[DNFSB LETTERHEAD]
May 29, 2003
Mr. Roy J. Schepens
Manager, Office of River Protection
U.S. Department of Energy
P.O. Box 450
Richland, Washington 99352
Dear Mr. Schepens:
The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board
(Board) has been reviewing an Office of River Protection (ORP) proposal whereby
changes to the Waste Treatment Plant (WTP) Safety Requirements Document (SRD)
implementing codes and standards could be made without prior Department of
Energy (DOE) approval. The Board’s
review has focused on the safety implications of delegating these authorities
to the contractor and does not believe that this delegation of authority is
appropriate.
The Board’s review of the SRD recognizes
that it represents a DOE approved, tailored set of Environmental, Safety,
Quality, and Health requirements referenced in the WTP contract as part of the
List B required by DOE Acquisition Regulation (DEAR) 970.5204-78, Laws,
Regulations and DOE Directives. DOE
M 411.l-1B, Safety Management Functions, Responsibilities, and Authorities
Manual, states that the Field Element Manager, when delegated these
authorities, is responsible for directing the contractor to propose site- and
facility-specific standards tailored to the work and hazards. The Field Element Manager is also responsible
for reviewing and approving the specific requirements to be included in
contracts, authorization agreements, safety documents, and authorization
bases. The proposal would grant the
contractor authority to make changes or limited case by case deviations to the
SRD implementing codes and standards without prior DOE approval.
This same proposal would also allow the
contractor to change nuclear safety controls during construction and cold
testing without prior DOE approval as long as they did not involve major
reorganizations of the SRD or Preliminary Safety Analysis Report (PSAR) or
broadly affect them. However, DOE M
411.1-1B states that the Field Element Manager, when delegated the authority,
is responsible for approving the authorization basis and safety basis
documentation.
The Board recognizes that ORP would reserve
the right to rescind changes and be provided annual updates of the PSAR. However, early DOE involvement in the safety
controls selection and implementation is beneficial in managing the design
process, particularly for a close-coupled project. The Board strongly encourages ORP to retain its current practice
regarding the selection and implementation of safety controls.
The Board has also been observing ORP and
contractor efforts to transition to a DOE-STD-3009, Preparation Guide for
U.S. Department of Energy Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Documented Safety
Analyses, approach to accident analysis and classification of safety
controls, revise defense-in-depth and facility worker safety strategies, and
reevaluate requirements. While the
Board supports DOE’s efforts to optimize the WTP design, it is the Board’s
expectation that the revised control set will still maintain a heavy reliance
on engineered and preventive controls and limit the use of mitigative and less
reliable administrative controls to appropriate applications. As stated in DOE-STD-3009, “the evaluation
guideline is not to be treated as a design acceptance criterion, nor as justification
for nullifying the general design criteria relative to defense-in-depth safety
measures.”
The Board appreciates that these proposals
have not yet been approved, and expects ORP to make programmatic decisions that
do not compromise nuclear safety. Once
ORP has completed its review, the Board requests a briefing on the proposals
and how ORP will oversee this complex project to ensure a robust design and
authorization basis.
Sincerely,
John T. Conway
Chairman
c:
The Honorable Jessie Hill Roberson
Mr. Mark B. Whitaker, Jr.