of the conditions as described on the Web site, you see an awful lot of items that are written up as green findings in Region 4 that are no color findings in the other regions, and I'm suspecting those same issues exist at Region 2 plants, not written up at all perhaps in Region 2.

So I do see a difference in consistency.

Now, as I mentioned this morning, most of the inconsistencies that we see are in the area that has the least significance, and that's the no color and the green findings.

Obviously the great equalizer is the

significance determination process and the thresholds for the PIs that at least insure that there's consistency going on for the items that have greater significance.

When I look at crosscutting issues by the action matrix, and this one is kind of important, I think, when you take a look at the licensee response column, again, what I've done here is I've looked at the percentage of units in each of the four active columns in the matrix, the percent corrective action program findings, and percent human performance findings, and this is where I lump together procedure findings along with human performance findings that were specifically spelled out separately as human performance findings.

The real distinction on those in the inspection reports is primarily the human performance findings were related to where an operator made an error and turned off something that they should not have turned off. It wasn't a matter they didn't follow the procedure. They just didn't take the right action in a particular case as opposed to a procedure violation, which is just that, missing a step or not performing a step in a procedure as required.

But when I lump those together, what you

see, again, as you would expect, in the licensee response column, the percentage of plants is greater than the percentage of corrective action program and human performance findings.

When you go to the regulatory response column, you see that you have a greater percentage of corrective action and human performance findings than you do the percentage of plants, but then an interesting thing starts to happen here.

You can see from the data that when you go further across the action matrix at least for the data we have to date, the corrective action program findings seem to have a much greater emphasis and a much greater impact on where the licensee might be in the action matrix than the human performance findings.

You start to see it's a relatively close relationship in terms of percentages between the degraded cornerstone, and it really drops off in the multiple degraded cornerstone, and yet the percentage of corrective action program findings is about two and a half times what the population distribution would be in degraded cornerstone, and it works out to be about eight or so times or six times in the multiple degraded cornerstone.

So our conclusion from that, again,

preliminary data -- we need more data to evaluate this further -- but there does appear to be to us a correlation between corrective action program findings and where a plant is likely to fall in the action matrix.

And remember you've got here in the action matrix not because you have had CAP or human performance findings, but because you tripped performance indicator thresholds or you had greater than green inspection findings.

So it looks to us like the premise for corrective action program that's in the program at least has some early indications of being valid. The human performance findings we don't see a very good correlation between the human performance findings and where a licensee is likely to fall in the action matrix. At least it's certainly less obvious than it is for the corrective action findings to date.

MR. BROCKMAN: Steve, have you had a chance to analyze that data in looking at it to determine, let's say, which is the chicken and which is the egg? Because the performance is going down. It's just providing the opportunities to see more corrective action problems as opposed to identification of corrective action problems being

MR. FLOYD: No, I tried to look at that, and quite honestly I think given only nine months of the program it's probably not realistic to find it. You know, whether the CAP finding was there before the issue was or whether the issue was there before the CAP findings, it's awfully hard over a nine-month period, especially since not all of the modules are being looked at every quarter cycle.  MR. SCHERER: I think you'd have to  MR. FLOYD: Have a couple of years on this.  MR. SCHERER: I think that's an excellent question, and it's something that I think would have to be looked at because in many cases when you have a degraded performance, one of the findings is the corrective action program wasn't effective at correcting the performance earlier.  So whether that's a leading indicator or a lagging indicator, it is not clear to me yet, but I think that's a good question, and it's something when we analyze the data in the future we need to be
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we analyze the data in the future we need to be
careful of not assuming it's a direct correlation, but
it might be a result.
MR. FLOYD: A trend, right. Let's see.
MR. FLOYD: A trend, right. Let's

I just had something I wanted to add here. I'll just say it.

When you looked a the plants that have the greatest number of overall findings in every single case when you get to the ones that are well over ten findings per unit, without exception they have all tripped at least a PI threshold or they have a greater than green inspection finding.

And when you get up to the plants that had greater than 20, 25 inspection findings in the unit, those are the ones that have tripped -- right now in the program they may only have one effective one, but they have tripped multiple PIs during the course of the program or had at least one inspection finding identified.

So, again, there appears to be a reasonable correlation with the number of issues that an inspector is able to find at a station, and the likelihood that that plant either has or will have to watch and see, but this is the premise of the program, that that continues; that in all likelihood they will exceed a threshold in either a PI or inspection finding in ensuing quarters. We'll have to see if that's true.

But at least for the plants thus far that

have the highest percentage of inspection findings, they all have tripped a PI or inspection threshold, at least one, and some of them multiple ones.

Our overall inspection conclusions were that we think the inspection procedures are more objective and risk informed, at least the scope of them and what is looked at. The licensees tell us that the inspection conduct itself is really not a whole lot different than what it was under the previous program.

Where it's risk informed is the inspectors are tending to look at the more important systems at the plant based upon the risk insights, but when they look at it, they're still looking at it pretty much the way they used to look at the system in terms of looking for any kind of deficiency across the board related to it.

But where it's risk informed is in the outcome, when a finding is identified and it's run through the significance determination process, then a characterization is put on it that does seem to be more objective and certainly more risk informed than what the previous finding outcomes were.

The licensees here are spending less time responding to low value issues, the level four

1 violations, since they are non-sited. The point here 2 is that they're still taking the corrective action. 3 They're still going into the program, and they're 4 still evaluating what needs to be done to be fixed and 5 taking the actions, but at least they've saved the administrative routine of responding to the lowest 6 7 category of violations in the past. And probably the best feedback, the most 8 positive feedback we get from the industry is that the 9 dialogue between the licensee and the NRC is certainly 10 11 much, much more focused on safety, I think just as 12 Dave's observation was, and rather than on what was the severity level of the violation and who found it 13 14 and when they found it and things like that, trying to 15 figure out the ground rules for how much civil penalty 16 to assess. 17 Pretty much now the dialogue is almost exclusively focused on what's the safety significance 18 19 of this issue and what needs to be done about it. 20 MR. SCHERER: Steve. 21 MR. FLOYD: Yeah. 22 MR. SCHERER: The second bullet, I quess 23 I don't quibble at all with the words that you use, 24 but part of the meaning, I may have a problem with it. 25 Basically it's our experience at least,

1 and certainly I believe it's true of the Region 4 2 plants that the scope of the inspections have changed 3 to the extent that the NRC, when they come in and look 4 at a safety system, will tend to look at the more risk 5 significant safety systems. 6 MR. FLOYD: Yes, yes. MR. SCHERER: Or consider that a positive. 7 8 MR. FLOYD: Right. 9 But so when you say the MR. SCHERER: 10 scope of the inspections is not much different, they 11 are spending the same amount of time. They're sending 12 the same sort of people, but they're looking at the safety significant systems and tending to shy away 13 14 from the less safety significant. 15 MR. FLOYD: Right. The feedback we get is They're looking at the more safety 16 exactly right. 17 They're not spending as much significant systems. time looking at the lower risk significant systems in 18 the plan, but even when they look at the more safety 19 20 significant systems the plant, they're in 21 necessarily looking at what aspects of the system are 22 really making it safety significant. 23 They're still pretty much carrying out the 24 inspections that they have in the past by looking at

documentation reviews and, you know, looking for

1 instances of procedure compliance and documentation 2 requirements whether or not they in and of themselves 3 have much significance to them. 4 So there's still a lot more that could be done to, I think, approve the overall safety focus of 5 the inspection, even after you've picked a risk 6 7 significant system, but nonetheless, again, the great equalizer is the SDP process for at least getting an 8 9 consistency regions even across the the 10 significance of what's being found, looking at at 11 least some aspect of more risk significant systems. 12 My point is if all things MR. SCHERER: had remained equal, and if the NRC simply started 13 14 focusing more on the safety significant systems, then 15 you would expect an up tick in the number of non-green findings simply because the NRC is looking at the more 16 safety significant systems. 17 I'm trying to point out that the NRC is 18 19 looking at the more safety significant systems. 20 They're focusing on them more, and still we're getting 21 the results that you outlined. 22 Yeah, and I gave you some MR. FLOYD:

statistics on where we thought PI results would be.

Inspection finding results, when the NRC was putting

the program together, we know they went back and took

23

24

a look at licensee event reports that were filed, and on the basis of that the numbers that were thrown around was we thought that there would probably be somewhere around 50 greater than green inspection findings found in a typical assessment cycle year.

As I said, we've got 21 for the first three quarters. So what's that going to give you, about 28 or 30 for a full year? A little bit less, but pretty much in line with the same ratio that we're seeing between inspection -- excuse me -- performance indicator results and what the expectation there was.

Again, those same LERs were drawn from the -- I believe those were 97 and 98, were the batch of LERs that were evaluated. So, again, a couple of years older in performance, and again, I think it's reflecting the improvements in the overall performance in '99 and 2000 across the industry. So not inconsistent.

My overall summary is that we see the combination, and this is really what the purpose of the program is all about, is can the assessment process help the agency identify which plants need beyond the baseline inspection so that they can focus their resources and elevate attention on the more significant issues.

