Testimony of Michael E. Rolince, Acting Assistant Director
in Charge, FBI
Before
the Senate Judiciary Committee
June 24, 2003
"The Inspector General's Report and the September 11th
Response"
Good
morning Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee. On behalf
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, I would like to thank
you for the opportunity to discuss the Inspector General's
report on the September 11 detainees. I would also like to
recognize the Inspector General and his staff for their efforts
in putting the report together.
The FBI
is aware that delays in the clearance process led to some
extended, but legal, detentions. I believe delays in our clearance
process and inconsistencies in the classification of detainees,
while unintentional, should be recognized, as should the fact
that each of the 762 illegal aliens was lawfully detained.
The Office of the Inspector General (OIG) pointed out possible
areas of improvement, and we are in the process of closely
examining their findings and, in concert with the Department
of Justice, implementing recommendations that we believe will
improve the process in the future. We will certainly work
with the OIG as we continue our ongoing efforts to improve
the FBI's counterterrorism program.
That
being said, I think it is important to understand the context
in which these detentions occurred.
In the
days, weeks and months after the terrorist attacks of September
11, 2001, the FBI by necessity worked under the assumption
based on consistent intelligence reporting, that a second
wave of attacks could be coming. We did not know where, when,
or by whom, but we knew that the lives of countless Americans
could depend on our ability to prevent that second wave of
terror. The pressure placed on both the law enforcement and
the intelligence community was tremendous and we certainly
had more questions than answers. If air travel resumed, would
one or more planes slam into a building full of people? Could
the attack come in another form, such as chemical or biological?
We had to proceed with an excess of caution because the consequences
of releasing someone who really was a terrorist could have
cost thousands of lives. And given the choice between finishing
checks on those already in custody or locating and neutralizing
the seemingly endless threats that were still being reported
and investigated, we made a conscious decision to prioritize
and neutralize potential threats first. In addition, given
the primary goal of protecting the security of the American
people, the FBI believed it would have been irresponsible
to simply release individuals who, not only were in the country
illegally, but also were potential threats or who may have
crucial information related to the attacks, particularly given
that the federal government had the legal authority to detain
them based upon their illegal presence in the United States.
In fact, the OIG Report recognizes and agrees with the priority
of prevention over investigation in the days following 9/11.
In order
to put the 9/11 response in proper perspective, it is important
to understand the responsibilities of the International Terrorism
Operations Section within the FBI's Counterterrorism Program
in the years that preceded the unprecedented attacks. As Director
Mueller noted recently, prior to 9/11 we had only 535 Special
Agents assigned to International terrorism matters worldwide
and only 82 agent and support staff serving at FBIHQ. In spite
of that finite staff our responses to the threats posed and
the resultant successes should not go unrecognized. As you
now know, Usama Bin Laden and Al Qa'ida were the subjects
of sealed indictments obtained prior to the attacks on our
embassies in Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania and Nairobi, Kenya on
August 7, 1998. Following those attacks, the FBI deployed
over 1,000 agents and later secured the indictments of 23
individuals responsible for the deaths of 244 persons to include
12 Americans and the wounding of over 5,000 mostly Kenyan
and Tanzanian citizens. The FBI in concert with the United
States Attorneys Office in the Southern District of New York
gained convictions of four subjects and we await the extradition
of three others currently in custody in the United Kingdom.
Additionally,
the FBI's International Terrorism Operations Section, known
as ITOS, was responsible for: coordinating the forensic deployment
to Kosovo; the massive investigation and offshore recovery
efforts following the October 1999 crash of Egypt Air flight
990; the response to Al-Qa'ida's December 1999 Millenium conspiracy
to attack us in the United States, Jordan and Yemen; and the
October 12, 2000 attack on the USS Cole in which 17 brave
U.S. sailors lost their lives.
While
those investigations consumed significant resources, we remained
committed to and actively involved in dozens of extraterritorial
cases to include the June 1985 Hizballah hijacking of TWA
flight 847 which ended in the brutal murder of U.S. Navy diver
Robert Stetham. The United States holds three of the top 22
International Terrorist fugitives responsible for that crime.
