No. S-02-024
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ONE YEAR AFTER - REFLECTIONS ON NUCLEAR SECURITY
Dr. Richard A. Meserve
Chairman
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
at the
INFOCAST Conference
"The Nuclear Renaissance: Maximizing the Value of Nuclear Assets"
Washington, DC
September 11, 2002
Introduction
We meet today on the anniversary of a singular moment in our Nation's recent history. I am sure that each of us has personal memories of the horrifying September terrorist attacks. An image that remains clear in my mind today is the view from the 17th floor of NRC Headquarters of the smoke following the attack on the Pentagon. To say that the world was changed forever by these events is both a cliche and an understatement. For those who lost family members, friends, and colleagues on that day, the world will surely never be the same again. For those who survived the attacks or were near enough to be witnesses, the images will be forever seared in memory. For the rest of us, merely seeing the video images again during this period of remembrance brings back all the emotions we experienced on that terrible day.
Given the riveting effect that the attacks have had on the Nation, it is appropriate on this anniversary to spend a few moments to reflect on the implications of those horrendous events.
In the aftermath of the attacks, the security surrounding the Nation's critical infrastructure, including the Nation's commercial nuclear power plants, has become a central concern. I have been particularly gratified to have played a part in the collaborative work that has occurred among the Federal government, State and local officials, and licensees and industry working groups to ensure that the already robust protection of these facilities was further enhanced. All levels of government, as well as NRC licensees, have made significant contributions to bolster defenses against the increased threat of a terrorist attack. I would like to express my heartfelt appreciation to them.
The events of September 11 have also had a broader impact. We all look at the world in a different way. Society is wary of potential terrorist activities and is concerned about the facilities that they might be interested in attacking. This heightened alertness is manifested in the increased reporting by members of the public of possible suspicious activities in the vicinity of nuclear plants. It is also clear that the threat of terrorism will be an abiding issue for the long term. As a result, there is a demand for action by government to preserve the security of its citizens.
The NRC has fully accepted that responsibility. But this is not a task that can be completed overnight. Although the NRC has taken many significant actions, some major challenges remain. Let me take a moment to reflect upon the state of security at NRC-licensed facilities and then to focus on the future.
There are three fundamental points that I would like to emphasize at the outset. First, the physical protection at nuclear power plants was strong before September 11. I am aware of no other industry that has had to satisfy the tough security requirements that the NRC has had in place for a quarter of a century. And these requirements have been significantly augmented over the past year. The plants are surrounded by multiple fences with continuously monitored perimeter detection and surveillance systems. They are guarded by well trained and well armed security forces. Nuclear power plants are constructed to withstand hurricanes, tornadoes, and earthquakes, making them among the most formidable structures in existence. The plants also benefit from redundant and diverse safety equipment so that if any active component becomes unavailable, another component or system will satisfy its function. Operators are trained to respond to unusual events, and carefully designed emergency plans are in place. In short, the security at power plants is very strong and the plants have an inherent capacity to withstand severe events of all types, including those that might be initiated by terrorists.
Second, there have been no specific credible threats of a terrorist attack on nuclear power plants since September 11. The NRC has worked closely with intelligence and law enforcement personnel to assess the threats that may be directed at nuclear facilities. Although it is difficult to predict when and where terrorists may strike next, the robust security at nuclear plants should serve as a significant deterrent. Nonetheless, it is prudent to presume that al Qaeda may consider nuclear facilities as potential targets. As a result, NRC has put in place a five-level threat advisory and protective measures system that requires licensees to take specific actions in response to changes in the threat conditions.
Third, in light of the events of September 11, the NRC has recognized the need to reexamine past security strategies to ensure that we have the right protections in place for the long term. Shortly after the attacks, we began a comprehensive review of our requirements for physical protection and security. We are undertaking a reexamination of the assumptions that underlie the current regulatory framework and we are making any changes that are necessary. We have already taken actions as a result of this review, and more will be taken in the coming months.