1 So the real question we've got is can the 2 do that, and so far we that see the 3 combination of performance indicators and inspection 4 findings are able to discern performance differences. 5 As I stated, there's 22 percent of the plants that was receiving beyond the baseline activity 6 7 right now because they have tripped either performance indicator thresholds or inspection finding thresholds 8 or both, and we do see a correlation in the corrective 9 action area with the action matrix results. Whether 10 11 it's the leading or lagging I don't know, and we see 12 much less correlation between human performance findings and the action matrix results. 13 14 MR. TRAPP: Steve, that human performance 15 finding, it looked like the first two columns. It was only the last column, and I was wondering. I mean, 16 17 there's probably only one plant. MR. FLOYD: Yeah, there's one plant in the 18 19 last column, right. I think the point that I really 20 had on it was --21 MR. TRAPP: With data scatter, you know, 22 you'd expect, you know, if you only had one plant, 23 you're not going to have very much data. 24 MR. FLOYD: Let's see. Where was that? 25 I should take one off, right?

1 MR. TRAPP: So the regulatory response in the degraded cornerstone, it looks like you do have 2 3 the correlation you might expect, which is the last 4 one. 5 MR. FLOYD: Well, I think the point I've got here is that I see a nice up check on both 6 7 corrective action and human performance findings in 8 the regulator response column. 9 When I go to the degraded cornerstone 10 column, which is a five plant population, I see what 11 would expect to see, and that is a greater 12 contribution in the corrective action. If you look at the ratio between here and here, it's much greater 13 14 than from here to here. 15 So that tells me that, hey, corrective action program findings seem to be a little more 16 17 significant here, and yet I actually see quite a bit of a lessening in the percentage that are contributing 18 19 from human performance. 20 And you're right. It's just one plant, 21 and it's probably not a very good data point. You can 22 almost ignore that one, but I would expect if the 23 premise was that human performance findings are 24 equally as important with the corrective action

program, I would expect to see a uniform trend, and I

don't see that.

I do see the trend in corrective action, but I don't see it in human performance.

MR. GARCHOW: You also showed that there was some difference between the regions and how they choose to document something. So that includes --

MR. FLOYD: Yes, it does, yep, yeah.

MR. SCHERER: And, again, I think we need to look at whether the corrective action program is, in fact, a cause or an effect.

MR. FLOYD: Well, you know, you've probably heard me say this before, but when people say, "Gee, we don't have any leading indicators in the program," you know, I argue that the entire program is a leading indicator. That's what it's meant to be. It's leading from who might go from here to here to here to here.

And the fact that we have thresholds set up, you know, you have to ask yourself leading to what. If it's leading to have a significant impact on public health and safety, that's defined down near the yellow and red zones, and is this process able to pick up and watch plants migrate across these columns, and I think so far the answer is, yes, it is able to pick plants up and identify them.

1 We've had several plants now that have 2 migrated from the regulatory response column to the 3 degraded cornerstone column, and if you go back in 4 history and look at the plant that was here and 5 backfit as they did in the inspection report for Indian Point 2, go back and take a look at if they 6 7 were under the program a year before, would it have 8 picked up the decline in performance, and the answer 9 was clearly it would have. They would have been in the degraded 10 11 cornerstone column and multiple degraded cornerstone 12 column before they even had the event at IP-2 for the steam generator leakage event. So it looks like it 13 14 would have picked them up and maybe more attention 15 would have been put on the plant sooner. That's all I have. 16 17 MS. FERDIG: Steve, I have got a question. 18 MR. FLOYD: Sure. 19 MS. FERDIG: What does Dave's assertion 20 that the action matrix isn't being used mean to you? 21 Well, I wasn't really quite MR. FLOYD: 22 His example, one of them was the clear on that. 23 security condition at Quad Cities. Was it Ouad? 24 Yeah, it was Quad, and that was really an agency-wide

decision that the SDP process for entering the action,

possibly entering the action matrix from the security area had some fundamental flaws in it because the premise upon which that was built is not how the agency executes their force-on-force evaluations and the conclusions that they draw.

So there's a definite broken linkage between what the assumptions are for the OSREs and the SDP.

The other one was on IP-2 and the fact that I guess it was that they allowed the IP-2 to start up without correcting their deficiencies or acknowledging their deficiencies. I really don't have all of the details. I don't know that one that well.

But when I look at the action matrix, they're in the fourth column. They're getting a diagnostic examination. They're getting a fairly extensive round of team inspections looking at multiple areas across the plant, which is what the action matrix column for activity calls for.

And the plants that are in the degraded cornerstone, I know they're getting for cause inspections in the areas that are degraded, and without exception when you go through and read the findings on the NRC summary page, all of the plants that have tripped a PI threshold or a white

1	inspection, gotten a white or greater inspection
2	finding, you can read a supplemental inspection that
3	has been followed out under 75001 procedure and what
4	the results of that inspection were posted on the Web
5	site.
6	So it looks to me like the action is
7	pretty consistent with the action matrix. Dave may
8	have an issue with a couple of them, but I think
9	overall the action is as the action matrix has called
10	for.
11	MR. BROCKMAN: Yeah, I think Dave did
12	state that they were for the ones the couple of
13	examples at the upper level of significance, and they
14	had not done an analysis down at the 95001 level.
15	MR. FLOYD: Right.
16	MR. BROCKMAN: Which would be the vast
17	majority of experiences thus far.
18	MR. FLOYD: Yeah, but there have been
19	five, 95, or six 95002s carried out. Yeah, and they
20	were much more extensive than the 95001s.
21	Other questions?
22	CHAIRMAN PLISCO: I have one.
23	MR. FLOYD: Yeah.
24	CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Most of your
25	presentation talked about, you know, the inspection

1 program and the results. What about other parts of 2 from what you hear the program? I mean, utilities, are there big issues or concerns in those 3 4 other areas? 5 MR. FLOYD: Well, I didn't want to go into the whole litany of them. I think they're pretty much 6 7 what we've got captured on our list that we've been 8 going through. And that was one comforting thing I think 9 10 we've gotten. When we go from the knowledge that we 11 have from working with the NRC at the task force level 12 -- excuse me -- on the overall program, we don't see any surprises in terms of issues that come out of that 13 14 meeting versus what came out of the regional NRC 15 workshops versus what came out of we had a separate 16 industry lessons learned workshop at the end of 17 January, and we didn't have any surprises come out of 18 there. 19 It's all pretty much the same issues, and 20 I think we have them characterized pretty well in our 21 matrix there that we've been going over this morning. 22 A lot of them center around, as we talk 23 about the unavailability definition, that's the one 24 that I think people would really like to see fixed and

made consistent with what the regulatory requirements

1 are so they can get some consistency in thresholds and 2 eliminate this potential for having an unintended consequence of not doing enough maintenance so as not 3 4 to trip the threshold. 5 That's probably the most significant comment that we get from the industry. As far as how 6 7 the action matrix is going and the conduct of the supplemental inspections, we're getting very positive 8 9 feedback from the industry that appears like the agency is following what those supplemental procedures 10 11 call for. The actions seem appropriate. The response 12 seems appropriate. The only other growing concern that I --13 14 well, there's two. There's two growing concerns out 15 there. One is in the ALARA inspection area. I didn't have time to pull the data together, but I've got some 16 folks back at NEI taking a look at it. 17 But when you read through the inspection 18 19 reports, there seems to be a growing number of no 20 color and green findings being written up in the ALARA 21 area, and it's escalating by quarter at the same time 22 that the dose exposure continues to go down in the 23 industry. 24 So we're wondering what's going on there

and what's happening there and what's driving that.

The other issue that we have is there is a lingering concern about the -- although it's the low significant area, the inconsistency across regions for what is the threshold for documenting a green finding and no color finding, and I think that's out of a fear that there may be somewhere in the program down the road a desire to aggregate and try to look at the number of no color findings or green findings as a predictor for when somebody might trip the greater threshold.

And therefore, even though there are not shades of green in the program and no action is supposed to be taken until a threshold is tripped, I think there's a growing concern that, gee, it might happen, and if we're not careful about consistency across the region as to what the threshold is, some plants may get a disproportionate share of additional attention, and others that may be warranted, but that region chooses not to document those won't get it. So it's a fairness issue, I think, more than anything.

But other than that, the overall feedback we get from the program is that it seems to be working reasonably well, and similar to Dave's comment, better than what people expected for where we are in the first year of implementation.

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1 CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Any other questions? 2 MR. SHADIS: Yeah. These regional differences. 3 4 MR. FLOYD: Un-huh. 5 MR. SHADIS: Just your opinion. see anything other than the way that the NRC regions 6 7 look at these findings at thresholds? Do you see any other contributors that would allow for --8 MR. FLOYD: Do you mean is there actually 9 a difference in the performance of the plants? 10 11 MR. SHADIS: Yeah. Do you think? 12 MR. FLOYD: I would say there would be if the populations weren't so relatively even in the four 13 14 regions in terms of numbers of plants. I can't 15 believe all of the good plants just happen to be in one region and all of the poor performers just happen 16 17 to be in another region. I'm sure that's somewhat of a factor for 18 19 some of the regions, but if you take a look at it, I 20 think Region 4 had a fairly high number of green 21 findings and -- yeah, a fairly high number of green 22 findings, and yet they have the lowest number of 23 plants that have tripped either performance indicator 24 threshold and I believe inspection findings.

have the least number of green inspection findings.