I would
be remiss if I did not point that today we meet on the Seventh
Anniversary of the June 25, 1996 attack by Saudi Hizballah
at Khobar Towers which resulted in the deaths of 19 courageous
airmen. Thanks largely to the tireless efforts of former FBI
Director Louis Freeh, five years after the attack, a painstaking
and at times frustrating investigation reached a milestone.
Thirteen individuals were indicted in the Eastern District
of Virginia, four of whom remain on the Top 22 International
Terrorist fugitives list.
Additionally,
ITOS coordinated the FBI's response to the kidnappings and
murders of Americans by the Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines
and by the FARC in Colombia. In fact, on April 30, 2002, Attorney
General Ashcroft announced the indictment of six FARC members
charged with killing three Americans in 1999. ITOS also coordinated
the FBI's response to the killing of U.S. citizens over a
20 year period by the terrorist organization 17 November in
Greece. The first killing attributed to 17 November was the
December 23, 1975 assassination of CIA station chief, Richard
Welch. Today, 19 defendants are currently on trial in Greece
for the murder of 23 people including four Americans.
Simply
stated, Senators, the men and women in ITOS were fully engaged
in the war on terrorism and applied every resource available.
In the
aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, the FBI's response was immediate.
In a matter of hours we had deployed to each of the crash
sites, ordered dozens of seasoned management personnel back
to Washington, and fully staffed a 24/7 operation at our Command
Center with up to 500 persons representing approximately 30
federal agencies. At the height of the 9/11 investigation,
known as PENTTBOM, the FBI assigned 7,000 agents to assist
full-time. The majority were reassigned from other national
security and criminal investigative work. The lack of prior
counterterroism training and experience, although not recognized
by the OIG, needs to be factored into this discussion.
Before
the month was out, we were faced with another unique attack
- Anthrax. Not knowing whether we faced a domestic threat,
an international threat, or a follow-on attack by Al-Qa'ida,
we again responded with significant resources as we dealt
with an unknown killer or killers, first in Florida, then
in New York, and finally here on Capitol Hill. Additionally,
we turned our attention to the kidnapping of journalist Daniel
Pearl and the crash of an American Airlines flight in Queens
on November 12, 2001. In order to ensure the security of the
Winter Olympics in Salt Lake City, and drawing lessons from
the prior attack in Atlanta, we deployed 1103 agent and support
personnel, in addition to those assigned to our Salt Lake
City office.
Meanwhile,
PENTTBOM became the largest and most complex investigation
in the history of the FBI. In spite of operating under severe
handicaps, the New York Office - relocated to a garage on
26th street, and lacking a proficient infrastructure - began
a 24/7 operation utilizing 300 investigators from 37 agencies.
The 1-800 toll-free line set up in our Atlanta office received
180,000 calls from a shocked public eager to assist. 225,000
e-mails were received on the FBI's internet site. Evidence
response teams from throughout the country were dispatched
to New York, Washington and Pittsburgh.
Nationwide
we covered over 500,000 investigative leads and conducted
over 167,000 interviews. We collected over 7,500 pieces of
evidence which were submitted for analysis. Working in conjunction
with New York City agencies and authorities, we helped process
over 1.8 million tons of debris for investigative leads and
victim identification and took more than 45,000 crime scene
photographs.
As this
massive investigation unfolded, the concern of follow-on attacks
was critical to our thinking and to our development of an
investigative strategy. As investigators came upon individuals
who were in this country illegally, it was absolutely essential
to determine to the extent possible, any connection to the
attacks and the threat posed by them, if any. To do otherwise
would have been irresponsible, if not negligent.
As for
the clearing process itself, the OIG Report states that some
investigations were straightforward. That is true, but even
so-called "straightforward" investigations take
time. Many of the investigations were far from straightforward.
For each detainee we had to conduct a preliminary investigation.
This is more than a name check or Lexis-Nexis search. It often
requires getting court-approved checks for phone records or
computer records. It may involve translation services, multiple
interviews, surveillance and other time-consuming work.
This
policy was sound. We did not know who these people were --
some had numerous identity documents and others had failed
polygraphs on questions such as "did you know any of
the hijackers?" or "were you involved in the September
11th attacks?"
