Testimony of Dale L. Watson, Assistant Director, Counterterrorism
Division, FBI
Before
the Senate Judiciary Committe
May 31, 2001
"The 2002 Olympics - Cooperation Between Federal, State,
Local, and Private Agencies to Address Public Safety Concerns"
Good
afternoon, Senator Hatch, members of the Committee, and law
enforcement colleagues. It is a pleasure to be with you today
to discuss security preparations for the 2002 Winter Olympics
in Salt Lake City, Utah. As you know from my previous briefings
in Washington, D.C., major special events are a high priority
for the FBI. We have been heavily involved in coordinated
threat assessment and security proceedings for the 2002 Winter
Olympics. Today, I'd like to concentrate my remarks on the
Olympic Counterterrorism Center, the Olympic Joint Terrorism
Task Force, and Command Post and Field Training exercises,
as they relate to interagency cooperation and public safety.
As the
lead federal agency responsible for crisis management, intelligence,
hostage rescue, and the investigation of acts of terrorism,
the FBI is resolved to continuing to promote effective interagency
cooperation. Collectively, our goal is to ensure that all
reasonable preparations and contingency plans are in place
to create an environment throughout Salt Lake City, the state
of Utah, and the entire nation in which we may host a safe
and successful 2002 Winter Olympic Games. In that regard,
let me assure you that we have been working diligently and
continuously with our colleagues and counterparts at the federal,
state and local levels. I am particularly pleased to be here
today with representatives of two of our key federal partners,
the Federal Emergency Management Agency and the United States
Secret Service, as well as, of course, Deputy Attorney General
Thompson and United States Attorney Warner.
Since
the International Olympic Committee (IOC) selected Salt Lake
City to stage the 2002 Winter Olympic Games on June 19, 1995,
the FBI has undertaken significant counterterrorism planning
in an effort to help ensure the safety and security of this
major international sporting event. Leading the FBI's planning
efforts in Salt Lake City is SAC Don Johnson, an active member
of the Utah Olympic Public Safety Command (UOPSC). He is assisted
in this effort by the FBI's Olympic Planning Squad which addresses
all matters relating to FBI involvement, interagency cooperation,
and support to the Games. The members of this squad are assigned
full time to Olympic planning and are directly responsible
for coordinating programs in the areas of: theater wide tactical
planning, public safety training, communications systems,
infrastructure protection, intelligence, weapons of mass destruction,
explosive ordinance disposal, aviation support, media affairs,
and accreditation, as well as numerous other Olympic planning
functions.
With
attendance anticipated to be in the millions, the participation
of some 3,500 athletes from over 80 nations, and daily support
provided by over 20,000 organizers and planners, the 2002
Olympic Winter Games easily qualifies as a world class sporting
event. Coverage by over 9,000 media representatives broadcasting
to a television audience in excess of 3.5 billion viewers
will catapult these Games onto the world stage. Planning for
the public safety and security of the Games has required an
unprecedented level of cooperation and coordination among
the myriad of local, state and federal law enforcement entities
with responsibilities associated with the Games. There exists
an unquestioned consensus among these agencies that it is
impossible for any single law enforcement agency to possess
all the resources required and expertise necessary to accomplish
this task alone.
Planning
for the public safety and security essential for hosting a
safe and successful Games has long been recognized as every
agency's primary objective. However, in the process of planning
for the realization of this goal I believe that each of the
law enforcement agencies involved has already accomplished
something of equal importance. I am speaking of the partnerships
that have been created at all levels of law enforcement which
have been required to advance the Olympic public safety and
security planning process. These partnerships will exist as
a legacy long after the 17 days of the XIX Olympiad have past.
I would like to briefly illustrate for you today how these
partnerships have been built and how they have served to create
a truly integrated Olympic Public Safety and Security Plan.