1 Yet they are pretty high up on the total number of 2 green findings. And, again, when we looked at what they're 3 4 documenting as a green finding some of the other 5 regions are documenting as a no color finding, and it appears to us anyway that Region 2 isn't documenting 6 7 it at all. So Region 2, in our view, appears to be 8 carrying out what we through was the threshold for 9 documentation in the inspection program. 10 11 don't typically write up minor violations. We see a number of violations that are 12 acknowledged to be minor violations written up in the 13 14 inspection reports from the other regions, and it was 15 our understanding that that was not to be the case, that minor violations wouldn't be written up. 16 17 MR. GARCHOW: So, Steve, are the whites just -- maybe you know this or not; fair to say if you 18 19 don't, right? -- but are the white -- excuse me. 20 Drawing B -- are the regulatory response to greater, 21 to multiple to greater, are they pretty much 22 distributed across the country or do they focus in on 23 one region or another? 24 I don't see a graph on that, I don't 25 believe.

1	MR. FLOYD: Yeah, there is. There is a
2	graph on that.
3	MR. GARCHOW: Because that would answer
4	MR. FLOYD: You mean the greater than?
5	Well, there's the green stack-up, okay, green
6	findings, but then when you take a look at here's
7	how non-green PI results stack up. Okay? And I have
8	a similar thing for the inspection findings.
9	MR. GARCHOW: This slide states sorted by
10	region. Is there anything funny about the
11	distribution to the right of the action matrix? This
12	slide, Steve. Is there anything, you know is this
13	more one region than the other?
14	MR. FLOYD: Well, obviously when you get
15	to the last column there is only one plant in there.
16	MR. GARCHOW: Region 1 would win.
17	MR. FLOYD: So let's see.
18	MR. GARCHOW: That was the only question.
19	If you don't have the data, that was sort of
20	MR. FLOYD: I'm trying to think of who's
21	in there. Is that well, there's a Region 1 plant.
22	No, I'm sorry. Yeah, there's a Region 1 plant in that
23	column. There's a Region 4 plant in that column, and
24	let's see. There's a Region 3 plant in that column.
25	I don't believe there's a Region 2 plant. That's the

1	only region that doesn't have a plant in the degraded
2	cornerstone or multiple degrades cornerstone column.
3	MR. GARCHOW: So it's sort of spread?
4	MR. FLOYD: It's sort of, yeah.
5	MR. GARCHOW: With the exception of the
6	last column, which only has one plant.
7	MR. FLOYD: Yeah.
8	MR. GARCHOW: Okay.
9	CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Any other questions?
LO	(No response.)
L1	CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Great. Do you need a
L2	couple of minutes, Rich, or do you want to go?
L3	Okay. Our next presenter is Rich Janati
L4	from the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental
L5	Protection.
L6	MR. JANATI: John, I guess since I'm the
L7	last one I have unlimited time or what?
L8	I don't have any slides or transparencies,
L9	but I have copies of all of the comments available.
20	CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Is this what you want to
21	hand out?
22	MR. JANATI: Right. Basically I'm going
23	to go over my comments. Please stop me if you have
24	any questions or any areas that need further
25	clarification. I'll be happy to answer your

questions.

Well, my name is Rich Janati. I'm the Chief of the Nuclear Safety Program for the Bureau of Radiation Protection, Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection.

First of all, let me thank you for the opportunity to comment on the new reactor restart program. As you know, Pennsylvania did not have any pilot plan. Therefore, our experience is limited to the past ten months or so.

I have personally participated in some of the NRC Region I workshops during the promulgation of the pilot program, and I also attended the NRC Region I training for NRC inspectors, and that was very, very helpful and useful to us in understanding the process better.

I'd like to thank Randy Blough and Region

I management for making that available to us.

I believe this committee has done a commendable job in identifying or capturing the issues that will need to be addressed by the NRC staff in order to improve the reactor oversight program. Since this new program is an evolving process, it's reasonable to expect that some changes will have to be made as time goes forward to enhance the effectiveness

of the program.

However, I would like to point out that in my view too many changes to the existing program without providing adequate justification could potentially jeopardize the stakeholder's confidence in the process.

Because of this committee's good work, I had some difficulties coming up with any new issues. What I'd like to take this opportunity and talk to you a little bit about our experience with the new program and also communicate to you some of the comments or issues that have been brought to our attention by the interested members of the public in our state.

On page 1 of our comments, the questions that -- obviously the important question is does the new program satisfy the goals established by the NRC and those goals are maintaining safety, enhancing public confidence, improving effectiveness and efficiency, and reducing our necessary regulatory burden.

Looking at Item 1, maintaining safety, there are no signs of economy plant (phonetic) performance at any of our power plants in Pennsylvania since the new reactor oversight program was implemented in April of last year.

1 However, additional data is needed to 2 confirm the ability of the program to identify the economic safety (phonetic) performance trends in a 3 4 timely manner. 5 We support the NRC's initiative to develop industry trans-assessment process, to evaluate the 6 7 long-term effectiveness of the new reactor oversight 8 process as it relates to the goal of maintaining 9 safety. It's important that the extent that the 10 11 stakeholders know if the NRC staff, particularly the 12 regional staff, have confidence in the new oversight process and its ability to allow the NRC to recognize 13 14 or identify declining safety performance in a timely 15 manner. I believe from an NRC recent survey of its 16 17 internal stakeholders, particularly regional staff, shows that there is agreement among the staff, 18 19 particularly regional staff, over this issue. Then I 20 believe that that would help enhance public confidence 21 in the process. 22 And finally, there is a disparity between 23 goal of maintaining safety and the NRC's 24 industry's goal or the standard of excellence.

disparity in the performance standards could confuse

the members of the public and other external stakeholders.

To give you an example, under the new factory oversight process or program, one of the plants in Pennsylvania is a licensee response MAT (phonetic), all green findings. The same plant has received an input rating of three which indicates that there are some relatively significant issues that would have to be addressed or corrected by the utility in order to achieve the industry's standard, and those issues related equipment performance, are to engineering, training, and standards for performance. input fields is low within this particular utility.

Now, I don't consider that to be a major problem or major issue as far as we're concerned. However, at least at a minimum this could result in a public perception issue, and i think it's something that the industry and the regulatory industry perhaps could be able and prepared to explain to the public.

Is there any question on the first goal or objective of maintaining safety that I talked about?

MR. SCHERER: Do you have any examples where, that you're aware of, where a regulatory agency regulates to excellence?

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1	MR. JANATI: Not that I'm aware of, and I
2	really didn't raise that, as I said, a major issue,
3	but again, looking at, as I said, the industry report
4	and industry findings versus NRC findings, that could
5	potentially be a public perception.
6	MR. SCHERER: I'm not trying to overstate
7	you
8	MR. FLOYD: Sure.
9	MR. SCHERER: position, but I don't
10	this was raised before, and I asked the same question
11	in that context. You know, I can understand
12	regulators regulating to a minimum acceptable level of
13	safety and there are plenty of examples of that. I'm
14	just not familiar with many examples, and it's an
15	honest question.
16	MR. JANATI: No, I agree with you that
17	it's really the industry that's responsible to achieve
18	a goal of excellence. I don't argue with that.
19	MR. BORCHARDT: You know, I think EPA had
20	entered into some activities which if not regulating
21	to excellence came pretty close. Jim may be able to
22	help me out. There was a 30-50 program
23	MR. SETSER: It's the 33-50 rule and then
24	what is the White House initiative? I can't recall
25	the title of it right now, but the whole thrust of it

1 is to go beyond compliance, to encourage going beyond 2 compliance by reducing a number of parameters. OSHA does that with their 3 MR. GARCHOW: 4 VP, their VIP or VPP program where they're voluntary 5 or they'll come in and try to get you to do more than the regulation to improve safety and give you an 6 7 award. MR. BLOUGH: And I think Jill Lipoti -- I 8 don't know if she talked before this panel, but she 9 talked to me about some of the things done in New 10 11 Jersey with the mammography program and whatnot that 12 it isn't regulating to excellent, but it sets up a 13 program that's going to encourage 14 improvement, if you will. 15 MR. JANATI: I think there are incentives available, and we're doing it in Pennsylvania. As far 16 17 as regulating it, I mean, obviously that's a different situation. 18 19 MR. SETSER: Controversial or not, the 20 regulatory agency may be the person to stimulate, provide motivation or incentives to allow the industry 21 22 to go forward and meet this goal. 23 As I said, in some people's view, that 24 might be controversial, but that's where it works. MR. LAURIE: Rich, could I just for my own 25

1	education get 30 seconds of an explanation of what
2	Pennsylvania's nuclear safety inspection program is?
3	MR. JANATI: Sure.
4	MR. LAURIE: Is it one person?
5	MR. JANATI: No. Actually we have an
6	independent oversight program. There are nine
7	reactors in Pennsylvania, nine operating reactors at
8	five sites, and we have one nuclear engineer assigned
9	to each nuclear power plant site in Pennsylvania.
10	We don't have regulatory authority as
11	independent oversight. We conduct inspections, joint
12	inspections with the NRC. We have all staff attending
13	daily meetings at various power plants.
14	MR. LAURIE: Do you have some minimum
15	understanding with either NRC or the owners regarding
16	your ability to conduct those inspections?
17	MR. JANATI: Our mandate comes from
18	Radiation Protection Act of 1984.
19	MR. LAURIE: Is that federal or
20	MR. JANATI: No, it's a state act.
21	MR. LAURIE: Okay.
22	MR. JANATI: And the state basically gives
23	us the mandate or authority to have access to nuclear
24	power facilities in Pennsylvania, but the regulatory
25	authority obviously sets with the Nuclear Regulatory