It is
also important to clarify another point which I believe has
been significantly confused in the media -- that is the issue
of some individuals being "cleared" of terrorism
ties. The fact that an illegal alien was prosecuted for non-terrorism
crimes or deported rather than prosecuted, does not mean that
the alien had no knowledge of or connection to terrorism.
For example, one immigration detainee who pled guilty to conspiracy
to commit identification fraud and aiding and abetting the
unlawful production of identification documents traveled overnight
with two of the hijackers. The name and address of another
immigration detainee, who pled guilty to identification fraud,
was used by Al Qa'ida cell members in Hamburg, Germany to
attempt to obtain U.S. visas.
In many
cases, the Department of Justice, in conjunction with the
FBI, determined that the best course of action to protect
national security was to remove potentially dangerous individuals
from the country and ensure that they could not return. Charges
may have been withheld in such situations if, for example,
they could have compromised ongoing investigations or sensitive
intelligence matters.
Many
leads took us overseas and therefore took time to resolve.
It would have been a disservice to the American people we
work so hard to protect for the FBI not to check with the
law enforcement and intelligence organizations of the countries
of origin for name checks and traces in certain instances.
Then, as now, we had no control over the length of time our
counterparts overseas took to accomplish these checks. Please
do not lose sight of the fact that these investigations were
taking place simultaneous with the investigation of the 19
hijackers, the processing of the crash sites and the resolution
of the "second wave" threats.
The OIG
Report concluded, "The Justice Department faced enormous
challenges as a result of the September 11 terrorist attacks,
and its employees worked with dedication to meet these challenges."
I am pleased that the Inspector General recognizes the dedication
displayed by so many in the FBI, other DOJ agencies, and our
local, state and federal partners on the JTTFs.
At the
same time, we recognize that we can always improve, and we
have done so. Over the last twenty months, Director Mueller
has refocused the FBI's priorities and the Bureau has made
great strides in adapting to its mission of preventing terrorist
attacks. The changes we have implemented and others that are
ongoing, will ensure that should we ever face a similar crisis,
we will handle that crisis with even greater efficiency and
speed.
As I
mentioned earlier, the vast majority of Special Agents engaged
in the PENTTBOM investigation in the early months were not
experts in counterterrorism. Today, we have a much larger
pool of agents dedicated to and trained in counterterrorism.
We have greatly increased the number of strategic analysts,
vastly improved their training through the new College of
Analytical Studies, and provided them with advanced new software
tools to enhance their strategic intelligence capabilities.
We have hired nearly 300 additional foreign language translators.
New "Fly Away Squads" are now on standby to lend
specialized counterterrorism knowledge and expertise, language
capabilities, and analytical support around the country and
the world as needed. This particular capability was utilized
in Buffalo, Detroit, and Portland to assist local FBI offices
and recently in Morocco to assist our counterparts in their
investigations.
We have
new flexibility to mobilize additional personnel as needed.
The newly created Office of Intelligence will enable the FBI
to assess gaps, devise strategies and implement plans for
intelligence collection. It will help us quickly make the
connections necessary to prevent terrorist attacks, and to
determine a subject or suspect's connections to terrorism
with greater efficiency then ever before.
Today,
we have better coordination and information sharing with our
partner agencies than ever before, and yet we recognize the
need for continued improvement. The number of regional Joint
Terrorism Task Forces has been increased from 35 in 2001 to
66 today. The new National JTTF acts as a national liaison
entity and transmits information on threats and leads from
the 30 participating agencies at FBI headquarters to the local
JTTFs. We have CIA terrorism experts detailed to the FBI and
our terrorism experts detailed to CIA. We are working with
our former INS colleagues, now in the new Department of Homeland
Security. The Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement
plays a critical role on our JTTFs.
The FBI
acknowledges that our success is measured not only by how
effectively we disrupt acts of terrorism, but also by how
well we protect the Constitutional rights and cherished liberties
of Americans in the process. We will continue to work to find
new ways to continue to meet both of these crucial missions.
Thank
you for affording me the opportunity to participate in today's
discussion on this important topic, and I look forward to
answering any questions that you may have.
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