IMPASSE. See BARGAINING IMPASSE.

I&I (IMPACT AND IMPLEMENTATION) BARGAINING. Even where the decision to change conditions of employment (including established practices) of unit employees is protected by management`s § 7106(a) rights, there is a duty to notify the union and, upon request, bargain on the § 7106(b)(2) procedures that management will follow in implementing its protected decision as well as on § 7106(b)(3) appropriate arrangements for employees expected to be adversely affected by the decision. Such bargaining is commonly referred to as "impact and implementation," or "I&I" bargaining, which is the commonest variety of midterm bargaining. For examples of  I&I unfair labor practices cases, see 50 FLRA No. 40 (use of covert electronic surveillance), 50 FLRA No. 51(creating a team of unit employees to eliminate a backlog), and 49 FLRA No. 139 (changing an unlawful past practice).

There is, however, no duty to give notice if the agreement already contains provisions dealing with procedures and appropriate arrangements related to the type of change at issue. Suppose, e.g., that the agreement contains an article on details which sets forth the procedures management is to follow when detailing employees and on arrangements for employees adversely affected by details. If management changes the conditions of employment of certain employees by detailing them in accordance with the agreement`s requirements, there is no duty to give notice and bargain. This important exception to the duty to give notice of greater than de minimis changes in conditions of employment is sometimes referred to as the "covered by" doctrine, described above. See, e.g., 47 FLRA No. 114, 48 FLRA No. 10, 48 FLRA No. 89, 49 FLRA No. 130, and 56 FLRA No. 136.

INFORMATION. Under § 7114(b)(4), the union, to the extent not prohibited by law (e.g., the Privacy Act), is entitled, under certain circumstances (see PARTICULARIZED NEED), to data "for full and proper discussion, understanding, and negotiation of subjects within the scope of bargaining[.]" The agency must provide that information free of charge. 10 FLRA No. 78. "Furthermore, it is well-settled in both private and public sector labor law that this obligation applies not only to information needed to negotiate an agreement, but also to data relevant to its administration." AFGE Local 1345 v. FLRA, 793 F.2d 1360 (D.C. Cir. 1986). See 50 FLRA No. 86 and 51 FLRA No. 26 for the analytical approach the Authority takes in dealing with union requests for information under section 7114(b)(4)--i.e., on whether the union has established a "particularized need" for the information and whether the agency has asserted any "countervailing interests," such as the Privacy Act. Also see 56 FLRA No. 19 on the consequences of failing to assert a countervailing interest in response to the union request for information.

INTEREST. In interest-based bargaining, the concerns, needs, or desires behind an issue: why the issue is being raised.

INTEREST ARBITRATION. The arbitrator, instead of interpreting and applying the terms of an agreement to decide a grievance, determines what provisions the parties are to have in their collective bargaining agreement. Also see ARBITRATION.

INTEREST-BASED BARGAINING (IBB). A bargaining technique in which the parties start with (or at least focus on) interests rather than proposals; agree on criteria of acceptability that will be used to evaluate alternatives; generate several alternatives that are consistent with their interests, and apply the agreed-upon acceptability criteria to the alternatives so generated in order to arrive at mutually acceptable contract provisions. The success of the technique depends, in large measure, on mutual trust, candor, and a willingness to share information. (Compare with the duty to bargain in good faith.) But even where these are lacking, the technique, with its focus on interests and on developing alternatives, tends to make the parties more flexible and open to alternative solutions and thus increases the likelihood of agreement.

IBB often is contrasted with "position-based" bargaining, in which the parties start with proposals (which implicitly are solutions to known or inferred problems). However, even in position-based bargaining the parties normally are expected to justify their proposals in terms of their interests by identifying the problems to which the proposals are intended as solutions. (There is no case law in which FLRA has held that a refusal to so justify proposals constitutes bad faith bargaining.) Once the interests are on the table, the parties are in a position to evaluate their initial and subsequent proposals--whether generated by group brainstorming (a common method of generating alternatives in IBB) or by more customary methods--in terms of the extent they are likely to effectively and efficiently solve problems without creating additional problems. For an analytical treatment of the process, see Walton and McKersie`s discussion of "integrative" bargaining in A Behavioral Theory of Labor Negotiations. For a popular treatment of the process, see Getting to Yes, by Fisher and Ury.

INTERNAL SECURITY PRACTICES. A right reserved to management by title 5, United States Code, section 7106(a)(1). The right to determine the internal security practices of an agency isn`t limited to establishing "those policies and actions which are part of the Agency`s plan to secure or safeguard its physical property against internal and external risks, to prevent improper or unauthorized disclosure of information, or to prevent the disruption of the Agency`s activities." 14 FLRA No. 2. It also extends to safeguarding the agency`s personnel. See, e.g., 20 FLRA No. 19 and 20.

INTERVENTION/INTERVENOR. The action taken by a competing labor organization (intervenor) to place itself as a contender on the ballot for a recognition election originally initiated by another union (petitioner). Non-incumbent intervenors need only produce a 10 percent showing of interest to be included on the ballot.

INVESTIGATORY EXAMINATION. See WEINGARTEN RIGHT.