1	Commission.
2	PARTICIPANT: There's an MOU between
3	Pennsylvania and the NRC.
4	MR. JANATI: There is an MOU specifically,
5	for certain, for example, for doing transportation
6	inspections, but I don't believe there's an MOU for
7	necessarily doing conducting inspections, except when
8	we have joint inspections that there's certain
9	protocol when they do too far.
LO	MR. LAURIE: Okay.
L1	MR. JANATI: There's an independent
L2	oversight process.
L3	MR. BLOUGH: I'm sorry. The agreement
L4	with Pennsylvania and NRC dates way back to the '70s
L5	really, you know, which, you know, then we agreed on
L6	the protocols, whenever Pennsylvania is going to
L7	accompany our inspections, and so they've been
L8	they've been accompanying inspections with us for
L9	many, many years, and it's always gone really well,
20	and then they've done some additional things in the
21	rad waste areas that go beyond what other states have
22	done.
23	MR. SCHERER: Is Pennsylvania an agreement
24	statement?
25	MR. JANATI: Not yet. Our goal is to

1 become an agreement state in two years or so. 2 lengthy process. So we're lining up our staff and 3 training for our staff. 4 The second goal is to enhance public 5 confidence. It's very difficult, if not impossible, to measure public confidence in the new reactor 6 7 oversight process in this relatively short period of It might take several years before the NRC is 8 able to conclude whether the new ROP has public 9 confidence. 10 11 A question here is how would NRC measure 12 public confidence. Would there be public surveys, What criteria would NRC use 13 focus groups? 14 determine whether the new ROP has achieved its goal? 15 And obviously we'd be interested in learning more about that. 16 17 Now, based on our experience in Pennsylvania, particularly as it relates to TMI-1 18 restart and operation following the Unit 2 incident, 19 20 public confidence develops over a period of time, and 21 to a large extent it's a function of plant performance 22 or how well the plant is running and public awareness 23 and education. 24 As far as plant performance is concerned, obviously the industry and not just the regulatory 25

2 being operated safety and in a reliable manner. Good 3 operating record, no surprises, no significant events 4 helps improve public confidence. 5 For NRC to improve public confidence in the new reactor oversight process through public 6 7 education awareness, we have some recommendations. On page 2, Item B, we believe that NRC regional offices 8 should continue to conduct annual performance review 9 meetings, PPR meetings, in the vicinity of the nuclear 10 11 power plants. This would insure that the interested 12 citizens had sufficient understanding of the new process, and would also provide an opportunity to 13 14 inform the public about plants' overall performance, 15 what it means, and how it compares to the performance 16 of other plants in the same category. 17 For example, if it's a PWR, how does it compare to other PWRs in the region, or if it's a BWR, 18 19 the same thing. 20 Rich, if I could ask a MR. KRICH: 21 question. 22 MR. JANATI: Sure. 23 MR. KRICH: Do you mean you'd like the NRC 24 to do something other than or in addition to the 25 annual assessment meetings that they're going to have?

agency has an obligation to insure that the plants are

1	MR. JANATI: No, as part of the annual
2	assessment meeting, having a table, simple table,
3	showing that this plant, TMI or any other plant,
4	has this is the overall performance and how it
5	compares to performance of other plants in the region.
6	I think that would be helpful.
7	MR. KRICH: I understand that part, but
8	the first part of your recommendation was that they
9	should conduct annual meetings like the PPR meetings
10	in your vicinity.
11	Right now the process calls for annual
12	assessment meetings to be held at the site.
13	MR. JANATI: It's the same meeting.
14	MR. KRICH: Okay.
15	MR. JANATI: The same meeting. It was not
16	an additional meeting.
17	MR. KRICH: Okay.
18	MR. JANATI: The accuracy consists of
19	timeliness of the information to the public, are
20	important factors in agencies' credibility. Posting
21	of performance indicators and assessment information
22	on the NRC Web site helps improve public confidence in
23	the process and should continue.
24	And finally, under public confidence, NRC
25	should establish an effective mechanism to receive

public input continuously and on a plant specific basis. The NRC resident inspector should play a proactive role in this process by being more available and accessible to the local community.

It is recommended that the resident inspectors periodically brief interested members of the public, including the local officials on significant plant issues and inspection assessment findings. These periodic meeting would also provide an opportunity for the public to ask questions and to provide input to the NRC.

The NRC has recognized the importance of public involvement, and we're aware of it. However, the agency should focus more on public involvement information at the local level in the vicinity of nuclear power plants.

We have not seen a lot of interactions or face-to-face dialogue between NRC inspectors and the interested members of othe community, and I think that's a weakness in the program.

I've had a member of the public in our state saying that, you know, they don't have access to resident inspectors because they're inside the plant, and obviously there are some advantages to that, but that's one of the things that we're hearing from

member of the public, and some members of the public have no idea that there are resident inspectors at these power plants.

So I think we're really going to have to improve the public involvement in the local community and not necessarily at national levels. It's nice to have meetings here and workshops inviting the states and the public to attend, but people who live near these power plants are people who have concerns, and they need to be educated.

Related to the goal of public confidence, the question is is the process more objective and predictable. We believe that the new process is more objective and predictable, and this is mainly due to the combination of performance indicators, and the objective and structured NRC inspection more assessment program, including the significance determination process.

Now, I'm going to talk about its various components of the reaction oversight process. Starting with performance indicators, I'd like to repeat some of the comments that I made in Region I at the workshop we had several weeks ago.

There's some strength associated with the performance indicators. PRs are actual plant data and

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1 objective criteria for evaluating plant performance. 2 PRs have been collected consistently and in a timely 3 manner. The public is able to review and scrutinize 4 the performance indicators, and PRs can help licensees focus 5 their attention on areas that may 6 improvement. 7 give you an example, one of facilities in Pennsylvania had a relatively high 8 number of percentage of their sirens inoperable. 9 Sirens available to being a performance indicator 10 11 receive high level management attention, and the 12 utility took timely and appropriate measures correct the problem. 13 14 This resulted in a wide finding, but the 15 problem was corrected in a timely manner. The same 16 utility has so far received two white findings associated with the PIs, which indicates that the 17 process is working as it relates to the performance 18 19 indicators. 20 And, by the way, this particular plant is 21 a good, solid performer, but there are problems that, 22 you know, resulted because of the PIs, and so that's

first two items here that I have listed, radiations in

As far as challenges and weaknesses, the

a positive aspect of the new program.

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1 plant designs, are an intended consequence of PIs, are 2 known through the agency and through the industry, 3 although I don't necessarily believe that the manual 4 at SCRAM, for example, has intended consequences. 5 But these complicated factors should have identified and addressed 6 been during the 7 implementation of the pilot program. Now that the program has been fully implemented, we are talking 8 about making all of these changes. So that's an issue 9 that you might want to consider in the future. 10 11 Again, I go back to the comment that i 12 made that too many changes to the existing program could potentially jeopardize stakeholders' confidence 13 14 in the process. 15 MR. KRICH: Rich. 16 MR. JANATI: Sure. 17 MR. KRICH: Could you tell me what you mean, give me some examples maybe of how variations in 18 19 plant designs or tech specs or operating --20 MR. JANATI: Well, for example, right, we 21 have heard that the way utilities measure RCS leak 22 rate. 23 MR. KRICH: yes. 24 JANATI: That's, for example, one 25 example.

1 MR. KRICH: The tech spec. 2 The tech spec change. So MR. JANATI: 3 that's one. I have some other examples I have not 4 listed here, but I could get it for you. 5 Item C, the basis for setting the existing PI thresholds are inconsistent. The thresholds of 6 7 some PIs are based on PRA insights, such as reactor SCRAM, safety system unavailability. 8 9 Others based are on regulatory 10 requirements or tech spec limits, RCS leak rate, RCS 11 specific activity, and some are based on professional 12 judgment, security, or measured response. Additional thresholds for PIs that are 13 14 based on regulatory comments are high, and some of the 15 PI thresholds that are based on PR insights have very high thresholds and may have undesired results with 16 17 the public. For example, thresholds of six and 25 for 18 unplanned SCRAM, thresholds of ten and 20 for SCRAM 19 with loss of normal heat removal. I think the numbers 20 21 are high. 22 Now, that's really a dilemma because now 23 NRC is looking at developing this space performance 24 indicators, and that could result in some high

numbers. So I'm just raising that as an issue for you

to consider.

Now, the relatively large number of green findings is probably due to high thresholds for some of the PIs, but I do not wish to make a firm conclusion at this point.

The issue with color coding, we really don't have a problem with it. However, the only problem is that it is difficult to differentiate between superior plants and plants with average level of performance, particularly for the members of the public, because we know, since we have our own independent oversight and we interface with NRC frequently, we know who the solid performers are or which plants are having some problems, but the public might not know, and I think that's an issue.

The significance determination process, the strength of the SDP is that, first of all, it allows for more consistent risk based decisions by the NRC.

Under the new reactor oversight program and because of the SDP process, the licensees are more inclined to perform risk analysis to identify the risk associated with certain events, and I think that's a positive.

I've heard from utilities who are doing

risk assessment, risk analysis for the licensee and 1 reports that are being documented. 2 So that's a positive aspect of the process. 3 4 The challenges are that, first of all, 5 SDPs are complex and a complicated process for the public to understand, but I would not consider that to 6 7 be a major weakness, and let me tell you why. Based on our experience, the public is not 8 very interested in risk analysis or risk assessment. 9 It's a difficult subject to understand. The public is 10 11 interested in risk management. What are the risks, 12 industry is taking, and what actions the the 13 regulatory agency is taking mitigate the 14 consequences of an event? 15 For example, what monitors are in place to detect any release from a power plant. 16 The measured response program, how effective it is. 17 So risk analysis is really difficult to 18 understand for the members of the public. I would not 19 consider this to be a major weakness. 20 21 Second, unnecessary challenges to the SDP 22 non-green findings by licensees. We have experienced 23 that, and this is mostly due to a result of licensees' 24 disproportionate concern about non-green findings.