NRC's Response following the September 11 Terrorist Attacks
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Following the attacks, the NRC issued over 30 safeguards and threat
advisories to the major licensed facilities, placing them on the highest
security level. Security across the nuclear industry was enhanced
as a result of these actions, and many of the strengthened security
measures are now requirements as a result of subsequently issued NRC
Orders. The security enhancements include increased security patrols,
augmented security forces, additional security posts, increased vehicle
standoff distances, and enhanced coordination with the law enforcement
and intelligence communities.
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The Commission has also enhanced access control at nuclear power
plants. This may be one of the most effective means of preventing
a successful attack, because an insider could provide significant
assistance to an attacking force. NRC regulations require that individuals
having unescorted access to nuclear power plants undergo a background
investigation which includes credit checks, employment history, reference
examination, psychological testing, and a criminal history check conducted
by the FBI. Further restrictions include prohibitions on the use of
temporary unescorted access in sensitive areas.
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Improvements in communications have been a central feature of our
activities. Not only have we had frequent interactions with licensees
concerning the security of their facilities, but also we have improved
linkages with other parts of government. For example, we are in close
and continuous contact with the intelligence and law enforcement communities
and we have advised licensees to enhance protocols for involving governmental
entities in the defense of their facilities.
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The Commission has also completed an initial assessment of power
reactor vulnerabilities to the intentional malevolent use of commercial
aircraft in suicidal attacks and has initiated a broad-ranging research
program to understand the vulnerabilities of various classes of facilities
to a wide spectrum of attacks. We are developing measures to mitigate
vulnerabilities that are identified. Although our work in this area
is ongoing, the Commission has directed nuclear power plant licensees
to develop specific plans and strategies to respond to an event that
could result in damage to large areas of their plants from impacts,
explosions, or fire. In addition, licensees must provide assurance
that their emergency planning resources are sufficient to respond
to such an event.
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The Commission is working closely with other Federal agencies to
revise the design basis threat that provides the foundation for the
security programs of power plant licensees. Significant changes are
likely. The Commission's Orders effectively provide enhanced security
in the interim while this work in underway.
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Inspection of security capability is necessary to provide confidence
in the adequacy of defensive measures. The Commission has decided
that full security performance reviews, including force-on-force exercises,
will be carried out in the future at each nuclear power plant on a
three-year cycle, instead of the eight-year cycle that had been applied
in the past. These reviews have commenced with table-top exercises
that for the first time involve a wide array of Federal, State, and
local law enforcement and emergency planning officials.
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The NRC has developed a new Threat Advisory and Protective Measures
System in response to Homeland Security Presidential Directive-3.
When a new threat condition is declared, the NRC will promptly notify
affected licensees of the condition and refer them to the predefined
protective measures that we have developed for each threat level.
The new system has been formally communicated to licensees, Governors,
State Homeland Security Advisors, Federal agency administrators, and
other appropriate officials. We had the opportunity to exercise this
system yesterday afternoon when the Attorney General announced that
the threat condition had moved to the Orange (high) level.
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The Commission is actively involved in efforts to defend against
possible terrorist use of radiological dispersal devices. Following
the terrorist attacks of last September, NRC alerted licensees, suppliers,
and shippers of the need to enhance security against the threat of
theft of radioactive material. The NRC is conducting a comprehensive
evaluation of controls to protect those radioactive materials that
constitute the greatest hazard to public health and safety. For example,
we are evaluating approaches for "cradle-to-grave" control of radioactive
sources which might be used in a radiological dispersal device and
are reexamining the import and export licensing for these isotopes.
We are also working with the Office of Homeland Security and other
agencies to ensure that the Federal Government is prepared to respond
to an event involving a radiological dispersal device.
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In April, we established the Office of Nuclear Security and Incident
Response (NSIR) to improve communications and coordination both within
and external to the NRC on security and safeguards issues. This office
is responsible for developing overall safeguards and security policies
and is the central point of contact with the Office of Homeland Security.
It contains our Incident Response organization; coordinates with Federal
response and law enforcement agencies; and directs our counter-intelligence,
information security, and secure communications activities.