The
Olympic Counterterrorism Center:
From
the outset each agency recognized, due to the unique jurisdictional,
legislative and budgetary issues as well as widely different
agency capabilities, that Olympic public safety and security
planning would require an immense amount of interagency communication
and cooperation. In 1998, in the spirit of interagency cooperation,
the FBI entered into a multi-year lease for office space to
house the Olympic Coordination Center, Olympic Counterterrorism
Center, the FBI Critical Incident Command Post, and the Joint
Operations Center. This facility houses representatives of
state, local, and federal agencies in a coordinated effort
to address Olympic planning, preparation, and execution. To
further this communication, the FBI has requested Top Secret
security clearances for fifty local, state and federal partners
to alleviate in advance any impediment to the open and complete
sharing of information which may impact Olympic public safety.
The
Olympic Joint Terrorism Task Force:
Another
planning and operational requirement identified early on in
the process was the need to combine and coordinate law enforcement
capabilities from agencies at all levels to be able to rapidly
assess threats and investigate significant incidents during
the games. In May 2000, the FBI established the Olympic Joint
Terrorism Task Force (OJTTF). The OJTTF is currently comprised
of over 40 full and part-time local, state, and federal law
enforcement officers and agents representing dozens of agencies
and jurisdictions. Task forces, by design, are excellent vehicles
for bringing to bear the specialized resources of each member's
parent agency. The OJTTF is capable of collecting and analyzing
intelligence, and investigating matters in virtually any jurisdiction
at any level. This ability has been proven to enhance law
enforcement efforts across the country and will serve to greatly
enhance Olympic public safety and security operations. Again,
the FBI has requested Top Secret clearances for all members
of the OJTTF to better facilitate this joint working environment.
Command
Post and Field Training Exercises:
Other
than the military, perhaps no other public entity understands
as well as law enforcement the profound impact and absolute
necessity of quality training. Moving from the conceptual
stages of Olympic public safety and security planning to operational
readiness demands that all plans be tested in concert in an
effort to identify areas that may need to be revised or enhanced.
In November 2000, the FBI in close coordination with UOPSC
invited all Olympic public safety planners to participate
in a Command Post Exercise (CPX) designed primarily to test
interagency communications and information flow in a limited
nonoperational setting. This exercise was prefaced by initial
training by all agencies on advanced information systems that
will be utilized during the games.
In April
2001, after analyzing lessons learned in November and improving
the plan, a full scale Field Training Exercise (FTX) was again
jointly hosted by the FBI and all members of UOPSC. This exercise,
involving more than 1,600 persons over a three-day period,
tested all aspects of the Olympic public safety and security
plan. Unlike the CPX, the FTX not only tested concepts and
theoretical procedures, it fully exercised actual physical
responses to threats and staged incidents as may occur during
the games. This afforded all participating agency personnel
the opportunity to fulfill their role in the overall plan
simultaneously. Tactical teams exercised strategic assaults
while investigators gathered evidence and processed crime
scenes. Crisis management specialists coordinated with consequence
management officials to first control, then manage, then mitigate
the effects of a major hazardous materials incident. Federal
venue security designers and local venue commanders worked
together to manage a wide variety of incidents occurring at
actual Olympic venues. And, as in November, the FTX afforded
personnel from all agencies the opportunity to further refine
their skills on Olympic information systems which provide
the backbone for interagency communication during the Games.
Continuing to provide quality training, the Salt Lake City
Division will be hosting a weapons of mass destruction conference
in Salt Lake City in June and is contemplating hosting another
command post exercise in the fall of this year.
Closing:
In closing,
I would like to express my sincere appreciation for the support
afforded by this committee to the FBI and all law enforcement
agencies engaged in the partnership that is Olympic public
safety and security planning. I would also like to express
my appreciation and admiration of the professionalism which
law enforcement and public safety personnel at all levels
have demonstrated throughout this process. With 253 days remaining
before the Olympic flame enters the stadium, I believe we
are already realizing one of the greatest benefits of the
Games: the ability to bring people together; in this case
the ability for law enforcement agencies in Utah and across
the nation to exponentially magnify their effectiveness by
working together. I am confident that all agencies join me
in hoping that our first great dividend of this ability will
be a safe and secure XIX Olympiad.
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