We had an example in Pennsylvania. One of

our utilities received a white finding. It was related to misclassification of a shipment of a low, low waste. A shipment was packaged properly. It was disposed of at a disposal facility. It was placed in an appropriate trench.

So the risk associated with this particular finding was small. However, the SDP clearly indicated that the result was a white finding, and I think the utility had some problems with it.

Now, the question is: should you revise the SDP to reflect the concern that has been expressed by the utility or not? That's a different issue, but the SDP was being challenged, and I think in this particular case I think the utility might have gone a little overboard.

Obviously there are going to be negotiations. I mean, this is a complex process. I am not going to use the word "negotiations" for this particular case, but if the risk associated with this particular event is low, then obviously you need to revisit the SDP and see if there's a change, the change is required in this process.

I think NEI should probably play a role in also changing the culture within the utilities. The white finding necessarily is not bad. As I said, one

1	of our good, solid performers has two white findings.
2	And finally, at present the NRC regional
3	offices do not have adequate number of risk analysts.
4	Does the NRC expect the resident inspectors to develop
5	this expertise, or is NRC considering increasing the
6	risk analysis expertise in the regional offices to
7	implement the process effectively or a combination of
8	both?
9	I think that is something the NRC is going
10	to have to look at and decide what you want to do.
11	I have been told that the resident
12	inspectors are expected to do more, particularly for
13	Phase 1 and Phase 2 SDPs. Am I correct in that?
14	MR. MOORMAN: You are correct.
15	MR. JANATI: Okay.
16	MR. SCHERER: I'm curious. You come to a
17	conclusion that the NRC regional offices do not have
18	an adequate number of SRAs. How do you reach that
19	conclusion?
20	MR. JANATI: Oh, at some of the workshop
21	meetings I've attended, I've been told that there's
22	only one or two individuals who have expertise in this
23	area in the regional office. Considering that
24	MR. SCHERER: Is this anecdotal or you
25	have

MR. SCHERER: two in the region,  you determine that two are inadequate, that the  three or four or five? On what basis have you  MR. JANATI: The basis that I have i  considering that there's a lot more focus or  significant issues, having one or two expenses  common sense. You don't have to make that conc  based on the fact that, you know, wow, you h  look at this or look at this chart. You're go  need more people to do that.  And being at meetings, being at work	ey need  u  is that  n risk  rts is  clusion  ave to
three or four or five? On what basis have you  MR. JANATI: The basis that I have i  considering that there's a lot more focus or  significant issues, having one or two expenses  common sense. You don't have to make that conce  based on the fact that, you know, wow, you h  look at this or look at this chart. You're go  need more people to do that.	u is that n risk rts is clusion ave to
5 MR. JANATI: The basis that I have i 6 considering that there's a lot more focus of 7 significant issues, having one or two expens 8 common sense. You don't have to make that conc 9 based on the fact that, you know, wow, you h 10 look at this or look at this chart. You're go 11 need more people to do that.	is that n risk rts is clusion ave to
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look at this or look at this chart. You're go need more people to do that.	
need more people to do that.	oing to
12 And being at meetings, being at work	
II	shops,
I have come to that conclusion that that's the	case.
14 If I'm wrong, fine.	
MR. TRAPP: I think it's a great co	mment.
16 (Laughter.)	
MR. SCHERER: You've been talking	to the
18 SRAs.	
MR. JANATI: Well, that may be the	case,
but obviously, again, being there and talking	to the
various people in meetings and workshops you	learn
22 that, and I've not seen anything in writing	which
would indicate that's the case, but there hav	e been
24 discussions over that issue.	
25 Inspection sorry?	

1 MR. BLOUGH: You're not wrong on that 2 In fact, you know, there's been a lot of discussions among staff on how to address this. 3 4 know, now that we're already into the ROP and we need 5 the inspection forces to do the inspection, but we also need to bootstrap the --6 7 MR. JANATI: Okay. 8 MR. TRAPP: This week we've actually in 9 the region -- I think each region is selecting two 10 people to get additional training. 11 That would be good. MR. JANATI: So we're actually moving 12 MR. TRAPP: forward on that. This week a couple of people will be 13 14 chosen. 15 MR. JANATI: Actually, we'd like to get some training in that area, too. I think it would 16 help us understand the process better. 17 And I think as we 18 CHAIRMAN PLISCO: 19 discussed at our last meeting with the SRAs, the 20 complication in assessing what we need because we 21 don't have the Phase 2 work sheets, it's really hard 22 to tell what resources we really need once we get int 23 the routine program. We can't really tell right now 24 because the SRAs are really doing more now than was 25 intended because of the last of the Phase 2 work

1	sheets.
2	MR. SCHERER: I guess that was my concern.
3	How do you derive and what's the answer? Is it four?
4	Is it six? Is it 18? How do you come to that answer
5	other than intuitively?
6	MR. JANATI: I don't know how many more,
7	but it seems that there appears to be a need for
8	additional RAs.
9	Inspection program, I think we talked
10	about the transfers. Inspections are more focused on
11	the significant issues, and that's good. The quality
12	of inspection reports has improved. I really believe
13	that.
14	I have a report here from Region 1 for
15	Susquehanna plant, dated January 30th, 2001. It's an
16	excellent report. It's well written, adequate amount
17	of information, signed and approved by Randy Blough.
18	(Laughter.)
19	MR. JANATI: And again, I made a copy
20	available for you if you want to review it. It's just
21	the amount of information here is adequate for us, and
22	I really think that's probably one of the best
23	inspection reports I have seen.

probably at as I don't want to say adequate, but they

1 don't have as much information as this particular 2 report does. It's a very good report. MR. MOORMAN: Rich, did you have a chance 3 4 to compare that report to the previous reports that we 5 issued or have you been --MR. JANATI: Under the old process? 6 7 MR. MOORMAN: Yes, under the old process. 8 MR. JANATI: Yes. Yeah, this is much 9 Actually I'll have a tendency on my part to read the whole report with this new process. The old 10 11 process, I mean, the reports are very lengthy, wordy, 12 and this is more focused. It's more focused on the significant issues. That's my conclusion. 13 14 Communication with the NRC inspectors, 15 licensees, the staff have improved. That's a strength. For example, the exit meetings are not as 16 They're more informal, more open. 17 rigid. inspectors are being used 18 NRC 19 resource by the licensees more than before, and I 20 think that's a good sign. 21 Weaknesses, well, the baseline 22 in my view, should focus inspections, more 23 crosscutting issues and specifically corrective action 24 program. It's recommended that NRC use the import

report findings as an additional resource, only as an

1 additional resource, to focus on areas that are more 2 problematic or have the potential of being precursors to larger problems. 3 4 I think IMPO (phonetic) does a very good 5 doi far as human performance is concerned, corrective action measures, and that, again, is an 6 7 additional resource. 8 I'll give you an example. Recently Excelon Corporation completed a self-assessment study 9 10 of its nuclear power plants. As you know, they have 11 17 nuclear power plants. It's called the Excelon 12 state of the free assessment. The utility has concluded that one of the 13 14 areas that needs improvement for the majority of the 15 power plants is corrective action program. I'm certain that this situation applies to many other 16 17 plants nationwide. Actually, the unusual event that we had at 18 19 facilities was the result of 20 corrective action measures. So I think that's one 21 area that I believe we need to focus on at least for 22 a while. 23 Now, it appears to me that the licensees 24 are struggling with a relative large number of issues.

So we have a large number of issues, and you're going

to have to prioritize those issues, and I hope that the way they're prioritizing the issues is not based on whether it's an NRC finding or not. You should prioritize the issues based on how significant the issues are.

It could be a licensee identified issues as more significant than NRC identified issues, but I think that the real problem here is that there are just so many of them, and I respectfully disagree with the suggested recommendation that NRC should reduce the frequency or the scope of PI&R inspections, at least not at this point.

No color issues of findings in the inspection reports are causing some confusion to the public, particularly the no color issues that result in violations that are assigned a color code.

I'll give you an example. Again, a facility received a no color finding for the failure to properly evaluate a change under 50.59. They had made a modification. It was related to reactor water clean-up system, the pump room. So it was a 50.59 that was not evaluated properly, and then the finding of that was assessed, and it was a green finding.

And I had somebody calling me and asking me what does this mean. I don't necessarily believe

that no color issues should not be included. I think the more information we have, particularly on issues that are relatively significant issues that result in nonviolations, whether they recite a violation, they should be documenting inspection reports, but might want to provide some additional information as to what it means for the members of the public who have access to these inspections, inspection reports.

And then just a couple other comments on the inspections. Changes to the inspection should be communicated to the extent of the stakeholders in a timely manner. I know tat least one other state had that comment. We're planning to observe or do an inspection with NRC obviously it would be appropriate for NRC to let us know if there were any changes to the schedule in a timely manner.

And finally, I believe NRC should promote and encourage the state's participation in or observation of NRC inspections, particularly those states that have their own independent oversight program.