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In short, the NRC has taken a wide variety of steps over the past
year in response to the changing environment in which we find ourselves.
Looking to the Future
Nonetheless, there are issues that remain before us and the Nation. Let me mention a few:
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First, there are limits to the defensive capabilities that should
be expected of nuclear plant operators. For example, the defense against
aircraft attacks should certainly be the responsibility of governmental
authorities, as should the defense against attackers with significant
military capabilities. As a result, there must be an allocation of
responsibility between the licensee's security organization and the
government. Establishing the boundary that defines the responsibilities
that should be borne by the private sector and those that should be
assumed by the government has proven difficult for all types of civilian
infrastructure. There is no quick answer that can be developed by
the NRC in isolation from the other parts of government.
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Let me note in this connection that, given the current threat environment,
an abundance of governmental response forces -- local, State, and
Federal -- would be dispatched to engage any attackers at a nuclear
facility and to lend assistance, regardless of the scope and nature
of the attack. The real issue is not whether governmental entities
will provide assistance, but rather when such resources will arrive
and how they will be used to defend the facility. This has practical
implications because the security framework should reflect the joint
security capability of both the licensee and the government.
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Second, there needs to be an integrated national strategy to protect
critical infrastructure of all types. The defense of nuclear facilities
should not be viewed in isolation, but should be part of an overall
national defensive scheme. The effort to develop such a strategy is
underway. In some respects the nuclear industry is the pathfinder
because of the extensive security capabilities that it had in place
before September 11. Establishing and implementing an integrated national
strategy will be an important task for the new Department of Homeland
Security.
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Third, we need to ensure coordination with Agreement and non-Agreement
States in implementing security measures for radioactive materials.
Agreement States have responsibility for roughly three quarters of
the radioactive sources in the United States. Thus, any action the
NRC might take to prevent a terrorist from using a radiological dispersal
device will impact Agreement State licensees. In enhancing the security
of nuclear materials, we must preserve NRC's ultimate responsibility
for protection of common defense and security, while maintaining the
integrity of the Agreement State programs. Moreover, States must be
heavily involved with securing hazardous unlicensed sources and in
establishing holding or disposal areas for materials.
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Fourth, there is a difficult challenge in maintaining the appropriate
public access to information. The NRC has strived to ensure public
confidence by being one of the most open agencies in the U.S. government;
we recognize the reality that suspicions are nurtured if our activities
are not fully accessible to the concerned public. But some information
must be withheld because it could help a terrorist. We thus have the
dilemma of trying to balance the public's right to know against the
need for secrecy in certain areas.
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Fifth, we must confront the reality that the concern for nuclear
matters arises from an abiding public fear that devastating consequences
will necessarily result from an attack on a nuclear power plant or
from the detonation of a radiological dispersal device. These fears
are certainly greatly exaggerated. But putting nuclear events in context
has proven extraordinarily difficult because of ingrained public attitudes.
This may have the unfortunate consequence that too little attention
is provided to the defense of other types of infrastructure for which
the consequences of a successful terrorist attack could be far greater.
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Finally, although security must be an abiding concern, we cannot
allow it to displace or to diminish the obligation to protect public
health and safety from accidents. This has been a particular challenge
in the United States because, for reasons wholly apart from security,
we are in a period of dramatic change. Our nuclear plant licensees
continue to seek to extend their operating licenses beyond the original
40-year term and to increase the power output of their facilities.
There continues to be interest in the possibility of new construction.
And after decades of technical studies and political debate, we confront
the need for decisions associated with the establishment of a possible
national disposal facility for spent fuel and high-level waste. September
11 has added another important task at a time of intense activity
in the nuclear arena.
In conclusion, let me note again that our nuclear facilities are the strongest and most well protected civilian facilities in our country. But we recognize the need to enhance those protections. The NRC is dedicated to meeting the obligation to protect the public health and safety and the common defense and security from threats of all kinds. We have accomplished much over the last year, but we have more to do and we are on track to do it.
Thank you.
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