I believe the state's involvement in the process would enhance stakeholder's confidence in the process, knowing that the state has a role in the process, that all issues or concerns are being

1 addressed, and we're doing joint inspections with NRC. I really believe that that would help 2 3 improve public confidence in the process. 4 And even inspection reports, if they are routine interactions, on site interactions with the 5 resident inspectors, I 6 NRC think that 7 interactions should be documented. I think it would be helpful to the public to know that the state is 8 involved. 9 The other goals three and four, improve 10 11 effectiveness and efficiency, reduce unnecessary 12 regulatory burden, I believe those two goals are related, and I also believe that NRC and the industry 13 14 are in a better position to make that determination, 15 whether the program has achieved these goals or objectives. 16 17 However, I believe that the NRC and we recommend that the NRC should conduct a survey of its 18 19 staff, particularly the original staff, and the licensees in order to determine whether the process 20 21 has accomplished these goals or not. 22 We have some observations, and those are, 23 first of all, NRC inspectors are focusing more on 24 inspection preparation and less on inspection

documentation. NRC inspectors are spending more time

on their own documents, less time on actual physical inspections, and this is not necessarily a criticism. It's an observation.

If you're doing more risk assessment, you're looking at the licensee's corrective action program, very fine PIs, that doesn't necessarily mean that it's bad, but it's just that we've seen less physical inspections.

Licensees are spending a considerable amount of time on data collection and reporting, especially with the PIs. However, this increasing burden has been offset by changes in the assessment and enforcement program.

There are less, much less non-cited violations for licensees. You don't have to respond to those violations. We don't see as many licensee reports because of the NRC's changes to the reporting requirements.

And finally, some members of the public continue to be skeptical of the idea of reducing unnecessary burden on licensees, and the perception is that the NRC has significantly reduced its oversight program, and some actually are under the impression that performance indicators are the only mechanism that the NRC is using for evaluating power plants or

1 licensee's performance. 2 And, again, to a large extent that's due 3 to a lack of understanding of the new process. So NRC 4 needs to do a better job in informing the public and 5 making sure that they understand the process better. Overall at this point it's premature to 6 7 make a firm conclusion as to whether the reactor oversight process satisfies the goals established by 8 9 the NRC Commission. I think we're going to need more time. 10 11 We've seen some positive things, some 12 positive aspects of the program, but we're going to need more time to make a firm conclusion. 13 14 The new process is more objective and 15 predictable than the old process, but there are areas that require improvement. NRC should continue to 16 evaluate the effectiveness of 17 the new reactor oversight process periodically and make improvements 18 19 in a systematic and timely manner. 20 And finally, NRC should continue to 21 receive feedback from its external stakeholders, 22 particularly members of the public in order to improve 23 public confidence in the process. 24 That concludes my presentation. I'll be 25 happy to answer any questions you might have.

	Overall, I think this is a better process,
2	and we've seen, as I've said, some positive points
3	about the process.
4	MR. SCHERER: I have a curiosity question
5	more than anything. I was surprised at the discussion
6	in the roll-out of the new reactor oversight process.
7	How small a percentage of the population not actively
8	involved in nuclear power plants knew of the existence
9	of a federal regulator, much less one that had
10	resident inspectors at the plants?
11	Have you done any polling in Pennsylvania
12	as to what percentage of the public knows of your
13	involvement and the state's involvement in
14	MR. JANATI: No.
15	MR. SCHERER: oversight at nuclear
16	power plants?
17	MR. JANATI: No, we haven't done that for
18	our nuclear safety process. We did some survey for
19	our low level waste process several years ago.
20	Obviously I don't have the results of the survey, but
21	not for nuclear safety.
22	MR. SCHERER: Do you have any feel for the
23	public awareness? I mean any anecdotal. I'm just
24	curious.
25	MR. JANATI: In our state as to how

1	MR. SCHERER: In your state, yeah.
2	MR. JANATI: I tell you that the
3	interested members of the public, people who are
4	really interested in the process, are aware of our
5	program, and one of the reasons that we have our own
6	emergency response program, like several many other
7	states, and that's how the public gets involved, and
8	they're aware that we do have a program.
9	I don't have facts or numbers at this
10	point.
11	MR. SCHERER: Thank you.
12	MR. FLOYD: Rich, I was struck by your
13	comment that you thought the program should focus even
14	more on crosscutting issues because there's already a
15	big difference between the old program and the new
16	program in terms of focus on crosscutting issues.
17	If you look at the 200 hour PI&R
18	inspection model and ten percent of every other module
19	is supposed to look at corrective action, there's
20	about 20 percent of the total number of inspection
21	hours that are supposed to focus on crosscutting
22	issues in the baseline.
23	MR. JANATI: Right.
24	MR. FLOYD: In fact, I was looking through
25	the data on some of the statistics I was giving you

and looking at the data entry that I had, and I went back and took a look at the findings, and this is pretty consistent across the four regions. The number varies between 20 and 25 percent of the total number of findings and each of the four regions are related to crosscutting issues. Green findings I'm talking about.

MR. JANATI: You asked that question right. I don't have the actual numbers, but looking at, for example, the inspection schedule, I've seen inspections, three or four inspections, for example, for safety and one for PI&R.

I don't know how many hours the resident inspectors -- how much time they are spending on corrective action and PI&R inspections. I assume they are looking at some, but just going by looking at the schedule, it appears to me that, you know, we're spending time on some other areas whereas we could have probably spent more time on corrective action program that is a key component, at least for a while until we feel confident that the utilities are doing an effective job.

MR. FLOYD: Yeah. It sounds like an education piece because you're right. There is only one annual PI&R inspection scheduled that you'll see

1 on the schedule, but imbedded in the program is ten 2 percent of every inspection module regardless of the 3 subject matter, is to go query the corrective action 4 program and look for issues. 5 That's how you get about 20 percent of the total hours in the program. In fact, I was actually 6 7 quite --MR. JANATI: That may not be a bad idea to 8 actually publish those number of hours of inspections 9 so we know, at least on the Web site or inspection 10 11 reports so that we know how much time the actual 12 inspectors are spending on --MR. FLOYD: 13 Ι was amazed the 14 correlation between, I mean, having 20 percent of the 15 hours in the program devoted to corrective action and seeing 20 to 25 percent of the findings in the 16 17 corrective action area. That pretty much reinforces what you inspectors -- what you find. 18 19 MR. JANATI: And it may not be only the 20 hours, but also the scope and also quality of 21 inspections. 22 MR. FLOYD: Yeah. 23 MR. JANATI: I think that's something that 24 we're going to have to look at. I used the IMPO 25 (phonetic) report findings because I really believe

_	IMPO does a very good job, and I think that's a good
2	basis for looking at some of the problems that
3	utilities have.
4	MR. SETSER: Rich, you indicated in
5	several different ways that there's more need for
6	outreach education at the local level, but I think the
7	interesting thing is you pretty much suggested that as
8	a role for us regulators, and that's true, and I
9	support that.
LO	Yet that's one of the most painful things
11	for a regulator to think about doing because they
L2	don't view themselves as
L3	MR. JANATI: I know we do that.
L4	MR. SETSER: doing this kind of thing.
L5	Their role is to regulate, not to tell the people they
L6	serve how good a job they're doing, you know.
L7	And so I think our real future holds in
L8	focusing on just what you said, you know, not the
L9	industry. The industry is supporting the community in
20	many different ways.
21	MR. JANATI: I'm aware of some of that,
22	sure.
23	MR. SETSER: But we as regulators need to
24	be out there with proactive education and outreach
25	programs to tell them what we're doing and what is

1	going on.
2	MR. JANATI: Particularly some of your
3	technical people because they have the knowledge.
4	They know the details, you know. They need to be
5	trained. It's going to take some time. It's not
6	going to be easy, and you need public involvement
7	people also, but you also need technical people who
8	are able and capable of dealing with the public and
9	can communicate with members of the public.
LO	I don't see that as much happening, at
L1	least not at the local level.
L2	MS. FERDIG: Would those technical people
L3	tend to be people like yourself, associated somehow
L4	with the state or a government function that has a
L5	concern about public safety and monitoring activity?
L6	MR. JANATI: Are you saying the public
L7	within the community or do you mean the resident
L8	inspector?
L9	MS. FERDIG: No, public, technical people
20	and the public who would be inclined to
21	MR. JANATI: For example, well, obviously
22	there are radiation health physicists in the
23	communities. There are emergency responders, by the
24	way. They're very interested

MS. FERDIG: Oh, sure.

1 MR. JANATI: they're very much 2 interested in nuclear safety, plant operations issues, 3 reactor waste issues. 4 I don't see too many emergency responders 5 attending the public meetings. I think the NRC should probably do a better job in advertising these meetings 6 7 or actually formally inviting some of those public 8 officials that basically respond to attend 9 meetings. MS. FERDIG: Good idea. 10 11 MR. JANATI: We've experienced that we 12 were developing a disposal facility, radioactive facility 13 for а compound. 14 responders are interested in those issues, and some 15 members of the -- well, local officials also, from the county officials, particularly the officials in these 16 counties around the nuclear power plants. 17 CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Any other questions for 18 Rich? 19 20 MR. MOORMAN: Yeah, I have one. Rich, you 21 talked about the accuracy, consistency, and timeliness 22 of the information to the public are important factors 23 in our credibility. We've had some instances where 24 we've published some information and then later on

changed it, maybe refined it a little bit more,

1 changed color of some findings. I just wondered what 2 your perspective is on that type of occurrence. 3 Would it bother you if we were more 4 conservative initially on an inspection finding and 5 then after other information comes to light, we --MR. JANATI: Yeah, because once it's on 6 7 the Web site and you change it, obviously that's going 8 to create some problems. Again, working for the state and being 9 involved on a day-to-day basis, it probably wouldn't 10 11 bother me as much, but I can understand that somebody 12 from the public who's not involved on a daily basis would be a lot more disturbed by that. 13 14 MR. MOORMAN: So for a significant issue, 15 it would be preferable to get the information right and be four months or six months down the line, or it 16 would be preferable to get it out initially and then 17 18 perhaps --19 MR. JANATI: If you get it out initially, 20 make sure that you provide adequate explanation so members of the public who will have access will know 21 22 what's going on. 23 You want both. MS. FERDIG: MR. JANATI: But it is an issue. 24 25 dilemma.

1	CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Do it fast and be right.
2	(Laughter.)
3	MR. JANATI: I mean, it's a balance.
4	Obviously there's a balance, but again, looking at it
5	from a member of the public's point of view obviously,
6	I can see why that could create some problems. In
7	working for the state and being involved in the
8	process, it's not as disturbing to me.
9	MS. FERDIG: But do I hear you say that
LO	further information about what leads to that first
l1	initial assessment and what has led to
L2	MR. JANATI: A change.
L3	MS. FERDIG: might be okay?
L4	MR. JANATI: Might be okay, might be
L5	helpful, but again, I'm sure the perception is going
L6	to be that, you know, there was apparently some
L7	negotiations that resulted in changing the findings,
L8	and it's a difficult issue.
L9	I personally wouldn't have as much of a
20	problem with it, but I can understand the public
21	might.
22	CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Any other questions?
23	MR. SHADIS: In Pennsylvania, do you
24	proactively communicate your concerns to the public
25	about any given plan? Do you rank them?

1 For example, I mean, I'll just follow 2 this. Do you --3 MR. JANATI: We don't rank them, but we do 4 have members of the public who are interested. They 5 call us. they write to us, and in the past we'd do it obviously, try to give them as much information as 6 7 possible. We invited individuals to our offices, 8 spend time with them. We've done it. I have done it 9 10 personally, and I think that has been helpful. 11 MR. SHADIS: But I mean do you --12 MR. JANATI: We don't rank, no. We don't have our own official ranking. 13 14 MR. SHADIS: And you don't proactively 15 report out your concerns? I presume you report to the legislature or to the governor's office of some --16 17 MR. JANATI: We do report through our management obviously, for example, yes, through the 18 19 legislators to the governor's office, sure. 20 aware of the issues, but we don't have our own ranking 21 system for power plants. 22 MR. BLOUGH: The protocol though for when 23 you're involved with NRC inspections, if they see 24 something that they think the inspector hasn't noticed 25 or if they think we sized an issue up wrong, that's

1 part of the inspector company. 2 Right. MR. JANATI: 3 MR. BLOUGH: They communicate that to the 4 inspector --5 MR. JANATI: Sure. -- all along, and if at the 6 MR. BLOUGH: 7 end we get clear to the end of it and knowing what the state thinks would come out different, then they have 8 the option of writing a letter that would be public 9 that just says they disagree with the NRC finding. 10 11 That's part of the protocol. 12 I don't think we've ever gotten to one of those where we got clear to the end, but that's all 13 14 part of how that works. 15 Pennsylvania is fairly visible because, 16 you know, they have a state-of-the-art emergency 17 response facility that's been widely recognized, and a lot of people come to see it, and it's a matter of 18 19 pride for the state. So when it's discussed, the fact 20 that it's used for all types of events, including if 21 there's nuclear events. 22 I think just generally the MR. SHADIS: 23 public does not go about saying, "Gosh, they're 24 telling us this plant is more dangerous than it really 25 is." I don't think that's a comment you can find frequently from the public.

And in terms of being candid and open with the public -- and I'm not necessarily getting into the heavy dangers -- but when there are issues, you know, I think it goes a long way to public confidence if they're expressed openly, and I'm finding in talking to different state regulators they have the same problem apparently that NRC does in being terribly reticent because of fear of overreaction to whatever they might say.

And I'm just, you know, wondering if that's the case in Pennsylvania.

MR. JANATI: Well, particularly dealing in emergencies, I mean, you really have to be careful as to what you say. You don't want to make the situation worse than it is. So you need to have actual information and actual data, and later to the public officials, to members of the public, and we've experienced that in the past.

You know, the public has access to us. We have an 800 number. They know where our offices are. So I'm sure that the RA is a big improvement as far as the state getting the public more involved. Sure, they are, but we're available, and we're accessible to the members of the public.

1 MR. LAURIE: Of course, California is 2 probably at the other extreme. We have no state 3 regulation when it comes to inspections. 4 state regulations who are involved in emergency 5 response, and we haven't received any invitations from either the NRC or the owners for such. 6 7 One of our plants, Diablo, has a special arrangement where they have an oversight committee 8 9 unconnected to any governmental agency, and I don't 10 know how that was done as in response to -- do you 11 know how that was created, Ken? 12 It's some form of independent --MR. BROCKMAN: Yeah, the governor's select 13 14 committee, if you want to call it that, that he put on 15 there was part of the original negotiations on the siting because of the intervenors' extreme interest in 16 that area, and I believe it was driven mostly by the 17 18 fees. 19 MR. LAURIE: It's part of the licensing 20 process. 21 MR. BROCKMAN: It's been in place Yes. 22 ever since initial licensing. 23 MR. LAURIE: And certainly we find or I 24 found that when it comes to the communications element 25 of government, the closer you are to the people, the

1	better you are at communicating. Local government
2	people can sit there all day because that's how
3	they're trained. You get state, and then you get
4	federal, and the further away you get, I think the
5	less training folks have in dealing with people
6	wearing black arm bands sitting in your audience.
7	So I can see the benefit of that. I'd be
8	interested in gaining some knowledge and understanding
9	about your actual inspection work and how you avoid
10	basically taxpayer paid duplication of effort, which
11	is something that I would be concerned about.
12	So I'm interested in getting educated
13	about the kind of work that you do. I'd like to call
14	you up and talk to you about it sometime.
15	MR. JANATI: If you'd like to, we can talk
16	about it after the meeting, some information.
17	MR. LAURIE: Thanks.
18	CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Any other questions for
19	Rich?
20	(No response.)
21	CHAIRMAN PLISCO: We've got one more
22	stakeholder input, Judith Johnsrud.
23	DR. JOHNSRUD: I guess I need one of
24	these; is that right?
25	CHAIRMAN PLISCO: If you'd like, you can

1 just sit here. 2 Oh, okay. DR. JOHNSRUD: Judith, if you could 3 CHAIRMAN PLISCO: 4 introduce yourself and your title so the transcriber 5 can have that. My name is Judith 6 DR. JOHNSRUD: Yes. 7 Johnsrud, and it's J-o-h-n-s-r-u-d. I live in State 8 College, Pennsylvania. Rich Janati and I have worked together. 9 I serve on our state's advisory committee on low level 10 11 radioactive waste and have done so since its 12 inception, oh, 15 years ago, and I have a long history of working in this realm. 13 14 My doctoral degree is in the field of the 15 geography of nuclear energy, and I'm, therefore, interested in the totality of the production system; 16 17 have specialized -- well, many years ago I was the intervenor, legal representative in the original 18 licensing of Three Mile Island Unit 2 and have been 19 involved in NRC licensing proceedings for most of the 20 21 reactors in Pennsylvania. 22 In recent years, I've focused much more on 23 radioactive waste issues, serving as Sierra Club's 24 national energy chair and head of their nuclear waste

group, and come down every so often at Chip Cameron's

invitation to serve on your various panels.

So I've tried to follow the issues with particular focus on the roles of the regulatory process and have had a deep concern over the years about many of the problems that you've mentioned today with regard to particularly the relationship between the regulators, who have a job to do under the Atomic Energy Act, and those they service, the affected publics in the vicinity of nuclear facilities.

I would want to make it clear Pennsylvania is probably quite different from some other states. We have a long history of some issues that brought statewide interest and involvement, one of which was the Energy Park issue 25 years ago with proposals throughout the state that activated citizens.

Certainly the Three Mile Island accident was and remains a significant matter of public participation and concern, and within the past decade or so, of course, the low level radioactive waste disposal issues associated with our status as host state.

So a number of years ago -- I've been trying all day to remember what language, what designated that the agency gave to some of the first workshops on the beginning of the shift in regulatory

philosophy. I recall at that time it was probably what, six, seven years ago or more?

I recall one of the industry associated attorneys who spoke emphasizing that it would be helpful to the industry to see a moving away from prescriptive, conservative regulatory processes, such as had always characterized the agency, and to utilize the, well, generic letters and notifications, a lesser role in the day-to-day decision making on the part of the utilities.

And I have felt, as I have daily received information concerning our plants in Pennsylvania, I have felt that I have seen a lot of changes in that direction. I'm glad that the agency has not chosen to formal avoid rulemaking as appeared be to possibility some time ago, and I certainly hope you don't get rid of formal rulemaking, but I have observed the curtailment of the opportunities for effective public participation in NRC license related proceedings, tech spec changes, and so forth.

It has become an onerous burden for members of othe public to attempt to participate in the formal proceedings. So as the performance based risk informed regulatory philosophy came into being and acceptance, I was very much concerned that

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1 performance based would, to put it in simplistic terms 2 that I think members of the public may tend to think 3 of it, well, if the valve is performing and hasn't 4 failed, we needn't worry about it. I would hate to feel that that is the 5 direction in which this kind of regulation will move. 6 7 Now, having said all of that, I want to commend, first, the extent to which the Commission has 8 moved to include at least portions of the public. I'm 9 appreciative of being able to be a participant in your 10 11 various round tables, as I know Ray is. 12 At the same time, a caution that the stakeholder designation from the perspective of the 13 14 rest of the public is not an adequate service to the 15 public as a whole. There are many views. None of us from the public interest organizations has the right 16 or the arrogance to say that we represent the public. 17 There are a lot of folks out there who 18 will feel excluded and can be excluded, their views 19 20 not sought. I have to say that as the Commission does 21 still send out its staff people, the lessons of 22 effective communication with members of the public in 23 the vicinity of facilities is still imperfect, shall 24 I say?

There remains a sense of frustration, I

think, among people living in the vicinity of plants who are occasionally treated to visits from staff, from D.C. or from the regions, with the lingering of the arrogance of old. I regret to say it, but it's still there. It's part of a culture. It's true for many regulatory agencies, and I'm very pleased that I have sensed in the past few years a shift toward effective trying to be much more in these communications, and similarly, that I feel that the utilities have changed markedly. I sense much less of the arrogance of old, if I may use that term.

Well, let me add concern remains about risk, the utilization of risk analysis. It rings bells, and they are warning bells in the minds of many members of the public in that it's very difficult for people to get a grip on the underlying assumptions that have gone into risk analyses.

And so the question then remains: is the use of the risk informed process -- well, what's behind the risk part of risk informed? I think that's a question that needs some illumination for the public.

Now, I want to add today I was very pleased to hear the apparent concern about not only the higher priority issues, but also the effort to

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1 pick up on what may seem to be minor problems, the 2 trend analysis approach that you discussed. Because 3 my sense is that there may be problems, you know, that 4 are sort of under the surface, likely to be avoided or 5 just ignored until they suddenly do become serious matters in conjunction with other problems in multiple 6 7 failure situations. Finally, if I understood what you were 8 saying earlier this morning, I am concerned about the 9 apparent dismissal as a high priority matter of P-10 10 11 and P-11, public radiation safety, and physical 12 protection matters. I think I heard it proposed that they might simply be removed from your list. 13 14 And I would very strongly urge that the 15 concerns for off-site affairs is a very high priority in your relationship with the public. 16 17 I don't often come to an NRC meeting and feel pleased with as much of what I've heard as I 18 19 think I was today. And so I do want to thank you for 20 your work, which I believe is on behalf of the 21 public's well-being. 22 CHAIRMAN PLISCO: I did want to say I 23 think, just to clarify on P-10 and P-11, yeah, I 24 think, I don't want to speak for the whole panel, but

the concern had to do with certain performance

indicators. I think the staff is not satisfied that it's good enough.

DR. JOHNSRUD: I don't -- I suspect that the members of the public, even those who have a continuing interest or whose interest will pick up if there are events, I don't think that -- that what performance indicators are and how you're using them has gotten through yet at all. So some explication there may be in order.

CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Well, I'd be interested in your insights. I think one of the things the group that developed the performance indicators wrestled with and for example, say, like effluents. If -- if a plant -- you know, no plant exceeds any of the requirements and the performance indicator is always green, is it still worth keeping that performance indicator, to communicate the public that fact?

That's I think what we've wrestled with on a couple of those because if we're using it to drive our inspection and assessment programs to identify problems and essentially set NRC action in motion, but there's other benefits that providing those performance indicators and for the public confidence, just to provide that information and make it available, even though it may never trigger our

1 action. And that's a balance we're always wrestling 2 with. 3 MR. BROCKMAN: The data is available 4 through the normal letter that comes in annually on 5 your off-site doses and all that stuff. That is an extremely cumbersome, not particularly effective 6 7 communications vehicle for the public. 8 CHAIRMAN PLISCO: It's painful to 9 through it is what you mean. MR. BROCKMAN: Well, I'm trying to be --10 11 I'm trying to be gracious, and this is a much more 12 user friendly vehicle in spite of some of challenges that it had. You've got something there 13 14 that can put context. 15 historically But that hasn't been something that exceeding the thresholds, as currently 16 established, has been a problem. 17 So, I mean it has the potential of staying 18 19 green for a long time. 20 DR. JOHNSRUD: Well you may or may not 21 know, in the aftermath of TMI for quite a while the 22 local newspapers did have a daily report. And I would 23 commend that approach to you with respect to keeping 24 a kind of presence before the public that will help

people to understand the operations and the problems

1 that may be encountered, rather than suddenly an event 2 that creates a panic sort of situation. 3 let me just add with regard to 4 Pennsylvania, in the aftermath of TMI, in fact, still 5 going back to the energy issue, I find people who, oh, yes remember that they were to be subject to ten 6 7 reactors and ten coal-fired plants. 8 MR. GARCHOW: What was the Energy Park? I'm not familiar with the Energy Park. 9 DR. JOHNSRUD: Oh, in the mid-1970s, four 10 11 of the Pennsylvania utilities formed a consortium 12 to -- they were having trouble with siting by then. And they wanted to find a large empty area in the 13 14 hinterlands for a large energy development, and it was 15 to have been ten 10,000 megawatt rectors and ten equally large coal-fired plants and presumably at some 16 point some attendant fuel cycle facilities as well. 17 And there were ten candidate sites around 18 19 Pennsylvania. It raised perception of issues relating 20 to nuclear energy remarkably. 21 But there is in this aftermath of TMI and 22 of the waste issue, both of which were well enough known that there's a kind of residual knowledge, 23 24 interest, concern which will re-emerge with any

untoward event.

1	MR. SHADIS: I've got a general question.
2	DR. JOHNSRUD: Yeah.
3	MR. SHADIS: I see that you're talk
4	prompted written struck a memory thing here. You
5	talk about regulating to excellence. When was the
6	last time that the cost avoidant numbers were updated
7	for ALARA?
8	Right now it's like what? Two thousand
9	dollars per man?
10	DR. JOHNSRUD: Yeah.
11	MR. SHADIS: But when
12	DR. JOHNSRUD: Discounted.
13	MR. SHADIS: How old is that number?
14	DR. JOHNSRUD: Oh, that's only about
15	MR. FLOYD: It used to be \$1,000 a person,
16	and it was changed what, around 1990?
17	DR. JOHNSRUD: Oh, no, much more recently,
18	yeah, sometime after I think around 1995 or so
19	maybe it was raised, yes.
20	MR. GARCHOW: I wouldn't want to guess.
21	I think it's higher than that now.
22	DR. JOHNSRUD: I don't think so. It's
23	\$2,000 by regulation.
24	MR. SCHERER: It's \$2,000 by regulation.
25	In most utilities they use higher numbers. Utilities

1 are using higher numbers, but by regulation. 2 MR. SETSER: Yeah, I've seen 2,800. 3 DR. JOHNSRUD: Yeah. May I add, I concur 4 totally with David Lockbaum concerning ADAMS. 5 (Laughter.) Whatever you can find to 6 DR. JOHNSRUD: 7 it can't be any worse. But keep the information flowing, even excessive information. That 8 9 I think is your -- your obligation to the public 10 you're supposed to serve. 11 MR. BROCKMAN: With your locality right 12 there you can maybe of great -- I'm going to put on a little different hat at the moment and that's being a 13 14 regional manager. 15 One of the things I tried to do last year when we were going out and having these annual 16 17 meetings in the localities, I don't know whether it's just my residence personalities or what have you, but 18 19 in Region 4 trying to get more than three jack rabbits 20 and two rattlesnakes to the meeting was a large 21 challenge. 22 DR. JOHNSRUD: Yes. 23 MR. BROCKMAN: And you expressed this 24 concern that a lot of people have. I read into your 25 comments also from what you said that only contact over a period of time is going to change that, so that they can see, get to meet the people understand them, see the motivation, see the dedication.

Do you have any suggestions that you could bring forward as to how to try to find better vehicles to make that happen? Because obviously the path we chose last year wasn't as successful as we would have liked it to have been.

DR. JOHNSRUD: Well, you know, things -things have changed in the world of 24-hour news cycle
television. The employed population, many, many of
whom have two jobs, if not three, along with the
children to be dealt with; people simply do have less
time to attend actual meetings.

interested. And I really think that there are mechanisms through the press, local press, and in areas with nuclear facilities; that if they are not used in a propagandistic manner to convince anybody of the safety of a nuclear plant or that low dose radiation doesn't hurt them and so forth; if you don't do that, but give some straightforward information about the operation of a facility, that that is of utility in a community.

And I don't know. Maybe above all, send

1	out folks who are not arrogant, who are polite, who
2	are able to listen and accept even those comments that
3	we heard about this morning, that one doesn't want to
4	have to listen to for seven hours straight.
5	Thanks.
6	CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Any questions? Thank
7	you.
8	DR. JOHNSRUD: You're welcome.
9	CHAIRMAN PLISCO: Well, I think that wraps
10	up our agenda for today. I would ask we always
11	have the standard Tuesday problem. I know a lot of
12	people have flights in the afternoon so I'd like to
13	get started close to on time tomorrow.
14	(Whereupon, at 5:25 p.m., the meeting in
15	the above-entitled matter was adjourned.)
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